{"id": "3/28", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 28", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "715C–725A", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXVIII. Recitat vnam glossam autoritatum erroneam.\n\nAD haec autem et maxime ad autoritates, quae de necessitate secundum causas superiores faciunt mentionem, communiter respondetur, quod loquuntur de necessitate consequentiae, non consequentis,\n\nseu de necessitate conditionali non absoluta, siue de necessitate dicti non rei, coniunctim non diuisim: et hoc videtur Boetius innuere vbi fuerat allegatus; et sic notat glossa decreti super autoritatem Boctij allegatam. Item Ansel. de Concor. 2. Cum dico, inquit, si praescit Deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurum, idem est ac si dicam, si erit, ex necessitate erit: et cum dico, Si erit, ex necessitate erit, idē valet, si sic pronuntietur, quod erit, ex necessitate erit. Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit, non poterit simul non esse: Haec vero est necessitas conditionalis, consequentiae siue dicti, at que coniunctim, non autem consequentis, vel rei, siue diuisim; et hanc solam concedit, aliam omnem negans, quod et infra expressius manifestar; quippe, inquiens, Non est idem rem esse praeteritā, et rem praeteritam esse praeteritam; aut rem esse praesentem, et rem praesentem esse praesentē; aut rem esse futuram, et rem futuram esse futuram; sicut non idem est rem esse albam, et rem albam esse albam,\n\nLignum enim non est semper necessitate album, sed aliquādo priusquam fieret album, potuit non fieri album, et postquam est album, potest fieri non album: lignū vero album semper necesse est esse album, quia nec antequam sit, nec postquam est album, fieri potest vt album simul non sit albū. Similiter res non de necessitate est praesens, quoniā antequā esset praesens, potuit fieri vt praesens non esset, et postquā est praesens, potest fieri non praesens: Rem autem praesentē necesse est esse praesentem semper, quia nec priusquā sit, nec postquam est praesens potest simul esse non praesens; codē modo res aliqua, vt quaedam actio, non necessitate futura est, quia priusquā sit fieri potest vt non sit futura; Rē vero futurā necesse est esse futuram, quia futurū nequit simul esse nō futurū: de praeterito autem similiter est verū, quia res aliqua nō est necessitate praeterita, quoniā antequā esset, potuit fieri vt no esset, et quia praeteritū sēper necesse est praeteritum esse, quoniam non potest simul non esse praeteritum, sed in re praeterita est quiddam\n\nquod non est in re praesenti vel futura. Nunquam enim fieri potest, vt res, quae praeterita est, fiat non praeterita, sicut res quaedam, quae praesens est, potest fieri non praesens, et aliqua res, quae non necessitate futura est, potest fieri vt non sit futura. Itaque cum dicitur futurum de futuro, necesse est esse quod dicitur, quia futurum nunquam est non futurum, sicut quoties idem dicimus de eodem. Cum enim dicimus, quia omnis homo est homo; aut si est homo, homo est; aut omne album est album, et si est album, album est, necesse est esse quod dicitur, quia non potest aliquid simul esse et non esse; quippe si non est necesse omne futurum esse futurum, quoddam futurum non est futurum, quod est impossibile: Necessitate ergo omne futurum, futurum est, et si est futurum, futurum est, cum futurum dicitur de futuro, sed necessitate sequente quae nihil esse cogit. Cum autem futurum dicitur de re, non semper res necessitate est, quamuis sit futura. Nam si dico, Cras seditio futura est in populo; non\n\ntamen necessitate erit seditio. Potest enim fieri autequam sit, vt non fiat, etiamsi sit futura. Idem quoque secundi Cut Deus homo 27. docet idem, vnde sic ait; Si dicitur, necesse erat vt voluntate sua moreretur, quia vera fuit fides, siue prophetia quae de hoc praecesserant; Non est aliud quam si dicas, necesse fuisse ita fururum esse, quoniam sic futurum erat: huiusmodi autem necessitas non cogit rem esse, sed esse rei facit necessitatē esse. Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa est vt sit res, et est necessitas sequens, quam res facit. Praecedens et efficiens necessitas est, cum dicitur coelum volui, quia necesse est vt voluatur; sequens vero, et quae nihil efficit, sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui quia loqueris. Cum enim hoc dico, significo nihil facere posse vt dum loqueris non loquaris, non quod aliquid te cogat ad loquendum: Nam violentia naturalis conditionis cogit coelum volui, te vero nulla necessitas facit loqui. Et infra, Hac sequenti, et nihil efficienti necessitate, quoniam vera fuit fides et prophetia de Christo, quia ex voluntate, non ex necessitate moriturus erat, necesse fuit vt sic esset; hac homo factus est, hac fecit, et passus est quaecunque fecit et passus\n\nest, hac voluit quaecunque voluit. Ideo enim necessitate fuerunt quia futura erant, et futura erant quia fuerunt, et fuerunt quia fuerunt. Sanctus quoque Thomas vbi proximo fuerat allegatus, statim post autoritatem eius praemissam subiungit; Vnde bona est distinctio, quod est necessarium necessitate consequentiae et non consequentis, vel necessitate conditionata non absoluta: et infra distinguit istam, Omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse, eo quod potest esse de dicto, et sic vera; vel de re, et sic falsa. Qui et primo contra Gentiles 67.83. et 85. istam distinctionem multo clarius et diffusius recitat et exponit, et secundum illam semper respondet in ista materia de futuris. Lumbardus etiam 1. sentent. dist. 38. et 40. secundum istam distinctionem in materia ista respondet, quem et pene omnes posteriores Doctores communiter imitantur. Sed ista responsio multipliciter deficit. Primo quia falsa; secundo, quia incauta; tertio quia diminuta. Primo, inquam, deficit, quia falsa. Falso namque exponit autoritates ponentes necessitatem omnium futurorum respectu causarum\n\nsuperiorum, seu causae primae, non autem respectu inferiorum, seu etiam secundarum, dicendo eas loqui tantummodo de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali. Non enim iste est intellectus Autorum, sed alius quem non tangit, quem capitulum proximiun exponebat. Si enim Autores in autoritatibus talibus tantummodo loquerentur de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali, ita haberent concedere quod futura necessario euenirent respectu causarum inferiorum et secundarum, sicut respectu superiorum et primae. Consequentia namque seu conditionalis in talibus respectu causarum secundarum ita est necessaria sicut respectu primae. Sicut enim haec consequentia seu conditionalis est necessaria, Deus praescit hoc esse futurum, seu faciet hoc futurum, vel si Deus praescit seu faciet hoc futurum, hoc erit; ita est ista, Causa secunda praescit hoc esse futurum, vel faciet hoc futurum, ergo hoc erit; et de conditionali similiter. Item omnis doctrina debet esse alicuius dubij aut ignoti; sed ista consequentia seu conditionalis nunquam fuit alicui dubia aut ignota, Deus, vel si Deus praescit\n\nhoc esse futurum, ergo hoc est futurum seu erit; quis ergo sapiens hoc scriberet vt doceret, cum non sit docibile, sed per se scibile a quocunque, supposita notitia terminorum? Item si Autores intelligerent tantum istud, nullo modo soluerent propositam quaestionem. Supposita namque et concessa necessitate consequentiae et conditionalis huiusmodi, quomodo per hanc soluitur per plexitas quaestionis? Quis enim tantum hac necessitate sibi ostensa, non tantum dubitabit de libero arbitrio, merito, et demerito, certitudine, fallibilitate, aut mutabilitate diuinae scientiae, et caeteris problema istud tangentibus, sicut prius maxime, quia nullus vnquam sani capitis de illa necessitate consequentiae dubitauit? Cur etiam tam multi Autores, tam multa, tam ambigua et tam difficilia de ista materia et ista necessitate scripserunt,\n\nsi nihil aliud intelligere voluerunt, cum in vno verbo breuissimo et leuissimo se porerant expedisse, dicendo. quod in omnibus talibus est necessitas consequentiae seu conditionalis tantummodo? Ad cundem quoque intellectum de necessitate haberent concedere quod Chimaera, et omnia non futura de necessitate euenient: nam ita necessaria est consequentia et conditionalis praemissa de eis, sicut de alijs. Nam necessario sequitur, Deus praescit, vel si Deus praescit, quod Chimaera, et omnia non futura euenient, ergo illa euenient. Nec potest aliquis respondere, quod in praeteritis et futuris ponitur antecedens inesse, in his autem non, et ideo non est similis necessitas hic et ibi, quia consequentia seu conditionalis ipsa per se in vere praescitis et futuris non ponit antecedens in esse, sicut nec in alia materia, seu alijs terminis quibuscunque, sed necessitatem consecutionis tantummodo, et sic facit alia consequentia seu conditionalis praemissa. Loquendo ergo praecise de sola necessitate\n\npraedicta, •milem oportet concedere de Chimaera, et omnibus non futuris nec praescitis, sicut de futuris et vere praescitis. Consequentia enim et conditionalis huiusmodi simili necessitate firmatur, sicut alia qualiscunque. Praeterea in ista consequentia, Deus praesci• Chimaeram fore, ergo Chimaera necessario erit, supponitur, et ponitur antecedens, sicut in ista, Deus praescit Antichristum fore, ergo Antichristus necessario erit, et necessitas consequentiae est aequalis, ergo simpliciter aequalis et similis est necessitas in ambabus. Nec sufficit dicere, quod antecedens in secunda est verum, et in prima falsum, et ideo non est necessitas similis hic et ibi. Falsitas enim antecedentis necessitatem consequentiae nullatenus minuit, nec veritas ipsam auget, sicut nullus Dialecticorum ignorat. Cum ergo necessitas consequentiae nullo modo veritatem antecedentis includat respiciendo ad solam necessitatem consequentiae, similis est necessitas in ambabus: et hanc solam in talibus\n\nponit ista responsio; quare habet ponere consequenter, quod sicut necesse est Antichristum fore, sic et Chimaeram. Textus quoque ac processus Autorum de ista necessitate loquentium, istam glossam velut vipeream, peremtoriam scilicet sui textus, non expositoriam, redarguunt et conuincunt. Causa namque, quam assignat Boetius vbi prius, quare futura contingentia sunt necessaria respectu cognitionis seu voluntatis diuinae, et non respectu causarum inferiorum, est ista, quia apud cognitionem diuinam sunt praesentia, et esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; sed apud causas inferiores non sunt praesentia, sed futura, et ideo apud eas, antequam sint, possunt non esse. Dicit eoim Boetius 5. de consolatione Philosophiae, prosa vlt. Quoniam omne iudicium secundum sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est autem Deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status, scientia quoque eius omnem temporis supergressa morionem, in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae, infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spacia complectens, omnia quasi\n\niam gerantur, in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praesentiam pensare velis, qua cuncta dignoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri, sed scientiam nunquam deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis; vnde non praeuidentia, sed prouidentia potius dicitur. Et infra nulla necessitas cogit incedere voluntate gradientem, quamuis eum, cum graditur, incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo, si quid prouidentia praesens vider, id esse necesse est, tametsi nullam naturae habeat necessitatem, atque Deus ea futura, quae ex arbitrij libertate proueniunt, praesentia contuetur. Haec ergo ad intuitum relata diuinum necessaria fiunt per conditionem seu dispositionem diuinae notionis. Et inferius cuidam obijcienti, et quaerenti ab eo, Quid igitur refert non esse necessaria, cum propter diuinae scientiae conditionem modis omnibus necessitatis instar eueniant? Quasi diceret, si sit ita, inter esse non necessaria vel necessaria nihil refert. Boetius sic respondet; Hoc refert, quod ea quae paulo ante proposui, Sol oriens, et gradiens homo, quae dum fiunt non fieri non possunt, eorum tamen vnum priusquam fieret, necesse erat existere, alterum\n\nvero minime: ita etiam quae presentia Deus habet, proculdubio existent, sed eorum hoc quidem dererum necessitate descendit, illud vero de potestate facientium. Haud igitur iniuria diximus, haec si ad diuinam notitiam referantur, necessaria; si per se considerentur, necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta. Quem in hac assignatione causae sequitur sanctus Thomas super 1. sentent. dist. 38. quaest. 5. Deus, inquiens, ab aeterno non solum vidit ordinem sui ad rem, ex cuius potestate res erat futura, sed ipsum esse rei intuebatur: quod qualiter sit, euidenter docet Boetius in libro de consolatione. Omnis enim cognitio est secundum modum cognoscentis; cum igitur Deus sit ab aeterno, oportet quod cognitio eius aeternitatis habeat modum, qui est totum esse simul sine succcssione: vnde sicut quamuis tempus sit successiuum, tamen eternitas est praesens omnibus temporibus vna et eadem indiuisibilis, vt nunc stans: ita cognitio sua intuetur omnia temporalia, quamuis sint succedentia, vt praesentia sibi, nec aliquid eorum est futurum respectu ipsius, sed vnum respectu alterius. Vnde secundum\n\nBoetium melius dicitur prouidentia, quam praeuidentia, quia non quasi futurum, sed omnia quasi praesentia vno intuitu prouidet, quasi ab aeternitatis specula: sed tamen potest dici praeuidentia in quantum cognoscit id quod futurum est nobis, non sibi. Et infra, Actus diuinae cognitionis transit supra contingens, et si futurum sit nobis sicut visus noster supra ipsum dum est; et quia esse quod est, quando est, necesse est, quod tamen absolute non est necessarium, ideo dicitur quod in se consideratum est contingens, relatum ad Dei cognitionem est necessarium, quia ad ipsam refertur, secundum quod est in esse actuali, et ideo omnino simile est, si ego viderem Socratem currere praesentialiter, quod quidem in se est contingens, sed relatum ad visum meum est necessarium. Et infra, Scitum a Deo potest sumi secundum conditionem qua subiacet diuinae scientiae, et hoc est, secundum quod habet esse terminatum,\n\net sic necessitatem habet: vel potest sumi sine illa conditione, vt scilicet est in causis suis, antequam sit in actu, et sic non habet necessitatem. Venerabilis quoque Anselmus De concord. 3. et 4. similem causam similis dicti reddit. Dicit enim quod omnia futura sunt necessaria et immutabilia in aeternitate, non necessaria, sed mutabilia in tempore antequam fiant; quia in aeternitate, inquit, non est praeteritum vel futurum, sed tantum praesens immutabile. Haec igitur est causa Autorum, quare omnia futura respectu causarum superiorum, scilicet cognitionis et voluntatis diuinae, sunt necessaria, quia esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; et omnia futura sunt ibi in praesentia et in actu; et quare respectu inferiorum causarum non sunt necessaria, quia ibi non sunt actualiter praesentia, sed futura. Quomodo ergo loquuntur de necessitate, cum dicunt, quia esse quod est, quando est, necesse est, vel de necessitate consequentiae siue dicti vel rei? vel an intelligunt totam propositionem in sensu coniuncto, vel diuiso? Si secundo modo intelligant, ergo cum ex illa causa interunt consequenter, quod omnia futura respectu superiorum causarum de necessitate euenient, similem necessitatem\n\nintelligent; non ergo solam necessitatem consequentiae seu conditionis, vt responsio ista fingit. Si autem intelligant primo modo secundum eundem intellectum, haberent concedere quod fore seu futurum esse quod erit, quando erit, necesse erit. Nam ita necessaria est ista consequentia, Si aliquid erit, ipsum erit; sicut ista, Si aliquid est, ipsum est; et ita necessaria est ista secundum eos de dicto, siue in sensu composito, sicut illa. Nam ita impossibile est quod aliquid simul sit futurum et non sit futurum, sicut quod aliquid simul praesentialiter sit et non sit, quod tamen non concedunt, sed negant, doctrinam Philosophi 1. peri hermenias vlt. imitantes, dicendo, quod Esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; futura vero antequam veniant, et hoc est, quando et dum sunt futura, non necessario euentura, sed posse nullatenus euenire. Praeterea quando Boetius assignando differentiam inter necessarium et non necessarium in autoritate praemissa, dicit quod Sol oriens, et gradiens homo dum fiunt, non fieri non possunt; eorum tamen vnum, scilicet primum, priusquam fieret, necesse erat existere,\n\nalterum vero minime, id est, hominem fieri gradientem, innuendo quod priusquam homo graderetur, possibile fuit ipsum non gradi, quomodo intelligit de necessario et possibili, vel simpliciter omnino, scilicet respectu quarumcunque causarum superiorum, et inferiorum similiter, vel secundum quid, respectu scilicet inferiorum naturalium que causarum? Non intelligit primo modo, quia secundum suam sententiam ante et post illam differentiam positam, sicut vnum eorum priusquam fieret, erat necessarium respectu primae causae, sic reliquum; et quia Deus aeque libere operatur ad extra quemcunque effectum, sicut 9. et 20. primi, 30. secundi, ac suppositio prima docent; Non est ergo magis necessarium respectu voluntatis diuinae volentis et facientis haec ambo, quod Sol oriatur, quam quod homo gradiatur, sicut et decimum primi probat; et quia dicit similiter, quod alterum illorum priusquam fieret, minime necessarium erat existere, quod non potest intelligi respectu primae causae, scilicet prouidentiae et cognitionis diuinae, quia secundum suam sententiam superius recitatam, omnia\n\nsunt ibi praesentia: oportet ergo quod intelligat de necessitate et possibilitate istorum secundo dictorum modorum, scilicet respectu naturalium et inferiorum causarum tantummodo respectu quarum solummodo talia dicuntur futura, quod et verba sua sequentia manifestant: nam immediate subiungit, Illa etiam, quae praesentia Deus habet, proculdubio existent, sed eorum hoc quidem de rerum necessitate descendit. Quarum rerum, nisi naturalium et inferiorum? Etaddit, illud vero de potestate facientium, de potestate, scilicet opposita necessitati praemissae, id est libera a necessitate inferiorum causarum: differentiae namque oppositorum oppositae debent esse. Haec igitur secundum eum est differentia inter necessaria, puta ortum Solis, et non necessaria sed libera, puta gressum hominis, quod illa sunt necessaria respectu inferiorum causarum, haec vero nequaquam, sed libera; ita quod secundum eum\n\nactus liberi arbitrij non dicuntur omnino et simpliciter liberi, quia non respectu quarumcunque causarum, quoniam respectu superiorum dicuntur necessarij, sed dicuntur liberi secundum quid tantum, scilicet respectu inferiorum causarum, sicut quintum et nonum huius ostendunt. Quare et post verba sua praeposita statim subdit, haud igitur iniuria diximus, haec si ad diuinam notitiam referantur, necessaria; si per se considerentur, necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta. Intelligit ergo Boetius in autoritatibus allegatis, quod omnia futura euenient de necessitate superiorum causarum, sicut capitulum proximum exponebat, non de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali tantummodo, sicut ista responsio somniauit: quod et adhuc aliud verbum eius ostendit. Hanc enim necessitatem secundum causas superiores concessurus, et aliam negaturus, praemisit, Fatebor, inquiens, rem solidissimae veritatis, sed cui vix aliquis nisi diuini ingenij speculator accesserit. Respondebo namque idem futurum, cum ad diuinam\n\nnotionem refettur, necessarium; cum vero in sua natura perpenditur, liberum prorsus atque abiolutum videri. Si tamen de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali tantummodo loqueretur, quis tamen asinini ingenij vt ad illam non facillime accesserit speculandam? Quis vnquam istam consequentiam seu conditionalem notis terminis non sciuit, Deus praescit hoc fore, vel si Deus praescit hoc fore, hoc erit? Et quis in literis Philosophicis, seu Theologicis ad limen saltem prouectus, aut etiam idiota omnipotentem Deum credens, istam consequentiam ignorauit, Deus prouidet et vult hoc esse, ergo hoc erit? Vel quis saltem ad istam consequentiam speculandam faciliter non accedat? Non ergo loquitur de necessitate consequent• seu conditionali tantummodo, sed alio capitulo proximo declarata. Et si quis ad istius necessitatis speculationem nequaquam accesserit, non imputet quaeso mihi, sed sui humani ingenii tarditati, togans humiliter et attente, quatenus diuini ingenij aliquod participium mereatur\n\naccipere, quo ipsam valeat speculati: necaestimet quispiam autoritatem Boetij contemnendam, cum sanctus Augustinus, Anselmus, et Thomas, alijque quamplures Doctores Catholici ipsum in ista materia imitentur. Erat namque magnus Philosophus et Doctor Catholicus, sicut libri sui Philosophici et Theologici manifestant, tandemque faelici martyrio coronatus, ascriptusque Sanctorum catalogo sub nomine Seuerini: habebat namque multa nomina more nobilium Romanorum, quae vt communiter librorum suorum initijs praescribuntur. Secundo ista responsio deficit vt incauta: non enim cauit necessitatem quam voluit et credidit praecauisse, nec tribuit nobis quam voluit et credidit liberam potestatem. Si enim ista consequentia est necessaria, Deus praescit aut praeuult quodcunque ergo illud erit, et antecedens non est in potestate nostra, sicut decimum quintum primi et octauum huius ostendunt; ergo nec consequens est in potestate nostra simpliciter libera et exclusoria necessitatis cuiuslibet praecedentis. Tertio deficit ista responsio, quia plutimum diminuta; quia licet aliquibus\n\npaucis autoritatibus apparenter vtcunque respondeat, rationibus tamen factis et quamplurimis autoritatibus alijs non respondet nec poterit respondere. Quomodo namque poterit respondere rationibus ibi factis, et specialiter syllogisticae rationi? Quomodo etiam respondebit Ecclesiastico, Augustino, Sibyllae, Domino nostro Christo, Chrysostomo, Paulo, Iob, Gregorio, Tobiae, Esaiae, Ieremiae, et Glossae? Vel quomodo pot•it respondere ad necessitatem fati diuini, et ad omnes autotitates ac Parisienses articulos illam probantes? Nullus enim ponens necessitatem fatalem, ponit eam esse necessitatem consequentiae, sed conditionalem tantummodo. Quoue colore poterit respondere ad autoritates Augustini 5. de ciuit. Dei, 9. et 10? Nunquam enim fuit aliquis Stoicorum tam stolidus, imo nec aliquis Laicorum tam Laicus, vt crederet omnem necessitatem consequentiae seu conditionalem libertati arbitrij repugnare. Quis enim tam rudis aut fatuus, qui ignoret necessitatem huius consequentiae et conditionalis, Si tu vis libere, tu vis libere, secum compati arbitrij libertatem? Cur ergo Augustinus redargueret Stoicos hanc ponentes, si ipsemet ibidem hanc eandem et aliam\n\nnullam ponat? Cur etiam frustra docet hanc necessitatem non adimere libertatem, cum nullus vnquam hominum hoc nesciuit? Quare haud dubie non istam necessitatem ibi volebat intelligi, sed aliam in capitulo proximo patefactam, quod et verba processus illius ostendunt. Loquens enim ibi de necessitate fati diuini, scilicet a fando dicti, exponit illud Psalmi, Semel loquutus est Deus, id est, immobiliter, hoc est, incommutabiliter loquutus est, sicut nouit incommutabiliter omnia quae futura sunt, et quae facturus est. Deinde repraehendit Stoicos, quia voluntates nostras necessitati huiusmodi subdere noluerunt, ne liberae tunc non essent; et distinguendo de necessitate, tollit eorum motiu•m, ostendens quod vna necessitas, scilicet inuita, quae contingit nobis nolentibus, puta necessitas moriendi, repugnat arbitrij libertati; et quod alia definitur necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse est vt ita sit aliquid, vel ita fiat, quae libertati arbitrij non repugnat. Ecce quam patenter istam necessitatem exprimit, et definit per respectum ad causam actiuam, sicut capitulum proximum\n\nexponebat: et haec est duplex, conseruatiua scilicet et factiua, sicut in secundo primi docetur. Pro conseruatiua dicit, necessitas, secundum quam dicimus, necesse est vt ita sit aliquid; et pro factiua subiungit, vel ita fiat, de necessitate vero consequentiae seu conditionali nullam penitus faciens mentionem. Quare non videtur quod de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali tantummodo velit loqui. quod et ratio exemplaris, per quam ostendit suum propositum, clare docet. Ostendit enim necessitatem praedictam, secundum quam scilicet dicimus, necesse est vt ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat, non esse timendam ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis, quia nec vitam et praescientiam Dei ponimus sub necessitate, scilicet primo modo, quae aufert vel minuit libertatem, si dicamus necesse esse Deum semper viuere, et cuncta praescire, sicut nec potestas eius minuitur, cum dicitur mori fallique non posse. In hac autem ratione nihil penitus loquitur nec intelligit de necessitate consequentiae, seu conditionali quacunque. Quomodo etiam per hanc necessitatem possunt exponi aliae autoritates ipsius de correptione\n\net gratia capitulo proximo memoratae? Illa quoque eius autoritas, De fide ad Petrum quomodo per istam glossam subtilem et logicam, et non nisi talibus agnitam exponetur? imo potius peruertetur, maxime cum ipse velit omnia dicta sua in illo libello intelligi ad vulgarem et vsitatum modum loquendi simplicium fidelium vel infidelium, rudium, indoctorum, vt nullus sensus posset eis surrepere haereticae falsitatis: vnde et in capite libri ait, Epistolam fili Petre tuae charitatis accepi, in qua significasti velle te Hierosolymam pergere, et poposcisti te literis nostris instrui, quam debeas in illis partibus verae; fidei regulam tenere, vt nullus tibi posset sensus hereticae subrepere falsitatis. Qui et in calcaneo libri dicit, Haec interim 40. capitula ad regulam verae fidei firmissime pertinentia fideliter crede, fortiter tene, veraciter patienterque defende; et si quem contraria his dogmatizare cognoueris, tanquam pestem fuge, et tanquam haereticum abijce. Ita enim ista, quae posuimus, fidei catholicae congruunt, vt si quis non solum omnibus, sed etiam singulis voluerit contraire, in eo quod singulis horum\n\ncontumaciter repugnat, et his qui contraria docere non dubitat, haereticus et fidei Christianae inimicus, atque ex hoc omnibus catholicis anathematizandus appareat. Quare et planissime affirmando et certissime asserendo, firmissime, inquit, tene, et nullatenus dubites ita esse. Item quomodo per hanc responsionem exponetur Anselmus, et specialiter de concor. 3. vbi dicit, Quae tempore praeterita sunt, ad similitudinem aeterni praesentis omnino immutabilia sunt? Hoc enim non potest exponi de immutabilitate consequentiae, conditionalis, seu dicti, sed rei, cum sit categorica vna pura. Cum etiam statim post dicit, quod quae sunt praesentia in aeternitate nunquam possunt non esse ibi praesentia, sed praesentia in tempore possunt non esse ibi praesentia, vel intelligit in sensu compositionis et de dicto, vel in sensu diuisionis et de re. Non primo modo, quia sic secunda pars est falsa; quoniam sicut ista non est possibilis, praesentia in aeternitate non sunt praesentia in aeternitate, sic nec ista, praesentia in tempore\n\nnon sunt praesentia in tempore: intelligit ergo secundo modo, sicut capitulum proximum, quod tam verba eius quam processus indicant euidenter. Pro motiuis autem huius responsionis sciendum, quod illa distinctio de necessitate consequentiae seu consequentis, conditionali vel absoluta, de dicto vel de re, est in casibus suis bona, sicut in ista et suis similibus, Si sim cras lecturus, necesse est cras me legere: Veruntamen rationes et autoritates praemissae capitulo proximo non possunt exponi rationabiliter, nec ad intellectum tantum per ipsam, sicut superius est ostensum. Primo autem pro dicto Boetij aduertendum quod multum congrue potuit exemplariter hoc dixisse. Videns enim quod esset multum difficile intellectu, quomodo aliquid esset necessarium respectu voluntatis et cognitionis diuinae, et liberum in sua natura, voluit hoc vtcunque ostendere per manifestum exemplum, vt sic per faciliora et notiora, ad difficiliora et ignotiora deduceret tardiores, sicut in omni disciplina Philosophica et Theologica est creber modus docendi, et vtilis per exempla; quare non immerito exemplum inter species argumenti a Logicis computatur. Volens igitur Boetius ostendere,\n\nquod aliqua futura essent necessaria respectu primae causae, et libera in sua natura, consulte dicebat; Duae sunt necessitates, simplex vna, veluti quod necesse est omnes homines esse mortales; altera conditionalis, vt si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare necesse est, vt sic puram necessitatem a futuris contingentibus deneger, et per secundam, in qua consequens est necessarium respectu antecedentis, et liberum in sua natura, ostendat vtcunque licet multum dispariter et remote, quod ita potest esse de libere futuris respectu primae causae. Ipsa enim est causa naturaliter antecedens, ex qua cuncta libera necessario consequuntur: necessario inquam respectu illius, non in sua natura, sicut capitulum proximum exponebat: quare et in toto processu sequente negat semper necessitatem naturae, et coactionis ab actibus liberis,\n\naliam vero, scil. secundum causas superiores nunquam: qd. tamen, vt videtur, aliquando fecisset, si eam nullatenus posuisset, Imo et hic et 4. prosa. 