{"id": "3/45", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/45/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 45", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "791A–793C", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XLV.\n\nVentilat quartam responsionem.\n\nQVidam autem volentes Christum defendere a mendacio, periurio, et peccato, dicunt, quod illa, quae Christus asseruit, et iurauit ad vnum intellectum, potest asseruisse et iurasse non ad illum, sed ad alium intellectum. Istud autem videtur assertum ex mirabili intellectu. Sint namque verba christi tam plana et tam simpla, quod non possint rationabiliter accipi ad duplicem intellectum, nec ad alium quam primo praetendit superficies literalis, dicatque Christus et iuret se tantum intelligere illo modo: et si quis dixerit adhuc Christum posse alio modo intelligere illud dictum, habet dicere consequenter, Christum nullum posse certificate de aliquo dicto suo, ad quem intellectum hoc dixit; et hoc est sacra Euangelia haesitatione et\n\nsuspicione nimia fermentare. Quis enim propter verba Christi incerta certe crederet aut faceret magnum aliquid et incertum? Nec posset cum Christo fieri ciuilis aut securus contractus, quantumcunque aliquid planissime diceret, promitteret, vel iuraret: semper enim posset latere anguis in herba, et fallacia sub abscondito intellectu, essetque Christus magis mutabilis et varius in sermone, quam Chamaeleon in colore: colorem namque quem Chamaeleon nunc habet vel in praeterito habuit, necesse est eum nunc habete et in praeterito habuisse; de intellectu vero sermonis Christi opposito modo se habet. Esset quoque assertio Christi dubitabilior et incertior, quam assertio alterius hominis cuiuscunque, vt de ipso veraciter possit dici illud opprobriosum ridiculum Horatij 1. Epistolarum 1. Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo? Cum tamen secundum Isidorum 2. de summo bono 31. Quacunque arte verborum quis iuret, Deus, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit, sicut ille, cui iuratur, intelligit: et allegatur\n\n3. sentent. Petri dist. 39. et in Canone 22. Causa quaestione 5. Quacunque. Quare et de ipsomer Domino nostro Iesu Christo scribitur, Marc. 4. Loquebatur eis verbum prout poterant audire; dicitque Apostolus 1. ad Cor. 14. Si nesciero virtutem vocis, ero ei, cui loquor, barbarus, et qui loquitur mihi barbarus. Mirabilis insuper, imo et miserabilis magister ac inutilis videretur, qui nullum discipulum posset docere ad quam intelligentiam loqueretur: qualis namque esset communicatio inter illos? Hoc autem non decet Magistrum et Dominum nostrum Christum; quare et Luc. 24. scribitur sic de ipso, Aperuit eis sensum vt intelligerent scripturas; qui et Discipulis suis dixit, Vobis datum est nosse mysterium regni coelorum, Matth. 13. Et Luc. 8. Qui habet aures audiendi audiat. Interrogabant autem eum Discipuli eius, quae esset haec parabola? Quibus ipse dixit, Vobis datum est nosse mysterium regni coelorum Dei, caeteris autem in parabolis, vt videntes non videant, et audientes\n\nnon intelligant. Vnde videtur, quod licet parabolae Euangelicae et amphibologicae Iesu Christi possint accipi ad multiplicem et dubium intellectum, quod tamen potest certificare de eis; quanto magis de alijs dictis suis; imo videtur quod alia dicta sua non possunt rationabiliter accipi ad intellectum tam dubium, sed ad certum quem verba praetendunt, secundum communem hominum intellectum. Vnde Iohan. 16. Haec in prouerbijs locutus sum vobis; venit hora, cum iam non in prouerbijs loquar vobis, sed palam de Patre meo annuntiabo vobis, quod debet intelligi pro statu vitae praesentis, sicut indicat verbum sequens: nam immediate subiungit, Illo die in nomine meo peteris. Quod et propter eandem rationem tenet Augustinus, partis secundae super Iohan. homilia 48. seu 102. totius. Praeterea asserat Christus aliquid de futuro in anima humana, siue in Angelo per actus seu species naturales, significantes naturaliter tantum vnum, sicut capitulo proximo est ostensum; et responsio non vitabit. Dixit enim Propheta, Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus, Psalmo 84. Super quod\n\nAugustinus, Propheta dixit, Loquebatur in illo Deus intus, et mundus faciebat illi strepitum •oris; cohibens ergo aliquanto ab strepitu mundi, et auertens se ad se, et a se in illum cuius vocem audiebat interius, quasi obturans aurem contra tumultuantem vitae huius inquietudinem, et contra animam corpore quod cotrumpitur aggrauatam, et sensu terrena habitatione deprimente multa mala cogitantem, ait, Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus. Psalmo quoque 88. Locutus est, inquit, Deo Propheta, in visione Sanctis tuis; vbi litera Augustini habet, aspectu; quam sic exponit, Locutus est eis in aspectu, id est, in reuelatione; vnde Prophetae videntes dicebantur. Viderunt quiddam intus, quod dicerent foris, in occulto audierunt, quod palam praedicauerunt. Secundum istos etiam nec Spiritus Sanctus posset certe docere intellectum sacrae scripturae contra illud Iohan. 14. Spiritus sanctus quem mittet Pater in nomine meo, ille vos docebit omnia, et suggerit vobis omnia quaecunque dixero vobis: et contra illud eiusdem 16. Cum venerit ille spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem.\n\nPraeterea si illud quod Christus dixit ad vnum intellectum, potest non dixisse ad intellectum illum sed alium, cum talis intellectus in Christo sit aliquis actus cognitiuus proprius et distinctus, sicut potest haberi ex capitulo proximo, potest non habuisse actum quem habuit, et quem non habuit habuisse, quod hypothesi contradicit. Item Christus potest certificare hominem de intellectu suo in propositionibus de praesenti atque praeterito; quare et in propositionibus de futuro, et illa quae in istis ad vnum protulit intellectum, non potest ad alium protulisse, quare nec in alijs de futuro. Item eadem ratione habent dicere consequenter, quod id quod Christus voluit atque fecit vna intentione et ad vnum finem, potest non voluisse aut fecisse illa intentione, sed alia, ad alium quoque finem, et cum intentio finalis sit aliquis actus voluntatis proprius et distinctus, directus in aliquem finem proprium et distinctum, sicut patet ex capitulo proximo, potest Christus non habuisse actum voluntatis quem habuit, et quem non habuit, habuisse: potestque non fuisse passus, nec instituisse Ecclesiastica\n\nSacramenta pro iustificatione hominum vel salute; quare et iustificati et saluati per illa possunt nunc esse non tales, et in praeterito non fuisse; potest quoque Christus similiter non fecisse quae fecit, et quae non fecit, fecisse. Item si haec sint possibilia de Christo secundum naturam humanam, erunt