Book III, Chapter 44

CHAPTER XLIV. He recites the third response.

To this, as to other things, there are not a few defenders of old error, but many, more than the hairs of my head 1, clamorous and puffed up. They refuse to put their stubborn neck under the yoke of truth, sweet as it is, and so they dream up and fabricate for themselves countless responses and objections, contrary both to themselves and to the truth. Some are falsely diagrammed 2, some quarrelsome, some faulty in matter, some in form, some in both. Many of them do not unwind the wrapping of a difficulty, but wrap themselves in a still more manifold net. But there are very many that any friend of truth, advanced even a little, will easily check and refute. For "the perverse," as Ecclesiastes says, "are corrected with difficulty, and the number of fools is infinite." No wonder, for error is always accompanied by a twisting plurality, while the unity of truth is simple. Hence the Philosopher also says, in Metaphysics 14, 3: "All irrational things both fight against themselves and against rational things, and in them there seems to be a Simonidean long speech: for the speech becomes long, like that of slaves, since they say nothing sound" 3. Hence also Proverbs 14 [14:23]: "Where there are many words, there is often want."

D1 These responses, however, do not all seem to deserve reasoned treatment, but only the more probable ones. The emptier ones are to be passed over in silence, lest time and effort, with useful things neglected, D2 be spent vainly on vain things. For the Philosopher says in Physics 1, 11 4: "Nor is it fitting to solve everything, but whatever falsehoods anyone utters in demonstrating from principles; whatever do not so arise, not at all." And in Topics 1: "It is foolish to be anxious about anyone who brings forward things contrary to opinions, or about matters on which we have an argument contrary to opinions. Therefore one need not consider every problem nor every position, but whichever one of those in need of argument may doubt, and not one raised by those in need of punishment or perception." The same Philosopher says too, in Metaphysics 3, 15: "About those who sophisticate in a fabulous manner it is not worthwhile to give zealous attention." D3 Wherefore the Wise Man also wisely forbids answering a fool according to his folly 5.

One of these responses, then, which seems probable to its author, asserts that as long as the object believed by Christ, or willed, is future, Christ can not believe it or will it, and can not have believed it, nor even have willed it; but when it has become present or past, he cannot do so. But this will easily be refuted by the arguments of the thirtieth of this book, since it will be unable to assign any cause of this novel necessity, nor to posit it without cause.

Again, let it be posited that Christ prayed specially for Paul, still living and a wayfarer, and likewise an unbeliever, that he be converted to the faith, and convert others by preaching, and be beatified in heaven. And let it be posited that Christ did other works to the same effect: for example, that he came to him, surrounded him with light, threw him down, blinded him, and the like, as the history of Acts 9 teaches. Then now, in the intervening time in which we are, it is possible that Christ did none of these things, because it is possible that Christ never believed or willed any such future things concerning Paul, since it is possible that these things will not be. Or else it is possible that Christ did these things irrationally, erroneously and culpably, because not conformably but rather disconformably and contrarily to the vision in its own kind 6, and to the Father's word and command. For let it be posited that he received a command from the Father that he should pray for nothing and do nothing except as it was divinely revealed to him in his own kind.

Nor can anyone pretend that, although it is not possible that Christ's past effects did not occur, it is nevertheless possible that they were not done for the aforesaid end concerning Paul, but for another end altogether, on account of the reasons premised in 8 and 35 of this book. Moreover, in the intervening time in which we are, between Christ's bloody sweat and his terrible passion, it is possible, according to these people, that Christ did not sweat thus at all, as the thirty-third of this book argued more fully.

Others assert that the same act of believing in Christ, which is or was most distinct with respect to one object, can be and have been most distinct with respect to the opposite object and not that one. But then this could happen without any change whatever. Hence it would be purely indifferent to showing to Christ's mind this object or that. For this reason, without any determination, it would of itself show neither distinctly, or both, as the seventh of the first more fully argued.

