De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 8
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 669B–674E; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/8/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[669B–669E]
CHAPTER 8. He recites six other little replies, and corrects them.

There are also six other little replies, similar on this same point. All of them agree in admitting that the uncreated will precedes the created will in all things, but they diverge further. The first says that something is in the power of the created will because it is in its power that God should will, and pre-will,[n1] its free act. The second posits that a future free act is in the power of the created will because it is in its power to do something from which it follows that God wills this, or does not will it. The third reckons that something is in the power of the created will because, with equal priority[n2] as the uncreated will precedes the created for any free act of its own, the created will can act in the opposite direction, that is, hold back from that act and exercise the opposite act. The fourth asserts that something is in the power of the created will because, although the uncreated will pre-wills that the created will have some certain act for a certain measure of future time, it is nevertheless in the created will's power to dispose itself beforehand in such a way that God does not will this then, and it does not then have that act. The fifth supposes that God does not properly do the act of the created will, but only improperly, namely because he has ordained and wills that it alone, properly and freely, make its own act. The sixth, weaker than the rest, weakly judges that God co-acts and pre-acts properly every act of the created will, but influences so weakly that he in no way necessitates it to act.

The first of these seems marvelous to say, and more marvelous to understand. By the common way of speaking of ordinary people and of the Doctors, nothing is said to be in anyone's power except what is subject to his will and follows his will as its effect, or the privation of its effect, as motion and rest. Hence Augustine, Retractations 1.22: "Nothing is in our power, except what follows our will." He is speaking there of the thing in itself, which follows as an effect, as merit, for example, follows its doer.[n3] But God's willing beforehand the human will is in no way subject to the human will, nor does it follow the human will as an effect; it is the reverse, as 30 of the second demonstrates. Again, nothing is in anyone's power except what he can do when he wills, as Augustine says, On Free Choice 3.3: "I cannot think that anything else is in our power, except what we do when we will." And the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9.10:[n4] "Everything that is capable according to reason, when it desires that of which it has the power, and as it has it, necessarily does this." But no one can make God himself pre-will by willing, because anything that does something precedes its deed by nature. The human will would therefore by willing precede the divine, against the hypothesis and against 30 of the second. It would also be against 23 of the first, since every willing of God is eternal, not made in time by anyone; and because the divine will would then be passible by the human, against 20 of the first book. Again, if God's pre-willing is in the power of the created will, this is either by doing something or by doing nothing. It is not by doing something, as was argued in the argument just before.

[669E–670E]
Moreover, whoever wills and acts is by that very fact necessarily preceded by the divine volition. But what is done first, say the divine volition, whether it then be done or not done, is not in the power of a later agent, since nothing depends on a later action, but the reverse. Nor is it in his power by doing nothing, as no one is unaware. For every not-doing of his own comes from a preceding divine not-doing, by 32 of the second, and this through divine willing, as 22 of the first with its corollary proves. It comes, I say, through the divine willing that naturally precedes that not-doing, by 20 of the second also. And so the argument made against the other alternative returns.

Again, if God's pre-willing is in the power of the created will, then it is so either while the created will is actually willing, or before. It is not so while the created will is actually willing, as they themselves admit, because then that created willing is necessary, by a necessity naturally preceding it. And Lombard says, Sentences 1, dist. 25, that what is in the present is determined, and it is not in our power whether it then be or not be. Likewise, what has already been done earlier, say the divine willing, whether it was then done or not done, is not in the power of a later agent, since what was done earlier depends in no way on the later, but the reverse, as was argued above. Nor is it so before. For then, if a man does as much as he can up to a future instant A, so that God might precede him by willing in instant A, and if God has not willed this, indeed resists and acts with all his strength to the contrary, so it would come to pass, against 10 of the first book. For according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9.10: "Everything that is capable according to reason, when it desires that of which it has the power, and as it has it, necessarily does this." And Augustine says, On Free Choice 3.3: "I cannot think that anything else is in our power, except what we do when we will." Nor can anyone say that this is in a man's power except when he is not impeded. For the Philosopher adds in the same place: "For when none of the external things prevents, nothing further needs to be added: for it has the power as a power of acting. But it is so not altogether, only of those having it in some way, in which the things that prevent from outside are excluded; and some of the things that are added in the determination remove these." Where Averroes also says: "We do not need to add to this, that a power can act, 'unless something extrinsic impedes'; for it suffices in what we say, that the power can act, since when an impediment is present, the power will not be able."