et similia possibilia de puro homine, sicut ex praehabitis capitulo proximo potest ostendi; quae ergo purus homo asseruit, voluit, atque fecit ad vnum intellectum et ad vnum finem proprium et distinctum, potest non ad illum, sed ad alium haec fecisse; quare purus homo, qui taliter faciendo meretur, aut peccat, meruit, aut peccauit, et iustam mercedem recipit aut recepit, potest non sic, sed opposite singillatim. Haec etiam possunt de puro homine per eadem reprobari, per quae similia de Christo Deo et homine fuerant reprobata. Alij magis specificantes istam responsiunculam, aestimant posse asseruisse sub conditione saltem tacita quod asseruit absolute. Sed hi possunt redargui, sicut primi: omnis\n\nenim conditio tacite intellecta est aliquis actus intellectus; est ergo possibile praeteritum non fuisse. Eadem etiam ratione quod Christus voluit absolute, potest non sic voluisse, sed sub conditione tantum modo adhuc futura; et cum ex voluntate conditionali non sequatur effectus, nisi demum fortassis conditione extante, possunt Ecclesiastica Sacramenta non fuisse, vel vtilia non fuisse, factaque eius praeterita non fuisse. Ponatur etiam Christum heri asseruisse et voluisse aliquid cras futurum sub conditione hodie adimpleta, et reuertitur difficultas. Haec etiam omnia simili ratione sunt de puro homine concedenda, quare et inconuenientia ad quae superius est deductum. Praeterea si Christus scit futura contingentia, sic potest illa asserere; scit autem illa simpliciter absolute, sic enim sunt vera; et sicut sunt vera, sic scit illa. Rursum si Christus nesciret futura nisi sub conditione, vel scit quod conditio extabit, vel non. Si scit, aut ergo sub alia conditione, vel simpliciter absolute: si sub alia conditione, erit processus huiusmodi in conditionibus infinitus, nec vlla talis scientia de finita: si simpliciter et absolute, et simili modo scit futura, asserat etiam absolute impletionem conditionis illius, et\n\nresponsio vacuatur; si non scit quod extabit conditio, non scit certe: nec scit tunc aliter quam alius purus homo. Amplius autem asserat Christus A. fore sub B. conditione, et asserat simpliciter B. fore, et reuertitur difficultas. Et si quis adhuc dixerit quod illa assertio potest esse sub alia conditione, puta C. tunc potest esse processus in conditionibus talibus infinitus, et nulla penitus nisi de sola incertitudine certitudo, sicut superius est argutum. Item asserat Christus quicquam futurum, et asserat se asserere illud simpliciter absolute sine quacunque conditione tacita vel expressa. Alij vero dicunt, quod non omnis qui dicit falsum mentitur, sed quia dicit falsum animo asserendi; et quod Christus, licet aliquid dixerit animo asserendi, potest illud huiusmodi animo non dixisse. Sed istud per iam praehabita refelletur, quoniam\n\nanimus asserendi proptius et distinctus est finalis intentio siue propositum, et aliquis actus voluntatis vel intellectus proprius et distinctus. Alij opinantur quod mentiri est contra mentem ire cum intentione fallendi; Sed Christus non habuit intentionem fallendi; quare et si quis dixerit contra mentem, non est tamen mendacij redarguendus. Sed hi serui nequam blasphemant nequiter Dominum nostrum Christum: concedunt namque ipsum posse falsum asserere contra mentem scienter et peierare; quare et consequenter habent concedere ipsum posse peccare contra prius ostensa tricesimo secundi. Nam omne factum contra conscientiam est peccatum, dicente Apostolo, Omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est, ad Rom. 14. Glossa, Omne etiam, si bonum sit in se, quod non est ex fide, id est, quod fit contra fidem, id est, contra conscientiam, peccatum est: quod et simili modo intelligit consilium generale, sicut patet extra de praescriptionibus capitulo vltimo; et Papa Innocentius tertius, supra de restitutione spoliatorum capitulo, Literas; vbi et adiungit illud\n\nvulgatum, Quicquid fit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam. Quomodo etiam excusabitur quis ab intentione fallendi, si asseruit falsum scienter intendens vt tanquam verum sincerum ab auditoribus crederetur? Alij adhuc ponunt non oportere Christum fuisse mentitum, et si asseruit vnum falsum, quia non oportet hoc fuisse contra mentem ipsius. Sed hi mirabilem mentem habent: non enim aduertunt Christum esse Deum et hominem, ideoque saltem secundum naturam suam diuinam omnia verissime cognoscentem. Item secundum naturam suam humanam scit omnia saltem ad ipsum spectantia de propinquo, vt quadragesimo secundo huius erat ostensum; vel saltem secundum illam naturam credidit esse verum quod per illam asseruit: Non enim oblitus fuerat regulae, quam docebat; Sit sermo vester, Est, Est, Non, Non. Matth. 5. Est in corde, est in ore: et similiter negatiue; maxime autem quicquid iutauit, credidit esse verum; alias etenim nimis perperam iurasser, et potest esse qd. falsum asseruit et iurauit; ergo et quod credidit falsum esse verum, quare et quod fuit deceptus,\n\nquod quadragesimo secundo huius fuerat reprobatum: vnde etiam sequitur esse possibile ipsum peccasse, cuius oppositum tricesimo secundi fuerat demonstratum. Item asserat iusiurando se scire vel credere in proprio genere sic esse futurum, sicut asserit atque iurat, et responsio non respondet.", "english": "CHAPTER 45.\n\nHe examines the fourth response.\n\nCertain people, wishing to defend Christ from falsehood, perjury and sin, say that the things Christ asserted and swore to in one sense he can have asserted and sworn to not in that sense but in another. This seems to be asserted out of a marvelous understanding.[n1] For suppose the words of Christ are so plain and so simple that they cannot reasonably be taken in a double sense, nor in any other than the one the literal surface first presents, and suppose Christ says and swears that he means them only in that way. If anyone should still say that Christ can have meant that saying in another way, he must say in consequence that Christ can give assurance to no one about any saying of his, as to the sense in which he said it. And that is to leaven the sacred Gospels with hesitation and excessive suspicion. For who would confidently believe or do something great and uncertain because of Christ's uncertain words? No civil or secure contract could be made with Christ, however plainly he spoke, promised or swore: the snake could always lie hidden in the grass, and deceit beneath a concealed meaning. Christ would be more changeable and various in speech than the chameleon in color. For the color the chameleon now has, or had in the past, he must now have and have had in the past; with the sense of Christ's speech it would stand the opposite way.