{"id": "3/2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 2", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "646B–649C", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP II. Quod Deus quodammodo necessitat quamlibet voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet tiberum actum suum, et ad quamlibet liberam cessationem ac vacationem ab actu, et hoc necessitate naturaliter\n\npraecedente.\n\nHIc autem consequenter arbitror ostendendum, quod Deus quodammodo necessitat quamlibet voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet liberum actum suum, ad quamlibet etiam liberam cessationem et vacationem ab actu, et hoc necessitate naturaliter praecedente. Est namque, sicut docet Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo 17. et de Concordia 2. duplex necessitas, scili et praecedens et sequens, siue concomitans. Praecedens facit rem esse, et haec est in omnibus agentibus irrationalibus, quoniam cum actiuū appropinquauerit passiuo cum circumstantijs debitis, necessario sequetur effectus, sicut docet Philosophus, 9. Met. 10. et eodem modo est de necessitate\n\nnon essendi, de his quae per irrationalia prohibentur ab esse: sequens vero siue concomitans est, quae quodammodo fit a re ente, et ab esse quolibet quasi adoritur et descendit, illud que inseparabiliter sequitur et indiuidue comitatur, similiter et non esse. Et haec secundum Philosophum, 1. peri hermenias vlt. est vniuersaliter in entibus et non entibus quibuscunque: vnde sic dicit, Esse, quod est, quando est, et non esse, quod non est, quando non est, necesse est: et idem vult Anselmus locis praedictis. Nec solum ista praecedens necessitas in agentibus irrationabilibus et eorum actibus reperitur, verumetiam in agentibus rationabilibus ex arbitrij libertate et actibus liberis eorundem. Positis namque in actiuo rationali et libero potentia et voluntate quodlibet extrinsecum liberum faciendi, necessario sequitur quod hoc fiat: nihil enim deficit requisitum. Dicitque Philosophus 9. Metaphys. vbi prius [scilicet 10.] Potens secundum rationem omne necesse quando desiderat, cuius habet potentiam, et vt habet, hoc facere. Eandem quoque sententiam et alibi saepe docet, sicut\n\nin praecedentibus recitatur. Ex quo videtur perspicue colligi quaedam regula generalis, quod videlicet vniuersaliter omnis effectus a quocunque agente rationali vel irrationali et libero producatur hoc modo, quod posito suo agente cum omnibus suis dispositionibus sufficientibus naturaliter praeuijs quibus illum producit, necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur ipsum produci. et producitur ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente; quod et satis apparet ex significationibus terminorunt. Vnde et potest elici talis definitio necessitatis naturaliter praecedentis; quod ipsa est causa actiua, qua posita cum omnibus suis dispositionibus sufficientibus naturaliter praeuijs quibus causat suum causatum, necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur illud causari. Et ex hac clare potest cognosci definitio effectus necessarij necessitate naturaliter\n\npraecedente; scilicet, quod est causatum a causa, qua plene posita, necessario sequitur illud causari. Sed aliquis forsitan hic instabit negando regulam, et definitiones praemissas, dicendo illas esse veras de causis inferioribus et secundis tantummodo, non autem de causa suprema et prima, eo quod omnis causa secunda, quandocunque, quomodocunque sit disposita seu affecta, respectu cuiuscunque causabilis seu causati, necesse est tunc eam sic affici seu disponi. Prima autem causa non sic, vt dicit respondens, quia licet Deus nunc velit aliquid esse futurum, puta Antichristum, non est necesse pro nunc ipsum sic velle, sed potest pro nunc non sic velle. Sed secundum istam instantiam responsiuam, nulla esset omnino necessitas antecedens respectu alicuius effectus, nec aliquis effectus necessarius respectu suae causae necessitate naturaliter praecedente: nulla enim causa secunda quicquam potest sine coefficientia et praeefficientia primae causae, diuinae videlicet voluntatis, sicut vicesimum et tricesimum secundi\n\nmonstrabant: si ergo in ista seu illa non sit necessitas antecedens, nec in aliqua alia potest esse. Adhuc autem et istum effectum nunc factum seu creatum immediate a Deo necesse est nunc esse; quare et eius causam efficientem seu creantem, puta voluntatem diuinam: vel si ipsa possit pro nunc non esse, potest et iste effectus contra praemissa. Simili quoque modo potest argui de quocunque effectu praeterito; quoniam secundum decimum quartum primi, voluntas Dei est causa cuiuscunque praeteriti, quare ipsum est praeteritum. Et si dixerit quod voluntas diuina respectu praesentium et praetetitorum est necessitas antecedens, sed respectu futurorum nequaquam, facit voluntatem diuinam mutabilem, contra quintum, et vicesimum tertium primi libri: facit enim voluntatem diuinam respectu futurorum liberam secundum contradictionem, in tantum quod pro eodem instanti, in quo est, respectu alicuius futuri, potest non esse; et cum illud futurum fiat praesens, in praeteritumue discedat, facit eam necessariam necessitate opposita. Adhuc autem cur non potest omnipotens Dei voluntas esse tam\n\nnecessaria et tanta necessitas respectu effectus futuri, sicut praelentis et praeteriti? Si enim ex se sola sit necessaria, et necessitas antecedens respectu praesentis et praeteriti, potest et similiter respectu futuri, cum omni eodem modo intrinsece semper se habeat respectu eiusdem rei primo futurae, secundo praesentis, et tertio praeteritae. Si autem ponatur necessitas antecedens respectu praesentis et praeteriti non sufficienter nec totaliter ex se sola, sed ex adiutorio alicuius alterius, puta rei praesentis vel praeteritae, non videtur sibi ipsi plene sufficiens, neque plene omnipotens, contra primam suppositionem, tertiam partem, quintam, et septimam corollarij primi, primi. Si etiam res praesens aliquo modo iuuaret ad necessitatem in voluntate diuina respectu illius rei praesentis, videtur quod esset aliqua causa eius, et aliquo modo ipsam causaret; quare et prius naturaliter esset rem praesentem esse, et necessario pro nunc esse, quam voluntatem diuinam illam necessitatem suam intrinsecam nunc habere, quod potest\n\nconuinci per 20. primi, et 30. secundi: si insuper ita esset illa necessitas in voluntate diuina, esset necessitas subsequens et necessitas rei praesentis necessitas antecedens contra hypothesin. Si etiam aliquod adiutorium extrinsecum potest praebere voluntati diuinae necessitatem intrinsecam respectu omnium praesentium et praeteritorum, cur non similiter respectu ommum futurorum, aut alicuius futuri? Amplius autem et si voluntas diuina, quae nunc est respectu alicuius futuri, posset pro nunc non esse respectu illius, vt dicit responsio; hoc tamen non est in potestate illius futuri, nec alicuius causae inferioris, nec aliquarum causarum, sed tantum in voluntatis diuinae libera potestate, et ipsa est vniuersaliter efficax et indefectibilis in causando, quare et necessitas antecedens respectu illius futuri. Ecce quomodo iste modus loquendi de necessitate antecedente naturaliter consonat rationi: consonat quoque modo loquendi, imo et est modus loquendi Philosophorum et Theologorum seniorum, et Patrum nostrorum, sicut praemissa hic et proximo huius docent: vnde et Augustinus 3. de libero arbitrio 3. Voluntas, inquit, illius, scilicet Dei, mihi est necessitas: et quanquam sub\n\nnomine discipuli hoc dicatur, hoc tamen non reprobat, sed approbat Augustinus, ostendens quod voluntas et necessitas non repugnant: huic et consonant verba et sententia Augustini, 5. de ciuit. Dei 9. et 10. post huius praemissa: qui et 6. super Genesin ad literam 22. ostendit, quod necessitas rerum futurarum est in Deo, in voluntate diuina, vbi et sic ait, hoc necessario futurum est quod ille vult. Istud etiam consonat verbis et menti Anselmi proximo huius tactis. Vnde et 2. Cur Deus homo, 17. Omnis, inquit, necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacer voluntati; illius autem voluntas nulli subditur necessitati, aut impossibilitati: nihil enim est necessarium, aut impossibile, nisi quia ipse ita vult. Et infra loquens de Christo, sic ait; Si vis omnium quae fecit, et quae passus est, veram scire necessitatem, scito omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Qui et in quadam meditatione sua de redemptione humana sic dicit; Omnis necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacet voluntati, quippe quod vult necesse est esle, et quod non vult, impossibile est esse. Idem adhuc de concordia 2. post distinctionem\n\nde necessitate praemissa, et ostensionem eius diffusam sic ait; Opus voluntatis, cui datum est, vt quod vult sit, et quod non vult non sit, voluntarium siue spontaneum est, quoniam spontanca voluntate fit: et bifariam est necessarium, quia voluntate cogitur fieri, et quod fit non potest simul non fieri. Opus, inquit, voluntatis, id est operatio, seu operatum extrinsecum a voluntate volente procedens cogitur, id est necessitatur, sicut processus eius et verba lucide manifestant. Vnde et 5. Metaphys. Arist. 