{"id": "3/42", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 42", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "785C–787D", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XLII. Reducit adhuc opinionem tricesimam tertiam et eius hypothesin per viam reuelationis in proprio genere; et primo de Domino lesu Christo, et recitat vnam responsionem dicentem, quod Christus potuit decipi, et refellit.\n\nDEtecta siquidem infirmitate principalis hypothesis per viam reuelationis\n\nin verbo, restat eam detegere per viam reuelationis in proprio genere consequenter; et primo in Domino Iesu Christo, deinde in puris creaturis, Angelis et hominibus seruis suis. Ponatur igitur fuisse distincte reuelatum Christo in proprio genere, A. futurum, puta saluatio Pauli adhuc superstitis viatoris, et quod ipse eam similiter credidit, et secundum hypothesin, possibile est Paulum non saluari; ergo et possibile est hoc non fuisse reuelatum Christo, nec ipsum hoc credidisse: nam necessario sequitur, Paulus non saluabitur, ergo hoc nun quam fuit reuelatum nec creditum a Christo; et antecedens est possibile secundum hypothesin, ergo et consequens, quod hypothesis tamen negat. Vel arguatur e contra, Necesse est hoc fuisse reuelatum Christo, creditum que ab eo; ergo necesse est Paulum saluari: nam necessario sequitur, hoc fuit reuelatum, Christo et creditum ab eo, ergo erit; si non sit, nec fuit; et antecedens est necessarium, ergo et\n\nconsequens. Hic autem mulipliciter respondetur. Nam quidam dicunt quod necesse est Christum talem propositionem in proprio genere recepisse, Paulus saluabatur; sed non est necesse ipsam fuisse reuelationem, seu reuelatam, quia non est necesse ipsam fuisse veram, imo possibile est ipsam fuisse falsam. Et si arguatur vlterius, et necesse est Christum hoc credidisse, ergo possibile est Christum credidisse falsum et fuisse deceptum; Certe et hoc consequenter respondendo concedere non verentur. Mirum est tamen qua fronte aliquis Christianus hoc praesumet concedere de Deo, et Domino suo Christo, cum nullus Iudaeus, Agarenus, vel Gentilis quiscun que tantam irreuerentiam seu blasphemiā potius audeat facere Deo suo. Quis enim vellet talē Deū habere, quem quilibet stultus et miser facillime posset decipere tota dic? Si etiam Christus posset decipi et errare, esset possibile quod summa veritas esset falsa, et summa sapientia felleretur. Et si quis adhuc respondere praesumat, quod in Christo\n\nsunt duae naturae, diuida scilicet et humana, et quod secundum diuinam non potest decipi vel errare, sed secundum humanam; ponatur ergo eum sic decipi, false credendo A. esse B. tunc Christus credit in particulari et in actu A. esse B. et firmiter credit et scit verum A. esse B. quia Christus est Deus, quia omnia vera vere scit in particulari et in actu, vt sextum et septimum primi docent; ergo Christus in particular et in actu sub proprijssima forma sua ambo contradictoria simul credit, quod est impossibile manifestum: Quomodo namque potest quis certissime credere in particulari et in actu sub proprijssima forma sua aliquid esse verum, quod eisdem modis scit certiseime esse falsum? Quare et Philosophus 2. Prior. (illo capitulo, Accidit autem quandoque) determinans de falso opinionis, de possibili et impossibili, ostendit quod aliquis potest opinari simul opposita, vnum scilicet in vniuersali, et uliud in particulari; vnum in actu, aliud non in actu; vnum in propria forma? aliud vero extra; In particulari autem et in actu, et in forma propria nullo modo. Item si sic posset quis,\n\nvt Christus scire aliquam consequentiam esse bonam, et credere antecedens in particulari, et in actu sub forma propria sua, et non tamen credere consequens, imo scire certissime modis dictis consequens esse falsum, quod logicam totam infatuat et infirmat: et est contra Philosophum vbi prius. Ponatur namque Christum secundum intellectum eius humanum falso credere A. esse verum, et per sextum primi ipse credit et scit certissime A. esse non verum, et scit istam consequentiam esse bonam, A. est verum, et A. est non verum; ergo non verum est verum, vel ergo idem est verum et non verum, et credit totum autecedens quia vtramque pattem eius, et non credit istud consequens vllo modo; imo secundum vtramque eius naturam scit certissime illud cousequens esse falsum. Imo et necessario sequitur Christum secundum eandem naturam, humanam videlicet, posse credere simul contradictoria, et consequentiam, ac antecedens cum opposito consequentis. Nam si secundum animam credit falsum in proprio genere, simul secundum eandem credit seu scit verum oppositum in vebo, maxime\n\nde re ipsum specialiter concernente; vel saltem de omnipotentia Dei hoc potest, sicut praehabita quadragesimo huius docent. Hoc etiam nedum sequitur esse verum in Christo Deo, et homine, verum etiam in simplici homine, credendo videlicet in proprio genere vnum falsum, et videndo in verbo verum oppositum sicut Christus. Secundum istud similiter posset homo per demonstrationem mathematicam scire vnum, et per apparentiam sensitiuam, seu per aliquod argumentum probabile credere simul oppositum, puta solem vel stellam esse maiorem terra atque minorem. Item si Christus potuit decipi et errare, potuit false et erronce praedicasse, et similiter docuisse, fuisse pseudo-Propheta, et pseudo-Christus, etiam Antichristus, quod qui concesserit, totam fidem Catholicam haesitatione ac suspicione nimia fermentabit, qui et pro pseudo-Christiano merito conuincetur, et pro discipulo Antichristi. Item si hoc esset possibile, esset possibile consequenter Christum instituisse fallaciter omnia Ecclesiastica Sacramenta, ipsaque semper fuisse delusoria, nec efficaciam habuisse; quare et\n\nhomines per illa nunquam fuisse saluatos, sed semper damnatos, sicut tricesimum quintum huius plenius arguebat. Item qui hoc praesumunt concedere, velant cum Iudaeis faciem Christi, saltem interiorem scilicet intellectum, velo ignorantiae, et percutiunt caput eius, eundem scilicet intellectum seu etiam verbum Dei, naturam eius diuinam lingua blasphemiae dicentes ipsum posse decipi et errare, et per consequens, approbantes illud experimentum illusorium Iudaeorum, Christum iam velatum percutientium, atque dicentium, Prophetiza nobis Christe, quis est qui te percussit? Nam si potuit credere falsum aliquod esse verum, cur non potuit credidisse ipsum qui percussit nullatenus percussisse, et etiam e contra, oculis eius iam perfecte velatis? Quod si falso, erronee diuinando, dixisset, Iste me percussit, et iste non percussit; quanto Iudaeorum ridiculo merito patuisset? Quam