De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 42
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 785C–787D; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[785C]
He further reduces the thirty-third opinion and its hypothesis [to absurdity] by way of revelation in its own kind [n1]; first concerning the Lord Jesus Christ. He also recounts one answer, which says that Christ could be deceived, and refutes it.

[785C–785E]
Now that the weakness of the principal hypothesis has been exposed by way of revelation in the Word, it remains to expose it in turn by way of revelation in its own kind: first in the Lord Jesus Christ, then in pure creatures, the Angels and men, his servants. Let it be posited, then, that it was distinctly revealed to Christ in its own kind that A, a future thing (say, the salvation of Paul, who is still alive and a wayfarer), would come about, and that he likewise believed it. According to the hypothesis, it is possible that Paul not be saved. Therefore it is also possible that this was not revealed to Christ, and that he did not believe it. For it follows necessarily: "Paul will not be saved, therefore this was never revealed to Christ nor believed by him." The antecedent is possible according to the hypothesis, therefore the consequent is too, which the hypothesis nevertheless denies. Or let the argument be turned the other way: "It is necessary that this was revealed to Christ and believed by him; therefore it is necessary that Paul be saved." For it follows necessarily: "This was revealed to Christ and believed by him, therefore it will be; if it is not to be, neither was it." The antecedent is necessary, therefore the consequent is too.

To this there are several answers. For some say that it is necessary that Christ received in its own kind such a proposition, "Paul will be saved" [n2], but that it is not necessary that it was a revelation, or was revealed, because it is not necessary that it was true; indeed it is possible that it was false. And if it is argued further, "It is also necessary that Christ believed this, therefore it is possible that Christ believed something false and was deceived," then, answering consistently, they certainly do not shrink from conceding this too. Yet it is astonishing with what face any Christian would presume to concede this of God and of his Lord Christ, when no Jew, Hagarene [n3], or Gentile of any kind would dare to commit such irreverence, or rather blasphemy, against his own God. For who would want to have such a God, whom any fool or wretch could most easily deceive all day long? Moreover, if Christ could be deceived and err, it would be possible that the highest truth were false and that the highest wisdom were deceived.

[785E–786B]
And if anyone still presumes to answer that in Christ there are two natures, the divine and the human, and that according to the divine he cannot be deceived or err, but according to the human he can, let it be posited then that he is thus deceived, falsely believing that A is B. Then Christ believes in particular and in act that A is B, and he also firmly believes and knows it to be true that A is not B [n4]. For Christ is God, and God knows all true things truly, in particular and in act, as the sixth and seventh of the first teach. Therefore Christ, in particular and in act, under the very proper form of each, believes both contradictories at once, which is manifestly impossible. For how can anyone believe most certainly, in particular and in act, under its very proper form, that something is true which, in the same ways, he knows most certainly to be false? For this reason the Philosopher too, in Prior Analytics 2 (in that chapter beginning "Now it happens sometimes") [n5], treating the falsity of opinion and the possible and impossible, shows that someone can hold opposites at once in opinion: one in the universal and the other in the particular; one in act and the other not in act; one in its proper form and the other outside it. But in the particular, in act, and in the proper form, in no way. Again, if someone could, as Christ [on their view] can, know a certain consequence to be good, and believe the antecedent in particular and in act under its own proper form, and yet not believe the consequent, indeed know most certainly, in the ways stated, that the consequent is false, this would make the whole of logic foolish and weak. And it is against the Philosopher in the place cited before.

