Book I, Chapter 1, corollary: part 27

27. Against despair, whether from the magnitude or from the multitude of sins.

Let the Cainites and the Judaic breathe again, who despair because of any magnitude or multitude of crimes whatever. The Cainites are named after Cain, who because of the magnitude of his iniquity despaired of pardon. "My iniquity," he says, "is greater than that I may deserve pardon," Gen. 4. The Judaic are named after the Jews, who despair because of the multitude of their sins. For they stubbornly believe, and not long ago they declared to me in person with great firmness, that if anyone sins a fourth time there is no pardon possible for him, nor any medicine of penance. This is to be understood of the same kind of sin, and of one who has at some time fallen into sin and risen again through the mercy of God and penance. Relapsing after penance he fell a second time, and a second time likewise rose; relapsing yet again he falls a third time, and a third time also rises. If he falls a fourth time, according to them he will not be able to rise, but all hope of salvation is taken from him. This opinion of theirs seems to them to be founded on Amos 1, where the Lord says: "For three crimes of Damascus, and for four, I will not convert him";1 and so in turn of the three crimes and four of Gaza, Tyre, Edom, Ammon, Moab, Judah and Israel. And when I asked a certain learned Jew what one of them would do who happened to sin a fourth time,

he answered that he may do whatever he pleases, as one most certainly handed over to the Devil and damned; and in the end, perhaps, he will wander astray in some wood or desert, and will destroy himself by some wretched death.

But the first Supposition refutes these as it does those, and leads them back to hope of mercy, pardon and salvation. For if God is supremely good, so that nothing could be better, he is also supremely merciful, so that nothing can be more merciful, or even be thought so. In like manner he is supremely compassionate2 and clement, supremely rich and powerful, supremely liberal, supremely generous, supremely magnificent, supremely good in all goodnesses, and supremely full beyond what can be understood, as the third and fourth parts show. For who hesitates, even slightly, that mercy, compassion, clemency, power, liberality, largesse, magnificence and other such things are most splendid goodnesses? But the sin of a man, however great, is finite and small. For it could be increased, and there could be another sin greater than it; indeed it is as it were ‖B1 a point, a nothing and a void,3 in respect of the divine mercy, compassion and clemency, infinitely infinite, as any finite thing is in respect of any infinite.

Why then could so great a mercy and compassion, so great a clemency and power, not overcome, remove and purge so tiny a sin? Why could so great a liberality, so great a largesse, so great a magnificence not remit so tiny a debt to the prodigal son who repents, humbly begs, and has nothing with which to repay? Why could it not most fully relieve his so slight need, and even give him some great gifts beyond that? This is especially so since from such remissions and largesses his infinite riches and abundance are diminished by no want, and nothing decreases for him. Rather, in a way, one priceless jewel is added, one most brilliant pearl, one most precious soul, one most worthy creature, and through that one perhaps many others. And on this account also his citizens, his household and his friends rejoice with great joy, and praise, glorify and adore him the more.

Is it not more powerful to be able to do this than not to be able? And is it not more merciful, more clement, more liberal and more magnificent for one who is powerful so to act toward the wretched, the needy, the truly repentant, the one resolved to desist and humbly begging, than to turn away his face, stop his ear, harden his heart without compassion, and [un]mercifully4 block up the fountain of innumerable mercy prepared for the wretched? Is it not therefore most fitting for the good God to be able so to act, and so to act; and does it not befit him most becomingly, as the first Supposition shows? And whoever says that God can remit, wash away and purge sin up to such and such a point, and beyond that cannot: does he not set an end, limit and measure to the goodness, the divine power and the infinite mercy, simply and in every respect, and squeeze and constrict it, as it were, under a bushel?5 Whoever therefore is weighed down by a sin of however great magnitude, let him repent without fear, let him approach without doubt, let him draw sure hope of mercy, pardon and salvation. Therefore also whoever is pierced through by a multitude of sins however large, let him return confidently to the hope of life. For each single one of his sins is finite and small; therefore the whole