certam experientiam habuissent ipsum non fuisse Messiam? Item ponatur Christum iam velatum atque percussum erronee credidisse, quod A. eum percussit; vel potuit Christus hoc assertiue dixisse, vel non:\n\nsi potuit, ponatur, vel ergo mentiebatur proprie, eundo scilicet contra mentem sic dicendo, vel non: Si mentiebatur proptie, hoc est contra prius ostensa, tricesimo secundi, et etiam tantum dixit conformiter menti suae; Si non; contra asseruit falsum scienter, vt patet per sextum primi; Si non potuit hoc asserendo dixisse, tunc non potuit asserere quod credidit esse verum, etiam si iuxta illam credulitatem illud asserere voluisset: etiam, si non potuit illud asserere, potuit asserere eius oppositum, quod si fecisset, asseruisset contra mentem, et mentitus fuisset. Item secundum Philosophum 1. et 7. Met. actus et operationes sunt singularium, et suppositorum: Christus autem fuit suppositatus tantum suppositatione diuina, scil. verbi Dei, sicut ostendit Petrus 3. sent. dist. 5. per testimonia satis firma. Si ergo\n\nChristus secundum naturam suam humanam errasset, totum illud suppositum Filius Dei Deus errasset, sicque summa lux obtenebraretur, summa sapientia infatuaretur, et summa veritas falsaretur; et haec est virtualiter ratio Damasceni per quam ostendit in anima Christi non fuisse consilium, electionem, neque ignorantiam alicuius, sicut tricesimum secundi plenius allegauit. Anselmus 2. Cur Deus homo 13. ostendit, Christum secundum naturam suam humanam non habere ignorantiam alicuius multiplici ratione, tum quia ignorantia ad nihil est vtilis, tum quia non posset tanta opera facere sine immensa sapientia, tum quia homines non crederent sibi, si scirent eum nescium, tum quia omne bonum amat, quare et cognoscit, et quia bonum nemo perfecte nouerit, nisi qui illud a malo scit discernere, et hanc discretionem nullus scit facere qui malum ignorat, sicut omne bonum perfecte sciet, ita nullum malum ignorabit. Si igitur secundum istos, ignorantia non fuit possibilis in Christo secundum naturam suam humanam, multo magis neque deceptio, neque fallacia, neque error.\n\nPetrus etiam 3. sentent. dist. 13. et 14. ostendit Christum secundum animam cuncta scire, ad quod similiter ostendendum dicit Fulgentium in quodam serm one plurima induxisse. Isti ergo qui se velut aliquid contrarium fidei Christianae omnem ignorantiam circa animam Christi vitant, nonne multo magis omnem fallaciam et errorem tanquam venenum mortiferum circa animam eius deuitarent? Inspiciatur siquidem ratio quam adducunt. Nihil scit aliquis quod anima eius ignoret; sed Christus secundum omnem opinionem omnia scit; ergo anima eius omnia scit. Si ergo Christus, quia Deus, de necessitate scit omnia, quomodo anima eius nedum scitum aliquod ignorabit, verum etiam eius oppositum aestimabit? De Christo etiam dicit Apostolus, In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi, ad Col. 2. sed stultus thesaurarius esset ille, qui thesaurum sapientiae et scientiae in insipientiam et fallaciam permutaret. Item Augustinus super Psal. 21. tractatu secundo tractans illud verbum Christi Matt. 26. Vbicunque praedicatum fuerit hoc Euangelium in toto mundo, dicetur\n\netc. Quare aurem calumniatoribus, scilicet Donatistis, accommodatis? Aut mentitus est Dominus, aut fefellit illum; eligant, quid dicant; aut mentitam dicant veritatem, aut deceptam dicant veritatem. Item si Christus possit nunc decipi, et semper fuisse deceptus, potest nunc esse miser et semper fuisse miser; quare nec nunc, nec vnquam prius beatus, sicut erat ostensum 34. huius, quod nullus praesumet concedere nisi miser. Item si Christus possit decipi, non esset de beatitudine sua certus, quare neque plene beatus, sicut idem 34. docet. Item si Christus potest fuisse deceptus in proprio genere, credendo Paulum saluandum qui non fuit saluandus, potuit similiter secundum animam in proprio genere illud velle et orare Patrem pro eius salute; potuit ergo secundum voluntatem suam humanam velle interius, et operari exterius contrarie suae voluntati diuina; et hoc scienter, quia iste homo Christus Deus noster sciuit voluntatem diuinam hoc nolle, et oppositum eius velle: Potuit ergo Christus peccasse, quia contra mandatum Patris scienter fecisse. Nam qui misit me Pater, inquit\n\nChristus, ipse mini mandatum dedit, quid dicam et quid loquar, Ioh. 12. quod praeostensa tricesimo secundi nullatenus patiuntur.", "english": "He further reduces the thirty-third opinion and its hypothesis [to absurdity] by way of revelation in its own kind [n1]; first concerning the Lord Jesus Christ. He also recounts one answer, which says that Christ could be deceived, and refutes it.\n\nNow that the weakness of the principal hypothesis has been exposed by way of revelation in the Word, it remains to expose it in turn by way of revelation in its own kind: first in the Lord Jesus Christ, then in pure creatures, the Angels and men, his servants. Let it be posited, then, that it was distinctly revealed to Christ in its own kind that A, a future thing (say, the salvation of Paul, who is still alive and a wayfarer), would come about, and that he likewise believed it. According to the hypothesis, it is possible that Paul not be saved. Therefore it is also possible that this was not revealed to Christ, and that he did not believe it. For it follows necessarily: \"Paul will not be saved, therefore this was never revealed to Christ nor believed by him.\" The antecedent is possible according to the hypothesis, therefore the consequent is too, which the hypothesis nevertheless denies. Or let the argument be turned the other way: \"It is necessary that this was revealed to Christ and believed by him; therefore it is necessary that Paul be saved.\" For it follows necessarily: \"This was revealed to Christ and believed by him, therefore it will be; if it is not to be, neither was it.\" The antecedent is necessary, therefore the consequent is too.\n\nTo this there are several answers. For some say that it is necessary that Christ received in its own kind such a proposition, \"Paul will be saved\" [n2], but that it is not necessary that it was a revelation, or was revealed, because it is not necessary that it was true; indeed it is possible that it was false. And if it is argued further, \"It is also necessary that Christ believed this, therefore it is possible that Christ believed something false and was deceived,\" then, answering consistently, they certainly do not shrink from conceding this too. Yet it is astonishing with what face any Christian would presume to concede this of God and of his Lord Christ, when no Jew, Hagarene [n3], or Gentile of any kind would dare to commit such irreverence, or rather blasphemy, against his own God. For who would want to have such a God, whom any fool or wretch could most easily deceive all day long? Moreover, if Christ could be deceived and err, it would be possible that the highest truth were false and that the highest wisdom were deceived.