De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 53
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 872A–876C; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/53/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[872A]
CHAPTER LIII.

Against ready accusers, easy judges, and headlong condemners; and he sets down 36 articles which seem to him erroneous, humbly entreating the authority of the Church to determine the truth.

[872B–872E]
With these matters finished, by God's grace, I look back, and look back again, upon the dreadful magnitude of this most perilous sea. The pestilent Pelagius, together with his pestiferous Pelagians, has been swallowed up by its whirlpools,[n1] and we, with the Lord as leader, have now been carried across into the safest little boat of Peter, giving manifold thanks for manifold grace.[n2] I return to my own mind and turn over what I have set forth; I ruminate and chew it. I consider also, within myself, the greatest possible difficulty of the matter (or rather of the matters), the greatest possible variety of opinions, and no small vanity in those who hold them. I believe firmly, and judge without doubt, that many ready detractors will accuse me in many ways, judge me lightly, and perhaps condemn me headlong. But did not our Fathers, ancient and recent alike, before the law, under the law, and under grace, and indeed our Master and Lord Jesus Christ himself, suffer like things from like men, as not a few histories bear witness, and the opening of this book touches upon?[n3]

And who am I, so small, rottenness and worm, that I should be reckoned comparable to men so great and of such a kind? Why then should I fear to suffer with them, or shrink from being troubled, so that at least in this way, though very unlike them and at a great distance, I might deserve to be compared with them? Nevertheless, let whoever has thought that I err (at the urging, I ask, of Timaeus, and on the advice of the Apostle)[n4] consider, and consider again and again, and by considering take note that he himself is a man like me, ringed about with weakness, subject to vanity, liable to wander in many ways; and let him take care lest perhaps he himself err. One thing I know: if I err, I err very plausibly,[n5] since I am not alone but with many great approved Authors, and with many great plausible arguments, not easily to be rejected. One thing also I humbly ask and require: that whoever has contended that I err weigh our reasons and authorities and the contrary ones,[n6] those that buttress the opposed opinions, in an impartial and just balance, not a favorable or crafty one, and embrace the better-proved opinion. For I think confidently, indeed I seem to know, that if for the opinion of the opposing party there were as many and as strong arguments, and as many authorities so full of marrow, so harmonious, as there are for the opinion of this party; and if for this party there were such withered arguments, and authorities so lean and so discordant, as there are for that; then that opinion would long ago have been solemnly canonized, and this one solemnly stoned. And the contrary qualities of these opinions seem clearly to show this as well: that the more vehemently both opinions were lately put to the test, and the more diligently they were proved, in the long and frequent scholastic crucible, the more this one always appeared brighter, like gold, and that one duller, like brass or dross.

Nevertheless, because I by no means reckon myself of so great authority, nor am I so drunk in judgment as to suppose even slightly that so great a cause could be finally decided by so small a man as I, and the mouth of those who speak iniquities be stopped, I implore the Church on the bent knees of my heart. I implore especially the Roman Church, which is known to flourish in supreme authority and to be governed by the spirit of wisdom, that she may deign to determine what is to be held catholically concerning the foregoing; for one does not go astray in such matters without danger. Simon, are you asleep?[n7] Rise, I beg you; draw the sword; cut off every sinister thing of heretical depravity; defend and protect the catholic truth. Moreover, even if the Lord himself sleeps in Peter's little boat, overcome by the excess of the storm, I shall confidently rouse him too, that by the breath of his mouth he may still the storm and make the sea tranquil and calm. But far be it that he who laboured wakeful at the prow of this little boat should now sleep, or doze, on the pillow at the stern; unless perhaps for this reason: that, weighed down beyond our strength and so recognizing our own weakness, we may cry out to him more fervently, knock more attentively, seek help more diligently, and, having found it, hold it more lovingly and embrace it more dearly. But although I would desire with great longing that each and every one of the matters set forth above should deserve the Church's examination, I beseech with my whole heart, suppliantly, and especially concerning the 36 articles written below, which seem to me erroneous, that whoever has erred, whether I (as I fear) or another (as I think), may be clearly led back to the path of truth and be unswervingly confirmed in it.

[873A–873B]
That God is not so perfect and good that something more perfect and better could not exist.[n8]

That something exists, God in no way conserving it.

That something exists, God in no way conserving it immediately and per se and properly, but only by means of the heavens or something else and through it; whether because he prohibits corrupting agents, or because he permits the thing to be, or does not destroy the thing when he could.

