Book III, Chapter 9
CHAPTER IX. He replies.
So that the perplexity of this question may be unraveled more fully and more briefly, it must be known that "power" for our purpose can be taken in two ways 1: as active power, that is, and as passive power, as the preceding chapter distinguished. What we can in no way do, but can only undergo, is not said to be in our power, as the preceding chapter showed. But according to the common manner of speaking of ordinary people and of the Authors, only that is said to be in our power which is in our active power, and not in just any active power, but only in that of contradiction, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9, 18 2, quoted more fully in the fourth corollary of this 3. So everything, and only that, is said to be in our power which is in our free power: free, I say, with a like freedom, namely that of contradiction, as the same corollary defined it. Wherefore, by the tenth part of the fifth of this, no act of ours is simply in our free active power, as the preceding chapter also proves sufficiently, but only in a certain respect 4, namely with respect to all second causes. Hence the unlearned and the learned alike, who for the most part consider natural and second causes, say that this or that is simply set in our power, and understand it with respect to these causes. So, in the common manner of speaking, "to be set in our power", although uttered simply, is nevertheless taken and signifies in the way stated, as was likewise said of the contingent in the fifth of this. This, however, namely to be in our power, can be defined more intelligibly according to the more usual manner of speaking, by saying that that is in our power which we do when we will and by no means do when we do not will. Hence also blessed Augustine, in On the Spirit and the Letter 26, after a long discussion, expressing its definition, or what the name means 5, C1 says: "We call that a power where the capacity to do lies at the disposal of the will. Hence each one is said to have in his power that which he does if he wills, and does not do if he does not will." And in On Free Choice 3, 3: "I cannot think anything else to be in our power than what we do when we will." And in City of God 5, 10, showing that many things are in our power, he says: "For we do many things which, if we did not will them, we certainly would not do, and to this first of all belongs willing itself: for if we will, it is; if we do not will, it is not; for we would not will if we did not will." Therefore nothing is in our power except in a certain respect only, namely as subactive, subexecutive 6, and necessarily subserving, by a necessity, that is, naturally preceding, with respect to the divine will. It is called in our power for this reason, that when we will, we do it voluntarily and not unwillingly. But simply and utterly absolutely, antecedently and sufficiently, that is, without need of anything that is not subject to our power or will, nothing at all is truly said to be in our power. In this way the reasons and authorities which seem contrary are brought into agreement with one another. Let no man, then, be indignant if he has nothing absolutely and simply in his own power, but is subject in all things to a higher power, as the Apostle says in Romans 13: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." For it should suffice each man to have in his own power, in a certain way, what he ought: namely, to be subject in all things to the higher, divine power, and set over what is lower; that is, to have a middle power between the extreme powers, like those angelic spirits who, placed in a certain middle order, are called Powers 7 and yet are subject to the divine power; like the highest Kings and Princes, who have power over subjects and are themselves subject to the King of Kings, namely him who has written on his robe and on his thigh, "King of Kings and Lord of lords," Apocalypse 19; and like other men in the middle, such as Dukes and Counts, Barons and Satraps, and the other officials who in certain cities are commonly called Powers 8, who so exercise power over subjects that they themselves nevertheless are subject to higher powers. The Centurion rightly understood this when he said, "I am a man placed under authority, having soldiers under me," Matthew 8, as 28 of the second also recalls. E1 Hence Augustine, too, in On Rebuke and Grace 69, says: "To will or not to will is in the power of the one who wills or does not will, so that it fulfills the divine will and does not overcome its power 9." And in Retractations 1, 22, he says: "Unless someone, I say, has changed his will, he cannot do good": which he teaches to be placed in our power where he says, "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad," which is not against the grace of God that we preach. For it is in a man's power to change his will for the better; but that power is nothing unless it is given by God, of whom it is said, "He gave them power to become children of God." For since this is in our power, that 10
675A CAP. IX. Respondet.
