De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 6
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 658A–668B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/6/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

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CHAPTER VI. He objects and replies.

Someone will perhaps object against what has been said. Against the first point, shown in the previous chapter,[n1] he will object in this way: Let it be posited that John, contingently and equally, does not will A.[n2] Then, by conversion through opposite qualities, it follows that John, contingently and equally, wills A. Therefore John's willing A is equally contingent. Therefore, by the third and fourth of this book,

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it is the case that John wills A; therefore John wills A; therefore John at once wills A and does not will A. Likewise, a pure negation posits nothing; therefore a negative about what is contingent to either alternative does not posit an affirmative; therefore it is not truly converted into one in any way. To the first of these it must be said that the statement "It is contingent that John, etc.," and any such statement, can be taken in two ways, namely de inesse and modally.[n3] Taken de inesse, it signifies that the contingent, or some contingent thing, is John's willing, and so the argument proceeds. But this does not stand in the way of the conversion stated, because that conversion takes place only in propositions taken modally, and so it does not signify that something contingent is John's willing, but that John can will to either alternative. And if it is objected, by the rule of the Grammarians, that every verb of the third person can be resolved into its participle of the same tense and the verb "is," so that it necessarily follows, "It is contingent that John wills, therefore a contingent thing is John's willing," I say, so far as the present point is concerned, that the rule is true when the verb is taken categorematically and de inesse: for then it signifies the inherence of the participle of such a verb in the other extreme expressed in the proposition. But when the verb is taken modally, that rule has no place: for it does not signify that a contingent thing belongs to something, or something to it, but that something can contingently belong to another, for instance, willing to John. It must also be noted further that this statement is likewise to be distinguished: "A contingent thing is John's willing," and any similar one, because it can be taken de inesse or modally. If de inesse, its sense is plain from what has been said. If modally, then "contingent" is not taken there as one extreme of the proposition, but is like a copula properly connecting the extremes of the proposition; and these two words, "is contingent," are taken for "it is contingent that" (contingit), that is, for the single mode by which it is signified that willing can belong to John. So too this statement, "It is possible that Antichrist will be," is to be distinguished in like manner, because it can be de inesse or modal. If it is de inesse, it signifies "a possible thing is Antichrist's being to come," as if one said "a possible thing is wood," "a possible thing is an animal"; that is, some possible thing, or some possible entity, is wood or an animal. But if it is modal, its sense is known. The second is easily resolved, since all those converse and converting statements about the equally contingent are affirmative: for it does not follow, "It is contingent that John wills, therefore it is not contingent that John wills"; but, "therefore it is contingent that John does not will," which affirms like the first. Hence the Philosopher says in Prior Analytics 1, in the chapter on the contingent: "It happens that all propositions that are according to the contingent are converted into one another; I mean not affirmatives into negatives, but whatever have an affirmative form, in respect of the opposite, such as 'It is contingent to be' into 'It is contingent not to be.'" Against the second it is objected in this way: In such a consequence the opposite of the contingent consequent stands as of now with the antecedent; therefore the consequence does not hold as of now. I reply at once by denying the assumption: for the opposite of the consequent does not stand as of now with its antecedent, but as of now it can stand; and therefore, as of now, the consequence is not necessary, but for now can fail to be valid. Just as this consequence is good as of now: "Everything that will run is A; therefore John is A," if he himself is going to run; which can nevertheless fail to hold for now, because John can for now be one who will not run, and so not be contained under the subject of that universal; hence also the opposite of that consequent does not stand as of now with the antecedent, but can stand for now. It does not stand, I say, unless that is said to stand which does not conflict in a consequence necessary simply or as of now. But since there is another good consequence besides such a one, namely one good contingently, so too there is another conflict besides such a one, namely a correspondingly contingent conflict. Since, then, the matter is settled, there is no need to labor in vain over words. Against the third this is urged: If some active cause is undetermined to acting, there is no cause or reason why it should act rather than not act; therefore it acts and does not act at once, or neither acts nor does not act. To this third, however, the third of this book and the thirty-fourth part of the first corollary of the first of the first reply. Against the sixth the Philosopher seems to stand expressly, in Prior Analytics 1 and On Interpretation 2.[n4] For according to his teaching it plainly follows: "It is contingent that it be; therefore it is contingent that it not be; therefore it is not necessary that it be," and conversely. "It is necessary that it be; therefore it is not contingent that it not be; therefore it is not contingent to either alternative that it be." Each of these two, therefore, plainly infers the contradictory of the other. On this it must be known that all contingency to either alternative excludes some necessity and conflicts with it, and conversely likewise. Hence, just as there are two kinds of necessity, namely antecedent and consequent, as the second of this book taught, so too there are two kinds of contingency to either alternative. One is taken properly and strictly; it excludes only naturally antecedent necessity and conflicts with that alone, as is plain from the definitions of the equally contingent and of naturally antecedent necessity set out in the fourth and second of this book. But this contingency does not exclude consequent necessity, nor conflict with it. The other is contingency to either alternative called improperly, commonly, and broadly, which excludes from the contingent both the aforesaid necessities and conflicts with both. And so, according to the Philosopher, nothing actually existing or not existing is said to be contingent for the present, because according to him, in On Interpretation 1, last chapter, "That what is, is, when it is,

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and that what is not, is not, when it is not, is necessary," namely of consequent necessity, as the second of this book showed. But according to the same author in the same place, only the future is said to be contingent in this way, for the future. For the future contingent itself, although for now it is necessary that it not be, by this consequent necessity, because it now is not, yet for the future, according to him, it is necessary by neither necessity that it not be, or not be going to be, or that it be or be going to be; but, by way of the opposite of each,[n5] this and that can happen equally. Directly against the seventh goes the authority of the Philosopher with the exposition of Boethius, in On Interpretation 1, last chapter, adduced in the third of this book for the first opinion, plainly implying that contingents are found only in propositions about the future. Here one could reply, as Anselm seems to have replied in Cur Deus homo 2, 17, by saying that Aristotle erred here, because by positing that everything that is, when it is, is of necessity, he seems to have destroyed the contingent to either alternative, since necessity and contingency to either alternative seem to conflict with each other. Hence Anselm, having distinguished necessity there into antecedent and consequent, as the second of this book set out,

