{"id": "3/38", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/38/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 38", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "769A–769B", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXXVIII. Arguit contra quintam.\n\nREsponsio vero quinta, quae ponit libertatem voluntatis creatae posse, fuisse, vel esse causam effctus huiusmodi praeteriti vel praesentis, videtur multum libere dicere sine actione aliqua rationis; nec enim difficultatem euacuat, nec est vera. Non euacuat difficultatem pramissam:\n\nponatur namque quod praecipiatur videnti in verbo velle et operari tantum conformiter visioni etc. sicut tricesimum tertium, et tricesimum quintum huius plenius arguebant, et reuertitur difficultas. Nec est responsio ista vera; quoniam aliqui sunt effectus causati a sola visione aliquorum obiectorum in verbo sine quacunque operatione libera voluntatis, sicut tricesimo tertio huius patet.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXVIII. He argues against the fifth.\n\nThe fifth response holds that the liberty of a created will can be, or was, the cause of such a past or present effect. It seems to speak very freely,[n1] without any exercise of reason, for it neither clears away the difficulty nor is it true. It does not clear away the difficulty set out above. Suppose, for example, that one who sees in the Word[n2] is commanded to will and to act only in conformity with the vision, etc., as the thirty-third and the thirty-fifth of this[n3] argued more fully. Then the difficulty returns. Nor is that response true, since some effects are caused solely by the vision of certain objects in the Word, without any free operation of the will whatsoever, as the thirty-third of this makes plain.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "libere dicere: \"to speak freely\" plays on libertas voluntatis, the liberty of the will, which the fifth response asserts. The English keeps the adverb and loses the echo of liberum arbitrium."}, {"n": 2, "text": "videnti in verbo: \"one who sees in the Word\" is one who sees things in the divine Word. The blessed, or one granted revelation, see what is to come there. The argument of the preceding chapters concerns a seer of future contingents."}, {"n": 3, "text": "huius: \"of this\" is left as Bradwardine wrote it, in the manner of a cross-reference, with capitulum understood. It refers to chapters 33 and 35 of this book, Book III."}], "errata": [{"address": "769A", "keyed": "effctus", "print": "effectus"}, {"address": "769A", "keyed": "pramissam", "print": "praemissam (printed præmissam)"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p769A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/38/#p769A", "locator_display": "769A–769B", "source_text": "CAP. XXXVIII. Arguit contra quintam.\n\nREsponsio vero quinta, quae ponit libertatem voluntatis creatae posse, fuisse, vel esse causam effctus huiusmodi praeteriti vel praesentis, videtur multum libere dicere sine actione aliqua rationis; nec enim difficultatem euacuat, nec est vera. Non euacuat difficultatem pramissam:\n\nponatur namque quod praecipiatur videnti in verbo velle et operari tantum conformiter visioni etc. sicut tricesimum tertium, et tricesimum quintum huius plenius arguebant, et reuertitur difficultas. Nec est responsio ista vera; quoniam aliqui sunt effectus causati a sola visione aliquorum obiectorum in verbo sine quacunque operatione libera voluntatis, sicut tricesimo tertio huius patet.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXVIII. He argues against the fifth.\n\nThe fifth response holds that the liberty of a created will can be, or was, the cause of such a past or present effect. It seems to speak very freely,[n1] without any exercise of reason, for it neither clears away the difficulty nor is it true. It does not clear away the difficulty set out above. Suppose, for example, that one who sees in the Word[n2] is commanded to will and to act only in conformity with the vision, etc., as the thirty-third and the thirty-fifth of this[n3] argued more fully. Then the difficulty returns. Nor is that response true, since some effects are caused solely by the vision of certain objects in the Word, without any free operation of the will whatsoever, as the thirty-third of this makes plain.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}