16. vbi vna translatio dicit, Quod prius et potentius est illud, cuius secundum praeuoluntatem sequi necesse est alterum; alia translatio dicit, quod fortius et ante est illud quod cogit alterum sequi suam voluntatem: quam literam Auetroes exponendo, sic ait; Vniuersaliter dicitur Ante, illud quod est fortius et dignius, et est illud quod cogit illud quod est post, vt voluntas eius consequatur voluntatem suam,\n\nquoniam voluntas debiliotis sequitur voluntatem fortioris, sicut primum huius plenius recitauit. Eundem quoque modum loquendi videtur diuinissimus Esaias diuinitus habuisse, praedicens de Christo quod veniret quasi fluuius violentus, quem spiritus Domini cogit; violentus, inquit, id est, non inuitus, sed vi plenus, vi spiritus Domini, qui super ipsum plenarie requ ieuit, et ipsum agebat in omnibus, et ducebat, quem et ipse in omnibus necessario sequebatur, sicut 30. secundi, et primum tertij plenius declarabat. Vnde et Matthaeus dicit, quod Iesus ductus est a spiritu in desertum; et Lucas, quod agebatur a spiritu in desertum; et Marcus, quod expulit, aut, secundum aliam literam, compulit eum spiritus in desertum, quae omnia de spiritu sancto constat certissime dicta esse, sicut 30. secundi breuiter memorabat. Quapropter et Stephanus Episcopus Parisiensis condemnauit quendam errorem dicentem, quod ad hoc, quod effectus omnes sint necessarij respectu primae causae, non sufficit, quod ipsa causa prima non sit impedibilis, sed exigitur quod causae mediae non sint impedibiles. Error, inquit Episcopus, quia tunc Deus non posset facere aliquem effectum necessarium\n\nsine causis posterioribus: omnes ergo effectus, etiam liberi, sunt necessarij respectu causae primae, quia voluntate sua procedunt, quae non potest aliqualiter impediri. Et si quis instandum putauerit, dicendo, quod articulus Parisiensis non dicit vniuersaliter effectus omnes, sed particulariter seu indefinite tantum effectus; fateor me nescire quomodo in originali articulo scribebatur: scio tamen quod inter articulos multum correctos vniuersaliter illam scriptam inueni: nec refert: ex illa namque particulari seu indefinita cum alijs veris, vniuersalis illa consequitur euidenter. Si enim ad hoc, quod aliqui effectus sint necessarij respectu causae primae, sufficiat, quod ipsa non sit impedibilis respectu illorum, cum vniuersaliter omnes effectus fiant ab ipsa, et ipsa sit vniuersaliter non impedibilis respectu aliquorum effectuum, aut etiam alicutus, sicut praehabita demonstrarunt, omnes effectus sunt necessarij respectu illius. Istis igitur suppositis, principalis conclusio faciliter ostendetur. Nam secundum capitulum proximum, Deus potest sic necessitare omnem voluntatem creatam, et hoc necessitate naturaliter\n\npraecedente, quia secundum talem necessitatem capitulum totum procedit; et hoc non posset aliquid aliud faciendo, quam tantum volendo, quoniam nullo alio modo agit ad extra, sicut 9 et 10. primi docent; nec aliter volendo quam prius naturaliter; et per 20. secundi iuncto 30. sic vult semper, sicut et capitulo proximo plenius est argutum. Item per idem 20. Deus per voluntatem suam est causa efficiens proprie omnis actus voluntatis creatae; et per idem 30. prior naturaliter voluntate creata; et per 10. primi voluntas diuina frustrari non potest: ergo per regulam generalem et definitiones praemissas, omnis actus voluntatis creatae producitur ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente; imo et per eadem, omnis voluntas creata agens quodcunque, illud agit ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente. Ad idem non improbabiliter arguitur isto modo: In voluntate creata nunc volente est quaedam necessitas ad volendum, saltem necessitas subsequens, et in voluntate diuina similiter, quae; vult et facit voluntatem creatam nunc velle, quoniam secundum Philosophum et Anselmum vbi prius,\n\nQuod est, quando est, necesse est esse: hae ergo duae necessitates in his duabus voluntatibus, diuina scilicet et humana, aut sunt coaequaevae et disparatae in causalitate, et impertinentes ad inuicem, aut non sunt ita: si sint tales, ergo iuxta habita 25. secundi, ambae reducuntur ad tertiam, tanquam ad causam communem priorem ambabus: ergo voluntas diuina necessitatur per aliquam causam priorem ad volendum aliquid extra Deum; quod nullus dubitat esse falsum, quoniam illa causa vel est rationalis et libera, vel irrationalis et necessaria in agendo. Si detur primum, ergo diuina voluntas non est prima causarum omnium liberarum, nec Deus primum agentium liberorum; cuius oppositum suppositio prima primi, et capitulum 9. cum 20. et sequentibus, ac 30. secundi huius ostendunt. Si detur secundum, ergo Deus necessitate penitus absoluta vult et facit aliquid extra ipsum; quod destruitur per praemissa. Omnis\n\nquoque necessitas in qualibet creatura, sicut et quodlibet aliud, producitur a voluntate diuina, tanquam a causa efficiente priori, vt nonum primi docebat: Omnis ergo volendi necessitas in voluntate creata efficitur a voluntate diuina; quare dici non potest illas duas necessitates praedictas esse disparatas et ad inuicem coaequaeuas; nec quisquam in tantum desipit aut insanit, vt dicat necessitatem in voluntate humana esse causam naturaliter praecedentem, et efficientem respectu necessitatis in voluntate diuina: Hoc enim eius libertati permaximae nimium derogaret; quod et per praemissa conuincitur esse falsum; Illa ergo necessitas in voluntate diuina est prior naturaliter necessitate in voluntate humana, et efficiens causa eius. Item nulla voluntas creata in actibus suis est liberior voluntate Christi humana, et illam necessitauit voluntas eius diuina ad singulos actus suos, sicut hic supra et capitulo proximo est ostensum. Quare et quamlibet aliam quodammodo necessitat voluntatem. Voluntas quoque diuina antecedenter necessitat beatos confirmatos in Coelo ad beatificum actum suum,\n\net ad non peccandum, et contrario modo damnatos, sicut 15. secundi 16. et 17. suaserunt: Cur ergo non agentia caetera simili ratione?\n\nCOROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium, quod aliqualis necessitas antecedens et libertas ac meritum non repugnant, et quod nulla causa inferior, sed tantum superior, scilicet Dei voluntas, est necessitas antecedens respectu sui effectus: et quod omnia, quae sunt, fiunt et eueniunt, sunt, fiunt et eueniunt de aliqua necessitate ipsam naturaliter praecedente.\n\nVNde consequitur euidenter, quod aliqualis necessitas antecedens et libertas ac meritum non repugnant, et quod nulla causa inferior, sed tantum superior, scilicet Dei voluntas,\n\nest necessitas antecedens, et quod omnia quae sunt, fiunt, et eueniunt, sunt, fiunt, et eueniunt dealiqua necessitate ipsa naturaliter praecedente. Primam namque partem huius ostendit clarissime conclusio principalis, quae etiam potest ostendi simpliciter sicut illa; et secunda sequitur ex hac prima. Potest quoque istud corollarium demonstrari quantum ad has partes, sicut proximum fuerit demonstratum: Secunda vero pars huius sequitur manifeste, quoniam nulla causa inferior, quantumcunque disposita, quicquam potest, si voluntas diuina resistat, vel etiam si non agat, sicut 10. et 9. primi, cum 20. secundi lucide manifestant: Relinquitur ergo sola voluntas diuina necessitas antecedens; Vnde et cum nono primi sequitur vltima pars istius.", "english": "CHAPTER II. That God in a certain way necessitates every created will to each of its free acts, and to every free cessation and abstention from an act, and does so by a necessity naturally preceding.\n\nNext, I think, it must be shown here that God in a certain way necessitates every created will to each of its free acts, and also to every free cessation of and abstention from an act, and does so by a necessity naturally preceding. For there is, as Anselm teaches in Cur Deus homo 1, 17 [n1] and in De concordia 2, a twofold necessity, namely the preceding and the following, or concomitant. The preceding necessity makes a thing be, and it is found in all irrational agents. When the active has approached the passive with the due circumstances, the effect will follow necessarily, as the Philosopher teaches in Metaphysics 9, 10 [n2]. The same holds for the necessity of not-being, in the case of things which are prevented from being by irrational agents. The following or concomitant necessity, on the other hand, is that which in a way comes about from the existing thing, and from any being takes its rise and descends, as it were; not-being likewise follows it inseparably and accompanies it individually. And this, according to the Philosopher, Peri hermeneias 1, last chapter [n3], holds universally in all beings and non-beings whatever. Hence he says: \"It is necessary that what is, be, when it is; and that what is not, not be, when it is not.\" Anselm means the same in the places cited.\n\nNor is this preceding necessity found only in irrational agents and their acts. It is found also in rational agents, from the freedom of their choice and from their free acts. For when the power and the will to do any free external thing are posited in a rational and free active agent, it follows necessarily that this be done: nothing required is lacking. And the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9, where before [that is, 10]: \"Everything that is capable according to reason must, when it desires, do that of which it has the power, and in the way it has it.\" He teaches the same opinion often elsewhere as well, as is recited in what precedes. From this a certain general rule seems plainly to be gathered, namely that universally every effect, produced by whatever agent, rational or irrational and free, is produced in this manner. When its agent is posited with all its sufficient dispositions naturally prior, by which it produces the effect, it follows necessarily and unfailingly that the effect is produced; and it is produced from a naturally preceding necessity. This is also sufficiently apparent from the meanings of the terms. Hence a definition of naturally preceding necessity can be drawn: that it is the active cause which, once posited with all its sufficient dispositions naturally prior, by which it causes what it causes, necessarily and unfailingly has it follow that this be caused.