adds concerning consequent necessity: "This is that necessity which, where Aristotle treats of singular and future propositions, seems to destroy what could go either way, and to assert that all things are from necessity." Yet lest I, so simple-minded,[n6] contradict so great a Philosopher, and very many philosophical men, flatly and without qualification, I say that contingency to either alternative, for our present purpose, is taken in two ways: properly and strictly, and commonly or broadly, as the preceding reply distinguished. The first is said properly with respect to the present; the second with respect to the future, as was shown in the previous chapter; and this I judge to be the mind of the alleged authority of the Philosopher. Against the eighth tell all the things adduced against the seventh, since all freedom is contingency, as the fourth of the previous chapter demonstrated. Likewise all necessity conflicts with freedom; but by the authority of the Philosopher so often recalled, "That what is, is, when it is, is necessary"; therefore with respect to any present thing there is necessity, not freedom. Likewise, one who works freely is either said to work freely because now he can freely work and not work, or because earlier he was freely able, for the present moment, to do both. The first cannot be said, on account of the authority set out above; there remains therefore the second, which proves that freedom is said only with respect to the future. Likewise Averroes, on On the Heavens 1, the next-to-last comment, supposes and says expressly that all power is with respect to the future. Likewise Hugh, On the Sacraments, bk. 1, part 5, ch. 22, says and proves that freedom is not with respect to the present, but only to the future. Following him too, the Lombard, in Sentences 2, dist. 25, says thus: "It must be known that free choice is not referred to the present or the past, but to future contingents: for what is in the present is determined, nor is it in our power that it then be or not be when it is." These objections are easily resolved by a distinction about freedom similar to the distinction about contingency touched on above. For freedom, taken in customary speech, excludes necessity and conflicts with it; and this too can be taken in two ways, namely properly and strictly, and commonly or broadly. Properly, it excludes only naturally antecedent necessity and conflicts with it, as is plain from its definition, which the corollary of the fourth of this book set forth; but it does not exclude consequent necessity, nor conflict with it, but is compatible with it, embraces it, and includes it, as is plain from the corollary mentioned, with the corollary of the first of this book added. Freedom, then, so taken, is said per se primo and properly with respect to the present; but taken commonly and broadly, and according to the vulgar transference of the term, it excludes all necessity, both antecedent and consequent, and so, supposing that famous saying of the Philosopher, "That what is, is, when it is, is necessary," it is said not with respect to the past or present, but only to the future. The objections adduced against the seventh are thus resolved, and so is the first that follows against this eighth. But when it is asked why one who works freely is said to work freely, I say that he is so said properly because he works from a power naturally preceding his operation, which being posited, together with all the dispositions naturally prior to the work, it does not necessarily follow that he works, but both working and not working can equally stand; as the corollary of the fourth of this book shows by the contrary case of irrational agents, which, when they can, act necessarily by natural necessity naturally antecedent, as the same fourth chapter taught. Now this natural priority is the thing about which many contend, saying that whoever works freely was earlier able to work freely and not to work; which has something false in it, and something true. For if the verb "was able" signifies a power temporally preceding, it is false, as the proofs of the eighth part of the previous chapter showed; but if it signifies a naturally preceding power, namely that whoever works freely has a power naturally preceding his operation, from which he does not work necessarily by naturally antecedent necessity, but with which working and not working stand together, it is true, as the foregoing have taught. Hence John Scotus[n7] also, on Sentences 1, dist. 39, immediately after his saying about the same distinction, recited in the proof of the seventh part of the previous chapter, adds: "There is therefore a power of the cause toward the opposite of what it causes, without succession; and that real power is the power of what is naturally prior, as of a first act, toward opposites which are naturally posterior,

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as of a second act. For the first act, considered in that instant in which it is, being naturally prior to the second act, so posits it in being as its effect contingently, and as naturally prior could fail to posit it, and instead posit the opposite in being." The authorities adduced proceed by the second part of the distinction about freedom set out above. I wonder, however, at Averroes saying that power exists only with respect to the future, since the text of the translation which he expounds says thus: "For power is not in past time, but in the time in which 'now' is said, and in future time"; and of the new translation, thus: "For there is no single power of what has already come to be, but of what is, or is going to be"; hence it seems that the Philosopher favors the contrary opinion more. Against the ninth, in this way: Some creature so acts that, with its acting power posited together with all the necessary natural and supernatural concurring factors naturally prior to the action, the action does not necessarily follow, but both action and non-action can equally stand; therefore, by the definition of the equally contingent set out in the fourth of this book, that action is simply equally contingent;

for otherwise every acting creature, if it is not determined naturally, is determined of itself by something else, namely by the divine willing, which is necessary with respect to this action; which seems to have been condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris,[n8] in this form: "What by its own nature is not determined to be or not to be, is not determined except by something that is necessary with respect to it"; and again in these words: "that no agent stands open to either alternative; rather, it is determined." It must be said that this argument assumes something false, as the proof of this ninth shows, nor does the condemnation of the article stand in the way. For the article posited universally that everything which by its own nature, etc.; hence the condemnation denies it universally, and does not affirm the opposite of any singular instance, but the particular opposed to it, for some singular instance. And this is verified by God's outward willing, though not essentially according to what it is, since so it is the very essence of God, but only relatively, namely in so far as it is a willing directed outward. For such a willing of God is not by its own nature determined to be such a willing or not to be, nor is it determined by anything that is necessary with respect to it, as the eleventh part of the previous chapter demonstrated; and by this same answer the other condemnation is also avoided. But another answer, and a good one, must be made on behalf of those condemnations: that those articles spoke of necessary determination through lower or secondary causes. This is plain from certain other articles condemned immediately afterward in the same series, of which one says that the will is of itself undetermined to opposites, like matter, but is determined by the appetible object, as matter by an agent; another, that the will, while a passion and particular knowledge remain in act, cannot act against it; another, that will and intellect are not moved in act by themselves, but by an eternal cause, namely the heavenly bodies; and again another, that man's will is made necessary by his cognition, as the appetite of a brute is. Hence it is manifest that this condemner denies that the human will is necessarily determined by any lower or secondary causes, but not that it is so determined by the divine will, since in the same series, condemning another error, he says thus: "that all voluntary motions are reduced to the first mover: error, unless it is understood of the first mover simply uncaused, and understanding it of motion according to substance, not according to deformity."[n9] And earlier he condemned another error, saying, "that human acts are not governed by divine providence." Against the tenth the same can be objected as was objected against the ninth: some rational and free creature so acts that, with all higher and lower causes naturally prior to its free act posited, it does not necessarily follow that it acts, but both acting and not acting can equally stand; therefore, and so on, by the corollary of the fourth of this book. For otherwise, with all causes and dispositions naturally prior to the creature's free act posited, it would necessarily perform its free act: which seems

