Thomae Bradwardini · De causa DeiLib. III. Cap. XIX.

Book III, Chapter 19

SavileLatinEnglish

Chapter XIX.

He censures the eighth and ninth opinions, which hold that nothing in the lower world is contained under divine providence, and that nothing voluntary or free is disposed by God's providence.

695A CAP. XIX.

695B Castigat octauam et nonam opiniones, credentes nulla inferioris mū di sub diuina prouidentia contineri, et quod nulla voluntaria seu libera per Dei prouidentiam disponantur.

695B–695E
  • ‖C1 (variant) necessitans.
  • D1 (source) Stephanus.
  • ‖D2 (variant) inquiens.

There are many other petty opinions besides these. Because each and every one of them is fully refuted by what has been shown before, I had proposed to pass them over in silence. But so that they may not make themselves wholly untouched 1, and so that it may be seen what phantoms of error the fancies of many people give birth to, I shall touch on them briefly. In this way I may also, at last, deserve to be excused before experts, who might condemn me as superfluous for dealing at length with things already shown, which are almost notorious. The cause is known. The first of these opinions, then, which is the eighth together with the others recounted, affirms that nothing in the lower world is contained under divine providence 2. The ninth opinion, for its part, says that nothing voluntary or free is disposed by divine providence. The reasoning common to both is that divine providence imposes necessity on what it provides for; take providence away, and all necessity is taken away, since, as they say, there is no cause ‖C1 of necessity if not providence 3. Both of these together are refuted by the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth parts of the first; the second [of the two] separately by the thirtieth, thirty-first and thirty-second of the same 4. Again, specially against the latter: at least this position must then concede that all natural things come about by wholly absolute necessity, because it speaks, as it seems, of this alone. For it concedes that all natural things are contained under divine providence. Therefore whatever God provides for or does in this lower world, he does by wholly absolute necessity. Therefore any man whatever, even a manservant or a maidservant, is freer in all his providings and doings than the Lord his God is in his, which the first supposition of the first forbids. Again, God then provides and does by necessity, and not freely, whatever is provided for and made immediately by him. He is therefore less free and more servile than any servant, and by this the earlier opinion is refuted as well. D1 For this reason Stephen, Bishop of Paris, also condemned a certain article asserting that God must do whatever is done immediately by him 5. It is an error, he says, ‖D2 whether it be understood of the necessity of compulsion, because that removes freedom, or of the necessity of immutability, because that posits the impossibility of acting otherwise. He likewise condemned another article in this form: that some things can happen by chance with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause, because then they would come about from necessity. And again another in these words: that human acts are not governed by divine providence. This same senseless view had also long before been judged as almost heretical in Job 22. "Do you think," he says, "that God is higher than heaven, and exalted above the summit of the stars? And do you say that God does not know, and judges as if through darkness? The clouds are his hiding place, and he does not consider our affairs, and he walks about the poles of heaven." 6 And in Ezekiel 9: They have said, "The Lord has forsaken the land."

695B SVnt et aliae multae opiniunculae praeter istas, quas, quia omnes et singulae per prius ostensa refelluntur plenarie, proposui sub silentio praeterijsse; sed ne omnino intactas se factent, et vt appareat qualia errorum phantasmata multorum phantasiae parturiunt, breuiter illas tangam; vt etiam sic tandem apud peritos, qui me in plurimis praeostensis quia quasi notorijs possent velut superfluum condemnare, excusari

695C merear nota causa. Prima igitur istarum opinionum et octaua cum caeteris recitatis, affirmat quod nulla inferioris mundi sub diuina prouiuidentia continentur. Opinio vero nona dicit, quod nulla voluntaria seu libera diuina prouidentia disponuntur; et haec est ratio communis ambarum quia diuina prouidentia imponit necessitatem prouisis, et illa remota, omnis necessitas remouetur, quia nulla, vt dicunt, est causa ‖C1 necessitatis si non illa. Has autem ambas coniunctim redarguunt vicesimum septimum, vicesimum octauum, et vicesimum nonum primi, secundam vero diuisim, tricesimum, tricesimum primum, et tricesimum secundum eiusdem. Item specialiter contra istam, Tunc saltem haec habet concedere, quod omnia naturalia euenient de necessitate penitus absoluta, quia de hac sola loquitur, vt videtur: Concedit enim omnia naturalia sub diuina prouidentia contineri; ergo Deus quicquid prouidet aut agit in hoc mundo inferiori, hoc facit de necessitate penitus absoluta; ergo quilibet homo, etiam seruus et ancilla in omnibus prouidentijs

695D suis et factis est liberior Domino Deo suo in suis, quod prima suppositio primi vetar. Item tunc Deus necessario et non libere prouidet atque facit quicquid prouidetur et immediate fit ab eo; est ergo illeberior et seruilior omni seruo, per quod et prior opinio confutatur. D1 Quare et Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus damnauit quendam articulum asserentem, quod Deum necesse est facere quicquid immediate fit ab ipso; Error, ‖D2 inquit, siue intelligatur de necessitate coactionis, quia tollit libertatem, siue de necessitate immutabilitatis, quia ponit impossibilitatem aliter faciendi. Idemque damnauit alium articulum sub hac forma, quod aliqua possunt casualiter euenire respectu primae causae, et quod falsum est, omnia esse praeordinata a prima causa, quia tunc euenirent ex necessitate: et iterum alium sub his verbis, quod humani actus non reguntur prouidentia diuina. Haec etiam eadem insensata sententia diu ante quasi haeretica fuerat iudicata Iob. 22. An cogitas, inquit, quod Deus excelsior coelo sit, et super stellarum verticem subleuetur, et dicis quod non nouit Deus, et quasi per caliginem iudicat? Nubes latibulum eius, nec nostra considerat, et per cardines coeli perambulat. Et Ezech. 9.

695E Dixerunt, dereliquit Dominus terram.

Notes

  1. 1

    se faciant is read from the print; the keyed text has factent. The subject is the "petty opinions" themselves: lest they make themselves wholly untouched, that is, lest they escape any notice.

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  2. 2

    Prima igitur istarum opinionum et octava cum caeteris recitatis, affirmat: the verb is singular. The sense appears to be that the first of these minor opinions is the eighth of the whole series. This agrees with the chapter argument, which names the eighth and the ninth. I have translated the et as "which is" and kept the Latin's loose syntax in the English.

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  3. 3

    Savile's margin offers the variant necessitans for necessitatis ("a cause necessitating"). The main reading, "a cause of necessity," construes, so I have kept it (rule 2).

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  4. 4

    The cross-references are to numbered parts of the first Corollary of I.1, kept as Bradwardine gives them (rule 4). Secundam means the second of the two opinions, that is, the ninth.

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  5. 5

    Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, whose condemnation of 219 propositions in 1277 is the source of the articles cited here. Bradwardine cites them in his own wording, not as a verbatim list.

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  6. 6

    Job 22:12–14 (Vulgate), with slight variants: Vulgate vertices, circa cardines. The Ezekiel verse is Ezek 9:9, where the Vulgate reads Dereliquit Dominus terram, et Dominus non videt. Bradwardine breaks off after terram.

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Errata: where the keyed text and the 1618 print differ (2)
SavileKeyed text (TCP)1618 print
695Bfactentfaciant
695Cvetarvetat