Moreover, it is either in a man's power to remove the impediment of the divine volition and resistance, or it is not. If it is, he can remove it when he wills, so there is no need to add "unless he is impeded." And if he does as much as he can up to instant A in the case laid down, he will necessarily remove it. If not, and unless that impediment is removed, the thing intended will not follow; so it is not in his power that what was proposed should follow. For how is it in the power of the weaker to enter the house of the stronger, bind him, and plunder all his goods? Again, according to this view the will could not freely will anything in the first instant of its creation. Nor could the old will in the first instant of coming of age, or of waking from sleep, or of being cured of madness, because it would not then be in its power that it be preceded by God, nor was it earlier. The eighth truth of 5 of this taught the opposite. Again, suppose the weaker Linus had Peter as his stronger lord, and (to use the words of the Philosopher recited in 1 of this) necessarily followed his pre-will, so that when Peter does not move him he is not moved, and when Peter moves him he is necessarily moved. How would it [even] be in his power to make some motion, say to draw this or that? For how would his lord's pre-will be in his power? Now every rational agent stands thus toward God, as the foregoing attests and the opinion itself confesses. Suppose there were a rational axe or saw, which nevertheless could not cut or saw unless drawn by the preceding will of the craftsman, which it would also necessarily follow: how would it be in its power to split or saw? In just this way every man stands toward God, as Isaiah 10 attests, with the common Gloss and the exposition of Jerome, as 32 of the first recited more fully.

Again, if it is in my power that God should pre-will and will this something, why not something else, and anything whatever? Even if it is in my power that God make me will this something antecedently, under this degree and mode, why is it not likewise in my power that God [at once] make me antecedently will and not will, love and hate, anything whatever, under any degree and mode possible to me through God? Why not, for example, to love God supremely and to love him beatifically, with supreme hatred of vices, along with many similar things which I cannot do at any given time, as everyone experiences? Many passages cited in 46 of the first also bear witness to this; hence the Prophet too: "My soul has longed to desire your justifications," Ps 118 [119]. Again, if some action is in anyone's free power, he is its Lord, as the Philosopher shows, Ethics 3.13, and in many other places,[n5] and as John Damascene, 39 sent., as 28 of the second recalls. But no one is Lord of the free volition of the Lord his God, as no Christian doubts, nor any pagan. For this would greatly detract from his supreme freedom, which the first supposition forbids.

[670E–671E]
Again, the divine will would then be more in the power of man than the will of any lowest servant of his. For no one has a servant so lowly that the servant always follows his will by willing;[n6] indeed, the action of no other created cause is so much in the power of the created will as the action of the divine will would be. For it is not in the power of any created will that some other created cause should act at its every willing. Nor is it in the power of the created will, with regard to any created cause, that the created will should precede that cause in acting, as induction through the individual cases shows. Therefore the free action of the divine will would be more in the power of the created will than any free action, or servile, of any other created cause whatever. This destroys its supreme freedom, or rather is destroyed by its supreme freedom.