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condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in these words: "that, with the will existing in such a disposition in which it is naturally apt to be moved, and the mover so disposed that it is naturally apt to move, it is impossible for the will not to will." These objections are resolved entirely as the foregoing. For this article meant to say this universally of any will whatever, which is false for God's outward will, as the twelfth part of the previous chapter shows. More truly, however, to the mind of the condemner and of the condemned, as I judge, it can be said that the article is spoken of disposition through lower and secondary causes only, so that, the will and the object being sufficiently disposed according to causes of this kind, it would be impossible for it not to will. For the article posited, as it seems, a will merely passive, or at least one that necessarily undergoes its willing from the object. Hence it says, "with the will existing in such a disposition in which it is naturally apt to be moved" (to be moved, it says, not to move), "and the mover so disposed that it is apt to move," that is, sufficiently and necessarily from itself; just as another article also affirmed more expressly, which the same man on another occasion

condemned, saying thus: that free choice is a passive power, not an active one, and that it is moved of necessity by the appetible object. Likewise, that the article just mentioned speaks of disposition through lower causes only is plain from many other articles placed in the same series and speaking so. For this article is placed among those recited just above, where another also says thus: "Appetite, impediments ceasing, is necessarily moved by the appetible object"; and another, that "a man acting from passion acts under compulsion"; and another, that "After a conclusion has been reached about something to be done, the will does not remain free"; and again another, that "The will necessarily pursues what is principally believed by reason, and cannot abstain from what reason dictates; this necessity, however, is not compulsion, but the nature of the will"; and still another asserts that "our will is subject to the power of the supercelestial bodies." This condemner, therefore, denies, as regards the human will, a necessity according to lower or secondary causes, not according to the higher causes and the first, but this he concedes, as the article adduced for the proof of the ninth part of the previous chapter shows. Against the eleventh this is urged: Where there is greater mutability, greater contingency is found; but in creatures there is greater mutability than in God, or in the divine will, as the fifth and twenty-third of the first teach. It must be said that the consequence made does not hold. For although there is varied mutability in creatures, and none in God or in the divine willing, yet all the mutability of the creature is necessarily subject to the immutable divine willing, as the thirtieth of the second and the tenth of the first teach. But the outward willing of God itself is subject to no antecedent necessity, as the proof of this eleventh demonstrated; hence in the former some antecedent necessity is found, but in the latter only the purest contingency. Moreover, against this eleventh, and the twelfth and thirteenth, a grave objection is urged in this way: Every divine will or willing is acted or produced, and is an acted or produced thing; therefore through some acting or producing naturally antecedent to it; and, such acting or producing of that will or willing being posited, it necessarily follows that it is acted or

produced. Therefore every act of the divine will is produced from naturally antecedent necessity, and is necessary in that way, and none is simply equally contingent, nor free in respect of contradiction,[n10] namely with the freedom according to what was set out above. Moreover, God produces every act of the divine will voluntarily; therefore he wills, naturally before he produces it, to produce every such act, and is able, naturally before, to produce it; therefore every act of this kind is produced from naturally antecedent necessity, according to the foregoing, etc., as before. On the first of these it must be known that some hold that action and passion are relative things, or are nothing but pure relations. But to the more learned I think it is clear that relations of this kind follow action and passion naturally, and are caused by them. For which reason others judge that action and passion are absolute things according to their essence, yet necessarily coupled with relations; and of these some think that action and passion are different things in essence, absolutely, because they are different categories; while others hold that they are the same thing, and the same really and

absolutely, but differ relatively. For an act, and a motion, has one relation and one denomination as it proceeds from the agent, and another as it is received in the patient; just as the radius of the world, with respect to its upper point, is called descent or "downward," but with respect to the center is called ascent, or "upward"; as also the relation between first and second, and likewise between one and two, is one proportion in so far as it is of the first to the second, or of one to two, and another in so far as it is the reverse. And this seems to be the opinion of the Philosopher in Physics 3, 18,[n11] and in the text that follows, and of Averroes in his commentary on On the Soul 2, 137 and 138, and of Averroes likewise in the [Physics] commentary. In agreement with these is Anselm, On Truth: "In many ways," he says, "the same thing receives contraries according to different considerations, which often happens in action, as in striking. For striking belongs both to the agent and to the patient, so that it can be called both action and passion, although according to the very name actio or percussio, and those which are similarly formed from passive forms and used in an active signification,

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seem to belong more to the patient than to the agent; for it is according to what it does that things seem more properly to be called agentia and percutientia, and according to what it undergoes, actio and percussio.[n12] For agentia and percutientia are named from the agent and the striker, as providentia from the provider, and continentia from the container; and these, namely agens and percutiens, providens and continens, are active; whereas actio and percussio[n13] are derived from actus and percussus, which are passive. But since, to speak of one case so that you may understand it of the rest, just as the striker is not without the struck, nor the struck without the striker, so percutientia and percussio cannot exist without each other; indeed, one and the same thing is signified by different names according to different parts. Therefore percussio is said to belong both to the striker and to the struck; wherefore, according to agent and patient, it is subject to the same judgment [indifferently], or to contrary ones. The action itself, too, will be judged from either side alike or contrariwise." But these matters seem to me truly too lofty, too subtle, and too fertile to be worthily explained by me, especially here, in a few words; nevertheless the second opinion recited seems to me, this time, the more probable.

For from the first, by the argument earlier objected, which this opinion too admits, it seems to follow that in actions, in doings or agencies, there is an essentially ordered process, in respect of below and above, in respect of naturally prior and posterior, that is infinite. For if it does not follow, let A be the first doing, or first action, or agency; then A is done or produced, and is an acted or produced thing; therefore it is so through some doing or producing naturally antecedent to it, as the adversary argued. A, therefore, posited as first, is not first; indeed one must necessarily ascend, by a similar argument, infinitely above A. Someone perhaps will not fear to concede this; but how then will the second supposition of the first of the first stand? And how do all the Philosophers abhor an actual infinite process, especially in essentially ordered things in the manner stated? Does not the Philosopher too, in Metaphysics 2, 10, rejecting infinite process in formal causes, say thus: "But of that of which there is no first, there is no next either";[n14] "next" (habitum), that is, something that stands in sequence to another; which Averroes and all the expositors unanimously

attest. According to this opinion also there would be no first action or production in the divine realm, but before any understanding and willing, before any generation and spiration, there would be others without end. Moreover, according to this opinion God, creating or doing anything anew, would be changed: for he would receive and have a new action, which he never had before. For this opinion posits that the action is in the agent, as the passion is in the patient, as it is also necessarily compelled to posit; otherwise, in everything moved there would necessarily be two motions or movings, which not even almighty God could separate from each other. There would also be, in such new creations and actions, created and acted simultaneously in time, a process in respect of prior and posterior, below and above, naturally infinite. For that creation or action would be created or acted through another preceding it causally and naturally, not temporally, and that through another, and so on, ascending infinitely upward. From whom, moreover, would God receive this new action anew?

