{"id": "3/4", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 4", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "651D–653C", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. IIII. Quid sit contingens ad vtrumlibet.\n\nHAbito igiturper praemissa, quod contingens ad vtrumlibet est, et quid et quale non est, restat consequenter inquirere quid est et quale. Porro secundum Philosophum 9, Met. 10. Sicuragente irrationali posito cum omnibus dispositionibus sufficientibus et naturaliter praeuiis ad agendum, sequitur de necessitate quod agat: Sic secundum eundem ibidem, posito agente rationali cum omnibus dispositionibus sufficientibus et naturaliter praeuiis suae liberae actioni, non\n\nsequitur de necessitate quod agat, nec sequitur quod non agat, sed stat oppositum vtriusque, sicut primum primi plenius manifestat: cuius et vnam breuem demonstrationem commemorare non piget. Supposito quod A. sit aliquod agens rationale et liberum, accipio primum liberum actum eius qui sit B. et sit C. collectio omnium dispositionum sufficientium et naturaliter praeuiarum: Aut ergo posito C. necessario sequitur B. produci, vel non: si sic, et non est in libera potestate A. C. poni, nec aliquam eius partem, cum totum C. praecedat naturaliter B. et B. sit primus liberactus ipsius A. ergo nec B. est in ipsius A. libera potestate, cuius oppositū dicebatur: si autē posito C. non necessario sequitur B. produci, habetur intētū. Nunc enim A. cū C. producit B. et hoc non sequitur necessario; ergo oppositū potest stare; quare et possibile quod A. stet cū C. nō producēdo B. et etiā producēdo. Quāobrē, sicut iuxta praedicta, in isto cap. cū regula generali de necessitate naturaliter praeced. 2. huius praemissa, effectus proprius agentis irrationalis dicitur fieri ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente,\n\nnaturaliter praedeterminata ad alteram partem tantum: sic actus proprius agentis rationalis et liberi recte dicitut fieri seu produci ex libertate naturaliter praecedente, naturaliter inpraedeterminata ad alteram partium, sed ad vtrumlibet aequaliter se habente: et sicut ille dicitur contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis, sic iste dicitur contingens liberum ad vtrumlibet et aequaliter respectu suae causae totalis. Quod et patet per Stephanum Parisiensem Episcopum damnantem quendam articulum erroneum sic dicentem; Voluntate existente in tali dispositione in qua nata est moueri, et mouente sic disposito quod natum est sic mouere, impossibile est voluntatem non velle; et iterum alium sic ponentem, Scientia contratiorum solum est causa quare anima rationalis potest in opposita, et quod potentia simpliciter vna non potest in opposita nisi per accidens, et ratione altetius. Et ad hoc idem faciunt alij articuli\n\nab eodem damnati, tertio secundi plenius recitati. Quare videtur mihi, quod contingens aequaliter per se et primo acceptum potest sic congrue definiri, quod est actus agentis liberi per se et primus, quo posito cum omnibus dispositionibus naturaliter praeuijs cum quibus ilium producit, non necessario sequitur ipsum produci, sed vtralibet partium potest stare aequaliter. Porto contingens aequaliter accipitur multis modis; sed iuxta praehabita. 26. secundi, per se et primo accipitur vno modo tantum, et ad illum primum omnes alij velut attributales et accessorij reducuntur, et ille est modus eius praedictus; Nam contingens aequaliter cum sit, per se et primo est causa vel effectus, sed non causa: Omne enim tale contingens contingit esse ab aliquo alio; nam si esset per se et a se solo, non diceretur contingere illo modo. Quis enim dixerit, quod Deus est sic contingens, et sic contingere Deum esse? Causa autem per se et primo non est sic contingens. Nam causa quae est ab alio, non est abalio in quantum causa, sed in quantum causatum. Etiam, si causa per se et primo esset sic contingens ab alio, tunc per ostensa secundo primi, omnis causa sic esset, et per consequens prima causa:\n\nContingens ergo aequaliter per se et primo est causatum, effectus seu actus, vt dicit definitio iam praemissa, et agentis liberi, quia non agentis irrationalis, sicut praecedentia docuerunt; et est effectus seu actus eius per se, scilicet secundum quod est agens liberum: multos enim effectus non libere, sed necessario efficit, quorum quilibet est contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis, sicut praehabita manifestant; Et est effectus eius actus eius primus, scilicet actio immanens, vt velle vel nolle, non effectus eius extrinsecus et secundus, scilicet operatio transiens, siue exterior. Nam talis effectus secundus, posito primo eius actu, a quo procedit ille secundus, puta velle et nolle, de necessitate naturaliter praecedente producetur, sicut secundum huius docebat: Quare ipse est contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis, non autem simpliciter contingens aequaliter. Iste tamen effectus secundus quodammodo denominatiue et tropice potest dici contingens aequaliter, quia est actio deriuata ab agente, seu actione per se et primo agente, seu contingente aequaliter: et sic loquitur Philosophus 1. Prior:\n\nfrequenter dicendo, Contingit ad vtrumlibet hominem currere vel sedere. Quod autem posito agente libero cum omnibus dispositionibus cum quibus producit liberum actum suum, non necessario sequitur ipsum produci, patet ex praemissis hoc eodem capitulo; Vnde et consequitur manifeste, quod vtralibet partium aequaliter potest stare, et hunc arbitror intellectum dicentium contingens ad vtrumlibet aequaliter se habere ad esse, et ad non esse, scilicet in consecutione respectu suae causae totalis; et similiter Philosophi. 