De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 32
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 756A–758C; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/32/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[756A–756B]
CHAPTER XXXII. He returns the same hypothesis to the attack by way of the immutability of the divine will. [n1]

The same hypothesis can also be attacked by way of the immutability of the divine will. For if God could be unwilling, privatively or even positively [n2], that these things now present, which he now wills to be, should now be present, and that those past things which he wills to have been should have been, and from now on forever be unwilling that those present and past things should have been future, which he always before willed to have been future, he would be mutable, as all the authors of this hypothesis themselves confess. But the divine will stands in exactly the same way intrinsically toward future things as toward present or past ones, as can be gathered from what was shown earlier in the thirtieth of this book. Otherwise, when a future thing had become present or past, the divine will would be intrinsically changed, against the twenty-third of the first book. Therefore, if he can be unwilling, now and always afterward, that the future things which he wills, and always before willed to be, should be, without those things having been posited in being, he is mutable. Or conversely: if God, without change in himself, can be unwilling, now and always afterward, that the future things which he now wills, and always before willed to be and to have been future, should be, those things not having been posited, and can be unwilling that they should have been future, then he can likewise, without change in himself, be unwilling now that these present things should be and that these past things should have been, and can be unwilling always afterward that they should have been future. For no cause or reason for a dissimilarity can be given. And if perhaps someone says that the cause of dissimilarity between these cases is this: that it is now necessary that God will, and always have willed, that this present or past thing have been future, and therefore, if after this he were unwilling, he would necessarily be changed, whereas earlier, with future things, it was not so; then God wills present and past things in one intrinsic way and future things in another, and wills the same thing in one intrinsic way first as future and then as present; therefore he is mutable.

[756C–756E]
Moreover, the divine will is no more necessary with respect to past or present things than with respect to future ones, as the thirtieth of this book teaches. And if anyone should still say otherwise — that if God could after this be unwilling, regarding this present or past thing, that it should have been future, which he always willed to have been future, and did so, the thing itself would be changed, and would necessarily be changed from having been future to not having been future, but not so in the case of a future thing; so the divine will too would here be necessarily changed, likewise, and not there — I ask why the present or past thing would be changed in this case rather than a future thing. For no cause or reason can be given, except that it is necessary that the present or past thing always have been future, and that God always willed it in conformity, and not so with a future thing; and so this response is like the former. Again, to the same point: change in the effect is not the cause of change in the agent, but rather the converse, where change occurs in the agent, and most of all in the effect of the divine will [n3]. Otherwise it would be changed continually at the change of its effects. But it is itself impassible, unalterable, and altogether immutable by all its effects, as the twenty-first of the first teaches.

Moreover, this seems almost a single common conception of the mind among all: everything that is of one disposition and can be of the opposite can be so through some change, speaking of a potency that can be actualized and not of one wholly absolute. This is seen in every other matter, relative as well as absolute. For if this is not a being, or a man, or hot, and can be, it can be so through some change. And the same appears in every relative species: for if this is not the double of that, or a father, or known, and can be, it can be so through some change, as the thirtieth of this book shows. The same is not improbably confirmed by this: as it seems, if this is not such and can be, it can become such, speaking of becoming in the common sense, as "the Lord has become a refuge for us," as the same thirtieth makes clear. But every such making seems to be some kind of change, since it is a passage or motion from one of two opposites to the other. And the chief cause of this whole matter, a kind of maxim naturally implanted in all, seems to be this: that what is, when it is, necessarily is, and what is not, when it is not, necessarily is not [n4]; and likewise that what was, when it was, necessarily was, and what was not, necessarily was not. For in this Logicians, Philosophers, Theologians, and the common crowd generally agree. And if it is necessary that this be or have been of one disposition, and it can be of the opposite, it can be changed, because this can happen only by departure from the prior disposition, as from the term from which, and approach to the later, as to the term to which of the motion. And if anyone should say that that maxim is true only of present and past things not dependent on the future, let him observe, I beg, that this gloss is supported by no common conception of the mind and by no authority of the elders, but only by certain subtleties of sophists. And God's will in no way depends on future things, as the twenty-first of the first and the thirty-second of the second taught, but future things depend on it, as the fourteenth of the first

[757A–757B]
book shows. Nor does the divine will stand in any way intrinsically otherwise toward future things than toward present [n5] or past ones, nor conversely, as 30 of this book makes clear. With the foregoing suppositions premised, then, it seems that if God now is, and always has been, willing that this be future, or that this have been future, and can be of the opposite disposition without the thing being posited in being, he can be so through some change, and not on the part of the thing willed before its being posited in being. For it involves a contradiction that something be changed from future to non-future except by positing it in being, as 18 of this book had shown; therefore it would be through a change of the divine will. One can argue likewise by supposing that A is a certain non-future thing which nevertheless can be future: God was always unwilling that A be, and can be willing that A be; therefore he can do this through some change, and not through a change on the part of the thing, since that change would be from non-future to future, against 18 of this book; therefore it would be through a change of the divine will.