Not from any lower agent, because of the seventh part of the first corollary of the first, and because then that action of the creature would causally and naturally precede that action of God, and conversely. For every action of a creature is from God the Agent, as the preceding chapters taught; or else there will be, in such essentially ordered actions, a multitude infinite beyond number. Moreover, if a new creation or action is in God creating or acting anew, there is also in him likewise a new relation, by which he is referred to his creature or the thing done, and hence also a new change. By this argument Augustine, in On the Trinity 5, last chapter, considers that he demonstrates that no new temporal relation happens to God anew. There would also be, in such essentially ordered relations, a process infinite beyond number. For that relation is created or acted by God, so that God too is referred to it, as creating or acting, through another relation, and to that, through another, by a similar argument, and so on beyond all number and measure. Further, suppose a luminous carbuncle covered up, illuminating nothing outside itself, that is newly uncovered and illuminates the air; it has now, therefore, a new action, a new intrinsic illumination within itself; but from where? from what agent? Not from itself alone: for why now rather than

before, since it is an irrational agent, of non-elective and unfree action? Nor from the air: for the air receives its passion from the carbuncle, nor can any way be assigned by which the air could cause that illumination of the carbuncle, except by way of reflection or reaction; but the action of the carbuncle is causally and naturally prior, as is plain. Moreover, those actions of the carbuncle and of the air would act upon and cause each other mutually; hence they would causally and naturally precede and succeed each other mutually; or else an infinite process in such things will be posited, and the carbuncle does not receive this new action from anything else. For from what? If you say, from God, then God himself likewise receives at that moment a new action, contrary to the foregoing. Moreover, if God performs that action in the illuminating carbuncle, and that passion in the thing illumined, since these are absolutely different things, and neither is a part of the other, nor is anything

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of the one part of the essence of the other, it seems that almighty God could separate them from each other, and make and preserve either without the other, especially the prior thing without the posterior, which includes a contradiction. Moreover, God also makes future things be future, by 14 of book 1; therefore by some making, and not a new one, because then they would have newly begun to be future; therefore by an eternal one. Something else, therefore, other than God, and corruptible, is coeternal with God or prior to God himself; and the same is plain in a similar way of futurity. God also makes some things that are always non-existent always not to be, as appears from 32 and 33 of the second; therefore it is clear that it is through some making, and not a temporal one, but one simply coeternal with God. If these things were true, God could not create anything unless he annihilated something else, namely the making by which he previously made it not to be, and to be future, and its futurity. Further, almighty God could not annihilate anything unless he at once created something else, namely an annihilation, and a relation between the annihilator and the annihilated. Indeed, not even almighty God, creator and preserver of the whole creation,

could annihilate the created totality of things; for if he could, let it be posited: God then annihilates the world, and is annihilating and an annihilator; therefore through some active annihilation and a relation now made. It will perhaps be said on their behalf that creation and making of things in God is his eternal will or willing, and likewise as to annihilation; but how? For either, when God creates something anew, say the world, his eternal willing is an eternal creation, or a new one. Not eternal, because then he would have created eternally, and the creature would likewise be coeternal. If new, by what is that will then creation, and not before? Either by something eternal, or by something new. Not eternal, because then creation would have been eternal; nor new, because then that new thing is created by God, and God creates it, and is creating, prior by nature to its being created or being. That willing of God also is produced, therefore through some antecedent producing, and that through another by a similar argument, and so on, as above. And moreover, by what is God's eternal willing or nilling a new thing, an annihilation new at this moment?[n15] If it is likewise so in God, why not, by like reasoning, may any created active thing, rational

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…or non-rational, sufficiently disposed for acting, act without any new action newly produced in it? Perhaps you will object that an agent of the designated action A, which is posited as the first action in God and therefore the first simply of all actions, is constituted in the being of an agent. It would be so constituted through something formal, through some formal cause or some form of whatever kind, as the Wise Man speaks where he says, "I became a lover of her form," Wis 8, and the Apostle in Phil 2, "who, though he was in the form of God." But that formal thing, or form, cannot be posited as the action A, since it is naturally posterior to this being an agent. For by the fact that God is an agent the action A is produced and caused, and nothing can be posited except an action; for what else would be posited? There is therefore some other action naturally preceding the action A. For the form by which something is formed precedes its formed thing causally, hence also naturally, though not temporally. On this it must be known that "action" and nominal verbals of this kind can be taken in two ways, actively and passively. Taken as proceeding from the active thing or agent, it can fittingly be called agency [n16]. Taken as received in the thing acted upon or patient, it is called action or passion. Further, according to what can be had from the Philosopher, Phys. 3, where above, and Met. 5, 20 [n17], and from Anselm where above, it must be noticed that when the active thing or agent produces some acting or moving, some action, act or motion, it also in a certain way co-produces two relations. One is the relation of action, the active relation, insofar as the acting, action, act or motion proceeds from the active thing or agent and is thus referred to it. The other is the relation of passion, the passive relation, insofar as it is received in the thing acted upon or patient and is thus referred to it. Indeed, if anyone looks more subtly and examines more diligently the things themselves, and Aristotle and Averroes and Anselm where above, it will appear that there is one relation of the active thing or agent to the act, insofar as it acts or causes, and another conversely, of the act to the active thing or agent, insofar as it is acted or caused. So the relation of the father to the offspring or son, paternity, is one, and the son's to the father, filiation, another; and likewise in other cases, which can fittingly be named by the names above or by other similar ones, and these relations are sometimes called by the names of action and passion. In God, however, though there is acting, action and act, being acted upon or passion should not properly be posited, but something similar to passion, such as reception or conception, or whatever similar thing might be better said. Hence, according to the opinion of the ancients, God was named with the names of both sexes: not only as begetter, insofar as he begets and acts, but also as genetrix, insofar as he conceives and conserves his own action, his own immanent act, as the first of the first more fully shows. Hence also Jer 50, "Hear the counsel of the Lord, which he conceived in mind" [n18]. And Prov 8: "The Wisdom of God says, the Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways; I was ordained from eternity; the abysses did not yet exist, and I had already been conceived; before the hills I was being brought to birth" [n19]. With these things premised, it can plausibly be said that the agent of the first action A is constituted in the being of an agent by his first acting. For in some way he seems to act before being an agent. The first seems to be the active thing, the second acting, the third being an agent, not in time but in nature or causally.