675A IGitur vt huius quaestionis perplexitas absolutius et breuius enodetur, sciendum quod potestas ad propositum dupliciter potest sumi; pro potestate actiua scilicet et passitia, sicut capitulum proximum distinguebat: illud autem quod nullo modo possumus agere, sed tantum pati, non dicitur esse in potestate nostra, sicut cap. proximum ostendebat, sed ad communem modum loquendi vulgarium, et Autorum, solum
675B illud dicitur esse in potestate nostra, quod est in potestate nostra actiua, et hoc non quacunque, sed tantummodo contradictionis, sicut loquitur Philosophus 9. Metaphys. 18. in corollario 4. huius plenius recitatus; quare omne illud et solum illud dicitur esse in potestate nostra, quod est in nostra libera potestate, libera inquam, consimili libertate, scilicet contradictionis, vt idem corollarium definiuit. Quamobrem per partem 10. quinti huius, nullus actus noster est simpliciter in nostra libera potestate actiua, sicut et capitulum proximum satis probat, sed secundum quid tantum, scilicet respectu causarum omnium secundarum: Quare tam vulgares quam docti, qui vt plutimum causas naturales et secundas considerant, dicunt simpliciter in potestate nostra constitui hoc vel illud, et intelligunt respectu harum causarum; quare ad communem modum loquendi, in potestate nostra constitui, licet proferatur simpliciter, accipitur tamen et significat dicto modo, sicut et dictum est de contingenti aequaliter quinto huius. Quod tamen, scilicet esse in
675C potestate nostra, secundum vsitatiorem modum loquendi potest intelligibilius definiri, dicendo quod illud est in potestate nostra, quod, cum volumus, facimus, et cum nolumus nequaquam. Vnde et B. Augustinus de Sp. et lit. 26. magna disputatione praemissa, C1 eius definitionem siue quid nominis exprimendo, sic ait; Hanc dicimus potestatem, vbi voluntati adiacet facultas faciendi: vnde hoc quisque in potestate habere dicitur, quod si vult, facit; si non vult, non facit: et 3. de libero arbitrio 3. Non possum aliud sentire esse in potestate nostra, nisi quod cum volumus, facimus: et 5. de ciuit. Dei 10. ostendens multa esse in potestate nostra, sic ait; Multa enim facimus, quae si nollemus, non vti que faceremus, quo primitus pertinet ipsum velle: nam si volumus est, si nolumus non est; non enim vellemus si nollemus. Nihil ergo est in potestate nostra nisi secundum quid tantummodo, scilicet subactiua, subexecutiua, et subseruiente necessario, necessitate scilicet naturaliter praecedente respectu voluntatis diuinae; quod ideo in nostra dicitur potestate, quia cum volumus, illud facimus voluntarij, non
675D inuiti. Simpliciter autem et penitus absolute, antecedenter et sufficienter, sine indigentia scilicet alicuius, quod nostrae potestati seu voluntati non subiacet, nihil omnino in nostra vere dicitur potestate; sic que rationes et autoritates quae videntur contrariae, inuicem concordantur. Nullus ergo hominū indignetur, etsi nihil habeat absolute simpliciter in propria potestate, sed potestati sublimiori in omnibus sit subiectus, dicente Apost. ad Rom. 13. Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Sufficiat enim cuilibet homini habere quae debet in sua quodammodo potestate; vt scilicet superiori potestati diuinae in omnibus sit subiectus, et inferiori praefectus; vt scilicet habeat potestatē mediā inter potestates extremas, sicut illi Angelici spiritus, qui in quodam ordine medio constituti, Potestates dicuntur, quitamen potestati diuinae subduntur; sicut et summi Reges et Principes, qui potestatem habent in subditos, et ipsi sunt subditi Regi Regum, illi scilicet, qui in vestimento et femore suo habet scriptum, Rex Regū, et Dominus dominantiū, Apoc. 19. Ac sicut alij homines medij, puta Duces, et Comites,
675E Barones et Satrapae, ac praepositi caeteri qui in quibusdā ciuitatibus Potestates vulgariter nuncupantur, qui sic potestatē exercent in subdiros, vt ipsimet tamen potestatibus sublimioribus sint subiecti, quod ille Centurio recte sensit, cum dixit, Ego homo sum sub potestate constitutus, habens sub me milites, Mat. 8. sicut et 28. 2i. commemorat. E1 Vnde et Augustinus de correptione et gratia 69. dicit sic, Velle seu nolle in volentis aut nolentis est potestate, vt diuinam voluntatem impleat, nec superet potestatem. Et 1. Retract. 22. sic ait, Nisi quisquam, inquam, voluntatem mutauerit, bonum operari non potest; quod in nostra potestate positum esse docet, vbi ait, Aut facite arborem bonam, et fructum eius bonū, aut facite arbore malam, et fructum eius malum, quod non est contra gratiam Dei quam praedicamus: in potestate est quippe hominis mutare in melius voluntatem; sed ea potestas nulla est nisi a Deo detur, de quo dictum est, Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Cum enim hoc sit in potestate, quod