6. semper ipsam probat, expresse sustinet▪ et defendit, sicut testatur totus eius processus, et specialiter autoritates cap. proximo recitatae. Secundo dico pro intellectu Boetij et omnium aliorum, qui dicunt expresse qd. in talibus est necessitas conditionalis, consequentiae, dicti, siue coniunctim, non autem consequentis, rei, siue diuisim; quod hoc est verum ad duplicem intellectum. Primo, quia secundum ipsos in omni tali conditionali, consequentia, dicto, et enuntiatione composita est necessitas absoluta; in consequente vero, vel re, siue enuntiatione diuisa nequaquam. Secundo, ad communem et vsitatum modum loquendi: sic enim consequentia est necessaria apud omnes, sed consequens non est ita. Necessitas nam que et libertas consequentiū talium secundū cōmuniorem et vsitatiorem modsi loquendi, tantum secundum causas inferiores attenditur, de quibus\n\ntam vulgates quam scientiarum ferme omnium professores considerant plurimum et loquuntur, sicut 5. et proximum huius docent. Tertio, pro intellectu Boetij, quia solent Philosophi pauca verba multis sententijs onetare, dicente Ouid. 3. de vetula, pauca loquuti, Multa subesse suis voluerunt pondera verbis, credo quod per necessitatem conditionis, praeter necessitatē conditionalem praedictam, voluit intelligere cum Anselmo necessitatem concomitantē siue sequentem, quae consurgit quodammodo ex positione rei praesentis in esse, et ipsam necessario comitatur, et sequitur dum est praesens; qua secundum Philosophos, et Theologos, et secundum omnes communiter dicitur, quod Omne qd. est, quando est, necesse est esse, sicut 2. huius plenius docebatur; qui ideo sic rationabiliter intelligete potuit, quoniam sicut in conditionali ex antecedenti necessario sequitur consequens, sic et in rebus ex quacun que re posita praesentialiter iam in esse, velut ex causa antecedēte secundū naturā, vel saltē includente causā anteced. secundum naturam, necessario realiter sequitur velut inseperabile, consequens secundū naturam, quia posterior naturaliter necesitas quaedam talis. De hoc tamen sicut de alijs omnibus\n\npossunt Sophistae sophistice altercari, quaerendo quae sit illa sequens necessitas quae omnē rem necessario sequitur, et quod magis videtur mirabile, omnem non rem. Sicut enim esse qd. est, quando est, necesse est; sic et non esse, qd. non est, quando non est . Haec autē necessitas non potest causari nec descēdere a non ente. Ad haec autē et his similia respōdebūt 13. et 14. 1. lib. Si autem 1. necessitatē, scil. conditionalē, intelligere voluit, bene quidem: 2. autē, scil. necessitatē consequētē siue sequentē, credo firmiter ipsu intelligere voluisse, qd. tam sententia eius, quā verba indicant euidenter. Causa nam que huius necessitatis secundum ipsum est ista, quia res futurae apud diuinam notitiam seu prouidentiam sunt praesentes; et omne qd. praesentialiter est, dum praesentialiter est, necesse est esse, sicut superius est ostensum. Quare et euidenter ostendens qd. per conditionē nequaquā conditionalē intelligit, sed dispositionē, seu statū vel modū praesentialem siue praesentaneum diuinae notitiae, ita dicit; Nulla necessitas cogit incedere voluntate gradientem, quamuis cum, cum graditur, incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo\n\nsi quid prouidentia praesens videt, id esse necesse est, tamet si nullam naturae habeat necessitatē: atqui Deus ea futura, quae ex arbitrij libertate proueniūt, praesentia contuetur; haec igitur ad intuitum relata diuinum, necessaria fiunt per conditionē diuinae notionis. Vnde Rob. Lincoln. de lib. arbit. 3. super senes intelligens, et materiam •stam profundissime inuestigans etiam vs que ad fundamentum in ea, Duplex, inquit, est necessitas, sicut distinguit Anselm. in lib. 2. Cur D•us homo cap. 17. vna, quam vocat necessitatem praeced, quae est causa vt sit res, et cogit rem esse: Alia, quam vocat necessitatem sequentem, quae non est causa rei, nec cogit rem esse: et haec, vt ipse dicit, est illa necessitas vbi tractat Aristot. de proposition. singular. et futur. Videtur vtrū libet destruere, et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere, et hac sequēti et nihil efficiēti necessitate, necessarium est Deum scire meam sessionem cras futuram, et similia. Ex necessari•s hac sequente necessitate nullum inconueniens, imo magis necessarium videtur sequi contingens: dū\n\nenim sedeo, necesse est me sedere, et postquam sedi, necesse est me sedisse. Sed quam comparationem habent haec dicta, me sedere, et me sedisse ad meā sesionē dū sedeo, et postquam sed•; eandem comparationē habet scientia Dei ad meā sesionē futurā antequā sedeā; ipse enim scit futura tanquā praesentia. Etinfra has duas necessitates, ex quarū altera non sequitur nisi necessariū, ex reliqua vero, vt dictum est, videtur sequi contingens. Puto Boetiū vocasse necessitatem simplicē et necessitatē conditionis, licet aliqui necessitatē cōditionis intelligāt nō illam, quae supra dicta est necessitas sequens, sed necessitatē cōsequutionis cōsequētis ad anteced. vt puta cū dicitur, Si homo currit, mouet pedes; hic est necessitas cōsecutionis cōseq. ad anteced. licet vtrū que scil. tam cōsequens quā antecedens sit contingens et addit, Ex verbis autē ipsius Boetii interius cōsideratis melius perpendi potest ipsū vocasse necessitatem cōditionis quā supra necessitatē sequentē dicebamus. Ait nam que idē futurū cū ad diuinā notionē refertur, necessariū; cū vero in sui natura perpēditur, liberū prorsus at que absolutū videri, et post pauca: atqui Deus ea futura, quae ex arbitrij libertate proueniunt, praesentia contuetur; haec igitur ad intuitum relata\n\ndiuinum necessaria fiunt per conditionem diuinae notionis, per se autem considerata absoluta naturae suae libertatem non deserunt. Et iterum, haec si ad diuinam notitiam referantur, necessaria; si per se considerentur, necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta. Quid autem aliud sapiunt haec verba, nisi, ea quae in sui natura sunt ad vtrumlibet contingentia flexibilia et mutabilia in Dei notitia esse inuatiabilia, non propter rerum inua•iabilitatem, sed propter scientiae Dei immutabilitatem? Adhuc autem pro intellectu Boetij est sciendum, quod per necessitatem conditionis seu conditionalem potuit rationabiliter intelligere necessitatem consecutiuā inter causam non impedibilem et suum causatum, quia sicut in conditionali verbali ex antecedenti verbali necessario verbaliter sequitur consequens suum verbale; sic et in conditione seu colligatione reali causae non impedibilis et causati, ex causa, quae naturaliter antecedit, velut ex antecedenti reali, necessario realiter sequitur, quia posterius naturaliter suū causatum, qd. est consequens suum reale, et haec est necessitas respectiua, respectu scil. superiorum et inferiorum causarum,\n\nquarum 1. concedit in actibus liberis, 2. vero negat, sicut superius est ostensum. Hunc autem ideo verisimiliter arbitror esse intellectum Autorum, qui dicunt qd. quicquid, vel si quid Deus vult, praescit, aut prouidet, de necessitate eueniet, quia secundum eos Dei voluntas, praescientia, siue scientia et prouidentia sunt causae rerum, et causae non impedibiles, sed efficaces omnino et necessariae in causando, sicut 9. et 15.27. et sequentia cum 10.1. docent. Glossa veto Decre•i potuit intelligi iuxta secundum intellectum Boetij supradictum; potuit tamen glossa exposuisse propinquius textum suum per necessitatem sequentem, siue per necessitatem consecutiuam causarum superiorum, sicut praerert superficies literae, sicut et praemissa exponunt. Sed fortassis quia illa expositio fuisset difficilior nimiū et multū diffusior, ipsam sub silentio transiens, faciliorē et breuiorē elegit, non praeiudicans meliori. Veruntamen si quis huic glossae pertinaciter innitatur, caueat sibi, quaeso, ne forte innitatur baculo arundineo, qui intret et perforet\n\nmanum eius. Ecce nam que quid dicit in fine; Haec, inquit, est duplex. Necessarium est hoc\n\neuenire qd. Deus praeuidit: de dicto est vera, de re est falsa. Istud enim, qd. Deus praeuidit, non est necesse euenire. Et nota, qd. haec argumentatio non valet, Si Deus praeuidit aliquid, necessario illud eueniet; ergo si Deus praeuidit aliquid, necessarium est illud euenire, quia modo haec dictio, necessarium, non potest determinare illam consequentiam, sed tantū consequens. Vult igitur ista glossa negare omnia talia, illud qd. Deus praescit aut praesciuit, prouidet aut prouidit, vult aut voluit aliquid necesse seu necessarium est illud euenire, quia necessitas secundū ipsam in omnibus talibus refertur non ad consequentiam, sed ad consequēns, non ad dictū, sed ad rē tantū. Sed ecce quam diligenter respexit textū Boetij et Decreti, quē glossando exponit, Si quid, inquit textus amborū, prouidentia praesens videt, id necesse est esse, siue id esse necesse est. Ecce similiter quam diligenter respexit verba Scripturae canonicae et Doctorū. Nam Luc. vlt. veritas ipsa dicit, Necesse est impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege Mosis et Propheus, et Psalmis\n\nde me: et Mat. 18. Necesse est vt veniant scandala; qd. et Luc. 17. aequipollenter exponens, Impossibile est, inquit, vt non veniant scandala. Aug. etiam 3. de libero arbitrio 11. Tantum, inquit, abest a vero, quod Creatori deputanda existimantur peccata creaturae, quāuis necesse fiant, quae ipse futura praesciuit, vt cum dixeris non te inuenire, quomodo non ei deputetur quicquid in eius creatura fieri necesse est; ego contra non inueniā modū, nec inueniri posse, atque omnino nō esse confirmē, quo ei deputetur quicquid in eius creatura ita fieri necesse est, vt voluntate peccantiū fiat. Simile quo que sentētiā cum simili modo loquendi proferunt autoritates eius quamplurimae cap. proximo allegatae; Dicit que Anselm. de concord. 2. Quod Deus praescit futurū, necesse est esse futurū; et infra; Si praescit Deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurū: qui et 2. cur Deus homo. 17. Nihil, inquit, est necessariū aut impossibile, nisi quia ipsa vult: In Meditatione quo que sua de redemtione humana sic ait, Anima Christiana, anima de graui morte resuscitata; omnis necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacet voluntati, quippe qd. vult, necesse est esse, et qd. non vult, impossibile est esse. Similē quo que sententiā similiter proferunt\n\nmulti docti. Pro intellectu vero Anselmi sciendū, qd. secundū suā sententiā duplex est necessitas, scil. praecedens et sequens, et vtra que istarū triplex. Praecedens autē necessitas secūdū eum est causa actiua indefectibilis in agēdo, quā scil. positā necessario sequitur suus effectus: et haec duplex, quia quaedā cōpatiens libertatē, quaedā vero perimens libertatē: et haec duplex: quaedā enim est talis necessitas naturalis, quaedam vero est talis necessitas violenta. Hi autem tres modi ex secundo huius et decimo sunt satis noti; qui et 2. de concord. possunt elici manifeste, vbi et in rebus liberi arbitrij primum istorum concedit, sicut cap. proximum recitauit, et alios duos negat. Necessitas quo que sequēs est duplex; vna dictionalis, siue cōsequētialis et cōplexa; altera vero realis et incomplexa. Necessitas autem sequens dictionalis seu consequentialis et complex a est necessitas alicuius dicti et enuntiationis compositae, seu coniunctum scil. in sensu\n\ncompositionis, vel necessitas conditionalis aut consequentiae: et haec secundum Logicam Anselmi De concord. 2. est tanta necessitas, quod eius oppositum contradictionem formaliter implicat et inuoluit, sicut eius autoritas allegata indicat euidenter: Quare et habet consequenter concedere, quod talis est necessitas penitus absoluta; in re vero et in consequente non est necessitas absoluta, sicut in secunda expositione Boetij fuit dictum. Veruntamen secundum probabilem Logicam Modernotum Oxoniae, non omnes illae propositiones necessariae reputantur, in quibus idem dicitur de eodem, sicut supponit Anselmus, et antiquiores Doctores. Haec enim non esset necessaria, nec vera, sed falsa, nullo homine existente, Homo est homo; sequitur enim, homo est homo, ergo homo est animal rationale; hoc enim est de per se intellectu illius; ergo homo est animal; ergo animal est homo; cum tamen nullo homine existente, sed animalibus alijs, sicut ante creationem Adae fuit, omne animal esset\n\nirrationale et non homo; et nullum animal esset rationale nec homo. Ad hoc autem quod solent obijcere, ergo quidem homo non est homo, dupliciter respondetur. Quidam enim simpliciter hanc concedunt, et si arguatur vlterius, ergo aliquid est homo, et illud non est homo, consequentiam illam negant, quia antecedens est simpliciter negatiuum, nec quicquam ponit vel implicat, sicut dicunt, sicut nec ista, Chymaera non est animal, vel non est homo. Alij vero negantes hanc, Homo est homo, concedunt contradictoriam eius talem; Non homo, vel nullus homo est homo, et ita semper praeponendo negationem, contradictoriam dicunt dandam; aequipollentias vero Philosophi dicunt semper tenere, nisi aliquid speciale impediat et repugnet. Sed quia ista magis ad Logicos, quam ad Theologicos pertinent, sufficiat isto loco haec breuiter tetigisse. Necessitas vero sequens realis et incomplexa est duplex: quaedam est enim praesentialis, quaedam autem causalis seu effectualis, vt quam propinquius potero, licet aliquantulum transumtiue, nomina eis imponam: Sequens autem necessitas\n\nrealis et praesentialis a re praesente siue a praesentia dici potest. Haec enim omnem rem praesentem necessario sequitur isto modo, quod omne quod est, quando est, hac necessitate necesse est esse, sicut in tertia expositione Boetij dicebatur. Pro hac autem sententia dicit Anselmus 2. de concord. isto modo, quia ponitur res esse, dicitur ex necessitate esse; aut quia ponitur non esse, affirmatur non esse ex necessitate: Et infra, Quod vult libera voluntas, et potest, et non potest non velle, et necesse est eam velle. Potest namque non velle antequam velit, quia libera est; et cum iam vult, non potest non velle, sed cam velle necesse est, quoniam impossibile est illi idipsum simul et velle et non velle. Et sequitur, Opus vero voluntatis cui datum est, vt quod vult, sit, bifariam est necessarium; quia voluntate cogitur fieri, et quod sit non potest simul non fieri. Qui et infra 3. dicit futura esse necessaria in aeternitate et apud Deum, cuius causam assignat, quia ibi\n\nsunt praesentia non futura, sicut superius est ostensum. Idemque 2. Cur Deus homo 17. Esse, inquit, rei facit necessitatem esse. Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa est vt sit res, et est necessitas sequens quam res facit. Praecedens et efficiens necessitas est, cum dicitur Coelum volui, quia necesse est vt voluatur; sequens vero et quae nihil efficit, sed sit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris. Haec autem sequens necessitas non potest tantum exponi per necessitatem dictionalem seu consequentialem, quoniam siue res sit, siue non sit, siue loquaris, siue non loquaris, secundum eius sententiam 2. de concordant. superius recitatam, hoc dictum semper est necessarium de re quacunque; talis res est talis res, et tu loquens loqueris; et consequentia ista similiter, Si talis res est, talis res est; et si tu loqueris, tu loqueris. Haec ergo non est illa sequens necessitas, quam dicit factam a rebus, sed illa realis necessitas supradicta, quae necessario sequitur ex re omni. Hoc etiam verba sua sequentia contestari videntur, Haec est, inquit, illa necessitas, quae, vbi tractat Aristoteles de propositionibus singularibus et futuris,\n\nvidetur vtrumlibet destruere, et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere. Sed 1. peri hermenias vlt. vbi Aristot. ista tractat, non apparet poni aliqua talis necessitas quae possit videri vtrumlibet destruere, et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere, nisi necessitas realis et praesentialis praedicta, quae affirmat, quod omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse; et similiter de eo quod non est: vnde sic ait, Esse quod est, quando est, et non esse quod non est, quando non est, necesse est. Hunc quo que intellectum Anselmi de necessitate sequente testatur autoritas Roberti Lincoln superius recitata, in qua primo allegat duplicem necessitatem ab eo; praecedentem scil. et sequentem: et infra ostendit, quod necessitas conditionis, quam Boetius asserit, non est necessitas consecutionis, sed necessitas sequens quam praedixit, necessitas scil. praesentialis, sicut in 3. expos. Boetij est ostensum: necessitas vero sequens, causalis, seu effectualis, potest dici a causa vel ab effectu; et videtur esse illa necessitas consecutiua inter causam non impedibilem et suum effectum, in 4. expositione Boetij supradicta, propter rationem et causam ibi similiter\n\nassignatam; et hunc intellectum satis attestari videntur Autoritates Anselmi cap. proximo allegatae. Et si quis obijciat, quod tunc eadem esset necessitas antecedens et consequens; dicendum, hoc esse satis possibile, imo et necessarium diuersis respectibus rationibusque diuersis. Necessitas tamen praecedens proprie et stricte accepta tantum est causa siue in causa indefectibili in causando, de qua secundo huius est dictum, et haec correspondet antecedenti logicali in consequentia logicali: necessitas vero sequens, realis, causalis, seu effectualis dupliciter potest sumi; vno modo, vt sit tantum effectus, seu in effectu huiusmodi causae non impedibilis in causando, et correspondet necessitati praecedenti praedictae, sicut effectus efficienti, et passum agenti; et haec assimilatur consequenti logicali in consequentia logicali: alto modo, vt quodammodo complectatur vtramque, vt videlicet sit necessitas consecutiua, siue\n\nconsecutio, seu consequentia ipsa realis inter causam huiusmodi et suum causatum, sicut consecutio, seu consequentia logicalis non est in solo antecedente vel consequente, sed vtrumlibet complectitur, et est quaedam habitudo media inter illa; et haec necessitas sequens realis correspondet toti consequentiae necessariae logicali. Veruntamen est sciendum, quod necessitas antecedens siue praecedens habet duplicem intellectum. Nam vno modo accipitur, sicut hic est dictum, et sicut secundum huius eam definit, alio modo pro necessitate simpliciter et penitus absoluta; haec enim omnem aliam necessitatem naturaliter antecedit; vel pro necessitate naturali effectus naturaliter necessarios praecedente; quod et videtur innuere Robertus Lincolniensis de libero arbitrio 3. vbi ait, Ex necessario secundum Boetij sententiam sequi videtur contingens, non tamen ex necessario absoluto siue antecedente, quod cogit rem esse, sed ex necessario conditionis et sequente, quod permittit rei liberum esse. Qui et infra 10. necessitatem antecedentem et simplicem reputat pro eadem; Qui etiam in quadam quaestionum\n\nsuarum de scientia Dei quaerente, Qualiter Deus scit ea quae contingunt a casu, vel ex libera voluntate, distincta duplici causa, scilicet antecedente et coniuncta, definiendo causam antecedentem; Est, inquit, causa antecedens, scilicet praeordinans, vt secundum cursum naturae eueniat aliqua res de necessitate, vt eclipsis Solis et Lunae; et infra, responso, quod Deus non est causa antecedens huiusmodi effectuum, sed coniuncta, vnam obiectionem possibilem fieri remouendo, subiungit; Facere Dei et eius scire idem est; et non sequitur, Scientia Dei, quae est causa rei, est aeterna, ergo est antecedens; antecedentia enim, de qua fit hic sermo, est euentus futuri secundum cursum naturae necessaria praeordinatio. Hoc etiam videtur consonare verbis et menti Anselmi de concor. et 2. Cur Deus homo. vbi fuerat allegatus. De concordia namque 2. negans necessitatem antecedentem in actibus liberis, in ortu Solis eam concedit. Et 2. Cur Deus homo. 17. negans similiter necessitatem antecedentem a rebus liberi arbitrij, concedit eam in volubili motu Coeli. Nam violentia, sicut dicit, naturalis conditionis cogit coelum volui. Intellectus etiam sancti Thomae ex praemissis potest elici manifeste:\n\nconcedit enim necessitatem dicti, non rei, necessitatem consequentiae, conditionis, et ex suppositione aliam vero negat. Necessitas namque conditionis, et ex suppositione ad modum suum loquendi, et ad communem modum loquendi Doctorum Parisiensium dupliciter potest exponi. Quaedam namque est dictionalis et complexa; quaedam vero realis et incomplexa: et haec duplex, quaedam praesentialis, quaedam autem consecutiua, causalis, seu effectualis, sicut de necessitate sequente Anselmi superius est distinctum. Consequentia nam que atque consecutio est duplex, dictionalis seu logicalis, et realis: et haec duplex, praesentialis et causalis seu effectualis, propter rationem et causam in expositione Boetij et Anselmi superius assignatam. Concedit igitur S. Tho. necessitatem dicti et consequentiae pro necessitate simpliciter absoluta, secundum logicam Anselmi et antiquorum Doctorū superius recitatam. Necessitatem vero rei et consequentis negat ad similem intellectum; quod et verba sua indicant manifeste; Bona, inquit, est distinctio, quod est necessarium necessitate consequentiae et non\n\nnecessitate consequentis; vel necessitate conditionata non absoluta, sicut erat superius allegatum. Qui et 1. contra Gentiles 67. loquens de huiusmodi necessario, Hoc, inquit, non est necessarium absolute, sed sub conditione, et necessitate consequentiae. Et infra 83. Licet Deus circa causata nihil necessario velit absolute, vult tamen aliquid necessario ex conditione, vel ex suppositione. Et infra 85. Necessitas ex suppositione in causa non potest concludere necessitatem absolutam in effectu; Deus autem vult aliquid in creatura non necessitate absoluta, sed solum necessitate, quae est ex suppositione: ex voluntate igitur diuina non potest concludi in rebus creatis necessitas absoluta; haec autem sola excludit contingentiā. Vult ergo S. Tho. tantū negare necessitatē absolutā cōtingētiā excludētē. Necessitatē antē cōsequētiae, conditionis, et suppositionis realē, praesentialē concedit, sicut in assignatione causae necessitatis, quā ponit,\n\nreci•ata superius clare patet. Necessitatem quo que consequentiae, conditionis, et suppositionis realem, causalem, seu effectualem innuit et affirmat, si sententia eius et verba intime perserutentur, quod et euidenter ostendit causa in 4a. expositione Boetij superius assignata. Aliter autem et breuius potest dici, quod necessitas secundum eum don dicitur secundum causas superiores, sed inferiores tantummodo, sicut cap. proximum recitauit. Quando ergo negat necessitatem abactibus liberis, intelligit de necessitate respectu inferiorū causarum, sicut et cap. proximum allegauit. Secundum has quoque expositiones praemissas, aliquamue illarum intelligi potest Lumbardus caeteri que Doctores distinctiones huiusmodi facientes.", "english": "Chapter 28. It recites one erroneous gloss on the authorities.\n\nTo this, and above all to the authorities that make mention of necessity in respect of the superior causes, the common reply is that they speak of the necessity of the consequence, not of the consequent, or of conditional, not absolute, necessity, or of the necessity of the dictum, not of the thing, taken conjointly, not separately. Boethius seems to hint at this where he was cited, and the gloss on the Decretum so notes on the cited authority of Boethius.[n1] So too Anselm, On Concord 2: \"When I say,\" he says, \"if God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future, it is the same as if I were to say, if it will be, it will be of necessity; and when I say, If it will be, it will be of necessity, it means the same if it is pronounced thus: what will be, will be of necessity. For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will be cannot at the same time not be. But this is conditional necessity, of the consequence or of the dictum, and conjoint, not however of the consequent or of the thing, nor divided.\" He concedes this alone and denies every other, as he also makes plainer below; for he says, \"It is not the same for a thing to be past, and for a past thing to be past; or for a thing to be present, and for a present thing to be present; or for a thing to be future, and for a future thing to be future; just as it is not the same for a thing to be white, and for a white thing to be white.\"\n\n\"For wood is not always white of necessity, but sometimes, before it became white, it could have failed to become white, and after it is white it can become not white; but white wood is always necessarily white, because neither before it is white nor after it is white can it come about that the white is at the same time not white. Likewise a thing is not present of necessity, since before it was present it could have come about that it would not be present, and after it is present it can become not present; but a present thing is necessarily present always, because neither before it is nor after it is present can it be at the same time not present. In the same way some thing, an action for instance, is not future of necessity, since before it is, it can come about that it is not future; but a future thing is necessarily future, because the future cannot at the same time be not future. Of the past the same is likewise true: a thing is not past of necessity, since before it was it could have come about that it would not be; but it is always necessary that the past be past, since it cannot at the same time not be past; and in a past thing there is something which is not in a present or future thing. For it can never come about that a thing which is past becomes not past, whereas a certain thing that is present can become not present, and something that is not future of necessity can come about as not future. So when the future is said of the future, what is said must be so, because the future is never not future, just as whenever we say the same of the same. For when we say, 'every man is a man,' or 'if he is a man, he is a man,' or 'every white thing is white, and if it is white, it is white,' what is said must be so, because something cannot at the same time be and not be; for if it is not necessary that every future thing be future, some future thing is not future, which is impossible. By necessity, then, every future thing is future, and if it is future, it is future, when the future is said of the future; but this is by a following necessity, which compels nothing to be. When, however, the future is said of a thing, the thing is not always of necessity, though it be future. For if I say, 'Tomorrow there will be a riot among the people,' there will not for all that be a riot of necessity. For it can come about, before it is, that it does not happen, even if it is future.\"\n\nThe same writer, in the second book of Why God Became Man, 27,[n2] teaches the same, and says: \"If it is said, 'It was necessary that he die by his own will, because the faith or prophecy that had gone before concerning this was true,' it is nothing other than if you were to say that it was necessary that it be going to be so, since it was going to be so; but a necessity of this kind does not compel a thing to be, but makes the being of the thing be necessary. For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing is, and there is a following necessity, which the thing makes. A preceding and effecting necessity is that by which it is said that the heavens revolve because it is necessary that they revolve; a following one, which effects nothing but comes to be, is that by which I say that you speak of necessity because you are speaking. For when I say this, I signify that nothing can bring it about that, while you are speaking, you are not speaking, not that anything compels you to speak: for the violence of a natural condition compels the heavens to revolve, but no necessity makes you speak.\" And below: \"By this following necessity, which effects nothing, since the faith and prophecy about Christ were true, because he was to die by will, not of necessity, it was necessary that it be so; by this the man was made, by this he did, and suffered, whatever he did and suffered,\n\nby this he willed whatever he willed. For they were of necessity because they were going to be, and they were going to be because they were, and they were because they were.\"\n\nSaint Thomas also, where he had last been cited, adds immediately after his authority set out above: \"Hence the distinction is good, that something is necessary by necessity of the consequence and not of the consequent, or by conditioned, not absolute, necessity\"; and below he distinguishes thus: \"Everything known by God is necessarily so, because it can be taken of the dictum, and so it is true; or of the thing, and so it is false.