1. Prior: dicentis, Infinitum autem eo quod nihil magis sic vel illo modo sicut capitulum proximum allegauit. Posita enim causa tali actiua totali, nihil magis necessario sequitur sic vel illo modo, scilicet effectum produci quam non produci, Iuxta transumptionem insuper supradictam, Contingens aequaliter reperitur in potentijs actu agentibus, non quia illae sunt contingentes aequaliter, sed quia contingit aequaliter illas agere et non agere, cum fuerint dispositae modo dicto. Reperitur quoque in potentijs non actu agentibus sed actiuis, propter similem causam huic; reperitur similiter\n\nin potentijs actu patientibus, et passiuis de se aeque dispositis ad contrarias passiones, quia contingit aequaliter lapidem moueri ad hanc partem vel ad illam; reperitur in rebus praesentibus, sicut ex praehabitis satis patet, et similiter in futuris, eo quod a causis huiusmodi producentur; in rebus etiam possibilibus non futuris, eo quod possunt a causis huiusmodi prouenire. Nec solum reperitur in rebus, sed in priuationibus ipsis rerum; in priuationibus scilicet huiusmodi effectuum liberorum, eo quod illae et sui habitus aequaliter possunt contingere, vt est dictum. Reperitur quoque in propositiombus de praesenti et de futuro, tanquam in signis. Omnes autem hi modi transumptionum praedicti cum suis causis, et ordine ipsorum ad inuicem possunt plane patere per Philosophica, Grammaticalia, et Rhetorica, 26. secundi plenius allegata.\n\nCOROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium, quid sit libertas contradictionis, et quis sit actus liber libertate contradictionis.\n\nVNde cognoscitur manifeste quid sic libertas contradictionis, et quid sit actus libet libertate contradictionis. Est n. libertas contradictionis libera potestas actiua, qua posita cum omnibus dispositiombus necessarijs ad agendum, libere potest agere et non agere, nec sequitur de necessitate quod agat, sed et haec et altera pars contradictionis aequaliter potest stare. Istud per praehabita satis patet. Dicitque Philosophus 9. Met. 18. haec verba; Potentiae vero\n\naliae, ex quibus definitum est, omnes contradictionis sunt. Nam possibile sic mouere potest, et non sic, quicunque secundum rationem: Irrationales vero per adesse et non contradictionis erunt eodem. Vult ergo Philosophus dicere, quod quaecunque potentiae secundum rationem agentes, sunt contradictionis per se et primo; ita scilicet quod cum fuerint in dispositione, in qua possunt libere agere, possunt et libere non agere, sicut et supra decimo docebat, vt erat superius allegatum; et quod irrationales potentiae sint contradictionis tantum per accidens et non primo, scilicet per adesse et non adesse actiuas passiuis; quoniam cum assunt et possunt, necesse est has agere, illas pati, vt ipsemet testatur supra decimo, sicut superius erat tactum. Vnde et translatio, quam Commentator exponit, sic habet; Aliae vero potentiae, ex quibus aguntur, omnes sunt contradictoriorum. Illud enim quod habet potentiam mouere hoc, habet potentiam non mouere hoc, etiam omnia quae habent verbum; illa autem quae non habent verbum, non erunt contradictoriorum, cum sint praesentes primo. Quare\n\net Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus iuste damnauit quendam articulurn erroneum, asserentem quod post conclusionem factam de aliquo faciendo voluntas non manet libera, et quosdam alios similes tertio secundi expressius recitatos. Actus vero liber libertate contradictionis, est actus proprius libertatis contradictionis, liberae scilicet potentiae actiuae, qua posita cum omnibus dispositionibus naturaliter praeuiis actui, libere potest produci vel non produci, id est, non necssario sequitur actum produci. Sed et haec, et altera pars contradictionis aequaliter potest stare, quod intellectis praemissis, reputo manifestum.", "english": "Chapter 4. What the contingent to either alternative is.[n1]\n\nHaving established from the premises that the contingent to either alternative exists, and what and of what sort it is not, it remains in consequence to inquire what and of what sort it is. Now according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 10,[n2] just as, when an irrational agent is posited with all the dispositions sufficient and naturally prior to acting, it follows of necessity that it acts, so, according to the same author in the same place, when a rational agent is posited with all the dispositions sufficient and naturally prior to its free action, it does not follow of necessity that it acts, nor does it follow that it does not act; rather the opposite of each stands, as the first of the first shows more fully. I am not loath to recall one brief demonstration of this. Suppose that A is some rational and free agent. I take his first free act, which let be B, and let C be the collection of all the sufficient and naturally prior dispositions. Then either, when C is posited, B necessarily follows to be produced, or not. If so, then (since it is not in A's free power to posit C, nor any part of it, because the whole of C naturally precedes B, and B is the first free act of A himself) neither is B in A's free power, though the opposite of this was being said. But if, when C is posited, B does not necessarily follow to be produced, we have what we intended. For now A with C produces B, and this does not follow necessarily; therefore the opposite can stand; hence it is also possible that A should stand with C without producing B, and also producing it. Wherefore, just as according to what was said above in this chapter, with the general rule on naturally preceding necessity premised in the second of this,[n3] the proper effect of an irrational agent is said to come about from a naturally preceding necessity, naturally predetermined to one side only, so the proper act of a rational and free agent is rightly said to come about or be produced from a naturally preceding freedom, naturally not predetermined to one of the two sides, but standing equally toward either alternative. And just as that effect is called contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause,[n4] so this one is called contingent-free to either alternative, and equally so, with respect to its total cause. This is also clear from Stephen, Bishop of Paris,[n5] who condemned a certain erroneous article that said: \"With the will existing in such a disposition in which it is naturally apt to be moved, and with the mover so disposed as to be naturally apt to move in this way, it is impossible for the will not to will\"; and again another, that posits: \"Knowledge of contraries is the sole cause why the rational soul has power toward opposites, and a power that is simply one cannot [act] toward opposites except per accidens and by reason of another.