\n\nAnd from this the definition of an effect that is necessary by naturally preceding necessity can clearly be known: namely, that it is what is caused by a cause which, once fully posited, necessarily has it follow that the effect be caused.\n\nBut someone will perhaps object here, denying the rule and the definitions premised. He will say that they are true only of inferior and secondary causes, but not of the supreme and first cause. For every secondary cause, whenever and however it is disposed or affected, must then be so affected or disposed with respect to whatever is causable or caused. The first cause, the respondent says, is not so: although God now wills something to be future, say the Antichrist, it is not necessary for now that he so will, but he can for now not so will. But according to this responsive instance there would be no antecedent necessity at all with respect to any effect, nor any effect necessary with respect to its cause by naturally preceding necessity. For no secondary cause can do anything without the co-efficiency and pre-efficiency of the first cause, namely the divine will, as the twentieth and thirtieth of the second showed [n4]. If, therefore, there is no antecedent necessity in this cause or in that, there cannot be in any other either.\n\nMoreover, this effect, now made or created immediately by God, necessarily is now; so too, therefore, must its efficient or creating cause be now, namely the divine will. Or, if that cause can for now not be, so can this effect also, against what was premised. In the same way it can be argued about any past effect: for by the fourteenth of the first, the will of God is the cause of anything past, on account of which it is past. And if he says that the divine will is an antecedent necessity with respect to present and past things, but by no means with respect to future things, he makes the divine will mutable, against the fifth and the twenty-third of the first book. For he makes the divine will, with respect to future things, free with respect to contradiction, to the point that for the very instant in which it is, with respect to some future thing, it can not be; and when that future thing becomes present, or passes into the past, he makes it necessary by the opposite necessity.\n\nMoreover, why can the omnipotent will of God not be as necessary, and with as great a necessity, with respect to a future effect as with respect to a present and a past one? For if it is necessary from itself alone, and is an antecedent necessity with respect to present and past, it can likewise be so with respect to the future. It always stands intrinsically in every respect in the same way [n5] with respect to the same thing: first as future, second as present, third as past. But suppose the antecedent necessity with respect to present and past is posited as arising not sufficiently nor wholly from itself alone, but with the help of something else, say the present or past thing. Then the divine will does not seem fully sufficient to itself, nor fully omnipotent, against the first supposition, the third part, the fifth and the seventh of the first corollary of the first. Again, if the present thing in some way helped toward the necessity in the divine will with respect to that present thing, it would seem to be some cause of that necessity, and in some way to cause it. Hence it would be naturally prior for the present thing to be, and of necessity to be for now, than for the divine will now to have that intrinsic necessity of its own; and this can be disproved by the twentieth of the first and the thirtieth of the second. Moreover, if the necessity in the divine will were so, it would be a subsequent necessity, and the necessity of the present thing would be an antecedent necessity, contrary to the hypothesis.\n\nAnd if some extrinsic help can supply the divine will with an intrinsic necessity with respect to all present and past things, why not likewise with respect to all future things, or to some future thing? Further, suppose the divine will, which now exists with respect to some future thing, could for now not be with respect to it, as the response says. Still, this is not in the power of that future thing, nor of any inferior cause, nor of any causes whatever, but only in the free power of the divine will; and that will is universally efficacious and unfailing in causing, and hence there is antecedent necessity with respect to that future thing.\n\nSee how this way of speaking about antecedent necessity accords naturally with reason. It accords also with the manner of speaking of the older Philosophers and Theologians and of our Fathers; indeed it is their manner of speaking, as what is premised here and in the preceding chapter teaches. Hence Augustine also, in On Free Choice 3, 3: \"His will,\" he says, \"that is, God's, is for me necessity\" [n6]. Although this is said under the name of the disciple, Augustine does not reject it but approves it, showing that will and necessity do not conflict. The words and opinion of Augustine in City of God 5, 9 and 10 also accord with this, after what is premised in this chapter. In On Genesis, Literal Commentary 6, 22, he also shows that the necessity of future things is in God, in the divine will, where he says: \"That is necessarily future which he wills.\" This also accords with the words and mind of Anselm, touched on in the chapter immediately preceding. Hence also in Cur Deus homo 2, 17: \"All,\" he says, [n7] \"necessity and impossibility is subject to his will; but his will is subject to no necessity or impossibility: for nothing is necessary or impossible except because he so wills.\" And below, speaking of Christ, he says: \"If you wish to know the true necessity of all that he did and suffered, know that all of it was from necessity, because he himself willed it.\" And in a certain meditation of his on human redemption he says: \"All necessity and impossibility is subject to his will, since what he wills necessarily is, and what he does not will is impossible to be.\"\n\nThe same again in De concordia 2, after the distinction on the necessity premised and its extended exposition, he says: \"The work of the will, to which it has been granted that what it wills be, and what it does not will not be, is voluntary or spontaneous, since it comes about by spontaneous will. And it is necessary in two ways, because it is compelled by the will to come about, and what comes about cannot at the same time not come about.\" The work of the will, he says, that is, the operation or the thing wrought externally, proceeding from the willing will, is compelled, that is, is necessitated, as his procedure and words plainly show.\n\nHence also in Metaphysics 5, 16 [n8], where one translation says: \"That is prior and more powerful, according to whose prior will it is necessary that the other follow.\" Another translation says that what is stronger and before is that which compels another to follow its will. Averroes, expounding this text, says: \"Universally 'before' is said of that which is stronger and worthier, and it is that which compels what is after, so that the will of the latter follows the will of the former, since the will of the weaker follows the will of the stronger.\" The first of this book recited this more fully.\n\nThe most divine Isaiah seems also to have had by divine gift this same manner of speaking, predicting of Christ that he would come \"like a violent river, which the spirit of the Lord drives\" [n9]. \"Violent,\" he says, that is, not unwilling but full of force, the force of the Spirit of the Lord, who rested fully upon him, and drove him in all things and led him, and whom he himself in all things followed necessarily, as the thirtieth of the second and the first of the third declared more fully. Hence Matthew also says that Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert; and Luke, that he was driven by the Spirit into the desert; and Mark, that the Spirit cast him out or, by another reading, compelled him into the desert. It is most certain that all these things were said of the Holy Spirit, as the thirtieth of the second briefly recalled.\n\nFor this reason Stephen, Bishop of Paris [n10], also condemned a certain error which said that, for all effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it is not enough that the first cause itself not be impedible; it is required also that the intermediate causes not be impedible. \"An error,\" says the Bishop, \"because then God could not make any effect necessary without posterior causes.\" All effects, therefore, even free ones, are necessary with respect to the first cause, because they proceed from his will, which cannot in any way be impeded.\n\nAnd if anyone should think to object, saying that the Parisian article does not say \"all effects\" universally, but only \"effects\" particularly or indefinitely, I confess that I do not know how it was written in the original article. I know, however, that among the heavily corrected articles I found it written universally; and it does not matter. For from that particular or indefinite statement, together with other truths, the universal one follows evidently. For suppose that, for some effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it suffices that the first cause not be impedible with respect to them. Since universally all effects come about from it, and it is universally non-impedible with respect to some effects, or even to any one, as what has been had before has demonstrated, all effects are necessary with respect to it.