Again, every such created act in its own kind is a purely natural, inanimate thing, not free. Therefore, according to what was shown against the fourth response in the thirtieth of this book, it always acts so, according to the utmost of its power, and so signifies. Hence, if the same act, disposed in the same way, could represent and show either of the opposites, it always does so, since no reason at all can be given why this act, disposed in entirely the same way, yesterday showed to the soul of Christ one of the opposites and today the other.

Likewise, if this is so, since the act most properly, most distinctly, most immediately, through itself and primarily represents, signifies and shows the object, the same likeness or species could likewise be proper to both opposites, and by the same reasoning to the one as to the other. And so with any part of the definition, and with the whole; and thus one of the opposites would truly be the other. The same proposition, numerically, would be both true and false, and contradictories would be true at once.

For a proposition affirming one of the opposites of itself, through such an act and species common to both opposites, would be true; but a proposition affirming one of the opposites of the other, through the numerically same act and species, would be false. And this proposition would be that one, because this would differ from that in nothing at all; and any part of this would likewise be a part of that, and conversely.

On this view, too, the likenesses of things in the soul would not always naturally signify one thing, but this or that at pleasure; the wise soul finds the opposite of this most readily in experience. Hence the Philosopher also says, in Peri hermeneias 1, 1 7: "Just as," he says, "letters are not the same for all, so neither are the same sounds; but those things of which these are the first signs are the same for all, the affections of the soul; and those things of which these are likenesses, the things also are the same." All Logicians and Philosophers also hold this in agreement, and blessed Augustine, On the Trinity 15, 10, concurs with them.

Again, such a species or act in the soul would then be purely equivocal. For it would signify several things, namely both contraries equally and primarily, whose account of substance is diverse; and by the same reasoning that applies to one species or act, it would apply to all. Hence no one could understand anything with certainty, distinctly and properly, nor compose or divide, love or hate.

Such equivocation, moreover, has not yet been discovered by any Logician or Philosopher; indeed, according to their opinion, it cannot even be found possible. For all agree that every species in the soul naturally and most univocally signifies always one thing. Moreover, such a species in the soul, or act, is most univocal, as the premises attest, and as the definition of univocals in the Categories also shows. For what term would be univocal if not that one? It would therefore be purely univocal and equivocal at once.

Furthermore, if it is so with species and act in the soul, then by the same reasoning it will be so in memory, and likewise in every internal and external sense; indeed also in the sensitive medium, and even in the object. For here the whole natural analysis of this kind stands and is founded. For this reason the opposite happens. For as one object is only one, so it naturally causes only one species like itself in the sensitive medium; so too that species beyond, in the external sense; and so further through the internal senses, until in like manner the soul is finally reached.

Moreover, the vision or cognition of one of the opposites causes one effect in the soul or body of the knower, for example delight, dilation and the like; but the cognition and belief of the other causes an opposite effect. Therefore some past effect could not have been, and its opposite could have been, as was shown in the thirty-sixth of this book. And the arguments ‖789E·1 made in the thirty-sixth against this little response go through in full.

Moreover, whoever says this must likewise say it of acts of will. Hence he must also say, as a consequence, that what Christ or another mere man did externally by means of such a volition, he can never have done, but only its opposite, which he ‖E2 did not do. Likewise, then, an act in Christ, or in another, which is or was earlier love and merit, can now be, and earlier have been, hatred and sin. Someone's friend could also become or be that person's enemy without any change whatever in the other or in himself, contrary to what was shown above in the thirtieth and twenty-second of this book, and contrary to Augustine, On the Trinity 5, last chapter, 790E·1 where he says 8: "A friend is spoken of relatively: for he does not begin to be one unless he has begun to love." Some change of will therefore occurs, so that he is called a friend.

And Anselm says in On Free Choice 7 A1 that the will which is the work, namely the act of will (which is the natural instrument of willing), is as manifold as the many things we will, and as often as we will. A2 Hence the Philosopher too, in Ethics 8, 7 9, distinguishes the kinds of loving and of friendship according to the kinds of things loved; whence he says: "Different are the things for the sake of which they love; therefore different also are the lovings and the friendships."