\" To the same effect there are other articles condemned by the same bishop,\n\nrecited more fully in the third of the second. Wherefore it seems to me that the equally contingent, taken per se and first, can fittingly be defined thus: it is the per se and first act of a free agent, upon positing which, together with all the naturally prior dispositions with which it produces it, its being produced does not necessarily follow, but either of the two sides can stand equally. Now \"contingent equally\" is taken in many ways; but according to what was had in the 26th of the second, it is taken per se and first in one way only, and all the others are reduced to that first one as attributive and accessory, and that is the way stated above. For since the equally contingent is per se and first a thing caused, that is, an effect, but not a cause,[n6] every such contingent happens to be from something else; for if it were per se and from itself alone, it would not be said to happen in that way. Who, indeed, would say that God is thus contingent, and that God happens thus to be? But a cause per se and first is not thus contingent. For a cause that is from another is not from another insofar as it is a cause, but insofar as it is caused. Moreover, if a cause per se and first were thus contingent from another, then by what was shown in the second of the first, every cause would be so, and consequently the first cause:\n\nthe equally contingent, therefore, is per se and first something caused, an effect or act, as the definition just premised says, and of a free agent, not of an irrational agent, as the preceding matter taught. It is its effect or act per se, namely insofar as it is a free agent; for it produces many effects not freely but necessarily, each of which is contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, as the earlier matter makes clear. And the effect is its first act, namely an immanent action, such as willing or not willing, not its extrinsic and second effect, namely a transient operation, or external one. For such a second effect, given its first act, from which that second proceeds (for example, willing and not willing), will be produced from a naturally preceding necessity, as the second of this taught. Hence it is contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, but not simply contingent equally. Yet that second effect can in a certain way be called equally contingent, denominatively and tropically, because it is an action derived from an agent, or from an action acting per se and first, that is, contingent equally. And so the Philosopher speaks in Prior Analytics 1, often saying, \"It is contingent to either alternative that a man run or sit.\"[n7] That, moreover, when a free agent is posited with all the dispositions with which it produces its free act, its being produced does not necessarily follow, is clear from what has been premised in this same chapter. Whence it also follows manifestly that either of the sides can equally stand; and this I judge to be the meaning of those who say that the contingent to either alternative stands equally toward being and toward not being, namely in consequence, with respect to its total cause; and likewise of the Philosopher, Prior Analytics 1, saying, \"The infinite, however, because nothing [is] more thus or in that way,\" as the immediately preceding chapter cited. For when such a total active cause is posited, nothing follows more necessarily in this way or in that, namely that the effect be produced rather than not produced. And according to the transferred use[n8] besides that was mentioned above, the equally contingent is found in powers actually acting, not because they are themselves equally contingent, but because it is equally contingent that they act and do not act, when they have been disposed in the manner stated. It is also found in powers not actually acting but active, for a like reason; it is found likewise in powers actually undergoing, and in passive ones equally disposed of themselves to contrary passions, because it is equally contingent that a stone be moved to this side or to that. It is found in present things, as is clear enough from what has been had before, and likewise in future things, because they will be produced by causes of this kind; and also in possible things that are not future, because they can come from such causes. Nor is it found only in things, but in the very privations of things; namely in privations of such free effects, because those privations and the corresponding positive states can equally come about, as has been said. It is also found in propositions about the present and the future, as in signs. All these modes of transferred use stated above, with their causes and their order to one another, can be made plain through philosophical, grammatical and rhetorical matters, cited more fully in the 26th of the second.\n\nCOROLLARY.