\" In Against the Gentiles 1, 67, 83 and 85, he recites and expounds this distinction much more clearly and at greater length, and according to it he always answers in this matter of futures. Lombard also, in Sentences 1, dist. 38 and 40, answers in this matter according to this distinction, and almost all later Doctors commonly imitate him. But this reply fails in many ways: first because it is false; second because it is incautious; third because it is incomplete. First, I say, it fails because it is false. For it falsely expounds the authorities that posit the necessity of all futures in respect of the superior causes, or the first cause, but not in respect of the inferior, or even secondary, causes, by saying that they speak only of necessity of consequence, or conditional necessity. For this is not the Authors' meaning, but another, which it does not touch, and which the preceding chapter expounded. For if the Authors in such authorities were speaking only of necessity of consequence or conditional necessity, they would have to concede that futures come about necessarily in respect of inferior and secondary causes just as in respect of the superior and first. For the consequence or conditional in such cases is as necessary in respect of secondary causes as in respect of the first. For just as this consequence or conditional is necessary, \"God foreknows that this will be, or will make this be, or: if God foreknows or will make this be, this will be,\" so is this one, \"A secondary cause foreknows that this will be, or will make this be, therefore this will be\"; and likewise of the conditional. Moreover all teaching ought to concern something doubtful or unknown; but this consequence or conditional was never doubtful or unknown to anyone, \"God, or: if God foreknows\n\nthat this will be,[n3] therefore this is future, or will be\"; what wise man, then, would write this in order to teach it, since it is not teachable but knowable per se by anyone, the meaning of the terms being supposed? Again, if the Authors understood only this, they would in no way resolve the question proposed. For with the necessity of consequence and conditional of this kind supposed and conceded, how is the perplexity of the question resolved by it? For who, with only this necessity shown to him, will not be as much in doubt as before about free choice, merit and demerit, the certainty, fallibility or mutability of divine knowledge, and the other matters touching this problem, and especially since no one of sound mind ever doubted that necessity of consequence? Why also have so many Authors written so much, and so ambiguous and so difficult, on this matter and this necessity, if they wished to understand nothing else, when they could have disposed of it in one very short and very light word, saying that in all such cases there is only a necessity of consequence or of the conditional? By the same understanding of necessity they would have to concede that the Chimera, and all things that are not future, will come about of necessity: for the consequence and conditional laid down about them is as necessary as about the rest. For it follows necessarily, \"God foreknows, or: if God foreknows, that the Chimera and all non-futures will come about, therefore they will come about.\" Nor can anyone reply that in past and future things the antecedent is posited as being the case, but not in these, and that therefore the necessity is not alike here and there, because the consequence or conditional itself, per se, does not posit the antecedent as being the case in truly foreknown and future things, any more than in any other matter or any other terms whatever, but posits only the necessity of the following-from, and so does any other consequence or conditional that is laid down. Speaking, then, precisely of the necessity just mentioned alone, one must concede the like of the Chimera, and of all things neither future nor foreknown, as of future and truly foreknown things. For a consequence and conditional of this kind is confirmed by a like necessity, as is any other whatever. Moreover, in this consequence, \"God foreknows that the Chimera will be, therefore the Chimera will necessarily be,\" the antecedent is supposed and posited, just as in this one, \"God foreknows that Antichrist will be, therefore Antichrist will necessarily be\"; and the necessity of the consequence is equal; therefore the necessity in both is simply equal and alike. Nor does it suffice to say that the antecedent in the second is true and in the first false, and that therefore the necessity is not alike here and there. For falsity of the antecedent in no way diminishes the necessity of the consequence, nor does truth increase it, as no dialectician is ignorant. Since, therefore, the necessity of the consequence in no way includes the truth of the antecedent, so far as the necessity of the consequence alone is concerned the necessity is alike in both; and this alone in such cases\n\nthis reply posits; so it must hold consistently that just as it is necessary that Antichrist will be, so it is also of the Chimera. The text, too, and the course of argument of the Authors who speak of this necessity refute and convict this gloss as a viper-like one,[n4] that is, one destructive of its own text and not expository. For the cause which Boethius assigns where he spoke earlier, why future contingents are necessary in respect of divine cognition or will, and not in respect of inferior causes, is this: that with divine cognition they are present, and what is, when it is, is necessary; but with inferior causes they are not present but future, and therefore with them, before they are, they can fail to be. For Boethius says in Consolation of Philosophy 5, last prose: \"Since every judgment comprehends the things subject to it according to its own nature, and God has always an eternal and present state, his knowledge also, surpassing all movement of time, abides in the simplicity of its presence, and, embracing the infinite spaces of past and future, considers all things in its simple cognition as if now being done. And so if you wish to weigh the presence by which he discerns all things, you will rightly judge that it is not foreknowledge as of a future thing, but knowledge of a never-failing instant; hence it is called not praevidentia but rather providentia.\" And below: \"No necessity compels the man who walks by his will to walk, though it is necessary that he walk when he walks. In the same way, then, if providence sees anything as present, it must be, though it has no necessity of nature, and God beholds as present those futures which proceed from the freedom of choice. These things, then, referred to the divine view, become necessary through the condition or disposition of the divine notion.\" And further down, to someone who objects and asks him, \"What difference does it make, then, that they are not necessary, since by reason of the condition of divine knowledge they come about in every way in the manner of necessity?\" (as if he said, \"If it is so, it makes no difference whether they are not necessary or necessary\"), Boethius replies: \"This is the difference: those things which I put forward a little earlier, the rising Sun and the walking man, which while they happen cannot fail to happen, yet of these one, before it happened, was necessary to exist, the other\n\nnot at all: so also the things which God has as present will without doubt exist, but of these the one descends from the necessity of things, the other from the power of those who do them. We have, then, not unjustly said that these, if referred to the divine notice, are necessary; if considered in themselves, are free from the bonds of necessity.\" Saint Thomas follows him in this assignment of the cause, on Sentences 1, dist. 38, q. 5.[n5] \"God,\" he says, \"from eternity not only saw the order of himself to the thing, from whose power the thing was to be, but beheld the very being of the thing; how this is, Boethius clearly teaches in the book On Consolation. For all cognition is according to the mode of the knower; since, therefore, God is from eternity, his cognition must have the mode of eternity, which is the whole being at once without succession. Hence, just as, though time is successive, eternity is nevertheless present to all times, one and the same and indivisible, like a standing now, so his cognition beholds all temporal things, though they come in succession, as present to itself, nor is any of them future in respect of it, but only one in respect of another. Hence, according to Boethius, it is better called providence than foresight, because it does not provide as for something future, but provides for all things as present in a single view, as from the watchtower of eternity; yet it can be called foresight insofar as it knows that which is future to us, not to itself.\" And below: \"The act of divine cognition passes over the contingent, even if it is future to us, as our sight passes over it while it is; and because what is, when it is, is necessary, which however is not absolutely necessary, it is therefore said that what, considered in itself, is contingent, is necessary when related to God's cognition, because it is referred to that cognition as it is in actual being; and so it is altogether like this: if I were to see Socrates running in the present, that is in itself contingent, but related to my sight is necessary.\" And below: \"What is known by God can be taken according to the condition under which it lies under divine knowledge, that is, insofar as it has determinate being,\n\nand so it has necessity; or it can be taken without that condition, that is, as it is in its causes before it is in act, and so it has no necessity.\" The venerable Anselm also, On Concord 3 and 4, gives a like cause for a like saying. For he says that all futures are necessary and immutable in eternity, but not necessary, rather mutable, in time before they come to be; because in eternity, he says, there is neither past nor future, but only an immutable present. This, then, is the Authors' cause why all futures in respect of superior causes, namely divine cognition and will, are necessary: because what is, when it is, is necessary, and all futures are there in presence and in act; and why in respect of inferior causes they are not necessary: because there they are not actually present but future. In what way, then, do they speak of necessity when they say that what is, when it is, is necessary: of necessity of the consequence or dictum, or of the thing? Or do they understand the whole proposition in the conjoined sense, or in the divided? If in the second way, then, since from that cause they infer in consequence that all futures in respect of the superior causes will come about of necessity, they understand a like necessity; not, therefore, the necessity of consequence or conditional alone, as this reply imagines. But if they understand it in the first way, by the same understanding they would have to concede that for what will be to be going to be (fore, that is, futurum esse), when it will be, will be necessary. For this consequence, \"If something will be, it will be,\" is as necessary as this, \"If something is, it is\"; and according to them this one is as necessary of the dictum, or in the composite sense, as that one. For it is as impossible that something be at once future and not future as that something be at once present and not be; which they do not concede but deny, imitating the doctrine of the Philosopher, On Interpretation 1, last,[n6] saying that what is, when it is, is necessary; but that future things, before they come, that is, when and while they are future, will not come about necessarily, but can in no way come about.[n7] Moreover, when Boethius, assigning the difference between the necessary and the non-necessary in the authority set out above, says that the rising Sun and the walking man, while they happen, cannot fail to happen, yet that of them one, namely the first, before it happened, was necessary to exist,\n\nbut the other not at all (that is, that a man become a walker), implying that before the man walked it was possible for him not to walk: how does he understand this about the necessary and the possible? Simply and altogether, that is, in respect of any superior causes whatever, and likewise of inferior ones, or in a certain respect, namely in respect of inferior and natural causes? He does not understand it in the first way, because according to his view, before and after that difference is laid down, just as the one of them was necessary in respect of the first cause before it happened, so is the remaining one; and because God works outward any effect whatever equally freely, as the 9th and 20th of the first, the 30th of the second, and the first supposition teach. Hence it is not more necessary, in respect of the divine will willing and making both of these, that the Sun rise than that a man walk, as the tenth of the first also proves. And because he says likewise that the other of those two, before it happened, was by no means necessary to exist, this cannot be understood in respect of the first cause, namely divine providence and cognition, since according to his view recited above all things are present there. It must therefore be that he understands the necessity and possibility of those things in the second of the aforesaid ways, namely in respect of natural and inferior causes only, in respect of which alone such things are called future, as his following words also make plain; for he immediately adds, \"Those things also which God has as present will without doubt exist, but of these the one indeed descends from the necessity of things.\" Of which things, if not of natural and inferior ones? And he adds, \"the other from the power of those who do them\": from a power, that is, opposed to the necessity just mentioned, which is to say free from the necessity of inferior causes; for the differences of opposites must be opposite. This, then, according to him, is the difference between necessary things (the rising of the Sun, say) and non-necessary but free things (a man's walking, say): that the former are necessary in respect of inferior causes, the latter by no means so, but free; so that according to him\n\nacts of free choice are not called wholly and simply free, because they are not free in respect of any causes whatever, since in respect of the superior causes they are called necessary, but are called free in a certain respect only, namely in respect of inferior causes, as the fifth and ninth of this book show. Therefore, right after his words set out above, he adds, \"We have, then, not unjustly said that these, if referred to the divine notice, are necessary; if considered in themselves, are free from the bonds of necessity.\" Boethius therefore understands in the authorities alleged that all futures will come about of the necessity of the superior causes, as the preceding chapter expounded, and not of necessity of consequence or conditional only, as this reply has dreamed; which yet another word of his shows. For, about to concede this necessity in respect of superior causes and to deny another, he prefaced it with: \"I shall confess,\" he says, \"a matter of the most solid truth, but one which scarcely anyone but a contemplator of divine wit has approached. For I shall answer that the same future thing, when it is referred to the divine notion, appears necessary; but when it is weighed in its own nature, appears wholly free and absolute.\" But if he were speaking only of necessity of consequence or conditional, who would be so asinine of wit as not to approach the contemplation of it very easily? Who ever, the terms being known, did not know this consequence or conditional, \"God foreknows that this will be, or: if God foreknows that this will be, it will be\"? And who, advanced at least to the threshold of philosophical or theological letters, or even an unlettered man believing in almighty God, was ignorant of this consequence, \"God provides for this and wills it to be, therefore it will be\"? Or who would not at least approach very readily the contemplation of this consequence? He is not, then, speaking of necessity of consequence or conditional only, but of another, declared in the next chapter. And if anyone has in no way approached the contemplation of this necessity, let him not impute it to me, I beg, but to the slowness of his own human wit, asking humbly and attentively that he may deserve to receive some participation in the divine wit, by which he may be able to contemplate it:\n\nand let no one suppose the authority of Boethius to be despicable, since Saint Augustine, Anselm, Thomas, and very many other Catholic Doctors imitate him in this matter. For he was a great Philosopher and a Catholic Doctor, as his philosophical and theological books show, and was at length crowned with a happy martyrdom and enrolled in the catalogue of the Saints under the name of Severinus;[n8] for he had many names, after the manner of the Roman nobles, which are commonly written at the head of his books. Second, this reply fails as incautious: for it has not guarded against the necessity which it wished, and believed it had guarded against, nor has it granted us the free power which it wished, and believed it had granted. For if this consequence is necessary, \"God foreknows or prewills[n9] whatever it is, therefore it will be,\" and the antecedent is not in our power, as the fifteenth of the first and the eighth of this book show, then neither is the consequent in our power as simply free and excluding every preceding necessity whatever. Third, this reply fails because it is very much incomplete; for although it answers somehow, in appearance, to a few authorities,\n\nyet to the reasons set out and to very many other authorities it does not answer, nor will it be able to. For how will it be able to answer the reasons set out there, and especially the syllogistic reason? How also will it answer Ecclesiasticus, Augustine, the Sibyl, our Lord Christ, Chrysostom, Paul, Job, Gregory, Tobias, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the Gloss? Or how could it answer concerning the necessity of divine fate, and all the authorities and Parisian articles that prove it? For no one who posits fatal necessity posits it to be a necessity of consequence, or conditional only.[n10] And by what pretext will it be able to answer the authorities of Augustine, City of God 5, 9 and 10? For there never was any of the Stoics so stupid, indeed no layman so lay, as to believe that every necessity of consequence or conditional is repugnant to freedom of choice. For who is so crude or foolish as to be ignorant that the necessity of this consequence and conditional, \"If you will freely, you will freely,\" is compatible with freedom of choice? Why, then, would Augustine refute the Stoics who posit this, if he himself there posits this very one and no other? Why also does he teach in vain that this necessity does not take away freedom, since no man ever failed to know it? Therefore, without doubt, he did not wish that necessity to be understood there, but another, made plain in the next chapter, as the words of that discourse also show. For speaking there of the necessity of divine fate, that is, of fate as named from speaking (fando), he expounds that verse of the Psalm, \"God has spoken once,\"[n11] that is, immovably, that is, unchangeably has he spoken, as he unchangeably knows all things that will be and that he is going to do. Then he rebukes the Stoics, because they did not wish to subject our wills to a necessity of this kind, lest they then not be free; and by distinguishing concerning necessity, he removes their motive, showing that one necessity, namely the unwilling one, which befalls us against our will (the necessity of dying, for instance), is repugnant to freedom of choice, and that another necessity is defined, according to which we say that it is necessary that something be so, or come to be so, and this is not repugnant to freedom of choice. See how plainly he expresses this necessity, and defines it by reference to an active cause, as the next chapter expounded;\n\nand this is twofold, conservative namely and factive, as is taught in the second of the first. For the conservative he says, \"the necessity according to which we say it is necessary that something be so\"; and for the factive he adds, \"or come to be so,\" making no mention whatever of necessity of consequence or conditional. Hence it does not seem that he wishes to speak of necessity of consequence or conditional only; and the exemplary reasoning by which he shows his purpose also teaches this plainly. For he shows that the aforesaid necessity, according to which we say that it is necessary that something be so or come to be so, is not to be feared lest it take freedom of will from us, because we do not put God's life and foreknowledge under necessity in the first manner, the manner that takes away or diminishes freedom, if we say that it is necessary that God always live and foreknow all things, just as his power is not diminished when it is said that he cannot die or be deceived. But in this reasoning he says and understands nothing whatever about necessity of consequence or any conditional. How, moreover, can other authorities of his, on correction and grace, mentioned in the next chapter, be expounded by this necessity? And that authority of his, On the Faith, to Peter, how will it be expounded by this subtle and logical gloss, recognized only by such as these? Rather it will be perverted, especially since he himself wishes all his sayings in that little book to be understood according to the common and customary way of speaking of simple believers or unbelievers, the rude and the unlearned, so that no sense of heretical falsehood could creep in on them. Hence at the head of the book he says: \"I have received the letter of your charity, my son Peter, in which you indicated that you wished to go to Jerusalem, and asked to be instructed by our letters how you should hold the rule of the true faith in those parts, so that no sense of heretical falsehood could creep in on you.\"[n12] And at the heel of the book he says: \"These forty chapters for now, which most firmly pertain to the rule of the true faith, believe faithfully, hold strongly, defend truthfully and patiently; and if you learn that anyone teaches doctrines contrary to these, flee him as a plague, and cast him out as a heretic.\" For these things which we have set down so agree with the Catholic faith that if anyone should wish to contradict not only all of them but even single ones, in that he stubbornly resists each single one of these,\n\nand these points, he who does not hesitate to teach the contrary[n13] would appear a heretic and an enemy of the Christian faith, and on this account one to be anathematized by all Catholics. Hence, affirming most plainly and asserting most certainly, he says, \"Hold most firmly, and by no means doubt, that it is so.\" Again, how will Anselm be expounded by this reply, and especially in On Concord 3, where he says, \"Things that are past in time are, in likeness to the eternal present, altogether immutable\"? For this cannot be expounded of the immutability of a consequence, a conditional, or a dictum, but of the thing, since it is one pure categorical. Also when he says immediately afterwards that things present in eternity can never fail to be present there, but things present in time can fail to be present there, he understands it either in the sense of composition and of the dictum, or in the sense of division and of the thing. Not in the first way, because then the second part is false; for just as this is not possible, \"things present in eternity are not present in eternity,\" so neither is this, \"things present in time are not present in time\": he understands it, therefore, in the second way, as does the preceding chapter, which both his words and his course of argument plainly indicate. As for the motives of this reply, it must be known that that distinction concerning necessity of the consequence or of the consequent, conditional or absolute, of the dictum or of the thing, is good in its own cases, as in this one and its like, \"If I am going to read tomorrow, it is necessary that I read tomorrow.\" Nevertheless, the reasons and authorities set out in the preceding chapter cannot be expounded reasonably by it, nor [brought] to their meaning through it alone,[n14] as was shown above. First, however, for the saying of Boethius, it must be noted that he could very fittingly have said this by way of example. For, seeing that it would be very difficult to understand how something could be necessary in respect of the divine will and cognition and yet free in its own nature, he wished to show this somehow by a manifest example, so that by easier and better-known things he might lead the slower to the more difficult and the unknown, as in every philosophical and theological discipline a frequent and useful way of teaching is by examples; for which reason an example is, not undeservedly, counted by logicians among the species of argument. Boethius, therefore, wishing to show\n\nthat some future things were necessary with respect to the first cause, and free in their own nature, he said advisedly: \"There are two necessities, one simple, as that it is necessary that all men be mortal; the other conditional, as, if you know that someone is walking, it is necessary that he is walking.\" In this way he might deny pure necessity of future contingents. By the second necessity, in which the consequent is necessary with respect to the antecedent and yet free in its own nature, he might show in some fashion, though with great dissimilarity and remoteness, that the same can hold of freely future things with respect to the first cause. For that cause is the naturally antecedent cause, from which all free things follow necessarily: necessarily, I say, with respect to it, not in their own nature, as the preceding chapter explained. Wherefore in the whole course that follows he always denies of free acts the necessity of nature and of coercion, but the other\n\n(namely the necessity according to superior causes) never. As it seems, he would have done this at some point, had he not posited that necessity at all. Indeed both here and in Book 4, prose 6, he always proves it, expressly maintains and defends it,[n15] as his whole argument attests, and especially the authorities cited in the preceding chapter.\n\nSecond, I say, for the understanding of Boethius and of all the others who say expressly that in such matters there is conditional necessity, of the consequence, of the dictum, or taken jointly, but not of the consequent, of the thing, or taken severally,[n16] that this is true on a twofold understanding. First, because according to them, in every such conditional, consequence, dictum, and composite proposition there is absolute necessity, but in the consequent, or the thing, or the divided proposition, by no means. Second, according to the common and usual way of speaking: for in that way the consequence is necessary for all, but the consequent is not. For the necessity and freedom of such consequences, according to the more common and usual way of speaking, is considered only with respect to inferior causes. About these both the common people and the professors of almost all the sciences think and speak the most, as 5 and the one next to this teach.\n\nThird, for the understanding of Boethius: since Philosophers are accustomed to load few words with many meanings, as Ovid says in De vetula 3,[n17] \"Speaking few words, they wished many weights to lie beneath their words,\" I believe that by \"necessity of condition,\" besides the aforesaid conditional necessity, he meant to include, with Anselm, the concomitant or following necessity. This arises in a way from the positing of a present thing in being, necessarily accompanies it, and follows it while it is present. It is the necessity which, according to the Philosophers and Theologians and according to all commonly, is expressed in the saying that everything that is, when it is, necessarily is, as was taught more fully in 2 of this work.[n18] He could therefore reasonably be understood in this way. For just as in a conditional the consequent follows necessarily from the antecedent, so also in things, from any thing posited as already present in being, as from an antecedent cause according to nature, or at least one including the antecedent cause according to nature, there follows necessarily and really, as an inseparable, the consequent according to nature, since a certain necessity of this kind is naturally posterior.[n19] About this, however, as about everything else\n\nSophists can wrangle sophistically, asking what that following necessity is, which necessarily follows every thing and, what seems more wonderful, every non-thing. For just as it is necessary that what is, when it is, be, so also that what is not, when it is not, not be . But this necessity cannot be caused, nor descend from a non-being. To these and similar points I shall reply in 13 and 14 of Book 1. Now if he meant the first necessity, namely the conditional, well and good. But the second, namely the consequent or following necessity, I firmly believe he meant, as both his thought and his words show clearly. For the cause of this necessity, according to him, is this: future things are present to the divine knowledge or providence, and everything that presently is, while it presently is, necessarily is, as was shown above. Wherefore also, showing evidently that by \"condition\" he by no means understands a conditional, but a disposition, or a presential or immediate state or mode of the divine knowledge, he says thus: \"No necessity compels the man who walks of his own will to go on, although when he walks it is necessary that he go on. In the same way, then,\n\nif providence sees something as present, it is necessary that it be, even if it has no necessity of nature. But God beholds as present those future things which arise from the freedom of choice; therefore these, related to the divine gaze, become necessary through the condition of the divine knowledge.