[786B–786C]
For let it be posited that Christ, according to his human intellect, falsely believes A to be true. By the sixth of the first, he himself believes and knows most certainly that A is not true, and he knows this consequence to be good: "A is true and A is not true; therefore the not-true is true," or, "therefore the same thing is true and not true." And he believes the whole antecedent, since he believes each part of it, and yet he does not believe that consequent in any way; indeed, according to both his natures he knows most certainly that consequent to be false. Indeed it follows necessarily that Christ, according to the same nature, namely the human, can believe contradictories at once, and both the consequence and the antecedent together with the opposite of the consequent. For if according to the soul he believes a falsehood in its own kind, he at the same time, according to the same soul, believes or knows the true opposite in the Word, especially about a matter concerning himself in particular; or at least he can do this by the omnipotence of God, as the things established earlier in the fortieth of this book teach. Moreover this follows to be true not only in Christ, God and man, but also in a mere man, namely by believing one falsehood in its own kind and seeing the true opposite in the Word, as Christ does. By this same reasoning a man could know one thing by mathematical demonstration, and at the same time believe its opposite through the appearance of the senses or some probable argument; for example, that the sun or a star is both greater and smaller than the earth.

[786C–786D]
Again, if Christ could be deceived and err, he could have preached falsely and erroneously, and likewise taught so, and have been a false Prophet, a false Christ, even Antichrist. Whoever concedes this will leaven the whole Catholic faith with hesitation and excessive suspicion, and will deservedly be convicted as a false Christian and a disciple of Antichrist. Again, if this were possible, it would follow that it is possible that Christ established all the Ecclesiastical Sacraments deceitfully, that they were always delusory and had no efficacy; hence also that men were never saved through them but always damned, as the thirty-fifth of this book argued more fully.

[786D–786E]
Again, those who presume to concede this veil the face of Christ along with the Jews, at least his inner face, namely the intellect, with the veil of ignorance; and they strike his head, that is the same intellect, or rather the Word of God, his divine nature, with the tongue of blasphemy, saying that he can be deceived and err. Consequently they approve that mocking test of the Jews, who struck Christ when he was already veiled and said, "Prophesy to us, Christ: who is it that struck you?" For if he could believe something false to be true, why could he not have believed that the very one who struck him had in no way struck him, and conversely too, his eyes being already completely veiled? And if he had said, falsely and by erroneous divining, "This one struck me, and that one did not strike me," how deservedly he would have lain open to the Jews' ridicule! What sure proof they would have had that he was not the Messiah! Again, let it be posited that Christ, already veiled and struck, erroneously believed that A struck him; either Christ could have said this assertively, or not. If he could, let it be posited; then either he was lying in the proper sense, namely by speaking against his mind in so saying, or not. If he was lying in the proper sense, this is against what was shown earlier in the thirty-second of the second; and also he said it only in conformity with his mind; if not, he asserted a falsehood knowingly, as is clear by the sixth of the first [n6]. If he could not have said this by way of assertion, then he could not assert what he believed to be true, even if he had wished to assert it in accord with that belief; and if he could not assert that, he could assert its opposite, and had he done so he would have asserted against his mind and lied. Again, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 1 and 7, acts and operations belong to singulars and to supposits. But Christ was supposited only by the divine supposition, namely that of the Word of God [n7], as Peter shows in Sentences 3, distinction 5, by sufficiently firm testimonies [n8].

[786E–787A]
If, therefore, Christ had erred according to his human nature, that whole supposit, the Son of God, God, would have erred; and so the highest light would be darkened, the highest wisdom made foolish, and the highest truth falsified. And this is virtually the argument of Damascene by which he shows that in the soul of Christ there was no deliberation, no choice, and no ignorance of anything, as the thirty-second of the second more fully alleged.

[787A]
Anselm, in Cur Deus homo 2, 13, shows that Christ according to his human nature has no ignorance of anything, for many reasons: because ignorance is useful for nothing; because he could not do such great works without immense wisdom; because men would not trust him if they knew him to be ignorant; because he loves every good, and therefore also knows it; and because no one knows the good perfectly unless he knows how to distinguish it from evil, and no one who is ignorant of evil knows how to make this discrimination. As he will know every good perfectly, so he will be ignorant of no evil. If, then, according to these people, ignorance was not possible in Christ according to his human nature, much less were deception, falsehood, or error.