\n\nCorollary: what the freedom of contradiction is, and what an act free by freedom of contradiction is.\n\nFrom this it is clearly known what the freedom of contradiction is,[n9] and what an act free by freedom of contradiction is. For the freedom of contradiction is a free active power, upon positing which together with all the dispositions necessary for acting, it can freely act and not act, nor does it follow of necessity that it act, but both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand. This is clear enough from what was had before. And the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 18, says these words: \"But the other potencies, from which it has been defined, are all of contradiction. For what is possible can move in this way, and not in this way, whoever [acts] according to reason; but irrational ones will, through presence and non-presence, be of contradiction in the same.\"[n10] The Philosopher therefore means to say that whatever potencies act according to reason are of contradiction per se and first; that is, that when they are in a disposition in which they can freely act, they can also freely not act, as he also taught above in the tenth, as was cited above; and that irrational potencies are of contradiction only per accidens and not first, namely through the presence and non-presence of active potencies to passive ones; since when these are present and able, it is necessary that these act and those undergo, as he himself attests above in the tenth, as was touched on above. Hence the translation too that the Commentator expounds reads thus: \"But the other potencies, from which things are done, are all of contradictories. For that which has the power to move this has the power not to move this, and so do all things that have a word; but those which have no word will not be of contradictories, since they are present first.\" Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, rightly condemned a certain erroneous article, asserting that after a conclusion has been reached about something to be done the will does not remain free, and certain other similar ones, recited more expressly in the third of the second. An act free by freedom of contradiction is the proper act of the freedom of contradiction, that is, of the free active power, upon positing which with all the dispositions naturally prior to the act it can freely be produced or not be produced, that is, the act's being produced does not necessarily follow. But both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand, which, once the premises are understood, I reckon manifest.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Contingens ad utrumlibet is rendered \"the contingent to either alternative\"; the chapter then glosses it as contingens aequaliter, \"contingent equally\", i.e. standing indifferently toward either of two outcomes. Both terms are kept throughout."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Savile's \"9, Met. 10\" and, in the corollary, \"9, Met. 18\" follow the numbering of the Latin Metaphysics with Averroes' commentary, Book 9 being Θ. They seem to correspond roughly to Θ.5 (1048a) and Θ.2 (1046b). I have kept Savile's numbers (Conventions §5.4) and have not checked the numeration."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The print has \"secundum huius\" here and in 652C, for the \"2. huius\" of 651E. I take it as \"the second of this\", probably chapter 2 of this book, which treats necessity. Cross-references are left as Bradwardine wrote them."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis: an effect that is contingent in itself but necessary in relation to its total cause, as an irrational agent's effect is. It is opposed to the contingens liberum, which is not necessitated even by its total cause. 652C says the same: \"contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, but not simply contingent equally\". The hyphenated forms mark this as a technical pair."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Étienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, whose condemnation of 1277 Bradwardine cites repeatedly (here \"the third of the second\" refers to the fuller citation in Book II)."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The print reads per se et primo est causa vel effectus, sed non causa, which cannot be construed as it stands, since \"cause\" is both affirmed and denied. The argument that follows (\"every such contingent happens to be from something else\"; and next, \"is per se and first something caused, an effect or act\") shows that the first causa should be causatum, \"something caused\". I translated that sense; the print is not emended."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Prior Analytics 1.13 (32b ff.), where \"contingent\" is extended to the indeterminate, \"which is no more so than otherwise\". Capitulum proximum is taken as the immediately preceding chapter, which had already cited the passage. The ambiguity of proximum is Bradwardine's."}, {"n": 8, "text": "Transumptio: the \"transferred\" or extended use of a term. Bradwardine lists the secondary senses of \"contingent equally\" (of powers, of present, future and possible things, of privations, of propositions) that derive from the primary sense. Habitus in the next sentence is the Aristotelian opposite of privatio (a positive state or possession)."}, {"n": 9, "text": "Libertas contradictionis: the capacity to do either of a pair of contradictories (to act, not to act) while all the necessary dispositions are present. It is the formal mark of the free will for Bradwardine's opponents, and he turns it to his own purposes."