That some created or creatable thing could exist altogether without divine conservation, or at least without immediate divine conservation, per se and properly.

That something comes to be, according to its essence or substance, God in no way making it.

That something comes to be, according to its essence or substance, without God immediately, per se and properly making it, but only by means of the heavens or something else, and through it; or God merely keeping off contrary hindrances, or only on the ground that its efficient cause was made, conserved, permitted, or not hindered by God.

That something could come to be, according to its essence or substance, God in no way making it, or at least God in no way making it immediately, per se and properly.

[873B–873C]
That God is in some way mutable.

That God's knowledge, or his will, is in some way mutable.

That God, in knowing, willing, or doing anything intrinsically, is not always intrinsically equally, supremely, and most fully actual.

That God's knowledge is caused by the later things known.

That God's will, or willing, is caused by the later things willed by it.

That the act of the divine, angelic, or human will is nothing.

That an act of the created will comes to be, according to the essence or substance of the act, from that will, God in no way co-acting it.

That an act of the created will comes to be, according to the essence or substance of the act, from that will, without God immediately, per se and properly making it, but only by means of the heavens, general influence, the object, or something else of the kind, and through it; or only for this improper reason, that God made or preserves the created will which produces that act, does not destroy it or impede it, but permits it to be and to operate, or because he keeps it from being impeded by others.[n9]

[873C–873D]
That when God and a rational creature jointly produce their free act, the creature acts it prior by nature to God; and that the created will precedes by nature in acting, as mistress, and the divine will follows it by nature, as handmaid.

That for God to will beforehand this, that is, to will it first by nature, or to have willed first from eternity this or that, present or future, is or was in man's free power of contradiction.[n10]

That the first cause, or the divine will, is in the free power of the later cause, or created will.

That the grace by which we are saved is not given by God freely, simply speaking, but is procured by some previous merit, great or small, condign or congruous.

That the divine will can be impeded, and is not universally efficacious in causing.

That for the divine will to be unfrustrable and necessary in causing, with respect to all its effects whatever and to all later causes whatever, and for all its effects to be necessary with respect to it, it is not sufficient that it be the first cause by nature and, being in the power of no other cause nor of any other causes, unimpedible and universally efficacious in causing.[n11]

[873D–873E]
That it is not necessary that God created the world, was incarnate, or redeemed man, nor that God wills this, or even willed it.

That the divine will, with respect to future contingents, as long as they are future, is free with freedom of contradiction, and not necessary; but when they become present or slip into the past, it ceases to be free with this kind of freedom, and begins to be necessary with the opposed necessity with respect to them.[n12]

That the divine will is not always equally free or equally necessary with respect to any whatever of its objects, and any whatever intrinsic act of its own.

That it is not necessary that God know or have known, of any present or past thing, that it is or was.

That God's knowledge, with respect to future contingents, as long as they are future contingents, is contingent, not necessary; but when they become present or pass into the past, it ceases to be contingent and begins to be necessary with the opposed necessity with respect to them.

That God's knowledge is not always equally free, or equally necessary, with respect to any whatever of its objects; and that the divine intellect, or God, by no means remains from eternity intrinsically most fully uniform, namely always equally free, or equally necessary, with respect to any whatever intrinsic act of his.

[874A–874B]
That although Christ, according to his human intellect, will, and tongue, in their own kind, distinctly knew, or believed, through natural human acts, and likewise willed, and asserted and swore with living voice, that the Sacraments of the Church would last until the end of the age, that there would be a general resurrection of the dead, and that they would have eternal punishment or glory, it is nevertheless not necessary that he knew, believed, willed, asserted, or swore that. Or, as some say more sophistically, that although Christ, according to his human intellect, will, and tongue, thus knew, believed, willed, asserted, and swore any of these things, and did so in a general, plain, simple, absolute sense,[n13] it is nevertheless not necessary that he knew, believed, willed, asserted, or swore this in that sense; but it is contingently possible that he did this not in that sense but in some parabolic, mystical, conditional, or other such sense.

That even if Christ, according to his human nature, through natural human acts, distinctly knew, believed, willed, asserted, and swore, concerning some future contingent, that this will be, then, as long as that remains a future contingent, it is contingent and free according to contradiction, and not necessary, that Christ thus knew, believed, willed, asserted, and swore it; but when that thing becomes present, or slips into the past, it is not contingent or free that Christ so acted, but necessary with the opposed necessity.