Again, how can a superior and prior active cause be in the power of an inferior and posterior cause, the mover in the power of the moved, the one drawing in the power of the one drawn, and its action, already done earlier by nature, indeed already done earlier from eternity, in the power of a cause acting later, naturally and temporally? Again, how can it be in a man's power what God wills, and when; indeed, by 23 of the first, what he willed from eternity, when it is not in a man's power what he himself willed yesterday? For thus the divine will would be more in a man's power than his own will, which reason refuses, and checks, with Augustine, On Free Choice 3.3, saying thus of our will: "Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself." And if it is in a man's power what God has already willed in the past, then, since by 10 of the first God's willing is necessarily followed by his doing when he has willed (for he spoke and they were made), it is likewise in a man's power what God has already done in the past. Suppose God made heaven or hell for you, or some seat here or there, or even a tunic, as he made for Adam, which you have never worn, to the end that you alone should put it on. Then it is in your power that God should now or in the future will you to put it on. Therefore by 23 of the first it is in your power that God ever willed this. Therefore it is also in your power that God made it so, since by 10 of the first God's purpose cannot be frustrated. Therefore it is in your power to make what was done in the past not so done, against many authorities cited more fully in the objections of the sixth of this against the eighth part of the fifth of this.

Here it will perhaps be said that it does not follow that it is in a man's power what God did in the past, but only for what final cause he did it. For it is not in the power of this wayfarer that God made the heavenly seat, or the tunic, but that God made them finally for him, or for his use. For he can act so that he will never finally have this one or that one; and if he does this, God did not make them finally for him, but for some other final cause. But this seems marvelous: how can it be in a man's newborn power what God had intended of old from eternity? It also follows that it is or will be in the power of Antichrist, and of any wayfarer, to make Christ have been incarnated and to have suffered for a different final cause than the one he had. That is, Christ would have suffered to redeem someone whom he did not intend to redeem, and not to redeem the one whom he did intend to redeem, which does not seem consistent with the Christian faith. Indeed it follows that it was and is in men's power to void the whole effect and the whole final power of the Lord's passion: the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, the restoration of the heavenly city, and the completion of the number of heavenly citizens. For men could, and would be especially able, if all had been and were adults, to persist in sinning. And adults could and can fail to help infants who are not adults, so that thus all men would equally be damned. Thus it would be in men's power to make true that impossibility to which the Apostle leads: "then Christ died for nothing" (gratis),[n7] Gal 2, Gloss: that is, in vain, without cause. Moreover, the same can be argued likewise about the human will of Christ, for it is necessarily conformed to his divine will, as 30 of the second and the first of this show.

Again, by the tenth part of the fifth of this, no act of a creature is free simply, with freedom of contradiction; therefore neither is any act simply in its free power. For no act is said to be in our power except one of which we have the power, or capacity, of contradiction. Again, how can anything be in a man's free power, when by the second of this every action of his, or non-action, proceeds from a necessity naturally preceding? Again, according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.17, power is twofold, active namely and passive; and according to the same Philosopher, Metaphysics 9.2, power is likewise twofold, active and passive. So when they say that God's pre-willing is in the power of the created will, they mean either its active power or its passive. If passive, what wonder if the created will can undergo what God pre-wills, when it can not only undergo it but, if God has willed it, will necessarily undergo it? And so God's pre-willing would better be said to be in its necessity than in its free power. For we do not say that anything is in our power which we can only undergo. So if the will were only passive, it would not be of free power, as the corollary of the third of the second showed. If the pre-willing is in its active power, but a power not equally co-active, nor pre-active, as 29 and 30 of the second of this show and the opinion itself confesses, then it is only in a subactive, subexecutive, subservient and truly passive power. But that the created will should sub-act, sub-execute, subserve and undergo, with God pre-willing, is necessary by a necessity naturally preceding, by the second of this. How then is it in its power, unless a preceding necessity is called power? And how, by the common way of speaking, is this in its free power, namely with freedom of contradiction? But let each speak as he pleases, so long as the truth of the matter stands. Yet if anyone wishes to speak as the Fathers did, to whom the oracles of the Lord were entrusted, avoiding profane novelties of words, he cannot say that God's pre-willing, or anything else, is simply in man's free power.

