De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 41
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 783D–785B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/41/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[783D]
CAP. XLI. He sets out the diverse modes of seeing in the Word, according to diverse authors, and raises objections and resolves them.

[783D–783E]
Having shown that true complexes can be revealed to a rational creature in the Word, and in the very essence of God, it remains to inquire next into the manner of this revelation, that is, how such things can be revealed there. To know this more easily, it seems that we must first ask how incomplexes are revealed to the creature in the Word and the essence of God, and then proceed in order to complexes. [n1] In both cases diverse modes are assigned, by diverse persons in diverse ways. Some hold that in all such things revealed and seen, the Word of God takes the place of both a created habit and a created act, and is itself both the habit and the act of the creature that sees. Others [n2] judge that in all such cases the Word takes the place of the species or habit, but not of the act. They hold rather that the creature sees by a created act of seeing what the Word presents to it as species, habit, or idea. [n3] These are further divided in three ways.

[784A–784C]
Some of these hold that the creature sees distinctly each single thing it sees in the Word, whether incomplex or complex, by one created, beatific, supernatural act, which presents each thing distinctly, immediately, and supernaturally. Others hold that by one created act it sees all the incomplexes in the Word, and by another created act all the complexes it sees. Still others hold that it sees each single incomplex and complex that it sees in the Word by single and distinct created acts, corresponding to the single things seen. Each way of this threefold sect is further divided into two paths, as regards the number of things visible or seen. Some posit that the creature can see in the Word an infinity of things distinctly at once; others, only finitely many. Pursuing the foregoing division still further, others judge that the Word takes the place neither of species or habit, nor of act, but that whatever incomplex or complex the creature sees in the Word it sees by a created species, habit, and act. By species or habit, I mean, mediating between the Word and the act of seeing. Yet these things are said to be seen in the Word, as material things seen are said to be seen in the Sun or in material light: namely, because the Word, like a kind of spiritual Sun and light, illuminates them and disposes them so that they can be seen in this way. These too have a threefold sect on the side of such a habit, as the former had on the side of the act. For some affirm that all the incomplexes and complexes seen there are seen through a single habit; others, that incomplexes are seen through one and complexes through another; some, that each single incomplex and complex seen is seen through its own single and distinct habit. Further, all these divide in two ways, by the infinite and the finite, as to the multitude of things visible or seen, just as the former did, who all likewise hold opinions about acts corresponding to those about habits. There are besides others, mediating, who say that all the incomplexes seen in the Word are seen through the Word itself, with no creature, species, habit, or act mediating, as the first opinion says; but that all complexes are seen through some creature mediating. These too, like the former, are separated in many ways. Besides these mediators, there are others who try to mediate among the later sects. They say that all incomplexes seen in the Word are seen through a created act, intermediate between the seeing creature and the Word, yet not through any habit or species mediating, since the Word itself takes the place of every such species and habit. The complexes seen there, they say, are seen with both a created habit and a created act mediating: a created habit mediating between the Word and the act of seeing, and a created act mediating between that habit and the one who sees, and both mediating between the one who sees and the Word. All of these also, like the former, can be divided in two ways as to the number of things seen in the Word, namely into the infinite and the finite. Which of these modes is truer, and better suited to philosophical and theological discipline, I leave to the diligence of students to inquire. For this might perhaps seem out of place here, or to some too laborious for my purpose, and because I hasten to other matters on the road I have begun,

[784D–784E]
I shall nevertheless first touch briefly here on the arguments of those who oppose. Among all their arguments there are two on which they chiefly rely: one proceeding by distinction, the other by necessity. The first runs thus. If a creature saw distinctly in the Word that Antichrist will be, or that Antichrist will be contrary to Christ, or any such true complex, it would see distinctly the extremes of that proposition or true complex, and not by one and the same act. For by one and the same act alone it would in no way distinguish or discern between them, and that act would also be purely equivocal, and the same proposition true and false, along with other absurdities which are easy to see following from these. Their second argument runs thus. If any future contingent were revealed to a creature in the Word, it would come about necessarily. This they argue by reasons of the same kind as the earlier chapters brought against the earlier responses. But the first argument does not go through. For in the same way they could argue that the Father could not see such true complexes in the Word or in His essence, nor reveal them to the Son or to the Holy Spirit, against the sixth and seventh, the eighteenth and nineteenth of the first, and the thirty-fourth of this. God also sees all things most distinctly by His most unitary and simple, yet most infinite, power, as is clear from the seventh of the first. Why then, according to what was premised in the chapter next before this [n4], if He wills, mercifully and omnipotently, though ineffably, to lend the eye of His power to a creature that is disposed, can the creature too not see in like manner in some way, not by its own power but by the divine? And does not a creature that knows or believes in its own kind [n5] any true complex whatever, any proposition whatever with extremes however diverse, do this by one simple act of knowing or believing? Why then can it not likewise, by one simple act, see in the Word any true complex whatever, especially since the Word expresses any true complex incomparably more simply than any proposition, any habit, or any creature?