[874B–874D]
That it was and is in man's power to deceive Christ according to the human nature assumed, the union remaining; to make him believe what is false, to lie, to will vainly, and in repugnance to the divine will. Or, as certain subtler men in their own eyes[n14] do not fear to assert, that it was and is in man's power to do something; whence, together with certain other truths, it follows that Christ, according to his human nature united [to the Word], was or is deceived, by believing what is false, that he lied, or actually willed to lie,[n15] or wills vainly and in repugnance to the divine will.

That it was impossible that Christ, according to his united human nature and in its own kind, have natural, proper, and distinct acts of knowing or willing with respect to some things placed in man's power, or some things that will come about contingently or not absolutely necessarily; or that it was possible that Christ, according to his united human nature and in its own kind, be deceived in believing, and err in willing, namely will that to be done which would never be done, and will in repugnance, or in disagreement, to the divine will; will, I say, by rational will, not by sensual or carnal appetite.

That the prophecies about Christ, before their fulfilment, were not necessarily to be fulfilled; and that in the intervening time between the cleansing or sanctification of the Blessed Mary and of the holy Fathers of the Old Testament in the faith of Christ the future Redeemer, and the passing and salvation of those same Fathers, and the Passion of Christ, it was not necessary that they had been cleansed, sanctified, or saved through faith in Christ the future Redeemer; or that it was possible that they had been cleansed, sanctified, and saved through a feigned, false, erroneous, and lying faith.

That the prophecies and promises of Christ, before their fulfilment, were not and are not necessarily to be fulfilled.

That all the aforesaid prophecies about Christ, and all the prophecies and promises of Christ about future things, although they seemed verbally absolute, were nevertheless tacitly conditional in the mind, and none simply absolute.

That it is not necessary that the Church of Christ persevere faithful to the end of the world.

That it is possible that the Church of Christ has always been deceived, directly by the teaching of Christ, in the substantial articles of the Christian faith, and has erroneously believed that the resurrection of the dead, the day of judgment, and eternal life are to come; and that it is not necessary that there will be a general resurrection of the dead, nor that the reprobate or the elect will have eternal punishment or joy.

[874D]
But once these articles have been condemned as erroneous, what is more consequent than that these just as many opposite truths be established?

That God is so perfect and good that nothing more perfect or better could exist.

That nothing exists unless God conserves it in being.

That nothing exists unless God conserves it in being immediately, per se and properly, and not merely by means of the heavens or something else and through it, whether because he prohibits corrupting agents, or because he permits the thing to be, or does not destroy the thing when he could.

[874D]
4. That no created or creatable thing could exist without divine preservation altogether, nor without divine preservation that is immediate, per se and proper.

5. That every thing made, according to its essence or substance, is made by God.

[874D–875B]
6. That every thing made, according to its essence or substance, is made by God himself, immediately, acting per se and properly, and not merely through the heaven or some other thing, and through that; nor merely for the reason that God forbids contrary impediments, or has made or preserves the efficient cause of the thing, permits it, or does not hinder it from operating. [n16]

7. That no thing could come to be, according to its essence or substance, except by God, and not except by God himself immediately, acting per se and properly.

8. That God is not mutable in any way.

9. That neither God's knowledge nor his will is mutable in any way.

10. That God, in knowing, in willing, and in whatever he does, is always, within himself and intrinsically, equally supremely and most fully actual.

11. That no knowledge of God is caused by the posterior things known.

12. That no will of God, or willing, is caused by its posterior things willed.

13. That every act of the divine, angelic and human will is something.

14. That every action of a created will, according to the essence or substance of the act itself, is made by that will and by God equally co-acting the same act.

[875B]
15. That every act of a created will, according to the essence or substance of the act itself, is made by that will and by God equally co-acting the same act immediately, per se and properly, and not merely through the heaven, general influence, an object, or something else of the kind, and through that; nor merely in the improper manner in which God made or preserves the created will that produces that act, does not destroy it or does not impede it, but permits it to be and to operate, or because he forbids it to be impeded by others.

16. That whenever God and a rational creature jointly produce its free act, God performs that act first naturally, before the creature does; and that the divine will precedes naturally in acting, as mistress, while the created will follows it in the natural order, as handmaid.

