De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 9
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 675A–677E; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/9/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[675A–675E]
CHAPTER IX. He replies.

So that the perplexity of this question may be unraveled more fully and more briefly, it must be known that "power" for our purpose can be taken in two ways [n1]: as active power, that is, and as passive power, as the preceding chapter distinguished. What we can in no way do, but can only undergo, is not said to be in our power, as the preceding chapter showed. But according to the common manner of speaking of ordinary people and of the Authors, only that is said to be in our power which is in our active power, and not in just any active power, but only in that of contradiction, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9, 18 [n2], quoted more fully in the fourth corollary of this [n3]. So everything, and only that, is said to be in our power which is in our free power: free, I say, with a like freedom, namely that of contradiction, as the same corollary defined it. Wherefore, by the tenth part of the fifth of this, no act of ours is simply in our free active power, as the preceding chapter also proves sufficiently, but only in a certain respect [n4], namely with respect to all second causes. Hence the unlearned and the learned alike, who for the most part consider natural and second causes, say that this or that is simply set in our power, and understand it with respect to these causes. So, in the common manner of speaking, "to be set in our power", although uttered simply, is nevertheless taken and signifies in the way stated, as was likewise said of the contingent in the fifth of this. This, however, namely to be in our power, can be defined more intelligibly according to the more usual manner of speaking, by saying that that is in our power which we do when we will and by no means do when we do not will. Hence also blessed Augustine, in On the Spirit and the Letter 26, after a long discussion, expressing its definition, or what the name means [n5], says: "We call that a power where the capacity to do lies at the disposal of the will. Hence each one is said to have in his power that which he does if he wills, and does not do if he does not will." And in On Free Choice 3, 3: "I cannot think anything else to be in our power than what we do when we will." And in City of God 5, 10, showing that many things are in our power, he says: "For we do many things which, if we did not will them, we certainly would not do, and to this first of all belongs willing itself: for if we will, it is; if we do not will, it is not; for we would not will if we did not will." Therefore nothing is in our power except in a certain respect only, namely as subactive, subexecutive [n6], and necessarily subserving, by a necessity, that is, naturally preceding, with respect to the divine will. It is called in our power for this reason, that when we will, we do it voluntarily and not unwillingly. But simply and utterly absolutely, antecedently and sufficiently, that is, without need of anything that is not subject to our power or will, nothing at all is truly said to be in our power. In this way the reasons and authorities which seem contrary are brought into agreement with one another. Let no man, then, be indignant if he has nothing absolutely and simply in his own power, but is subject in all things to a higher power, as the Apostle says in Romans 13: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." For it should suffice each man to have in his own power, in a certain way, what he ought: namely, to be subject in all things to the higher, divine power, and set over what is lower; that is, to have a middle power between the extreme powers, like those angelic spirits who, placed in a certain middle order, are called Powers [n7] and yet are subject to the divine power; like the highest Kings and Princes, who have power over subjects and are themselves subject to the King of Kings, namely him who has written on his robe and on his thigh, "King of Kings and Lord of lords," Apocalypse 19; and like other men in the middle, such as Dukes and Counts, Barons and Satraps, and the other officials who in certain cities are commonly called Powers [n8], who so exercise power over subjects that they themselves nevertheless are subject to higher powers. The Centurion rightly understood this when he said, "I am a man placed under authority, having soldiers under me," Matthew 8, as 28 of the second also recalls. Hence Augustine, too, in On Rebuke and Grace 69, says: "To will or not to will is in the power of the one who wills or does not will, so that it fulfills the divine will and does not overcome its power [n9]." And in Retractations 1, 22, he says: "Unless someone, I say, has changed his will, he cannot do good": which he teaches to be placed in our power where he says, "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad," which is not against the grace of God that we preach. For it is in a man's power to change his will for the better; but that power is nothing unless it is given by God, of whom it is said, "He gave them power to become children of God." For since this is in our power, that [n10]