[663D–664B]
Or otherwise it can be said that the agent is constituted in the being of an agent by that aforesaid relation of action, the active relation, so that the first is the active thing, the second acting, the third that relation, the fourth, in this order, being an agent. Thirdly it can be said that it is not wholly clear that nothing is formally denominated in any way by something unless that thing was first so in nature. For something is said to be about to be formed from the future form which it will receive, and what is about to make is referred to what is to be made. It is named "about to make" from the future making, as also one building, one hatching chicks and one breeding offspring are named from that same chick and offspring that are to be, through the actions which they perform to bring these finally to completion. Many natural things, and others, are also quite often named from their effects and from their accidents. Is not God too called Creator or creating through something posterior in nature? Let the first thing created by God in the natural order be taken; for such a first must be granted. Otherwise, before every creature and creation there would be another prior to it causally and naturally, without end, against what has gone before. Let B, then, be the first thing created by God. God is therefore named and called Creator or creating: from what form, and through what formal thing? Not through anything uncreated and eternal, because then he would have been Creator eternally. Therefore through something created: through B, say, or through something posterior to B itself. But B, and everything posterior to it, is causally and naturally posterior to God's creating and being creating; for this is the cause of B and of what follows.

[664B–664C]
If, moreover, God were to annihilate all posterior things, by what formal thing, naturally preceding, would he be the annihilator, or annihilating? Not by an eternal one, because then he would have been annihilating eternally; nor by a newly arisen one, because that thing would then be annihilated, reduced to nothing and to non-being. And by these perhaps and similar reasons it can be shown that active creation, or creative agency, is not in the creator (unless perhaps originatively, or rather originatingly [n20], as, in the manner of speaking of the Philosopher, Phys. 4, 23, "the things of the realm are in the King," and motion in the first mover; or, according to another translation, in the first moving thing; and, according to Averroes, "the things are in the agent"; because then something would newly befall the Creator intrinsically, and depart from him, and he would be changeable) but only in the created thing. And it is shown that relations do not have a really positive existence from absolute things, or one wholly different from related things, as is posited by some.

[664C–664D]
Further, perhaps you will object, arguing that creative agency is in the creator, because nothing is constituted, informed or formally denominated by an extrinsic form outside itself, whereas the creator is constituted, and in a way informed, and formally denominated by creative agency; therefore creative agency is in the creator. But is not an external work, in moral matters, called good, and is it not good, on account of the goodness that is in the agent, namely virtue, intention and the other morally required things? Is not also, in truth and according to the Philosopher, Met. 5, 20, a thing said and held to be seen or known on account of the sight or knowledge existing in someone? Is it not also the case, according to the Philosopher, Phys. 5, 10, and according to Averroes in the Commentary, that sometimes something is denominated in some way newly in relation, not by any new form or change in itself, but in the other term of the relation? In agreement with this Augustine, De Trin. 5, last chapter, shows that God is said to be newly Lord of this thing, our refuge and Father, not through something that newly befalls him relatively, because then he would be changeable, as I argued above, but only for that thing to which it is thus newly said relatively.

[664D–664E]
But perhaps not even so will you cease to reply, but will say: To beget and to be begotten, to act and to be acted upon, to strike and to be struck, to teach and to be taught, are not the same but different, as also to be begetting and begotten, agent and patient, striking and struck, teaching and taught, as is clear to everyone. To this it can briefly be said that to beget and to be begotten, and the other such pairs, are the same thing, and the same in reality absolutely; they nevertheless have the aforesaid different relations, and according to those correspondingly different denominations. But to make this clearer it must be noticed that a man who strikes moves his arm and sword, or whatever instrument he applies to the blow, while the one struck receives the passion and suffers the wound or blow. Now that moving in the striker and the sword seems, by common judgment, to be only striking, not being struck; but that being moved, receiving or suffering in the one struck seems to be only being struck and in no way striking. Looking more subtly, however, it will appear that that moving in the striking arm and sword is not without being moved, inseparably annexed to it and fixed in them. Nor is that being moved in the one struck without the moving annexed to it. Indeed, according to the premises, that moving and being moved are the same in reality, not different. This is perhaps clearer if someone in a void [n21] were to strike with his hand a stable and solid stone, not yielding, nor moved by any kind of motion. For then that moving and being moved, striking and being struck, would be in one and the same, and one and the same thing in reality absolutely, yet would be denominated by different names on account of the aforesaid different considerations, relations and respects. Wherefore it is not the same to be begetting and begotten with respect to the same thing. The begetter is called, and is, begetting through his begetting, that is, through that aforesaid active or causative relation; but the begotten is called, and is, begotten through his being begotten, that is, through that passive relation premised, the relation of being caused [n22].

[664E–665A]
With these things now premised, to the first of the principal objections it must be said that it seems to presuppose something false. For it seems to presuppose that everything that is acted or produced is acted or produced through some acting or producing naturally preceding it. This seems false, because then in such actions or productions there would be an infinite regress, ascending simply, against the premises.

[665A–665B]
Then too there would be no first production in the divine persons, nor any first thing produced, but before any and every one there would be infinitely many others, and other infinite things. How then, according to philosophy and theology, "In the beginning was the Word," that is, the first of all things produced? Nay, not even one production, nor one thing produced, precedes the Word and Son of God, as I think all Catholic writers unanimously profess. Nay, it was also condemned at Oxford [n23] that, since God the Father is prior to the Son in origin, in that prior stage he could have produced something before him. Perhaps you will further reply, The Word of God is produced; therefore through some preceding producing. But who will presume that the Son in the divine persons is removed from the Father so far as to set up one bridge, wall or boundary, any middle between them, posterior to the Father and prior to the Son? Who takes away from the Word of God and the Son the beginning, the primogeniture, and the primacy of all things produced? Is not that producing too, by which you labour to have the Word of God produced, similarly produced? Wherefore, and (to strike you with your own sword) through another preceding producing, etc., as above.

[665B–665C]
Wherefore, with the better opinion of my elders always saved, it seems it can be said not improbably that the Word of God is not only the first thing produced, but also the first producing and the first production in the divine persons, though with the aforesaid considerations, relations or respects in some way different. In the same way there is the understanding one and the understood, and indeed understanding and being understood, in modes in some way other or different, as Averroes too, albeit stammeringly, touches on in Metaph. 12, 39. Is not the Word of God the most perfect word? Hence also the most actual, and what word is more actual than the actual speaking itself, or the actual utterance? Hence also, according to the Philosopher, Met. 12, 51, and according to Averroes, God is understanding, that is, the action or agency of the one understanding, in Anselm's aforesaid manner of speaking; indeed also understanding and being understood, according to the same there. But what person is more worthy of this than the Word? In agreement with this the Wise Man also says, "The sun of understanding," he says, "has not risen for them," Wis 5 [n24]. That is, the sun of understanding is the sun which is understanding, speaking intransitively. Hence also Job 12: "With God are wisdom and strength; he has counsel and understanding." On which Gregory, Moralia 11, 4: "These," he says, "we understand, not inappropriately, of the Only-begotten of the supreme Father." And is not Wisdom the action or agency of the Wise One, as understanding is of the one understanding, and providence of the one providing? Hence also the Wise Man says of uncreated wisdom that it is a certain pure emanation of the clarity of almighty God, Wis 7. That the Word of God is also his actual speaking, and not only its terminus, appears from Anselm, Monol. 33, who says: "By no reasoning can it be denied that when a rational mind understands itself by thinking, its image is born in its thinking; indeed, that the thinking of itself is its own image, formed in its likeness as if from its impression. A rational mind therefore, when it understands itself by thinking, has with itself its image born of itself, that is, the thinking of itself, formed in its likeness as though by its impression; and this image of it is its word."