17. That to will beforehand, that is, to will first naturally, or to have willed first eternally, this or that thing, present or future, neither is nor was in man's free power of contradiction. [n17]

[875C]
18. That the first cause, or the divine will, is not in the free power of the posterior cause or created will.

19. That the grace by which we are saved is given by God gratis, simply, and is not obtained by any previous merit, great or small, condign or congruous.

20. That the divine will cannot be impeded, but is universally efficacious in causing.

21. That for the divine will to be incapable of being frustrated and necessary in causing, with respect to any of its effects whatever and any posterior causes whatever, and for all its effects to be necessary with respect to it, it suffices that it be the first cause naturally, and in the power of no other and of no others, unimpedible and universally efficacious in causing.

22. That it is necessary that God created the world, was incarnate, redeemed man, and that God wills this and has also willed it.

[875C–875E]
23. That when future contingents become present or slip away into the past, the divine will with respect to them does not cease to be free by any freedom, or in any mode of freedom, intrinsically, by which or in which it had been free before, nor does it begin to be necessary by any opposite necessity with respect to them.

24. That the divine will is always equally free, or equally necessary, with respect to any object of it whatever, and to any intrinsic act of it whatever.

25. That it is necessary that God know, of any present thing, that it is, and also know, and have known, of any past thing, that it was.

26. That when future contingents become present or pass into the past, God's knowledge with respect to them does not cease to be contingent by any contingency, or in any mode of contingency, intrinsically, by which or in which it was contingent before, nor does it begin to be necessary by any opposite necessity with respect to them.

27. That God's knowledge is always equally free, or equally necessary intrinsically, with respect to any object of it whatever; and that the divine intellect, or God, remains eternally, intrinsically, most fully uniform, that is, always equally free or equally necessary with respect to any intrinsic act of his.

[875E]
28. That whatever Christ, in respect of his human intellect, will and tongue, each in its own kind, distinctly knew, believed, willed, asserted aloud and swore by natural human acts, it is necessary that he so did; and whatever he knew, believed, willed, asserted or swore in whatever sense, it is necessary that he did so in that same sense. [n18]

29. That if Christ, according to his human nature, by natural human acts distinctly knew, believed, willed, asserted and swore of some future contingent that it will be, while that thing still remains a future contingent, it is necessary that Christ so did; and it is as necessary then as it will be when that thing is present or has passed into the past.

[876A]
30. That it never was, and is not, in the power of man to deceive Christ according to the human nature assumed, the union remaining, to make him believe what is false, to lie, to will in vain or in opposition to the divine will; nor was it ever, or is it, in the power of man to make anything of the kind. Hence, together with certain other truths, it follows that Christ, according to his united human nature, was or is deceived in believing falsely, has lied or lies in the present, has willed or wills in vain or in opposition to the divine will.

31. That it was possible that Christ, according to his united human nature and in its own kind, had natural, proper and distinct acts of knowing and willing with respect to some things placed in the power of man, and some things that are future contingently and not absolutely necessarily; and that it was impossible that Christ, according to his united human nature and in its own kind, be deceived in believing, or err in willing, that is, will that to come about which would never come about, or will in opposition or discord to the divine will: will, I say, by rational will, not by sensual or carnal appetite.

[876A–876B]
32. That the prophecies about Christ, before their fulfilment, were necessarily to be fulfilled; and that in the intervening time between, on the one side, the cleansing or sanctification of Blessed Mary and of the holy Fathers of the Old Testament in the faith of Christ the future Redeemer, and, on the other, the passing and salvation of those same Fathers and the Passion of Christ, it was necessary that they were cleansed, sanctified and saved through faith in Christ the future Redeemer; and that it was not possible that they were cleansed, sanctified and saved through a feigned, false, erroneous and lying faith. [n19]

33. That the prophecies and promises of Christ, before their fulfilment, were and are necessarily to be fulfilled.

34. That not all the prophecies foretold about Christ, nor all the prophecies or promises of Christ about the future, were in intention tacitly conditional, but many were in intention simply absolute.

[876B–876C]
35. That it is necessary that the holy Church of Christ persevere faithful to the end of the world.

36. That it is not possible that the holy Church of Christ, from the teaching of Christ, was ever or at any time directly deceived in the substantial articles of the Christian faith, or erroneously believed in the resurrection of the dead, the day of judgment, or eternal life; and that it is necessary that these things will be, and that the reprobate also will have punishment, and the elect everlasting joy.