multitude likewise of all his sins is finite and small, especially since all of them, as they say, are four, or at least comprised in a finite and brief number. That whole multitude could be still further increased [in number] by sinning on; it could be increased in malice, twofold, a hundredfold, and as much greater as you wish, if, that is, each unit, each one of the simple sins, were enlarged and proportionally increased. And there can be another multitude of sins greater in number, and many times greater than that in malice. Therefore this multitude is finite and tiny, as it were nothing in respect of the divine mercy and power, compassion and clemency, largesse and magnificence, which are infinitely infinite beyond all number and measure, as the first Supposition together with the third and fourth parts clearly shows, and the rest as above.

Who, moreover, would dare to say that up to such and such a number of sins God can remit them and stretch out the hand of compassion, and not beyond? For goodness, power, wisdom, mercy and the other virtues of God are infinite, simply in intensity, and so also innumerably so, as the first Supposition shows with the third and fourth parts. I also summon you in particular, O Jews. Suppose someone commits once some light gluttony, pride or other slight sin, and rises at once through penance, and so a second and third time, and yet a fourth, sins from bad habit and human frailty. Could not someone, I ask, commit at the first time one grave sin, say a most horrible blasphemy, a most cruel murder, a most shameful incest, or some other sin of equal or greater weight than this fourth sin, or than these four sins; and for that sin, however grave and great, obtain mercy and win pardon, as the foregoing has taught, which you also do well to concede? Why not, then, for that fourth sin, equal to this, or perhaps less, when all the circumstances are weighed?

Further, suppose some Father or Lord had one Son, or a servant, wholly fearful, who resolved to avoid offending his Father or Lord as far as he could, and toiled in many ways to that end. Yet from ignorance or human frailty he once offends his Father or Lord, and at once with tears and every possible satisfaction he diligently seeks and receives reconciliation; and so a second and a third time in succession. He sins likewise a fourth time, and in like manner, or even more devoutly if he can, he asks for reconciliation, with firm purpose never again to offend. And all this he does not from fear of punishment but from love of justice, not from servile fear but from most devoted filial love. And suppose there were another son of the same Father or Lord, or a servant, wholly proud, defiant and rebellious, who in contempt of his Father or Lord resolved always to sin, never to repent, never to make satisfaction, and never to obtain any reconciliation; and so lived most wickedly for many years, ever heaping crime upon crime as far as he could. Is not that first one more fit and better disposed than this latter to obtain mercy, and to win full reconciliation? For otherwise too great an occasion would be offered

for men to lie in their sins like pigs until the evening of their life, and then at last, when they could sin no further, to repent all at once of all their sins, however tepidly or remissly. But who, I ask, is so wise, unless he who is foolish and mad?

You too, Jew: have you never forgiven a fourth time your son, or an outside servant, who had offended and was humbly and truly repentant? I think you forgave a fifth, sixth and seventh time, indeed seventy times seven if need be, and so on. And if you did not, I know that I did, and many others have done so more often. And is not God, supremely good, as merciful as a wretched sinner? Indeed he is incomparably far more merciful, beyond all number and measure, as the first Supposition most clearly shows. Whoever therefore is burdened with a multitude of sins however large, let him repent without fear, let him cease from sinning, and let him receive sure hope of the grace, life and glory to be obtained.

The motive of the Jews, if it is understood to the letter, does not help them. For the truth is that the Lord at times converts some sinners from very many sins, while some he at times does not convert from few, even from one actual or original sin alone. And if it is expounded morally, it does not help them either. For in the moral exposition the first sin can be understood as thinking evil with relish and willingly; the second, consenting to evil; the third, accomplishing it in deed. Or: the first is to will to do evil; the second, to seek an opportunity of doing it; the third, once the opportunity is found, to complete it in deed. But the fourth sin is to remain thus finally, without penance or correction, in the present life. From this sin the Lord does not convert in the present life, because then one would not thus remain finally; nor does he convert after this life either. For the Jews confess that if the tree falls to the south or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there it will be, Eccl. 11.