{"id": "3/39", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/39/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 39", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "769B–769E", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXXIX.\n\nArguit contra sextam.\n\nSExta quoque responsio astruens Deum per se solum posse esse aut fiusse causam totalem effectus saepius memorati, praesentis aut praeteriti, non est vera; quia secundum ipsam esset possibile hominem, qui ex visione et mandato in verbo orauit, cucurrit, praedicauit, domos construxit, et filios procreauit, nihilhorum fecisse, sed Deum fecisse singula per se solum. Quare et erit consequenter possibile deuirginatos reuirginari per suam actionem vel quietionem libere et contingenter futuram; etitque secundum istud tanta contingentia respectu praesentium et praeteritorum, sicut respectu futurorum. Facta namque homini viatorireuelatione in verbo de aliquo effectu, qui sit A. per eum libere et contingenter\n\nfuturo, ipsoque ex illa reuelatione faciente alium effectum ante A. puta B. medio tempore post B. et ante A. vel dum B. fit, sicut contingit ipsum facere vel non facere A. futurum; sic et contingit ipsum fecisse vel non fecisse, B. praeteritum, vel facere et non facere, B. nunc praesens, sicut ex tricesimo tertio huius patet. Item secundum istud possibile est hominem qui ex tali reuelatione meruit, vel contra eam peccauit, et fuit iustus vel iniustus, saluatus vel damnatus, praemiatus vel punitus, beatus vel miser, in coelo sursum vel in inferno deorsum, nunquam sic fecisse, nec talia recepisse. Item eadem ratione, qua est possibile Deum solum fecisse quod fecit cum causa rationali secunda; erit et similiter possibile ipsum solum fecisse quicquid fecit cum causa irrationali secunda; ergo quicquid Deus fecit cum quacunque causa secunda, possibile est ipsum solum fecisse, et nullam causam secundam vnquam fecisse aliquid vel mouisse. Item si ea, quae Deus non fecit solus, potest fecisse solus, simili ratione ea, quae non fecit cum alio nec solus, potest fecisse, quoniam alterius iuuamento non eger, quare et quae fecit\n\npotest similiter non fecisse; quae omnia repugnant planissime hypothesi principali.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXIX.\n\nHe argues against the sixth.\n\nThe sixth reply also is not true. It maintains that God through himself alone can be, or could have been, the total cause of the often-mentioned effect, whether present or past. It is false because, according to that reply, it would be possible that a man who, from a vision and command in the Word,[n1] prayed, ran, preached, built houses and begot sons did none of these things, and that God did each of them through himself alone. Consequently it would also be possible for those who have been deflowered to become virgins again, by their own action or inaction, which would be future freely and contingently. According to that reply there would then be as much contingency with respect to present and past things as with respect to future ones. For suppose a revelation in the Word is made to a wayfarer about some effect, which let be A, future by him freely and contingently. Suppose that he, from that revelation, brings about another effect before A, say B, in the intervening time, after B and before A, or while B is being done. Just as it is contingent that he do or not do A, which is future, so also it is contingent that he did or did not do B, which is past, or that he is now doing and not doing B, which is present, as is plain from the thirty-third of this.\n\nAgain, according to that reply it is possible that a man who, from such a revelation, merited, or sinned against it, and was just or unjust, saved or damned, rewarded or punished, blessed or wretched, above in heaven or below in hell, never so acted and never received such things. Again, by the same reasoning by which it is possible that God alone did what he did with a rational secondary cause, it will likewise be possible that he alone did whatever he did with an irrational secondary cause. Therefore whatever God did with any secondary cause, it is possible that he alone did it, and that no secondary cause ever did or moved anything. Again, if he can have done alone what God did not do alone, then by like reasoning he can have done what he did neither with another nor alone, since he has no need of another's help. Hence he can likewise have not done what he did do. All this is flatly contrary to the principal hypothesis.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "in verbo: \"in the Word,\" the divine Word in which, on the hypothesis of the preceding chapters, the vision, command and revelation are given. The \"principal hypothesis\" at the end is the one on which the whole argument rests: that such a revelation is made and an effect follows from it."