De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 24
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 698B–699B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/24/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[698B–698D]
CHAPTER XXIV.

He treats the eighteenth opinion, which says that God's willing and pre-willing lie in man's power [n1], and the nineteenth, that it lies in man's power to do something, whence it follows that God does not will, and never willed, that A would be [n2], which nevertheless he now wills and has always willed that it would be. He treats the twentieth, that as early as the divine will precedes a free act of the human will, just as early the human will can turn to the opposite of such an act. He treats the twenty-first, that when God wills that a man carry through A, a future act, in the measure B [n3], the man can previously so dispose himself that God does not then will this, and therefore that the man does not then have that act. He treats the twenty-second, that the divine will is not always necessary in acting, but is in some way liable to fail and to be frustrated. He treats the twenty-third, that the divine will is not the efficient cause of anything, but only consents to the divine intellect as it dictates, and some other executive power, posterior, in God or in secondary causes, produces the things effected. And he treats the twenty-fourth, that although the divine will co-acts and carries through [n4] every act of the created will, it does so by influencing so feebly that it by no means necessitates the will to act.

[698D–699B]
There are also four others very like one another, of which the first, namely the eighteenth [n5], affirms that God's willing and pre-willing lie in man's power. The nineteenth judges that it lies in man's power to do something, whence it follows that God does not will, and never willed, that A would be, which nevertheless he now wills and has always willed that it would be. The twentieth holds that as early as the divine will precedes a free act of the human will, just as early the human will can turn to the opposite of such an act. The twenty-first thinks that when God wills that a man produce A, a future act, in a certain measure of time or of an instant, the man can previously so dispose himself that God does not then will this, and that the man does not then have that act.

But all these err in two ways. First, because they affirm what is false; second, because they do not avoid the difficulty of the problem. That all of them affirm what is false is plainly shown in the eighth of this book; and that they do not avoid the difficulty can be shown, as was shown against the 14th opinion and the 16th. For God's will is necessary with respect to all things present and past; therefore also with respect to all future things. Hence all future things also are in some way necessarily future, and all things will come about from some kind of necessity.

There are, moreover, three other fantastic vanities. Of these the first, the 22nd [n6], supposes that the divine will is not always necessary in acting, but is at times liable to fail and to be frustrated. The 23rd dreams that the divine will is not the efficient cause of anything, but only consents to the divine intellect as it dictates, and that some other executive power, posterior, in God or in secondary causes, produces the things effected. The 24th thinks that although the divine will co-acts and acts beforehand upon every act of the created will, it does so by influencing so feebly that it by no means necessitates the will to act.

But the first of these and the third are plainly refuted by the tenth of the first book. The second of them errs in matter and in form. It errs in matter, because it supposes what is false, as the tenth of the first, and the tenth of the second and what follows, have taught. It errs in form, because it does not escape the difficulty proposed. For if the divine will consents and wills that any executive power whatever execute anything, by making it do so [n7], that power will necessarily execute it, by the tenth of the first book, and the difficulty returns.

NOTES

1. The argument prints peruelle, the body praeuelle. I take them as one word, praevelle, "to will beforehand" (God's willing prior to the creature's act), and render it "pre-will" in both places.
2. The argument reads voluisse aut fore, which cannot be construed. The body (698E) has voluisse A. fore, and the same clause continues quod tamen nunc vult... ipsum fore. The italic capital A. has evidently been read, or set, as aut. I translate "that A would be."
3. The argument has perducere, "to carry through" or "bring to completion." The body (698E) has producere, "to produce." Both are construed with Deo volente hominem: God willing that the man carry through or produce the act. I keep each word where it stands.
4. The argument has coagat et peragat ("co-acts and carries through"). The body (699A) has coagat et praeagat ("co-acts and acts beforehand"). I translate each as printed and do not harmonize them. The sense is much the same: God's will acts with the creature's act and in advance of it.
5. quarum prima et decima octaua: et here introduces the identification, "the first of which, namely the eighteenth." The first of the four is the eighteenth opinion; the listing that follows runs 18, 19, 20, 21.
6. quarum 1. et 22. is the same idiom as in note 5: the first of the three, namely the 22nd. The next sentence confirms it, for the three are the 22nd, 23rd and 24th, and "the first of these... and the third" are 22 and 24.
7. quicquam exequi faciendo: I take the ablative gerund faciendo as "by making [it do so]," which gives the executive power as the subject of exequetur. It could also be read more loosely as "in doing [so]." Either way the argument is the same: if God's will wills that the power execute, the execution is necessary.