De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 4
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 651D–653C; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[651D]
Chapter 4. What the contingent to either alternative is.[n1]

[651D–652A]
Having established from the premises that the contingent to either alternative exists, and what and of what sort it is not, it remains in consequence to inquire what and of what sort it is. Now according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 10,[n2] just as, when an irrational agent is posited with all the dispositions sufficient and naturally prior to acting, it follows of necessity that it acts, so, according to the same author in the same place, when a rational agent is posited with all the dispositions sufficient and naturally prior to its free action, it does not follow of necessity that it acts, nor does it follow that it does not act; rather the opposite of each stands, as the first of the first shows more fully. I am not loath to recall one brief demonstration of this. Suppose that A is some rational and free agent. I take his first free act, which let be B, and let C be the collection of all the sufficient and naturally prior dispositions. Then either, when C is posited, B necessarily follows to be produced, or not. If so, then (since it is not in A's free power to posit C, nor any part of it, because the whole of C naturally precedes B, and B is the first free act of A himself) neither is B in A's free power, though the opposite of this was being said. But if, when C is posited, B does not necessarily follow to be produced, we have what we intended. For now A with C produces B, and this does not follow necessarily; therefore the opposite can stand; hence it is also possible that A should stand with C without producing B, and also producing it. Wherefore, just as according to what was said above in this chapter, with the general rule on naturally preceding necessity premised in the second of this,[n3] the proper effect of an irrational agent is said to come about from a naturally preceding necessity, naturally predetermined to one side only, so the proper act of a rational and free agent is rightly said to come about or be produced from a naturally preceding freedom, naturally not predetermined to one of the two sides, but standing equally toward either alternative. And just as that effect is called contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause,[n4] so this one is called contingent-free to either alternative, and equally so, with respect to its total cause. This is also clear from Stephen, Bishop of Paris,[n5] who condemned a certain erroneous article that said: "With the will existing in such a disposition in which it is naturally apt to be moved, and with the mover so disposed as to be naturally apt to move in this way, it is impossible for the will not to will"; and again another, that posits: "Knowledge of contraries is the sole cause why the rational soul has power toward opposites, and a power that is simply one cannot [act] toward opposites except per accidens and by reason of another." To the same effect there are other articles condemned by the same bishop,

[652B]
recited more fully in the third of the second. Wherefore it seems to me that the equally contingent, taken per se and first, can fittingly be defined thus: it is the per se and first act of a free agent, upon positing which, together with all the naturally prior dispositions with which it produces it, its being produced does not necessarily follow, but either of the two sides can stand equally. Now "contingent equally" is taken in many ways; but according to what was had in the 26th of the second, it is taken per se and first in one way only, and all the others are reduced to that first one as attributive and accessory, and that is the way stated above. For since the equally contingent is per se and first a thing caused, that is, an effect, but not a cause,[n6] every such contingent happens to be from something else; for if it were per se and from itself alone, it would not be said to happen in that way. Who, indeed, would say that God is thus contingent, and that God happens thus to be? But a cause per se and first is not thus contingent. For a cause that is from another is not from another insofar as it is a cause, but insofar as it is caused. Moreover, if a cause per se and first were thus contingent from another, then by what was shown in the second of the first, every cause would be so, and consequently the first cause:

[652C–652E]
the equally contingent, therefore, is per se and first something caused, an effect or act, as the definition just premised says, and of a free agent, not of an irrational agent, as the preceding matter taught. It is its effect or act per se, namely insofar as it is a free agent; for it produces many effects not freely but necessarily, each of which is contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, as the earlier matter makes clear. And the effect is its first act, namely an immanent action, such as willing or not willing, not its extrinsic and second effect, namely a transient operation, or external one. For such a second effect, given its first act, from which that second proceeds (for example, willing and not willing), will be produced from a naturally preceding necessity, as the second of this taught. Hence it is contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, but not simply contingent equally. Yet that second effect can in a certain way be called equally contingent, denominatively and tropically, because it is an action derived from an agent, or from an action acting per se and first, that is, contingent equally. And so the Philosopher speaks in Prior Analytics 1, often saying, "It is contingent to either alternative that a man run or sit."[n7] That, moreover, when a free agent is posited with all the dispositions with which it produces its free act, its being produced does not necessarily follow, is clear from what has been premised in this same chapter. Whence it also follows manifestly that either of the sides can equally stand; and this I judge to be the meaning of those who say that the contingent to either alternative stands equally toward being and toward not being, namely in consequence, with respect to its total cause; and likewise of the Philosopher, Prior Analytics 1, saying, "The infinite, however, because nothing [is] more thus or in that way," as the immediately preceding chapter cited. For when such a total active cause is posited, nothing follows more necessarily in this way or in that, namely that the effect be produced rather than not produced. And according to the transferred use[n8] besides that was mentioned above, the equally contingent is found in powers actually acting, not because they are themselves equally contingent, but because it is equally contingent that they act and do not act, when they have been disposed in the manner stated. It is also found in powers not actually acting but active, for a like reason; it is found likewise in powers actually undergoing, and in passive ones equally disposed of themselves to contrary passions, because it is equally contingent that a stone be moved to this side or to that. It is found in present things, as is clear enough from what has been had before, and likewise in future things, because they will be produced by causes of this kind; and also in possible things that are not future, because they can come from such causes. Nor is it found only in things, but in the very privations of things; namely in privations of such free effects, because those privations and the corresponding positive states can equally come about, as has been said. It is also found in propositions about the present and the future, as in signs. All these modes of transferred use stated above, with their causes and their order to one another, can be made plain through philosophical, grammatical and rhetorical matters, cited more fully in the 26th of the second.