\n\nWith these things supposed, then, the principal conclusion will be easily shown. For according to the preceding chapter, God can so necessitate every created will, and this by a necessity naturally preceding, since the whole chapter proceeds according to such necessity. And he could not do this by doing anything other than only willing, since in no other way does he act outwardly, as 9 and 10 of the first teach; nor by willing otherwise than he naturally willed before. By the twentieth of the second joined to the thirtieth, he always so wills, as was also argued more fully in the preceding chapter. Likewise, by the same twentieth, God through his will is properly the efficient cause of every act of the created will; by the same thirtieth, he is naturally prior to the created will; and by the tenth of the first, the divine will cannot be frustrated. Therefore, by the general rule and the definitions premised, every act of the created will is produced from a naturally preceding necessity. Indeed, by the same reasoning, every created will doing anything does it from a naturally preceding necessity.\n\nTo the same end it is argued, not improbably, in this way. In a created will now willing there is a certain necessity to will, at least a subsequent necessity; and likewise in the divine will, which wills and makes the created will now to will, since according to the Philosopher and Anselm, where before, \"What is, when it is, necessarily is.\" These two necessities, then, in these two wills, the divine and the human, either are coeval and disparate in causality and unrelated to each other, or they are not so. If they are such, then, according to what was had in the twenty-fifth of the second, both are reduced to a third, as to a common cause prior to both. Therefore the divine will is necessitated by some prior cause to will something outside God; and no one doubts this to be false, since that cause is either rational and free, or irrational and necessary in acting. If the first is granted, then the divine will is not the first of all free causes, nor is God the first of free agents. The opposite of this the first supposition of the first, and chapter 9 with 20 and what follows, and the thirtieth of this second, show. If the second is granted, then God wills and does something outside himself by a wholly absolute necessity, and this is destroyed by what was premised.\n\nMoreover, every necessity in any creature, as also anything else, is produced by the divine will as by a prior efficient cause, as the ninth of the first taught. Every necessity of willing in the created will, therefore, is brought about by the divine will. Hence it cannot be said that those two aforesaid necessities are disparate and coeval with each other. Nor is anyone so foolish or mad as to say that the necessity in the human will is the naturally preceding and efficient cause with respect to the necessity in the divine will. For that would derogate far too much from the divine will's supreme freedom, and this is convicted as false also by what was premised. That necessity in the divine will, therefore, is naturally prior to the necessity in the human will, and is its efficient cause. Likewise, no created will is freer in its acts than the human will of Christ, and his divine will necessitated it to each of its acts, as has been shown above here and in the preceding chapter. Therefore he in a certain way necessitates every other will too. The divine will also antecedently necessitates the blessed, confirmed in Heaven, to their beatific act and to not sinning, and in the contrary way the damned, as the fifteenth of the second, with the sixteenth and seventeenth, have urged. Why, then, not the other agents, by like reasoning?\n\nCOROLLARY.\n\nCorollary: that some kind of antecedent necessity and freedom and merit do not conflict; and that no inferior cause, but only a superior one, namely the will of God, is antecedent necessity with respect to its effect; and that all things that are, come about and happen, are, come about and happen from some necessity naturally preceding them [n11].\n\nHence it follows evidently that some kind of antecedent necessity and freedom and merit do not conflict; that no inferior cause, but only a superior one, namely the will of God, is antecedent necessity; and that all things that are, come about and happen, are, come about and happen from some necessity naturally preceding them. For the first part of this the principal conclusion shows most clearly, and that conclusion can also be shown simply, just as that one can [n12]; and the second follows from this first. This corollary can also be demonstrated, as to these parts, as the preceding one has been demonstrated. The second part of it follows manifestly, since no inferior cause, however disposed, can do anything if the divine will resists, or even if it does not act, as the tenth and ninth of the first, with the twentieth of the second, lucidly show. There remains, therefore, the divine will alone as antecedent necessity; whence also, with the ninth of the first, the last part of this follows.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "The passage on the twofold necessity, preceding and subsequent, is Anselm, Cur Deus homo II.17. Bradwardine himself cites it below as \"Cur Deus homo 2, 17\". The \"1.\" in the first citation is therefore probably a slip for \"2.\", but the print reads \"1.\" and I have kept it."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Metaphysics 9 is Θ; the passage is Θ.5, 1048a5–21. The second number (\"10\") is probably the text number in the Latin Aristotle with Averroes's commentary. Savile's numbers are kept as printed (Conventions §5.4)."}, {"n": 3, "text": "\"Peri hermeneias 1, last chapter\" is De interpretatione 9, 19a23–27, the last chapter of the first book in the medieval Latin division."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Bradwardine's cross-references are to chapters of this work: \"20 of the second\" is II.20, and \"the first of the first\" is I.1, whose suppositions and corollary parts are cited by number. \"The preceding chapter\" and \"the next chapter\" (proximum capitulum) are the chapter immediately before this one, III.1. \"The first of this book\" is III.1 also. All are left as Savile gives them (Conventions §5.4)."}, {"n": 5, "text": "The print reads cum omni eodem modo intrinsece semper se habeat. I construe omni eodem modo as \"in every respect in the same way\", the sense of omnino eodem modo. The Latin is awkward but not corrupt."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The speaker in De libero arbitrio III.3 is the disciple Evodius, Augustine's interlocutor. Bradwardine's point is that the master lets the statement stand."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Savile's margin reads Augustinus, but the passage beside it (Cur Deus homo II.17 and the Meditatio de redemptione humana) is Anselm's. The margin evidently refers to the Augustine citations just before, or is a slip for Anselmus. I give it as printed."}, {"n": 8, "text": "Metaphysics 5, 16 is Δ.11, 1019a2–4, with Averroes's comment 16 (the number follows the Latin edition with the Commentary). The first translation's praeuoluntatem renders the Greek literally (\"prior will\" or \"prior choice\"). The Latin versions of Aristotle that Bradwardine quotes are not identified here."}, {"n": 9, "text": "Is 59:19 in the Vulgate: cum venerit quasi fluvius violentus, quem spiritus Domini cogit. Both violentus and cogit are the Vulgate's. Bradwardine's gloss turns \"violent\" into \"full of force, not unwilling\"."}, {"n": 10, "text": "Stephen Tempier, whose condemnation of 219 propositions at Paris (1277) is meant. I have not checked Bradwardine's wording of the article against the Chartularium, and the text itself treats the article's wording as uncertain."}, {"n": 11, "text": "The heading has necessitate ipsam naturaliter praecedente, and the body has necessitate ipsa naturaliter praecedente. Neither form agrees grammatically with necessitate. I read both as \"preceding the thing itself\", that is, preceding the things that come about, and translated \"preceding them\"."}, {"n": 12, "text": "Simpliciter sicut illa is ambiguous: illa may be the first part of the corollary, or the previous conclusion. I translated it literally (\"just as that one can\") rather than choosing."