{"id": "3/31", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/31/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 31", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "755B–755E", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXXI. Reuocat eandem per viam necessitatis et contingentiae intellectus scientiaeque diuinae.\n\nCOntra eandem quoque hypothesin potest similiter argui per viam necessitatis et contingentiae intellectus scientiae que diuinae. Nam ante\n\npraesentiam seu praeteritionem rei Deus contingenter sciuit cam semper suisse futuram et fore; sed in eius praesentia seu praeteritione necessario scit eam semper fuisse futuram, et esse vel fuisse; ergo tunc aliter intrinsece scit quam prius, quod est contra rationes praemissas, et contra autoritates superius memoratas. Nec aliqua rationalis causa huius necessitatis nouellae in diuina scientia poterit assignari, prohibentibus rationibus de necessitate nouella in volutione seu voluntate diuina, si ad diuinam scientiam congrue transferantur, decimo quinto primi, atque decimo sexto succurrente. Nec sine causa rationabili potest necessitas talis poni, sicut contra responsionem vltimam est ostensum. Item si diuina scientia respectu futurorum sit contingens ad vtrumlibet, et respectu praesentium et praeteritorum necessaria, Deus certius intrinsece scit praesentia et praeterita quam futura: haec enim scita certiora sunt illis. Illa namque, quae necessario sunt aliqualia, sunt certius\n\ntalia quam illa quae contingenter ad vtrumlibet tantum sunt talia: nam haec non possunt non esse talia, illa possunt; Deus ergo perfectius scit praesentia et praeterita, quam futura. Nam scire quid certe est perfectius, quam incerte; quare Deus intrinsece mutatur et melioratur de nouo; nec etiam scit futura summe certe, nec summe perfecte. Huius etiam maioris certitudinis nulla causa rationalis potest dari, quia non intrinseca ipsi Deo cum ipse intrinsece non mutetur, nec extrinseca, quia nulla res extrinseca quicquam causat in eo, sicut 15. et 16. ac 20. primi docent. Quapropter et Sapiens Ecclesiastici 23. Domino inquit, Deo antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita, sic et post perfectum respicit omnia; sic inquit, et non aliter. Vnde et Augustinus 15. de Trinit. 13. Nec, inquit, aliter scruit creata quam creanda: non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, ita vt scriptum est in libro Ecclesiastico, Antequam crearentur. omnia nota sunt ei, sic et postquam consummata sunt; sic inquit, non aliter. Qui et quinto super Gen. ad literam 18. Ipsi, inquit, Deo non audeo dicere alio modo\n\ninnotuisse cum ea fecisser, quam illo quo ea nouerat, vt faceret, apud quem non est commutatio nec momenti obumbratio. Quare et Petrus 1. sentent. dist. 35. Sciuit, inquit, Deus ab aeterno aeternum, et omne quod futurum erat, et sciuit. immutabiliter; scit quoque non minus praeterita vel futura, quam praesentia, et sua aeterna sapientia et immutabili scit ipse omnia quae sciuntur.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXI. He recalls the same hypothesis by way of the necessity and contingency of the divine intellect and knowledge.\n\nThe same hypothesis can likewise be argued against by way of the necessity and contingency of the divine intellect and knowledge. For before a thing's presence or its passing into the past, God knew contingently that it had always been going to be and would be. But in its presence, or in its passing, he knows necessarily that it had always been going to be, and that it is or was. Therefore he then knows otherwise, intrinsically, than he did before. This is against the premises argued above and against the authorities cited earlier. Nor can any rational cause be assigned for this new necessity in the divine knowledge, since the arguments about a new necessity in the divine willing or will forbid it, if they are suitably transferred to the divine knowledge, the fifteenth of the first prevailing and the sixteenth coming to its aid.[n1] Nor can such a necessity be posited without a rational cause, as was shown against the last response.\n\nAgain, suppose the divine knowledge is contingent to either alternative with respect to future things, and necessary with respect to present and past things. Then God knows present and past things more certainly, intrinsically, than future things; for the things known in the former way are more certain than the latter. For things that are necessarily of some sort are more certainly of that sort than things that are such only contingently, to either alternative: the former cannot fail to be of that sort, the latter can. God, therefore, knows present and past things more perfectly than future things. For to know something with certainty is more perfect than to know it with uncertainty. Hence God is changed intrinsically and made better anew, and he does not know future things with supreme certainty, nor with supreme perfection.