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The Latin version of Aristotle (Met. Θ.2, 1046b4–7) is obscure, and the last clause (\"per adesse et non contradictionis erunt eodem\") is hardly construable in isolation. I translated it literally; Bradwardine's gloss that follows gives the sense (irrational potencies are \"of contradiction\" only through the presence or absence of an active power to a passive one). Below, verbum, which renders Aristotle's λόγος, is translated \"word\", as the Commentator's translation has it. \"Since they are present first\" (cum sint praesentes primo) is likewise literal and unclear."}], "errata": [{"address": "651D", "keyed": "Sicuragente", "print": "Sicut agente"}, {"address": "651E", "keyed": "liberactus", "print": "liber actus"}, {"address": "652A", "keyed": "dicitut", "print": "dicitur"}, {"address": "652A", "keyed": "contratiorum", "print": "contrariorum"}, {"address": "652A", "keyed": "altetius", "print": "alterius"}, {"address": "652B", "keyed": "ilium", "print": "illum"}, {"address": "652B", "keyed": "Porto", "print": "Porro"}, {"address": "652E", "keyed": "propositiombus", "print": "propositionibus"}, {"address": "653A", "keyed": "quid sic libertas", "print": "quid sit libertas"}, {"address": "653A", "keyed": "actus libet", "print": "actus liber"}, {"address": "653A", "keyed": "dispositiombus", "print": "dispositionibus"}, {"address": "653C", "keyed": "articulurn", "print": "articulum"}, {"address": "653C", "keyed": "necssario", "print": "necessario"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p651D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/#p651D", "locator_display": "651D", "source_text": "CAP. IIII. Quid sit contingens ad vtrumlibet.", "english": "Chapter 4. What the contingent to either alternative is.[n1]", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p651D-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/#p651D-2", "locator_display": "651D–652A", "source_text": "HAbito igiturper praemissa, quod contingens ad vtrumlibet est, et quid et quale non est, restat consequenter inquirere quid est et quale. Porro secundum Philosophum 9, Met. 10. Sicuragente irrationali posito cum omnibus dispositionibus sufficientibus et naturaliter praeuiis ad agendum, sequitur de necessitate quod agat: Sic secundum eundem ibidem, posito agente rationali cum omnibus dispositionibus sufficientibus et naturaliter praeuiis suae liberae actioni, non\n\nsequitur de necessitate quod agat, nec sequitur quod non agat, sed stat oppositum vtriusque, sicut primum primi plenius manifestat: cuius et vnam breuem demonstrationem commemorare non piget. Supposito quod A. sit aliquod agens rationale et liberum, accipio primum liberum actum eius qui sit B. et sit C. collectio omnium dispositionum sufficientium et naturaliter praeuiarum: Aut ergo posito C. necessario sequitur B. produci, vel non: si sic, et non est in libera potestate A. C. poni, nec aliquam eius partem, cum totum C. praecedat naturaliter B. et B. sit primus liberactus ipsius A. ergo nec B. est in ipsius A. libera potestate, cuius oppositū dicebatur: si autē posito C. non necessario sequitur B. produci, habetur intētū. Nunc enim A. cū C. producit B. et hoc non sequitur necessario; ergo oppositū potest stare; quare et possibile quod A. stet cū C. nō producēdo B. et etiā producēdo. Quāobrē, sicut iuxta praedicta, in isto cap. cū regula generali de necessitate naturaliter praeced. 2. huius praemissa, effectus proprius agentis irrationalis dicitur fieri ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente,\n\nnaturaliter praedeterminata ad alteram partem tantum: sic actus proprius agentis rationalis et liberi recte dicitut fieri seu produci ex libertate naturaliter praecedente, naturaliter inpraedeterminata ad alteram partium, sed ad vtrumlibet aequaliter se habente: et sicut ille dicitur contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis, sic iste dicitur contingens liberum ad vtrumlibet et aequaliter respectu suae causae totalis. Quod et patet per Stephanum Parisiensem Episcopum damnantem quendam articulum erroneum sic dicentem; Voluntate existente in tali dispositione in qua nata est moueri, et mouente sic disposito quod natum est sic mouere, impossibile est voluntatem non velle; et iterum alium sic ponentem, Scientia contratiorum solum est causa quare anima rationalis potest in opposita, et quod potentia simpliciter vna non potest in opposita nisi per accidens, et ratione altetius. Et ad hoc idem faciunt alij articuli", "english": "Having established from the premises that the contingent to either alternative exists, and what and of what sort it is not, it remains in consequence to inquire what and of what sort it is. Now according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 10,[n2] just as, when an irrational agent is posited with all the dispositions sufficient and naturally prior to acting, it follows of necessity that it acts, so, according to the same author in the same place, when a rational agent is posited with all the dispositions sufficient and naturally prior to its free action, it does not follow of necessity that it acts, nor does it follow that it does not act; rather the opposite of each stands, as the first of the first shows more fully. I am not loath to recall one brief demonstration of this. Suppose that A is some rational and free agent. I take his first free act, which let be B, and let C be the collection of all the sufficient and naturally prior dispositions. Then either, when C is posited, B necessarily follows to be produced, or not. If so, then (since it is not in A's free power to posit C, nor any part of it, because the whole of C naturally precedes B, and B is the first free act of A himself) neither is B in A's free power, though the opposite of this was being said. But if, when C is posited, B does not