[671E–672E]
For it is written, Tobit 3: "Your counsel is not in the power of man." And Eccl 6: "A man to whom God has given riches and substance and honor, so that nothing is lacking to his soul of all that he desires, and yet God has not given him the power to eat of it." But if man had free power of himself that God should pre-will his eating it, he would likewise have free power of himself that he should eat it himself, and would not need God to grant him the power for this. Again, Num 22: Balaam said, "If Balak gives me his house full of gold and silver, I cannot change the word of the Lord my God, so as to speak more or less." This means more, by cursing the Lord's people, or less, by blessing them; yet he wished to curse and not to bless, as the following history makes clear. And below, 23, Balaam said to Balak: "I was brought to bless." Gloss: "By God, who put the truth in my mouth, I cannot hold back the blessing." Gloss: "For he cannot, even if he wishes, turn the word of God by a human tongue." Again, 1 Esdras [Ezra] 5: "The eye of their God was upon the elders of the Jews, and they could not hinder them." Again, Job 5: "He who scatters the thoughts of the wicked, neither can their hands fulfil what they had begun; who scatters the wise in their craftiness, and the counsels of the perverse." On this the blessed Gregory, Moralia 6.12, speaks thus: "Our action ought devoutly to serve the supernal will once known, and to follow it as the leader of its journey, lest it serve it even unwillingly, if in pride it turns aside from it. For the force of the supernal counsel can in no way be avoided." The authority of the same Gregory, from the twenty-seventh of the Moralia, the twenty-second chapter, set out earlier in the thirty-second of the second, also plainly attests this. Again, Isaiah 14: "The Lord of hosts has decreed, and who can annul it?" Again, Jer 10: "I know, Lord, that a man's way is not his own, nor is it for a man to walk and direct his steps." On this the Gloss says: "Let them be ashamed who say that each is ruled by his own choice: for a man's way is not his own." And Prov 20: "A man's steps are directed by the Lord." Gloss: "Not by freedom of choice." But the thirty-second of the first refutes and convicts the Gloss of the forger.[n8]

Again, the Apostle, Rom 9, speaks thus: "It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy." "It is not of him who wills," says Anselm, On Concord 9, "what he wills, nor of him who runs what he runs." If, then, one's own willing is not in the power of the one who wills, and according to Augustine, On Free Choice 3.3, "Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself," how will God's willing be in the power of each of us? Again, no Christian will presume to say that he has greater power than his Lord Christ. But no act of Christ, nor the will of the Father, was simply in his power, as he himself testifies: "I can do nothing of myself, but as I hear, I judge, and my judgment is just, because I do not seek my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father," John 5. Augustine says this is to be understood of Christ's human nature, as the thirty-second of the second cited more fully. Who, then, among men can do anything of himself? He also attests this most plainly to all, saying: "Not even what is least [is in your power]," Luke 12.[n9] Again, if anything were simply in man's power, this above all would seem to be it, to avoid sin. But if it were, it would be asked in vain of the heavenly Father, saying, "Lead us not into temptation," as was shown at length in 46 of the first; yet this ought to be asked more devoutly by all Catholics, as 4 and 5 of the second of this show. Hence Augustine too, On Grace and Free Choice 29, says: "We say, 'Do not lead us into temptation,' so that sins may be avoided; and we should in no way ask this of the Father who is in heaven if we could bring it about by the power of the human will." Very many authorities cited in the said chapters likewise say as much. Nor can anyone reply by saying that Augustine is to be understood in this way: "If by the power of the human will alone we could bring this about, we should in no way ask for it." But it is not so; therefore the argument does not proceed; because the argument proceeds nonetheless.[n10] For although this is not in the power of the human will alone by itself, but with another, since that other's cooperating with the human will is in its free power, the whole is in its free power. This, therefore, is not to be asked; just as, if a man has a horse, and it is in his power to ride, and it is in his power to have a horse, then it is in his power to ride, so there is no need to ask anyone to ride. Again, no gift of God is simply in man's power, as 23 of the second teaches; but every act of ours is a gift of God, as 20, 23 and 32 of the second show.