Moreover, passing over these petty logical arguments, I show the same by one theological argument. If, according to the hypothesis, God always willed that something be, and can never have willed this, but always have willed the opposite, without any change whatever, then by a like reasoning, after God has said, promised, and sworn that he would do A, or that A would be, he can fail to do A, and it is possible that A not be, without change in himself, lie, or perjury of any kind. For he can never have so said, promised, or sworn, without any change whatever; and if that is posited, he can fail to do A without change, lie, or perjury of any kind. This seems a falsehood, and contrary to theological truth. For in Numbers 23, to Balak, who wished to appease the Lord so that Balaam, with his consent or permission, would curse the people of Israel, to whom the Lord had a little before promised good things and blessing, Balaam answered — or rather the Lord through Balaam: "God is not like a man, that he should lie, nor like a son of man, that he should be changed. Has he said, and will he not do it? Has he spoken, and will he not fulfil it? I was brought to bless; I cannot forbid the blessing." Therefore, if God had promised anything — say, that A would be future — and did not fulfil it, he would be mutable and a liar. According to the aforesaid hypothesis, however, Balaam [n6] could have answered truthfully:

[757C–757D]
even if God said and spoke that A would be, it can be that he never said this nor spoke, and this without any change whatever; and if that is posited in being, although he does not do A but its opposite, it does not follow that he is changed or even lies. Nor should anyone make little of this saying of Balaam, because he was wicked, as if it were not authentic, since it is a saying of the Lord, the highest author, as was also the saying of Caiaphas. For Scripture there prefaces it: "To him, namely Balaam, when the Lord had met him and put a word in his mouth, he said: Return to Balak, and you shall speak these things to him." And all catholic expositors embrace Balaam's sayings there as prophecies and as divine and authentic sayings; so too does Holy Church, which on the day of Epiphany sings thus: "Balaam, prophesying of whom, said: There shall come forth from Jacob a shining star." Likewise Psalm 88 [89]: "I will not profane my covenant, and what proceeds from my lips I will not make void. Once I have sworn by my holy one — if I lie to David [n7] — his seed shall remain for ever." Here the Lord intimates through the Prophet that if the seed of David did not remain forever, as he himself promised and swore, he himself would profane his covenant, and make void what has proceeded from his lips, and would even be lying. But profanation, voiding, and lying imply change. Yet if the Lord, after he promised and swore this to David, could never have promised nor sworn it, he could refrain from doing this without profanation of the covenant, voiding, or lying of any kind. Likewise Malachi 3: "Behold," says the Lord to the people of Israel, "I will send my angel, and he will prepare the way before your face"; and he promises many other good things, and to confirm the promise adds: "For I am the Lord, and I do not change." It is as if he said: I am not mutable, therefore I will do these things for you; therefore, conversely, if I do not do these things for you, I am mutable. Yet according to the hypothesis this would not follow at all. For although the Lord promised these things, it can be, without any change whatever, that he never promised them; and if that is posited, then even if God does not do these things, he is not changed. Likewise Hebrews 6: "God, wishing more abundantly to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath, so that by two immovable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie,

[757E]
we may have the strongest comfort." Here the Apostle supposes that the promise and oath of God, by which he promised to the heirs certain good things — let them be A — are immovable things; and if he did not fulfil them by furnishing those goods A to the heirs, he would be lying, and so likewise would be changed. Yet according to the hypothesis this would not follow at all. For let us be in the interval between the promise and the furnishing of the goods A. Then, according to the hypothesis, it can be that God never promised nor swore to the heirs that goods A would be future; and if that is posited, God can never furnish them to the heirs without any change or lie. To all this someone perhaps will briefly reply, saying that all this must be understood in the composite sense, always conjunctively, and not in the divided sense, or divisively. For if God did not fulfil what was promised, such that these two things concur, that God promised this and that God does not fulfil it, he is changed and lies; but divisively, this — namely A, which God has promised beforehand — he can fail to fulfil, or fail to do, without change