\n\nAnd if anyone still presumes to answer that in Christ there are two natures, the divine and the human, and that according to the divine he cannot be deceived or err, but according to the human he can, let it be posited then that he is thus deceived, falsely believing that A is B. Then Christ believes in particular and in act that A is B, and he also firmly believes and knows it to be true that A is not B [n4]. For Christ is God, and God knows all true things truly, in particular and in act, as the sixth and seventh of the first teach. Therefore Christ, in particular and in act, under the very proper form of each, believes both contradictories at once, which is manifestly impossible. For how can anyone believe most certainly, in particular and in act, under its very proper form, that something is true which, in the same ways, he knows most certainly to be false? For this reason the Philosopher too, in Prior Analytics 2 (in that chapter beginning \"Now it happens sometimes\") [n5], treating the falsity of opinion and the possible and impossible, shows that someone can hold opposites at once in opinion: one in the universal and the other in the particular; one in act and the other not in act; one in its proper form and the other outside it. But in the particular, in act, and in the proper form, in no way. Again, if someone could, as Christ [on their view] can, know a certain consequence to be good, and believe the antecedent in particular and in act under its own proper form, and yet not believe the consequent, indeed know most certainly, in the ways stated, that the consequent is false, this would make the whole of logic foolish and weak. And it is against the Philosopher in the place cited before.\n\nFor let it be posited that Christ, according to his human intellect, falsely believes A to be true. By the sixth of the first, he himself believes and knows most certainly that A is not true, and he knows this consequence to be good: \"A is true and A is not true; therefore the not-true is true,\" or, \"therefore the same thing is true and not true.\" And he believes the whole antecedent, since he believes each part of it, and yet he does not believe that consequent in any way; indeed, according to both his natures he knows most certainly that consequent to be false. Indeed it follows necessarily that Christ, according to the same nature, namely the human, can believe contradictories at once, and both the consequence and the antecedent together with the opposite of the consequent. For if according to the soul he believes a falsehood in its own kind, he at the same time, according to the same soul, believes or knows the true opposite in the Word, especially about a matter concerning himself in particular; or at least he can do this by the omnipotence of God, as the things established earlier in the fortieth of this book teach. Moreover this follows to be true not only in Christ, God and man, but also in a mere man, namely by believing one falsehood in its own kind and seeing the true opposite in the Word, as Christ does. By this same reasoning a man could know one thing by mathematical demonstration, and at the same time believe its opposite through the appearance of the senses or some probable argument; for example, that the sun or a star is both greater and smaller than the earth.\n\nAgain, if Christ could be deceived and err, he could have preached falsely and erroneously, and likewise taught so, and have been a false Prophet, a false Christ, even Antichrist. Whoever concedes this will leaven the whole Catholic faith with hesitation and excessive suspicion, and will deservedly be convicted as a false Christian and a disciple of Antichrist. Again, if this were possible, it would follow that it is possible that Christ established all the Ecclesiastical Sacraments deceitfully, that they were always delusory and had no efficacy; hence also that men were never saved through them but always damned, as the thirty-fifth of this book argued more fully.\n\nAgain, those who presume to concede this veil the face of Christ along with the Jews, at least his inner face, namely the intellect, with the veil of ignorance; and they strike his head, that is the same intellect, or rather the Word of God, his divine nature, with the tongue of blasphemy, saying that he can be deceived and err. Consequently they approve that mocking test of the Jews, who struck Christ when he was already veiled and said, \"Prophesy to us, Christ: who is it that struck you?\" For if he could believe something false to be true, why could he not have believed that the very one who struck him had in no way struck him, and conversely too, his eyes being already completely veiled? And if he had said, falsely and by erroneous divining, \"This one struck me, and that one did not strike me,\" how deservedly he would have lain open to the Jews' ridicule! What sure proof they would have had that he was not the Messiah! Again, let it be posited that Christ, already veiled and struck, erroneously believed that A struck him; either Christ could have said this assertively, or not. If he could, let it be posited; then either he was lying in the proper sense, namely by speaking against his mind in so saying, or not. If he was lying in the proper sense, this is against what was shown earlier in the thirty-second of the second; and also he said it only in conformity with his mind; if not, he asserted a falsehood knowingly, as is clear by the sixth of the first [n6]. If he could not have said this by way of assertion, then he could not assert what he believed to be true, even if he had wished to assert it in accord with that belief; and if he could not assert that, he could assert its opposite, and had he done so he would have asserted against his mind and lied. Again, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 1 and 7, acts and operations belong to singulars and to supposits. But Christ was supposited only by the divine supposition, namely that of the Word of God [n7], as Peter shows in Sentences 3, distinction 5, by sufficiently firm testimonies [n8].