[n2] Christ's assertion would also be more doubtful and uncertain than the assertion of any other man whatever, so that the insulting jest of Horace, Epistles 1, 1, could truly be said of him: \"With what knot shall I hold Proteus, who keeps changing his face?\" Yet according to Isidore, On the Highest Good 2, 31, \"By whatever art of words one swears, God, who is the witness of conscience, takes it as the man to whom the oath is made understands it.\" This is cited in the Sentences 3, Peter's distinction 39, and in the Canon [law], 22, Causa, question 5, Quacunque.[n3] So too it is written of our Lord Jesus Christ himself, Mark 4: \"He spoke the word to them as they were able to hear it.\" And the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 14: \"If I do not know the meaning of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to him to whom I speak, and he who speaks will be a barbarian to me.\" A teacher who could teach no disciple in what sense he was speaking would moreover seem a strange teacher, indeed a pitiable and useless one. What communication would there be between them? But this does not befit Christ, our Teacher and Lord. Hence Luke 24 writes of him thus: \"He opened their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures.\" He also said to his disciples, \"To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven,\" Matthew 13, and Luke 8, \"Let him who has ears to hear, hear.\" And his disciples asked him what this parable was. He said to them, \"To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of the God of heaven, but to the rest in parables, so that seeing they may not see, and hearing\n\nmay not understand.\" Hence it seems that, although the Gospel parables of Jesus Christ and his ambiguous sayings can be taken in a manifold and doubtful sense, he can nevertheless give assurance about them; how much more about his other sayings! Indeed it seems that his other sayings cannot reasonably be taken in so doubtful a sense, but in the certain sense that the words present according to the common understanding of men. Hence John 16: \"I have spoken these things to you in proverbs; the hour is coming when I shall no longer speak to you in proverbs, but shall tell you openly of my Father.\" This must be understood of the state of the present life, as the following word shows; for he adds at once, \"In that day you will ask in my name.\" For the same reason Augustine holds this, in the second part [of his work] on John, homily 48, or 102 of the whole. Suppose, moreover, that Christ asserts something about the future in a human soul, or in an angel, through natural acts or species that naturally signify only one thing, as was shown in the preceding chapter; the response will not escape this. For the Prophet said, \"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me,\" Psalm 84. On which Augustine says: The Prophet said, \"God was speaking within him, and the world was making a din outside.\" So, restraining himself somewhat from the din of the world and turning to himself, and from himself to him whose voice he was hearing within, as if stopping his ear against the tumultuous unrest of this life, and against the soul weighed down by the body that corrupts it (the earthly dwelling pressing down the mind that thinks many evils), he says, \"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.\" Again in Psalm 88: \"You spoke,\" says the Prophet to God, \"in a vision to your saints\";[n4] where Augustine's text has \"in sight,\" which he explains thus: \"He spoke to them in sight, that is, in revelation; whence the Prophets were called seers. They saw something within, which they were to say outside; they heard in secret what they proclaimed openly.\" According to these people not even the Holy Spirit could teach with certainty the sense of sacred Scripture, against John 14: \"The Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and will suggest to you whatever I shall have said to you\"; and against John 16: \"When that Spirit of truth has come, he will teach you all truth.\"\n\nMoreover, if what Christ said to one understanding he can have said not to that understanding but to another, then, since such an understanding in Christ is some proper and distinct cognitive act (as can be had from the preceding chapter), he can have failed to have the act that he had, and have had the one he did not have; and this contradicts the hypothesis. Again, Christ can give a man assurance about his meaning in propositions about the present and the past; so also in propositions about the future; and what he uttered in these to one understanding he cannot have uttered to another; therefore neither in the others, about the future. Again, by the same reasoning they must say in consequence that what Christ willed and did with one intention and for one end he can have failed to will or do with that intention, but with another, and for another end. And since the final intention is some proper and distinct act of will, directed to some proper and distinct end, as is clear from the preceding chapter, Christ can have failed to have the act of will that he had, and have had the one he did not have. He can also have not suffered, and not have instituted the Church's Sacraments for the justification or salvation of men.[n5] Hence those justified and saved through them can now be not such, and not have been in the past. Likewise Christ can have not done what he did, and have done what he did not do. Again, if these things are possible of Christ according to his human nature, similar things will also be possible of a mere man, as can be shown from what was established in the preceding chapter. What a mere man has asserted, willed and done with one understanding and for one proper and distinct end, he can have done not with that but with another. Hence a mere man who, by acting so, merits or sins, or has merited or sinned, and receives or has received his just reward, can have done otherwise, in each case the opposite. These claims can be refuted of a mere man by the same arguments by which similar ones were refuted of Christ, God and man. Others, specifying this petty little response more closely, think he can have asserted under a condition, at least a tacit one, what he asserted absolutely. But these can be refuted as the first were. For every tacitly understood condition is some act of the intellect; therefore it is possible that the past not have been. By the same reasoning, what Christ willed absolutely he can have willed not so but only under a condition still to come; and since an effect does not follow from a conditional will unless perhaps the condition is at last