\"\n\nHence Robert of Lincoln,[n20] in On Free Choice 3, \"understanding above the elders,\" and investigating this matter most profoundly, even to its foundation, says: \"Necessity is twofold, as Anselm distinguishes in Cur Deus homo 2, ch. 17. One he calls preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing be, and compels a thing to be. The other he calls following necessity, which is not the cause of the thing and does not compel the thing to be. And this, as he himself says, is that necessity which Aristotle treats in On Propositions, concerning singulars and futures. It seems to destroy contingency to either side[n21] and to establish that all things are from necessity, and by this following and nothing-effecting necessity it is necessary that God know my sitting tomorrow, and the like. No absurdity results from [calling things] necessary by this following necessity; indeed it rather seems necessary that a contingent follow:[n22] for while I sit, it is necessary that I sit, and after I have sat, it is necessary that I have sat. But the relation which these sayings, 'that I sit' and 'that I have sat,' have to my sitting while I sit and after I have sat, the same relation God's knowledge has to my future sitting before I sit; for he knows future things as present. And below:[n23] these two necessities, from one of which only the necessary follows, whereas from the other, as has been said, a contingent seems to follow, I think Boethius called simple necessity and necessity of condition. Some, however, understand 'necessity of condition' not as that which was called above the following necessity, but as necessity of consecution of the consequent to the antecedent, as when it is said, 'If a man runs, he moves his feet'; this is the necessity of the consecution of the consequent to the antecedent, although both, namely the consequent as well as the antecedent, are contingent.\" And he adds: \"From the words of Boethius himself, considered more deeply, it can be better perceived that he called 'necessity of condition' what we above called the following necessity. For he says that the same future thing, when referred to the divine knowledge, is necessary, but when weighed in its own nature, is seen to be altogether free and absolute.\" And after a few lines: \"But God beholds as present those future things which arise from the freedom of choice; these, therefore, related to the gaze\n\ndivine, become necessary through the condition of the divine knowledge, but considered in themselves, being absolute, they do not abandon the freedom of their nature.\" And again: \"If these things are referred to the divine knowledge, they are necessary; if they are considered in themselves, they are released from the bonds of necessity.\" What else do these words mean, but that those things which in their own nature are contingent to either alternative, flexible and changeable, are invariable in God's knowledge, not on account of the invariability of things, but on account of the immutability of God's knowledge?\n\nMoreover, for the understanding of Boethius it must be known that by \"necessity of condition,\" that is, \"conditional necessity,\" he could reasonably have meant the consecutive necessity between an unimpedible cause and its effect. For as in a verbal conditional, from a verbal antecedent its verbal consequent follows necessarily and verbally, so also in the real condition or connection of an unimpedible cause and its effect, from the cause which naturally precedes, as from a real antecedent, there follows necessarily and really its effect, because that is naturally posterior; and the effect is its real consequent. And this is a respective necessity, that is, with respect to superior and inferior causes, of which the first is conceded in free acts and the second denied, as was shown above. I therefore judge this likely to be the meaning of the authors who say that whatever, or if anything, God wills, foreknows or provides, will come to pass of necessity. For according to them God's will, foreknowledge (or knowledge) and providence are causes of things, and causes not impedible but altogether efficacious and necessary in causing, as 9 and 15.27 and what follows, with 10.1, teach. The Gloss of the Decretum could be understood according to the second meaning of Boethius given above. Yet the Gloss could also have expounded its text more closely by means of the following necessity, or by the consecutive necessity of superior causes, as the surface of the letter suggests, and as the premises also expound. But perhaps that exposition would have been too difficult and far too lengthy, and so it passed over it in silence and chose the easier and shorter one, without prejudice to the better. Yet if anyone leans stubbornly on this Gloss, let him beware, I beg, lest he lean on a reed staff, which will enter and pierce\n\nhis hand. For see what it says at the end: \"This,\" it says, \"is twofold: It is necessary that this happen which God foresaw: as to the dictum it is true, as to the thing it is false. For that which God foresaw, it is not necessary that it happen.\" And note that this argument is not valid: \"If God foresaw something, it will necessarily happen; therefore, if God foresaw something, it is necessary that it happen.\" The reason is that here the word \"necessary\" cannot qualify that consequence, but only the consequent. This Gloss therefore wishes to deny all such statements as these: that which God foreknows or has foreknown, provides or has provided, or anything he wills or has willed, it is of necessity, or necessary, that it happen. For according to the Gloss the necessity in all such cases refers not to the consequence but to the consequent, not to the dictum but to the thing alone.\n\nBut see how carefully it has looked at the text of Boethius and of the Decretum, which it expounds by glossing: \"If providence sees something as present,\" says the text of both, \"it is necessary that it be, or: that it be, is necessary.\"[n24] See likewise how carefully it has looked at the words of canonical Scripture and of the Doctors. For in Luke, last chapter, the Truth himself says, \"It is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses and the Prophets and the Psalms concerning me\";\n\nand in Matthew 18, \"It is necessary that scandals come\"; and Luke 17, expounding the same in equivalent terms, says, \"It is impossible that scandals not come.\" Augustine too, On Free Choice 3, 11: \"So far is it from the truth that the sins of the creature are to be thought imputable to the Creator, though they come about necessarily, which he himself foreknew as future, that, when you say you do not find how whatever must happen in his creature is not imputed to him, I on the contrary shall not find a way, and shall affirm that none at all can be found, by which whatever must happen in his creature, in such a way that it happens by the will of those who sin, could be imputed to him.\" Very many of his authorities, cited in the preceding chapter, express a similar thought in a similar manner of speaking. And Anselm says in On Concord 2: \"That God foreknows a future thing, it is necessary that it be future\"; and below: \"If God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future.\" In Cur Deus homo 2, 17, he says: \"Nothing is necessary or impossible, except that she herself wills.\"[n25] In his Meditation on human redemption too he says thus: \"Christian soul, soul raised from grievous death; all necessity and impossibility of his is subject to his will, since what he wills, it is necessary that it be, and what he does not will, it is impossible that it be.\" Many learned men also express a similar thought similarly.\n\nFor the understanding of Anselm, however, it must be known that according to his view necessity is twofold, namely preceding and following, and each of these is threefold. Preceding necessity, according to him, is an active cause unfailing in acting, upon the positing of which its effect necessarily follows. This is twofold, because one kind is compatible with freedom, another destroys freedom; and the latter is twofold, for one kind is natural necessity of this sort, another violent necessity of this sort. These three modes are well enough known from the second and tenth of this work. They can also be clearly drawn out of On Concord 2, where he concedes the first of them even in matters of free choice, as the preceding chapter recited, and denies the other two. Following necessity too is twofold: one dictional or consequential and complex, the other real and incomplex. Following necessity, dictional or consequential and complex, is the necessity of some dictum and composite proposition, or taken jointly, that is, in the sense\n\nof composition, or conditional necessity or necessity of consequence. According to Anselm's logic in On Concord 2 this is such a necessity that its opposite formally implies and involves contradiction, as his cited authority clearly shows. Consequently he must grant that such necessity is wholly absolute, but in the thing and in the consequent there is no absolute necessity, as was said in the second exposition of Boethius. However, according to the probable logic of the Moderns of Oxford, not all those propositions are reputed necessary in which the same is said of the same, as Anselm and the older Doctors suppose. For \"A man is a man\" would be neither necessary nor true, but false, if no man existed. For it follows: a man is a man, therefore a man is a rational animal (for this belongs to the per se understanding of that); therefore a man is an animal; therefore an animal is a man. Yet when no man exists, but other animals, as was the case before the creation of Adam, every animal would be irrational and not a man, and no animal would be rational or a man.\n\nTo the objection they commonly raise, \"therefore a man is not a man,\" a twofold answer is given. Some concede this simply, and if it is argued further, \"therefore something is a man and that is not a man,\" they deny that consequence, because the antecedent is simply negative and posits or implies nothing, as they say, just as neither does this: \"A chimaera is not an animal,\" or \"is not a man.\" Others, denying this (\"A man is a man\"), concede its contradictory in this form: \"Not a man, or no man, is a man,\"[n26] and so, always prefixing the negation, they say the contradictory is to be given. The Philosophers say that equipollences always hold, unless something special prevents and opposes. But since these matters pertain more to Logicians than to Theologians, let it suffice to have touched on them briefly in this place. Real and incomplex following necessity, however, is twofold. One kind is presential, another causal or effectual, for I shall give them names as closely as I can, though somewhat metaphorically. Following necessity,\n\nreal and presential, may be called so from the present thing, or from presence. For it follows every present thing necessarily in this way: that everything which is, when it is, by this necessity necessarily is, as was said in the third exposition of Boethius. For this view Anselm says in On Concord 2, in this way: because a thing is posited to be, it is said to be from necessity; or because it is posited not to be, it is affirmed not to be from necessity. And below: \"What the free will wills, it both can not-will and cannot not-will, and it is necessary that it will it. For it can not will before it wills, because it is free; but when it already wills, it cannot not will, and it is necessary that it will it, since it is impossible for it at the same time both to will and not to will the same thing.\" And it goes on: \"But the work of the will, to which it has been given that what it wills be done, is necessary in two ways: because it is compelled to come about by the will, and because what is cannot at the same time not come to be.\" He also says below, in 3, that future things are necessary in eternity and with God, and assigns as the cause that there\n\nthey are present and not future, as was shown above. And the same author in Cur Deus homo 2, 17: \"The being of a thing,\" he says, \"makes the necessity of being. For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing be, and there is a following necessity, which the thing makes. Preceding and efficient necessity is when it is said, 'The heaven revolves,' because it is necessary that it revolve. Following necessity, which effects nothing but comes to be, is when I say that you speak of necessity, because you are speaking.\"\n\nThis following necessity cannot be explained merely by dictional or consequential necessity. For, whether the thing is or is not, whether you speak or do not speak, according to his view in On Concord 2, recited above, this dictum is always necessary of any thing whatever: \"such a thing is such a thing,\" and \"you, speaking, speak\"; and likewise this consequence, \"If such a thing is, such a thing is,\" and \"if you speak, you speak.\" This, then, is not that following necessity which he says is made by things, but that real necessity spoken of above, which follows necessarily from every thing. His following words also seem to bear witness to this: \"This,\" he says, \"is that necessity which, where Aristotle treats of singular propositions and futures,\n\nseems to destroy contingency to either side, and to establish that all things are from necessity.\" But in Peri hermenias 1, last chapter, where Aristotle treats these matters,[n27] no such necessity appears to be posited that could seem to destroy contingency to either side and establish that all things are from necessity, except the aforesaid real and presential necessity, which affirms that everything that is, when it is, necessarily is; and likewise of what is not. Hence he says thus: \"That what is, when it is, be, and that what is not, when it is not, not be, is necessary.\" This understanding of Anselm concerning following necessity is also attested by the authority of Robert of Lincoln recited above. In it he first alleges a twofold necessity from Anselm, namely preceding and following; and below he shows that the necessity of condition, which Boethius asserts, is not the necessity of consecution, but the following necessity which he mentioned before, namely presential necessity, as was shown in the third exposition of Boethius. But following necessity, causal or effectual, can be named from the cause or from the effect; and it seems to be that consecutive necessity between an unimpedible cause and its effect, mentioned in the fourth exposition of Boethius above, for the reason and cause likewise\n\nassigned there. The Authorities of Anselm cited in the preceding chapter seem also sufficiently to attest this understanding.\n\nAnd if anyone objects that then the same necessity would be both antecedent and consequent, it must be said that this is quite possible, indeed even necessary, under diverse respects and for diverse reasons. Preceding necessity, properly and strictly taken, is only the cause, or [necessity] in the cause unfailing in causing, of which it was spoken in 2 of this work, and this corresponds to the logical antecedent in a logical consequence. Following necessity, real, causal or effectual, can be taken in two ways. In one way, it is only the effect, or [necessity] in the effect of such a cause unimpedible in causing; and it corresponds to the aforesaid preceding necessity, as effect to efficient cause and patient to agent; and this is likened to the logical consequent in a logical consequence. In the other way, it somehow embraces both: namely as consecutive necessity, or consecution, or the real consequence itself between such a cause and its effect. Just as the logical consecution or consequence is not in the antecedent alone or the consequent alone, but embraces each of them, and is a kind of relation midway between them, so this real following necessity corresponds to the whole necessary logical consequence.\n\nIt must nevertheless be known that antecedent or preceding necessity has a twofold meaning. In one way it is taken as has been said here, and as the second part of this work defines it;[n28] in the other way it is taken for necessity simply and wholly absolute (for this naturally precedes every other necessity), or for natural necessity preceding naturally necessary effects. Robert of Lincoln also seems to hint at this in On Free Choice 3, where he says: \"From the necessary, according to the view of Boethius, a contingent seems to follow, but not from the absolute or antecedent necessary, which compels a thing to be, but from the necessary of condition and following, which permits a thing to be free.\" Below, in 10, he reckons antecedent and simple necessity to be the same. In one of his questions\n\non God's knowledge, asking how God knows those things which happen by chance or from free will, he distinguishes a twofold cause, namely antecedent and conjoined, and in defining the antecedent cause says: \"The antecedent cause is the preordaining one, so that according to the course of nature some thing comes about of necessity, as an eclipse of Sun and Moon.\" Below, having answered that God is not the antecedent cause of such effects but the conjoined cause, and removing one possible objection that could be raised, he adds: \"God's doing and his knowing are the same; and it does not follow, 'God's knowledge, which is the cause of the thing, is eternal, therefore it is antecedent'; for antecedence, of which this discourse speaks, is the necessary preordination of a future event according to the course of nature.\"\n\nThis also seems to accord with the words and mind of Anselm in On Concord and Cur Deus homo 2, where he had been cited. For in On Concord 2, denying antecedent necessity in free acts, he grants it in the rising of the Sun. And in Cur Deus homo 2, 17, denying likewise antecedent necessity from things of free choice, he grants it in the revolving motion of the Heaven. For the violence, as he says, of natural condition compels the heaven to revolve.\n\nThe understanding of St Thomas also can be clearly elicited from what has been said:\n\nhe concedes the necessity of the dictum, not of the thing, necessity of consequence, of condition, and ex suppositione, but the other he denies. For necessity of condition and ex suppositione, in his manner of speaking, and in the common manner of speaking of the Parisian Doctors, can be explained in two ways. For one is dictional and complex, the other real and incomplex; and this latter is twofold, one presential, the other consecutive, causal or effectual, as was distinguished above concerning Anselm's following necessity. For consequence and consecution too is twofold, dictional or logical, and real; and the real is twofold, presential and causal or effectual, for the reason and cause assigned above in the expositions of Boethius and Anselm. St Thomas therefore concedes the necessity of the dictum and of consequence as necessity simply absolute, according to the logic of Anselm and of the older Doctors, recited above. The necessity of the thing and of the consequent he denies, in the same sense; and his own words indicate this plainly: \"The distinction is good: that something is necessary by necessity of the consequence and not by necessity of the consequent\"; or by conditioned necessity, not absolute, as was alleged above.\n\nHe also, in Against the Gentiles 1, 67,[n29] speaking of such a necessary thing, says: \"This is not necessary absolutely, but under a condition, and by necessity of the consequence.\" And below, 83: \"Although God wills nothing absolutely and necessarily concerning caused things, yet he wills something necessarily from a condition, or from a supposition.\" And below, 85: \"Necessity from supposition in the cause cannot conclude absolute necessity in the effect. But God wills something in a creature not by absolute necessity, but only by the necessity which is from supposition; therefore from the divine will absolute necessity cannot be concluded in created things; yet this alone excludes contingency.\" St Thomas therefore wishes only to deny the absolute necessity that excludes contingency. But necessity of consequence, of condition and of supposition, real and presential, he concedes, as is clearly evident in his assignment of the cause of the necessity which he posits,\n\nrecited above. He also hints at and affirms necessity of consequence, of condition and of supposition, real, causal or effectual, if his thought and words are searched closely, which the cause assigned above in the fourth exposition of Boethius also evidently shows. It can be said otherwise, and more briefly, that necessity according to him is not spoken of according to superior causes, but only according to inferior ones, as the preceding chapter recited. When he denies necessity from free acts, therefore, he means necessity with respect to inferior causes, as the preceding chapter also alleged. According to these expositions given above too, or any one of them, Lombard and the other Doctors who make distinctions of this kind can be understood.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "\"The gloss of the Decretum\" is the Ordinary Gloss on Gratian. The \"authority of Boethius\" is the Consolation 5, prose 6 passage that Bradwardine quotes in full below (717C–D). Gratian's use of it was cited at the end of ch. 27 (715A–B), together with Aquinas, Sent. I, d. 38."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Savile prints \"27\". The passage (necessitas praecedens / sequens) is Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, 17. I translate the print's number unchanged (rule 4)."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The print gives \"Deus, vel si Deus praescit hoc esse futurum, ergo hoc est futurum seu erit\". Deus is left without a verb. I take it as an abbreviated form of the conditional itself (\"God [foreknows], or: if God foreknows…\") and translate it as printed."}, {"n": 4, "text": "The viper was thought to be killed by its own offspring, which gnaw their way out of the mother. Bradwardine's gloss is therefore \"viper-like\" because it destroys the very text it claims to explain (peremtoriam … sui textus, non expositoriam)."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Savile's \"quaest. 5\" is Aquinas, Super Sent. I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5. The \"Boethius\" he cites is Consolation 5, prose 6."}, {"n": 6, "text": "\"1. peri hermenias vlt.\" is Aristotle, On Interpretation 9 (19a23 ff.), the last chapter of Savile's book 1. Per rule 4 the number stays as Savile has it."}, {"n": 7, "text": "posse nullatenus evenire is literally \"to be able in no way to come about\". The sense required is \"to be able not to come about at all\". Nullatenus does the work of a negation on the infinitive, and I translate accordingly."}, {"n": 8, "text": "Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, venerated in medieval Pavia as St Severinus. The \"many names\" are those prefixed to his works."}, {"n": 9, "text": "praeuult, \"prewills\" (praevolo): the volitional counterpart to praescit, \"foreknows\". English has no ready equivalent, so I keep the compound."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The print reads \"ponit eam esse necessitatem consequentiae, sed conditionalem tantummodo\". Taken literally this would assert the opposite of what the sentence is arguing, since the Stoic fatalists are being said not to mean a merely logical necessity. The evident sense requires seu (\"or\"), as everywhere else in this chapter (\"consequentiae seu conditionalis\"). I translate that sense and leave the print as it is."}, {"n": 11, "text": "Ps 61:12 [62:11], \"Semel locutus est Deus\". The derivation of fatum from fari (\"to speak\") is Augustine's, City of God 5.9. Bradwardine's \"next chapter\" is ch. 27, so the reference points back to what he has already shown."}, {"n": 12, "text": "The work is Fulgentius of Ruspe's De fide ad Petrum, which medieval writers commonly ascribed to Augustine. Bradwardine's wording of the opening differs slightly from the printed Fulgentius, and I translate his Latin as given."}, {"n": 13, "text": "The Latin is \"et his qui contraria docere non dubitat\". It does not construe smoothly. I take his as a second object of repugnat (\"resists each of these, and these [points]\") and qui … non dubitat as the subject's relative clause. The variant testimonijs (margin) would make the object \"these testimonies\". The main reading can be construed, so I do not adopt the variant (rule 2). The sense is not in doubt."}, {"n": 14, "text": "nec ad intellectum tantum per ipsam: the Latin is elliptical. I read \"nor can they be brought, through it alone, to their meaning\". The point is that the distinction between necessity of consequence and of the consequent cannot by itself yield the sense of the authorities."}, {"n": 15, "text": "\"Both here and in Book 4, prose 6\": Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, IV pr. 6 (on providence and fate), and \"here\" is V pr. 6, the passage Bradwardine has been quoting. Boethius is cited by book and prose."}, {"n": 16, "text": "Dictum (the proposition as a whole, \"that Socrates runs\") against res (the thing). Dictionalis means \"of the dictum.\" Coniunctim/diuisim are the composite and divided senses. The necessity attaches to the whole conditional (de dicto, \"jointly\") and not to its consequent taken by itself (de re, \"severally\"). I keep dictum as a term (§5.8)."}, {"n": 17, "text": "De vetula is the medieval pseudo-Ovidian poem. Bradwardine, like his contemporaries, cites it as Ovid's."}, {"n": 18, "text": "The print reads qua (ablative), which gives no construction with dicitur quod. I read the relative as quae (\"which,\" that is, the following necessity) and translate the evident sense."}, {"n": 19, "text": "quia posterior naturaliter necessitas quaedam talis: the Latin is elliptical (posterior naturaliter [est] necessitas quaedam talis). I take it that this following necessity is naturally posterior to the thing posited in being, and that this is why the consequent follows inseparably."}, {"n": 20, "text": "Robert of Lincoln is Robert Grosseteste, here quoted from his De libero arbitrio. \"Understanding above the elders\" (super senes intelligens) is Ps 118:100 [119:100], super senes intellexi."}, {"n": 21, "text": "vtrumlibet (ad utrumlibet, \"to either alternative\") is the contingent's openness to go either way. I render it \"contingency to either side\" or \"contingent to either alternative,\" according to the context. At 723D, \"embraces each of them\" is a different use of the same word."}, {"n": 22, "text": "magis necessarium videtur sequi contingens can be read two ways. Either \"it rather seems necessary that a contingent follow [from them]\" (as I translate), or \"the necessary seems rather to follow the contingent.\" Grosseteste's later formula (724B: ex necessario … sequi videtur contingens) supports the first reading."}, {"n": 23, "text": "Et infra has duas necessitates … The infra is Bradwardine's \"and below,\" and he quotes Grosseteste further on. The object is fronted: \"these two necessities … I think Boethius called …\""}, {"n": 24, "text": "The two orders, id necesse est esse and id esse necesse est, have the same sense. Bradwardine's point against the Gloss is that the text puts \"necessary\" over the whole clause (the dictum), not over the consequent alone."}, {"n": 25, "text": "ipsa is feminine, and no antecedent appears in the words as quoted. Anselm presumably has the divine will or nature in view. I render \"she herself\" because the pronoun cannot be left open in English. Anselm's sense is that necessity and impossibility are what God's will makes them."}, {"n": 26, "text": "Non homo, vel nullus homo est homo: \"always prefixing the negation\" means the negation is set before the whole proposition (\"Not: man is man\"), as in \"no man is a man.\" It is not the predicate \"non-man.\""}, {"n": 27, "text": "Peri hermenias 1, last chapter, is On Interpretation 9, 19a23–24. Savile's \"1\" is the first book of the Latin division."}, {"n": 28, "text": "The print reads secundum huius eam definit. The parallel secundo huius (\"in 2 of this work,\" used a few lines before) is evidently meant, and I translate accordingly."}, {"n": 29, "text": "Savile's \"1. contra Gentiles 67\" is Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 67. The following \"83\" and \"85\" are chapters of the same book (I.83, I.85)."}], "errata": [{"address": "715D", "keyed": "Boctij", "print": "Boetij"}, {"address": "715D", "keyed": "at que", "print": "atque"}, {"address": "715D", "keyed": "manifestar", "print": "manifestat"}, {"address": "715D", "keyed": "rem albam esse albam,", "print": "rem albam esse albam."}, {"address": "716B", "keyed": "Cut Deus homo", "print": "Cur Deus homo"}, {"address": "716B", "keyed": "autequam", "print": "antequam"}, {"address": "716B", "keyed": "fururum", "print": "futurum"}, {"address": "716C", "keyed": "(no margin keyed beside \"Sanctus quoque Thomas\")", "print": "margin \"Thomas.\" (source) at 716C"}, {"address": "716D", "keyed": "proximiun", "print": "proximum"}, {"address": "716E", "keyed": "per plexitas", "print": "perplexitas"}, {"address": "717A", "keyed": "se porerant", "print": "se poterant"}, {"address": "717A", "keyed": "dicendo. quod", "print": "dicendo, quod"}, {"address": "717A", "keyed": "cundem", "print": "eundem"}, {"address": "717B", "keyed": "•milem", "print": "similem"}, {"address": "717B", "keyed": "praesci•", "print": "praescit"}, {"address": "717C", "keyed": "eoim", "print": "enim"}, {"address": "717C", "keyed": "morionem", "print": "motionem"}, {"address": "717E", "keyed": "dererum", "print": "de rerum"}, {"address": "717E", "keyed": "presentia", "print": "praesentia"}, {"address": "717E", "keyed": "succcssione", "print": "successione"}, {"address": "718B", "keyed": "718B·1 \"necesse Anselmus.