}], "errata": [{"address": "646B", "keyed": "tiberum", "print": "liberum"}, {"address": "646E", "keyed": "terminorunt", "print": "terminorum"}, {"address": "647B", "keyed": "praetetitorum", "print": "praeteritorum"}, {"address": "647C", "keyed": "praelentis", "print": "praesentis"}, {"address": "647D", "keyed": "ommum", "print": "omnium"}, {"address": "647E", "keyed": "subiacer", "print": "subiacet"}, {"address": "647E", "keyed": "esle", "print": "esse"}, {"address": "648A", "keyed": "spontanca", "print": "spontanea"}, {"address": "648B", "keyed": "debiliotis", "print": "debilioris"}, {"address": "648B", "keyed": "Auetroes", "print": "Auerroes"}, {"address": "648C", "keyed": "alicutus", "print": "alicuius"}, {"address": "648D", "keyed": "quae; vult", "print": "quae vult"}, {"address": "649C", "keyed": "dealiqua", "print": "de aliqua"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p646B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p646B", "locator_display": "646B–646C", "source_text": "CAP II. Quod Deus quodammodo necessitat quamlibet voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet tiberum actum suum, et ad quamlibet liberam cessationem ac vacationem ab actu, et hoc necessitate naturaliter\n\npraecedente.", "english": "CHAPTER II. That God in a certain way necessitates every created will to each of its free acts, and to every free cessation and abstention from an act, and does so by a necessity naturally preceding.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p646C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p646C", "locator_display": "646C–646D", "source_text": "HIc autem consequenter arbitror ostendendum, quod Deus quodammodo necessitat quamlibet voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet liberum actum suum, ad quamlibet etiam liberam cessationem et vacationem ab actu, et hoc necessitate naturaliter praecedente. Est namque, sicut docet Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo 17. et de Concordia 2. duplex necessitas, scili et praecedens et sequens, siue concomitans. Praecedens facit rem esse, et haec est in omnibus agentibus irrationalibus, quoniam cum actiuū appropinquauerit passiuo cum circumstantijs debitis, necessario sequetur effectus, sicut docet Philosophus, 9. Met. 10. et eodem modo est de necessitate\n\nnon essendi, de his quae per irrationalia prohibentur ab esse: sequens vero siue concomitans est, quae quodammodo fit a re ente, et ab esse quolibet quasi adoritur et descendit, illud que inseparabiliter sequitur et indiuidue comitatur, similiter et non esse. Et haec secundum Philosophum, 1. peri hermenias vlt. est vniuersaliter in entibus et non entibus quibuscunque: vnde sic dicit, Esse, quod est, quando est, et non esse, quod non est, quando non est, necesse est: et idem vult Anselmus locis praedictis. Nec solum ista praecedens necessitas in agentibus irrationabilibus et eorum actibus reperitur, verumetiam in agentibus rationabilibus ex arbitrij libertate et actibus liberis eorundem. Positis namque in actiuo rationali et libero potentia et voluntate quodlibet extrinsecum liberum faciendi, necessario sequitur quod hoc fiat: nihil enim deficit requisitum. Dicitque Philosophus 9. Metaphys. vbi prius [scilicet 10.] Potens secundum rationem omne necesse quando desiderat, cuius habet potentiam, et vt habet, hoc facere. Eandem quoque sententiam et alibi saepe docet, sicut", "english": "Next, I think, it must be shown here that God in a certain way necessitates every created will to each of its free acts, and also to every free cessation of and abstention from an act, and does so by a necessity naturally preceding. For there is, as Anselm teaches in Cur Deus homo 1, 17 [n1] and in De concordia 2, a twofold necessity, namely the preceding and the following, or concomitant. The preceding necessity makes a thing be, and it is found in all irrational agents. When the active has approached the passive with the due circumstances, the effect will follow necessarily, as the Philosopher teaches in Metaphysics 9, 10 [n2]. The same holds for the necessity of not-being, in the case of things which are prevented from being by irrational agents. The following or concomitant necessity, on the other hand, is that which in a way comes about from the existing thing, and from any being takes its rise and descends, as it were; not-being likewise follows it inseparably and accompanies it individually. And this, according to the Philosopher, Peri hermeneias 1, last chapter [n3], holds universally in all beings and non-beings whatever. Hence he says: \"It is necessary that what is, be, when it is; and that what is not, not be, when it is not.\" Anselm means the same in the places cited.", "margins": [{"id": "646D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "The Philosopher."}, {"id": "646D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosophus."}]}, {"anchor": "p646D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p646D", "locator_display": "646D–646E", "source_text": "in praecedentibus recitatur. Ex quo videtur perspicue colligi quaedam regula generalis, quod videlicet vniuersaliter omnis effectus a quocunque agente rationali vel irrationali et libero producatur hoc modo, quod posito suo agente cum omnibus suis dispositionibus sufficientibus naturaliter praeuijs quibus illum producit, necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur ipsum produci. et producitur ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente; quod et satis apparet ex significationibus terminorunt. Vnde et potest elici talis definitio necessitatis naturaliter praecedentis; quod ipsa est causa actiua, qua posita cum omnibus suis dispositionibus sufficientibus naturaliter praeuijs quibus causat suum causatum, necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur illud causari. Et ex hac clare potest cognosci definitio effectus necessarij necessitate naturaliter", "english": "Nor is this preceding necessity found only in irrational agents and their acts. It is found also in rational agents, from the freedom of their choice and from their free acts. For when the power and the will to do any free external thing are posited in a rational and free active agent, it follows necessarily that this be done: nothing required is lacking. And the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9, where before [that is, 10]: \"Everything that is capable according to reason must, when it desires, do that of which it has the power, and in the way it has it.\" He teaches the same opinion often elsewhere as well, as is recited in what precedes. From this a certain general rule seems plainly to be gathered, namely that universally every effect, produced by whatever agent, rational or irrational and free, is produced in this manner. When its agent is posited with all its sufficient dispositions naturally prior, by which it produces the effect, it follows necessarily and unfailingly that the effect is produced; and it is produced from a naturally preceding necessity. This is also sufficiently apparent from the meanings of the terms. Hence a definition of naturally preceding necessity can be drawn: that it is the active cause which, once posited with all its sufficient dispositions naturally prior, by which it causes what it causes, necessarily and unfailingly has it follow that this be caused.", "margins": [{"id": "646D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosophus."}, {"id": "646D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "The Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p646E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p646E", "locator_display": "646E–647A", "source_text": "praecedente; scilicet, quod est causatum a causa, qua plene posita, necessario sequitur illud causari. Sed aliquis forsitan hic instabit negando regulam, et definitiones praemissas, dicendo illas esse veras de causis inferioribus et secundis tantummodo, non autem de causa suprema et prima, eo quod omnis causa secunda, quandocunque, quomodocunque sit disposita seu affecta, respectu cuiuscunque causabilis seu causati, necesse est tunc eam sic affici seu disponi. Prima autem causa non sic, vt dicit respondens, quia licet Deus nunc velit aliquid esse futurum, puta Antichristum, non est necesse pro nunc ipsum sic velle, sed potest pro nunc non sic velle. Sed secundum istam instantiam responsiuam, nulla esset omnino necessitas antecedens respectu alicuius effectus, nec aliquis effectus necessarius respectu suae causae necessitate naturaliter praecedente: nulla enim causa secunda quicquam potest sine coefficientia et praeefficientia primae causae, diuinae videlicet voluntatis, sicut vicesimum et tricesimum secundi", "english": "And from this the definition of an effect that is necessary by naturally preceding necessity can clearly be known: namely, that it is what is caused by a cause which, once fully posited, necessarily has it follow that the effect be caused.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p647A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p647A", "locator_display": "647A–647B", "source_text": "monstrabant: si ergo in ista seu illa non sit necessitas antecedens, nec in aliqua alia potest esse. Adhuc autem et istum effectum nunc factum seu creatum immediate a Deo necesse est nunc esse; quare et eius causam efficientem seu creantem, puta voluntatem diuinam: vel si ipsa possit pro nunc non esse, potest et iste effectus contra praemissa. Simili quoque modo potest argui de quocunque effectu praeterito; quoniam secundum decimum quartum primi, voluntas Dei est causa cuiuscunque praeteriti, quare ipsum est praeteritum. Et si dixerit quod voluntas diuina respectu praesentium et praetetitorum est necessitas antecedens, sed respectu futurorum nequaquam, facit voluntatem diuinam mutabilem, contra quintum, et vicesimum tertium primi libri: facit enim voluntatem diuinam respectu futurorum liberam secundum contradictionem, in tantum quod pro eodem instanti, in quo est, respectu alicuius futuri, potest non esse; et cum illud futurum fiat praesens, in praeteritumue discedat, facit eam necessariam necessitate opposita. Adhuc autem cur non potest omnipotens Dei voluntas esse tam", "english": "But someone will perhaps object here, denying the rule and the definitions premised. He will say that they are true only of inferior and secondary causes, but not of the supreme and first cause. For every secondary cause, whenever and however it is disposed or affected, must then be so affected or disposed with respect to whatever is causable or caused. The first cause, the respondent says, is not so: although God now wills something to be future, say the Antichrist, it is not necessary for now that he so will, but he can for now not so will. But according to this responsive instance there would be no antecedent necessity at all with respect to any effect, nor any effect necessary with respect to its cause by naturally preceding necessity. For no secondary cause can do anything without the co-efficiency and pre-efficiency of the first cause, namely the divine will, as the twentieth and thirtieth of the second showed [n4]. If, therefore, there is no antecedent necessity in this cause or in that, there cannot be in any other either.