Book III, Chapter 25

Chapter XXIV. 1 It touches the 25th opinion, which pretends that God does not foresee, predestine, will, or make the degrees 2 of free acts, of merits, or even of rewards; and the 26th, that no act is anything; and the 27th, that no non-acting, ceasing, or resting comes from God; and the 28th, that future things foreknown are the cause of God's foreknowledge; and the 29th, that future things foreknown are a cause without which there would be no divine foreknowledge; and the 30th, that God knows and foreknows things according to their mode; and the 31st, that of the Academics, that no one can search out or know this so recondite miracle of nature, this so hidden secret of God; and the thirty-second, that in all things future, present, and past, with respect to divine knowledge and will, there is always contingency to either side, and freedom, and no necessity at all.

Yet three further little opinions remain, to be briefly retraced. The first of them, the 25th, together with those set out above, affirms that God does not foresee, predestine, will, or make the degrees of free acts, nor of any merits, nor even of rewards. 3 The twenty-sixth holds that every free act, and universally any act whatever, is nothing. The twenty-seventh judges that no non-acting, ceasing, or resting is from God. But these three err in common in two ways: first, because they affirm what is false; second, because they do not avoid the difficulty. That all of them affirm a falsehood is sufficiently shown by 46 of the first, 18 of the second, with 32 of the same. Nor does the first avoid the difficulty.

For it says that God does not dispose concerning degrees at all, so as thereby to avoid a necessity in them which otherwise, as it believes, would have to be conceded. Yet it does not deny that all acts and all things, as to their essence, are contained under the divine disposition. Hence it cannot escape the conclusion that all acts and things that will come about will come about of necessity. Again, a degree is either something or nothing. If something, it is contained under the divine disposition; therefore all the degrees that will come about will come about of necessity, and all other things for the same reason, as was just argued; therefore, universally, all things. If nothing, it is neither contained nor distributed under the name of being; hence it does not falsify this universal, "All things that will come about will come about of necessity"; and the holder of the opinion has to concede this universal for all beings that are not, or will not be, degrees, hence also simply for all beings. Again, either beings vary numerically and essentially with the variation of degrees, or not. If so, then they are thus contained under the divine disposition and will come about necessarily, as was argued above. If not, then all things as to their essence are contained under the divine disposition, and a degree introduces nothing new, either essentially or numerically; therefore all things that will come about, as to their essences and number, will still come about of necessity; hence also, simply, all things that will come about will come about of necessity. Nor does the 26th

extricate itself from the difficulty of the problem. For it denies that an act is anything, so as not to be forced to concede that it is foreseen, willed, or made by God; thus it hopes to escape necessity in free acts, which otherwise, as it judges, it could not escape. Yet all beings, present and future, that are not and will not be acts, as the opinion hints and the opiner expressly concedes, are and will be foreseen, willed, and made by God. Hence, according to him, they will come about of necessity, and no act is anything. Hence it is not contained, nor distributed, under such names as "being" or "something," nor does it falsify this universal, "All things that will come about will come about of necessity." This universal is therefore simply true, since it holds for each of its singulars. Again, God wills every agent, or one about to act, to do whatever it does or will do, as 22 of the first, with its corollary and 30 of the same and the other chapters that follow, make clear; and above all meritorious works, as is evident from 42 and 45 of the first. For when these are done, they are pleasing and acceptable to God, and not newly but eternally, as 23 of the first shows. Hence by the reasoning of the position just touched on, it is necessary that everything about to act do whatever it will do, and above all virtuous

works. Again, no second cause can move or act without God properly moving along with it and likewise co-acting, as 4 and 22 of the first show, and this by willing, as 9 of the first shows. The difficulty therefore returns. That the 27th also in no way frees itself from the difficulty at hand can be plainly demonstrated, as against the preceding one. There remain, moreover, two further little opinions of the same sort. The first of them, the 28th, judges, with the earlier ones, that future things foreknown are the cause of God's foreknowledge. The second, the 29th, holds that future things foreknown are a cause without which there would be no divine foreknowledge. But both suppose what is false, and by this do not escape the difficulty. They suppose a falsehood, as 15 and 16 of the first book bear witness. Nor do they exclude the difficulty. For the divine will and its knowledge, with respect to present and past things, is necessary, just as it is also necessary that these things are and have been, and not by a new necessity arising from the presence or pastness of things, or from any other cause arising in time, by reason of the 6th part and 7th corollary of I.1 and chapter 23 of the first book. The will of God and its knowledge was therefore likewise necessary from eternity with respect to all future things; hence, also by 10 of the first book, all