when we will, we do, and nothing is so much in our power as the will itself, yet the will is prepared by the Lord, and in that way, therefore, he gives the power. And above, in 10: "As for what I said, that all men can fulfill the commandments of God if they will, let the new heretics, the Pelagians, not suppose it was said in their sense: for it is altogether true that all men can do this if they will, but the will is prepared by the Lord, and is so far increased by the gift of charity that they do will." And according to this explanation the authorities of Augustine and others should be understood which say absolutely that something is set in our power. The other authorities, of other writers, which say likewise absolutely that nothing is set in our power, will be explained according to the distinction laid down above. Of this kind are: A1 "A man's way is not his own, nor is it for a man to walk," Jeremiah 10. "Your counsel is not in a man's power," Tobit 3. "Nor can you do even what is least," Luke 12. "It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy," Romans 9. And the saying of the Catholic Doctor and most blessed Martyr Cyprian, in his thirteenth letter, headed To Quirinus, on the Discipline of the Christian Religion, chapter 4 11: "We must glory in nothing, since nothing is our own." This is, as it were, the title and the content of that whole chapter, and he proves it there in many ways. Blessed Augustine devoutly embraces this authority and cites it in On Rebuke and Grace 19, in On the Predestination of the Saints 3, and in many other places; the preceding chapter recited very many others of this kind. From these things it is made clear how a man is and is not lord of his act, and how, consequently, he is and is not of free choice, since the one corresponds to the premises. For as a man's act is and is not set in his power, so he is and is not lord of it, and so, consequently, he is and is not of free choice, as is plain to anyone from the meanings of the terms. For no one, I hope, will presume to claim for himself so proud a lordship as not to acknowledge that higher Lord who has written on his robe and on his thigh, "King of Kings and Lord of lords," Apocalypse 19, but let him say, "We wish this man to reign over us" 12. Whoever presumes this will be subjected to the divine dominion by 30 of the second.
676A cum volumus facimus, nihil tam in potestate quam ipsa voluntas: sed praeparatur voluntas a Domino, eo modo ergo dat potestatem. Et supra 10. Quod vero dixi, Dei praecepta implere omnes homines possint si velint, non existiment noui haeretici Pelagiani secundum eos esse dictum: verum est enim omnino, omnes homines hoc posse si velint, sed praeparatur voluntas a Domino, et tantum augetur munere charitatis vt velint. Et secundum hanc expositionem debent autoritates Augustini et aliorum intelligi, quae dicunt absolute aliquid in nostra constitui potestate; autoritates vero aliae aliorum dicentes similiter absolute nihil in nostra constitui potestate secundum distinctionem praemissam superius exponentur; cuiusmodi sunt, A1 Non est hominis via eius, nec viri vt ambuler, Ierem. 10. Non est in hominis potestate consilium tuum, Tobiae 3. nec quod minimum est potestis, Luc. 12. Non volentis nec currentis, sed miserentis est Del, ad Rom. 9. Illud quoque Doctoris Catholici et beatissimi Martyris Cypriani epistola sua 13. praetitulata ad Quirinum de disciplina religionis Christianae
676B cap. 4. In nullo nobis gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit, quod est quasi titulus et continentia illius totius capituli, quod et multipliciter ibi probat. Quam autoritatem beatus Augustinus deuote amplectitur, et allegat de correptione et gratia 19. de praedestinatione sanctorum 3. et alijs locis multis, cuiusmodi plurimas alias capitulum proximum recitauit. Ex his autem redditur manifestum qualiter homo est et non est Dominus sui actus, et qualiter est et non est liberi arbitrij consequenter, quoniam correspondenter praemissis. Nam sicut actus hominis constituitur et non constituitur in eius potestate, sic est et non est Dominus illius, et sic est et non est liberi arbitrij consequenter, quod patet cuilibet ex significationibus terminotum. Nulius enim, vt spero, tam superbum dominium sibi vendicare praesumet, vt illum superiorem Dominum non agnoscat, qui in vestimento et in femore suo habet scriptum, Rex Regum, et Dominus dominantium, Apoc. 19. sed dicat, Volumus hunc regnare super nos: quod quicunque praesumserit, per 30. secundi diuino dominio subigetur.