[672E–673E]
Again, if God's pre-willing and our free acts were simply in our free power, how would the Apostle by such teaching of his call men back from pride and ground them in humility, as he chiefly intended, as the same 23 makes clear? He says: "Let no flesh glory in his sight; of him you are in Christ Jesus, so that he who glories may glory in the Lord"; and "What do you have that you have not received? And if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received?"; and "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God"; and "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish"; and many similar passages more fully recorded in 23 of the second. Indeed, if it were so, he would do not this but the contrary. For he would give men great occasion for pride if he exalted them so far above God that God's will and action were in their free power. Therefore not so the holy Apostle of God, not so Augustine, not so the other Catholic writers. Rather they deny free acts of men to them, and ascribe them to God, saying: "It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy"; "By grace you have been saved through faith, and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God"; "Neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but God who gives the increase." And according to Augustine, the Apostle ascribes that very thing, that this one plants and that one waters, not to them but to the Lord, as 23 of the second recited with many similar passages. To these the thirty-second of the second adds similar ones recited from the Gloss: "It is not you who work, but God who works in you"; from Cyprian: "In nothing may we glory, since nothing is ours"; from Anselm: "It is not of him who wills what he wills, nor of him who runs what he runs"; from John about Caiaphas: "This he did not say of himself, but prophesied"; and from the Lord Jesus Christ: "You did not choose me, but I chose you"; "It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father." How, then, are all these things in the power of men, when they are simply denied to them and granted to the Lord? Hence also Acts 4: "We cannot but speak of what we have seen and heard." Again Augustine, On Nature and Grace 27: "The other vices," he says, "have force only in evil deeds; but pride alone must be guarded against even in good deeds. Hence they are warned lest, by ascribing the gifts of God to their own power and exalting themselves, they perish more gravely than if they had done no good; to whom it is said: 'Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who works in you both to will and to work.'" The same, On the Gift of Perseverance 18: "He who stands, stands by the will of God; for God is able to make him stand; not, then, himself, but God. Yet it is good not to be high-minded but to fear, as the Apostle says: 'We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.'" Following him, the blessed Ambrose also dares to say: "For our heart is not in our power, nor our thoughts," which everyone who is humbly and truly pious perceives to be most true. Ambrose said this in the book he wrote On Flight from the World, teaching that this world must be fled not with the body but with the heart, which he judges cannot be done except by the help of God. And after citing the Prophet, who says, "Incline my heart to your testimonies, and not to greed," Ambrose adds: "For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power; thus it is not in the power of men but of God that men should have the power to become sons of God." This seems to be founded on that passage, John 1: "He gave them power to become sons of God, to those who believe in his name," a power he would not give them if they had it of themselves. Hence Augustine too, Retractations 2.1: "We do not say," he says, "that anything is in our power except what happens when we will, in which first and above all is the willing itself; but this very power, too, for living well, we receive from above." Hence also the same, On Free Choice 3.29: "Man," he says, "does not have it in his power to be good, whether through not seeing what he ought to be, or through seeing it and not being able to be such as he sees he ought to be." He does not retract this in Retractations 1.9, but recites it approvingly against the Pelagians. The same, On Rebuke and Grace 70, writes thus: "It is not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth has done whatever he willed, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills; since even with the wills of men themselves he does what he wills, when he wills. Unless perhaps, to recall some among many, when God willed to give Saul the kingdom, thus it was in the power of the Israelites to submit themselves to the man mentioned or not to submit, which indeed was [not] placed in their will, that they could even resist God;[n11] yet he did this only through the wills of the men themselves, having without doubt over human hearts, to incline them where he pleases, the most omnipotent power." Augustine says, then, that God has power over human wills, but that man has power over the divine will he nowhere affirms; rather he often hints the contrary. Indeed here he teaches expressly that when God willed to give the kingdom to Saul, it was not in the power of the Israelites to submit themselves to him or not to submit. So much more was it not in their power that God should will this or not will it. Therefore by the same reasoning no willing of God is simply in a man's power, and no act of a man either, nor non-act, since both of these proceed from the divine will naturally preceding, as 30 and 32 of the second with the corollary of 22 of the first clearly show. So much, then, against the first little reply of these. The second can likewise be corrected by the same means. For that God wills and pre-wills the act of the created will is either in the power of that created will itself, or not. If it is, this reply falls into the former. If not, then since from God's willing and pre-willing anything to be done in any way it necessarily follows, by 10 of the first, that it be done in that way, it is not in the power of the created will to will or not to will.