fulfilled, the Church's Sacraments could not have existed, or not have been useful, and his past deeds not have been. Suppose also that Christ yesterday asserted and willed something to take place tomorrow, under a condition to be fulfilled today; the difficulty returns. All these things must, by like reasoning, be conceded also of a mere man, and so the absurdities to which we were led above. Moreover, if Christ knows future contingents, he can assert them so; but he knows them simply and absolutely, for that is how they are true; and as they are true, so he knows them. Again, if Christ knew the future only under a condition, either he knows that the condition will be met or he does not. If he knows it, he knows it either under another condition or simply and absolutely. If under another condition, the process will go on to infinity in such conditions, and no such knowledge is definite. If simply and absolutely, and he knows future things in the same way, then let him also assert absolutely the fulfilment of that condition, and\n\nthe response is emptied. If he does not know that the condition will be met, he does not know with certainty; and then he knows no differently from any other mere man. Further, let Christ assert that A will be, under condition B, and assert simply that B will be, and the difficulty returns. And if anyone should say still that this assertion can be under another condition, say C, then the process can go on to infinity in such conditions, and there is no certainty at all except about uncertainty alone, as was argued above. Again, let Christ assert something future, and assert that he asserts it simply and absolutely, without any condition, tacit or express. Others say that not everyone who says something false lies, but because he says it with the intention of asserting; and that Christ, though he said something with the intention of asserting, can have not said it with that intention. But this will be refuted by what has already been established, since the intention of asserting is a proper and distinct final intention or purpose, and some proper and distinct act of will or intellect. Others hold that to lie is to go against one's mind with the intention of deceiving; but Christ had no intention of deceiving, and so even if someone spoke against his mind, he is not for that reason to be convicted of lying. But these wicked servants wickedly blaspheme our Lord Christ. For they concede that he can knowingly assert a falsehood against his mind, and perjure himself; and so they must in consequence concede that he can sin, against what was shown earlier in the thirtieth of the second.[n6] For every deed against conscience is sin, as the Apostle says, Romans 14: \"Whatever is not from faith is sin.\" The Gloss: \"Everything also, even if it is good in itself, that is not from faith, that is, that is done against faith, that is, against conscience, is sin.\" The General Council understands it likewise, as is clear in the Extra, On Prescriptions, the last chapter; and Pope Innocent III, supra, On the Restitution of the Despoiled, the chapter Literas, where he also adds the\n\nfamiliar saying, \"Whatever is done against conscience builds toward hell.\"[n7] How, moreover, will anyone be excused of the intention of deceiving, if he asserted a falsehood knowingly, intending that it be believed by his hearers as sincere truth? Others still hold that Christ need not have lied, even if he asserted one falsehood, since it need not have been against his own mind. But these have a marvelous mind! For they do not notice that Christ is God and man, and therefore, at least according to his divine nature, knows all things most truly. Again, according to his human nature he knows all things, at least those pertaining to himself closely, as was shown in the forty-second of this book; or at least he believed, according to that nature, to be true what he asserted through it. For he had not forgotten the rule he taught, \"Let your speech be, Yes, yes; No, no,\" Matthew 5. \"Yes\" is in the heart, it is in the mouth; and likewise \"No.\" Above all, whatever he swore he believed to be true; otherwise he would have sworn most wrongly, and it could be that what he asserted and swore was false. Then it could be also that what he believed false was true, and hence that he was deceived, which was refuted in the forty-second of this book. From this it also follows that it is possible he sinned, the opposite of which was demonstrated in the thirtieth of the second. Again, let him assert by oath that he knows or believes that in its own kind it will be as he asserts and swears; and the response does not respond.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Mirabili intellectu: ironic, \"marvelous\" in the sense of \"astonishing.\" The same irony returns at 793B (\"hi mirabilem mentem habent\")."}, {"n": 2, "text": "The chameleon's past color is now fixed and necessary, since the past cannot be otherwise. On the position Bradwardine is attacking, the sense of Christ's past utterance would remain open. This is the \"possible that the past not have been\" idiom of 792B–D."}, {"n": 3, "text": "Isidore, Sententiae 2, 31; Peter Lombard, Sententiae III, d. 39; Gratian, Decretum, C. 22 q. 5 c. Quacunque. Savile's \"in Canone\" means the canon law, i.e. Gratian."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Ps 88 [89]:20 reads locutus es (\"you spoke\"), and the print has est. I translate the sense, \"You spoke … to your saints,\" with Deo Propheta as \"the Prophet to God.\" Augustine's text has in aspectu (\"in sight\") for the Vulgate's in visione; Bradwardine notes the variant. The Ps 84 [85]:9 quotation and Augustine's comment come from the Enarrationes in Psalmos."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Potest non fuisse passus … non instituisse and similar phrases are modal operators over the past: \"it is possible that he did not suffer,\" not \"he can fail to suffer.\" I have used \"can have failed / can have not\" for this throughout. Bradwardine takes the construction to follow from his opponents' premise that the past is open."}, {"n": 6, "text": "Tricesimo secundi, Savile's cross-reference. Read strictly it is \"the thirtieth [chapter] of the second [book],\" as tricesimo is \"thirtieth\" and secundi is \"of the second\"; the 32nd would be tricesimo secundo. Compare quadragesimo secundo huius, \"the forty-second of this book,\" just below. I have left it as written (Conventions §5.4); the same reference recurs at 793C."