Book III

THOMAS BRADWARDINE, BOOK III.

Here ends this work, On the Cause of God against Pelagius, and on the Power of Causes, and on the power of God, the cause of causes;1 written out in London, in the one thousand three hundred and forty-fourth year of our Lord Jesus Christ.2

THE CHAPTERS OF THE THIRD BOOK.

CH. I. That God can in a certain way necessitate every created will to its free act, and to free cessation and abstention from act. It has a Corollary: that a certain kind of necessity and freedom and merit, and chance and fortune, do not conflict with one another; and also on the general concord of fate, foreknowledge, predestination and grace with Free Choice and merit.

CH. II. That God in a certain way necessitates any created will to any free act of its own, and to any free cessation and abstention from act, and this by a necessity that naturally precedes. It has a Corollary: that a certain antecedent necessity and freedom and merit do not conflict; that no inferior cause, but only a superior one, namely the will of God, is an antecedent necessity with respect to its effect; and that all things that are, come to be and come about, do so from some necessity that naturally precedes them. 3

CH. III. On the contingent to either alternative, according to diverse opinions, and that it exists. 4

CH. IV. What the contingent to either alternative is. It has a Corollary: what freedom of contradiction is, and what a free act by freedom of contradiction is. 5

CH. V. As if by corollary, he infers thirteen parts from the foregoing. The first is that propositions about the contingent are equally convertible through opposite qualities. II. That some good consequence is not necessary simply, nor as of now, but equally contingent. III. That some undetermined cause, that is, one not predetermined to acting, acts. IV. That every free act by freedom of contradiction, and only such an act, is equally contingent. V. That everything equally contingent, and only such, is an act free by freedom of contradiction. VI. That contingency to either alternative and necessity do not conflict. VII. That contingency is properly spoken of with respect to the present. VIII. That freedom is properly spoken of with respect to the present. IX. That no act of a creature is simply equally contingent, but only in an undetermined kind, for instance with respect to inferior causes. X. That no act of a creature is free simply by freedom of contradiction, but only in a certain respect, namely with respect to all secondary causes. XI. That only the act of the divine will directed outward is simply equally contingent. XII. That only the act of the divine will directed outward is free simply by freedom of contradiction. XIII. That the first and highest freedom of contradiction, and likewise contingency to either alternative, is in the divine will; and that these are the causes of similar freedom and contingency in all other things.

CH. VI. He objects and replies.

CH. VII. He raises the question whether anything is in the power of the created will; and he sets down one response and corrects it.

CH. VIII. He recites six other little responses and amends them.

CH. IX. He answers.

CH. X. He makes distinctions concerning necessity and freedom. It has a Corollary: that necessity and freedom and merit do not conflict with one another, or [in another sense] do conflict.

CH. XI. He objects and replies. It has a corollary: what freedom is in irrational creatures, and how it differs from and agrees with the freedom of rational ones.

CH. XII. He begins to dispute that most famous question, whether all things that will come about will come about of necessity, and he recites the opinion of the Mathematicians, or Stoics, which says that all things that will come about will come about of necessity simply absolute.

CH. XIII. He treats the opinion of Cicero, which says that God does not know future things.

CH. XIV. He treats the opinion which says that many things are future in their own nature but not with God.

CH. XV. He recites the fourth opinion, of the Sophists, who say that nothing is future.

CH. XVI. He refutes the fifth opinion, of the Megarians, who deny all potency toward future things.

CH. XVII. He corrects the sixth opinion, of certain people who think that something is future to either alternative, or not future, in the composite sense and not in the divided.

CH. XVIII. He rectifies the seventh opinion, which says that something can begin to be future.

CH. XIX. He chastises the eighth and ninth opinions, which believe that nothing of the lower world is contained under divine providence, and that nothing voluntary or free is disposed by God's providence.

CH. XX. He corrects the tenth opinion, that God has no volition with respect to any effect of the lower world, and the eleventh, that he does not will any voluntary or free effect.

CH. XXI. He refutes the twelfth opinion, which thinks that nothing lower is made by God, and the thirteenth, which supposes that nothing voluntary or free is made immediately and properly by him.

CH. XXII. He chastises the fourteenth opinion, that God does not will anything freely future absolutely, but only conditionally; and the fifteenth, that no evils, but only goods, are absolutely provided, willed or done by God.

CH. XXIII. He argues against the sixteenth opinion, which holds that God does not will a free act of the creature by an antecedent will, but only by a consequent one, and that God co-effects with the creature every free act of the creature, but posteriorly in natural order; and against the seventeenth, which judges that although God in fact always acts, and pre-acts, any act of a creature whatever, it is nevertheless absolutely possible for some creature to act through itself alone.

CH. XXIV. He treats the eighteenth opinion, which says that God's willing and pre-willing is in man's power; and the nineteenth, that it is in man's power to do something from which it follows that God does not will, and never willed, nor [that there] will be, what he nevertheless now wills and has always willed to be 6; and the twentieth, that at the very moment at which the divine will precedes a free act of the human will, at that very moment the human will can [turn] to the opposite of such an act; and the twenty-first, that when God wills to produce a man, a, [and] an act, e, future at b of measure, the man can first so dispose himself that God then does not will this, and therefore that he then does not have that act 7; and the twenty-second, that the divine will is not always necessary in acting, but is in some way defectible and frustrable; and the twenty-third, that the divine will is not the efficient cause of some things, but only consents to the divine intellect dictating, and some other executive and posterior power, in God or in secondary causes, effects the things effected; and the twenty-fourth, that although the divine will co-acts and pre-acts every act of the created will, it does so by influencing so feebly that it by no means necessitates it to act.

