Book I, Chapter 1, corollary: part 10
10. Against those who imagine that God is composed of human limbs, or of other things, or of any diverse things whatever, and who deny that he is a substance most simple, most indivisible, having no composition, divisibility, or magnitude, that is, bodily magnitude.
Let the composers of God come to their senses, who imagine him composed of human limbs, or of other things, or of any diverse things whatever. Let them know too that God is a substance most simple, most indivisible, having no composition, divisibility, or magnitude, namely bodily magnitude. For if such composition were in God, it would not be repugnant for the parts to be pulled apart and separated from one another, and hence neither for the whole to be changed, diminished, or corrupted, which the foregoing overturn. Moreover, how would God be supremely perfect, or sufficient and blessed, as the foregoing attest, if he depended of necessity on others, and needed other necessary things? Again, it seems more actual and more potent to exist sufficiently from oneself and through oneself than to be supported by another's prop and aid. But God is supremely actual and potent, so that nothing more actual and potent could be, as the first Supposition and other earlier things demonstrate. Moreover, if God were composed of parts, each component part, or at least the form perfecting those parts, uniting and joining them, would be by nature prior to God, against the first Supposition, as appears in the demonstration of the second Supposition.
Besides, either God is composed of homogeneous parts only, or also of heterogeneous ones. If of homogeneous only, animals and the heaven are more perfectly composed, against the first Supposition and the third part of this. If he is composed of heterogeneous parts, those are of unlike function, of unequal dignity, and not equally perfect. And so some of them are not supremely and infinitely perfect, against the fourth part set out above [of this.]
7D Contra fingentes Deum ex membris humanis, vel alijs, seu quibuscunque diuersis componi, negantesque ipsum esse substantiam simplicissimam, impartibilissimam, nullam compositionem, partibilitatem, magnitudinemue habentem, magnitudinem scilicet corporalem. 10.
7E REsipiscant compositores Dei, fingentes ipsum ex membris humanis, vel alijs, seu quibuscun que diuersis componi: Sciant quo que Deum esse substantiam simplicissimam, impartibilissimam, nullam compositionem, partibilitatem, magnitudinem habentem, magnitudinem scilic•t corporalem. Si nam que compositio talis esset in Deo, non repugnaret partibus distrahi, et ab invicem separari, quare nec toti mutari, minui, vel corrumpi, quod praemissa corrumpunt. Quomodo insuper esset Deus summe perfectus, siue sufficiens et beatus, sicut praemissa testantur, si necessario dependeret ab alijs, et alijs necessarijs indigeret? Actualius etiam at que potentius videtur ex se, et per se sufficienter existere, quam alieno fulcimento et adminiculo supportari. Deus autem est summe actualis et potens, ita quod nihil actualius et potentius esse posset, sicut prima Suppositio, et alia priora demonstrant. Si etiam Deus componeretur ex partibus, quaelibet pars componens, vel saltem forma partes illas perficiens, vniens, et coniungens esset naturaliter, prior Deo, contra primam Suppositionem, sicut in ostensione
8A secundae Suppositionis apparet. Ad haec autem, vel Deus componitur ex partibus homogeneis tantum, vel etiam heteromogeneis: Si tantum homogeneis, animalia et coelum perfectius componuntur contra primam Suppositionem, et tertiam partem hujus: Si ex heteromogeneis partibus componatur, illae sunt dissimilis officij, disparis dignitatis, et non aeque perfectae: quare et aliqua earum non est summe et infinite perfecta contra quartam partem praemissam [hujus.]
Furthermore, if God is composed of parts, either some one of them is of simply and universally infinite perfection, or none is. If some one is, that one would be God, as the first Supposition shows; and it would also be superfluous that God should have several parts, since that one alone would suffice for whatever is needed, against the third part of this. If none is, the fourth part of this is offended. To the same effect, any part could then be more perfect, and so could God, which the first Supposition condemns. Besides, the parts of God are either finite or infinite in number. If finite, the whole God is of finite perfection, against the first Supposition and the fourth part. If infinite, the same follows, since each of them, being of only finite perfection, could be increased; and so likewise could God as a whole. Infinity, too, ‖B1 the second Supposition of this chapter excludes 1; and all nature together, and the mind of anyone, shuns and abhors it. The second clause of this part follows from the former, and from the first Supposition together with the third part and the fourth.
8A Amplius autem si Deus ex partibus componatur; vel aliqua earum est infinitae perfectionis simpliciter omniqua que vel nulla: Si aliqua, ipsa esset Deus, sicut Suppositio prima monstrat; esset quo que superfluum, quod Deus plures partes haberet, cum illa sola sufficeret ad quaecun que contra tertiam partem hujus: Si nulla, offenditur quarta pars hujus. Ad idem tunc quaelibet pars posset esse perfectior, et sic Deus, quod Suppositio prima damnat. Praeterea partes Dei vel sunt finitae, vel infinitae in numero: Si finitae, totus Deus est perfectionis finitae
8B contra primam Suppositionem et quartam partem. Si infinitae, idem sequetur, quia quaelibet istarum, cum sit tantum finitae perfectionis, posset augeri: quare et similiter Deus totus. Infinitatem quoque ‖B1 huius 2a. Suppositio excludit, et tota simul natura, ac cuiuslbet animus ipsam refugit et abhorret: altera particula huius partis consequitur ex priori et ex prima Suppositione cum tertia parte et quarta.
Notes
- 1
The main text has huius ("of this"), with the variant huiusmodi in the margin. I construe the main reading with Suppositio, "the second Supposition of this chapter". The variant would give "an infinity of this kind" with the same sense. Savile's 2a is read as secunda.
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Errata: where the keyed text and the 1618 print differ (4)
| Savile | Keyed text (TCP) | 1618 print |
|---|---|---|
| 7E | scilic•t | scilicet |
| 7E | quo que / nam que / at que / quibuscun que | quoque / namque / atque / quibuscunque |
| 8A | omniqua que / quo que / quaecun que | omniquaque / quoque / quaecunque |
| 8B | cuiuslbet | cuiuslibet |