}, {"n": 7, "text": "The canonical citations: Rom 14:23 with the Ordinary Gloss; the Fourth Lateran Council, constitution Quoniam omne (Decretales X 2.26.20, De praescriptionibus); Innocent III, Literas (X 2.13.13, De restitutione spoliatorum), the source of the maxim \"Quicquid fit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam.\" Savile's \"supra\" for the second reference is as printed."}], "errata": [{"address": "791B", "keyed": "certificate", "print": "certificare"}, {"address": "791C", "keyed": "habete", "print": "habere"}, {"address": "792A", "keyed": "•oris", "print": "foris"}, {"address": "792A", "keyed": "cotrumpitur", "print": "corrumpitur"}, {"address": "793A", "keyed": "proptius", "print": "proprius"}, {"address": "793B", "keyed": "iutauit", "print": "iurauit"}, {"address": "793B", "keyed": "iurasser", "print": "iurasset"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p791A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/45/#p791A", "locator_display": "791A–791B", "source_text": "CAP. XLV.\n\nVentilat quartam responsionem.", "english": "CHAPTER 45.\n\nHe examines the fourth response.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p791B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/45/#p791B", "locator_display": "791B–791D", "source_text": "QVidam autem volentes Christum defendere a mendacio, periurio, et peccato, dicunt, quod illa, quae Christus asseruit, et iurauit ad vnum intellectum, potest asseruisse et iurasse non ad illum, sed ad alium intellectum. Istud autem videtur assertum ex mirabili intellectu. Sint namque verba christi tam plana et tam simpla, quod non possint rationabiliter accipi ad duplicem intellectum, nec ad alium quam primo praetendit superficies literalis, dicatque Christus et iuret se tantum intelligere illo modo: et si quis dixerit adhuc Christum posse alio modo intelligere illud dictum, habet dicere consequenter, Christum nullum posse certificate de aliquo dicto suo, ad quem intellectum hoc dixit; et hoc est sacra Euangelia haesitatione et\n\nsuspicione nimia fermentare. Quis enim propter verba Christi incerta certe crederet aut faceret magnum aliquid et incertum? Nec posset cum Christo fieri ciuilis aut securus contractus, quantumcunque aliquid planissime diceret, promitteret, vel iuraret: semper enim posset latere anguis in herba, et fallacia sub abscondito intellectu, essetque Christus magis mutabilis et varius in sermone, quam Chamaeleon in colore: colorem namque quem Chamaeleon nunc habet vel in praeterito habuit, necesse est eum nunc habete et in praeterito habuisse; de intellectu vero sermonis Christi opposito modo se habet. Esset quoque assertio Christi dubitabilior et incertior, quam assertio alterius hominis cuiuscunque, vt de ipso veraciter possit dici illud opprobriosum ridiculum Horatij 1. Epistolarum 1. Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo? Cum tamen secundum Isidorum 2. de summo bono 31. Quacunque arte verborum quis iuret, Deus, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit, sicut ille, cui iuratur, intelligit: et allegatur\n\n3. sentent. Petri dist. 39. et in Canone 22. Causa quaestione 5. Quacunque. Quare et de ipsomer Domino nostro Iesu Christo scribitur, Marc. 4. Loquebatur eis verbum prout poterant audire; dicitque Apostolus 1. ad Cor. 14. Si nesciero virtutem vocis, ero ei, cui loquor, barbarus, et qui loquitur mihi barbarus. Mirabilis insuper, imo et miserabilis magister ac inutilis videretur, qui nullum discipulum posset docere ad quam intelligentiam loqueretur: qualis namque esset communicatio inter illos? Hoc autem non decet Magistrum et Dominum nostrum Christum; quare et Luc. 24. scribitur sic de ipso, Aperuit eis sensum vt intelligerent scripturas; qui et Discipulis suis dixit, Vobis datum est nosse mysterium regni coelorum, Matth. 13. Et Luc. 8. Qui habet aures audiendi audiat. Interrogabant autem eum Discipuli eius, quae esset haec parabola? Quibus ipse dixit, Vobis datum est nosse mysterium regni coelorum Dei, caeteris autem in parabolis, vt videntes non videant, et audientes", "english": "Certain people, wishing to defend Christ from falsehood, perjury and sin, say that the things Christ asserted and swore to in one sense he can have asserted and sworn to not in that sense but in another. This seems to be asserted out of a marvelous understanding.[n1] For suppose the words of Christ are so plain and so simple that they cannot reasonably be taken in a double sense, nor in any other than the one the literal surface first presents, and suppose Christ says and swears that he means them only in that way. If anyone should still say that Christ can have meant that saying in another way, he must say in consequence that Christ can give assurance to no one about any saying of his, as to the sense in which he said it. And that is to leaven the sacred Gospels with hesitation and excessive suspicion. For who would confidently believe or do something great and uncertain because of Christ's uncertain words? No civil or secure contract could be made with Christ, however plainly he spoke, promised or swore: the snake could always lie hidden in the grass, and deceit beneath a concealed meaning. Christ would be more changeable and various in speech than the chameleon in color. For the color the chameleon now has, or had in the past, he must now have and have had in the past; with the sense of Christ's speech it would stand the opposite way.[n2] Christ's assertion would also be more doubtful and uncertain than the assertion of any other man whatever, so that the insulting jest of Horace, Epistles 1, 1, could truly be said of him: \"With what knot shall I hold Proteus, who keeps changing his face?\" Yet according to Isidore, On the Highest Good 2, 31, \"By whatever art of words one swears, God, who is the witness of conscience, takes it as the man to whom the oath is made understands it.\" This is cited in the Sentences 3, Peter's distinction 39, and in the Canon [law], 22, Causa, question 5, Quacunque.[n3] So too it is written of our Lord Jesus Christ himself, Mark 4: \"He spoke the word to them as they were able to hear it.\" And the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 14: \"If I do not know the meaning of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to him to whom I speak, and he who speaks will be a barbarian to me.\" A teacher who could teach no disciple in what sense he was speaking would moreover seem a strange teacher, indeed a pitiable and useless one. What communication would there be between them? But this does not befit Christ, our Teacher and Lord. Hence Luke 24 writes of him thus: \"He opened their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures.\" He also said to his disciples, \"To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven,\" Matthew 13, and Luke 8, \"Let him who has ears to hear, hear.