Book I, Chapter 1, corollary: part 8

Against those who opine that God is not a substance and a rational power, having intellect and free will, actually knowing and willing; who also think that the divine will is not universally efficacious, that is, unhinderable, unfrustrable, and unfailing in any way. 1 8.

Let those who opine that God is not a substance and a rational power, having intellect and free will, actually knowing and willing, and who think that the divine will is not universally efficacious, that is, unhinderable, unfrustrable, and unfailing in any way, reason better. For it is clear from the first Supposition that God exists, and is substance, since substance is more perfect than accident; and hence also a substance and a rational power, since a rational power is reasonably preferred to an irrational one; wherefore he also has intellect and free will, as the third part also shows; and he knows and wills actually, not merely habitually, since this is more perfect, just as a good act is more perfect than a potency toward the good. The divine will, moreover, is universally efficacious in the manner stated. For this is more perfect than that it should be hinderable, frustrable, or liable to fail in any way. Again, if God willed something and did not have it, or it did not come about, he would not be supremely blessed and happy, but wretched, especially since he wills nothing, and can will nothing, except justly, by the third part of this, which also beatifies him supremely. 2 For who does not know that happiness and blessedness is a good whole and perfect, and that it is more blessed to have whatever is justly desired or willed than to lack it? For if someone would not be less blessed on account of not having one thing willed, nor on account of not having another, and by the same reasoning further, and so on, then neither would he be less blessed even if he lacked all and each of the things willed and desired. But whose mind thinks so, unless perhaps the senseless? Hence the Philosopher also says, in Ethics 1, 9, that happiness is a good sufficient in itself and perfect. 3 Boethius too, in the Consolation 3, Prose 2 of Philosophy, says that blessedness is a good which, once it is attained, leaves one able to desire nothing further; and this is indeed the highest of all goods, containing within itself all goods; and if anything were lacking to it, it could not be the highest, since there would be left outside it something that could be wished for. It is clear, therefore, that Blessedness is a state made perfect by the gathering together of all goods. Is it not also more joyous, more pleasant, and more delightful to have what is desired and willed than to lack it against one's will? Who dissents here? Whose mind does not so feel? Now in the highest Blessedness the highest joy, pleasantness, and delight are contained. But God is always supremely blessed by the third part of this; therefore he never lacks, against his will, anything willed. Further, who does not know that this follows best: if God can do this, and wills this, he does this, since nothing requisite is lacking, as philosophy also often testifies? Hence also by the opposite: if God does not do this, and wills this, he cannot do this, some possible thing having been demonstrated; he is therefore not to be reckoned omnipotent, but impotent, against the 7th part of this. This is also attested by the twelfth of the twenty-four Definitions of the twenty-four Philosophers concerning God, 4 which says thus: "God is he whose will is of deific power."