\" as one variant margin", "print": "two margins: (variant) \"necesse\" at \"necessitatem\"; (source) \"Anselmus.\" beside \"Venerabilis quoque Anselmus\""}, {"address": "718B", "keyed": "interunt", "print": "inferunt"}, {"address": "718E", "keyed": "Etaddit", "print": "Et addit"}, {"address": "719B", "keyed": "abiolutum", "print": "absolutum"}, {"address": "719B", "keyed": "refettur", "print": "refertur"}, {"address": "719B", "keyed": "consequent•", "print": "consequentiae"}, {"address": "719B", "keyed": "togans", "print": "rogans"}, {"address": "719C", "keyed": "speculati", "print": "speculari"}, {"address": "719C", "keyed": "necaestimet", "print": "nec aestimet"}, {"address": "719C", "keyed": "plutimum", "print": "plurimum"}, {"address": "719D", "keyed": "pot•it", "print": "potuit"}, {"address": "719D", "keyed": "autotitates", "print": "autoritates"}, {"address": "719E", "keyed": "motiu•m", "print": "motiuum"}, {"address": "720B", "keyed": "verae; fidei", "print": "verae fidei"}, {"address": "720E", "keyed": "deneger", "print": "deneget"}, {"address": "721A", "keyed": "modsi", "print": "modū"}, {"address": "721B", "keyed": "vulgates", "print": "vulgares"}, {"address": "721B", "keyed": "onetare", "print": "onerare"}, {"address": "721B", "keyed": "intelligete", "print": "intelligere"}, {"address": "721B", "keyed": "necesitas", "print": "necessitas"}, {"address": "721C", "keyed": "respōdebūt", "print": "respōdebo"}, {"address": "721C", "keyed": "quamuis cum, cum graditur", "print": "quamuis cum graditur"}, {"address": "721D", "keyed": "•stam", "print": "istam"}, {"address": "721D", "keyed": "D•us", "print": "Deus"}, {"address": "721D", "keyed": "necessari•s", "print": "necessariis"}, {"address": "721E", "keyed": "sed•", "print": "sedi"}, {"address": "722A", "keyed": "inuatiabilia", "print": "inuariabilia"}, {"address": "722A", "keyed": "inua•iabilitatem", "print": "inuariabilitatem"}, {"address": "722B", "keyed": "Decre•i", "print": "Decreti"}, {"address": "722B", "keyed": "veto", "print": "vero"}, {"address": "722B", "keyed": "praerert", "print": "praefert"}, {"address": "722C", "keyed": "Propheus", "print": "Prophetis"}, {"address": "722E", "keyed": "complex a", "print": "complexa"}, {"address": "723A", "keyed": "Modernotum", "print": "Modernorum"}, {"address": "723B", "keyed": "qoud (margin)", "print": "quod"}, {"address": "723C", "keyed": "cam velle", "print": "eam velle"}, {"address": "723D", "keyed": "sed sit", "print": "sed fit"}, {"address": "724A", "keyed": "alto modo", "print": "alio modo"}, {"address": "724E", "keyed": "antē", "print": "autē"}, {"address": "725A", "keyed": "reci•ata", "print": "recitata"}, {"address": "725A", "keyed": "perserutentur", "print": "perscrutentur"}, {"address": "725A", "keyed": "don dicitur", "print": "non dicitur"}, {"address": "725A", "keyed": "abactibus", "print": "ab actibus"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p715C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p715C", "locator_display": "715C–715D", "source_text": "CAP. XXVIII. Recitat vnam glossam autoritatum erroneam.\n\nAD haec autem et maxime ad autoritates, quae de necessitate secundum causas superiores faciunt mentionem, communiter respondetur, quod loquuntur de necessitate consequentiae, non consequentis,\n\nseu de necessitate conditionali non absoluta, siue de necessitate dicti non rei, coniunctim non diuisim: et hoc videtur Boetius innuere vbi fuerat allegatus; et sic notat glossa decreti super autoritatem Boctij allegatam. Item Ansel. de Concor. 2. Cum dico, inquit, si praescit Deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurum, idem est ac si dicam, si erit, ex necessitate erit: et cum dico, Si erit, ex necessitate erit, idē valet, si sic pronuntietur, quod erit, ex necessitate erit. Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit, non poterit simul non esse: Haec vero est necessitas conditionalis, consequentiae siue dicti, at que coniunctim, non autem consequentis, vel rei, siue diuisim; et hanc solam concedit, aliam omnem negans, quod et infra expressius manifestar; quippe, inquiens, Non est idem rem esse praeteritā, et rem praeteritam esse praeteritam; aut rem esse praesentem, et rem praesentem esse praesentē; aut rem esse futuram, et rem futuram esse futuram; sicut non idem est rem esse albam, et rem albam esse albam,", "english": "Chapter 28. It recites one erroneous gloss on the authorities.\n\nTo this, and above all to the authorities that make mention of necessity in respect of the superior causes, the common reply is that they speak of the necessity of the consequence, not of the consequent, or of conditional, not absolute, necessity, or of the necessity of the dictum, not of the thing, taken conjointly, not separately. Boethius seems to hint at this where he was cited, and the gloss on the Decretum so notes on the cited authority of Boethius.[n1] So too Anselm, On Concord 2: \"When I say,\" he says, \"if God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future, it is the same as if I were to say, if it will be, it will be of necessity; and when I say, If it will be, it will be of necessity, it means the same if it is pronounced thus: what will be, will be of necessity. For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will be cannot at the same time not be. But this is conditional necessity, of the consequence or of the dictum, and conjoint, not however of the consequent or of the thing, nor divided.\" He concedes this alone and denies every other, as he also makes plainer below; for he says, \"It is not the same for a thing to be past, and for a past thing to be past; or for a thing to be present, and for a present thing to be present; or for a thing to be future, and for a future thing to be future; just as it is not the same for a thing to be white, and for a white thing to be white.\"", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p715E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p715E", "locator_display": "715E–716B", "source_text": "Lignum enim non est semper necessitate album, sed aliquādo priusquam fieret album, potuit non fieri album, et postquam est album, potest fieri non album: lignū vero album semper necesse est esse album, quia nec antequam sit, nec postquam est album, fieri potest vt album simul non sit albū. Similiter res non de necessitate est praesens, quoniā antequā esset praesens, potuit fieri vt praesens non esset, et postquā est praesens, potest fieri non praesens: Rem autem praesentē necesse est esse praesentem semper, quia nec priusquā sit, nec postquam est praesens potest simul esse non praesens; codē modo res aliqua, vt quaedam actio, non necessitate futura est, quia priusquā sit fieri potest vt non sit futura; Rē vero futurā necesse est esse futuram, quia futurū nequit simul esse nō futurū: de praeterito autem similiter est verū, quia res aliqua nō est necessitate praeterita, quoniā antequā esset, potuit fieri vt no esset, et quia praeteritū sēper necesse est praeteritum esse, quoniam non potest simul non esse praeteritum, sed in re praeterita est quiddam\n\nquod non est in re praesenti vel futura. Nunquam enim fieri potest, vt res, quae praeterita est, fiat non praeterita, sicut res quaedam, quae praesens est, potest fieri non praesens, et aliqua res, quae non necessitate futura est, potest fieri vt non sit futura. Itaque cum dicitur futurum de futuro, necesse est esse quod dicitur, quia futurum nunquam est non futurum, sicut quoties idem dicimus de eodem. Cum enim dicimus, quia omnis homo est homo; aut si est homo, homo est; aut omne album est album, et si est album, album est, necesse est esse quod dicitur, quia non potest aliquid simul esse et non esse; quippe si non est necesse omne futurum esse futurum, quoddam futurum non est futurum, quod est impossibile: Necessitate ergo omne futurum, futurum est, et si est futurum, futurum est, cum futurum dicitur de futuro, sed necessitate sequente quae nihil esse cogit. Cum autem futurum dicitur de re, non semper res necessitate est, quamuis sit futura. Nam si dico, Cras seditio futura est in populo; non\n\ntamen necessitate erit seditio. Potest enim fieri autequam sit, vt non fiat, etiamsi sit futura. Idem quoque secundi Cut Deus homo 27. docet idem, vnde sic ait; Si dicitur, necesse erat vt voluntate sua moreretur, quia vera fuit fides, siue prophetia quae de hoc praecesserant; Non est aliud quam si dicas, necesse fuisse ita fururum esse, quoniam sic futurum erat: huiusmodi autem necessitas non cogit rem esse, sed esse rei facit necessitatē esse. Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa est vt sit res, et est necessitas sequens, quam res facit. Praecedens et efficiens necessitas est, cum dicitur coelum volui, quia necesse est vt voluatur; sequens vero, et quae nihil efficit, sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui quia loqueris. Cum enim hoc dico, significo nihil facere posse vt dum loqueris non loquaris, non quod aliquid te cogat ad loquendum: Nam violentia naturalis conditionis cogit coelum volui, te vero nulla necessitas facit loqui. Et infra, Hac sequenti, et nihil efficienti necessitate, quoniam vera fuit fides et prophetia de Christo, quia ex voluntate, non ex necessitate moriturus erat, necesse fuit vt sic esset; hac homo factus est, hac fecit, et passus est quaecunque fecit et passus", "english": "\"For wood is not always white of necessity, but sometimes, before it became white, it could have failed to become white, and after it is white it can become not white; but white wood is always necessarily white, because neither before it is white nor after it is white can it come about that the white is at the same time not white. Likewise a thing is not present of necessity, since before it was present it could have come about that it would not be present, and after it is present it can become not present; but a present thing is necessarily present always, because neither before it is nor after it is present can it be at the same time not present. In the same way some thing, an action for instance, is not future of necessity, since before it is, it can come about that it is not future; but a future thing is necessarily future, because the future cannot at the same time be not future. Of the past the same is likewise true: a thing is not past of necessity, since before it was it could have come about that it would not be; but it is always necessary that the past be past, since it cannot at the same time not be past; and in a past thing there is something which is not in a present or future thing. For it can never come about that a thing which is past becomes not past, whereas a certain thing that is present can become not present, and something that is not future of necessity can come about as not future. So when the future is said of the future, what is said must be so, because the future is never not future, just as whenever we say the same of the same. For when we say, 'every man is a man,' or 'if he is a man, he is a man,' or 'every white thing is white, and if it is white, it is white,' what is said must be so, because something cannot at the same time be and not be; for if it is not necessary that every future thing be future, some future thing is not future, which is impossible. By necessity, then, every future thing is future, and if it is future, it is future, when the future is said of the future; but this is by a following necessity, which compels nothing to be. When, however, the future is said of a thing, the thing is not always of necessity, though it be future. For if I say, 'Tomorrow there will be a riot among the people,' there will not for all that be a riot of necessity. For it can come about, before it is, that it does not happen, even if it is future.\"\n\nThe same writer, in the second book of Why God Became Man, 27,[n2] teaches the same, and says: \"If it is said, 'It was necessary that he die by his own will, because the faith or prophecy that had gone before concerning this was true,' it is nothing other than if you were to say that it was necessary that it be going to be so, since it was going to be so; but a necessity of this kind does not compel a thing to be, but makes the being of the thing be necessary. For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing is, and there is a following necessity, which the thing makes. A preceding and effecting necessity is that by which it is said that the heavens revolve because it is necessary that they revolve; a following one, which effects nothing but comes to be, is that by which I say that you speak of necessity because you are speaking. For when I say this, I signify that nothing can bring it about that, while you are speaking, you are not speaking, not that anything compels you to speak: for the violence of a natural condition compels the heavens to revolve, but no necessity makes you speak.\" And below: \"By this following necessity, which effects nothing, since the faith and prophecy about Christ were true, because he was to die by will, not of necessity, it was necessary that it be so; by this the man was made, by this he did, and suffered, whatever he did and suffered,", "margins": [{"id": "716B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}]}, {"anchor": "p716C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p716C", "locator_display": "716C–716D", "source_text": "est, hac voluit quaecunque voluit. Ideo enim necessitate fuerunt quia futura erant, et futura erant quia fuerunt, et fuerunt quia fuerunt. Sanctus quoque Thomas vbi proximo fuerat allegatus, statim post autoritatem eius praemissam subiungit; Vnde bona est distinctio, quod est necessarium necessitate consequentiae et non consequentis, vel necessitate conditionata non absoluta: et infra distinguit istam, Omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse, eo quod potest esse de dicto, et sic vera; vel de re, et sic falsa. Qui et primo contra Gentiles 67.83. et 85. istam distinctionem multo clarius et diffusius recitat et exponit, et secundum illam semper respondet in ista materia de futuris. Lumbardus etiam 1. sentent. dist. 38. et 40. secundum istam distinctionem in materia ista respondet, quem et pene omnes posteriores Doctores communiter imitantur. Sed ista responsio multipliciter deficit. Primo quia falsa; secundo, quia incauta; tertio quia diminuta. Primo, inquam, deficit, quia falsa. Falso namque exponit autoritates ponentes necessitatem omnium futurorum respectu causarum\n\nsuperiorum, seu causae primae, non autem respectu inferiorum, seu etiam secundarum, dicendo eas loqui tantummodo de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali. Non enim iste est intellectus Autorum, sed alius quem non tangit, quem capitulum proximiun exponebat. Si enim Autores in autoritatibus talibus tantummodo loquerentur de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali, ita haberent concedere quod futura necessario euenirent respectu causarum inferiorum et secundarum, sicut respectu superiorum et primae. Consequentia namque seu conditionalis in talibus respectu causarum secundarum ita est necessaria sicut respectu primae. Sicut enim haec consequentia seu conditionalis est necessaria, Deus praescit hoc esse futurum, seu faciet hoc futurum, vel si Deus praescit seu faciet hoc futurum, hoc erit; ita est ista, Causa secunda praescit hoc esse futurum, vel faciet hoc futurum, ergo hoc erit; et de conditionali similiter. Item omnis doctrina debet esse alicuius dubij aut ignoti; sed ista consequentia seu conditionalis nunquam fuit alicui dubia aut ignota, Deus, vel si Deus praescit", "english": "by this he willed whatever he willed. For they were of necessity because they were going to be, and they were going to be because they were, and they were because they were.\"\n\nSaint Thomas also, where he had last been cited, adds immediately after his authority set out above: \"Hence the distinction is good, that something is necessary by necessity of the consequence and not of the consequent, or by conditioned, not absolute, necessity\"; and below he distinguishes thus: \"Everything known by God is necessarily so, because it can be taken of the dictum, and so it is true; or of the thing, and so it is false.\" In Against the Gentiles 1, 67, 83 and 85, he recites and expounds this distinction much more clearly and at greater length, and according to it he always answers in this matter of futures. Lombard also, in Sentences 1, dist. 38 and 40, answers in this matter according to this distinction, and almost all later Doctors commonly imitate him. But this reply fails in many ways: first because it is false; second because it is incautious; third because it is incomplete. First, I say, it fails because it is false. For it falsely expounds the authorities that posit the necessity of all futures in respect of the superior causes, or the first cause, but not in respect of the inferior, or even secondary, causes, by saying that they speak only of necessity of consequence, or conditional necessity. For this is not the Authors' meaning, but another, which it does not touch, and which the preceding chapter expounded. For if the Authors in such authorities were speaking only of necessity of consequence or conditional necessity, they would have to concede that futures come about necessarily in respect of inferior and secondary causes just as in respect of the superior and first. For the consequence or conditional in such cases is as necessary in respect of secondary causes as in respect of the first. For just as this consequence or conditional is necessary, \"God foreknows that this will be, or will make this be, or: if God foreknows or will make this be, this will be,\" so is this one, \"A secondary cause foreknows that this will be, or will make this be, therefore this will be\"; and likewise of the conditional. Moreover all teaching ought to concern something doubtful or unknown; but this consequence or conditional was never doubtful or unknown to anyone, \"God, or: if God foreknows", "margins": [{"id": "716C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Lombard. — In the print, but not keyed in the TCP text, a further source margin \"Thomas.\" stands beside \"Sanctus quoque Thomas\" (716C); see Errata."}]}, {"anchor": "p716E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p716E", "locator_display": "716E–717B", "source_text": "hoc esse futurum, ergo hoc est futurum seu erit; quis ergo sapiens hoc scriberet vt doceret, cum non sit docibile, sed per se scibile a quocunque, supposita notitia terminorum? Item si Autores intelligerent tantum istud, nullo modo soluerent propositam quaestionem. Supposita namque et concessa necessitate consequentiae et conditionalis huiusmodi, quomodo per hanc soluitur per plexitas quaestionis? Quis enim tantum hac necessitate sibi ostensa, non tantum dubitabit de libero arbitrio, merito, et demerito, certitudine, fallibilitate, aut mutabilitate diuinae scientiae, et caeteris problema istud tangentibus, sicut prius maxime, quia nullus vnquam sani capitis de illa necessitate consequentiae dubitauit? Cur etiam tam multi Autores, tam multa, tam ambigua et tam difficilia de ista materia et ista necessitate scripserunt,\n\nsi nihil aliud intelligere voluerunt, cum in vno verbo breuissimo et leuissimo se porerant expedisse, dicendo. quod in omnibus talibus est necessitas consequentiae seu conditionalis tantummodo? Ad cundem quoque intellectum de necessitate haberent concedere quod Chimaera, et omnia non futura de necessitate euenient: nam ita necessaria est consequentia et conditionalis praemissa de eis, sicut de alijs. Nam necessario sequitur, Deus praescit, vel si Deus praescit, quod Chimaera, et omnia non futura euenient, ergo illa euenient. Nec potest aliquis respondere, quod in praeteritis et futuris ponitur antecedens inesse, in his autem non, et ideo non est similis necessitas hic et ibi, quia consequentia seu conditionalis ipsa per se in vere praescitis et futuris non ponit antecedens in esse, sicut nec in alia materia, seu alijs terminis quibuscunque, sed necessitatem consecutionis tantummodo, et sic facit alia consequentia seu conditionalis praemissa. Loquendo ergo praecise de sola necessitate\n\npraedicta, •milem oportet concedere de Chimaera, et omnibus non futuris nec praescitis, sicut de futuris et vere praescitis. Consequentia enim et conditionalis huiusmodi simili necessitate firmatur, sicut alia qualiscunque. Praeterea in ista consequentia, Deus praesci• Chimaeram fore, ergo Chimaera necessario erit, supponitur, et ponitur antecedens, sicut in ista, Deus praescit Antichristum fore, ergo Antichristus necessario erit, et necessitas consequentiae est aequalis, ergo simpliciter aequalis et similis est necessitas in ambabus. Nec sufficit dicere, quod antecedens in secunda est verum, et in prima falsum, et ideo non est necessitas similis hic et ibi. Falsitas enim antecedentis necessitatem consequentiae nullatenus minuit, nec veritas ipsam auget, sicut nullus Dialecticorum ignorat. Cum ergo necessitas consequentiae nullo modo veritatem antecedentis includat respiciendo ad solam necessitatem consequentiae, similis est necessitas in ambabus: et hanc solam in talibus", "english": "that this will be,[n3] therefore this is future, or will be\"; what wise man, then, would write this in order to teach it, since it is not teachable but knowable per se by anyone, the meaning of the terms being supposed? Again, if the Authors understood only this, they would in no way resolve the question proposed. For with the necessity of consequence and conditional of this kind supposed and conceded, how is the perplexity of the question resolved by it? For who, with only this necessity shown to him, will not be as much in doubt as before about free choice, merit and demerit, the certainty, fallibility or mutability of divine knowledge, and the other matters touching this problem, and especially since no one of sound mind ever doubted that necessity of consequence? Why also have so many Authors written so much, and so ambiguous and so difficult, on this matter and this necessity, if they wished to understand nothing else, when they could have disposed of it in one very short and very light word, saying that in all such cases there is only a necessity of consequence or of the conditional? By the same understanding of necessity they would have to concede that the Chimera, and all things that are not future, will come about of necessity: for the consequence and conditional laid down about them is as necessary as about the rest. For it follows necessarily, \"God foreknows, or: if God foreknows, that the Chimera and all non-futures will come about, therefore they will come about.\" Nor can anyone reply that in past and future things the antecedent is posited as being the case, but not in these, and that therefore the necessity is not alike here and there, because the consequence or conditional itself, per se, does not posit the antecedent as being the case in truly foreknown and future things, any more than in any other matter or any other terms whatever, but posits only the necessity of the following-from, and so does any other consequence or conditional that is laid down. Speaking, then, precisely of the necessity just mentioned alone, one must concede the like of the Chimera, and of all things neither future nor foreknown, as of future and truly foreknown things. For a consequence and conditional of this kind is confirmed by a like necessity, as is any other whatever. Moreover, in this consequence, \"God foreknows that the Chimera will be, therefore the Chimera will necessarily be,\" the antecedent is supposed and posited, just as in this one, \"God foreknows that Antichrist will be, therefore Antichrist will necessarily be\"; and the necessity of the consequence is equal; therefore the necessity in both is simply equal and alike. Nor does it suffice to say that the antecedent in the second is true and in the first false, and that therefore the necessity is not alike here and there. For falsity of the antecedent in no way diminishes the necessity of the consequence, nor does truth increase it, as no dialectician is ignorant. Since, therefore, the necessity of the consequence in no way includes the truth of the antecedent, so far as the necessity of the consequence alone is concerned the necessity is alike in both; and this alone in such cases", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p717C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p717C", "locator_display": "717C–717D", "source_text": "ponit ista responsio; quare habet ponere consequenter, quod sicut necesse est Antichristum fore, sic et Chimaeram. Textus quoque ac processus Autorum de ista necessitate loquentium, istam glossam velut vipeream, peremtoriam scilicet sui textus, non expositoriam, redarguunt et conuincunt. Causa namque, quam assignat Boetius vbi prius, quare futura contingentia sunt necessaria respectu cognitionis seu voluntatis diuinae, et non respectu causarum inferiorum, est ista, quia apud cognitionem diuinam sunt praesentia, et esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; sed apud causas inferiores non sunt praesentia, sed futura, et ideo apud eas, antequam sint, possunt non esse. Dicit eoim Boetius 5. de consolatione Philosophiae, prosa vlt. Quoniam omne iudicium secundum sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est autem Deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status, scientia quoque eius omnem temporis supergressa morionem, in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae, infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spacia complectens, omnia quasi\n\niam gerantur, in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praesentiam pensare velis, qua cuncta dignoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri, sed scientiam nunquam deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis; vnde non praeuidentia, sed prouidentia potius dicitur. Et infra nulla necessitas cogit incedere voluntate gradientem, quamuis eum, cum graditur, incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo, si quid prouidentia praesens vider, id esse necesse est, tametsi nullam naturae habeat necessitatem, atque Deus ea futura, quae ex arbitrij libertate proueniunt, praesentia contuetur. Haec ergo ad intuitum relata diuinum necessaria fiunt per conditionem seu dispositionem diuinae notionis. Et inferius cuidam obijcienti, et quaerenti ab eo, Quid igitur refert non esse necessaria, cum propter diuinae scientiae conditionem modis omnibus necessitatis instar eueniant? Quasi diceret, si sit ita, inter esse non necessaria vel necessaria nihil refert. Boetius sic respondet; Hoc refert, quod ea quae paulo ante proposui, Sol oriens, et gradiens homo, quae dum fiunt non fieri non possunt, eorum tamen vnum priusquam fieret, necesse erat existere, alterum", "english": "this reply posits; so it must hold consistently that just as it is necessary that Antichrist will be, so it is also of the Chimera. The text, too, and the course of argument of the Authors who speak of this necessity refute and convict this gloss as a viper-like one,[n4] that is, one destructive of its own text and not expository. For the cause which Boethius assigns where he spoke earlier, why future contingents are necessary in respect of divine cognition or will, and not in respect of inferior causes, is this: that with divine cognition they are present, and what is, when it is, is necessary; but with inferior causes they are not present but future, and therefore with them, before they are, they can fail to be. For Boethius says in Consolation of Philosophy 5, last prose: \"Since every judgment comprehends the things subject to it according to its own nature, and God has always an eternal and present state, his knowledge also, surpassing all movement of time, abides in the simplicity of its presence, and, embracing the infinite spaces of past and future, considers all things in its simple cognition as if now being done. And so if you wish to weigh the presence by which he discerns all things, you will rightly judge that it is not foreknowledge as of a future thing, but knowledge of a never-failing instant; hence it is called not praevidentia but rather providentia.\" And below: \"No necessity compels the man who walks by his will to walk, though it is necessary that he walk when he walks. In the same way, then, if providence sees anything as present, it must be, though it has no necessity of nature, and God beholds as present those futures which proceed from the freedom of choice. These things, then, referred to the divine view, become necessary through the condition or disposition of the divine notion.\" And further down, to someone who objects and asks him, \"What difference does it make, then, that they are not necessary, since by reason of the condition of divine knowledge they come about in every way in the manner of necessity?\" (as if he said, \"If it is so, it makes no difference whether they are not necessary or necessary\"), Boethius replies: \"This is the difference: those things which I put forward a little earlier, the rising Sun and the walking man, which while they happen cannot fail to happen, yet of these one, before it happened, was necessary to exist, the other", "margins": [{"id": "717D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) generantur."}, {"id": "717D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) intuitionis."