\n\nIf, therefore, Christ had erred according to his human nature, that whole supposit, the Son of God, God, would have erred; and so the highest light would be darkened, the highest wisdom made foolish, and the highest truth falsified. And this is virtually the argument of Damascene by which he shows that in the soul of Christ there was no deliberation, no choice, and no ignorance of anything, as the thirty-second of the second more fully alleged.\n\nAnselm, in Cur Deus homo 2, 13, shows that Christ according to his human nature has no ignorance of anything, for many reasons: because ignorance is useful for nothing; because he could not do such great works without immense wisdom; because men would not trust him if they knew him to be ignorant; because he loves every good, and therefore also knows it; and because no one knows the good perfectly unless he knows how to distinguish it from evil, and no one who is ignorant of evil knows how to make this discrimination. As he will know every good perfectly, so he will be ignorant of no evil. If, then, according to these people, ignorance was not possible in Christ according to his human nature, much less were deception, falsehood, or error.\n\nPeter too, in Sentences 3, distinctions 13 and 14, shows that Christ knows all things according to the soul; and to show this likewise he says that Fulgentius brought forward very many points in a certain sermon. Now those who avoid all ignorance concerning the soul of Christ as being, as it were [n9], something contrary to the Christian faith: would they not much more avoid all falsehood and error concerning his soul, as a deadly poison? Let the argument which they bring forward be examined. \"No one knows anything which his soul does not know; but Christ, by every opinion, knows all things; therefore his soul knows all things.\" If, then, Christ, because he is God, knows all things of necessity, how will his soul not only be ignorant of something known, but even judge its opposite? Of Christ the Apostle also says, \"In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden,\" in Colossians 2. But that would be a foolish treasurer who exchanged the treasure of wisdom and knowledge for folly and falsehood. Again, Augustine, on Psalm 21, in his second discourse, treating that word of Christ in Matthew 26, \"Wherever this Gospel will be preached in the whole world, it will be told\" etc.: \"Why do you lend an ear to the slanderers, namely the Donatists? Either the Lord lied, or something deceived him. Let them choose what they will say: let them say either that the Truth lied, or that the Truth was deceived.\"\n\nAgain, if Christ can now be deceived, and has always been deceived, he can now be wretched and have always been wretched; therefore he is neither now blessed nor ever was before, as was shown in the thirty-fourth of this book, which no one will presume to concede unless he is wretched. Again, if Christ can be deceived, he would not be certain of his own beatitude, and therefore would not be fully blessed, as the same thirty-fourth teaches. Again, if Christ can have been deceived in its own kind, believing that Paul was to be saved who was not to be saved, he could likewise, according to the soul, in its own kind, have willed that and prayed to the Father for Paul's salvation. Therefore, according to his human will, he could have willed inwardly and acted outwardly in a way contrary to his divine will, and this knowingly, because this man Christ, our God, knew that the divine will did not will this and willed its opposite. Therefore Christ could have sinned, because he could have acted knowingly against the command of the Father. For \"the Father who sent me,\" says Christ, \"himself gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak,\" John 12; and the things shown earlier in the thirty-second of the second in no way allow this.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Reducit: the technical \"reduces to absurdity.\" In proprio genere (and in verbo, \"in the Word\") are Bradwardine's two modes of revelation. In verbo is knowledge in the divine Word, the vision of God. In proprio genere is a revelation received in the creature's own natural mode of cognition. I render \"in its own kind\" throughout."}, {"n": 2, "text": "The print has Paulus saluabatur (imperfect), but the argument requires the future saluabitur, the proposition that was posited as revealed. I translate \"Paul will be saved.\""}, {"n": 3, "text": "Agarenus, a descendant of Hagar, is the medieval term for a Muslim (Saracen)."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Both occurrences of \"A is B\" read A. esse B in the keyed Latin, and I could not read the second differently in the print. The argument requires the contradictory (A. non esse B) in the second place: Christ as God knows what is true, so he knows that A is not B. Two sentences later the text itself says \"he believes and knows most certainly that A is not true.\" I translate the evident sense and have not emended the Latin."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Prior Analytics 2, probably the chapter on error and opinion (II.21). The Latin incipit Accidit autem quandoque is Savile's own gloss and I cannot match it to a chapter number. I have not checked the edition."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The syntax of this dilemma is loose. The branches seem to be: (a) he lied in the proper sense, against ch. 32 of Book II; (b) he did not lie, hence spoke in conformity with his mind, though Si non; contra asseruit falsum scienter then pictures a knowing assertion of falsehood. I translate the clauses in their order as printed."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Suppositum is the individual subsistent that acts. Christ has no created supposit of his own, only the divine person of the Word. Hence an error \"of the human nature\" would be an error of the Word."}, {"n": 8, "text": "The Peter cited here and at 787B is Peter Lombard, Sentences. Distinction 5 of book 3 concerns the union in the one person; distinctions 13–14 concern Christ's knowledge."}, {"n": 9, "text": "The pronoun se in qui se velut aliquid contrarium fidei Christianae ... vitant does not construe; I leave it untranslated and render velut \"as it were.