future things were eternally going to come about in some way necessarily. There is also the 30th opinion, which affirms that God knows and foreknows things according to their mode: necessary things necessarily, and contingent things contingently. Nor does this opinion avoid the difficulty. For if God knows things according to their mode, either God takes the mode of knowing from the later things known, or rather the thing takes its mode of being from God knowing and from his knowledge, and from his own mode. The first cannot be said, by reason of the first supposition, the 3rd part and 5th corollary of I.1, and 15 and 16 of the first book. The contrary therefore seems the more likely: that every future thing known by God takes its mode ‖C1 of knowing and of knowability 4 from God, from the divine will and its knowledge, as 14 of the first book and the chapters following persuade. Since also every species, mode, and order is from God, according to 26 of the first, as set out above; and since God imposes a mode on things only by willing, and his will is universally efficacious and in no way frustrable, by 10 of the first book, it seems that all things are of necessity in that mode in which God has willed them to be present,

past, or future, especially since the divine will is not in the power of any lower cause, nor even of several, as 8 of this book shows. Moreover, if God knows future contingents contingently, how will he know them necessarily when they become present or run on into the past, just as those things will then necessarily be such? Or if he will then know them necessarily, how does he not foreknow them necessarily while they are future, since he himself and his knowledge are altogether immutable by 5 and 23 of the first book? Further, the case concerning the divine will is entirely similar, as was touched on against the preceding opinions. D1 Moreover, the 31st opinion also judges that no one can search out or know this so recondite miracle of nature and so hidden secret of God. This seems the general and very ancient opinion of the Academics, D2 which John of Salisbury too, in the 22nd chapter of the second book of his Policraticus, seems to profess on this matter 5; and Cicero too, as he says at the end of his life, turns aside to it. But it is quite certain that it is fitting, expedient, and necessary for Philosophers, Theologians, and professors of any faith whatever, and it is permitted, 6 to reply maturely and soberly to those who seek something more adequate, more reasonable, or more probable, and to those who taunt and oppose. Wherefore Logicians, Philosophers,

natural philosophers, ethicists, and divines, Catholic and pagan theologians alike, will labor anxiously over the elucidation of this so anxious an axiom. E1 Hence Ammonius the Armenian, in his Record., treating this matter on Aristotle's book Peri hermeneias, on the last chapter of Book 1, 7 writes thus: "This theorem is necessary for all parts of philosophy. According to moral philosophy it is altogether necessary to assume beforehand that 'Not all things are and come about from necessity, but there are some things in our power.' For since, as being lords of certain operations, and it lying in us to choose or not to choose certain things, and to act or not; and some of these choices and operations we call blameworthy, others praiseworthy 8… Indeed the theorem seems opportune for natural philosophy as well: for the natural philosopher will ask whether all things that come about come about from necessity, or some from fortune and chance; and for the logical

method in the same way. For this is the very thing now being asked: whether every contradiction determinately divides the true and the false. You will find the theorem extended also to first philosophy. For the Theologian too will ask in what manner the things in the world are governed, and whether all things come about determinately and from necessity, as in eternal things, or whether some come about contingently. Nor will you find men of even wholly unlearned disposition neglecting reflection on this theorem. Further, the 32nd opinion, not yet held by anyone, so far as I know, but perhaps to be held, which, to confess the truth, once tempted me too, and which may perhaps arise plausibly from what is to be said, will presume to assert that in all things future, present, and past, with respect to divine knowledge and will, there is always contingency to either side, and freedom, and no necessity at all. But this opinion in no way fully satisfies the difficulty of the problem, and ‖A1 also supposes a falsehood. It does not fully satisfy: for the difficulty

of the problem seems to press upon many chiefly for this reason, that in their free acts they would not wish to be subject to any superior and prior necessity, but to be simply lords, wholly and absolutely free with respect to their free acts, and to have those acts also in their simply free power. But this opinion, as a response, does not grant them that. For although a future human free act could, through the power of the divine will, contingently and freely not be going to be, and conversely, yet this is not simply, sufficiently, and antecedently in human power; since the human will, in all its actions and non-actions, necessarily follows the preceding divine will, and the divine will does not rest in the power of the human will, as what has been set out above makes plain. Moreover, all things that are, come about, and happen, even in the acts and non-acts of men, are, come about, and happen from some necessity naturally preceding them, as the corollary of the second of this book shows. Further, it also supposes a falsehood. For when it says that in things future, present, and past, with respect to divine knowledge and will, there is no necessity at all, it understands either

that, while divine knowledge and will stand with respect to something future, present, or past, that thing can fail to be such, that is, that these stand together without contradiction: God knows and wills this to be, to exist, or to have been, and this will not be, is not, or was not; or it understands that the divine knowledge and will, which are the causes of future, present, and past things, is always free in itself and contingent to being or not being at the time, never necessary in any way to being at the time, to any measure whatever, and so consequently that these *C1 caused things are so by reason of these causes. 9 The first cannot be said: for it is evidently impossible simply, and includes a contradiction, that God know what is false and that God's will be frustrated, by 10 of the first book. Nor can the second truly be said, since according to all Philosophers and Theologians it is necessary, in some mode of necessity, that a thing now existing as present exist now, and that a past thing have been previously, as was somewhat touched on in the second of this book. For what Theologian would presume to affirm that it is in no way necessary that the world was created,