}], "errata": [{"address": "769C", "keyed": "fiusse", "print": "fuisse"}, {"address": "769C", "keyed": "nihilhorum", "print": "nihil horum"}, {"address": "769C", "keyed": "etitque", "print": "eritque"}, {"address": "769C", "keyed": "viatorireuelatione", "print": "viatori reuelatione"}, {"address": "769D", "keyed": "eger", "print": "eget"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p769B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/39/#p769B", "locator_display": "769B–769C", "source_text": "CAP. XXXIX.\n\nArguit contra sextam.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXIX.\n\nHe argues against the sixth.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p769C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/39/#p769C", "locator_display": "769C–769E", "source_text": "SExta quoque responsio astruens Deum per se solum posse esse aut fiusse causam totalem effectus saepius memorati, praesentis aut praeteriti, non est vera; quia secundum ipsam esset possibile hominem, qui ex visione et mandato in verbo orauit, cucurrit, praedicauit, domos construxit, et filios procreauit, nihilhorum fecisse, sed Deum fecisse singula per se solum. Quare et erit consequenter possibile deuirginatos reuirginari per suam actionem vel quietionem libere et contingenter futuram; etitque secundum istud tanta contingentia respectu praesentium et praeteritorum, sicut respectu futurorum. Facta namque homini viatorireuelatione in verbo de aliquo effectu, qui sit A. per eum libere et contingenter\n\nfuturo, ipsoque ex illa reuelatione faciente alium effectum ante A. puta B. medio tempore post B. et ante A. vel dum B. fit, sicut contingit ipsum facere vel non facere A. futurum; sic et contingit ipsum fecisse vel non fecisse, B. praeteritum, vel facere et non facere, B. nunc praesens, sicut ex tricesimo tertio huius patet. Item secundum istud possibile est hominem qui ex tali reuelatione meruit, vel contra eam peccauit, et fuit iustus vel iniustus, saluatus vel damnatus, praemiatus vel punitus, beatus vel miser, in coelo sursum vel in inferno deorsum, nunquam sic fecisse, nec talia recepisse. Item eadem ratione, qua est possibile Deum solum fecisse quod fecit cum causa rationali secunda; erit et similiter possibile ipsum solum fecisse quicquid fecit cum causa irrationali secunda; ergo quicquid Deus fecit cum quacunque causa secunda, possibile est ipsum solum fecisse, et nullam causam secundam vnquam fecisse aliquid vel mouisse. Item si ea, quae Deus non fecit solus, potest fecisse solus, simili ratione ea, quae non fecit cum alio nec solus, potest fecisse, quoniam alterius iuuamento non eger, quare et quae fecit\n\npotest similiter non fecisse; quae omnia repugnant planissime hypothesi principali.", "english": "The sixth reply also is not true. It maintains that God through himself alone can be, or could have been, the total cause of the often-mentioned effect, whether present or past. It is false because, according to that reply, it would be possible that a man who, from a vision and command in the Word,[n1] prayed, ran, preached, built houses and begot sons did none of these things, and that God did each of them through himself alone. Consequently it would also be possible for those who have been deflowered to become virgins again, by their own action or inaction, which would be future freely and contingently. According to that reply there would then be as much contingency with respect to present and past things as with respect to future ones. For suppose a revelation in the Word is made to a wayfarer about some effect, which let be A, future by him freely and contingently. Suppose that he, from that revelation, brings about another effect before A, say B, in the intervening time, after B and before A, or while B is being done. Just as it is contingent that he do or not do A, which is future, so also it is contingent that he did or did not do B, which is past, or that he is now doing and not doing B, which is present, as is plain from the thirty-third of this.\n\nAgain, according to that reply it is possible that a man who, from such a revelation, merited, or sinned against it, and was just or unjust, saved or damned, rewarded or punished, blessed or wretched, above in heaven or below in hell, never so acted and never received such things. Again, by the same reasoning by which it is possible that God alone did what he did with a rational secondary cause, it will likewise be possible that he alone did whatever he did with an irrational secondary cause. Therefore whatever God did with any secondary cause, it is possible that he alone did it, and that no secondary cause ever did or moved anything. Again, if he can have done alone what God did not do alone, then by like reasoning he can have done what he did neither with another nor alone, since he has no need of another's help. Hence he can likewise have not done what he did do. All this is flatly contrary to the principal hypothesis.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}