No man, therefore, ‖C1 is lord of his act wholly simply and utterly absolutely, supremely, antecedently and sufficiently, that is, without need of anything that is not subject to his power or dominion. He is lord only in a certain respect, namely with respect to all second causes, necessarily subserving the first cause, and that by a necessity naturally preceding, as the second of this shows. And so he is called lord of his act because when he wills, he acts, and when he does not will, he does not act, and this voluntarily, not unwillingly or under compulsion. Nor let him take this ill: for it should suffice him to be a middle lord, like those holy angelic spirits placed in a certain middle order who are called Dominations; like our highest Kings and Princes, who are lords in such a way that they nevertheless serve the Lord of lords; and like Dukes and Counts, who are lords of their subjects in such a way that they nevertheless serve and are subject to higher lords, as 28 of the second also confirms. C2 Hence Boethius on Peri hermeneias 1, at the end: "Our will is in a certain way the mistress of our acts and of the whole plan of life": "in a certain way," he says, "not utterly absolutely."
676C Nullus ergo ‖C1 hominum est Dominus sui actus omnino simpliciter et penitus absolute, summe, antecedenter, et sufficienter sine indigentia scilicet alicuius, quod suae potestati siue dominio non sit subiectum, sed tantum secundum quid, scilicet respectu causarum omnium secundarum subseruiens necessario causae primae, et hoc necessitate naturaliter praecedente, sicut secundum huius ostendit; sicque dicitur Dominus sui actus, quia cum vult, agit, et cum non vult, non agit, et hoc voluntarie, non inuite nec coacte. Nec hoc ferat indigne: sufficiat enim sibi vt sit Dominus medius, sicut et illi sancti Angelici spiritus in quodam medio ordine constituti qui dominationes dicuntur, sicut summi Reges nostri et Principes, qui ita sunt Domini, vt tamen seruiant Domino Dominorum; sicut et Duces ac Comites, qui ita sunt Domini subditorum, vt tamen superioribus Dominis seruiant et subdantur, sicut et 28. secundi confirmat. C2 Vnde Boetius super 1. peri hermenias vlt. Nostra voluntas domina quodammodo est nostrorum actuum, et totius vitae rationis: quodammodo, inquit, non penitus absolute.
And Augustine, in the 144th of Prosper's Sentences D1, says: "The rational soul is mistress of its body, but it will not rule well what is beneath it unless it has served what is above it, God, with the whole subjection of charity." The same, On True Religion 25: "God judged such servants of his to be better if they served him freely." Let us therefore say devoutly with the whole Church of God: "Lord, in your will all things are placed, and there is no one who can resist your will: for you have made heaven and earth and all things that are contained within the circuit of heaven; you are Lord of all." He is therefore Lord of every human act, and not in equal rank with man himself, as the laws forbid and reason prohibits, as appears by the demonstration of the second corollary of the first and by 20 of the second. Nor is man the higher Lord, by 30 of the second, but God. Nor, I beg you, should anyone claim so great a freedom for himself as to flee even the service of God, saying with the impious, "Who is the Almighty, that we should serve him?" Job 21. For the Prophet says: "By your ordinance the day continues, for all things serve you," Psalm 118 and Psalm 61 13: "Shall not my soul be subject to God?" And further on, "Yet let my soul be subject ‖E1 to God" 14. E2 And the Apostle, Romans 3: "Let every mouth be stopped, and let the whole world become subject to God." Hence also Isaiah 45: "I have sworn by myself, says the Lord, the word of justice shall go out of my mouth and shall not return, for *E3 every knee shall bend to me." Hence also Ecclesiasticus 42 it is written: "In every necessity all things obey him." Let such men beware lest, while they wish to be free of righteousness, they become slaves of sin. Blessed Augustine also says, On the Spirit and the Letter 25: "Why do wretched men dare to be proud of free choice before they are set free, or of their own strength if they are already set free, and do not notice that in the very name of free choice the sound of freedom is surely heard? But where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. If, then, they are slaves of sin, why do they boast of free choice? For by whom a man is overcome, to him he is also bound as a slave." 15