[676A–676B]
when we will, we do, and nothing is so much in our power as the will itself, yet the will is prepared by the Lord, and in that way, therefore, he gives the power. And above, in 10: "As for what I said, that all men can fulfill the commandments of God if they will, let the new heretics, the Pelagians, not suppose it was said in their sense: for it is altogether true that all men can do this if they will, but the will is prepared by the Lord, and is so far increased by the gift of charity that they do will." And according to this explanation the authorities of Augustine and others should be understood which say absolutely that something is set in our power. The other authorities, of other writers, which say likewise absolutely that nothing is set in our power, will be explained according to the distinction laid down above. Of this kind are: "A man's way is not his own, nor is it for a man to walk," Jeremiah 10. "Your counsel is not in a man's power," Tobit 3. "Nor can you do even what is least," Luke 12. "It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy," Romans 9. And the saying of the Catholic Doctor and most blessed Martyr Cyprian, in his thirteenth letter, headed To Quirinus, on the Discipline of the Christian Religion, chapter 4 [n11]: "We must glory in nothing, since nothing is our own." This is, as it were, the title and the content of that whole chapter, and he proves it there in many ways. Blessed Augustine devoutly embraces this authority and cites it in On Rebuke and Grace 19, in On the Predestination of the Saints 3, and in many other places; the preceding chapter recited very many others of this kind. From these things it is made clear how a man is and is not lord of his act, and how, consequently, he is and is not of free choice, since the one corresponds to the premises. For as a man's act is and is not set in his power, so he is and is not lord of it, and so, consequently, he is and is not of free choice, as is plain to anyone from the meanings of the terms. For no one, I hope, will presume to claim for himself so proud a lordship as not to acknowledge that higher Lord who has written on his robe and on his thigh, "King of Kings and Lord of lords," Apocalypse 19, but let him say, "We wish this man to reign over us" [n12]. Whoever presumes this will be subjected to the divine dominion by 30 of the second.

[676C]
No man, therefore, is lord of his act wholly simply and utterly absolutely, supremely, antecedently and sufficiently, that is, without need of anything that is not subject to his power or dominion. He is lord only in a certain respect, namely with respect to all second causes, necessarily subserving the first cause, and that by a necessity naturally preceding, as the second of this shows. And so he is called lord of his act because when he wills, he acts, and when he does not will, he does not act, and this voluntarily, not unwillingly or under compulsion. Nor let him take this ill: for it should suffice him to be a middle lord, like those holy angelic spirits placed in a certain middle order who are called Dominations; like our highest Kings and Princes, who are lords in such a way that they nevertheless serve the Lord of lords; and like Dukes and Counts, who are lords of their subjects in such a way that they nevertheless serve and are subject to higher lords, as 28 of the second also confirms. Hence Boethius on Peri hermeneias 1, at the end: "Our will is in a certain way the mistress of our acts and of the whole plan of life": "in a certain way," he says, "not utterly absolutely."

[676D–676E]
And Augustine, in the 144th of Prosper's Sentences , says: "The rational soul is mistress of its body, but it will not rule well what is beneath it unless it has served what is above it, God, with the whole subjection of charity." The same, On True Religion 25: "God judged such servants of his to be better if they served him freely." Let us therefore say devoutly with the whole Church of God: "Lord, in your will all things are placed, and there is no one who can resist your will: for you have made heaven and earth and all things that are contained within the circuit of heaven; you are Lord of all." He is therefore Lord of every human act, and not in equal rank with man himself, as the laws forbid and reason prohibits, as appears by the demonstration of the second corollary of the first and by 20 of the second. Nor is man the higher Lord, by 30 of the second, but God. Nor, I beg you, should anyone claim so great a freedom for himself as to flee even the service of God, saying with the impious, "Who is the Almighty, that we should serve him?" Job 21. For the Prophet says: "By your ordinance the day continues, for all things serve you," Psalm 118 and Psalm 61 [n13]: "Shall not my soul be subject to God?" And further on, "Yet let my soul be subject to God" [n14]. And the Apostle, Romans 3: "Let every mouth be stopped, and let the whole world become subject to God." Hence also Isaiah 45: "I have sworn by myself, says the Lord, the word of justice shall go out of my mouth and shall not return, for every knee shall bend to me." Hence also Ecclesiasticus 42 it is written: "In every necessity all things obey him." Let such men beware lest, while they wish to be free of righteousness, they become slaves of sin. Blessed Augustine also says, On the Spirit and the Letter 25: "Why do wretched men dare to be proud of free choice before they are set free, or of their own strength if they are already set free, and do not notice that in the very name of free choice the sound of freedom is surely heard? But where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. If, then, they are slaves of sin, why do they boast of free choice? For by whom a man is overcome, to him he is also bound as a slave." [n15]