necessarily follow to be produced, we have what we intended. For now A with C produces B, and this does not follow necessarily; therefore the opposite can stand; hence it is also possible that A should stand with C without producing B, and also producing it. Wherefore, just as according to what was said above in this chapter, with the general rule on naturally preceding necessity premised in the second of this,[n3] the proper effect of an irrational agent is said to come about from a naturally preceding necessity, naturally predetermined to one side only, so the proper act of a rational and free agent is rightly said to come about or be produced from a naturally preceding freedom, naturally not predetermined to one of the two sides, but standing equally toward either alternative. And just as that effect is called contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause,[n4] so this one is called contingent-free to either alternative, and equally so, with respect to its total cause. This is also clear from Stephen, Bishop of Paris,[n5] who condemned a certain erroneous article that said: \"With the will existing in such a disposition in which it is naturally apt to be moved, and with the mover so disposed as to be naturally apt to move in this way, it is impossible for the will not to will\"; and again another, that posits: \"Knowledge of contraries is the sole cause why the rational soul has power toward opposites, and a power that is simply one cannot [act] toward opposites except per accidens and by reason of another.\" To the same effect there are other articles condemned by the same bishop,", "margins": [{"id": "651E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: primum liberum"}, {"id": "652A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: proprie"}, {"id": "652A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: partem"}, {"id": "652A·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: vtramlibet"}, {"id": "652A·4", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Stephen [Tempier]."}]}, {"anchor": "p652B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/#p652B", "locator_display": "652B", "source_text": "ab eodem damnati, tertio secundi plenius recitati. Quare videtur mihi, quod contingens aequaliter per se et primo acceptum potest sic congrue definiri, quod est actus agentis liberi per se et primus, quo posito cum omnibus dispositionibus naturaliter praeuijs cum quibus ilium producit, non necessario sequitur ipsum produci, sed vtralibet partium potest stare aequaliter. Porto contingens aequaliter accipitur multis modis; sed iuxta praehabita. 26. secundi, per se et primo accipitur vno modo tantum, et ad illum primum omnes alij velut attributales et accessorij reducuntur, et ille est modus eius praedictus; Nam contingens aequaliter cum sit, per se et primo est causa vel effectus, sed non causa: Omne enim tale contingens contingit esse ab aliquo alio; nam si esset per se et a se solo, non diceretur contingere illo modo. Quis enim dixerit, quod Deus est sic contingens, et sic contingere Deum esse? Causa autem per se et primo non est sic contingens. Nam causa quae est ab alio, non est abalio in quantum causa, sed in quantum causatum. Etiam, si causa per se et primo esset sic contingens ab alio, tunc per ostensa secundo primi, omnis causa sic esset, et per consequens prima causa:", "english": "recited more fully in the third of the second. Wherefore it seems to me that the equally contingent, taken per se and first, can fittingly be defined thus: it is the per se and first act of a free agent, upon positing which, together with all the naturally prior dispositions with which it produces it, its being produced does not necessarily follow, but either of the two sides can stand equally. Now \"contingent equally\" is taken in many ways; but according to what was had in the 26th of the second, it is taken per se and first in one way only, and all the others are reduced to that first one as attributive and accessory, and that is the way stated above. For since the equally contingent is per se and first a thing caused, that is, an effect, but not a cause,[n6] every such contingent happens to be from something else; for if it were per se and from itself alone, it would not be said to happen in that way. Who, indeed, would say that God is thus contingent, and that God happens thus to be? But a cause per se and first is not thus contingent. For a cause that is from another is not from another insofar as it is a cause, but insofar as it is caused. Moreover, if a cause per se and first were thus contingent from another, then by what was shown in the second of the first, every cause would be so, and consequently the first cause:", "margins": [{"id": "652B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Definition of the contingent to either alternative. Contingent."}]}, {"anchor": "p652C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/#p652C", "locator_display": "652C–652E", "source_text": "Contingens ergo aequaliter per se et primo est causatum, effectus seu actus, vt dicit definitio iam praemissa, et agentis liberi, quia non agentis irrationalis, sicut praecedentia docuerunt; et est effectus seu actus eius per se, scilicet secundum quod est agens liberum: multos enim effectus non libere, sed necessario efficit, quorum quilibet est contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis, sicut praehabita manifestant; Et est effectus eius actus eius primus, scilicet actio immanens, vt velle vel nolle, non effectus eius extrinsecus et secundus, scilicet operatio transiens, siue exterior. Nam talis effectus secundus, posito primo eius actu, a quo procedit ille secundus, puta velle et nolle, de necessitate naturaliter praecedente producetur, sicut secundum