\""}], "errata": [{"address": "785E", "keyed": "tota dic", "print": "tota die"}, {"address": "786A", "keyed": "diuida scilicet", "print": "diuina scilicet"}, {"address": "786A", "keyed": "false credendo", "print": "falso credendo"}, {"address": "786A", "keyed": "in particular et in actu", "print": "in particulari et in actu"}, {"address": "786A", "keyed": "uliud", "print": "aliud"}, {"address": "786A", "keyed": "certiseime", "print": "certissime"}, {"address": "786B", "keyed": "autecedens", "print": "antecedens"}, {"address": "786B", "keyed": "pattem", "print": "partem"}, {"address": "786B", "keyed": "cousequens", "print": "consequens"}, {"address": "787B", "keyed": "serm one", "print": "sermone"}, {"address": "787C", "keyed": "voluntati diuina", "print": "voluntati diuinae"}, {"address": "787D", "keyed": "mini mandatum", "print": "mihi mandatum"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p785C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p785C", "locator_display": "785C", "source_text": "CAP. XLII. Reducit adhuc opinionem tricesimam tertiam et eius hypothesin per viam reuelationis in proprio genere; et primo de Domino lesu Christo, et recitat vnam responsionem dicentem, quod Christus potuit decipi, et refellit.", "english": "He further reduces the thirty-third opinion and its hypothesis [to absurdity] by way of revelation in its own kind [n1]; first concerning the Lord Jesus Christ. He also recounts one answer, which says that Christ could be deceived, and refutes it.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p785C-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p785C-2", "locator_display": "785C–785E", "source_text": "DEtecta siquidem infirmitate principalis hypothesis per viam reuelationis\n\nin verbo, restat eam detegere per viam reuelationis in proprio genere consequenter; et primo in Domino Iesu Christo, deinde in puris creaturis, Angelis et hominibus seruis suis. Ponatur igitur fuisse distincte reuelatum Christo in proprio genere, A. futurum, puta saluatio Pauli adhuc superstitis viatoris, et quod ipse eam similiter credidit, et secundum hypothesin, possibile est Paulum non saluari; ergo et possibile est hoc non fuisse reuelatum Christo, nec ipsum hoc credidisse: nam necessario sequitur, Paulus non saluabitur, ergo hoc nun quam fuit reuelatum nec creditum a Christo; et antecedens est possibile secundum hypothesin, ergo et consequens, quod hypothesis tamen negat. Vel arguatur e contra, Necesse est hoc fuisse reuelatum Christo, creditum que ab eo; ergo necesse est Paulum saluari: nam necessario sequitur, hoc fuit reuelatum, Christo et creditum ab eo, ergo erit; si non sit, nec fuit; et antecedens est necessarium, ergo et\n\nconsequens. Hic autem mulipliciter respondetur. Nam quidam dicunt quod necesse est Christum talem propositionem in proprio genere recepisse, Paulus saluabatur; sed non est necesse ipsam fuisse reuelationem, seu reuelatam, quia non est necesse ipsam fuisse veram, imo possibile est ipsam fuisse falsam. Et si arguatur vlterius, et necesse est Christum hoc credidisse, ergo possibile est Christum credidisse falsum et fuisse deceptum; Certe et hoc consequenter respondendo concedere non verentur. Mirum est tamen qua fronte aliquis Christianus hoc praesumet concedere de Deo, et Domino suo Christo, cum nullus Iudaeus, Agarenus, vel Gentilis quiscun que tantam irreuerentiam seu blasphemiā potius audeat facere Deo suo. Quis enim vellet talē Deū habere, quem quilibet stultus et miser facillime posset decipere tota dic? Si etiam Christus posset decipi et errare, esset possibile quod summa veritas esset falsa, et summa sapientia felleretur. Et si quis adhuc respondere praesumat, quod in Christo", "english": "Now that the weakness of the principal hypothesis has been exposed by way of revelation in the Word, it remains to expose it in turn by way of revelation in its own kind: first in the Lord Jesus Christ, then in pure creatures, the Angels and men, his servants. Let it be posited, then, that it was distinctly revealed to Christ in its own kind that A, a future thing (say, the salvation of Paul, who is still alive and a wayfarer), would come about, and that he likewise believed it. According to the hypothesis, it is possible that Paul not be saved. Therefore it is also possible that this was not revealed to Christ, and that he did not believe it. For it follows necessarily: \"Paul will not be saved, therefore this was never revealed to Christ nor believed by him.\" The antecedent is possible according to the hypothesis, therefore the consequent is too, which the hypothesis nevertheless denies. Or let the argument be turned the other way: \"It is necessary that this was revealed to Christ and believed by him; therefore it is necessary that Paul be saved.\" For it follows necessarily: \"This was revealed to Christ and believed by him, therefore it will be; if it is not to be, neither was it.\" The antecedent is necessary, therefore the consequent is too.\n\nTo this there are several answers. For some say that it is necessary that Christ received in its own kind such a proposition, \"Paul will be saved\" [n2], but that it is not necessary that it was a revelation, or was revealed, because it is not necessary that it was true; indeed it is possible that it was false. And if it is argued further, \"It is also necessary that Christ believed this, therefore it is possible that Christ believed something false and was deceived,\" then, answering consistently, they certainly do not shrink from conceding this too. Yet it is astonishing with what face any Christian would presume to concede this of God and of his Lord Christ, when no Jew, Hagarene [n3], or Gentile of any kind would dare to commit such irreverence, or rather blasphemy, against his own God. For who would want to have such a God, whom any fool or wretch could most easily deceive all day long? Moreover, if Christ could be deceived and err, it would be possible that the highest truth were false and that the highest wisdom were deceived.", "margins": [{"id": "785E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: necessarium (for necesse)"}, {"id": "785E·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: esse (for fuisse)"}]}, {"anchor": "p785E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p785E", "locator_display": "785E–786B", "source_text": "sunt duae naturae, diuida scilicet et humana, et quod secundum diuinam non potest decipi vel errare, sed secundum humanam; ponatur ergo eum sic decipi, false credendo A. esse B. tunc Christus credit in particulari et in actu A. esse B. et firmiter credit et scit verum A. esse B. quia Christus est Deus, quia omnia vera vere scit in particulari et in actu, vt sextum et septimum primi docent; ergo Christus in particular et in actu sub proprijssima forma sua ambo contradictoria simul credit, quod est impossibile