[758A–758B]
and without a lie, because it can be that he never promised A. But the authorities cited, if they are looked at inwardly, do not speak conjunctively, but only divisively. For through the foregoing the Apostle wished to lift the heirs toward the strongest comfort and the firmest hope in Christ: "so that," he says, "by two immovable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest comfort, we who have fled to hold fast the hope set before us, which we have as an anchor of the soul, safe and firm, and entering even to the inner parts of the veil, where Jesus has entered on our behalf as forerunner, made high priest for ever according to the order of Melchizedek." But how, then, would we have the strongest comfort, or a hope safe and firm, merely in one composite statement, in one conditional, in one heap of words — namely, "God cannot, without change and lie, [not] [n8] fulfil what is promised, it being promised"? That is, such a proposition is not possible: "God without change and lie will not fulfil what was promised"; or, "if God has promised anything, and will not fulfil it, he will lie and be changed." This is the more telling since that on which such a proposition or conditional, comforting and hope-giving, rests as on the foundation of all comfort and hope, namely God's promising, is weaker and more unstable than anything whatever. For every present or past thing necessarily is or was; but according to the hypothesis, God's promising — which now is, and always was — can for now not be and never have been. Indeed it seems that in this respect we would reasonably have less comfort from divine promises than from human ones. For if a man has promised anything, at least with a solemn stipulation, or an oath, or some other such security, then if he does not make good, he can be refuted and convicted as false, a liar, and a perjurer; but God not so, since he can never have promised anything. For what catholic will presume to assume that this hope, to which the Apostle leads us, lies only in propositions of this kind, or in consequences, and not in things? Nor does the Apostle think so; rather, that we may hope safely and firmly for the very thing promised by God, as the whole Church hopes, and so may have the strongest comfort. Wherefore the Apostle too, showing that he is not speaking of the immutability of a conditional consequence, or of a composite proposition of this kind,

[758C]
but of the immutability of the divine will, counsel, promise, or oath, says: "God, wishing to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath, so that by two immovable things," namely the promise and the oath, "in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest comfort." It seems, then, that the Apostle understands and speaks divisively rather than conjunctively, to the common understanding, namely of men, which is this: that whatever is promised by God must be fulfilled, or else God lies and is changed. For example, God promised yesterday that he would do some good A for men tomorrow; then today they will say and so understand: "God will do A for us tomorrow, or he will lie and be changed." Malachi too, and David, and Balaam, indeed the Holy Spirit who spoke through those Prophets, seem to understand and speak likewise in the authorities recited. These same things can also be turned against the same hypothesis by way of the immutability of divine knowledge, with the terms suitably transposed.

NOTES

1. Reducit eandem: the feminine eandem is hypothesis (cf. eadem hypothesis impugnari in the next line). The verb recurs in the last sentence of the chapter (possunt reduci contra eandem hypothesin), so "reduces" here means "leads back to the attack": the same hypothesis is assailed along a second line. The previous chapters took the line of God's action intrinsece (see c.33.1: "if these things have been objected by way of God's intrinsic action…").
2. Nolle priuatiue … positiue: privatively, God merely lacks the act of willing a thing; positively, he actively wills against it. English "be unwilling" renders nolle in both senses.
3. et maxime in effectu voluntatis diuinae is elliptical in the Latin. I take it to mean that the principle (change in the agent, not the effect, is the source of change) holds above all where the effect is an effect of the divine will, which is what the following alias enim clause argues.
4. The maxim is Aristotle's, De Interpretatione 9 (19a23–27): what is, when it is, necessarily is. The scholastics call this necessity "of the consequence," not "of the consequent."
5. The print reads praescientia ("foreknowledge"), plainly a misprint for praesentia. Compare the parallel wording in unit 2: ad futura, sicut ad praesentia vel praeterita. I translate "present."
6. The print reads Balak veraciter respondisse. Balak is the king who sends for Balaam. It is Balaam who answers in Num 23:19–20, so I have translated "Balaam."
7. si Dauidi mentiar is the Hebrew elliptical oath-formula ("if I lie to David…" meaning "surely I will not lie"). The Vulgate keeps it literally. Bradwardine's gloss below (quod si semen … non maneret … mentiretur) reads it as I have.
8. The square-bracketed [non] is in the print: an insertion by Savile or a scribe. Without it the clause would say that God cannot fulfil what is promised. With it the clause says what the objectors' composite proposition (that God can, without change, fail to fulfil a promise) would deny, as the next clause explains. The print also has a question mark after promissum (existens promissum?), which I have not kept: I take the whole passage from quomodo tamen to re quacunque as one question, which I end at the end of unit 12–13's first sentence group, where the construction ends.