huius docebat: Quare ipse est contingens necessarium respectu suae causae totalis, non autem simpliciter contingens aequaliter. Iste tamen effectus secundus quodammodo denominatiue et tropice potest dici contingens aequaliter, quia est actio deriuata ab agente, seu actione per se et primo agente, seu contingente aequaliter: et sic loquitur Philosophus 1. Prior:\n\nfrequenter dicendo, Contingit ad vtrumlibet hominem currere vel sedere. Quod autem posito agente libero cum omnibus dispositionibus cum quibus producit liberum actum suum, non necessario sequitur ipsum produci, patet ex praemissis hoc eodem capitulo; Vnde et consequitur manifeste, quod vtralibet partium aequaliter potest stare, et hunc arbitror intellectum dicentium contingens ad vtrumlibet aequaliter se habere ad esse, et ad non esse, scilicet in consecutione respectu suae causae totalis; et similiter Philosophi. 1. Prior: dicentis, Infinitum autem eo quod nihil magis sic vel illo modo sicut capitulum proximum allegauit. Posita enim causa tali actiua totali, nihil magis necessario sequitur sic vel illo modo, scilicet effectum produci quam non produci, Iuxta transumptionem insuper supradictam, Contingens aequaliter reperitur in potentijs actu agentibus, non quia illae sunt contingentes aequaliter, sed quia contingit aequaliter illas agere et non agere, cum fuerint dispositae modo dicto. Reperitur quoque in potentijs non actu agentibus sed actiuis, propter similem causam huic; reperitur similiter\n\nin potentijs actu patientibus, et passiuis de se aeque dispositis ad contrarias passiones, quia contingit aequaliter lapidem moueri ad hanc partem vel ad illam; reperitur in rebus praesentibus, sicut ex praehabitis satis patet, et similiter in futuris, eo quod a causis huiusmodi producentur; in rebus etiam possibilibus non futuris, eo quod possunt a causis huiusmodi prouenire. Nec solum reperitur in rebus, sed in priuationibus ipsis rerum; in priuationibus scilicet huiusmodi effectuum liberorum, eo quod illae et sui habitus aequaliter possunt contingere, vt est dictum. Reperitur quoque in propositiombus de praesenti et de futuro, tanquam in signis. Omnes autem hi modi transumptionum praedicti cum suis causis, et ordine ipsorum ad inuicem possunt plane patere per Philosophica, Grammaticalia, et Rhetorica, 26. secundi plenius allegata.", "english": "the equally contingent, therefore, is per se and first something caused, an effect or act, as the definition just premised says, and of a free agent, not of an irrational agent, as the preceding matter taught. It is its effect or act per se, namely insofar as it is a free agent; for it produces many effects not freely but necessarily, each of which is contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, as the earlier matter makes clear. And the effect is its first act, namely an immanent action, such as willing or not willing, not its extrinsic and second effect, namely a transient operation, or external one. For such a second effect, given its first act, from which that second proceeds (for example, willing and not willing), will be produced from a naturally preceding necessity, as the second of this taught. Hence it is contingent-necessary with respect to its total cause, but not simply contingent equally. Yet that second effect can in a certain way be called equally contingent, denominatively and tropically, because it is an action derived from an agent, or from an action acting per se and first, that is, contingent equally. And so the Philosopher speaks in Prior Analytics 1, often saying, \"It is contingent to either alternative that a man run or sit.\"[n7] That, moreover, when a free agent is posited with all the dispositions with which it produces its free act, its being produced does not necessarily follow, is clear from what has been premised in this same chapter. Whence it also follows manifestly that either of the sides can equally stand; and this I judge to be the meaning of those who say that the contingent to either alternative stands equally toward being and toward not being, namely in consequence, with respect to its total cause; and likewise of the Philosopher, Prior Analytics 1, saying, \"The infinite, however, because nothing [is] more thus or in that way,\" as the immediately preceding chapter cited. For when such a total active cause is posited, nothing follows more necessarily in this way or in that, namely that the effect be produced rather than not produced. And according to the transferred use[n8] besides that was mentioned above, the equally contingent is found in powers actually acting, not because they are themselves equally contingent, but because it is equally contingent that they act and do not act, when they have been disposed in the manner stated. It is also found in powers not actually acting but active, for a like reason; it is found likewise in powers actually undergoing, and in passive ones equally disposed of themselves to contrary passions, because it is equally contingent that a stone be moved to this side or to that. It is found in present things, as is clear enough from what has been had before, and likewise in future things, because they will be produced by causes of this kind; and also in possible things that are not future, because they can come from such causes. Nor is it found only in things, but in the very privations of things; namely in privations of such free effects, because those privations and the corresponding positive states can equally come about, as has been said. It is also found in propositions about the present and the future, as in signs. All these modes of transferred use stated above, with their causes and their order to one another, can be made plain through philosophical, grammatical and rhetorical matters, cited more fully in the 26th of the second.", "margins": [{"id": "652D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: The Philosopher."