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p647B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p647B", "locator_display": "647B", "source_text": "", "english": "Moreover, this effect, now made or created immediately by God, necessarily is now; so too, therefore, must its efficient or creating cause be now, namely the divine will. Or, if that cause can for now not be, so can this effect also, against what was premised. In the same way it can be argued about any past effect: for by the fourteenth of the first, the will of God is the cause of anything past, on account of which it is past. And if he says that the divine will is an antecedent necessity with respect to present and past things, but by no means with respect to future things, he makes the divine will mutable, against the fifth and the twenty-third of the first book. For he makes the divine will, with respect to future things, free with respect to contradiction, to the point that for the very instant in which it is, with respect to some future thing, it can not be; and when that future thing becomes present, or passes into the past, he makes it necessary by the opposite necessity.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p647B-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p647B-2", "locator_display": "647B–647D", "source_text": "necessaria et tanta necessitas respectu effectus futuri, sicut praelentis et praeteriti? Si enim ex se sola sit necessaria, et necessitas antecedens respectu praesentis et praeteriti, potest et similiter respectu futuri, cum omni eodem modo intrinsece semper se habeat respectu eiusdem rei primo futurae, secundo praesentis, et tertio praeteritae. Si autem ponatur necessitas antecedens respectu praesentis et praeteriti non sufficienter nec totaliter ex se sola, sed ex adiutorio alicuius alterius, puta rei praesentis vel praeteritae, non videtur sibi ipsi plene sufficiens, neque plene omnipotens, contra primam suppositionem, tertiam partem, quintam, et septimam corollarij primi, primi. Si etiam res praesens aliquo modo iuuaret ad necessitatem in voluntate diuina respectu illius rei praesentis, videtur quod esset aliqua causa eius, et aliquo modo ipsam causaret; quare et prius naturaliter esset rem praesentem esse, et necessario pro nunc esse, quam voluntatem diuinam illam necessitatem suam intrinsecam nunc habere, quod potest\n\nconuinci per 20. primi, et 30. secundi: si insuper ita esset illa necessitas in voluntate diuina, esset necessitas subsequens et necessitas rei praesentis necessitas antecedens contra hypothesin. Si etiam aliquod adiutorium extrinsecum potest praebere voluntati diuinae necessitatem intrinsecam respectu omnium praesentium et praeteritorum, cur non similiter respectu ommum futurorum, aut alicuius futuri? Amplius autem et si voluntas diuina, quae nunc est respectu alicuius futuri, posset pro nunc non esse respectu illius, vt dicit responsio; hoc tamen non est in potestate illius futuri, nec alicuius causae inferioris, nec aliquarum causarum, sed tantum in voluntatis diuinae libera potestate, et ipsa est vniuersaliter efficax et indefectibilis in causando, quare et necessitas antecedens respectu illius futuri. Ecce quomodo iste modus loquendi de necessitate antecedente naturaliter consonat rationi: consonat quoque modo loquendi, imo et est modus loquendi Philosophorum et Theologorum seniorum, et Patrum nostrorum, sicut praemissa hic et proximo huius docent: vnde et Augustinus 3. de libero arbitrio 3. Voluntas, inquit, illius, scilicet Dei, mihi est necessitas: et quanquam sub", "english": "Moreover, why can the omnipotent will of God not be as necessary, and with as great a necessity, with respect to a future effect as with respect to a present and a past one? For if it is necessary from itself alone, and is an antecedent necessity with respect to present and past, it can likewise be so with respect to the future. It always stands intrinsically in every respect in the same way [n5] with respect to the same thing: first as future, second as present, third as past. But suppose the antecedent necessity with respect to present and past is posited as arising not sufficiently nor wholly from itself alone, but with the help of something else, say the present or past thing. Then the divine will does not seem fully sufficient to itself, nor fully omnipotent, against the first supposition, the third part, the fifth and the seventh of the first corollary of the first. Again, if the present thing in some way helped toward the necessity in the divine will with respect to that present thing, it would seem to be some cause of that necessity, and in some way to cause it. Hence it would be naturally prior for the present thing to be, and of necessity to be for now, than for the divine will now to have that intrinsic necessity of its own; and this can be disproved by the twentieth of the first and the thirtieth of the second. Moreover, if the necessity in the divine will were so, it would be a subsequent necessity, and the necessity of the present thing would be an antecedent necessity, contrary to the hypothesis.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p647D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p647D", "locator_display": "647D", "source_text": "", "english": "And if some extrinsic help can supply the divine will with an intrinsic necessity with respect to all present and past things, why not likewise with respect to all future things, or to some future thing? Further, suppose the divine will, which now exists with respect to some future thing, could for now not be with respect to it, as the response says. Still, this is not in the power of that future thing, nor of any inferior cause, nor of any causes whatever, but only in the free power of the divine will; and that will is universally efficacious and unfailing in causing, and hence there is antecedent necessity with respect to that future thing.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p647D-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p647D-2", "locator_display": "647D–647E", "source_text": "nomine discipuli hoc dicatur, hoc tamen non reprobat, sed approbat Augustinus, ostendens quod voluntas et necessitas non repugnant: huic et consonant verba et sententia Augustini, 5. de ciuit. Dei 9. et 10. post huius praemissa: qui et 6. super Genesin ad literam 22. ostendit, quod necessitas rerum futurarum est in Deo, in voluntate diuina, vbi et sic ait, hoc necessario futurum est quod ille vult. Istud etiam consonat verbis et menti Anselmi proximo huius tactis. Vnde et 2. Cur Deus homo, 17. Omnis, inquit, necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacer voluntati; illius autem voluntas nulli subditur necessitati, aut impossibilitati: nihil enim est necessarium, aut impossibile, nisi quia ipse ita vult. Et infra loquens de Christo, sic ait; Si vis omnium quae fecit, et quae passus est, veram scire necessitatem, scito omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Qui et in quadam meditatione sua de redemptione humana sic dicit; Omnis necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacet voluntati, quippe quod vult necesse est esle, et quod non vult, impossibile est esse. Idem adhuc de concordia 2. post distinctionem", "english": "See how this way of speaking about antecedent necessity accords naturally with reason. It accords also with the manner of speaking of the older Philosophers and Theologians and of our Fathers; indeed it is their manner of speaking, as what is premised here and in the preceding chapter teaches. Hence Augustine also, in On Free Choice 3, 3: \"His will,\" he says, \"that is, God's, is for me necessity\" [n6]. Although this is said under the name of the disciple, Augustine does not reject it but approves it, showing that will and necessity do not conflict. The words and opinion of Augustine in City of God 5, 9 and 10 also accord with this, after what is premised in this chapter. In On Genesis, Literal Commentary 6, 22, he also shows that the necessity of future things is in God, in the divine will, where he says: \"That is necessarily future which he wills.\" This also accords with the words and mind of Anselm, touched on in the chapter immediately preceding. Hence also in Cur Deus homo 2, 17: \"All,\" he says, [n7] \"necessity and impossibility is subject to his will; but his will is subject to no necessity or impossibility: for nothing is necessary or impossible except because he so wills.