\" And his disciples asked him what this parable was. He said to them, \"To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of the God of heaven, but to the rest in parables, so that seeing they may not see, and hearing", "margins": [{"id": "791C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Isidore."}, {"id": "791D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Mark. The Apostle."}, {"id": "791D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Luke."}, {"id": "791D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Matthew. Luke."}]}, {"anchor": "p791E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/45/#p791E", "locator_display": "791E–792A", "source_text": "non intelligant. Vnde videtur, quod licet parabolae Euangelicae et amphibologicae Iesu Christi possint accipi ad multiplicem et dubium intellectum, quod tamen potest certificare de eis; quanto magis de alijs dictis suis; imo videtur quod alia dicta sua non possunt rationabiliter accipi ad intellectum tam dubium, sed ad certum quem verba praetendunt, secundum communem hominum intellectum. Vnde Iohan. 16. Haec in prouerbijs locutus sum vobis; venit hora, cum iam non in prouerbijs loquar vobis, sed palam de Patre meo annuntiabo vobis, quod debet intelligi pro statu vitae praesentis, sicut indicat verbum sequens: nam immediate subiungit, Illo die in nomine meo peteris. Quod et propter eandem rationem tenet Augustinus, partis secundae super Iohan. homilia 48. seu 102. totius. Praeterea asserat Christus aliquid de futuro in anima humana, siue in Angelo per actus seu species naturales, significantes naturaliter tantum vnum, sicut capitulo proximo est ostensum; et responsio non vitabit. Dixit enim Propheta, Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus, Psalmo 84. Super quod\n\nAugustinus, Propheta dixit, Loquebatur in illo Deus intus, et mundus faciebat illi strepitum •oris; cohibens ergo aliquanto ab strepitu mundi, et auertens se ad se, et a se in illum cuius vocem audiebat interius, quasi obturans aurem contra tumultuantem vitae huius inquietudinem, et contra animam corpore quod cotrumpitur aggrauatam, et sensu terrena habitatione deprimente multa mala cogitantem, ait, Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus. Psalmo quoque 88. Locutus est, inquit, Deo Propheta, in visione Sanctis tuis; vbi litera Augustini habet, aspectu; quam sic exponit, Locutus est eis in aspectu, id est, in reuelatione; vnde Prophetae videntes dicebantur. Viderunt quiddam intus, quod dicerent foris, in occulto audierunt, quod palam praedicauerunt. Secundum istos etiam nec Spiritus Sanctus posset certe docere intellectum sacrae scripturae contra illud Iohan. 14. Spiritus sanctus quem mittet Pater in nomine meo, ille vos docebit omnia, et suggerit vobis omnia quaecunque dixero vobis: et contra illud eiusdem 16. Cum venerit ille spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem.", "english": "may not understand.\" Hence it seems that, although the Gospel parables of Jesus Christ and his ambiguous sayings can be taken in a manifold and doubtful sense, he can nevertheless give assurance about them; how much more about his other sayings! Indeed it seems that his other sayings cannot reasonably be taken in so doubtful a sense, but in the certain sense that the words present according to the common understanding of men. Hence John 16: \"I have spoken these things to you in proverbs; the hour is coming when I shall no longer speak to you in proverbs, but shall tell you openly of my Father.\" This must be understood of the state of the present life, as the following word shows; for he adds at once, \"In that day you will ask in my name.\" For the same reason Augustine holds this, in the second part [of his work] on John, homily 48, or 102 of the whole. Suppose, moreover, that Christ asserts something about the future in a human soul, or in an angel, through natural acts or species that naturally signify only one thing, as was shown in the preceding chapter; the response will not escape this. For the Prophet said, \"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me,\" Psalm 84. On which Augustine says: The Prophet said, \"God was speaking within him, and the world was making a din outside.\" So, restraining himself somewhat from the din of the world and turning to himself, and from himself to him whose voice he was hearing within, as if stopping his ear against the tumultuous unrest of this life, and against the soul weighed down by the body that corrupts it (the earthly dwelling pressing down the mind that thinks many evils), he says, \"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.\" Again in Psalm 88: \"You spoke,\" says the Prophet to God, \"in a vision to your saints\";[n4] where Augustine's text has \"in sight,\" which he explains thus: \"He spoke to them in sight, that is, in revelation; whence the Prophets were called seers. They saw something within, which they were to say outside; they heard in secret what they proclaimed openly.\" According to these people not even the Holy Spirit could teach with certainty the sense of sacred Scripture, against John 14: \"The Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and will suggest to you whatever I shall have said to you\"; and against John 16: \"When that Spirit of truth has come, he will teach you all truth.\"", "margins": [{"id": "791E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "John."}, {"id": "791E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p792B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/45/#p792B", "locator_display": "792B–792D", "source_text": "Praeterea si illud quod Christus dixit ad vnum intellectum, potest non dixisse ad intellectum illum sed alium, cum talis intellectus in Christo sit aliquis actus cognitiuus proprius et distinctus, sicut potest haberi ex capitulo proximo, potest non habuisse actum quem habuit, et quem non habuit habuisse, quod hypothesi contradicit. Item Christus potest certificare hominem de intellectu suo in propositionibus de praesenti atque praeterito; quare et in propositionibus de futuro, et illa quae in istis ad vnum protulit intellectum, non potest ad alium protulisse, quare nec in alijs de futuro. Item eadem ratione habent dicere consequenter, quod id quod Christus voluit atque fecit vna intentione et ad vnum finem, potest non voluisse aut fecisse illa intentione, sed alia, ad alium quoque finem, et cum intentio finalis sit aliquis actus voluntatis proprius et distinctus, directus in aliquem finem proprium et distinctum, sicut patet ex capitulo proximo, potest Christus non habuisse actum voluntatis quem