CH. XXV. He touches on the twenty-fifth opinion, which feigns that God does not provide, predestine, will, or make the degrees of free acts, of meritorious acts, or even of rewards; and the twenty-sixth, that no act is anything 8; and the twenty-seventh, that no not-acting, ceasing, or resting is from God; and the twenty-eighth, that future things foreknown are the cause of God's foreknowledge; and the twenty-ninth, that future things foreknown are the cause sine qua non of the divine foreknowledge; and the thirtieth, that God knows and foreknows things according to their mode; and the thirty-first, of the Academics, that no one can probe or know this so recondite a miracle of nature, so hidden a secret of God; and the thirty-second, that in all future, present and past things, with respect to divine knowledge and will, there is always contingency to either alternative, and freedom, and no necessity at all.

CH. XXVI. He treats the thirty-third opinion, more famous than the others. It affirms that something always was future and still is future, yet it is in no way necessary that it ever was, or now is, future; and that something never was future, nor now is future, and it is possible, with a possibility opposed to all necessity, that it always was and now is future. About God's foreknowledge it speaks in an entirely corresponding way. Yet of everything past or present it says that it is necessary that it was, and that it is necessary that God always foreknew that it was going to be, or knows it to be now present, and that it is also necessary that God knows it to be past and to have been. He rebukes it for the insufficiency of its response, because it does not adequately clear away the difficulty.

CH. XXVII. He answers according to the opinion of the Philosophers and Theologians: that all future things will come about by a certain necessity with respect to superior causes, a necessity not contrary to freedom but consonant with it.

CH. XXVIII. He recites an erroneous gloss on the authorities.

CH. XXIX. He objects and replies.

CH. XXX. He argues against it concerning the falsity of its hypothesis, by a way taken from the necessity and freedom of the divine will, which always remains necessarily uniform and equal.

CH. XXXI. He recalls the same by way of the necessity and contingency of the divine intellect and knowledge.

CH. XXXII. He leads back the same by way of the immutability of the divine will.

CH. XXXIII. He presses the same by way of revelation in the Word, and sets down six responses of those who concede revelations in the Word, and argues gravely against them.

CH. XXXIV. He argues especially against the first.

CH. XXXV. Against the second.

CH. XXXVI. Against the third.

CH. XXXVII. Against the fourth.

CH. XXXVIII. Against the fifth.

CH. XXXIX. Against the sixth. 9

CH. XL. He rebukes those who deny revelation in the Word.

CH. XLI. He recites various modes, according to the various ways of seeing in the Word; he objects and resolves.

CH. XLII. He leads back still further the thirty-third opinion and its hypothesis by way of revelation in its own kind; and first concerning the Lord Jesus Christ, and he recites one response, which says that Christ could be deceived, and refutes it.

CH. XLIII. He treats another response. 10

CH. XLIV. He recites a third response.

CH. XLV. He sifts a fourth response.

CH. XLVI. Against the same opinion and hypothesis by way of revelation in ‖1 its own kind 11, concerning mere creatures, namely Angels.

CH. XLVII. Against the same opinion and hypothesis by the same way, concerning mere men.

CH. XLVIII. He recites four Responses and corrects them.

CH. XLIX. He recites a twofold opinion, which says that in future things that have been revealed there is an ordained or absolute necessity, but in others none.

CH. L. He answers according to the opinion of the Philosophers and Theologians: that God wills and knows of necessity whatever he wills and knows, by a consequent necessity of immutability, immobility, stability, and an ordained necessity, not a preceding one; and simply absolute, not natural, violent, or unwilling; not contrary but consonant to the highest and greatest freedom. It has a Corollary: that every present act of divine volition and cognition has necessarily, by the aforesaid consequent necessity, always been, and likewise will always be; wherefore also that all things that presently are, are made, or come about, are, are made, and come about in the present by a like necessity; and that all things that will come about will come about in the future by a like necessity; indeed also that all things that are now made are now made by some preceding necessity; and that all things that come about from some preceding necessity will come about in the future.

CH. LI. On eternity. It has a Corollary: that there is one single and identical instant, utterly unchanging, in the whole of eternity; that the whole of eternity is neither more manifold nor greater than its instant, nor is the instant of eternity simpler or smaller than eternity itself; wherefore also that eternity and its instant are really the same. Further, that none of this standing in the way, eternity is said to be whole, great, long, even infinite, and to have been, to be, and to be going to be; and, moreover, that something was, is, and will be in it. Wherefore also that of God and his intrinsic act "was, is, and will be" is said by transference, whereas of his extrinsic actions "did, does, and will do" is said properly and temporally.

CH. LII. By way of eternity he shows the position previously touched on in the fiftieth [chapter]. 12 It has a Corollary of thirty parts to be noted; he objects and resolves.

CH. LIII. Against hasty accusers, easy judges and precipitate condemners. He sets down thirty-six chapters which seem erroneous to him 13, humbly imploring the authority of the Church to determine the truth.