Book II, Chapter 27
Chapter Xxvii
He corrects the sixth. 1
567A CAP. XXVII.
567B Sextam corrigit.
The last quibble of those mentioned is easily destroyed by the same arguments that destroyed the earlier ones. Moreover, every evil act, as to the substance of the act, is essentially something, just as a good one is. The act of fornication is no less something than the lawful act of marriage, as is plainly shown by arguments that speak for themselves and walk upon the earth. 2 B1 Hence Anselm, in On the Fall of the Devil 8, showing the same conclusion, says: "In short, a good will is no more something than an evil will; for the will that wishes to give mercifully is no more something than the one that wishes to seize violently." Therefore every evil act, as to the substance of the act, is brought about equally with a good one, and so it has an efficient cause equally, and that cause necessarily requires the co-efficiency of God. God therefore truly and properly effects any evil act whatever, according to the substance or pure essence of the act, C1 as the twentieth and twenty-fifth chapters of this second book argued more fully.
Likewise William of Auxerre, on the second book of the Sentences, asks whether an evil action is done by God operating and cooperating, 3 and he records three opinions. The first says that every evil action is solely from man or from the Devil. The second holds that every evil action is from God, because God alone gives the power to carry it out. The third maintains that every evil action, insofar as it is an action, is good and from God. After rejecting the others, he himself holds this one, as the twentieth chapter of this second book cited more fully.
The authority of Genesis alleged to the contrary does not mean that all the things God had made were very good morally. For how could inanimate *C2 or irrational things be morally good, when they are not capable of moral goodness? Yet all that God had made was naturally very good, and so too are evil acts as to their substance or essence, which God makes. They are not good as to the malice, which by the twenty-sixth of the first book is nothing, and which therefore is made properly neither by man nor by God, but only improperly by man. To the first authority, that of Augustine, the twenty-fifth chapter of this book replies. To the second and other such authorities one can reply by the same means, and by the thirty-fourth chapter of the first book.
567B VLtima vero cauillatio praedictarum destruetur faciliter, per quae priores aliae sunt destructae. Item omnis actus malus secundum substantiam actus essentialiter est aliquid, sicut bonus: Actus enim fornicationis non minus est aliquid, quam actus licitus coniugalis, sicut euidenter ostendunt argumenta per se loquentia, et gradientia super terram. B1 Vnde et Anselmus de casu Diaboli 8. ostendens eandem conclusionem, sic ait; Denique bona voluntas non magis est aliquid, quam mala voluntas? Nec enim magis est aliquid voluntas quae vult dare misericorditer, quam illa quae vult rapere violenter. Omnis ergo actus malus secundum substantiam actus aequaliter efficitur sicut bonus, quare et aequaliter habet causam efficientem, quae necessario coefficientia Dei eget. Deus ergo vere et
567C proprie efficit quemlibet actum malum, secundum substantiam seu essentiam puram actus, C1 sicut 20. et 25. huius secundi plenius suadebant. Item Williamus Altissiodorensis super 2. sentent. quaerit vtrum mala actio fiat a Deo operante et cooperante, et recitat tres opiniones; quatum Prima dicit quod omnis actio mala est tantum ab homine, vel a Diabolo: Secunda ponit, quod omnis actio mala est a Deo, eo quod solummodo Deus dat potentiam ad illam exercendam; Tertia vero tenet, quod omnis actio mala, in quantum actio est, bona est, et a Deo; quam et reprobatis alijs ipse tenet, sicut vicesimum huius secundi plenius allegauit. Autoritas vero Geneseos in contrarium allegata, non vult, quod cuncta quae Deus fecerat, erant valde bona moraliter. Quomodo namque inanimata, *C2 vel irrationalia erant bona moraliter, cum non sint capacia bonitatis moralis? Cuncta tamen quae Deus fecerat, erant naturaliter valde bona, sic sunt et actus mali quantum ad suam substantiam siue essentiam quam facit Deus, non quantum ad malitiam, quae per 26. primi nihil est, et ideo nec facta
567D proprie ab homine, nec a Deo; improprie tantum ab homine. Ad primam autoritatem Augustini respondet 25. huius: ad secundam vero et alias tales potest responderi per idem, et per tricesimum quartum primi.
Notes
- 1
Sextam corrigit: Savile's argument refers to the sixth of the objections ("quibbles", cauillationes) to the chapter-20 argument that God is the cause of every act, evil acts included. The text itself calls this one the last (ultima cauillatio). Corrigit here means "rebuts".
↩ - 2
argumenta per se loquentia, et gradientia super terram: arguments that "speak for themselves" (self-evident) and "walk on the ground" (palpable, obvious to anyone). The second phrase may allude to refutation by walking, solvitur ambulando, but Bradwardine does not say so. I have kept the images and not paraphrased them.
↩ - 3
"William of Auxerre" is Savile's Williamus Altissiodorensis. His "on the second book of the Sentences" presumably means the second book of William's Summa aurea. The wording of the three opinions is Bradwardine's report, and I have not checked it against William.
↩
Errata: where the keyed text and the 1618 print differ (2)
| Savile | Keyed text (TCP) | 1618 print |
|---|---|---|
| 567B | mala voluntas? Nec | mala voluntas : Nec |
| 567C | quatum Prima | quarum Prima |