[785A–785B]
The second argument likewise does not conclude. For if, because a future contingent is revealed to a creature in the Word, it therefore comes about of necessity, why not likewise because it is revealed to the Son and the Holy Spirit in the Word and the essence of God, as is clear from the thirty-fourth of this? Perhaps they will say that the revelation made to the Son can fail to be and can fail to have been made to him, but to the creature in no way. But if the revelation of a future contingent made to the Son, while the thing is still future, can fail to be and never have been made to him, it can do so likewise when the thing is present, or has passed into the past. Or if it then cannot, or will not be able, it never could; or else it can now [n6], as can be made clear from the thirtieth and thirty-first of this. Moreover, if the necessity of what is revealed follows from the revelation of a creature in the Word, why would it not follow likewise from revelation in its own kind? Although I have run through the modes of seeing in the Word set out above with such lightness, it does no harm to have touched them, at least briefly. And though no one can at once see fully the mode of seeing in the Word, let him not on that account straightway recoil as unbelieving of the vision. For we see and know with certainty many marvels, and we hold many things by most certain faith, whose mode we cannot perfectly comprehend in our present blindness. But we shall comprehend perfectly both the thing and the mode when what is in part has been emptied out and what is perfect has come, when we shall know even as we are known, when we shall see face to face, as He is, the Word Himself most truly, the brightness of eternal light, the spotless mirror of the divine majesty, and the image of His goodness [n7], in which all things and modes are most perfectly shown.

NOTES

1. Incomplexum / complexum are the scholastic terms for what is grasped as a simple term or thing (a being, Antichrist, Christ) and what is grasped as composed, i.e. a proposition or "true complex" (that Antichrist will be). I keep "incomplex" and "complex" throughout. Habitus is "habit" (a standing disposition of the intellect), species the intelligible form or likeness by which an object is present to the mind, actus the act of seeing. The margins of this chapter are not citations but Savile's labels for the branches of the division. "2i." and "3i." stand for secundi, tertii: they mean "of the second [principal mode]" and "of the third", and I render them "Of the 2nd", "Of the 3rd".
2. The print also has a margin "Secundus." (Second [mode]) at 783E, beside the line beginning "Alij aestimant". The keyed text omits it. I do not insert a marker for it, since the base numbering has none. The keyed marker 784E·1 stands, as given, on the first line of the next page (784A). That page has the margin "2i. Modus primus."
3. The 1618 text has a catchword "videat," at the foot of 783 and again at the head of 784. The English reads the sentence once.
4. secundum proximo huius praemissa: literally "according to what was premised in the nearest of this [book]". I take it to mean the chapter immediately preceding (c. 40), on God lending the creature the power of vision. The Latin gives no number, and it is left unexpanded (Conventions §5.4).
5. in proprio genere: "in its own kind", that is, by the creature's natural way of knowing, as distinct from revelation in the Word. The phrase becomes technical in the next chapter's heading ("revelation in its own kind").
6. The sentence aut si tunc non potest aut poterit, nec vnquam hoc potuit, aut nunc potest is compressed, and the Latin leaves its subject and the verb "be otherwise" unexpressed. I give it literally. The sense seems to be a dilemma. Either the revelation to the Son, once the thing is present or past, could never not have been made, in which case it never could (and the objection from fixity falls even for the Son); or it can be otherwise now, as ch. 30–31 show. Either way the adversaries' distinction between Son and creature fails.
7. An allusion to Wis 7:26 ("the brightness of eternal light, the spotless mirror of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness"), here applied to the Word. The preceding clauses allude to 1 Cor 13:10–12 and 1 Jn 3:2.