habuit, et quem non habuit, habuisse: potestque non fuisse passus, nec instituisse Ecclesiastica\n\nSacramenta pro iustificatione hominum vel salute; quare et iustificati et saluati per illa possunt nunc esse non tales, et in praeterito non fuisse; potest quoque Christus similiter non fecisse quae fecit, et quae non fecit, fecisse. Item si haec sint possibilia de Christo secundum naturam humanam, erunt et similia possibilia de puro homine, sicut ex praehabitis capitulo proximo potest ostendi; quae ergo purus homo asseruit, voluit, atque fecit ad vnum intellectum et ad vnum finem proprium et distinctum, potest non ad illum, sed ad alium haec fecisse; quare purus homo, qui taliter faciendo meretur, aut peccat, meruit, aut peccauit, et iustam mercedem recipit aut recepit, potest non sic, sed opposite singillatim. Haec etiam possunt de puro homine per eadem reprobari, per quae similia de Christo Deo et homine fuerant reprobata. Alij magis specificantes istam responsiunculam, aestimant posse asseruisse sub conditione saltem tacita quod asseruit absolute. Sed hi possunt redargui, sicut primi: omnis\n\nenim conditio tacite intellecta est aliquis actus intellectus; est ergo possibile praeteritum non fuisse. Eadem etiam ratione quod Christus voluit absolute, potest non sic voluisse, sed sub conditione tantum modo adhuc futura; et cum ex voluntate conditionali non sequatur effectus, nisi demum fortassis conditione extante, possunt Ecclesiastica Sacramenta non fuisse, vel vtilia non fuisse, factaque eius praeterita non fuisse. Ponatur etiam Christum heri asseruisse et voluisse aliquid cras futurum sub conditione hodie adimpleta, et reuertitur difficultas. Haec etiam omnia simili ratione sunt de puro homine concedenda, quare et inconuenientia ad quae superius est deductum. Praeterea si Christus scit futura contingentia, sic potest illa asserere; scit autem illa simpliciter absolute, sic enim sunt vera; et sicut sunt vera, sic scit illa. Rursum si Christus nesciret futura nisi sub conditione, vel scit quod conditio extabit, vel non. Si scit, aut ergo sub alia conditione, vel simpliciter absolute: si sub alia conditione, erit processus huiusmodi in conditionibus infinitus, nec vlla talis scientia de finita: si simpliciter et absolute, et simili modo scit futura, asserat etiam absolute impletionem conditionis illius, et", "english": "Moreover, if what Christ said to one understanding he can have said not to that understanding but to another, then, since such an understanding in Christ is some proper and distinct cognitive act (as can be had from the preceding chapter), he can have failed to have the act that he had, and have had the one he did not have; and this contradicts the hypothesis. Again, Christ can give a man assurance about his meaning in propositions about the present and the past; so also in propositions about the future; and what he uttered in these to one understanding he cannot have uttered to another; therefore neither in the others, about the future. Again, by the same reasoning they must say in consequence that what Christ willed and did with one intention and for one end he can have failed to will or do with that intention, but with another, and for another end. And since the final intention is some proper and distinct act of will, directed to some proper and distinct end, as is clear from the preceding chapter, Christ can have failed to have the act of will that he had, and have had the one he did not have. He can also have not suffered, and not have instituted the Church's Sacraments for the justification or salvation of men.[n5] Hence those justified and saved through them can now be not such, and not have been in the past. Likewise Christ can have not done what he did, and have done what he did not do. Again, if these things are possible of Christ according to his human nature, similar things will also be possible of a mere man, as can be shown from what was established in the preceding chapter. What a mere man has asserted, willed and done with one understanding and for one proper and distinct end, he can have done not with that but with another. Hence a mere man who, by acting so, merits or sins, or has merited or sinned, and receives or has received his just reward, can have done otherwise, in each case the opposite. These claims can be refuted of a mere man by the same arguments by which similar ones were refuted of Christ, God and man. Others, specifying this petty little response more closely, think he can have asserted under a condition, at least a tacit one, what he asserted absolutely. But these can be refuted as the first were. For every tacitly understood condition is some act of the intellect; therefore it is possible that the past not have been. By the same reasoning, what Christ willed absolutely he can have willed not so but only under a condition still to come; and since an effect does not follow from a conditional will unless perhaps the condition is at last fulfilled, the Church's Sacraments could not have existed, or not have been useful, and his past deeds not have been. Suppose also that Christ yesterday asserted and willed something to take place tomorrow, under a condition to be fulfilled today; the difficulty returns. All these things must, by like reasoning, be conceded also of a mere man, and so the absurdities to which we were led above. Moreover, if Christ knows future contingents, he can assert them so; but he knows them simply and absolutely, for that is how they are true; and as they are true, so he knows them. Again, if Christ knew the future only under a condition, either he knows that the condition will be met or he does not. If he knows it, he knows it either under another condition or simply and absolutely. If under another condition, the process will go on to infinity in such conditions, and no such knowledge is definite. If simply and absolutely, and he knows future things in the same way, then let him also assert absolutely the fulfilment of that condition, and", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p792E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/45/#p792E", "locator_display": "792E–793A", "source_text": "responsio vacuatur; si non scit quod extabit conditio, non scit certe: nec scit tunc aliter quam alius purus homo. Amplius autem asserat Christus A. fore sub B. conditione, et asserat simpliciter B. fore, et reuertitur difficultas. Et si quis adhuc dixerit quod illa assertio potest esse sub alia conditione, puta C. tunc potest esse processus in conditionibus talibus infinitus, et nulla penitus nisi de sola incertitudine certitudo, sicut superius est argutum. Item asserat Christus quicquam futurum, et