[677A–677E]
"But if they have been set free, why do they boast as though of their own work, and glory as though they had not received? Or are they so free that they do not even want to have as Lord him who says to them, 'Without me you can do nothing'?" The same, On the Freedom of Choice, to Hilary 3: "Let the Pelagians cease to rave so, and let them understand that they have free choice only so far as to keep them from rejecting help with a proud will and to lead them to call upon the Lord with a pious will. For this free will will be so much the freer, the more subject it is to the grace of divine mercy; for it prays faithfully and says, 'Direct my ways according to your word, and let no iniquity have dominion over me.'" Likewise Prosper, Against Cassian 8, says: "The grace of God is no danger to free choice, nor is the will taken away when the willing of good is generated in it. For if it is not to be thought free for this reason, that it is formed, ruled, ordered and imbued, then the sons of God, who are led by the Spirit of God, are robbed of freedom." And further on, 24: "The foolish complaint of the proud does not trouble us, by which they plead that free choice is taken away if beginnings, and progress [n16], and perseverance in good works up to the end are said to be gifts of God. For the helps of divine grace are the stabilizing supports of the human will: we pray willingly, and yet he has sent the Spirit into our hearts crying 'Abba, Father'; we speak willingly, and yet, if what we speak is holy, we are not the speakers, but the Spirit of our Father who speaks in us; we work out our salvation willingly, and yet it is God who works in us this very willing and working." And at the end, where 13 heresies of Pelagius are summarily recited, and as many catholic rulings against them, this stands eleventh: "That there is no free choice if it needs God's help, since each one has it in his own will to do something or not to do it": and the eleventh ruling against that heresy confesses that there is free choice, even though it needs divine help. And the same, in his Sentences, proposition 124, says: "Free always is the service before God, which necessity does not serve, but charity." No one at all, therefore, is of free choice simply, of choice simply free, that is, wholly immune from all servitude to a superior and utterly alien to all naturally preceding necessity, as the tenth part of the fifth of this shows. He is so only in a certain respect, namely with respect to all second causes, as the same tenth part and the third of the second taught, while nevertheless necessarily subserving the first cause, necessarily, I mean, by a naturally preceding necessity, as the second of this shows. And so a man is called free to do something because, when he wills, he does it, and when he does not will, he does not, voluntarily, not compelled or unwilling. Hence the Philosopher, Politics 6, 1[n17]: "To live as one wills, they say, is the work of freedom; for it is the mark of a slave not to live as he wills." In agreement with him is Augustine, Against Pelagius and Coelestius 1, 12. He says: "It is prayed in the Psalm: 'You are sweet, Lord, and in your sweetness teach me your justice'; that is, let me not be forced like a slave, by dread of punishment, to be under the law, but let me delight, by free charity, to be with the law. And he fulfills the commandment freely who does it gladly." And this seems to be the same as what is said in the Sentences of Prosper, in the proposition cited above: "Free always is the service before God, which necessity does not serve, but charity": not necessity, he says, that is, compelling violently, but charity, that is, the love of a spontaneous will, as the first corollary of this also shows. Let no one kick against it by murmuring; for such freedom should suffice every man as his Lord Christ had, has, and always will have, who is subject to the Father in all things, and by a naturally preceding necessity, as 30 of the second and the second of this show. For the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15: "But when all things have been made subject to him, that is, to Christ the Son of God, then the Son himself will be subject to the Father, who subjected all things to him." He is also called the servant of the Father; hence Isaiah 42: "Behold my servant, I will uphold him, my chosen one: my soul is therefore well pleased in him; I have given my spirit upon him, he shall bring forth judgment to the nations." And further on, 53: "The Lord was pleased to crush him in infirmity, and the will of the Lord shall be directed in his hand. By his knowledge shall my just servant himself justify many, and he shall bear their iniquities." Let such freedom suffice for man as there is in the holy Angels and in confirmed men, who are so subject to the divine will that they cannot sin or will to sin, but necessarily imitate it in all things, as all the authorities agree in professing. Hence also Lombard, Sentences 4, dist. 45, says: "They are so bound to the heavenly will that they can will nothing beyond his will." Let it suffice man to be free, like Kings and Princes, who are so free that they nevertheless serve divine providence even in all their deeds, as 27 of the first and the following taught. Let it suffice man to be free with respect to everything short of God, and only the servant of God: a servant, I say, spontaneous, not compelled; to serve him is, as the Church sings, to reign [n18], since very many men are called, and truly are, free who serve and are subject not merely to one but to many higher lords. Hence Augustine, On Free Choice 2, 22: "This is our freedom, when we are subject to the truth, that is, to the true God."