676D Et Augustinus 144. D1 sententiarum Prosperi, Rationalis, inquit, anima est domina corporis sui, quae inferiori non bene imperabit, nisi superiori se Deo tota charitatis subiectione scruierit. Idem de vera religione 25. Tales seruos suos meliores esse Deus iudicauit, si ei seruirent liberaliter. Dicamus igitur deuote cum Ecclesia tota Dei, Domine, in voluntate tua cuncta sunt posita, et non est qui possit resistere voluntati tuae: tu enim fecisti coelum et terram, et vniuersa quae coeli ambitu continentur, Dominus vniuersorum tu es, ergo ipse est Dominus cuiuslibet actus humani, et non in aequali ordine cum ipso homine, vt iura vetant, et ratio prohibet, sicut per ostensionem corollarij secundi primi, et per 20. secundi apparet; nec homo est superior Dominus per 30. secundi, sed Deus: nec quisquam, quaeso, tantam sibi vendicet libertatem, vt etiam Dei refugiat seruitutem, dicendo cum impijs, Quis est omnipotens vt seruiamus ei? Iob 21. Dicit enim Propheta, Ordinatione tua perseuerat dies, quoniam omnia seruiunt tibi, Psalm. 118. et Psalm. 61. Nonne Deo subiecta erit anima mea? Et infra,
676E Veruntamen Deo subiecta ‖E1 esto anima mea. E2 Et Apostolusad Rom. 3. Omne os obstruatur, et subditus fiat omnis mundus Deo. Vnde et Esaiae 45. In memetipso iuraui, dicit Dominus, egredietur de ore meo iustitiae verbum, et non reuertetur, quia *E3 mihi cutuabitur omne genu: quare et Ecclesiastici 42. sic scribitur; In omni necessitate omnia obaudiunt ei. Caueant sibi tales, ne dum liberi iustitiae volunt esse, fiant serui peccati. Dicit quo que beatus Augustinus de spiritu et litera 25. Vt quid miseri homines de libero arbitrio audent superbire antequam liberentur, aut de suis viribus si iam liberati sunt, nec attendunt in ipso nomine liberi arbitrij vtique libertatem sonare? Vbi autem spiritus Domini ibi libertas. Si ergo serui sunt peccati, quid se iactant de libero arbitrio? A quo enim quis deuictus, huic et seruus est addictus. Si
"But if they have been set free, why do they boast as though of their own work, and glory as though they had not received? Or are they so free that they do not even want to have as Lord him who says to them, 'Without me you can do nothing'?" The same, On the Freedom of Choice, to Hilary 3: "Let the Pelagians cease to rave so, and let them understand that they have free choice only so far as to keep them from rejecting help with a proud will and to lead them to call upon the Lord with a pious will. For this free will will be so much the freer, the more subject it is to the grace of divine mercy; for it prays faithfully and says, 'Direct my ways according to your word, and let no iniquity have dominion over me.'" Likewise Prosper, Against Cassian 8, A1 says: "The grace of God is no danger to free choice, nor is the will taken away when the willing of good is generated in it. For if it is not to be thought free for this reason, that it is formed, ruled, ordered and imbued, then the sons of God, who are led by the Spirit of God, are robbed of freedom." And further on, 24: "The foolish complaint of the proud does not trouble us, by which they plead that free choice is taken away if beginnings, and progress 16, and perseverance in good works up to the end are said to be gifts of God. For the helps of divine grace are the stabilizing supports of the human will: we pray willingly, and yet he has sent the Spirit into our hearts crying 'Abba, Father'; we speak willingly, and yet, if what we speak is holy, we are not the speakers, but the Spirit of our Father who speaks in us; we work out our salvation willingly, and yet it is God who works in us this very willing and working." And at the end, B1 where 13 heresies of Pelagius are summarily recited, and as many catholic rulings against them, this stands eleventh: "That there is no free choice if it needs God's help, since each one has it in his own will to do something or not to do it": and the eleventh ruling against that heresy confesses that there is free choice, even though it needs divine help. And the same, in his Sentences, proposition 124, says: "Free always is the service before God, which necessity does not serve, but charity." No one at all, therefore, is of free choice simply, of choice simply free, that is, wholly immune from all servitude to a superior and utterly alien to all naturally preceding necessity, as the tenth part of the fifth of this shows. He is so only in a certain respect, namely with respect to all second causes, as the same