[653A]
COROLLARY.

Corollary: what the freedom of contradiction is, and what an act free by freedom of contradiction is.

[653A–653C]
From this it is clearly known what the freedom of contradiction is,[n9] and what an act free by freedom of contradiction is. For the freedom of contradiction is a free active power, upon positing which together with all the dispositions necessary for acting, it can freely act and not act, nor does it follow of necessity that it act, but both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand. This is clear enough from what was had before. And the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 18, says these words: "But the other potencies, from which it has been defined, are all of contradiction. For what is possible can move in this way, and not in this way, whoever [acts] according to reason; but irrational ones will, through presence and non-presence, be of contradiction in the same."[n10] The Philosopher therefore means to say that whatever potencies act according to reason are of contradiction per se and first; that is, that when they are in a disposition in which they can freely act, they can also freely not act, as he also taught above in the tenth, as was cited above; and that irrational potencies are of contradiction only per accidens and not first, namely through the presence and non-presence of active potencies to passive ones; since when these are present and able, it is necessary that these act and those undergo, as he himself attests above in the tenth, as was touched on above. Hence the translation too that the Commentator expounds reads thus: "But the other potencies, from which things are done, are all of contradictories. For that which has the power to move this has the power not to move this, and so do all things that have a word; but those which have no word will not be of contradictories, since they are present first." Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, rightly condemned a certain erroneous article, asserting that after a conclusion has been reached about something to be done the will does not remain free, and certain other similar ones, recited more expressly in the third of the second. An act free by freedom of contradiction is the proper act of the freedom of contradiction, that is, of the free active power, upon positing which with all the dispositions naturally prior to the act it can freely be produced or not be produced, that is, the act's being produced does not necessarily follow. But both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand, which, once the premises are understood, I reckon manifest.

NOTES

1. Contingens ad utrumlibet is rendered "the contingent to either alternative"; the chapter then glosses it as contingens aequaliter, "contingent equally", i.e. standing indifferently toward either of two outcomes. Both terms are kept throughout.
2. Savile's "9, Met. 10" and, in the corollary, "9, Met. 18" follow the numbering of the Latin Metaphysics with Averroes' commentary, Book 9 being Θ. They seem to correspond roughly to Θ.5 (1048a) and Θ.2 (1046b). I have kept Savile's numbers (Conventions §5.4) and have not checked the numeration.
3. The print has "secundum huius" here and in 652C, for the "2. huius" of 651E. I take it as "the second of this", probably chapter 2 of this book, which treats necessity. Cross-references are left as Bradwardine wrote them.
4. Contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis: an effect that is contingent in itself but necessary in relation to its total cause, as an irrational agent's effect is. It is opposed to the contingens liberum, which is not necessitated even by its total cause. 652C says the same: "contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, but not simply contingent equally". The hyphenated forms mark this as a technical pair.
5. Étienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, whose condemnation of 1277 Bradwardine cites repeatedly (here "the third of the second" refers to the fuller citation in Book II).
6. The print reads per se et primo est causa vel effectus, sed non causa, which cannot be construed as it stands, since "cause" is both affirmed and denied. The argument that follows ("every such contingent happens to be from something else"; and next, "is per se and first something caused, an effect or act") shows that the first causa should be causatum, "something caused". I translated that sense; the print is not emended.
7. Prior Analytics 1.13 (32b ff.), where "contingent" is extended to the indeterminate, "which is no more so than otherwise". Capitulum proximum is taken as the immediately preceding chapter, which had already cited the passage. The ambiguity of proximum is Bradwardine's.
8. Transumptio: the "transferred" or extended use of a term. Bradwardine lists the secondary senses of "contingent equally" (of powers, of present, future and possible things, of privations, of propositions) that derive from the primary sense. Habitus in the next sentence is the Aristotelian opposite of privatio (a positive state or possession).
9. Libertas contradictionis: the capacity to do either of a pair of contradictories (to act, not to act) while all the necessary dispositions are present. It is the formal mark of the free will for Bradwardine's opponents, and he turns it to his own purposes.
10. The Latin version of Aristotle (Met. Θ.2, 1046b4–7) is obscure, and the last clause ("per adesse et non contradictionis erunt eodem") is hardly construable in isolation. I translated it literally; Bradwardine's gloss that follows gives the sense (irrational potencies are "of contradiction" only through the presence or absence of an active power to a passive one). Below, verbum, which renders Aristotle's λόγος, is translated "word", as the Commentator's translation has it. "Since they are present first" (cum sint praesentes primo) is likewise literal and unclear.