asserat se asserere illud simpliciter absolute sine quacunque conditione tacita vel expressa. Alij vero dicunt, quod non omnis qui dicit falsum mentitur, sed quia dicit falsum animo asserendi; et quod Christus, licet aliquid dixerit animo asserendi, potest illud huiusmodi animo non dixisse. Sed istud per iam praehabita refelletur, quoniam\n\nanimus asserendi proptius et distinctus est finalis intentio siue propositum, et aliquis actus voluntatis vel intellectus proprius et distinctus. Alij opinantur quod mentiri est contra mentem ire cum intentione fallendi; Sed Christus non habuit intentionem fallendi; quare et si quis dixerit contra mentem, non est tamen mendacij redarguendus. Sed hi serui nequam blasphemant nequiter Dominum nostrum Christum: concedunt namque ipsum posse falsum asserere contra mentem scienter et peierare; quare et consequenter habent concedere ipsum posse peccare contra prius ostensa tricesimo secundi. Nam omne factum contra conscientiam est peccatum, dicente Apostolo, Omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est, ad Rom. 14. Glossa, Omne etiam, si bonum sit in se, quod non est ex fide, id est, quod fit contra fidem, id est, contra conscientiam, peccatum est: quod et simili modo intelligit consilium generale, sicut patet extra de praescriptionibus capitulo vltimo; et Papa Innocentius tertius, supra de restitutione spoliatorum capitulo, Literas; vbi et adiungit illud", "english": "the response is emptied. If he does not know that the condition will be met, he does not know with certainty; and then he knows no differently from any other mere man. Further, let Christ assert that A will be, under condition B, and assert simply that B will be, and the difficulty returns. And if anyone should say still that this assertion can be under another condition, say C, then the process can go on to infinity in such conditions, and there is no certainty at all except about uncertainty alone, as was argued above. Again, let Christ assert something future, and assert that he asserts it simply and absolutely, without any condition, tacit or express. Others say that not everyone who says something false lies, but because he says it with the intention of asserting; and that Christ, though he said something with the intention of asserting, can have not said it with that intention. But this will be refuted by what has already been established, since the intention of asserting is a proper and distinct final intention or purpose, and some proper and distinct act of will or intellect. Others hold that to lie is to go against one's mind with the intention of deceiving; but Christ had no intention of deceiving, and so even if someone spoke against his mind, he is not for that reason to be convicted of lying. But these wicked servants wickedly blaspheme our Lord Christ. For they concede that he can knowingly assert a falsehood against his mind, and perjure himself; and so they must in consequence concede that he can sin, against what was shown earlier in the thirtieth of the second.[n6] For every deed against conscience is sin, as the Apostle says, Romans 14: \"Whatever is not from faith is sin.\" The Gloss: \"Everything also, even if it is good in itself, that is not from faith, that is, that is done against faith, that is, against conscience, is sin.\" The General Council understands it likewise, as is clear in the Extra, On Prescriptions, the last chapter; and Pope Innocent III, supra, On the Restitution of the Despoiled, the chapter Literas, where he also adds the", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p793B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/45/#p793B", "locator_display": "793B–793C", "source_text": "vulgatum, Quicquid fit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam. Quomodo etiam excusabitur quis ab intentione fallendi, si asseruit falsum scienter intendens vt tanquam verum sincerum ab auditoribus crederetur? Alij adhuc ponunt non oportere Christum fuisse mentitum, et si asseruit vnum falsum, quia non oportet hoc fuisse contra mentem ipsius. Sed hi mirabilem mentem habent: non enim aduertunt Christum esse Deum et hominem, ideoque saltem secundum naturam suam diuinam omnia verissime cognoscentem. Item secundum naturam suam humanam scit omnia saltem ad ipsum spectantia de propinquo, vt quadragesimo secundo huius erat ostensum; vel saltem secundum illam naturam credidit esse verum quod per illam asseruit: Non enim oblitus fuerat regulae, quam docebat; Sit sermo vester, Est, Est, Non, Non. Matth. 5. Est in corde, est in ore: et similiter negatiue; maxime autem quicquid iutauit, credidit esse verum; alias etenim nimis perperam iurasser, et potest esse qd. falsum asseruit et iurauit; ergo et quod credidit falsum esse verum, quare et quod fuit deceptus,\n\nquod quadragesimo secundo huius fuerat reprobatum: vnde etiam sequitur esse possibile ipsum peccasse, cuius oppositum tricesimo secundi fuerat demonstratum. Item asserat iusiurando se scire vel credere in proprio genere sic esse futurum, sicut asserit atque iurat, et responsio non respondet.", "english": "familiar saying, \"Whatever is done against conscience builds toward hell.\"[n7] How, moreover, will anyone be excused of the intention of deceiving, if he asserted a falsehood knowingly, intending that it be believed by his hearers as sincere truth? Others still hold that Christ need not have lied, even if he asserted one falsehood, since it need not have been against his own mind. But these have a marvelous mind! For they do not notice that Christ is God and man, and therefore, at least according to his divine nature, knows all things most truly. Again, according to his human nature he knows all things, at least those pertaining to himself closely, as was shown in the forty-second of this book; or at least he believed, according to that nature, to be true what he asserted through it. For he had not forgotten the rule he taught, \"Let your speech be, Yes, yes; No, no,\" Matthew 5. \"Yes\" is in the heart, it is in the mouth; and likewise \"No.\" Above all, whatever he swore he believed to be true; otherwise he would have sworn most wrongly, and it could be that what he asserted and swore was false. Then it could be also that what he believed false was true, and hence that he was deceived, which was refuted in the forty-second of this book. From this it also follows that it is possible he sinned, the opposite of which was demonstrated in the thirtieth of the second. Again, let him assert by oath that he knows or believes that in its own kind it will be as he asserts and swears; and the response does not respond.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}