\n\nFor this greater certainty also no rational cause can be given. It is not intrinsic to God, since he is not changed intrinsically; nor is it extrinsic, since no extrinsic thing causes anything in him, as the fifteenth, the sixteenth and the twentieth of the first teach. Therefore the Wise Man too says in Ecclesiasticus 23:[n2] \"To the Lord God, before they were created, all things were known; so also after they are complete he looks upon all things\"[n3]. \"So,\" he says, \"and not otherwise.\" Hence Augustine too, in On the Trinity 15, chapter 13:[n4] \"Nor did he know created things otherwise than things to be created; for nothing was added to his wisdom from them, as it is written in the book of Ecclesiasticus: 'Before they were created, all things are known to him; so also after they were completed.'\" \"So,\" he says, \"not otherwise.\" The same Augustine, in On Genesis according to the Letter 5, chapter 18, says: \"I do not dare to say that it became known to God itself in any other way when he had made them than in that by which he had known them in order to make them, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration.\" Hence Peter too, in the Sentences 1, distinction 35, says: \"God knew from eternity, eternally, and everything that was going to be, and he knew it immutably. He also knows past and future things no less than present ones, and by his eternal and immutable wisdom he himself knows all things that are known.\"", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "\"The fifteenth of the first … the sixteenth\" (and below \"the fifteenth, the sixteenth and the twentieth of the first\") are Bradwardine's own cross-references to Book I. They are left as written (Conventions §5.4) and not resolved here. The ablatives decimo quinto primi … decimo sexto succurrente are construed as absolute, giving the sense \"the first prevailing, the second helping\"."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Sir 23:29 (Vulgate). The \"Wise Man\" is the author of Ecclesiasticus (Sirach). The syntax of the quotation is dative: \"To the Lord God … all things were known.\" The Vulgate reads post perfectum, \"after [they are] complete\", which is the sense given."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The margin beside this passage has two separate entries, \"Ecclesiasticus.\" and \"Augustinus\", placed at different lines. The keyed text has only one marker, 755D·2, for both, and both are listed under it above."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Augustine, De Trinitate XV.13 (quoting Sir 23:29), and De Genesi ad litteram V.18 (the closing words echo Jas 1:17). The Augustine quotations are free and compressed, not verbatim. Peter Lombard, Sententiae I, d. 35, has the sense of the last sentence rather than its exact wording."}], "errata": [{"address": "755B", "keyed": "scientiae que", "print": "scientiaeque"}, {"address": "755C", "keyed": "cam semper suisse", "print": "eam semper fuisse"}, {"address": "755D", "keyed": "scruit", "print": "sciuit"}, {"address": "755D", "keyed": "755D·2 one margin entry (Ecclesiasticus. Augustinus)", "print": "two margin entries, at two different lines (Ecclesiasticus.; Augustinus)"}, {"address": "755E", "keyed": "fecisser", "print": "fecisset"}, {"address": "755E", "keyed": "et sciuit. immutabiliter", "print": "& sciuit immutabiliter"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p755B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/31/#p755B", "locator_display": "755B", "source_text": "CAP. XXXI. Reuocat eandem per viam necessitatis et contingentiae intellectus scientiaeque diuinae.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXI. He recalls the same hypothesis by way of the necessity and contingency of the divine intellect and knowledge.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p755B-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/31/#p755B-2", "locator_display": "755B–755C", "source_text": "COntra eandem quoque hypothesin potest similiter argui per viam necessitatis et contingentiae intellectus scientiae que diuinae. Nam ante\n\npraesentiam seu praeteritionem rei Deus contingenter sciuit cam semper suisse futuram et fore; sed in eius praesentia seu praeteritione necessario scit eam semper fuisse futuram, et esse vel fuisse; ergo tunc aliter intrinsece scit quam prius, quod est contra rationes praemissas, et contra autoritates superius memoratas. Nec aliqua rationalis causa huius necessitatis nouellae in diuina scientia poterit assignari, prohibentibus rationibus de necessitate nouella in volutione seu voluntate diuina, si ad diuinam scientiam congrue transferantur, decimo quinto primi, atque decimo sexto succurrente. Nec sine causa rationabili potest necessitas talis poni, sicut contra responsionem vltimam est ostensum. Item si diuina scientia respectu futurorum sit contingens ad vtrumlibet, et respectu praesentium et praeteritorum necessaria, Deus certius intrinsece scit praesentia et praeterita quam futura: haec enim scita certiora sunt illis. Illa namque, quae necessario sunt aliqualia, sunt certius", "english": "The same hypothesis can likewise be argued against by way of the necessity and contingency of the divine intellect and knowledge. For before a thing's presence or its passing into the past, God knew contingently that it had always been going to be and would be. But in its presence, or in its passing, he knows necessarily that it had always been going to be, and that it is or was. Therefore he then knows otherwise, intrinsically, than he did before. This is against the premises argued above and against the authorities cited earlier. Nor can any rational cause be assigned for this new necessity in the divine knowledge, since the arguments about a new necessity in the divine willing or will forbid it, if they are suitably transferred to the divine knowledge, the fifteenth of the first prevailing and the sixteenth coming to its aid.