[787B–787C]
Peter too, in Sentences 3, distinctions 13 and 14, shows that Christ knows all things according to the soul; and to show this likewise he says that Fulgentius brought forward very many points in a certain sermon. Now those who avoid all ignorance concerning the soul of Christ as being, as it were [n9], something contrary to the Christian faith: would they not much more avoid all falsehood and error concerning his soul, as a deadly poison? Let the argument which they bring forward be examined. "No one knows anything which his soul does not know; but Christ, by every opinion, knows all things; therefore his soul knows all things." If, then, Christ, because he is God, knows all things of necessity, how will his soul not only be ignorant of something known, but even judge its opposite? Of Christ the Apostle also says, "In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden," in Colossians 2. But that would be a foolish treasurer who exchanged the treasure of wisdom and knowledge for folly and falsehood. Again, Augustine, on Psalm 21, in his second discourse, treating that word of Christ in Matthew 26, "Wherever this Gospel will be preached in the whole world, it will be told" etc.: "Why do you lend an ear to the slanderers, namely the Donatists? Either the Lord lied, or something deceived him. Let them choose what they will say: let them say either that the Truth lied, or that the Truth was deceived."

[787C–787D]
Again, if Christ can now be deceived, and has always been deceived, he can now be wretched and have always been wretched; therefore he is neither now blessed nor ever was before, as was shown in the thirty-fourth of this book, which no one will presume to concede unless he is wretched. Again, if Christ can be deceived, he would not be certain of his own beatitude, and therefore would not be fully blessed, as the same thirty-fourth teaches. Again, if Christ can have been deceived in its own kind, believing that Paul was to be saved who was not to be saved, he could likewise, according to the soul, in its own kind, have willed that and prayed to the Father for Paul's salvation. Therefore, according to his human will, he could have willed inwardly and acted outwardly in a way contrary to his divine will, and this knowingly, because this man Christ, our God, knew that the divine will did not will this and willed its opposite. Therefore Christ could have sinned, because he could have acted knowingly against the command of the Father. For "the Father who sent me," says Christ, "himself gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak," John 12; and the things shown earlier in the thirty-second of the second in no way allow this.

NOTES

1. Reducit: the technical "reduces to absurdity." In proprio genere (and in verbo, "in the Word") are Bradwardine's two modes of revelation. In verbo is knowledge in the divine Word, the vision of God. In proprio genere is a revelation received in the creature's own natural mode of cognition. I render "in its own kind" throughout.
2. The print has Paulus saluabatur (imperfect), but the argument requires the future saluabitur, the proposition that was posited as revealed. I translate "Paul will be saved."
3. Agarenus, a descendant of Hagar, is the medieval term for a Muslim (Saracen).
4. Both occurrences of "A is B" read A. esse B in the keyed Latin, and I could not read the second differently in the print. The argument requires the contradictory (A. non esse B) in the second place: Christ as God knows what is true, so he knows that A is not B. Two sentences later the text itself says "he believes and knows most certainly that A is not true." I translate the evident sense and have not emended the Latin.
5. Prior Analytics 2, probably the chapter on error and opinion (II.21). The Latin incipit Accidit autem quandoque is Savile's own gloss and I cannot match it to a chapter number. I have not checked the edition.
6. The syntax of this dilemma is loose. The branches seem to be: (a) he lied in the proper sense, against ch. 32 of Book II; (b) he did not lie, hence spoke in conformity with his mind, though Si non; contra asseruit falsum scienter then pictures a knowing assertion of falsehood. I translate the clauses in their order as printed.
7. Suppositum is the individual subsistent that acts. Christ has no created supposit of his own, only the divine person of the Word. Hence an error "of the human nature" would be an error of the Word.
8. The Peter cited here and at 787B is Peter Lombard, Sentences. Distinction 5 of book 3 concerns the union in the one person; distinctions 13–14 concern Christ's knowledge.
9. The pronoun se in qui se velut aliquid contrarium fidei Christianae ... vitant does not construe; I leave it untranslated and render velut "as it were."