Others, however, posit that it is possible that the past effects done by Christ by means of human cognition or willing were done by him by means of his divine cognition and willing alone. But these will be refuted by the thirty-ninth of this book. Again, according to that view, it is now possible that Christ according to his human nature never willed anything, never merited anything, never redeemed human beings: for he did these things only according to his human nature. Hence it is now also, consequently, possible that no human being has been saved.

Moreover, then Christ's created act of willing in its own kind, being past, can have not been; or Christ can have done anything unwillingly, and willed disconformably and contrarily to the divine will and the Father's command, and sinned and been wretched.

Others still, subtle in their own eyes, as it seems to them, answer subtly and affirm that Christ did not understand or believe in his own kind through natural acts like the cognitive acts of other men, but through one supernatural act supernaturally given to him. Just as the Word himself and the divine essence can have represented and shown equally whatever future thing will be or will not be, so, as they assert, can that act. But this response sets about cruelly maiming Christ, in his human nature and likewise in his divine. For according to it, Christ could not, and cannot, have the proper and perfect natural operation of man, namely distinct cognition of the object through an act singularly proper and distinct, as other mere men have; nor can God, with all his power, confer such cognition on Christ. For if Christ could, or can, in any way have such cognition and knowledge or belief about future things, let it be posited; and the response is emptied, and the difficulty returns.

Or if Christ is not maimed in any power of man, he can attain, like other men, that natural operation of man; and also, if God is not curtailed in his omnipotence, he can at least from the fullness of power give Christ an act of this cognitive kind. For if he cannot, this is either because of an active impotence in God, which no one will grant, or because of a receptive impotence in Christ, which cannot be said, since every other man of the same nature is receptive of such an act.

Again, Christ and the other men are of the same nature, and these are naturally capable of such actions; C1 therefore he too is, as is evident per se. The Philosopher also attests this in On the Heavens 2, 48 10, arguing that if one star is moved by the motion of revolving, all are so moved; and at 49 he suggests a similar argument about the rolling motion of the stars; and at 59 he argues likewise about the sphericity of the stars. D1 On this Averroes says: "The demonstration is founded on this, that all heavenly bodies are of the same nature in species, and that heavenly bodies are many individuals in the species; and since this is so, it is also necessary that what exists in any one of the individuals of a species from essential things exist in all the individuals of that species; and shape is among essential things in heavenly bodies, because they are animate. According to these propositions, therefore, this discourse is verified, and it is not by way of example."

Likewise, forms of the same nature are naturally apt to have operations proper to that same nature, and the soul of Christ and the soul of any other man are of the same nature. Likewise, if the human nature in Christ were left by the Word, it could produce such an act in itself; nor does the Word weaken it, but rather strengthens it, now that it is united.

Likewise, by similar reasoning they must necessarily say, as a consequence, that Christ had and has a similar act of willing. Although this act were now, or had earlier been, most distinct with respect to one object, it could now not be, and earlier not have been, of that object, but of another. Hence a work which in the present proceeds from such a volition, or in the past proceeded, could now not be, and in the past not have been; and a work too that now is not, and earlier was not, could now be, and earlier have been.

Likewise, Christ can have acts of knowing and willing similar to the acts of other men, concerning present and past things; hence also concerning necessary things, and concerning all future things; hence also concerning all contingents. Moreover, it does not seem that the same created cognitive or volitional act, standing always in entirely the same condition 11, could immediately and through itself alone be the most distinct act of all diverse things, as was argued above against a similar response. Other arguments, too, that fight against that response are in force against this one.

Likewise, since Christ according to the man and another mere man are of the same nature, and Christ according to the man is capable of such a cognitive act, and likewise of a volitional one, so is another mere man. Since, therefore, a mere man is capable, and omnipotent God can give him such acts of knowing and willing, then once he has received them, even if he now believes and wills, or earlier believed and willed, some future contingent, by meriting, by sinning, or by doing an external work, he can now and earlier not do, and not have done, these things, but their opposites. The course of argument in the thirty-third of this book plainly goes against this response likewise. Other little responses that can possibly be fabricated here will easily be shattered by these arguments and ones like them, with the help of the grace of Jesus Christ.