tenth part and the third of the second taught, while nevertheless necessarily subserving the first cause, necessarily, I mean, by a naturally preceding necessity, as the second of this shows. And so a man is called free to do something because, when he wills, he does it, and when he does not will, he does not, voluntarily, not compelled or unwilling. C1 Hence the Philosopher, Politics 6, 117: "To live as one wills, they say, is the work of freedom; for it is the mark of a slave not to live as he wills." In agreement with him is Augustine, Against Pelagius and Coelestius 1, 12. C2 He says: "It is prayed in the Psalm: 'You are sweet, Lord, and in your sweetness teach me your justice'; that is, let me not be forced like a slave, by dread of punishment, to be under the law, but let me delight, by free charity, to be with the law. And he fulfills the commandment freely who does it gladly." And this seems to be the same as what is said in the Sentences of Prosper, in the proposition cited above: "Free always is the service before God, which necessity does not serve, but charity": not necessity, he says, that is, compelling violently, but charity, that is, the love of a spontaneous will, as the first corollary of this also shows. Let no one kick against it by murmuring; for such freedom should suffice every man as his Lord Christ had, has, and always will have, who is subject to the Father in all things, and by a naturally preceding necessity, as 30 of the second and the second of this show. For the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15: D1 "But when all things have been made subject to him, that is, to Christ the Son of God, then the Son himself will be subject to the Father, who subjected all things to him." He is also called the servant of the Father; hence Isaiah 42: "Behold my servant, I will uphold him, my chosen one: my soul is therefore well pleased in him; I have given my spirit upon him, he shall bring forth judgment to the nations." And further on, 53: "The Lord was pleased to crush him in infirmity, and the will of the Lord shall be directed in his hand. By his knowledge shall my just servant himself justify many, and he shall bear their iniquities." Let such freedom suffice for man as there is in the holy Angels and in confirmed men, who are so subject to the divine will that they cannot sin or will to sin, but necessarily imitate it in all things, as all the ‖D2 authorities agree in professing. Hence also Lombard, Sentences 4, dist. 45, says: "They are so bound to the heavenly D3 will that they can will nothing beyond his will." Let it suffice man to be free, like Kings and Princes, who are so free that they nevertheless serve divine providence even in all their deeds, as 27 of the first and the following taught. Let it suffice man ‖E1 to be free with respect to everything short of God, and only the servant of God: a servant, I say, spontaneous, not compelled; to serve him is, as the Church sings, to reign 18, since very many men are called, and truly are, free who serve and are subject not merely to one but to many higher lords. Hence Augustine, On Free Choice 2, 22: "This is our freedom, when we are subject to the truth, that is, to the true God."
677A si autem liberati sunt, quid se iactant velut de opere proprio, et gloriātur quasi non acceperint? An ita sunt liberi, vt nec illum velint habere Dominum, qui cis dicit, Sine me nihil potestis facere• Idem de libertate arbitrij ad Hilar. 3. Desinant, inquit, Pelagiani sic insanire, et ad hoc se intelligant habere quantū possunt liberum arbitrium, vt non superba voluntate respuant adiutoriū, sed vt pia voluntate inuocent Dominum. Haec enim voluntas libera tanto erit liberior, quanto diuinae misericordiae gratiae que subiectior; Ipsa quippe fideliter orat et dicit, Itinera mea dirige secundum verbū tuum; et ne dominetur mei omnis iniquitas. Itē Prosp. cont. Cas•ian. 8. A1 sic ait; Non est periculum liberi arbitrij gratia Dei, nec voluntas aufertur, cum in ipsa bene velle generatur. Nam si ideo non putanda est libera, quia formatur, regitur, ordinatur, imbuitur, spoliantur libertate silij Dei qui aguntur spiritu Dei. Et infra 24. Non conturbat, inquit, nos superbientium inepta querimonia, qua lib. arb. causantur auferri, si et principia, et protectus, et perseuerantia in bonis vs que in finem Dei dona esse dicantur, quoniā opitulationes diuinae gratiae