[673E–674E]
For in a necessary consequence, if the antecedent is not in anyone's free power according to contradiction, neither is the consequent; and if the consequent is in anyone's free power, so likewise is the antecedent. Suppose, then, that you can do something from which it follows that God does not will your free act. Either you can do that thing alone, without divine co-action or without divine pre-action, or you cannot, except with God acting with you and also pre-acting. If without divine co-action and pre-action, why not likewise your other acts, which 20 and 32 of the second also do not allow? But if you cannot do that act except with God acting with you and also pre-acting, how is that act in your free power? If it is through another such prior act, the same must be asked about that one; and if you refuse, since you cannot go on to infinity but must stop finally at some act, the question is put about that one and the argument made as above. Moreover, how is it in your power what you will and do immediately after this present instant? For you cannot do in the present anything other than what you now do.

Moreover, according to what was shown earlier, one who is created, or has come of age, or is waking, or is cured of madness in the present instant can freely will in that same instant, and was never before able freely to do anything; whence it would follow that God does not will that he act so, now or earlier. According to this opinion too, moving or not moving, striking or not striking would be in the power of the hand and the staff, and sawing or not sawing in the power of the saw, in the power, that is, of contradiction. For it can do something or not do it, such an action, that is. From this it plainly follows that it moves, strikes, or saws, or does not. This is most evident if hand, staff, or saw be imagined rational and of free will in such a way that they cannot move originally from themselves, but only when the man or craftsman pre-moves them, whose pre-motion they necessarily follow, as was touched on above. About Linus and Peter likewise disposed a like argument can be made, as was also made against the immediately preceding reply. Moreover, the same can be argued about the Sun and Moon, especially supposing, according to the opinion of some, that they are animate with a rational soul and that they move voluntarily, though not solely nor first from themselves, but by a superior mover, say an intelligence or God himself voluntarily pre-moving them, whose pre-willing and pre-motion they necessarily follow. It can be argued that it is in their power to move from East to West, or conversely to proceed or retrograde, to cause an eclipse or not, to move or stand still, in accord with what was touched on above in the thirty-second part of the first corollary of the first. For by the power of the superior mover they can do something from which this or that follows. The third reply can be corrected like the second.

Moreover, if with equal priority as the uncreated will precedes the created for the production of its free act, the created will can not produce that act, then it can do this either by doing something or by doing nothing. If something, then either it can do this something from itself alone, without God also co-acting, against 22 of the second; or it cannot do this something except with God specially co-acting the same, and also pre-acting. In that case the whole difficulty returns, namely how that doing, that action or act, is in the power of that created will. But if it is said that it can do this by doing nothing at all, namely by in no way producing that act, then either that non-production can be its own from itself alone, without God causing it and naturally pre-causing it, against 13 of the first and 32 of the second; or it cannot, except with God likewise co-causing it and naturally pre-causing it, and then the former difficulty returns. Moreover, if acting is in the contradictory power of the created will, so is not acting; and if acting is in the power of the created will on account of the cause stated, so is not acting on account of a like cause. For, namely, with equal priority as the uncreated will precedes the created for freely not acting, the created can act in the opposite direction, that is, freely act. Either it can do this from itself alone, or it cannot, except with God properly co-acting, and also pre-acting, etc., as above. The fourth reply can likewise be corrected like the second. The fifth reply is rejected by 22 of the second and what follows, and it does not avoid the difficulty either. For if God has ordained and wills that the created will alone do the act, since by 10 of the first it necessarily follows from this that it so do it, and the antecedent is not in its free power, then neither is the consequent, as was argued above. The sixth reply, finally, is refuted by 10 of the first book.[n12]