[n1] Nor can such a necessity be posited without a rational cause, as was shown against the last response.\n\nAgain, suppose the divine knowledge is contingent to either alternative with respect to future things, and necessary with respect to present and past things. Then God knows present and past things more certainly, intrinsically, than future things; for the things known in the former way are more certain than the latter. For things that are necessarily of some sort are more certainly of that sort than things that are such only contingently, to either alternative: the former cannot fail to be of that sort, the latter can. God, therefore, knows present and past things more perfectly than future things. For to know something with certainty is more perfect than to know it with uncertainty. Hence God is changed intrinsically and made better anew, and he does not know future things with supreme certainty, nor with supreme perfection.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p755D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/31/#p755D", "locator_display": "755D–755E", "source_text": "talia quam illa quae contingenter ad vtrumlibet tantum sunt talia: nam haec non possunt non esse talia, illa possunt; Deus ergo perfectius scit praesentia et praeterita, quam futura. Nam scire quid certe est perfectius, quam incerte; quare Deus intrinsece mutatur et melioratur de nouo; nec etiam scit futura summe certe, nec summe perfecte. Huius etiam maioris certitudinis nulla causa rationalis potest dari, quia non intrinseca ipsi Deo cum ipse intrinsece non mutetur, nec extrinseca, quia nulla res extrinseca quicquam causat in eo, sicut 15. et 16. ac 20. primi docent. Quapropter et Sapiens Ecclesiastici 23. Domino inquit, Deo antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita, sic et post perfectum respicit omnia; sic inquit, et non aliter. Vnde et Augustinus 15. de Trinit. 13. Nec, inquit, aliter scruit creata quam creanda: non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, ita vt scriptum est in libro Ecclesiastico, Antequam crearentur. omnia nota sunt ei, sic et postquam consummata sunt; sic inquit, non aliter. Qui et quinto super Gen. ad literam 18. Ipsi, inquit, Deo non audeo dicere alio modo\n\ninnotuisse cum ea fecisser, quam illo quo ea nouerat, vt faceret, apud quem non est commutatio nec momenti obumbratio. Quare et Petrus 1. sentent. dist. 35. Sciuit, inquit, Deus ab aeterno aeternum, et omne quod futurum erat, et sciuit. immutabiliter; scit quoque non minus praeterita vel futura, quam praesentia, et sua aeterna sapientia et immutabili scit ipse omnia quae sciuntur.", "english": "For this greater certainty also no rational cause can be given. It is not intrinsic to God, since he is not changed intrinsically; nor is it extrinsic, since no extrinsic thing causes anything in him, as the fifteenth, the sixteenth and the twentieth of the first teach. Therefore the Wise Man too says in Ecclesiasticus 23:[n2] \"To the Lord God, before they were created, all things were known; so also after they are complete he looks upon all things\"[n3]. \"So,\" he says, \"and not otherwise.\" Hence Augustine too, in On the Trinity 15, chapter 13:[n4] \"Nor did he know created things otherwise than things to be created; for nothing was added to his wisdom from them, as it is written in the book of Ecclesiasticus: 'Before they were created, all things are known to him; so also after they were completed.'\" \"So,\" he says, \"not otherwise.\" The same Augustine, in On Genesis according to the Letter 5, chapter 18, says: \"I do not dare to say that it became known to God itself in any other way when he had made them than in that by which he had known them in order to make them, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration.\" Hence Peter too, in the Sentences 1, distinction 35, says: \"God knew from eternity, eternally, and everything that was going to be, and he knew it immutably. He also knows past and future things no less than present ones, and by his eternal and immutable wisdom he himself knows all things that are known.\"", "margins": [{"id": "755D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) autem"}, {"id": "755D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Ecclesiasticus [Sirach]. Augustine."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}