NOTES

1. huius periculosissimi pelagi, Pelagio pestilente: the Latin sets pelagus ("sea") beside Pelagius and Pelagianis, and the whole opening is a sea-image: whirlpools, Peter's boat, the storm, the sleeping Lord. English "sea" keeps the image but not the sound. See also I.35.
2. pro gratia multiformi gratias referens multiformes: gratia is both "grace" and "thanks", so the Latin literally returns "manifold graces for manifold grace". English "thanks" loses the repetition. Multiformis gratia is the Vulgate phrase of 1 Pet 4:10.
3. exordium huius: huius has no stated antecedent. I take it as this work, whose preface alludes to the persecution of Pelagius's opponents. The sense could be looser ("the beginning of this matter").
4. Savile gives no margin. Timaeus is presumably Plato's dialogue, where the speaker says that we are only human and must accept a "likely account" (29C–D), which fits probabiliter below. The Apostle is presumably Gal 6:1: "considering yourself, lest you also be tempted." The identifications are not certain.
5. probabiliter multum erro: I take multum with probabiliter ("most plausibly"), since the reason given is quia non solus. The other reading, "I err plausibly, and greatly", does not fit that reason.
6. rationes et autoritates nostras contrarias, sententias nostras contrarias munientes: there is no conjunction. I read nostras and contrarias as two sets, "ours and the contrary ones", with munientes agreeing with both, and the second phrase as "our opinions and the opposed ones".
7. Simon, dormis: Mark 14:37, Christ to Peter in Gethsemane. Exime gladium, amputa recalls Peter's sword at the arrest (John 18:10). Simon Peter stands for the Roman See just addressed. The sleeping Lord "on the pillow" (super cervical) is from Mark 4:38.
8. Savile numbers the articles in the outer margin, 1–36 for the errors and then 1–6 for the opposed truths (of which this stretch gives 1–3). The unit addresses encode these numbers: 8731 is page 873, article 1; 87436 is page 874, article 36. The numerals themselves are not in the Latin text and are not repeated here.
9. The variant marker stands at seruat in the print, but the margin offers fecerat, which cannot replace seruat in any sense that construes ("had made or had made" is nonsense). It might be meant for fecit ("had made or preserves"). The main reading construes, so I translate it and adopt nothing from the variant.
10. libertas contradictionis (also liberum secundum contradictionem, art. 29) is the freedom to will either member of a contradictory pair, to will P or not to will P. Bradwardine reads this as the Pelagian conception of freedom, which he denies of the will's relation to God.
11. The negatives pile up: in nullius alterius, nullarumue aliarum potestate non impedibilis. The feminine aliarum shows that causae is understood. I read it as: the divine will, being in the power of no other cause, is unimpedible. The article says that this is not enough to make its effects necessary.
12. necessitas opposita is not defined here. Since the articles say the will "ceases to be free with this kind of freedom and begins to be necessary," I take it as the necessity opposed to freedom of contradiction, the necessity that belongs to what is present or past. The English leaves it literal.
13. intellectus has two senses in this one article: the faculty (secundum intellectum… suos humanos) and, from ad intellectum generalem on, the "sense" or meaning in which words are understood. I use "intellect" for the first and "sense" for the second.
14. subtiliores in oculis suis: an echo of Isa 5:21, "wise in their own eyes", which gives the phrase its irony.
15. praesentialiter: I take it as "actually, in real presence" (rather than only virtually or in foreknowledge). The word modifies a perfect infinitive and a present one, and the sense is uncertain.
16. The print reads vel aliquo et alio, "or by something and another"; items 3 and 4 have vel aliquo alio. The et looks like an intrusion, and I translate "or something else". The sense is unaffected.
17. libera contradictionis potestas is the scholastic power to choose either member of a contradictory pair (to do or not to do). Bradwardine denies that any human will has this power over what God wills beforehand.
18. intellectus here means "sense", the meaning in which a statement is understood, not the faculty. The corresponding item of the first list (874A) distinguishes the "general, plain, simple, absolute sense" from some "parabolic, mystical, conditional" one. The preceding clause uses intellectus in the faculty sense, "his human intellect".
19. The construction is loose. inter mundationem … et passionem is taken as "between the cleansing (in the faith of the future Redeemer) and the passing, salvation and Passion"; in fide Christi redemptoris futuri attaches to mundationem. The main clause is fuit necessarium … ipsos fuisse mundatos.