manifestum: Quomodo namque potest quis certissime credere in particulari et in actu sub proprijssima forma sua aliquid esse verum, quod eisdem modis scit certiseime esse falsum? Quare et Philosophus 2. Prior. (illo capitulo, Accidit autem quandoque) determinans de falso opinionis, de possibili et impossibili, ostendit quod aliquis potest opinari simul opposita, vnum scilicet in vniuersali, et uliud in particulari; vnum in actu, aliud non in actu; vnum in propria forma? aliud vero extra; In particulari autem et in actu, et in forma propria nullo modo. Item si sic posset quis,\n\nvt Christus scire aliquam consequentiam esse bonam, et credere antecedens in particulari, et in actu sub forma propria sua, et non tamen credere consequens, imo scire certissime modis dictis consequens esse falsum, quod logicam totam infatuat et infirmat: et est contra Philosophum vbi prius. Ponatur namque Christum secundum intellectum eius humanum falso credere A. esse verum, et per sextum primi ipse credit et scit certissime A. esse non verum, et scit istam consequentiam esse bonam, A. est verum, et A. est non verum; ergo non verum est verum, vel ergo idem est verum et non verum, et credit totum autecedens quia vtramque pattem eius, et non credit istud consequens vllo modo; imo secundum vtramque eius naturam scit certissime illud cousequens esse falsum. Imo et necessario sequitur Christum secundum eandem naturam, humanam videlicet, posse credere simul contradictoria, et consequentiam, ac antecedens cum opposito consequentis. Nam si secundum animam credit falsum in proprio genere, simul secundum eandem credit seu scit verum oppositum in vebo, maxime", "english": "And if anyone still presumes to answer that in Christ there are two natures, the divine and the human, and that according to the divine he cannot be deceived or err, but according to the human he can, let it be posited then that he is thus deceived, falsely believing that A is B. Then Christ believes in particular and in act that A is B, and he also firmly believes and knows it to be true that A is not B [n4]. For Christ is God, and God knows all true things truly, in particular and in act, as the sixth and seventh of the first teach. Therefore Christ, in particular and in act, under the very proper form of each, believes both contradictories at once, which is manifestly impossible. For how can anyone believe most certainly, in particular and in act, under its very proper form, that something is true which, in the same ways, he knows most certainly to be false? For this reason the Philosopher too, in Prior Analytics 2 (in that chapter beginning \"Now it happens sometimes\") [n5], treating the falsity of opinion and the possible and impossible, shows that someone can hold opposites at once in opinion: one in the universal and the other in the particular; one in act and the other not in act; one in its proper form and the other outside it. But in the particular, in act, and in the proper form, in no way. Again, if someone could, as Christ [on their view] can, know a certain consequence to be good, and believe the antecedent in particular and in act under its own proper form, and yet not believe the consequent, indeed know most certainly, in the ways stated, that the consequent is false, this would make the whole of logic foolish and weak. And it is against the Philosopher in the place cited before.", "margins": [{"id": "785E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "necessarium"}, {"id": "785E·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "esse"}]}, {"anchor": "p786B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p786B", "locator_display": "786B–786C", "source_text": "de re ipsum specialiter concernente; vel saltem de omnipotentia Dei hoc potest, sicut praehabita quadragesimo huius docent. Hoc etiam nedum sequitur esse verum in Christo Deo, et homine, verum etiam in simplici homine, credendo videlicet in proprio genere vnum falsum, et videndo in verbo verum oppositum sicut Christus. Secundum istud similiter posset homo per demonstrationem mathematicam scire vnum, et per apparentiam sensitiuam, seu per aliquod argumentum probabile credere simul oppositum, puta solem vel stellam esse maiorem terra atque minorem. Item si Christus potuit decipi et errare, potuit false et erronce praedicasse, et similiter docuisse, fuisse pseudo-Propheta, et pseudo-Christus, etiam Antichristus, quod qui concesserit, totam fidem Catholicam haesitatione ac suspicione nimia fermentabit, qui et pro pseudo-Christiano merito conuincetur, et pro discipulo Antichristi. Item si hoc esset possibile, esset possibile consequenter Christum instituisse fallaciter omnia Ecclesiastica Sacramenta, ipsaque semper fuisse delusoria, nec efficaciam habuisse; quare et", "english": "For let it be posited that Christ, according to his human intellect, falsely believes A to be true. By the sixth of the first, he himself believes and knows most certainly that A is not true, and he knows this consequence to be good: \"A is true and A is not true; therefore the not-true is true,\" or, \"therefore the same thing is true and not true.\" And he believes the whole antecedent, since he believes each part of it, and yet he does not believe that consequent in any way; indeed, according to both his natures he knows most certainly that consequent to be false. Indeed it follows necessarily that Christ, according to the same nature, namely the human, can believe contradictories at once, and both the consequence and the antecedent together with the opposite of the consequent. For if according to the soul he believes a falsehood in its own kind, he at the same time, according to the same soul, believes or knows the true opposite in the Word, especially about a matter concerning himself in particular; or at least he can do this by the omnipotence of God, as the things established earlier in the fortieth of this book teach. Moreover this follows to be true not only in Christ, God and man, but also in a mere man, namely by believing one falsehood in its own kind and seeing the true opposite in the Word, as Christ does. By this same reasoning a man could know one thing by mathematical demonstration, and at the same time believe its opposite through the appearance of the senses or some probable argument; for example, that the sun or a star is both greater and smaller than the earth.