{"id": "3/17", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/17/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 17", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "692A–693B", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XVII. Corrigit sextam opionem quorundam, putantium quod aliquid est futurum ad vtrumlibet, vel non futurum in sensu composito, non diuiso.\n\nOPinio sexta fingit quod aliquid est futurum ad vtrumlibet, vel non futurum in sensu composito, non autem in sensu diuiso, quam sic astruere moliuntur. Nulla propositio simplex de futuro in materia contingente aequaliter est vera vel falsa, Philosopho 1. peri hermenias vlt. attestante;\n\nquare nec aliquid est futurum ad vtrumlibet, vel non futurum diuisim. Hanc autem opinionem audiui in Curia Romana a quodam famoso Philosopho Tolosano in quadam disputatione solenni de contingentia futurorum, secundum eam totaliter publice respondente, quam et Oxoniae similiter audiebam. Sed haec faciliter conuincetur: Nam secundum eam nihil est futurum ad vtrumlibet contingenter, sed omnia quae euenient, euenient de necessitate penitus absoluta, quod 12. huius damnat. Item sic opinans propriae opinionis laqueo irretitur: dicit enim nihil esse contingenter futurum vel non futurum in sensu diuiso; ergo nihil est contingenter futurum, ergo Antichristus non est contingenter futurus, quod opinioni repugnat: sequitur quo que hanc esse veram, Antichristus non est futurus, et eius oppositam esse falsam, quod rationem positionis irrationabilem manifestat. Item tibi sic opinanti propono, Antichristus erit; si concedis vel negas, habes concedere consequenter oppositum positionis et\n\nrationis tuae similiter, nec potes eam dubitare, quia bene scis quod nec est vera nec falsa, nec potes eam distinguere propter simplicitatem et vniuocationem maximam terminorum ac totius complexi. Si autem dicas te non intelligere, nec intelligere posse illam, redargueris sicut quarta opinio fuerat redarguta, nisi forsitan vanum et fatuum videatur tibi quic quam arguere non potenti intelligere arguentem, nec te ipsum etiam respondentem; quare non videtur tibi dignius arguendum, quam homini fatuo, mortuo, bestiae, siue ligno. Si autem inprimis negaueris mihi istam, Antichristus erit, et hanc similiter, Antichristus non erit, vel non Antichristus erit, adhuc redit oppositum positi, imo et sequitur, Non Antichristus erit, ergo Antichristus erit, sicut nullus ignorat qui limen Logicae est ingressus, quare et iterum oppositum positi consequitur. Praeterea si vtramque illarum negaueris, concedes inter contradictoria medium reperiri, quod omnes Sophistae, Logici, Philosophi, et Theologi detestantur; quod et Philosophus\n\n4. Metaphys. 27. multipliciter reprobat et condemnat; qui et 29. scilicet vlt. Est, inquit, necesse contradictionis partem alteram esse veram; vbi et immediate subiungit. Amplius si omne aut dicere aut negare est necesse, vtraque falsa esse impossibile est. Item Antichristus erit vel non erit; ergo Antichristus erit, vel Antichristus non erit; ergo illa est disiunctiua vera, ergo et altera partium. Item tunc nec Deus, nec Angelus aut Propheta sciret Antichristum, nec quicquam possibilium contingenter esse futurum diuisim vel non futurum, sed tantum esse futurum vel non futurum coniunctim, sicut et scit quilibet idiota; quare et omnis praescientia penitus tolleretur, sicque haec opinio coincidit in secundam 13. huius destructam. Hanc etiam opinionem expresse refellit Boetius 5. de consolatione philosophiae: prosa tertia; vbi et comparat eam ridiculoso vaticinio Tiresiae dicentis, Quicquid dixero, aut erit aut non erit: de quo Tiresia Ouidius 3. Muthologiae suae plenius fabulatur. Item iste actus liber et contingenter productus nunc est, et non semper fuit, ergo aliquando fuit futurus, ergo tunc verum fuit ipsum esse futurum. Item si quis heri dixisset me hodie locuturum, verū\n\ndixisset, sicut exitus rei probat; hodie nam que loquor: dixisset enim totaliter sic fuisse futurū, sicut realiter nunc contingit; ergo verū dixisset; et si oppositum eius dixisset, falsum dixisset, eo quod non sic realiter eueniret, iuxta illā propositionē in praedicamentis communem; in eo quod res est, vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa dicitur; et 1. peri hermenias vlt. Similiter orationes verae sunt, quemadmodum et res. Et Ier. 28 Propheta qui vaticinatus est pacem, cum venerit verbum eius, scietur Propheta quem miserit Dominus in veritate. Et Ezech. 