Book III, Chapter 22

CHAPTER XXII. He corrects the fourteenth opinion, that God does not will anything free in the future absolutely, but only conditionally; and the fifteenth, that no evils, but only goods, are absolutely provided for,1 willed, or done by God.

The fourteenth holds that God does not will free future things absolutely, but only conditionally, namely, if the free agents themselves will them. The fifteenth asserts that no evils, but only goods, are absolutely, immediately, and properly provided for, willed, and done by God. But both of these err in two ways: first, because they suppose something false; second, because they do not escape the difficulty of the problem.

The first supposes something false, as the corollary of the thirtieth in the second shows.2 Nor does it escape the difficulty. Once God, by willing absolutely, has made something free, present or past, it is necessary that God will this now and always in the future, as is clear from 23 of the first, and no more necessary then than before, as can be shown by the same 23. Otherwise the thing willed, present or past, would impose necessity on the divine will and take away its former freedom. Therefore, of any future thing whatever that God now wills, and has always willed, He necessarily wills that it will be. Therefore by the tenth [of the first] too,3 all future things will come about of necessity.

The second likewise supposes something false, as the arguments adduced against the six opinions recited in the immediately preceding chapters prove.4 The 26th of the first also checks this opinion, showing that nothing is evil per se, but that every evil act, according to what it is, is good and is from God; the 20th of the second demonstrates this as well, and the 33rd and 34th of the first refute this same opinion too. Hence Stephen, Bishop of Paris, also condemned the article affirming that all voluntary motions are reduced to the first mover.5 "It is an error," he said, "unless it is understood of the first mover as simply uncaused, and with the motion understood according to its substance, not according to its deformity."

This opinion too speaks thus only in order to avoid this universal proposition, "All things that will happen will happen of necessity." It does so on the ground that not all things are of necessity, because evils are not provided for, willed, ‖B1 or done by God; yet it grants that all good things are provided for, willed, and done by God. Consequently it must also concede that all good things that will happen will happen of necessity. This too seems a fairly great absurdity, and not much less open to attack than that more universal proposition stated above.