677B stabilimenta sunt voluntatis humanae, volentes oramus, et tamen misit spiritum in corda nostra clamantem Abba Pater; volentes loquimur, et tamen si pium est quod loquimur, non sumus nos loquentes, sed spiritus Patris nostri qui loquitur in nobis; volentes operamur salutem nostram, et tamen idipsum velle ac operati Deus est qui operatur in nobis. Et in fine, B1 vbi 13. haereses Pelag. summarie recitantur, et totidem sanctiones carholicae contra eas, haec locatur 11a. Non esse lib. arb. si Dei indigeret auxilio, quoniam in propria voluntare habet vnusquis que facere aliquid aut non facere: et haec 11a. sanctio contra illam fatetur esse liberum arbitrium, etsi diuino indiget adiutorio. Idem que in senten. suis, proposit. 124. dicit, Libera semper est seruitus apud Deū, cui non necessitas seruit, sed charitas. Nullus igitur omnium est arbitrij liberi simpliciter, arbitrij simpliciter liberi, ab omni scilicet superioris seruitute immunis omnino et ab ommnecessitate naturaliter praecedente penitus altenus, sicut 10a pars quinti huius ostendit, sed secundū quid tantūscilicet respectu causarū omniū secundarū, sicut cadē pars 10a
677C et 3a secundi docebant, subseruiens tamen necessario causae primae, necessario inquānecessitate naturaliter praecedente, sicut secundum huius ostendit: Sic que dicitur homo liber ad aliquid faciendū, quia cum vult, facit illud, et cum non vult, nō facit, volūtarie, non coactus aut inuitus. C1 Vnde Philos. 6. Polit. 1. Viuere, inquit, vt vult quis, hoc opus libertatis esse aiunt; siquidem seruientis, ipsum viuere non vt vult. Cui et concorditer Aug. 1. contra Pelag. et Coelestium 12o. C2 Oratur, inquit, in Psal. Suauis es Domine, et in tua suauitate doce me iustitiam tuam; id est, non formidine poenae seruiliter cogar esse sub lege, sed libera charitate delecter esse cum lege; praeceptum quoque liber facit, qui libens facit; et hoc idem videtur esse, quod dicitur in sentēt. Prosp. propositione praemissa; Libera semper est seruitus apud Deum, cui non necessitas seruit, sed charitas; Non necessitas, inquit, cogens scilicet violenter, sed charitas, scilicet amor spontancae voluntatis, sicut et corol. primi huius ostendit, Nec quisquam recalcitret murmurando; sufficere namque debet cuilibet homini talis libertas, qualem habuit, habet, ac semper
677D habebit Dominus suus Christus, qui Patri in omnibus est subiectus, ac necessitate naturaliter praecedenti, vt 30o. secundi, et secūdum huius ostendunt. Dicit enim Apost. 1. ad Cor. 15. D1 Cum autem subiecta fuerint illi, scilicet Christo filio Dei, omnia, tunc ipse filius subiectus erit Patri, qui sibi subiecit omnia. Qui et dicitur seruus Patris; Vnde Esa. 42. Ecce seruus meus, suscipiam eum, electus meus: Complacuit igitur in illo anima mea; Dedi spiritum meum super eum, iudicium gentibus proferre. Et infra 53. Dominus voluit conterere cum in infirmitate et voluntas Domini in manu eius dirigetur; In scientia sua iustificabit ipse iustus scruus meus multos, et iniquitates eorum ipse portabit. Sufficiat homini talis libertas, qualis est in sanctis Angelis, et in hominibus confirmatis, qui diuinae voluntati adeo sunt subiecti, vt peccare aut velle peccare non possint, sed ipsam in omnibus necessario imitantur, sicut omnes ‖D2 autoritates concorditer profitentur. Quare et Lumbard. 4. sent. dist. 45. Adeo, inquit, D3 volūtati addicti sunt supernae, vt nihil praeter voluntatem eius queant velle. Sufficiat homini quod sit liber, sicut Reges et
677E Principes, qui ita sunt liberi, vt tamen diuinae prouidentiae seruiāt etiam in omnibus factis suis, sicut 27um. primi et seq. docuerunt. Sufficiat homini ‖E1 quod sit liber respectu omnium citra Deum, et tantummodo seruus Dei, seruus, inquam, spontaneus, non coactus; cui sic seruire sicut canit Ecclesia, est regnare, cum plurimi homines dicātur, et vere sint liberi, qui nedum vni, sed multis superioribus Dominis seruiunt et subduntur. Vnde Aug. 2. de lib. arb. 22. Haec est libertas nostra, cum ipsi subdimur veritati, scilicet vero Deo.
Notes
- 1
Potestas does double duty throughout the chapter: "power" (ability to act) and "authority" or "jurisdiction" (the power over subjects of kings, dukes, and angels). English "power" keeps both senses, as in John 1:12, "power to become children of God." I translate it "power" everywhere, and in potestate nostra "in our power."
↩ - 2
Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ (Savile's "9"); "18" is the number of the Latin text-division Savile uses. The point is that rational powers are powers of both contraries, doing and not doing (Θ.2, 1046b). I keep Savile's numbers (Conventions §5.4).