[665C–665E]
In this way, then, who would deny that the supreme wisdom, when it understands itself in speaking, begets a consubstantial likeness of itself, that is, its Word? Anselm also, below, 48, and afterwards at length, compares the trinity in our mind to the supreme Trinity in God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In the mind, namely, it remembers itself, thinks or understands itself, and loves; it is mindful, and thus, thinking or understanding itself and loving, it has remembering of itself, thinking or understanding, and loving. He compares these three, in order, to those three; and he says very often that the Son is the understanding of God the Father. In this part he also follows Augustine, De Trin. 10, chs. 10, 11 and the last; 11, chs. 1 and 2; and 14, chs. 3, 6 and 8. There Augustine likens to the divine Trinity the trinity found in our mind, namely remembering, understanding and willing, memory, understanding and will, and body, sight, actual vision, together with the will, or intention of the will, coupling these to each other. He likewise likens actual understanding and actual vision to the Son, the Word of God. Perhaps you will object, Any producing of God is produced; therefore through some preceding producer, and through some preceding producing: for through what else could it be produced? But reply has been given earlier.

[665E–666A]
For the first producing of God is produced through something productive in some way preceding, and not through some preceding producing. Yet, as it seems, that first producing of God is prior to the produced. For first of all seems the productive, second producing, and consequently the active relation of production and being a producer, and the passive relation of production and being produced. But neither will it help if you do not cease objecting, saying, "That producing is produced; therefore through something; what is that?" If "through" signifies a productive or active cause, then it is through God's productive faculty [n25] and his active power. If it signifies a formal cause, it has no produced formal cause prior to it, but is itself the first form produced, as appears also of the first act of an angel or of a man. Wherefore Augustine too, in the 83 Questions, question 23, says that the likeness of the Father, namely the Son, is the first species and the first form, by which all things were specified and formed. Yet, in order to resolve the first principal argument more absolutely, it must be especially noticed that God's willing outward is produced by God's understanding in some way proceeding, but that understanding does not necessarily cause that willing, as the preceding sections make plain.

[666A–666B]
For the second principal argument it must be known that willing in God is twofold: inward, namely, and outward. Inward, by which he wills and loves himself; outward, by which he wills and loves external things, makes them, and conserves them. And God produces each of these willings voluntarily, but in different ways. The first he produces voluntarily, because through his own will, spontaneous, not unwilling nor violently compelled, yet not freely with freedom of contradiction, but necessarily, with the opposed necessity [n26]; so too he breathes forth the Holy Spirit, who, according to the premises and according to Augustine, De Trin. 15, 20, is most properly called the will of God, as also charity. The second willing God produces voluntarily, because through his own will, spontaneous, not unwilling, but free according to contradiction, as the preceding sections have taught. Nor does it follow from this that he wills to produce every such act naturally before he produces it, any more than it does of a man willing something. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress in such willings, against what went before; indeed, to produce such an act voluntarily the will suffices, that is, the volitive power sufficiently disposed.

[666B–666C]
But here someone might press the point, not improbably, as follows. Let A be God's first willing outward. God therefore produces A; therefore through something naturally preceding it; and through what, if not through another willing with respect to it? And Anselm says, De casu Diaboli 12, that whatever moves itself to will first wills itself so to move. Again, God wills A. For he wills and loves all the goods which he has, and, as it seems, more and more dearly wills and loves any good of his own intrinsic to him than any other, extrinsic good, than a fly, or a leaf, or a straw; therefore also first in natural order. Further, by the twenty-second of the first, God wills each act of his own willing. He wills therefore this act of his willing through another, and that one through another, and so always thereafter. God therefore has simply infinite acts of willing, and not wholly disordered and confused, because of the premises, the first, and the twenty-sixth of the first [n27]. Therefore each act of this kind is naturally preceded by another such act, and that by yet another such, and thus infinitely, ascending simply. Therefore each act of the divine will is produced by another act preceding it, and with that posited, given God's full power, it necessarily follows that it is produced. Therefore each act of the divine will is produced from a naturally preceding necessity, etc., as above.

[666C–666D]
On these points it must be known, that some do not shrink from conceding such an infinite regress in God's willings. But has it not been shown above that there is no infinite regress in things essentially ordered in act according to under and over, or according to prior and posterior in natural order? According to these men, too, in efficient causes or agents essentially ordered in the aforesaid manner there is a simply infinite regress, since each such willing of God is an active cause, and an agent of this extrinsic effect, or a cause of its being. Further, since each such willing is a certain form and species, there is likewise an infinite regress among formal causes, against Philosophy and very many philosophers in many places. And who doubts that God wills himself before anything outside himself, since he is the end of all things, and is intended as end first, and the rest on account of the end? Wherefore the Wise Man also says wisely: "The Lord has made all things for himself," Prov 16. Let A therefore be the willing by which God wills himself, and B the willing by which he wills immediately to produce this effect. B is then produced through another willing immediately prior, and that through another, and so on, ascending upward infinitely in such willings, all of which are posterior to the aforesaid willing A. But how, when termini and extremes, namely A and B, are posited, are infinitely many actual middle terms, essentially ordered, interposed, and this in agent, formal and final causes, against the Philosopher, Metaph. 2, 5? And further: wherever it is possible to take two extremes of some things essentially ordered in act in serial order of prior and posterior, is it not possible to take all the middle terms as well? Hence there is also some whole multitude of those extremes and of all the middle terms together, and that is necessarily simply infinite, against what was premised in the fortieth part of the first, and in the seventh chapter of the first book.

