Book I, Chapter 1, corollary: part 14

14. Against the triflers and babblers who worship a burdensome multitude of equal gods of the same species or nature.

Let the triflers and babblers be restrained, who worship a burdensome multitude of equal gods of the same species or nature, as if one such were not enough for them. For if the first Supposition is true, one God suffices in the fullest measure. Where he would not suffice at all, some perfection and goodness would be lacking to him, which could belong to him or to another; and the third part and the seventh part of this Supposition show that this is not so. Since, then, he alone suffices in every respect, why is another, or why are others, posited superfluously and without cause, when every wise Philosopher or other person, nay nature itself, shuns and avoids this?1 And if anyone demands a witness, behold the Philosopher, On the Heaven and the World 3, 39,2 who

{10C} says that it is not necessary to make the elements infinite: for all these, that is, composite things, will be rendered finite if the principles are finite. And further on, 35, it is manifest that it is much better to make the principles finite, and as few as possible, the same results all being granted, as also those in the disciplines require.3 Why then, by worshipping many equal gods, do they make this one insufficient? Or, if they believe this one suffices, why do they, to his injury and contempt, withdraw from him alone the love, honour, and glory owed to him alone, and bestow them on others? Those, too, who so imagine concerning the divine nature, stray and wander very far. For it is not multipliable, nor can it be made plural into many individuals of entirely similar kind, differing substantially and by number alone, as natural species do; indeed there could not even be another individual of that nature. For if there could be, it could be supremely perfect and good; so that it would also be so, ‖C1 as was proved above in the conclusion of the first Supposition. And by the same reasoning by which one other could be, there could be another, and another, and so infinitely beyond number; so that they would actually be such, which the mind of anyone refuses,

{10D} and the second Supposition forbids.

Again, it is absolutely possible, simply, that there be one God. Who would not at once consent? Who, once this is posited and admitted as absolutely possible, would not readily defend himself against every contradiction? And if it is possible that there be one God, namely the one who, according to what was set out above, necessarily exists, and who is (let him be) A, then it is necessary that that one be unique, and that every other God not exist. For let B be some other God. According to what came earlier, it is possible that B not be God; so that, according to the sixth part, B not be; B therefore either is impossible to be, or possible to be with the possibility of contradiction; so that it is also necessary that B is not God.4 So what was established earlier in the demonstration of the first Supposition clearly shows. Or more briefly: it is necessary that every God be God, as the first Supposition and the sixth part demonstrate; it is not necessary that B be God; according to what was set out above, B therefore is not God. Again, if a multitude of equal gods is posited, is it not in some way more perfect than one God? So that none of them is supremely perfect. And so none

{10E} is God, as the first Supposition shows. Moreover, this one, unique, true God contains the whole essence and the whole possible perfection of his species or nature, as the first Supposition proves. There is therefore no other such God; indeed there cannot be, because not simultaneously with this one, for the reason given above, nor after this one, were he destroyed or in any way not existing, [there would be nothing],5 as the first Supposition shows. This reasoning, concerning any other individual of any other species, whether in natural things, in artificial things, or in any others whatever, is evident of itself.6 But if anyone delights in testimony, behold the Philosopher, On the Heaven and the World 1, ‖E1 92, showing that there are not, and cannot be, several Worlds, who says: "Neither is there any one necessity that there be several Worlds, nor is it possible that several have been made, seeing that this one is made from the whole of matter, just as it is."

Perhaps what is said will be made clearer in this way. And it follows, 94: "For if snubness is a curvature in the nose or the flesh, and flesh is the matter of the snub, and if one flesh were made from all [flesh], and the snub existed in this one, then nothing else would be snub, nor will there be a snub, nor is it possible that one have been made. Likewise too, if flesh and bones are the matter of a man, and a man were made from all flesh and all bones, and ‖A1 it being possible for them to be dissolved,7 it would not be possible for there to be another man. And likewise in other things." And it follows, 95: "The heaven, however, is a certain singular thing, and one of those that come from matter; but if it does not consist of a part of matter, but of all of it, there would not be another, nor can several have been made, because all matter has been comprehended." On which Averroes, Comment 95, says that demonstrations leading to the impossible are of the genus of signs; but this demonstration, proving that the World is one, is a demonstration of the reasoned fact (propter quid).8 For it has the cause as its middle term, and therefore gives us knowledge of this matter together with its cause, and this is the most perfect of the modes. Who, moreover, doubts which is worthier, more honourable, and more perfect: to be by oneself the highest and first without an equal, or to have of necessity an equal, even against one's will?

{11B} God therefore, by the first Supposition, has no equal. Again, why could one of several equal gods, differing numerically, as Angels or men do, not will what another would not will, and the reverse? For no reason is apparent why, by absolute power, this could not be so, since the willing of none of them depends on another, just as he himself does not, nor is the willing of one the same in number as the willing of another, just as he himself is not the same as the other. So any one of them could hinder any other, and any others, and make him or them wretched, and the reverse; which the first Supposition, the third part, and the eighth refute. Of this the witnesses are nearly all the Natural, Divine, and Moral philosophers.9 For all the Natural philosophers (a few excepted) posit one first mover, who according to them is God. The Divine philosophers likewise posit more explicitly one first being, one first cause, one highest God. Hence also Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, last chapter: "Beings do not wish to be badly ordered, nor is a plurality of rulers good."10 One Prince, therefore,

which Avicenna also proves, Metaphysics 1, 6 and 7, as was touched on above; and Algazel, Metaphysics 2, his 1st.11 The Moral philosophers too, treating of polities, say that monarchy is the best polity, especially if one sufficiently fit man is found; and that several ought not to rule at once, unless, for lack of one fit man, one cannot rule alone. The book of the Ethics and the Politics of Aristotle bear witness to this; so do the civil laws of the nations, and the legal codes of all cities, communities, and kingdoms. Those too who treat of military matters and the business of war declare that one supreme leader is always the best. But all this is more apparent in the lesser world, that is, in the lesser community of the powers of man (from which all other human communities are originally derived). For in man the outer and inner powers, sense, appetite, will, and reason, are joined together as a body. But who does not know that one of these ought by nature to rule, and the others to serve? Hence also the Philosopher, in the Secret of Secrets, Part 3, Chapter 8: "When," he says, "God the Most High created man, he established his body

{11D} as a kind of city, and its Intellect as King in it; he established for it five Bearers, that is, the five Senses, presenting to it whatever there is."12 So therefore in the greater World, in the most ample City of the world, we must think likewise. For so it is most worthy, most honourable, and best suited to God himself and to all others; so that by the first Supposition it must be so. It is not possible, therefore, that there be many gods, equal, of the same species, differing by number alone. Further, according to the concordant opinion of many philosophers and philosophical men, if there are many gods univocally, none of them is God per se and first; but all are so through some one prior nature, common to them and commonly inhering, which is such per se and first, and the others are such secondarily through it. None of them, then, is God, because not first and first per se; only that one common nature is, as the first Supposition makes plain. It is also more perfect to be good per se and first than through another and secondarily, as no one is ignorant, and the Philosophers attest. He is not God, therefore, who is not God per se and first, as

{11E} the first Supposition and the third part demonstrate. Since, moreover, these gods are not most actual, most pure, most simple, and most sufficient through themselves, but are constituted through another, against the first Supposition and the parts set out above?13