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p786C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p786C", "locator_display": "786C–786D", "source_text": "homines per illa nunquam fuisse saluatos, sed semper damnatos, sicut tricesimum quintum huius plenius arguebat. Item qui hoc praesumunt concedere, velant cum Iudaeis faciem Christi, saltem interiorem scilicet intellectum, velo ignorantiae, et percutiunt caput eius, eundem scilicet intellectum seu etiam verbum Dei, naturam eius diuinam lingua blasphemiae dicentes ipsum posse decipi et errare, et per consequens, approbantes illud experimentum illusorium Iudaeorum, Christum iam velatum percutientium, atque dicentium, Prophetiza nobis Christe, quis est qui te percussit? Nam si potuit credere falsum aliquod esse verum, cur non potuit credidisse ipsum qui percussit nullatenus percussisse, et etiam e contra, oculis eius iam perfecte velatis? Quod si falso, erronee diuinando, dixisset, Iste me percussit, et iste non percussit; quanto Iudaeorum ridiculo merito patuisset? Quam certam experientiam habuissent ipsum non fuisse Messiam? Item ponatur Christum iam velatum atque percussum erronee credidisse, quod A. eum percussit; vel potuit Christus hoc assertiue dixisse, vel non:", "english": "Again, if Christ could be deceived and err, he could have preached falsely and erroneously, and likewise taught so, and have been a false Prophet, a false Christ, even Antichrist. Whoever concedes this will leaven the whole Catholic faith with hesitation and excessive suspicion, and will deservedly be convicted as a false Christian and a disciple of Antichrist. Again, if this were possible, it would follow that it is possible that Christ established all the Ecclesiastical Sacraments deceitfully, that they were always delusory and had no efficacy; hence also that men were never saved through them but always damned, as the thirty-fifth of this book argued more fully.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p786D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p786D", "locator_display": "786D–786E", "source_text": "si potuit, ponatur, vel ergo mentiebatur proprie, eundo scilicet contra mentem sic dicendo, vel non: Si mentiebatur proptie, hoc est contra prius ostensa, tricesimo secundi, et etiam tantum dixit conformiter menti suae; Si non; contra asseruit falsum scienter, vt patet per sextum primi; Si non potuit hoc asserendo dixisse, tunc non potuit asserere quod credidit esse verum, etiam si iuxta illam credulitatem illud asserere voluisset: etiam, si non potuit illud asserere, potuit asserere eius oppositum, quod si fecisset, asseruisset contra mentem, et mentitus fuisset. Item secundum Philosophum 1. et 7. Met. actus et operationes sunt singularium, et suppositorum: Christus autem fuit suppositatus tantum suppositatione diuina, scil. verbi Dei, sicut ostendit Petrus 3. sent. dist. 5. per testimonia satis firma. Si ergo", "english": "Again, those who presume to concede this veil the face of Christ along with the Jews, at least his inner face, namely the intellect, with the veil of ignorance; and they strike his head, that is the same intellect, or rather the Word of God, his divine nature, with the tongue of blasphemy, saying that he can be deceived and err. Consequently they approve that mocking test of the Jews, who struck Christ when he was already veiled and said, \"Prophesy to us, Christ: who is it that struck you?\" For if he could believe something false to be true, why could he not have believed that the very one who struck him had in no way struck him, and conversely too, his eyes being already completely veiled? And if he had said, falsely and by erroneous divining, \"This one struck me, and that one did not strike me,\" how deservedly he would have lain open to the Jews' ridicule! What sure proof they would have had that he was not the Messiah! Again, let it be posited that Christ, already veiled and struck, erroneously believed that A struck him; either Christ could have said this assertively, or not. If he could, let it be posited; then either he was lying in the proper sense, namely by speaking against his mind in so saying, or not. If he was lying in the proper sense, this is against what was shown earlier in the thirty-second of the second; and also he said it only in conformity with his mind; if not, he asserted a falsehood knowingly, as is clear by the sixth of the first [n6]. If he could not have said this by way of assertion, then he could not assert what he believed to be true, even if he had wished to assert it in accord with that belief; and if he could not assert that, he could assert its opposite, and had he done so he would have asserted against his mind and lied. Again, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 1 and 7, acts and operations belong to singulars and to supposits. But Christ was supposited only by the divine supposition, namely that of the Word of God [n7], as Peter shows in Sentences 3, distinction 5, by sufficiently firm testimonies [n8].", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p786E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p786E", "locator_display": "786E–787A", "source_text": "Christus secundum naturam suam humanam errasset, totum illud suppositum Filius Dei Deus errasset, sicque summa lux obtenebraretur, summa sapientia infatuaretur, et summa veritas falsaretur; et haec est virtualiter ratio Damasceni per quam ostendit in anima Christi non fuisse consilium, electionem, neque ignorantiam alicuius, sicut tricesimum secundi plenius allegauit. Anselmus 2. Cur Deus homo 13. ostendit, Christum secundum naturam suam humanam non habere ignorantiam alicuius multiplici ratione, tum quia ignorantia ad nihil est vtilis, tum quia non posset tanta opera facere sine immensa sapientia, tum quia homines non crederent sibi, si scirent eum nescium, tum quia omne bonum amat, quare et cognoscit, et quia bonum nemo perfecte nouerit, nisi qui illud a malo scit discernere, et hanc discretionem nullus scit facere qui malum ignorat, sicut omne bonum perfecte sciet, ita nullum malum ignorabit. Si igitur secundum istos, ignorantia non fuit possibilis in Christo secundum naturam suam humanam, multo magis neque deceptio, neque fallacia, neque error.", "english": "If, therefore, Christ had erred according to his human nature, that whole supposit, the Son of God, God, would have erred; and so the highest light would be darkened, the highest wisdom made foolish, and the highest truth falsified. And this is virtually the argument of Damascene by which he shows that in the soul of Christ there was no deliberation, no choice, and no ignorance of anything, as the thirty-second of the second more fully alleged.", "margins": [{"id": "787A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Anselmus."