\" And below, speaking of Christ, he says: \"If you wish to know the true necessity of all that he did and suffered, know that all of it was from necessity, because he himself willed it.\" And in a certain meditation of his on human redemption he says: \"All necessity and impossibility is subject to his will, since what he wills necessarily is, and what he does not will is impossible to be.\"", "margins": [{"id": "647E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p647E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p647E", "locator_display": "647E–648A", "source_text": "de necessitate praemissa, et ostensionem eius diffusam sic ait; Opus voluntatis, cui datum est, vt quod vult sit, et quod non vult non sit, voluntarium siue spontaneum est, quoniam spontanca voluntate fit: et bifariam est necessarium, quia voluntate cogitur fieri, et quod fit non potest simul non fieri. Opus, inquit, voluntatis, id est operatio, seu operatum extrinsecum a voluntate volente procedens cogitur, id est necessitatur, sicut processus eius et verba lucide manifestant. Vnde et 5. Metaphys. Arist. 16. vbi vna translatio dicit, Quod prius et potentius est illud, cuius secundum praeuoluntatem sequi necesse est alterum; alia translatio dicit, quod fortius et ante est illud quod cogit alterum sequi suam voluntatem: quam literam Auetroes exponendo, sic ait; Vniuersaliter dicitur Ante, illud quod est fortius et dignius, et est illud quod cogit illud quod est post, vt voluntas eius consequatur voluntatem suam,", "english": "The same again in De concordia 2, after the distinction on the necessity premised and its extended exposition, he says: \"The work of the will, to which it has been granted that what it wills be, and what it does not will not be, is voluntary or spontaneous, since it comes about by spontaneous will. And it is necessary in two ways, because it is compelled by the will to come about, and what comes about cannot at the same time not come about.\" The work of the will, he says, that is, the operation or the thing wrought externally, proceeding from the willing will, is compelled, that is, is necessitated, as his procedure and words plainly show.", "margins": [{"id": "647E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus."}, {"id": "648A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Aristoteles."}]}, {"anchor": "p648A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p648A", "locator_display": "648A–648B", "source_text": "quoniam voluntas debiliotis sequitur voluntatem fortioris, sicut primum huius plenius recitauit. Eundem quoque modum loquendi videtur diuinissimus Esaias diuinitus habuisse, praedicens de Christo quod veniret quasi fluuius violentus, quem spiritus Domini cogit; violentus, inquit, id est, non inuitus, sed vi plenus, vi spiritus Domini, qui super ipsum plenarie requ ieuit, et ipsum agebat in omnibus, et ducebat, quem et ipse in omnibus necessario sequebatur, sicut 30. secundi, et primum tertij plenius declarabat. Vnde et Matthaeus dicit, quod Iesus ductus est a spiritu in desertum; et Lucas, quod agebatur a spiritu in desertum; et Marcus, quod expulit, aut, secundum aliam literam, compulit eum spiritus in desertum, quae omnia de spiritu sancto constat certissime dicta esse, sicut 30. secundi breuiter memorabat. Quapropter et Stephanus Episcopus Parisiensis condemnauit quendam errorem dicentem, quod ad hoc, quod effectus omnes sint necessarij respectu primae causae, non sufficit, quod ipsa causa prima non sit impedibilis, sed exigitur quod causae mediae non sint impedibiles. Error, inquit Episcopus, quia tunc Deus non posset facere aliquem effectum necessarium", "english": "Hence also in Metaphysics 5, 16 [n8], where one translation says: \"That is prior and more powerful, according to whose prior will it is necessary that the other follow.\" Another translation says that what is stronger and before is that which compels another to follow its will. Averroes, expounding this text, says: \"Universally 'before' is said of that which is stronger and worthier, and it is that which compels what is after, so that the will of the latter follows the will of the former, since the will of the weaker follows the will of the stronger.\" The first of this book recited this more fully.", "margins": [{"id": "648A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Aristotle."}, {"id": "648B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Esaias."}]}, {"anchor": "p648B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p648B", "locator_display": "648B", "source_text": "", "english": "The most divine Isaiah seems also to have had by divine gift this same manner of speaking, predicting of Christ that he would come \"like a violent river, which the spirit of the Lord drives\" [n9]. \"Violent,\" he says, that is, not unwilling but full of force, the force of the Spirit of the Lord, who rested fully upon him, and drove him in all things and led him, and whom he himself in all things followed necessarily, as the thirtieth of the second and the first of the third declared more fully. Hence Matthew also says that Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert; and Luke, that he was driven by the Spirit into the desert; and Mark, that the Spirit cast him out or, by another reading, compelled him into the desert. It is most certain that all these things were said of the Holy Spirit, as the thirtieth of the second briefly recalled.", "margins": [{"id": "648B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Isaiah."}]}, {"anchor": "p648B-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p648B-2", "locator_display": "648B–648C", "source_text": "sine causis posterioribus: omnes ergo effectus, etiam liberi, sunt necessarij respectu causae primae, quia voluntate sua procedunt, quae non potest aliqualiter impediri. Et si quis instandum putauerit, dicendo, quod articulus Parisiensis non dicit vniuersaliter effectus omnes, sed particulariter seu indefinite tantum effectus; fateor me nescire quomodo in originali articulo scribebatur: scio tamen quod inter articulos multum correctos vniuersaliter illam scriptam inueni: nec refert: ex illa namque particulari seu indefinita cum alijs veris, vniuersalis illa consequitur euidenter. Si enim ad hoc, quod aliqui effectus sint necessarij respectu causae primae, sufficiat, quod ipsa non sit impedibilis respectu illorum, cum vniuersaliter omnes effectus fiant ab ipsa, et ipsa sit vniuersaliter non impedibilis respectu aliquorum effectuum, aut etiam alicutus, sicut praehabita demonstrarunt, omnes effectus sunt necessarij respectu illius. Istis igitur suppositis, principalis conclusio faciliter ostendetur. Nam secundum capitulum proximum, Deus potest sic necessitare omnem voluntatem creatam, et hoc necessitate naturaliter", "english": "For this reason Stephen, Bishop of Paris [n10], also condemned a certain error which said that, for all effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it is not enough that the first cause itself not be impedible; it is required also that the intermediate causes not be impedible. \"An error,\" says the Bishop, \"because then God could not make any effect necessary without posterior causes.\" All effects, therefore, even free ones, are necessary with respect to the first cause, because they proceed from his will, which cannot in any way be impeded.", "margins": [{"id": "648B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Esaias."}]}, {"anchor": "p648C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p648C", "locator_display": "648C", "source_text": "", "english": "And if anyone should think to object, saying that the Parisian article does not say \"all effects\" universally, but only \"effects\" particularly or indefinitely, I confess that I do not know how it was written in the original article. I know, however, that among the heavily corrected articles I found it written universally; and it does not matter. For from that particular or indefinite statement, together with other truths, the universal one follows evidently. For suppose that, for some effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it suffices that the first cause not be impedible with respect to them. Since universally all effects come about from it, and it is universally non-impedible with respect to some effects, or even to any one, as what has been had before has demonstrated, all effects are necessary with respect to it.