[666D–667A]
Let C, moreover, be that total multitude. Than the multitude C, then, there can be, and is, some multitude greater, and some also smaller, and nonetheless infinite. Why then is it of such a determinate quantity? It seems also that a smaller would suffice; why then is this so great one posited superfluously? Further, according to these men, there is no first contingent as to either alternative, or equally, nor any first act free with freedom of contradiction. Nay, according to them no act is simply equally contingent, nor free simply according to contradiction, but each is in a certain way necessary, from a naturally preceding necessity. For let an act A be given that is simply equally contingent, and simply free according to contradiction, in God. But A is one willing of God, or one act of willing. So, by the hypothesis, God has another willing preceding with respect to it; and, with that preceding willing of God posited, given God's full power, it necessarily follows that A is produced. A, therefore, according to the premises, is a necessary act, from a naturally preceding necessity, and is not simply equally contingent nor free.

[667A–667B]
To this, however, since according to the premises the Holy Spirit is properly called will, charity and love in God, who would dare to say that he is not the first will, charity and love in God, but is preceded by infinite others, by one other will, by another charity, or by another love, produced before him causally, or by something produced? For as the Son of God is the first word and the first act of the divine intellect, so the Holy Spirit is the first of the divine affection. Since therefore the Holy Spirit is the first will of God proceeding from God, by which he wills himself, there is some will of his, immediate and proximate, proceeding from it and following it, by which he wills A or any other designated thing. For as one other divine will immediately precedes this last will, by which God wills immediately this designated thing, so, as it seems, by like reason some other will immediately succeeds that first divine will; so such middle wills are not infinite, by the premises. If, moreover, there is an infinite regress of this kind in God's willings, there is also in his intellections, or acts of understanding, similarly, as it seems, by like reason. For the intellection of a stone in God is begotten or acted; therefore through some preceding begetting or action, and so always ascending upward infinitely, as these men argue about the divine willings. For what other action than intellection would be posited, that action through which intellection is generated, against the premises? Then too there would be no first Word of God, but before any, infinite others. In that case too there would be no first forms of things in God, no first species, ideas, exemplars, nor any original and primary reasons. I think, therefore, that the answer must be otherwise.

[667B–667C]
When therefore it is urged, God produces A, his first willing outward; therefore through something naturally preceding it: it is true, through the intellection and the volitive power, in some way causally preceding it. And if you reply, God produces A; therefore through something preceding, with which posited it necessarily follows that A is produced: it is not true, as the foregoing sections declared. Anselm can also be expounded as meaning that whatever moves itself to will first wills itself so to move; that is, it first has a habitual volitive will so to move.

[667C–667D]
To what is argued consequently, that God wills A, namely his first willing outward, before that extrinsic thing willed, in nature, there can be many answers. First, some would say that even if he wills A before that thing willed which is B, nevertheless it is not through another willing but through the same. They would say moreover that he loves and wills himself and the rest by the same love, just as he also speaks himself and the rest by the same Word, as Anselm teaches, Monolog. 33 and 34. Further, if someone wills and loves A more and more dearly than B, it does not follow that he wills and loves A before B in natural order, as is plain of things not ordered to one another, in love and in parts [n28]. Indeed, to some perhaps it would seem that if A is God's willing outward with respect to the willed B, and God wills one of these first, he wills B in a way before A, insofar as A is such a willing. For in all things willed and ordered in a series, the earlier is seen to be willed on account of the later rather than the reverse. Let C therefore be God's willing by which he wills A, and prior to A according to the hypothesis. Of these three, therefore, posited in the series C, A, B, A seems willed on account of B, not conversely.

[667D–667E]
Who indeed would say that God or a man wills the object on account of the very willing of the object, rather than the reverse? Nevertheless it seems to me that God wills himself first, and secondly the rest to and on account of himself. Nor does it seem to me necessary to posit any middle will between these. For I do not dare to lift my neck so far as to deny that almighty God can, after the willing by which he first wills himself, will immediately in the second place extrinsic things, or something extrinsic, in relation to himself. If anyone, however, is God's counsellor to such an extent that he dares securely to posit a middle will between these, by which God wills himself to will extrinsic things, let him avoid an infinite regress in such essentially ordered wills, and the superfluity of positing more where fewer suffice. According to him it seems to follow that only such a middle willing, if it is one, or the first of all (if they are many, yet finite), is simply equally contingent, and simply free according to contradiction. The other side, however, I reckon more true.

[667E–668A]
As for what is finally objected, that God wills each of his wills, and so has an infinite multitude of wills essentially ordered according to prior and posterior, under and over: it can similarly be objected about the divine cognition that, because he knows each of his cognitions, he therefore has infinite cognitions of this kind. How, moreover, does it follow, "God has infinite ordered wills, therefore ordered in this order," always, that is, ascending upward from the will taken? For why so rather than descending downward, as seems more to be the case with cognitions of cognitions in him, or at least in creatures? Or why so rather than proceeding coevally, coequally or collaterally, as seems to be the case with his infinite proper willings in respect of the infinite points on a circular line, or in respect of infinite units conjoined to each other according to no causality, dependence or essential order?

[668A–668B]
It could be said otherwise: that God wills himself and all the rest, and each of his wills, by the same will, just as he also speaks himself and all created things by the same Word, as was said above. Nevertheless, by multiplying and in some way distinguishing the divine will according to the multitude and distinction of things willed, according to respect, consideration or even reason, just as Plato and the ancients multiply and distinguish the divine cognition through ideas, forms, species, or even reasons in the divine mind, according to the multiple multitude and distinction of things known; just as also Augustine, imitating Plato in this part, in the 83 Questions, question 46, says: "It remains that all things have been established by reason, and that man is not made by the same reason as a horse; for it is absurd to suppose this. Each thing therefore has been created by its own reasons; and where are we to think these reasons are, if not in the very mind of the creator?" So, I say, by multiplying and distinguishing the divine will, it can be said not improbably that God wills this thing through one will proper to it, and wills that will or willing through another, and so on infinitely. Yet these wills are not essentially ordered in ascending upward, according to posterior and prior, under and over, but are collateral to one another and coeval, as was said above of the infinite wills of points and of units. To someone, however, it might perhaps appear by no means impossible that in such wills and complacencies there be an infinite regress according to prior and posterior, descending downward in a certain way. For such a regress does not compel the denial that there is some first act, contingent and free, and simply equally contingent and free, nor does it lead to the other inconveniences touched on before. And perhaps it was in view of these wills so wonderfully multiplied that the Prophet said, "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out for all his wills" [n29]. Whether, however, all such wills in God are anything at all can be inquired into by disputation, as was inquired about his cognitions in the seventh of the first.