}]}, {"anchor": "p787A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p787A", "locator_display": "787A", "source_text": "", "english": "Anselm, in Cur Deus homo 2, 13, shows that Christ according to his human nature has no ignorance of anything, for many reasons: because ignorance is useful for nothing; because he could not do such great works without immense wisdom; because men would not trust him if they knew him to be ignorant; because he loves every good, and therefore also knows it; and because no one knows the good perfectly unless he knows how to distinguish it from evil, and no one who is ignorant of evil knows how to make this discrimination. As he will know every good perfectly, so he will be ignorant of no evil. If, then, according to these people, ignorance was not possible in Christ according to his human nature, much less were deception, falsehood, or error.", "margins": [{"id": "787A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Anselm."}]}, {"anchor": "p787B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p787B", "locator_display": "787B–787C", "source_text": "Petrus etiam 3. sentent. dist. 13. et 14. ostendit Christum secundum animam cuncta scire, ad quod similiter ostendendum dicit Fulgentium in quodam serm one plurima induxisse. Isti ergo qui se velut aliquid contrarium fidei Christianae omnem ignorantiam circa animam Christi vitant, nonne multo magis omnem fallaciam et errorem tanquam venenum mortiferum circa animam eius deuitarent? Inspiciatur siquidem ratio quam adducunt. Nihil scit aliquis quod anima eius ignoret; sed Christus secundum omnem opinionem omnia scit; ergo anima eius omnia scit. Si ergo Christus, quia Deus, de necessitate scit omnia, quomodo anima eius nedum scitum aliquod ignorabit, verum etiam eius oppositum aestimabit? De Christo etiam dicit Apostolus, In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi, ad Col. 2. sed stultus thesaurarius esset ille, qui thesaurum sapientiae et scientiae in insipientiam et fallaciam permutaret. Item Augustinus super Psal. 21. tractatu secundo tractans illud verbum Christi Matt. 26. Vbicunque praedicatum fuerit hoc Euangelium in toto mundo, dicetur\n\netc. Quare aurem calumniatoribus, scilicet Donatistis, accommodatis? Aut mentitus est Dominus, aut fefellit illum; eligant, quid dicant; aut mentitam dicant veritatem, aut deceptam dicant veritatem. Item si Christus possit nunc decipi, et semper fuisse deceptus, potest nunc esse miser et semper fuisse miser; quare nec nunc, nec vnquam prius beatus, sicut erat ostensum 34. huius, quod nullus praesumet concedere nisi miser. Item si Christus possit decipi, non esset de beatitudine sua certus, quare neque plene beatus, sicut idem 34. docet. Item si Christus potest fuisse deceptus in proprio genere, credendo Paulum saluandum qui non fuit saluandus, potuit similiter secundum animam in proprio genere illud velle et orare Patrem pro eius salute; potuit ergo secundum voluntatem suam humanam velle interius, et operari exterius contrarie suae voluntati diuina; et hoc scienter, quia iste homo Christus Deus noster sciuit voluntatem diuinam hoc nolle, et oppositum eius velle: Potuit ergo Christus peccasse, quia contra mandatum Patris scienter fecisse. Nam qui misit me Pater, inquit", "english": "Peter too, in Sentences 3, distinctions 13 and 14, shows that Christ knows all things according to the soul; and to show this likewise he says that Fulgentius brought forward very many points in a certain sermon. Now those who avoid all ignorance concerning the soul of Christ as being, as it were [n9], something contrary to the Christian faith: would they not much more avoid all falsehood and error concerning his soul, as a deadly poison? Let the argument which they bring forward be examined. \"No one knows anything which his soul does not know; but Christ, by every opinion, knows all things; therefore his soul knows all things.\" If, then, Christ, because he is God, knows all things of necessity, how will his soul not only be ignorant of something known, but even judge its opposite? Of Christ the Apostle also says, \"In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden,\" in Colossians 2. But that would be a foolish treasurer who exchanged the treasure of wisdom and knowledge for folly and falsehood. Again, Augustine, on Psalm 21, in his second discourse, treating that word of Christ in Matthew 26, \"Wherever this Gospel will be preached in the whole world, it will be told\" etc.: \"Why do you lend an ear to the slanderers, namely the Donatists? Either the Lord lied, or something deceived him. Let them choose what they will say: let them say either that the Truth lied, or that the Truth was deceived.\"", "margins": [{"id": "787B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Peter."}, {"id": "787B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "The Apostle."}, {"id": "787B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p787C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/42/#p787C", "locator_display": "787C–787D", "source_text": "Christus, ipse mini mandatum dedit, quid dicam et quid loquar, Ioh. 12. quod praeostensa tricesimo secundi nullatenus patiuntur.", "english": "Again, if Christ can now be deceived, and has always been deceived, he can now be wretched and have always been wretched; therefore he is neither now blessed nor ever was before, as was shown in the thirty-fourth of this book, which no one will presume to concede unless he is wretched. Again, if Christ can be deceived, he would not be certain of his own beatitude, and therefore would not be fully blessed, as the same thirty-fourth teaches. Again, if Christ can have been deceived in its own kind, believing that Paul was to be saved who was not to be saved, he could likewise, according to the soul, in its own kind, have willed that and prayed to the Father for Paul's salvation. Therefore, according to his human will, he could have willed inwardly and acted outwardly in a way contrary to his divine will, and this knowingly, because this man Christ, our God, knew that the divine will did not will this and willed its opposite. Therefore Christ could have sinned, because he could have acted knowingly against the command of the Father. For \"the Father who sent me,\" says Christ, \"himself gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak,\" John 12; and the things shown earlier in the thirty-second of the second in no way allow this.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}