↩ - 3
Throughout the chapter huius ("of this") and primi / secundi (without huius) are cross-references. They appear to mean parts or chapters "of this book" (Book 3) and of Books 1 and 2 respectively. I leave them exactly as written, with no expansion (Conventions §5.4).
↩ - 4
Secundum quid ("in a certain respect") is the counter-term to simpliciter ("simply," without qualification). The chapter's whole solution turns on it. I translate it consistently.
↩ - 5
Quid nominis: a nominal definition, saying what the word means rather than what the thing is.
↩ - 6
Subactiva, subexecutiva: Bradwardine's own formations ("subactive," "subexecutive"), meaning acting or executing under the first cause. The next word, subseruiente, is likewise "subserving."
↩ - 7
"Powers" (Potestates) is the name of one of the angelic orders.
↩ - 8
This seems to refer to the podestà, the chief magistrates of Italian city-communes.
↩ - 9
Augustine's text of De correptione et gratia, as usually cited, reads ut divinam voluntatem non impediat, "so that it does not hinder the divine will." Savile's print has impleat ("fulfills"), which I translate. The two readings give a different emphasis, but both construe.
↩ - 10
The sentence runs across the page turn (675E / 676A). Savile's section letters, and so the block division, cut it here.
↩ - 11
Cyprian, Testimonia ad Quirinum 3, 4 (Savile's "13" is his own numbering, which treats it as a letter). Bradwardine also uses its heading, "In nullo gloriandum," as a thesis.
↩ - 12
Luke 19:14 reads Nolumus hunc regnare super nos ("We do not wish this man to reign over us"), the refusal of the higher Lord. Savile's print reads Volumus ("We wish"), which I translate, with sed dicat as "but let him say." The following quod quicunque praesumserit is ambiguous. I take quod to refer to the proud lordship just described ("whoever presumes this"), since the one who says Volumus would not be "subjected" to the divine dominion by 30 of the second.
↩ - 13
Vulgate numbering: Ps 118 [119]:91; Ps 61 [62]:2 and 6 (the "further on" verse).
↩ - 14
The print has esto ("let it be subject"), with the variant erit ("will be") in the margin. I translate the main reading. In the keyed text the margins at this place are scrambled: the print has "Psalmus," "‖ erit," "Apostolus," "* tunc" as four separate margin entries. "Psalmus" stands beside the Ps 118/61 citation at the foot of 676D, where the keyed text has no marker. I have kept the markers as given and sorted the entries to the places they belong.
↩ - 15
The word Si closes the last line of 676, with the catchword autem, and is repeated as si autem at the head of 677 (unit 12). I translate it once, in unit 12.
↩ - 16
The print appears to read protectus (a misprint); the sense requires profectus, "progress," as Prosper has it. I translate the evident sense.
↩ - 17
Aristotle, Politics 6, 1 (Bekker VI.2, 1317b); Savile's numbering is kept.
↩ - 18
The Church's prayer cui servire regnare est ("to serve whom is to reign"), from the collect for peace.
↩
Errata: where the keyed text and the 1618 print differ (22)
| Savile | Keyed text (TCP) | 1618 print |
|---|---|---|
| 675A | passitia | passiua |
| 675B | plutimum | plurimum |
| 675B | recitatus | recitatus (same) |
| 675E | subdiros | subditos |
| 676A | Del | Dei |
| 676B | terminotum | terminorum |
| 676B | Nulius | Nullus |
| 676D | scruierit | seruierit |
| 676E | Apostolusad | Apostolus ad |
| 676E | cutuabitur | curuabitur |
| 676E | margins 676E·1 "erit Apostolus." and 676E·2 "Psalmus." | four separate margin entries: "Psalmus." (beside Ps 118/61 citation, 676D–E), "‖ erit" (variant), "Apostolus." (source), "* tunc" (variant) |
| 677A | cis | eis |
| 677A | facere• | facere? |
| 677A | Cas•ian. | Cassian. |
| 677B | voluntare | voluntate |
| 677B | carholicae | catholicae |
| 677B | altenus | alienus |
| 677B | ommnecessitate | omni necessitate |
| 677B | margin Prosfer. | Prosper. |
| 677C | spontancae | spontaneae |
| 677D | cum (Is 53) | eum |
| 677D | scruus | seruus |