}]}, {"anchor": "p717E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p717E", "locator_display": "717E–718A", "source_text": "vero minime: ita etiam quae presentia Deus habet, proculdubio existent, sed eorum hoc quidem dererum necessitate descendit, illud vero de potestate facientium. Haud igitur iniuria diximus, haec si ad diuinam notitiam referantur, necessaria; si per se considerentur, necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta. Quem in hac assignatione causae sequitur sanctus Thomas super 1. sentent. dist. 38. quaest. 5. Deus, inquiens, ab aeterno non solum vidit ordinem sui ad rem, ex cuius potestate res erat futura, sed ipsum esse rei intuebatur: quod qualiter sit, euidenter docet Boetius in libro de consolatione. Omnis enim cognitio est secundum modum cognoscentis; cum igitur Deus sit ab aeterno, oportet quod cognitio eius aeternitatis habeat modum, qui est totum esse simul sine succcssione: vnde sicut quamuis tempus sit successiuum, tamen eternitas est praesens omnibus temporibus vna et eadem indiuisibilis, vt nunc stans: ita cognitio sua intuetur omnia temporalia, quamuis sint succedentia, vt praesentia sibi, nec aliquid eorum est futurum respectu ipsius, sed vnum respectu alterius. Vnde secundum\n\nBoetium melius dicitur prouidentia, quam praeuidentia, quia non quasi futurum, sed omnia quasi praesentia vno intuitu prouidet, quasi ab aeternitatis specula: sed tamen potest dici praeuidentia in quantum cognoscit id quod futurum est nobis, non sibi. Et infra, Actus diuinae cognitionis transit supra contingens, et si futurum sit nobis sicut visus noster supra ipsum dum est; et quia esse quod est, quando est, necesse est, quod tamen absolute non est necessarium, ideo dicitur quod in se consideratum est contingens, relatum ad Dei cognitionem est necessarium, quia ad ipsam refertur, secundum quod est in esse actuali, et ideo omnino simile est, si ego viderem Socratem currere praesentialiter, quod quidem in se est contingens, sed relatum ad visum meum est necessarium. Et infra, Scitum a Deo potest sumi secundum conditionem qua subiacet diuinae scientiae, et hoc est, secundum quod habet esse terminatum,", "english": "not at all: so also the things which God has as present will without doubt exist, but of these the one descends from the necessity of things, the other from the power of those who do them. We have, then, not unjustly said that these, if referred to the divine notice, are necessary; if considered in themselves, are free from the bonds of necessity.\" Saint Thomas follows him in this assignment of the cause, on Sentences 1, dist. 38, q. 5.[n5] \"God,\" he says, \"from eternity not only saw the order of himself to the thing, from whose power the thing was to be, but beheld the very being of the thing; how this is, Boethius clearly teaches in the book On Consolation. For all cognition is according to the mode of the knower; since, therefore, God is from eternity, his cognition must have the mode of eternity, which is the whole being at once without succession. Hence, just as, though time is successive, eternity is nevertheless present to all times, one and the same and indivisible, like a standing now, so his cognition beholds all temporal things, though they come in succession, as present to itself, nor is any of them future in respect of it, but only one in respect of another. Hence, according to Boethius, it is better called providence than foresight, because it does not provide as for something future, but provides for all things as present in a single view, as from the watchtower of eternity; yet it can be called foresight insofar as it knows that which is future to us, not to itself.\" And below: \"The act of divine cognition passes over the contingent, even if it is future to us, as our sight passes over it while it is; and because what is, when it is, is necessary, which however is not absolutely necessary, it is therefore said that what, considered in itself, is contingent, is necessary when related to God's cognition, because it is referred to that cognition as it is in actual being; and so it is altogether like this: if I were to see Socrates running in the present, that is in itself contingent, but related to my sight is necessary.\" And below: \"What is known by God can be taken according to the condition under which it lies under divine knowledge, that is, insofar as it has determinate being,", "margins": [{"id": "717E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Thomas."}]}, {"anchor": "p718B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p718B", "locator_display": "718B–718C", "source_text": "et sic necessitatem habet: vel potest sumi sine illa conditione, vt scilicet est in causis suis, antequam sit in actu, et sic non habet necessitatem. Venerabilis quoque Anselmus De concord. 3. et 4. similem causam similis dicti reddit. Dicit enim quod omnia futura sunt necessaria et immutabilia in aeternitate, non necessaria, sed mutabilia in tempore antequam fiant; quia in aeternitate, inquit, non est praeteritum vel futurum, sed tantum praesens immutabile. Haec igitur est causa Autorum, quare omnia futura respectu causarum superiorum, scilicet cognitionis et voluntatis diuinae, sunt necessaria, quia esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; et omnia futura sunt ibi in praesentia et in actu; et quare respectu inferiorum causarum non sunt necessaria, quia ibi non sunt actualiter praesentia, sed futura. Quomodo ergo loquuntur de necessitate, cum dicunt, quia esse quod est, quando est, necesse est, vel de necessitate consequentiae siue dicti vel rei? vel an intelligunt totam propositionem in sensu coniuncto, vel diuiso? Si secundo modo intelligant, ergo cum ex illa causa interunt consequenter, quod omnia futura respectu superiorum causarum de necessitate euenient, similem necessitatem\n\nintelligent; non ergo solam necessitatem consequentiae seu conditionis, vt responsio ista fingit. Si autem intelligant primo modo secundum eundem intellectum, haberent concedere quod fore seu futurum esse quod erit, quando erit, necesse erit. Nam ita necessaria est ista consequentia, Si aliquid erit, ipsum erit; sicut ista, Si aliquid est, ipsum est; et ita necessaria est ista secundum eos de dicto, siue in sensu composito, sicut illa. Nam ita impossibile est quod aliquid simul sit futurum et non sit futurum, sicut quod aliquid simul praesentialiter sit et non sit, quod tamen non concedunt, sed negant, doctrinam Philosophi 1. peri hermenias vlt. imitantes, dicendo, quod Esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; futura vero antequam veniant, et hoc est, quando et dum sunt futura, non necessario euentura, sed posse nullatenus euenire. Praeterea quando Boetius assignando differentiam inter necessarium et non necessarium in autoritate praemissa, dicit quod Sol oriens, et gradiens homo dum fiunt, non fieri non possunt; eorum tamen vnum, scilicet primum, priusquam fieret, necesse erat existere,", "english": "and so it has necessity; or it can be taken without that condition, that is, as it is in its causes before it is in act, and so it has no necessity.\" The venerable Anselm also, On Concord 3 and 4, gives a like cause for a like saying. For he says that all futures are necessary and immutable in eternity, but not necessary, rather mutable, in time before they come to be; because in eternity, he says, there is neither past nor future, but only an immutable present. This, then, is the Authors' cause why all futures in respect of superior causes, namely divine cognition and will, are necessary: because what is, when it is, is necessary, and all futures are there in presence and in act; and why in respect of inferior causes they are not necessary: because there they are not actually present but future. In what way, then, do they speak of necessity when they say that what is, when it is, is necessary: of necessity of the consequence or dictum, or of the thing? Or do they understand the whole proposition in the conjoined sense, or in the divided? If in the second way, then, since from that cause they infer in consequence that all futures in respect of the superior causes will come about of necessity, they understand a like necessity; not, therefore, the necessity of consequence or conditional alone, as this reply imagines. But if they understand it in the first way, by the same understanding they would have to concede that for what will be to be going to be (fore, that is, futurum esse), when it will be, will be necessary. For this consequence, \"If something will be, it will be,\" is as necessary as this, \"If something is, it is\"; and according to them this one is as necessary of the dictum, or in the composite sense, as that one. For it is as impossible that something be at once future and not future as that something be at once present and not be; which they do not concede but deny, imitating the doctrine of the Philosopher, On Interpretation 1, last,[n6] saying that what is, when it is, is necessary; but that future things, before they come, that is, when and while they are future, will not come about necessarily, but can in no way come about.[n7] Moreover, when Boethius, assigning the difference between the necessary and the non-necessary in the authority set out above, says that the rising Sun and the walking man, while they happen, cannot fail to happen, yet that of them one, namely the first, before it happened, was necessary to exist,", "margins": [{"id": "718B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) necesse."}, {"id": "718B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) composito. — The TCP key merges into the first variant a second margin, the source \"Anselmus.\", which stands beside \"Venerabilis quoque Anselmus\" (718B); see Errata."}, {"id": "718C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) omne."}]}, {"anchor": "p718D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p718D", "locator_display": "718D–718E", "source_text": "alterum vero minime, id est, hominem fieri gradientem, innuendo quod priusquam homo graderetur, possibile fuit ipsum non gradi, quomodo intelligit de necessario et possibili, vel simpliciter omnino, scilicet respectu quarumcunque causarum superiorum, et inferiorum similiter, vel secundum quid, respectu scilicet inferiorum naturalium que causarum? Non intelligit primo modo, quia secundum suam sententiam ante et post illam differentiam positam, sicut vnum eorum priusquam fieret, erat necessarium respectu primae causae, sic reliquum; et quia Deus aeque libere operatur ad extra quemcunque effectum, sicut 9. et 20. primi, 30. secundi, ac suppositio prima docent; Non est ergo magis necessarium respectu voluntatis diuinae volentis et facientis haec ambo, quod Sol oriatur, quam quod homo gradiatur, sicut et decimum primi probat; et quia dicit similiter, quod alterum illorum priusquam fieret, minime necessarium erat existere, quod non potest intelligi respectu primae causae, scilicet prouidentiae et cognitionis diuinae, quia secundum suam sententiam superius recitatam, omnia\n\nsunt ibi praesentia: oportet ergo quod intelligat de necessitate et possibilitate istorum secundo dictorum modorum, scilicet respectu naturalium et inferiorum causarum tantummodo respectu quarum solummodo talia dicuntur futura, quod et verba sua sequentia manifestant: nam immediate subiungit, Illa etiam, quae praesentia Deus habet, proculdubio existent, sed eorum hoc quidem de rerum necessitate descendit. Quarum rerum, nisi naturalium et inferiorum? Etaddit, illud vero de potestate facientium, de potestate, scilicet opposita necessitati praemissae, id est libera a necessitate inferiorum causarum: differentiae namque oppositorum oppositae debent esse. Haec igitur secundum eum est differentia inter necessaria, puta ortum Solis, et non necessaria sed libera, puta gressum hominis, quod illa sunt necessaria respectu inferiorum causarum, haec vero nequaquam, sed libera; ita quod secundum eum", "english": "but the other not at all (that is, that a man become a walker), implying that before the man walked it was possible for him not to walk: how does he understand this about the necessary and the possible? Simply and altogether, that is, in respect of any superior causes whatever, and likewise of inferior ones, or in a certain respect, namely in respect of inferior and natural causes? He does not understand it in the first way, because according to his view, before and after that difference is laid down, just as the one of them was necessary in respect of the first cause before it happened, so is the remaining one; and because God works outward any effect whatever equally freely, as the 9th and 20th of the first, the 30th of the second, and the first supposition teach. Hence it is not more necessary, in respect of the divine will willing and making both of these, that the Sun rise than that a man walk, as the tenth of the first also proves. And because he says likewise that the other of those two, before it happened, was by no means necessary to exist, this cannot be understood in respect of the first cause, namely divine providence and cognition, since according to his view recited above all things are present there. It must therefore be that he understands the necessity and possibility of those things in the second of the aforesaid ways, namely in respect of natural and inferior causes only, in respect of which alone such things are called future, as his following words also make plain; for he immediately adds, \"Those things also which God has as present will without doubt exist, but of these the one indeed descends from the necessity of things.\" Of which things, if not of natural and inferior ones? And he adds, \"the other from the power of those who do them\": from a power, that is, opposed to the necessity just mentioned, which is to say free from the necessity of inferior causes; for the differences of opposites must be opposite. This, then, according to him, is the difference between necessary things (the rising of the Sun, say) and non-necessary but free things (a man's walking, say): that the former are necessary in respect of inferior causes, the latter by no means so, but free; so that according to him", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p719A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p719A", "locator_display": "719A–719B", "source_text": "actus liberi arbitrij non dicuntur omnino et simpliciter liberi, quia non respectu quarumcunque causarum, quoniam respectu superiorum dicuntur necessarij, sed dicuntur liberi secundum quid tantum, scilicet respectu inferiorum causarum, sicut quintum et nonum huius ostendunt. Quare et post verba sua praeposita statim subdit, haud igitur iniuria diximus, haec si ad diuinam notitiam referantur, necessaria; si per se considerentur, necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta. Intelligit ergo Boetius in autoritatibus allegatis, quod omnia futura euenient de necessitate superiorum causarum, sicut capitulum proximum exponebat, non de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali tantummodo, sicut ista responsio somniauit: quod et adhuc aliud verbum eius ostendit. Hanc enim necessitatem secundum causas superiores concessurus, et aliam negaturus, praemisit, Fatebor, inquiens, rem solidissimae veritatis, sed cui vix aliquis nisi diuini ingenij speculator accesserit. Respondebo namque idem futurum, cum ad diuinam\n\nnotionem refettur, necessarium; cum vero in sua natura perpenditur, liberum prorsus atque abiolutum videri. Si tamen de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali tantummodo loqueretur, quis tamen asinini ingenij vt ad illam non facillime accesserit speculandam? Quis vnquam istam consequentiam seu conditionalem notis terminis non sciuit, Deus praescit hoc fore, vel si Deus praescit hoc fore, hoc erit? Et quis in literis Philosophicis, seu Theologicis ad limen saltem prouectus, aut etiam idiota omnipotentem Deum credens, istam consequentiam ignorauit, Deus prouidet et vult hoc esse, ergo hoc erit? Vel quis saltem ad istam consequentiam speculandam faciliter non accedat? Non ergo loquitur de necessitate consequent• seu conditionali tantummodo, sed alio capitulo proximo declarata. Et si quis ad istius necessitatis speculationem nequaquam accesserit, non imputet quaeso mihi, sed sui humani ingenii tarditati, togans humiliter et attente, quatenus diuini ingenij aliquod participium mereatur", "english": "acts of free choice are not called wholly and simply free, because they are not free in respect of any causes whatever, since in respect of the superior causes they are called necessary, but are called free in a certain respect only, namely in respect of inferior causes, as the fifth and ninth of this book show. Therefore, right after his words set out above, he adds, \"We have, then, not unjustly said that these, if referred to the divine notice, are necessary; if considered in themselves, are free from the bonds of necessity.\" Boethius therefore understands in the authorities alleged that all futures will come about of the necessity of the superior causes, as the preceding chapter expounded, and not of necessity of consequence or conditional only, as this reply has dreamed; which yet another word of his shows. For, about to concede this necessity in respect of superior causes and to deny another, he prefaced it with: \"I shall confess,\" he says, \"a matter of the most solid truth, but one which scarcely anyone but a contemplator of divine wit has approached. For I shall answer that the same future thing, when it is referred to the divine notion, appears necessary; but when it is weighed in its own nature, appears wholly free and absolute.\" But if he were speaking only of necessity of consequence or conditional, who would be so asinine of wit as not to approach the contemplation of it very easily? Who ever, the terms being known, did not know this consequence or conditional, \"God foreknows that this will be, or: if God foreknows that this will be, it will be\"? And who, advanced at least to the threshold of philosophical or theological letters, or even an unlettered man believing in almighty God, was ignorant of this consequence, \"God provides for this and wills it to be, therefore it will be\"? Or who would not at least approach very readily the contemplation of this consequence? He is not, then, speaking of necessity of consequence or conditional only, but of another, declared in the next chapter. And if anyone has in no way approached the contemplation of this necessity, let him not impute it to me, I beg, but to the slowness of his own human wit, asking humbly and attentively that he may deserve to receive some participation in the divine wit, by which he may be able to contemplate it:", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p719C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p719C", "locator_display": "719C", "source_text": "accipere, quo ipsam valeat speculati: necaestimet quispiam autoritatem Boetij contemnendam, cum sanctus Augustinus, Anselmus, et Thomas, alijque quamplures Doctores Catholici ipsum in ista materia imitentur. Erat namque magnus Philosophus et Doctor Catholicus, sicut libri sui Philosophici et Theologici manifestant, tandemque faelici martyrio coronatus, ascriptusque Sanctorum catalogo sub nomine Seuerini: habebat namque multa nomina more nobilium Romanorum, quae vt communiter librorum suorum initijs praescribuntur. Secundo ista responsio deficit vt incauta: non enim cauit necessitatem quam voluit et credidit praecauisse, nec tribuit nobis quam voluit et credidit liberam potestatem. Si enim ista consequentia est necessaria, Deus praescit aut praeuult quodcunque ergo illud erit, et antecedens non est in potestate nostra, sicut decimum quintum primi et octauum huius ostendunt; ergo nec consequens est in potestate nostra simpliciter libera et exclusoria necessitatis cuiuslibet praecedentis. Tertio deficit ista responsio, quia plutimum diminuta; quia licet aliquibus", "english": "and let no one suppose the authority of Boethius to be despicable, since Saint Augustine, Anselm, Thomas, and very many other Catholic Doctors imitate him in this matter. For he was a great Philosopher and a Catholic Doctor, as his philosophical and theological books show, and was at length crowned with a happy martyrdom and enrolled in the catalogue of the Saints under the name of Severinus;[n8] for he had many names, after the manner of the Roman nobles, which are commonly written at the head of his books. Second, this reply fails as incautious: for it has not guarded against the necessity which it wished, and believed it had guarded against, nor has it granted us the free power which it wished, and believed it had granted. For if this consequence is necessary, \"God foreknows or prewills[n9] whatever it is, therefore it will be,\" and the antecedent is not in our power, as the fifteenth of the first and the eighth of this book show, then neither is the consequent in our power as simply free and excluding every preceding necessity whatever. Third, this reply fails because it is very much incomplete; for although it answers somehow, in appearance, to a few authorities,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p719D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p719D", "locator_display": "719D–719E", "source_text": "paucis autoritatibus apparenter vtcunque respondeat, rationibus tamen factis et quamplurimis autoritatibus alijs non respondet nec poterit respondere. Quomodo namque poterit respondere rationibus ibi factis, et specialiter syllogisticae rationi? Quomodo etiam respondebit Ecclesiastico, Augustino, Sibyllae, Domino nostro Christo, Chrysostomo, Paulo, Iob, Gregorio, Tobiae, Esaiae, Ieremiae, et Glossae? Vel quomodo pot•it respondere ad necessitatem fati diuini, et ad omnes autotitates ac Parisienses articulos illam probantes? Nullus enim ponens necessitatem fatalem, ponit eam esse necessitatem consequentiae, sed conditionalem tantummodo. Quoue colore poterit respondere ad autoritates Augustini 5. de ciuit. Dei, 9. et 10? Nunquam enim fuit aliquis Stoicorum tam stolidus, imo nec aliquis Laicorum tam Laicus, vt crederet omnem necessitatem consequentiae seu conditionalem libertati arbitrij repugnare. Quis enim tam rudis aut fatuus, qui ignoret necessitatem huius consequentiae et conditionalis, Si tu vis libere, tu vis libere, secum compati arbitrij libertatem? Cur ergo Augustinus redargueret Stoicos hanc ponentes, si ipsemet ibidem hanc eandem et aliam\n\nnullam ponat? Cur etiam frustra docet hanc necessitatem non adimere libertatem, cum nullus vnquam hominum hoc nesciuit? Quare haud dubie non istam necessitatem ibi volebat intelligi, sed aliam in capitulo proximo patefactam, quod et verba processus illius ostendunt. Loquens enim ibi de necessitate fati diuini, scilicet a fando dicti, exponit illud Psalmi, Semel loquutus est Deus, id est, immobiliter, hoc est, incommutabiliter loquutus est, sicut nouit incommutabiliter omnia quae futura sunt, et quae facturus est. Deinde repraehendit Stoicos, quia voluntates nostras necessitati huiusmodi subdere noluerunt, ne liberae tunc non essent; et distinguendo de necessitate, tollit eorum motiu•m, ostendens quod vna necessitas, scilicet inuita, quae contingit nobis nolentibus, puta necessitas moriendi, repugnat arbitrij libertati; et quod alia definitur necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse est vt ita sit aliquid, vel ita fiat, quae libertati arbitrij non repugnat. Ecce quam patenter istam necessitatem exprimit, et definit per respectum ad causam actiuam, sicut capitulum proximum", "english": "yet to the reasons set out and to very many other authorities it does not answer, nor will it be able to. For how will it be able to answer the reasons set out there, and especially the syllogistic reason? How also will it answer Ecclesiasticus, Augustine, the Sibyl, our Lord Christ, Chrysostom, Paul, Job, Gregory, Tobias, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the Gloss? Or how could it answer concerning the necessity of divine fate, and all the authorities and Parisian articles that prove it? For no one who posits fatal necessity posits it to be a necessity of consequence, or conditional only.[n10] And by what pretext will it be able to answer the authorities of Augustine, City of God 5, 9 and 10? For there never was any of the Stoics so stupid, indeed no layman so lay, as to believe that every necessity of consequence or conditional is repugnant to freedom of choice. For who is so crude or foolish as to be ignorant that the necessity of this consequence and conditional, \"If you will freely, you will freely,\" is compatible with freedom of choice? Why, then, would Augustine refute the Stoics who posit this, if he himself there posits this very one and no other? Why also does he teach in vain that this necessity does not take away freedom, since no man ever failed to know it? Therefore, without doubt, he did not wish that necessity to be understood there, but another, made plain in the next chapter, as the words of that discourse also show. For speaking there of the necessity of divine fate, that is, of fate as named from speaking (fando), he expounds that verse of the Psalm, \"God has spoken once,\"[n11] that is, immovably, that is, unchangeably has he spoken, as he unchangeably knows all things that will be and that he is going to do. Then he rebukes the Stoics, because they did not wish to subject our wills to a necessity of this kind, lest they then not be free; and by distinguishing concerning necessity, he removes their motive, showing that one necessity, namely the unwilling one, which befalls us against our will (the necessity of dying, for instance), is repugnant to freedom of choice, and that another necessity is defined, according to which we say that it is necessary that something be so, or come to be so, and this is not repugnant to freedom of choice. See how plainly he expresses this necessity, and defines it by reference to an active cause, as the next chapter expounded;", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p720A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p720A", "locator_display": "720A–720B", "source_text": "exponebat: et haec est duplex, conseruatiua scilicet et factiua, sicut in secundo primi docetur. Pro conseruatiua dicit, necessitas, secundum quam dicimus, necesse est vt ita sit aliquid; et pro factiua subiungit, vel ita fiat, de necessitate vero consequentiae seu conditionali nullam penitus faciens mentionem. Quare non videtur quod de necessitate consequentiae seu conditionali tantummodo velit loqui. quod et ratio exemplaris, per quam ostendit suum propositum, clare docet. Ostendit enim necessitatem praedictam, secundum quam scilicet dicimus, necesse est vt ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat, non esse timendam ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis, quia nec vitam et praescientiam Dei ponimus sub necessitate, scilicet primo modo, quae aufert vel minuit libertatem, si dicamus necesse esse Deum semper viuere, et cuncta praescire, sicut nec potestas eius minuitur, cum dicitur mori fallique non posse. In hac autem ratione nihil penitus loquitur nec intelligit de necessitate consequentiae, seu conditionali quacunque. Quomodo etiam per hanc necessitatem possunt exponi aliae autoritates ipsius de correptione\n\net gratia capitulo proximo memoratae? Illa quoque eius autoritas, De fide ad Petrum quomodo per istam glossam subtilem et logicam, et non nisi talibus agnitam exponetur? imo potius peruertetur, maxime cum ipse velit omnia dicta sua in illo libello intelligi ad vulgarem et vsitatum modum loquendi simplicium fidelium vel infidelium, rudium, indoctorum, vt nullus sensus posset eis surrepere haereticae falsitatis: vnde et in capite libri ait, Epistolam fili Petre tuae charitatis accepi, in qua significasti velle te Hierosolymam pergere, et poposcisti te literis nostris instrui, quam debeas in illis partibus verae; fidei regulam tenere, vt nullus tibi posset sensus hereticae subrepere falsitatis. Qui et in calcaneo libri dicit, Haec interim 40. capitula ad regulam verae fidei firmissime pertinentia fideliter crede, fortiter tene, veraciter patienterque defende; et si quem contraria his dogmatizare cognoueris, tanquam pestem fuge, et tanquam haereticum abijce. Ita enim ista, quae posuimus, fidei catholicae congruunt, vt si quis non solum omnibus, sed etiam singulis voluerit contraire, in eo quod singulis horum", "english": "and this is twofold, conservative namely and factive, as is taught in the second of the first. For the conservative he says, \"the necessity according to which we say it is necessary that something be so\"; and for the factive he adds, \"or come to be so,\" making no mention whatever of necessity of consequence or conditional. Hence it does not seem that he wishes to speak of necessity of consequence or conditional only; and the exemplary reasoning by which he shows his purpose also teaches this plainly. For he shows that the aforesaid necessity, according to which we say that it is necessary that something be so or come to be so, is not to be feared lest it take freedom of will from us, because we do not put God's life and foreknowledge under necessity in the first manner, the manner that takes away or diminishes freedom, if we say that it is necessary that God always live and foreknow all things, just as his power is not diminished when it is said that he cannot die or be deceived. But in this reasoning he says and understands nothing whatever about necessity of consequence or any conditional. How, moreover, can other authorities of his, on correction and grace, mentioned in the next chapter, be expounded by this necessity? And that authority of his, On the Faith, to Peter, how will it be expounded by this subtle and logical gloss, recognized only by such as these? Rather it will be perverted, especially since he himself wishes all his sayings in that little book to be understood according to the common and customary way of speaking of simple believers or unbelievers, the rude and the unlearned, so that no sense of heretical falsehood could creep in on them. Hence at the head of the book he says: \"I have received the letter of your charity, my son Peter, in which you indicated that you wished to go to Jerusalem, and asked to be instructed by our letters how you should hold the rule of the true faith in those parts, so that no sense of heretical falsehood could creep in on you.