}, {"id": "652E·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: constat (for patet)."}]}, {"anchor": "p653A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/#p653A", "locator_display": "653A", "source_text": "COROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium, quid sit libertas contradictionis, et quis sit actus liber libertate contradictionis.", "english": "COROLLARY.\n\nCorollary: what the freedom of contradiction is, and what an act free by freedom of contradiction is.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p653A-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/4/#p653A-2", "locator_display": "653A–653C", "source_text": "VNde cognoscitur manifeste quid sic libertas contradictionis, et quid sit actus libet libertate contradictionis. Est n. libertas contradictionis libera potestas actiua, qua posita cum omnibus dispositiombus necessarijs ad agendum, libere potest agere et non agere, nec sequitur de necessitate quod agat, sed et haec et altera pars contradictionis aequaliter potest stare. Istud per praehabita satis patet. Dicitque Philosophus 9. Met. 18. haec verba; Potentiae vero\n\naliae, ex quibus definitum est, omnes contradictionis sunt. Nam possibile sic mouere potest, et non sic, quicunque secundum rationem: Irrationales vero per adesse et non contradictionis erunt eodem. Vult ergo Philosophus dicere, quod quaecunque potentiae secundum rationem agentes, sunt contradictionis per se et primo; ita scilicet quod cum fuerint in dispositione, in qua possunt libere agere, possunt et libere non agere, sicut et supra decimo docebat, vt erat superius allegatum; et quod irrationales potentiae sint contradictionis tantum per accidens et non primo, scilicet per adesse et non adesse actiuas passiuis; quoniam cum assunt et possunt, necesse est has agere, illas pati, vt ipsemet testatur supra decimo, sicut superius erat tactum. Vnde et translatio, quam Commentator exponit, sic habet; Aliae vero potentiae, ex quibus aguntur, omnes sunt contradictoriorum. Illud enim quod habet potentiam mouere hoc, habet potentiam non mouere hoc, etiam omnia quae habent verbum; illa autem quae non habent verbum, non erunt contradictoriorum, cum sint praesentes primo. Quare\n\net Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus iuste damnauit quendam articulurn erroneum, asserentem quod post conclusionem factam de aliquo faciendo voluntas non manet libera, et quosdam alios similes tertio secundi expressius recitatos. Actus vero liber libertate contradictionis, est actus proprius libertatis contradictionis, liberae scilicet potentiae actiuae, qua posita cum omnibus dispositionibus naturaliter praeuiis actui, libere potest produci vel non produci, id est, non necssario sequitur actum produci. Sed et haec, et altera pars contradictionis aequaliter potest stare, quod intellectis praemissis, reputo manifestum.", "english": "From this it is clearly known what the freedom of contradiction is,[n9] and what an act free by freedom of contradiction is. For the freedom of contradiction is a free active power, upon positing which together with all the dispositions necessary for acting, it can freely act and not act, nor does it follow of necessity that it act, but both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand. This is clear enough from what was had before. And the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 18, says these words: \"But the other potencies, from which it has been defined, are all of contradiction. For what is possible can move in this way, and not in this way, whoever [acts] according to reason; but irrational ones will, through presence and non-presence, be of contradiction in the same.\"[n10] The Philosopher therefore means to say that whatever potencies act according to reason are of contradiction per se and first; that is, that when they are in a disposition in which they can freely act, they can also freely not act, as he also taught above in the tenth, as was cited above; and that irrational potencies are of contradiction only per accidens and not first, namely through the presence and non-presence of active potencies to passive ones; since when these are present and able, it is necessary that these act and those undergo, as he himself attests above in the tenth, as was touched on above. Hence the translation too that the Commentator expounds reads thus: \"But the other potencies, from which things are done, are all of contradictories. For that which has the power to move this has the power not to move this, and so do all things that have a word; but those which have no word will not be of contradictories, since they are present first.\" Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, rightly condemned a certain erroneous article, asserting that after a conclusion has been reached about something to be done the will does not remain free, and certain other similar ones, recited more expressly in the third of the second. An act free by freedom of contradiction is the proper act of the freedom of contradiction, that is, of the free active power, upon positing which with all the dispositions naturally prior to the act it can freely be produced or not be produced, that is, the act's being produced does not necessarily follow. But both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand, which, once the premises are understood, I reckon manifest.", "margins": [{"id": "653A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Definition of freedom."}, {"id": "653B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Stephen [Tempier]."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}