NOTES

1. Potestas does double duty throughout the chapter: "power" (ability to act) and "authority" or "jurisdiction" (the power over subjects of kings, dukes, and angels). English "power" keeps both senses, as in John 1:12, "power to become children of God." I translate it "power" everywhere, and in potestate nostra "in our power."
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ (Savile's "9"); "18" is the number of the Latin text-division Savile uses. The point is that rational powers are powers of both contraries, doing and not doing (Θ.2, 1046b). I keep Savile's numbers (Conventions §5.4).
3. Throughout the chapter huius ("of this") and primi / secundi (without huius) are cross-references. They appear to mean parts or chapters "of this book" (Book 3) and of Books 1 and 2 respectively. I leave them exactly as written, with no expansion (Conventions §5.4).
4. Secundum quid ("in a certain respect") is the counter-term to simpliciter ("simply," without qualification). The chapter's whole solution turns on it. I translate it consistently.
5. Quid nominis: a nominal definition, saying what the word means rather than what the thing is.
6. Subactiva, subexecutiva: Bradwardine's own formations ("subactive," "subexecutive"), meaning acting or executing under the first cause. The next word, subseruiente, is likewise "subserving."
7. "Powers" (Potestates) is the name of one of the angelic orders.
8. This seems to refer to the podestà, the chief magistrates of Italian city-communes.
9. Augustine's text of De correptione et gratia, as usually cited, reads ut divinam voluntatem non impediat, "so that it does not hinder the divine will." Savile's print has impleat ("fulfills"), which I translate. The two readings give a different emphasis, but both construe.
10. The sentence runs across the page turn (675E / 676A). Savile's section letters, and so the block division, cut it here.
11. Cyprian, Testimonia ad Quirinum 3, 4 (Savile's "13" is his own numbering, which treats it as a letter). Bradwardine also uses its heading, "In nullo gloriandum," as a thesis.
12. Luke 19:14 reads Nolumus hunc regnare super nos ("We do not wish this man to reign over us"), the refusal of the higher Lord. Savile's print reads Volumus ("We wish"), which I translate, with sed dicat as "but let him say." The following quod quicunque praesumserit is ambiguous. I take quod to refer to the proud lordship just described ("whoever presumes this"), since the one who says Volumus would not be "subjected" to the divine dominion by 30 of the second.
13. Vulgate numbering: Ps 118 [119]:91; Ps 61 [62]:2 and 6 (the "further on" verse).
14. The print has esto ("let it be subject"), with the variant erit ("will be") in the margin. I translate the main reading. In the keyed text the margins at this place are scrambled: the print has "Psalmus," "‖ erit," "Apostolus," "* tunc" as four separate margin entries. "Psalmus" stands beside the Ps 118/61 citation at the foot of 676D, where the keyed text has no marker. I have kept the markers as given and sorted the entries to the places they belong.
15. The word Si closes the last line of 676, with the catchword autem, and is repeated as si autem at the head of 677 (unit 12). I translate it once, in unit 12.
16. The print appears to read protectus (a misprint); the sense requires profectus, "progress," as Prosper has it. I translate the evident sense.
17. Aristotle, Politics 6, 1 (Bekker VI.2, 1317b); Savile's numbering is kept.
18. The Church's prayer cui servire regnare est ("to serve whom is to reign"), from the collect for peace.