\"[n12] And at the heel of the book he says: \"These forty chapters for now, which most firmly pertain to the rule of the true faith, believe faithfully, hold strongly, defend truthfully and patiently; and if you learn that anyone teaches doctrines contrary to these, flee him as a plague, and cast him out as a heretic.\" For these things which we have set down so agree with the Catholic faith that if anyone should wish to contradict not only all of them but even single ones, in that he stubbornly resists each single one of these,", "margins": [{"id": "720B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) iterum."}]}, {"anchor": "p720C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p720C", "locator_display": "720C–720D", "source_text": "contumaciter repugnat, et his qui contraria docere non dubitat, haereticus et fidei Christianae inimicus, atque ex hoc omnibus catholicis anathematizandus appareat. Quare et planissime affirmando et certissime asserendo, firmissime, inquit, tene, et nullatenus dubites ita esse. Item quomodo per hanc responsionem exponetur Anselmus, et specialiter de concor. 3. vbi dicit, Quae tempore praeterita sunt, ad similitudinem aeterni praesentis omnino immutabilia sunt? Hoc enim non potest exponi de immutabilitate consequentiae, conditionalis, seu dicti, sed rei, cum sit categorica vna pura. Cum etiam statim post dicit, quod quae sunt praesentia in aeternitate nunquam possunt non esse ibi praesentia, sed praesentia in tempore possunt non esse ibi praesentia, vel intelligit in sensu compositionis et de dicto, vel in sensu diuisionis et de re. Non primo modo, quia sic secunda pars est falsa; quoniam sicut ista non est possibilis, praesentia in aeternitate non sunt praesentia in aeternitate, sic nec ista, praesentia in tempore\n\nnon sunt praesentia in tempore: intelligit ergo secundo modo, sicut capitulum proximum, quod tam verba eius quam processus indicant euidenter. Pro motiuis autem huius responsionis sciendum, quod illa distinctio de necessitate consequentiae seu consequentis, conditionali vel absoluta, de dicto vel de re, est in casibus suis bona, sicut in ista et suis similibus, Si sim cras lecturus, necesse est cras me legere: Veruntamen rationes et autoritates praemissae capitulo proximo non possunt exponi rationabiliter, nec ad intellectum tantum per ipsam, sicut superius est ostensum. Primo autem pro dicto Boetij aduertendum quod multum congrue potuit exemplariter hoc dixisse. Videns enim quod esset multum difficile intellectu, quomodo aliquid esset necessarium respectu voluntatis et cognitionis diuinae, et liberum in sua natura, voluit hoc vtcunque ostendere per manifestum exemplum, vt sic per faciliora et notiora, ad difficiliora et ignotiora deduceret tardiores, sicut in omni disciplina Philosophica et Theologica est creber modus docendi, et vtilis per exempla; quare non immerito exemplum inter species argumenti a Logicis computatur. Volens igitur Boetius ostendere,", "english": "and these points, he who does not hesitate to teach the contrary[n13] would appear a heretic and an enemy of the Christian faith, and on this account one to be anathematized by all Catholics. Hence, affirming most plainly and asserting most certainly, he says, \"Hold most firmly, and by no means doubt, that it is so.\" Again, how will Anselm be expounded by this reply, and especially in On Concord 3, where he says, \"Things that are past in time are, in likeness to the eternal present, altogether immutable\"? For this cannot be expounded of the immutability of a consequence, a conditional, or a dictum, but of the thing, since it is one pure categorical. Also when he says immediately afterwards that things present in eternity can never fail to be present there, but things present in time can fail to be present there, he understands it either in the sense of composition and of the dictum, or in the sense of division and of the thing. Not in the first way, because then the second part is false; for just as this is not possible, \"things present in eternity are not present in eternity,\" so neither is this, \"things present in time are not present in time\": he understands it, therefore, in the second way, as does the preceding chapter, which both his words and his course of argument plainly indicate. As for the motives of this reply, it must be known that that distinction concerning necessity of the consequence or of the consequent, conditional or absolute, of the dictum or of the thing, is good in its own cases, as in this one and its like, \"If I am going to read tomorrow, it is necessary that I read tomorrow.\" Nevertheless, the reasons and authorities set out in the preceding chapter cannot be expounded reasonably by it, nor [brought] to their meaning through it alone,[n14] as was shown above. First, however, for the saying of Boethius, it must be noted that he could very fittingly have said this by way of example. For, seeing that it would be very difficult to understand how something could be necessary in respect of the divine will and cognition and yet free in its own nature, he wished to show this somehow by a manifest example, so that by easier and better-known things he might lead the slower to the more difficult and the unknown, as in every philosophical and theological discipline a frequent and useful way of teaching is by examples; for which reason an example is, not undeservedly, counted by logicians among the species of argument. Boethius, therefore, wishing to show", "margins": [{"id": "720C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) testimoniis."}]}, {"anchor": "p720E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p720E", "locator_display": "720E", "source_text": "quod aliqua futura essent necessaria respectu primae causae, et libera in sua natura, consulte dicebat; Duae sunt necessitates, simplex vna, veluti quod necesse est omnes homines esse mortales; altera conditionalis, vt si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare necesse est, vt sic puram necessitatem a futuris contingentibus deneger, et per secundam, in qua consequens est necessarium respectu antecedentis, et liberum in sua natura, ostendat vtcunque licet multum dispariter et remote, quod ita potest esse de libere futuris respectu primae causae. Ipsa enim est causa naturaliter antecedens, ex qua cuncta libera necessario consequuntur: necessario inquam respectu illius, non in sua natura, sicut capitulum proximum exponebat: quare et in toto processu sequente negat semper necessitatem naturae, et coactionis ab actibus liberis,", "english": "that some future things were necessary with respect to the first cause, and free in their own nature, he said advisedly: \"There are two necessities, one simple, as that it is necessary that all men be mortal; the other conditional, as, if you know that someone is walking, it is necessary that he is walking.\" In this way he might deny pure necessity of future contingents. By the second necessity, in which the consequent is necessary with respect to the antecedent and yet free in its own nature, he might show in some fashion, though with great dissimilarity and remoteness, that the same can hold of freely future things with respect to the first cause. For that cause is the naturally antecedent cause, from which all free things follow necessarily: necessarily, I say, with respect to it, not in their own nature, as the preceding chapter explained. Wherefore in the whole course that follows he always denies of free acts the necessity of nature and of coercion, but the other", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p721A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p721A", "locator_display": "721A–721B", "source_text": "aliam vero, scil. secundum causas superiores nunquam: qd. tamen, vt videtur, aliquando fecisset, si eam nullatenus posuisset, Imo et hic et 4. prosa. 6. semper ipsam probat, expresse sustinet▪ et defendit, sicut testatur totus eius processus, et specialiter autoritates cap. proximo recitatae. Secundo dico pro intellectu Boetij et omnium aliorum, qui dicunt expresse qd. in talibus est necessitas conditionalis, consequentiae, dicti, siue coniunctim, non autem consequentis, rei, siue diuisim; quod hoc est verum ad duplicem intellectum. Primo, quia secundum ipsos in omni tali conditionali, consequentia, dicto, et enuntiatione composita est necessitas absoluta; in consequente vero, vel re, siue enuntiatione diuisa nequaquam. Secundo, ad communem et vsitatum modum loquendi: sic enim consequentia est necessaria apud omnes, sed consequens non est ita. Necessitas nam que et libertas consequentiū talium secundū cōmuniorem et vsitatiorem modsi loquendi, tantum secundum causas inferiores attenditur, de quibus\n\ntam vulgates quam scientiarum ferme omnium professores considerant plurimum et loquuntur, sicut 5. et proximum huius docent. Tertio, pro intellectu Boetij, quia solent Philosophi pauca verba multis sententijs onetare, dicente Ouid. 3. de vetula, pauca loquuti, Multa subesse suis voluerunt pondera verbis, credo quod per necessitatem conditionis, praeter necessitatē conditionalem praedictam, voluit intelligere cum Anselmo necessitatem concomitantē siue sequentem, quae consurgit quodammodo ex positione rei praesentis in esse, et ipsam necessario comitatur, et sequitur dum est praesens; qua secundum Philosophos, et Theologos, et secundum omnes communiter dicitur, quod Omne qd. est, quando est, necesse est esse, sicut 2. huius plenius docebatur; qui ideo sic rationabiliter intelligete potuit, quoniam sicut in conditionali ex antecedenti necessario sequitur consequens, sic et in rebus ex quacun que re posita praesentialiter iam in esse, velut ex causa antecedēte secundū naturā, vel saltē includente causā anteced. secundum naturam, necessario realiter sequitur velut inseperabile, consequens secundū naturam, quia posterior naturaliter necesitas quaedam talis. De hoc tamen sicut de alijs omnibus", "english": "(namely the necessity according to superior causes) never. As it seems, he would have done this at some point, had he not posited that necessity at all. Indeed both here and in Book 4, prose 6, he always proves it, expressly maintains and defends it,[n15] as his whole argument attests, and especially the authorities cited in the preceding chapter.\n\nSecond, I say, for the understanding of Boethius and of all the others who say expressly that in such matters there is conditional necessity, of the consequence, of the dictum, or taken jointly, but not of the consequent, of the thing, or taken severally,[n16] that this is true on a twofold understanding. First, because according to them, in every such conditional, consequence, dictum, and composite proposition there is absolute necessity, but in the consequent, or the thing, or the divided proposition, by no means. Second, according to the common and usual way of speaking: for in that way the consequence is necessary for all, but the consequent is not. For the necessity and freedom of such consequences, according to the more common and usual way of speaking, is considered only with respect to inferior causes. About these both the common people and the professors of almost all the sciences think and speak the most, as 5 and the one next to this teach.\n\nThird, for the understanding of Boethius: since Philosophers are accustomed to load few words with many meanings, as Ovid says in De vetula 3,[n17] \"Speaking few words, they wished many weights to lie beneath their words,\" I believe that by \"necessity of condition,\" besides the aforesaid conditional necessity, he meant to include, with Anselm, the concomitant or following necessity. This arises in a way from the positing of a present thing in being, necessarily accompanies it, and follows it while it is present. It is the necessity which, according to the Philosophers and Theologians and according to all commonly, is expressed in the saying that everything that is, when it is, necessarily is, as was taught more fully in 2 of this work.[n18] He could therefore reasonably be understood in this way. For just as in a conditional the consequent follows necessarily from the antecedent, so also in things, from any thing posited as already present in being, as from an antecedent cause according to nature, or at least one including the antecedent cause according to nature, there follows necessarily and really, as an inseparable, the consequent according to nature, since a certain necessity of this kind is naturally posterior.[n19] About this, however, as about everything else", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p721C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p721C", "locator_display": "721C", "source_text": "possunt Sophistae sophistice altercari, quaerendo quae sit illa sequens necessitas quae omnē rem necessario sequitur, et quod magis videtur mirabile, omnem non rem. Sicut enim esse qd. est, quando est, necesse est; sic et non esse, qd. non est, quando non est . Haec autē necessitas non potest causari nec descēdere a non ente. Ad haec autē et his similia respōdebūt 13. et 14. 1. lib. Si autem 1. necessitatē, scil. conditionalē, intelligere voluit, bene quidem: 2. autē, scil. necessitatē consequētē siue sequentē, credo firmiter ipsu intelligere voluisse, qd. tam sententia eius, quā verba indicant euidenter. Causa nam que huius necessitatis secundum ipsum est ista, quia res futurae apud diuinam notitiam seu prouidentiam sunt praesentes; et omne qd. praesentialiter est, dum praesentialiter est, necesse est esse, sicut superius est ostensum. Quare et euidenter ostendens qd. per conditionē nequaquā conditionalē intelligit, sed dispositionē, seu statū vel modū praesentialem siue praesentaneum diuinae notitiae, ita dicit; Nulla necessitas cogit incedere voluntate gradientem, quamuis cum, cum graditur, incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo", "english": "Sophists can wrangle sophistically, asking what that following necessity is, which necessarily follows every thing and, what seems more wonderful, every non-thing. For just as it is necessary that what is, when it is, be, so also that what is not, when it is not, not be . But this necessity cannot be caused, nor descend from a non-being. To these and similar points I shall reply in 13 and 14 of Book 1. Now if he meant the first necessity, namely the conditional, well and good. But the second, namely the consequent or following necessity, I firmly believe he meant, as both his thought and his words show clearly. For the cause of this necessity, according to him, is this: future things are present to the divine knowledge or providence, and everything that presently is, while it presently is, necessarily is, as was shown above. Wherefore also, showing evidently that by \"condition\" he by no means understands a conditional, but a disposition, or a presential or immediate state or mode of the divine knowledge, he says thus: \"No necessity compels the man who walks of his own will to go on, although when he walks it is necessary that he go on. In the same way, then,", "margins": [{"id": "721C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) necesse est [\"is necessary\"]"}, {"id": "721C·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) vnde quidem? [\"whence indeed?\"]"}]}, {"anchor": "p721D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p721D", "locator_display": "721D–721E", "source_text": "si quid prouidentia praesens videt, id esse necesse est, tamet si nullam naturae habeat necessitatē: atqui Deus ea futura, quae ex arbitrij libertate proueniūt, praesentia contuetur; haec igitur ad intuitum relata diuinum, necessaria fiunt per conditionē diuinae notionis. Vnde Rob. Lincoln. de lib. arbit. 3. super senes intelligens, et materiam •stam profundissime inuestigans etiam vs que ad fundamentum in ea, Duplex, inquit, est necessitas, sicut distinguit Anselm. in lib. 2. Cur D•us homo cap. 17. vna, quam vocat necessitatem praeced, quae est causa vt sit res, et cogit rem esse: Alia, quam vocat necessitatem sequentem, quae non est causa rei, nec cogit rem esse: et haec, vt ipse dicit, est illa necessitas vbi tractat Aristot. de proposition. singular. et futur. Videtur vtrū libet destruere, et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere, et hac sequēti et nihil efficiēti necessitate, necessarium est Deum scire meam sessionem cras futuram, et similia. Ex necessari•s hac sequente necessitate nullum inconueniens, imo magis necessarium videtur sequi contingens: dū\n\nenim sedeo, necesse est me sedere, et postquam sedi, necesse est me sedisse. Sed quam comparationem habent haec dicta, me sedere, et me sedisse ad meā sesionē dū sedeo, et postquam sed•; eandem comparationē habet scientia Dei ad meā sesionē futurā antequā sedeā; ipse enim scit futura tanquā praesentia. Etinfra has duas necessitates, ex quarū altera non sequitur nisi necessariū, ex reliqua vero, vt dictum est, videtur sequi contingens. Puto Boetiū vocasse necessitatem simplicē et necessitatē conditionis, licet aliqui necessitatē cōditionis intelligāt nō illam, quae supra dicta est necessitas sequens, sed necessitatē cōsequutionis cōsequētis ad anteced. vt puta cū dicitur, Si homo currit, mouet pedes; hic est necessitas cōsecutionis cōseq. ad anteced. licet vtrū que scil. tam cōsequens quā antecedens sit contingens et addit, Ex verbis autē ipsius Boetii interius cōsideratis melius perpendi potest ipsū vocasse necessitatem cōditionis quā supra necessitatē sequentē dicebamus. Ait nam que idē futurū cū ad diuinā notionē refertur, necessariū; cū vero in sui natura perpēditur, liberū prorsus at que absolutū videri, et post pauca: atqui Deus ea futura, quae ex arbitrij libertate proueniunt, praesentia contuetur; haec igitur ad intuitum relata", "english": "if providence sees something as present, it is necessary that it be, even if it has no necessity of nature. But God beholds as present those future things which arise from the freedom of choice; therefore these, related to the divine gaze, become necessary through the condition of the divine knowledge.\"\n\nHence Robert of Lincoln,[n20] in On Free Choice 3, \"understanding above the elders,\" and investigating this matter most profoundly, even to its foundation, says: \"Necessity is twofold, as Anselm distinguishes in Cur Deus homo 2, ch. 17. One he calls preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing be, and compels a thing to be. The other he calls following necessity, which is not the cause of the thing and does not compel the thing to be. And this, as he himself says, is that necessity which Aristotle treats in On Propositions, concerning singulars and futures. It seems to destroy contingency to either side[n21] and to establish that all things are from necessity, and by this following and nothing-effecting necessity it is necessary that God know my sitting tomorrow, and the like. No absurdity results from [calling things] necessary by this following necessity; indeed it rather seems necessary that a contingent follow:[n22] for while I sit, it is necessary that I sit, and after I have sat, it is necessary that I have sat. But the relation which these sayings, 'that I sit' and 'that I have sat,' have to my sitting while I sit and after I have sat, the same relation God's knowledge has to my future sitting before I sit; for he knows future things as present. And below:[n23] these two necessities, from one of which only the necessary follows, whereas from the other, as has been said, a contingent seems to follow, I think Boethius called simple necessity and necessity of condition. Some, however, understand 'necessity of condition' not as that which was called above the following necessity, but as necessity of consecution of the consequent to the antecedent, as when it is said, 'If a man runs, he moves his feet'; this is the necessity of the consecution of the consequent to the antecedent, although both, namely the consequent as well as the antecedent, are contingent.\" And he adds: \"From the words of Boethius himself, considered more deeply, it can be better perceived that he called 'necessity of condition' what we above called the following necessity. For he says that the same future thing, when referred to the divine knowledge, is necessary, but when weighed in its own nature, is seen to be altogether free and absolute.\" And after a few lines: \"But God beholds as present those future things which arise from the freedom of choice; these, therefore, related to the gaze", "margins": [{"id": "721D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) at qui Deus est, [\"but he who is God,\"]"}]}, {"anchor": "p722A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p722A", "locator_display": "722A–722B", "source_text": "diuinum necessaria fiunt per conditionem diuinae notionis, per se autem considerata absoluta naturae suae libertatem non deserunt. Et iterum, haec si ad diuinam notitiam referantur, necessaria; si per se considerentur, necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta. Quid autem aliud sapiunt haec verba, nisi, ea quae in sui natura sunt ad vtrumlibet contingentia flexibilia et mutabilia in Dei notitia esse inuatiabilia, non propter rerum inua•iabilitatem, sed propter scientiae Dei immutabilitatem? Adhuc autem pro intellectu Boetij est sciendum, quod per necessitatem conditionis seu conditionalem potuit rationabiliter intelligere necessitatem consecutiuā inter causam non impedibilem et suum causatum, quia sicut in conditionali verbali ex antecedenti verbali necessario verbaliter sequitur consequens suum verbale; sic et in conditione seu colligatione reali causae non impedibilis et causati, ex causa, quae naturaliter antecedit, velut ex antecedenti reali, necessario realiter sequitur, quia posterius naturaliter suū causatum, qd. est consequens suum reale, et haec est necessitas respectiua, respectu scil. superiorum et inferiorum causarum,\n\nquarum 1. concedit in actibus liberis, 2. vero negat, sicut superius est ostensum. Hunc autem ideo verisimiliter arbitror esse intellectum Autorum, qui dicunt qd. quicquid, vel si quid Deus vult, praescit, aut prouidet, de necessitate eueniet, quia secundum eos Dei voluntas, praescientia, siue scientia et prouidentia sunt causae rerum, et causae non impedibiles, sed efficaces omnino et necessariae in causando, sicut 9. et 15.27. et sequentia cum 10.1. docent. Glossa veto Decre•i potuit intelligi iuxta secundum intellectum Boetij supradictum; potuit tamen glossa exposuisse propinquius textum suum per necessitatem sequentem, siue per necessitatem consecutiuam causarum superiorum, sicut praerert superficies literae, sicut et praemissa exponunt. Sed fortassis quia illa expositio fuisset difficilior nimiū et multū diffusior, ipsam sub silentio transiens, faciliorē et breuiorē elegit, non praeiudicans meliori. Veruntamen si quis huic glossae pertinaciter innitatur, caueat sibi, quaeso, ne forte innitatur baculo arundineo, qui intret et perforet", "english": "divine, become necessary through the condition of the divine knowledge, but considered in themselves, being absolute, they do not abandon the freedom of their nature.\" And again: \"If these things are referred to the divine knowledge, they are necessary; if they are considered in themselves, they are released from the bonds of necessity.\" What else do these words mean, but that those things which in their own nature are contingent to either alternative, flexible and changeable, are invariable in God's knowledge, not on account of the invariability of things, but on account of the immutability of God's knowledge?\n\nMoreover, for the understanding of Boethius it must be known that by \"necessity of condition,\" that is, \"conditional necessity,\" he could reasonably have meant the consecutive necessity between an unimpedible cause and its effect. For as in a verbal conditional, from a verbal antecedent its verbal consequent follows necessarily and verbally, so also in the real condition or connection of an unimpedible cause and its effect, from the cause which naturally precedes, as from a real antecedent, there follows necessarily and really its effect, because that is naturally posterior; and the effect is its real consequent. And this is a respective necessity, that is, with respect to superior and inferior causes, of which the first is conceded in free acts and the second denied, as was shown above. I therefore judge this likely to be the meaning of the authors who say that whatever, or if anything, God wills, foreknows or provides, will come to pass of necessity. For according to them God's will, foreknowledge (or knowledge) and providence are causes of things, and causes not impedible but altogether efficacious and necessary in causing, as 9 and 15.27 and what follows, with 10.1, teach. The Gloss of the Decretum could be understood according to the second meaning of Boethius given above. Yet the Gloss could also have expounded its text more closely by means of the following necessity, or by the consecutive necessity of superior causes, as the surface of the letter suggests, and as the premises also expound. But perhaps that exposition would have been too difficult and far too lengthy, and so it passed over it in silence and chose the easier and shorter one, without prejudice to the better. Yet if anyone leans stubbornly on this Gloss, let him beware, I beg, lest he lean on a reed staff, which will enter and pierce", "margins": [{"id": "722A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) 4th Exposition of Boethius."}]}, {"anchor": "p722C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p722C", "locator_display": "722C", "source_text": "manum eius. Ecce nam que quid dicit in fine; Haec, inquit, est duplex. Necessarium est hoc\n\neuenire qd. Deus praeuidit: de dicto est vera, de re est falsa. Istud enim, qd. Deus praeuidit, non est necesse euenire. Et nota, qd. haec argumentatio non valet, Si Deus praeuidit aliquid, necessario illud eueniet; ergo si Deus praeuidit aliquid, necessarium est illud euenire, quia modo haec dictio, necessarium, non potest determinare illam consequentiam, sed tantū consequens. Vult igitur ista glossa negare omnia talia, illud qd. Deus praescit aut praesciuit, prouidet aut prouidit, vult aut voluit aliquid necesse seu necessarium est illud euenire, quia necessitas secundū ipsam in omnibus talibus refertur non ad consequentiam, sed ad consequēns, non ad dictū, sed ad rē tantū. Sed ecce quam diligenter respexit textū Boetij et Decreti, quē glossando exponit, Si quid, inquit textus amborū, prouidentia praesens videt, id necesse est esse, siue id esse necesse est. Ecce similiter quam diligenter respexit verba Scripturae canonicae et Doctorū. Nam Luc. vlt. veritas ipsa dicit, Necesse est impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege Mosis et Propheus, et Psalmis", "english": "his hand. For see what it says at the end: \"This,\" it says, \"is twofold: It is necessary that this happen which God foresaw: as to the dictum it is true, as to the thing it is false. For that which God foresaw, it is not necessary that it happen.\" And note that this argument is not valid: \"If God foresaw something, it will necessarily happen; therefore, if God foresaw something, it is necessary that it happen.\" The reason is that here the word \"necessary\" cannot qualify that consequence, but only the consequent. This Gloss therefore wishes to deny all such statements as these: that which God foreknows or has foreknown, provides or has provided, or anything he wills or has willed, it is of necessity, or necessary, that it happen. For according to the Gloss the necessity in all such cases refers not to the consequence but to the consequent, not to the dictum but to the thing alone.\n\nBut see how carefully it has looked at the text of Boethius and of the Decretum, which it expounds by glossing: \"If providence sees something as present,\" says the text of both, \"it is necessary that it be, or: that it be, is necessary.\"[n24] See likewise how carefully it has looked at the words of canonical Scripture and of the Doctors. For in Luke, last chapter, the Truth himself says, \"It is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses and the Prophets and the Psalms concerning me\";", "margins": [{"id": "722C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Luke. Matthew. Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p722D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p722D", "locator_display": "722D–722E", "source_text": "de me: et Mat. 18. Necesse est vt veniant scandala; qd. et Luc. 17. aequipollenter exponens, Impossibile est, inquit, vt non veniant scandala. Aug. etiam 3. de libero arbitrio 11. Tantum, inquit, abest a vero, quod Creatori deputanda existimantur peccata creaturae, quāuis necesse fiant, quae ipse futura praesciuit, vt cum dixeris non te inuenire, quomodo non ei deputetur quicquid in eius creatura fieri necesse est; ego contra non inueniā modū, nec inueniri posse, atque omnino nō esse confirmē, quo ei deputetur quicquid in eius creatura ita fieri necesse est, vt voluntate peccantiū fiat. Simile quo que sentētiā cum simili modo loquendi proferunt autoritates eius quamplurimae cap. proximo allegatae; Dicit que Anselm. de concord. 