NOTES

1. The objections run through the numbered parts of the previous chapter ("Against the first," "…the sixth," "…the ninth"), and Savile's margin repeats them ("Against 2," etc.). Cross-references are kept as Savile has them. Huius is rendered "of this book," so "the third of this book" is evidently ch. 3 of Book III. "Of the previous chapter" renders proximi. "Of the first of the first" renders primi primi and is evidently Book I, ch. 1. So "the thirty-fourth part of the first corollary of the first of the first" is I.1, cor. 1, part 34.
2. Contingens aequaliter is the same as contingens ad vtrumlibet: contingent in equal measure toward either of two opposed outcomes, as the definition in ch. 4 has it. I render ad vtrumlibet "to either alternative," and vtrumlibet as a noun "what could go either way."
3. De inesse is a plain, non-modal assertion that a predicate belongs to a subject. Modaliter is the contrast: "contingent" then modifies the link between subject and predicate. The whole reply turns on this contrast, so the Latin term is kept in italics. Categorematice (taking the verb as a term that itself signifies) is translated "categorematically."
4. Savile's peri hermenias 1 and 2 follow the medieval division of Aristotle's De interpretatione into two books. "Book 1, last chapter" is the chapter on future contingents (De int. 9, 19a23 for the sentence quoted at 659A–B).
5. Per oppositum vtriusque aequaliter potest contingere hoc et illud. I take it as follows. Since neither necessity binds the future contingent, each of the two alternatives remains equally open, because the opposite of each stays possible. The Latin is terse, and I have kept its wording.
6. Ego tam simplex simpliciter contradicam. I take simplex as the speaker's modesty ("I, so unlearned") and simpliciter as the adverb ("outright, without qualification"). The doubling may also be meant as a play on the two words.
7. John Duns Scotus, on the Sentences (book 1, distinction 39), as Savile's reference has it. The passage quoted is the one Bradwardine had cited in the previous chapter, in the proof of its seventh part.
8. Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, whose condemnation of 1277 listed some 219 propositions. Bradwardine quotes them by their wording, not by number. The two quoted here, and those in the series that follows, belong to that list.
9. Deformitas is the moral defect of a sinful act. The qualification allows that voluntary motions are traced back to God as first mover in respect of their being (substantia), but not in respect of their sinful deformity.
10. Liber contradictionis: free in respect of contradiction, i.e. able to do or not to do, to choose either of two contradictory alternatives. This is the freedom defined in the earlier chapters of this book.
11. Physics III.3 (202a13–b22), where Aristotle argues that action and passion are one motion, differently described. Savile's "3. Phys. 18" gives the medieval text-and-comment numeration.
12. The argument turns on Latin word formation. Nouns in -ntia (agentia, percutientia, providentia, continentia) come from present participles, which are active. Nouns in -tio / -sio (actio, percussio) come from perfect participles (actus, percussus), which are passive. Hence actio and percussio sound as if they belonged to the patient, though they are used actively. The Latin words are kept in italics because English cannot show the derivation.
13. Savile's print has actio vero et passio ab acto et percusso. But passio cannot be derived from percusso, and the pair actio / percussio has just been set against agentia / percutientia. The sense requires percussio, and I translate so. Anselm's text, which Bradwardine is following, very probably reads that too.
14. Aristotle, Metaphysics α 2. Habitum renders Greek echomenon, "next in the series," "that which is held in sequence" (from habere). The gloss that follows in the text ("something that stands in sequence to another") is Bradwardine's own. The print has a question mark after nec habitum est, probably a stop; I have read it as a statement.
15. Per quid insuper nouum est volutio seu nolutio Dei aeterna, annihilatio modo noua? The construction is compressed. I read it as parallel to the creation case just above ("by what is that will then creation, and not before?"). The question is how God's eternal willing or nilling comes to be a new thing, an annihilation that is new now; modo is taken as "now."
16. Agentia and, below, creantia are Bradwardine's abstract nouns for the active relation of the agent (or creator) to its act. They are kept apart from actio and creatio, which in the passive sense name the act as received in the patient. "Agency" and "creative agency" are used for the active pole, "action" and "creation" for the other.
17. Savile's Aristotle references (Phys. 3, Met. 5, 20; Phys. 4, 23; Met. 12, 39 and 51; Metaph. 2, 5; and so on) are book and text- or comment-numbers of the medieval Latin Aristotle with Averroes' Commentary. They are kept as printed and not converted to Bekker numbers.
18. The Vulgate of Jer 50 [:45; cf. 49:20] reads audite consilium Domini quod init. Bradwardine's quod mente concepit is his own rendering, chosen to support the point about divine conception.
19. Prov 8:22–25 is spoken by Wisdom, and the Vulgate has "Dominus possedit me." The print punctuates "Sapientia Dei, dicit Dominus, possedit me," which taken literally makes "says the Lord" a parenthesis. The evident sense is "The Wisdom of God says: The Lord possessed me," and the English follows that.
20. As printed, the parenthesis opens at nisi and closes after mutabilis, so it contains both the exception and the reason for it. Principiatiue / principiantiue mean "as in a principle, as originated" and "as originating." The quotation that follows, "the things of the realm are in the King," is Bradwardine's illustration of that way of being "in" something.
21. In vacuo is ambiguous. It may mean "in empty space" or "in the air," that is, without any instrument. The point of the example is that the stone does not move, so that moving and being moved can be seen to belong to one and the same subject. The English keeps "in a void."
22. Passiuam seu causatiuam: causatiuam here means the relation of being caused (cf. agitur seu causatur above), as against the actiuam seu causatiuam of the agent.
23. Bradwardine gives no date or article. The reference is presumably to one of the thirteenth-century Oxford condemnations; it is not identified here.
24. The Vulgate of Wis 5:6 reads non est ortus nobis, "has not risen for us." Savile's eis, "for them," turns the words of the wicked into indirect speech. The English follows the print.
25. The print has productiuum, a noun, probably "what is productive" (the margin offers productionem). Dei productiuum is rendered "God's productive faculty." The words that follow, et potentiam eius actiuam, support this.
26. Necessitate opposita: the necessity opposed to freedom of contradiction, that is, a necessity that excludes the power to will the opposite.
27. The cross-reference propter praemissa primo, et vicesimo sexto primi is elliptical in the print. It is kept as written: the premises "first" and "the twenty-sixth of the first."
28. Inordinatis ad inuicem in amore et in partibus: things not ordered one to another, whether as objects of love or as parts. One may love one more than the other without its being prior in natural order.
29. The Vulgate of Ps 110 [111]:2 reads exquisita in omnes voluntates eius. Bradwardine's argument depends on taking voluntates as "wills," plural, rather than "wishes." The English keeps "wills." In the next sentence aliquae sint omnes huiusmodi voluntates is loose. It is taken as asking whether such wills are real things (aliquae) in God at all.