De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 48
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 803B–804B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/48/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[803B]
CHAPTER 48. He recites four responses, and corrects them.

[803B–803C]
Here, however, many insolent rejoinders present themselves. Some, wishing to clear God of every falsehood, say that even if God has foretold something to men in its proper kind [n1], and has promised and sworn it, it is nevertheless possible that he never did any such thing. Now this, even if by some fancy it might seem sayable of God, cannot be said of Christ according to his human nature, as was shown in 44 and 45 of this book. For although it might seem that this can be said of God when he reveals in word, it cannot be said of him when he reveals in its proper kind. Such a revelation is a created thing that signifies naturally in one way, as 44 of this book teaches. It is therefore necessary that every such revelation is already past and has signified naturally in that way.

Let there be such a revelation, then, that A will be. Then if it is possible that A will not be, it follows that it is possible that when God asserted and swore that, he did it against his mind, since he always knows everything. Hence it follows that he lied and perjured himself, and also deceived his dearest ones without any fault of theirs, which is contrary to what was shown in the preceding chapter.

[803D–803E]
A similar argument can be made about the present, and perhaps with more probability. Again, in that case no faith, or the least, would have to be given to the divine promises, even sworn ones, and less than to human ones, as was argued in 45 and in the preceding chapter. Again, this is expressly against the authorities from Psalm 88 [n2] and its expositions, and against other like ones cited in the preceding chapter; it is also against what was shown earlier in 32 of this book.

Again, in that case what God revealed to one intellect in its proper kind could have been revealed not to that one but to another, which is against what was set out in 45 of this book. Again, by the same reasoning, since God never revealed anything to Isaiah in its proper kind, he can have revealed it to him, and not only to him but to anyone else; hence one who was never a Prophet can now have been a Prophet. By a like reasoning God can also never have instituted what truly were and are the Sacraments of the Church for the effect of salvation, and can have established others instead. Hence the faithful of the past can have not been on the way of salvation or saved, and the unfaithful of the past can have been so. By equal reasoning, too, God can now not have commanded what he once commanded. Hence one who sinned only by acting against that command, and incurred damnation, would never have sinned nor been damned. Otherwise, in sinning, a powerless man would constrain almighty God to have commanded something at some earlier time.

Further, if God can have not foretold or promised a future thing, he can also have not foretold or promised a past one (for example the incarnation, the passion and the like), which does not seem so. By a like reasoning he can also have not willed beforehand nor foreknown past things [n3]; and consequently the past things did not occur, as is wholly clear from 30 and 31 of this book.

Others, however, say that what God revealed in its proper kind to one intellect he can have revealed not to that one but to another. This response will be reproved like the first. It can also be refuted by what was set out in 45 of this book; and the authorities from Psalm 88 and their expositions, and other similar ones alleged in the preceding chapter, likewise destroy it.

Others, again, hold that God never reveals a future contingent in its proper kind except under some condition, tacit or expressed. But these do not avoid the difficulty.

[804A–804B]
For although God had not in fact revealed anything absolutely, without a condition of whatever sort, he could nevertheless reveal something in that way. For in that way he knows many future things, and in that way the Father revealed them to the Son and to the Spirit of both, and to the man Christ Jesus, as can be gathered from 34 and 42 of this book. And these [n4] can be brought back to the truth by what was set out in the correction of a similar response in 45 of this book.

And if anyone still does not blush to be insolent, saying that God can have revealed and asserted to a man in its proper kind, under a condition at least tacitly understood, what he revealed and asserted absolutely, he will be corrected, I hope, by the same things by which a similar response was corrected in 45 of this book. He can also be brought back by the same things by which the first response of this chapter was brought back from its pathless error.

All the responses set out above, moreover, are insufficient and defective in many ways. For although they may perhaps seem to answer one argument or authority, or a few, to many others they have no appearance of answering, as is plain to anyone who considers these and those clearly.

NOTES

1. In proprio genere is a revelation made by a created thing that signifies naturally (see the next sentence), as opposed to revelation in verbo, by word. The distinction is worked out in the chapters cited here (44–45). I render it "in its proper kind" throughout.
2. Psalm 88 in the Vulgate is Psalm 89 in the English numbering.
3. Praeuoluisse is from praevelle, "to will beforehand", paired with praescire, "to foreknow". It is not from praevolvere.
4. Savile prints the masculine qui, with no clear masculine antecedent; the neuter quae would be expected, for the things revealed or the passages cited. I translate "these" and leave the antecedent open.