2. Quod Deus praescit futurū, necesse est esse futurū; et infra; Si praescit Deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurū: qui et 2. cur Deus homo. 17. Nihil, inquit, est necessariū aut impossibile, nisi quia ipsa vult: In Meditatione quo que sua de redemtione humana sic ait, Anima Christiana, anima de graui morte resuscitata; omnis necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacet voluntati, quippe qd. vult, necesse est esse, et qd. non vult, impossibile est esse. Similē quo que sententiā similiter proferunt\n\nmulti docti. Pro intellectu vero Anselmi sciendū, qd. secundū suā sententiā duplex est necessitas, scil. praecedens et sequens, et vtra que istarū triplex. Praecedens autē necessitas secūdū eum est causa actiua indefectibilis in agēdo, quā scil. positā necessario sequitur suus effectus: et haec duplex, quia quaedā cōpatiens libertatē, quaedā vero perimens libertatē: et haec duplex: quaedā enim est talis necessitas naturalis, quaedam vero est talis necessitas violenta. Hi autem tres modi ex secundo huius et decimo sunt satis noti; qui et 2. de concord. possunt elici manifeste, vbi et in rebus liberi arbitrij primum istorum concedit, sicut cap. proximum recitauit, et alios duos negat. Necessitas quo que sequēs est duplex; vna dictionalis, siue cōsequētialis et cōplexa; altera vero realis et incomplexa. Necessitas autem sequens dictionalis seu consequentialis et complex a est necessitas alicuius dicti et enuntiationis compositae, seu coniunctum scil. in sensu", "english": "and in Matthew 18, \"It is necessary that scandals come\"; and Luke 17, expounding the same in equivalent terms, says, \"It is impossible that scandals not come.\" Augustine too, On Free Choice 3, 11: \"So far is it from the truth that the sins of the creature are to be thought imputable to the Creator, though they come about necessarily, which he himself foreknew as future, that, when you say you do not find how whatever must happen in his creature is not imputed to him, I on the contrary shall not find a way, and shall affirm that none at all can be found, by which whatever must happen in his creature, in such a way that it happens by the will of those who sin, could be imputed to him.\" Very many of his authorities, cited in the preceding chapter, express a similar thought in a similar manner of speaking. And Anselm says in On Concord 2: \"That God foreknows a future thing, it is necessary that it be future\"; and below: \"If God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future.\" In Cur Deus homo 2, 17, he says: \"Nothing is necessary or impossible, except that she herself wills.\"[n25] In his Meditation on human redemption too he says thus: \"Christian soul, soul raised from grievous death; all necessity and impossibility of his is subject to his will, since what he wills, it is necessary that it be, and what he does not will, it is impossible that it be.\" Many learned men also express a similar thought similarly.\n\nFor the understanding of Anselm, however, it must be known that according to his view necessity is twofold, namely preceding and following, and each of these is threefold. Preceding necessity, according to him, is an active cause unfailing in acting, upon the positing of which its effect necessarily follows. This is twofold, because one kind is compatible with freedom, another destroys freedom; and the latter is twofold, for one kind is natural necessity of this sort, another violent necessity of this sort. These three modes are well enough known from the second and tenth of this work. They can also be clearly drawn out of On Concord 2, where he concedes the first of them even in matters of free choice, as the preceding chapter recited, and denies the other two. Following necessity too is twofold: one dictional or consequential and complex, the other real and incomplex. Following necessity, dictional or consequential and complex, is the necessity of some dictum and composite proposition, or taken jointly, that is, in the sense", "margins": [{"id": "722E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) doctores [\"doctors\"]"}]}, {"anchor": "p723A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p723A", "locator_display": "723A–723B", "source_text": "compositionis, vel necessitas conditionalis aut consequentiae: et haec secundum Logicam Anselmi De concord. 2. est tanta necessitas, quod eius oppositum contradictionem formaliter implicat et inuoluit, sicut eius autoritas allegata indicat euidenter: Quare et habet consequenter concedere, quod talis est necessitas penitus absoluta; in re vero et in consequente non est necessitas absoluta, sicut in secunda expositione Boetij fuit dictum. Veruntamen secundum probabilem Logicam Modernotum Oxoniae, non omnes illae propositiones necessariae reputantur, in quibus idem dicitur de eodem, sicut supponit Anselmus, et antiquiores Doctores. Haec enim non esset necessaria, nec vera, sed falsa, nullo homine existente, Homo est homo; sequitur enim, homo est homo, ergo homo est animal rationale; hoc enim est de per se intellectu illius; ergo homo est animal; ergo animal est homo; cum tamen nullo homine existente, sed animalibus alijs, sicut ante creationem Adae fuit, omne animal esset\n\nirrationale et non homo; et nullum animal esset rationale nec homo. Ad hoc autem quod solent obijcere, ergo quidem homo non est homo, dupliciter respondetur. Quidam enim simpliciter hanc concedunt, et si arguatur vlterius, ergo aliquid est homo, et illud non est homo, consequentiam illam negant, quia antecedens est simpliciter negatiuum, nec quicquam ponit vel implicat, sicut dicunt, sicut nec ista, Chymaera non est animal, vel non est homo. Alij vero negantes hanc, Homo est homo, concedunt contradictoriam eius talem; Non homo, vel nullus homo est homo, et ita semper praeponendo negationem, contradictoriam dicunt dandam; aequipollentias vero Philosophi dicunt semper tenere, nisi aliquid speciale impediat et repugnet. Sed quia ista magis ad Logicos, quam ad Theologicos pertinent, sufficiat isto loco haec breuiter tetigisse. Necessitas vero sequens realis et incomplexa est duplex: quaedam est enim praesentialis, quaedam autem causalis seu effectualis, vt quam propinquius potero, licet aliquantulum transumtiue, nomina eis imponam: Sequens autem necessitas", "english": "of composition, or conditional necessity or necessity of consequence. According to Anselm's logic in On Concord 2 this is such a necessity that its opposite formally implies and involves contradiction, as his cited authority clearly shows. Consequently he must grant that such necessity is wholly absolute, but in the thing and in the consequent there is no absolute necessity, as was said in the second exposition of Boethius. However, according to the probable logic of the Moderns of Oxford, not all those propositions are reputed necessary in which the same is said of the same, as Anselm and the older Doctors suppose. For \"A man is a man\" would be neither necessary nor true, but false, if no man existed. For it follows: a man is a man, therefore a man is a rational animal (for this belongs to the per se understanding of that); therefore a man is an animal; therefore an animal is a man. Yet when no man exists, but other animals, as was the case before the creation of Adam, every animal would be irrational and not a man, and no animal would be rational or a man.\n\nTo the objection they commonly raise, \"therefore a man is not a man,\" a twofold answer is given. Some concede this simply, and if it is argued further, \"therefore something is a man and that is not a man,\" they deny that consequence, because the antecedent is simply negative and posits or implies nothing, as they say, just as neither does this: \"A chimaera is not an animal,\" or \"is not a man.\" Others, denying this (\"A man is a man\"), concede its contradictory in this form: \"Not a man, or no man, is a man,\"[n26] and so, always prefixing the negation, they say the contradictory is to be given. The Philosophers say that equipollences always hold, unless something special prevents and opposes. But since these matters pertain more to Logicians than to Theologians, let it suffice to have touched on them briefly in this place. Real and incomplex following necessity, however, is twofold. One kind is presential, another causal or effectual, for I shall give them names as closely as I can, though somewhat metaphorically. Following necessity,", "margins": [{"id": "723B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) aliquid quod est homo, non est homo. [\"something which is a man is not a man.\"]"}]}, {"anchor": "p723C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p723C", "locator_display": "723C", "source_text": "realis et praesentialis a re praesente siue a praesentia dici potest. Haec enim omnem rem praesentem necessario sequitur isto modo, quod omne quod est, quando est, hac necessitate necesse est esse, sicut in tertia expositione Boetij dicebatur. Pro hac autem sententia dicit Anselmus 2. de concord. isto modo, quia ponitur res esse, dicitur ex necessitate esse; aut quia ponitur non esse, affirmatur non esse ex necessitate: Et infra, Quod vult libera voluntas, et potest, et non potest non velle, et necesse est eam velle. Potest namque non velle antequam velit, quia libera est; et cum iam vult, non potest non velle, sed cam velle necesse est, quoniam impossibile est illi idipsum simul et velle et non velle. Et sequitur, Opus vero voluntatis cui datum est, vt quod vult, sit, bifariam est necessarium; quia voluntate cogitur fieri, et quod sit non potest simul non fieri. Qui et infra 3. dicit futura esse necessaria in aeternitate et apud Deum, cuius causam assignat, quia ibi", "english": "real and presential, may be called so from the present thing, or from presence. For it follows every present thing necessarily in this way: that everything which is, when it is, by this necessity necessarily is, as was said in the third exposition of Boethius. For this view Anselm says in On Concord 2, in this way: because a thing is posited to be, it is said to be from necessity; or because it is posited not to be, it is affirmed not to be from necessity. And below: \"What the free will wills, it both can not-will and cannot not-will, and it is necessary that it will it. For it can not will before it wills, because it is free; but when it already wills, it cannot not will, and it is necessary that it will it, since it is impossible for it at the same time both to will and not to will the same thing.\" And it goes on: \"But the work of the will, to which it has been given that what it wills be done, is necessary in two ways: because it is compelled to come about by the will, and because what is cannot at the same time not come to be.\" He also says below, in 3, that future things are necessary in eternity and with God, and assigns as the cause that there", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p723D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p723D", "locator_display": "723D–723E", "source_text": "sunt praesentia non futura, sicut superius est ostensum. Idemque 2. Cur Deus homo 17. Esse, inquit, rei facit necessitatem esse. Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa est vt sit res, et est necessitas sequens quam res facit. Praecedens et efficiens necessitas est, cum dicitur Coelum volui, quia necesse est vt voluatur; sequens vero et quae nihil efficit, sed sit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris. Haec autem sequens necessitas non potest tantum exponi per necessitatem dictionalem seu consequentialem, quoniam siue res sit, siue non sit, siue loquaris, siue non loquaris, secundum eius sententiam 2. de concordant. superius recitatam, hoc dictum semper est necessarium de re quacunque; talis res est talis res, et tu loquens loqueris; et consequentia ista similiter, Si talis res est, talis res est; et si tu loqueris, tu loqueris. Haec ergo non est illa sequens necessitas, quam dicit factam a rebus, sed illa realis necessitas supradicta, quae necessario sequitur ex re omni. Hoc etiam verba sua sequentia contestari videntur, Haec est, inquit, illa necessitas, quae, vbi tractat Aristoteles de propositionibus singularibus et futuris,\n\nvidetur vtrumlibet destruere, et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere. Sed 1. peri hermenias vlt. vbi Aristot. ista tractat, non apparet poni aliqua talis necessitas quae possit videri vtrumlibet destruere, et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere, nisi necessitas realis et praesentialis praedicta, quae affirmat, quod omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse; et similiter de eo quod non est: vnde sic ait, Esse quod est, quando est, et non esse quod non est, quando non est, necesse est. Hunc quo que intellectum Anselmi de necessitate sequente testatur autoritas Roberti Lincoln superius recitata, in qua primo allegat duplicem necessitatem ab eo; praecedentem scil. et sequentem: et infra ostendit, quod necessitas conditionis, quam Boetius asserit, non est necessitas consecutionis, sed necessitas sequens quam praedixit, necessitas scil. praesentialis, sicut in 3. expos. Boetij est ostensum: necessitas vero sequens, causalis, seu effectualis, potest dici a causa vel ab effectu; et videtur esse illa necessitas consecutiua inter causam non impedibilem et suum effectum, in 4. expositione Boetij supradicta, propter rationem et causam ibi similiter", "english": "they are present and not future, as was shown above. And the same author in Cur Deus homo 2, 17: \"The being of a thing,\" he says, \"makes the necessity of being. For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing be, and there is a following necessity, which the thing makes. Preceding and efficient necessity is when it is said, 'The heaven revolves,' because it is necessary that it revolve. Following necessity, which effects nothing but comes to be, is when I say that you speak of necessity, because you are speaking.\"\n\nThis following necessity cannot be explained merely by dictional or consequential necessity. For, whether the thing is or is not, whether you speak or do not speak, according to his view in On Concord 2, recited above, this dictum is always necessary of any thing whatever: \"such a thing is such a thing,\" and \"you, speaking, speak\"; and likewise this consequence, \"If such a thing is, such a thing is,\" and \"if you speak, you speak.\" This, then, is not that following necessity which he says is made by things, but that real necessity spoken of above, which follows necessarily from every thing. His following words also seem to bear witness to this: \"This,\" he says, \"is that necessity which, where Aristotle treats of singular propositions and futures,\n\nseems to destroy contingency to either side, and to establish that all things are from necessity.\" But in Peri hermenias 1, last chapter, where Aristotle treats these matters,[n27] no such necessity appears to be posited that could seem to destroy contingency to either side and establish that all things are from necessity, except the aforesaid real and presential necessity, which affirms that everything that is, when it is, necessarily is; and likewise of what is not. Hence he says thus: \"That what is, when it is, be, and that what is not, when it is not, not be, is necessary.\" This understanding of Anselm concerning following necessity is also attested by the authority of Robert of Lincoln recited above. In it he first alleges a twofold necessity from Anselm, namely preceding and following; and below he shows that the necessity of condition, which Boethius asserts, is not the necessity of consecution, but the following necessity which he mentioned before, namely presential necessity, as was shown in the third exposition of Boethius. But following necessity, causal or effectual, can be named from the cause or from the effect; and it seems to be that consecutive necessity between an unimpedible cause and its effect, mentioned in the fourth exposition of Boethius above, for the reason and cause likewise", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p724A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p724A", "locator_display": "724A–724B", "source_text": "assignatam; et hunc intellectum satis attestari videntur Autoritates Anselmi cap. proximo allegatae. Et si quis obijciat, quod tunc eadem esset necessitas antecedens et consequens; dicendum, hoc esse satis possibile, imo et necessarium diuersis respectibus rationibusque diuersis. Necessitas tamen praecedens proprie et stricte accepta tantum est causa siue in causa indefectibili in causando, de qua secundo huius est dictum, et haec correspondet antecedenti logicali in consequentia logicali: necessitas vero sequens, realis, causalis, seu effectualis dupliciter potest sumi; vno modo, vt sit tantum effectus, seu in effectu huiusmodi causae non impedibilis in causando, et correspondet necessitati praecedenti praedictae, sicut effectus efficienti, et passum agenti; et haec assimilatur consequenti logicali in consequentia logicali: alto modo, vt quodammodo complectatur vtramque, vt videlicet sit necessitas consecutiua, siue\n\nconsecutio, seu consequentia ipsa realis inter causam huiusmodi et suum causatum, sicut consecutio, seu consequentia logicalis non est in solo antecedente vel consequente, sed vtrumlibet complectitur, et est quaedam habitudo media inter illa; et haec necessitas sequens realis correspondet toti consequentiae necessariae logicali. Veruntamen est sciendum, quod necessitas antecedens siue praecedens habet duplicem intellectum. Nam vno modo accipitur, sicut hic est dictum, et sicut secundum huius eam definit, alio modo pro necessitate simpliciter et penitus absoluta; haec enim omnem aliam necessitatem naturaliter antecedit; vel pro necessitate naturali effectus naturaliter necessarios praecedente; quod et videtur innuere Robertus Lincolniensis de libero arbitrio 3. vbi ait, Ex necessario secundum Boetij sententiam sequi videtur contingens, non tamen ex necessario absoluto siue antecedente, quod cogit rem esse, sed ex necessario conditionis et sequente, quod permittit rei liberum esse. Qui et infra 10. necessitatem antecedentem et simplicem reputat pro eadem; Qui etiam in quadam quaestionum", "english": "assigned there. The Authorities of Anselm cited in the preceding chapter seem also sufficiently to attest this understanding.\n\nAnd if anyone objects that then the same necessity would be both antecedent and consequent, it must be said that this is quite possible, indeed even necessary, under diverse respects and for diverse reasons. Preceding necessity, properly and strictly taken, is only the cause, or [necessity] in the cause unfailing in causing, of which it was spoken in 2 of this work, and this corresponds to the logical antecedent in a logical consequence. Following necessity, real, causal or effectual, can be taken in two ways. In one way, it is only the effect, or [necessity] in the effect of such a cause unimpedible in causing; and it corresponds to the aforesaid preceding necessity, as effect to efficient cause and patient to agent; and this is likened to the logical consequent in a logical consequence. In the other way, it somehow embraces both: namely as consecutive necessity, or consecution, or the real consequence itself between such a cause and its effect. Just as the logical consecution or consequence is not in the antecedent alone or the consequent alone, but embraces each of them, and is a kind of relation midway between them, so this real following necessity corresponds to the whole necessary logical consequence.\n\nIt must nevertheless be known that antecedent or preceding necessity has a twofold meaning. In one way it is taken as has been said here, and as the second part of this work defines it;[n28] in the other way it is taken for necessity simply and wholly absolute (for this naturally precedes every other necessity), or for natural necessity preceding naturally necessary effects. Robert of Lincoln also seems to hint at this in On Free Choice 3, where he says: \"From the necessary, according to the view of Boethius, a contingent seems to follow, but not from the absolute or antecedent necessary, which compels a thing to be, but from the necessary of condition and following, which permits a thing to be free.\" Below, in 10, he reckons antecedent and simple necessity to be the same. In one of his questions", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p724C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p724C", "locator_display": "724C–724D", "source_text": "suarum de scientia Dei quaerente, Qualiter Deus scit ea quae contingunt a casu, vel ex libera voluntate, distincta duplici causa, scilicet antecedente et coniuncta, definiendo causam antecedentem; Est, inquit, causa antecedens, scilicet praeordinans, vt secundum cursum naturae eueniat aliqua res de necessitate, vt eclipsis Solis et Lunae; et infra, responso, quod Deus non est causa antecedens huiusmodi effectuum, sed coniuncta, vnam obiectionem possibilem fieri remouendo, subiungit; Facere Dei et eius scire idem est; et non sequitur, Scientia Dei, quae est causa rei, est aeterna, ergo est antecedens; antecedentia enim, de qua fit hic sermo, est euentus futuri secundum cursum naturae necessaria praeordinatio. Hoc etiam videtur consonare verbis et menti Anselmi de concor. et 2. Cur Deus homo. vbi fuerat allegatus. De concordia namque 2. negans necessitatem antecedentem in actibus liberis, in ortu Solis eam concedit. Et 2. Cur Deus homo. 17. negans similiter necessitatem antecedentem a rebus liberi arbitrij, concedit eam in volubili motu Coeli. Nam violentia, sicut dicit, naturalis conditionis cogit coelum volui. Intellectus etiam sancti Thomae ex praemissis potest elici manifeste:\n\nconcedit enim necessitatem dicti, non rei, necessitatem consequentiae, conditionis, et ex suppositione aliam vero negat. Necessitas namque conditionis, et ex suppositione ad modum suum loquendi, et ad communem modum loquendi Doctorum Parisiensium dupliciter potest exponi. Quaedam namque est dictionalis et complexa; quaedam vero realis et incomplexa: et haec duplex, quaedam praesentialis, quaedam autem consecutiua, causalis, seu effectualis, sicut de necessitate sequente Anselmi superius est distinctum. Consequentia nam que atque consecutio est duplex, dictionalis seu logicalis, et realis: et haec duplex, praesentialis et causalis seu effectualis, propter rationem et causam in expositione Boetij et Anselmi superius assignatam. Concedit igitur S. Tho. necessitatem dicti et consequentiae pro necessitate simpliciter absoluta, secundum logicam Anselmi et antiquorum Doctorū superius recitatam. Necessitatem vero rei et consequentis negat ad similem intellectum; quod et verba sua indicant manifeste; Bona, inquit, est distinctio, quod est necessarium necessitate consequentiae et non", "english": "on God's knowledge, asking how God knows those things which happen by chance or from free will, he distinguishes a twofold cause, namely antecedent and conjoined, and in defining the antecedent cause says: \"The antecedent cause is the preordaining one, so that according to the course of nature some thing comes about of necessity, as an eclipse of Sun and Moon.\" Below, having answered that God is not the antecedent cause of such effects but the conjoined cause, and removing one possible objection that could be raised, he adds: \"God's doing and his knowing are the same; and it does not follow, 'God's knowledge, which is the cause of the thing, is eternal, therefore it is antecedent'; for antecedence, of which this discourse speaks, is the necessary preordination of a future event according to the course of nature.\"\n\nThis also seems to accord with the words and mind of Anselm in On Concord and Cur Deus homo 2, where he had been cited. For in On Concord 2, denying antecedent necessity in free acts, he grants it in the rising of the Sun. And in Cur Deus homo 2, 17, denying likewise antecedent necessity from things of free choice, he grants it in the revolving motion of the Heaven. For the violence, as he says, of natural condition compels the heaven to revolve.\n\nThe understanding of St Thomas also can be clearly elicited from what has been said:\n\nhe concedes the necessity of the dictum, not of the thing, necessity of consequence, of condition, and ex suppositione, but the other he denies. For necessity of condition and ex suppositione, in his manner of speaking, and in the common manner of speaking of the Parisian Doctors, can be explained in two ways. For one is dictional and complex, the other real and incomplex; and this latter is twofold, one presential, the other consecutive, causal or effectual, as was distinguished above concerning Anselm's following necessity. For consequence and consecution too is twofold, dictional or logical, and real; and the real is twofold, presential and causal or effectual, for the reason and cause assigned above in the expositions of Boethius and Anselm. St Thomas therefore concedes the necessity of the dictum and of consequence as necessity simply absolute, according to the logic of Anselm and of the older Doctors, recited above. The necessity of the thing and of the consequent he denies, in the same sense; and his own words indicate this plainly: \"The distinction is good: that something is necessary by necessity of the consequence and not by necessity of the consequent\"; or by conditioned necessity, not absolute, as was alleged above.", "margins": [{"id": "724C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) moueri [\"to be moved\"]"}]}, {"anchor": "p724E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p724E", "locator_display": "724E", "source_text": "necessitate consequentis; vel necessitate conditionata non absoluta, sicut erat superius allegatum. Qui et 1. contra Gentiles 67. loquens de huiusmodi necessario, Hoc, inquit, non est necessarium absolute, sed sub conditione, et necessitate consequentiae. Et infra 83. Licet Deus circa causata nihil necessario velit absolute, vult tamen aliquid necessario ex conditione, vel ex suppositione. Et infra 85. Necessitas ex suppositione in causa non potest concludere necessitatem absolutam in effectu; Deus autem vult aliquid in creatura non necessitate absoluta, sed solum necessitate, quae est ex suppositione: ex voluntate igitur diuina non potest concludi in rebus creatis necessitas absoluta; haec autem sola excludit contingentiā. Vult ergo S. Tho. tantū negare necessitatē absolutā cōtingētiā excludētē. Necessitatē antē cōsequētiae, conditionis, et suppositionis realē, praesentialē concedit, sicut in assignatione causae necessitatis, quā ponit,", "english": "He also, in Against the Gentiles 1, 67,[n29] speaking of such a necessary thing, says: \"This is not necessary absolutely, but under a condition, and by necessity of the consequence.\" And below, 83: \"Although God wills nothing absolutely and necessarily concerning caused things, yet he wills something necessarily from a condition, or from a supposition.\" And below, 85: \"Necessity from supposition in the cause cannot conclude absolute necessity in the effect. But God wills something in a creature not by absolute necessity, but only by the necessity which is from supposition; therefore from the divine will absolute necessity cannot be concluded in created things; yet this alone excludes contingency.\" St Thomas therefore wishes only to deny the absolute necessity that excludes contingency. But necessity of consequence, of condition and of supposition, real and presential, he concedes, as is clearly evident in his assignment of the cause of the necessity which he posits,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p725A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/28/#p725A", "locator_display": "725A", "source_text": "reci•ata superius clare patet. Necessitatem quo que consequentiae, conditionis, et suppositionis realem, causalem, seu effectualem innuit et affirmat, si sententia eius et verba intime perserutentur, quod et euidenter ostendit causa in 4a. expositione Boetij superius assignata. Aliter autem et breuius potest dici, quod necessitas secundum eum don dicitur secundum causas superiores, sed inferiores tantummodo, sicut cap. proximum recitauit. Quando ergo negat necessitatem abactibus liberis, intelligit de necessitate respectu inferiorū causarum, sicut et cap. proximum allegauit. Secundum has quoque expositiones praemissas, aliquamue illarum intelligi potest Lumbardus caeteri que Doctores distinctiones huiusmodi facientes.", "english": "recited above. He also hints at and affirms necessity of consequence, of condition and of supposition, real, causal or effectual, if his thought and words are searched closely, which the cause assigned above in the fourth exposition of Boethius also evidently shows. It can be said otherwise, and more briefly, that necessity according to him is not spoken of according to superior causes, but only according to inferior ones, as the preceding chapter recited. When he denies necessity from free acts, therefore, he means necessity with respect to inferior causes, as the preceding chapter also alleged. According to these expositions given above too, or any one of them, Lombard and the other Doctors who make distinctions of this kind can be understood.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}