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p648C-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p648C-2", "locator_display": "648C–648D", "source_text": "praecedente, quia secundum talem necessitatem capitulum totum procedit; et hoc non posset aliquid aliud faciendo, quam tantum volendo, quoniam nullo alio modo agit ad extra, sicut 9 et 10. primi docent; nec aliter volendo quam prius naturaliter; et per 20. secundi iuncto 30. sic vult semper, sicut et capitulo proximo plenius est argutum. Item per idem 20. Deus per voluntatem suam est causa efficiens proprie omnis actus voluntatis creatae; et per idem 30. prior naturaliter voluntate creata; et per 10. primi voluntas diuina frustrari non potest: ergo per regulam generalem et definitiones praemissas, omnis actus voluntatis creatae producitur ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente; imo et per eadem, omnis voluntas creata agens quodcunque, illud agit ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente. Ad idem non improbabiliter arguitur isto modo: In voluntate creata nunc volente est quaedam necessitas ad volendum, saltem necessitas subsequens, et in voluntate diuina similiter, quae; vult et facit voluntatem creatam nunc velle, quoniam secundum Philosophum et Anselmum vbi prius,", "english": "With these things supposed, then, the principal conclusion will be easily shown. For according to the preceding chapter, God can so necessitate every created will, and this by a necessity naturally preceding, since the whole chapter proceeds according to such necessity. And he could not do this by doing anything other than only willing, since in no other way does he act outwardly, as 9 and 10 of the first teach; nor by willing otherwise than he naturally willed before. By the twentieth of the second joined to the thirtieth, he always so wills, as was also argued more fully in the preceding chapter. Likewise, by the same twentieth, God through his will is properly the efficient cause of every act of the created will; by the same thirtieth, he is naturally prior to the created will; and by the tenth of the first, the divine will cannot be frustrated. Therefore, by the general rule and the definitions premised, every act of the created will is produced from a naturally preceding necessity. Indeed, by the same reasoning, every created will doing anything does it from a naturally preceding necessity.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p648D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p648D", "locator_display": "648D–648E", "source_text": "Quod est, quando est, necesse est esse: hae ergo duae necessitates in his duabus voluntatibus, diuina scilicet et humana, aut sunt coaequaevae et disparatae in causalitate, et impertinentes ad inuicem, aut non sunt ita: si sint tales, ergo iuxta habita 25. secundi, ambae reducuntur ad tertiam, tanquam ad causam communem priorem ambabus: ergo voluntas diuina necessitatur per aliquam causam priorem ad volendum aliquid extra Deum; quod nullus dubitat esse falsum, quoniam illa causa vel est rationalis et libera, vel irrationalis et necessaria in agendo. Si detur primum, ergo diuina voluntas non est prima causarum omnium liberarum, nec Deus primum agentium liberorum; cuius oppositum suppositio prima primi, et capitulum 9. cum 20. et sequentibus, ac 30. secundi huius ostendunt. Si detur secundum, ergo Deus necessitate penitus absoluta vult et facit aliquid extra ipsum; quod destruitur per praemissa. Omnis", "english": "To the same end it is argued, not improbably, in this way. In a created will now willing there is a certain necessity to will, at least a subsequent necessity; and likewise in the divine will, which wills and makes the created will now to will, since according to the Philosopher and Anselm, where before, \"What is, when it is, necessarily is.\" These two necessities, then, in these two wills, the divine and the human, either are coeval and disparate in causality and unrelated to each other, or they are not so. If they are such, then, according to what was had in the twenty-fifth of the second, both are reduced to a third, as to a common cause prior to both. Therefore the divine will is necessitated by some prior cause to will something outside God; and no one doubts this to be false, since that cause is either rational and free, or irrational and necessary in acting. If the first is granted, then the divine will is not the first of all free causes, nor is God the first of free agents. The opposite of this the first supposition of the first, and chapter 9 with 20 and what follows, and the thirtieth of this second, show. If the second is granted, then God wills and does something outside himself by a wholly absolute necessity, and this is destroyed by what was premised.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p648E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p648E", "locator_display": "648E–649B", "source_text": "quoque necessitas in qualibet creatura, sicut et quodlibet aliud, producitur a voluntate diuina, tanquam a causa efficiente priori, vt nonum primi docebat: Omnis ergo volendi necessitas in voluntate creata efficitur a voluntate diuina; quare dici non potest illas duas necessitates praedictas esse disparatas et ad inuicem coaequaeuas; nec quisquam in tantum desipit aut insanit, vt dicat necessitatem in voluntate humana esse causam naturaliter praecedentem, et efficientem respectu necessitatis in voluntate diuina: Hoc enim eius libertati permaximae nimium derogaret; quod et per praemissa conuincitur esse falsum; Illa ergo necessitas in voluntate diuina est prior naturaliter necessitate in voluntate humana, et efficiens causa eius. Item nulla voluntas creata in actibus suis est liberior voluntate Christi humana, et illam necessitauit voluntas eius diuina ad singulos actus suos, sicut hic supra et capitulo proximo est ostensum. Quare et quamlibet aliam quodammodo necessitat voluntatem. Voluntas quoque diuina antecedenter necessitat beatos confirmatos in Coelo ad beatificum actum suum,\n\net ad non peccandum, et contrario modo damnatos, sicut 15. secundi 16. et 17. suaserunt: Cur ergo non agentia caetera simili ratione?", "english": "Moreover, every necessity in any creature, as also anything else, is produced by the divine will as by a prior efficient cause, as the ninth of the first taught. Every necessity of willing in the created will, therefore, is brought about by the divine will. Hence it cannot be said that those two aforesaid necessities are disparate and coeval with each other. Nor is anyone so foolish or mad as to say that the necessity in the human will is the naturally preceding and efficient cause with respect to the necessity in the divine will. For that would derogate far too much from the divine will's supreme freedom, and this is convicted as false also by what was premised. That necessity in the divine will, therefore, is naturally prior to the necessity in the human will, and is its efficient cause. Likewise, no created will is freer in its acts than the human will of Christ, and his divine will necessitated it to each of its acts, as has been shown above here and in the preceding chapter. Therefore he in a certain way necessitates every other will too. The divine will also antecedently necessitates the blessed, confirmed in Heaven, to their beatific act and to not sinning, and in the contrary way the damned, as the fifteenth of the second, with the sixteenth and seventeenth, have urged. Why, then, not the other agents, by like reasoning?", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p649B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p649B", "locator_display": "649B", "source_text": "COROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium, quod aliqualis necessitas antecedens et libertas ac meritum non repugnant, et quod nulla causa inferior, sed tantum superior, scilicet Dei voluntas, est necessitas antecedens respectu sui effectus: et quod omnia, quae sunt, fiunt et eueniunt, sunt, fiunt et eueniunt de aliqua necessitate ipsam naturaliter praecedente.", "english": "COROLLARY.\n\nCorollary: that some kind of antecedent necessity and freedom and merit do not conflict; and that no inferior cause, but only a superior one, namely the will of God, is antecedent necessity with respect to its effect; and that all things that are, come about and happen, are, come about and happen from some necessity naturally preceding them [n11].", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p649B-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/2/#p649B-2", "locator_display": "649B–649C", "source_text": "VNde consequitur euidenter, quod aliqualis necessitas antecedens et libertas ac meritum non repugnant, et quod nulla causa inferior, sed tantum superior, scilicet Dei voluntas,\n\nest necessitas antecedens, et quod omnia quae sunt, fiunt, et eueniunt, sunt, fiunt, et eueniunt dealiqua necessitate ipsa naturaliter praecedente. Primam namque partem huius ostendit clarissime conclusio principalis, quae etiam potest ostendi simpliciter sicut illa; et secunda sequitur ex hac prima. Potest quoque istud corollarium demonstrari quantum ad has partes, sicut proximum fuerit demonstratum: Secunda vero pars huius sequitur manifeste, quoniam nulla causa inferior, quantumcunque disposita, quicquam potest, si voluntas diuina resistat, vel etiam si non agat, sicut 10. et 9. primi, cum 20. secundi lucide manifestant: Relinquitur ergo sola voluntas diuina necessitas antecedens; Vnde et cum nono primi sequitur vltima pars istius.", "english": "Hence it follows evidently that some kind of antecedent necessity and freedom and merit do not conflict; that no inferior cause, but only a superior one, namely the will of God, is antecedent necessity; and that all things that are, come about and happen, are, come about and happen from some necessity naturally preceding them. For the first part of this the principal conclusion shows most clearly, and that conclusion can also be shown simply, just as that one can [n12]; and the second follows from this first. This corollary can also be demonstrated, as to these parts, as the preceding one has been demonstrated. The second part of it follows manifestly, since no inferior cause, however disposed, can do anything if the divine will resists, or even if it does not act, as the tenth and ninth of the first, with the twentieth of the second, lucidly show. There remains, therefore, the divine will alone as antecedent necessity; whence also, with the ninth of the first, the last part of this follows.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}