NOTES

1. Praeuelle ("pre-will") is Bradwardine's term for God's willing prior to, and as cause of, the creature's willing. It belongs with praeuoluntas ("pre-will"), praeuolutio ("pre-willing") and praeagere ("pre-act"), and with coagere ("co-act"). I keep these as terms of art, with "pre-motion" for praemotio, and do not paraphrase them.
2. Aeque primo, literally "equally first". The third reply holds that the created will has its power to the opposite at the same first order of priority at which the uncreated will precedes it, so that no priority of the divine will removes that power. The phrase recurs in the correction below (c8.28–29).
3. "& loquitur ibi de se, qui sicut effectus, vt puta meritum sequitur effectorem." The relative qui has no clear antecedent. I take it as quod and de se as "of the thing itself": Augustine is speaking of what follows the will as an effect. The alternative, "of himself," is possible but leaves qui unconstrued.
4. Savile's book and chapter numbers for the Metaphysics (9.10, 5.17, 9.2) follow the medieval Latin chapter division and are kept as he gives them. The passage cited at 9.10 is Met. Θ 5 (1048a); I take 5.17 to be Δ 12 and 9.2 to be Θ 1, but I have not checked these two. The citation of Averroes is to his commentary on the same book.
5. "Ethic. 3.13" and "Damascene 39 sent." are kept as Savile gives them. The Ethics reference is evidently to the discussion of the voluntary and of what is "up to us" in Nicomachean Ethics III; Damascene's sent. is not expanded in the print.
6. "qui semper voluntatem suam volendo sequatur". The suam can only refer to the master (the man of the argument), not to the servant: no one has a servant who always follows the master's will as and when the master wills. I translated the clause literally, "follows his will by willing," so that the ambiguity of volendo stays visible.
7. Gratis mortuus est (Gal 2:21), with the Gloss "that is, in vain, without cause." The gratia/gratis family is in play, but here gratis has its sense of "for nothing," so I render it "for nothing," glossed by "in vain."
8. Glossam autem falsigraphi: "the Gloss of the forger." A falsigraphus is a forger of texts. The sentence does not identify him. The thirty-second of the first is also cited above (c8.9) for the common Gloss on Isaiah 10. I take the reference to be to the falsified gloss attacked there, but I have not verified it.
9. Luke 12:26 in the Vulgate reads neque quod minimum est potestis. The print has potestatis ("of power"). The evident sense is "not even what is least [is in your power]," and I translate that.
10. "Sed non est ita; Ideo ratio non procedit; quia ratio nihilominus procedit." The voices are mixed. I read "But it is not so [that we say the will does this alone]; therefore the argument does not proceed" as the objector's rejoinder, and "because the argument proceeds nonetheless" as Bradwardine's answer, which the following Licet enim sentence supports. The margin variant non minus (672D·2) confirms the sense "just the same." The main text can be construed, so I do not adopt the variant.
11. As printed, "sic erat in potestate Israelitarum subdere se … siue non subdere, quod vtique in eorum [non] erat positum voluntate" is awkward. The sic, and the bracketed [non] in the print, sit uneasily with Bradwardine's own conclusion in the next sentence (non fuit in potestate Israelitarum subdere se ei siue non subdere). I translate the print as it stands, keeping the square brackets, and do not emend.
12. Savile's margin carries the bare numerals 4, 5 and 6 beside the lines where the fourth, fifth and sixth replies are dealt with (674D, 674D, 674E). The keyed text did not treat them as margins. They survive only as the digits glued to the unit addresses (see Errata). I list them here without markers, since none were given in the Latin.