that Christ was incarnate of a virgin, was born and suffered, redeemed man, rose again, ascended, and sat and sits at the right hand of the Father? Especially since, even concerning future things, he himself being witness, it was and is necessary that all things written in the law of Moses, the Prophets, and the Psalms concerning him be fulfilled; 10 and since, by 2 and 14 of the first book, no later thing has being or has been except through divine willing, that willing is itself in some way necessary with respect to present and past things. For it follows necessarily: "This now is or was; therefore God now wills it to be or to have been"; and the antecedent is in some way necessary, hence also the consequent. For in every consequence that is formal simply, and necessary absolutely, if the antecedent is necessary simply or in some definite mode, the consequent will be secured by a like necessity; otherwise from a true premise a falsehood could sometimes follow. Just as, therefore, present and past things are in some way necessarily such, so also is the will, in its divine willing, with respect to them; 11 indeed it is even more necessary than they are, for it is the cause of necessity in them. Moreover, this assertion also seems contrary to the opinion of the Philosopher in Peri hermeneias 1, last chapter, showing that contingency to either side is found only in future things, not in present or past ones, but rather the contrary, necessity. Perhaps it will be said that this is true with respect to

lower causes, but not with respect to the higher or highest cause. But undoubtedly, on looking more subtly, the opposite plainly appears: namely, that just as there is contingency to either side in future things with respect to lower causes, so also is there in present and past things. For it is open to no lower cause to do or not to do anything in the future unless God first wills or nills it, as 30 and 32 of the second show; and in like manner it is open to any lower active cause to do or not to do anything in the present, and to have done or not to have done in the past, whatever is possible to be done, or not done, by it. For if God wills any active cause to do or not to do anything in the present, to have done or not to have done it in the past, it is so of necessity by 10 of the first book; and God can thus will and nill contingently, with possibility and contingency excluding all necessity of every kind, as the opinion ‖E1 asserts. Just as, therefore, it is contingent to either side that you read tomorrow or do not read, so also that you read yesterday or did not read: for it is contingent to either side that God thus will or nill. And as it is contingent to either side that someone build or not, beget or not, for the future, so also to have built or not, to have begotten or not, for the past: for it is contingent to either side that God thus will or nill. Therefore it is contingent

to either side that Solomon be a virgin in the present and never have begotten a son nor built the temple, and that John the Evangelist not be a virgin in the present but have begotten sons and built the temple of Solomon, with infinitely many similar cases. Wherefore it must also say, consequently, that determinate truth is found no more in propositions about the present or the past than in propositions about the future in contingent matter, but equally, alike here and there, against the Philosopher where cited earlier, and against many philosophical writers. Moreover, this opinion also takes from the blessed the most blessed portion of the whole of blessedness, namely the certainty of being so eternally, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 13, 7, where he treats of the matters of blessedness: "And what is wholly most blessed will thus be certain to be so always." Indeed, according to this opinion the blessed are not certain of their past blessedness, nor of their present; nor would any man have certainty, certain knowledge, and hence not knowledge of anything; since there would be none concerning any thing future, present, or past; and there would return the opinion of the Academics, once condemned by Philosophers

and Theologians, and no one would be or could be certain that he exists or existed, that he does or did anything—against Aristotle, against Augustine, indeed against all philosophical and theological writers and the common run of men not infected with the heresy of the Academics. Wherefore no one could safely bear witness concerning anything past, nor swear an oath, against all the laws of the world, divine and human alike. For God could most contingently bring it about, concerning anything whatever, future, past, or present, apart from himself, that it never will be, was, or is. According to this opinion too, it would be expedient to pray to God concerning past evils of guilt and of punishment, that he make them never to have been; indeed it seems just as expedient to pray concerning past evils, that they not have been, as concerning possible or future evils, that they not come about, unless God comes to the rescue. But who prays so? What Church? What person? Why did not our heavenly Father, why did not our mother the Church, why did not the Spirit of truth, who taught all truth, teach his children anywhere to pray so? 12 Moreover, a rational creature, angelic and human, which is wholly mutable by nature in essence and in acts, when it has some act, even the most mutable

and most free with respect to contradiction, it is necessary for it at that time that it have that act, and that act of its has at that time a certain necessity of being, namely a consequent necessity. Hence, and much more, as it seems, does any act of God have it, since he himself is supremely necessary, 13 immutable, stable, and firm, as the first supposition makes plain.