33. Cum venerit quod prae dictum est, tunc scient quod Propheta fuerit inter eos. Et Deut. 18. Hoc habebis signū, quod Propheta praedixerit, et non euenerit; hoc Dominus non locutus est sed per tumorem animi sui Propheta confinxit. Item tunc nullus deberet credere, nec sperare aliquid\n\ntale futurum: fatuum namque videtur et friuolum quenquam credere vel sperare quicquam futurum, quod bene scit, aut firmiter opinatur non esse verum quod sit futurum: quare nullus debet credere vel sperare quod ipse vel aliquis hominum morietur, resurget, aut vitam percipiet sempiternam. Item haec opinio tollit omnem motionem et actionem liberam, et meritoriam successiuam. Nam secundum eam in contingentibus talibus nihil est futurum; ergo nullus terminus ad quem motus, nec aliquod mutatum esse; quare nec vllus talis motus est, nec etiam esse potest, quod totam scientiam moralem subuertit, imo et totam scientiam naturalem, et omnem scientiam motu vel tempore indigentem, sicut et opinio Sophistarum, velomnipotentiam aut libertatem diuinam, aut subuertetur per ipsas: omnis namque motus subiacet omnipotentis Dei liberae voluntati, sicut 9. primi et 30. secundi ostendunt; ergo in motu et tempore est aliquid libere et contingenter futurum respectu voluntatis diuinae, quod opinioni repugnat, vel si nihil tale sit libere et contingenter futurum respectu voluntatis diuinae,\n\naut ipsa nequaquam libere libertate contradictionis de futuris disponit, aut si sic disponit, potest disponere aliter, sed non habet potentiam exequendi. Amplius autem secundum istam sententiam, nulla propositio de futuro esset vera, aut esse posset nisi propositio necessaria; quod Logica, Philosophia, Theologia, et omnis vera scientia reputat esse falsum. Quare et Robertus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus damnauit Oxoniae articulum asserentem, quod omnis propositio vera de futuro est necessaria. Quod autem a Philosopho allegatur, Nullam scilicet propositionem de futuro contingenti esse veram vel falsam, verum est secundum communiter exponentes determinate et de necessitate, sicut est in propositionibus alijs temporum aliorum.", "english": "CHAPTER XVII. It corrects the sixth opinion of certain people, who think that something is future either way, or not future, in the composite sense, not in the divided. [n1]\n\nThe sixth opinion imagines that something is future either way, or not future, in the composite sense but not in the divided sense, and they labor to establish this as follows. No simple proposition about the future, in contingent matter, is equally true or false, as the Philosopher attests in On Interpretation 1, last [chapter]; [n2] therefore nothing is future either way, or not future, taken in the divided sense. I heard this opinion in the Roman Curia from a certain famous Toulousan philosopher, in a solemn disputation on the contingency of future things, in which he answered publicly and wholly according to it; and I heard it likewise at Oxford. But it is easily refuted. For according to it nothing is future contingently either way, but everything that will happen will happen by utterly absolute necessity, which the 12th of this book condemns. Again, one who so opines is caught in the snare of his own opinion. For he says that nothing is contingently future or not future in the divided sense; therefore nothing is contingently future; therefore Antichrist is not contingently future, which conflicts with the opinion. It follows also that this is true, \"Antichrist is not future,\" and its opposite false, which shows the rationale of the position to be irrational. Again, I put to you, who so opine, \"Antichrist will be.\" If you grant it or deny it, you must consequently grant the opposite of your position, and likewise of your\n\nrationale; nor can you hold it in doubt, since you know well that it is neither true nor false; nor can you distinguish it, on account of the utmost simplicity and univocity of the terms and of the whole complex. If, however, you say that you do not understand it, nor can understand it, you will be refuted as the fourth opinion was refuted, unless perhaps it seems vain and foolish to you to argue anything against one who cannot understand the arguer, nor even yourself as you answer; [n3] whence it does not seem to you that he is to be argued with more worthily than a foolish man, a dead man, a beast, or a log of wood. If, however, in the first place you deny me this, \"Antichrist will be,\" and likewise this, \"Antichrist will not be,\" or \"Not Antichrist will be,\" the opposite of what was posited still returns; indeed it even follows, \"Not Antichrist will be, therefore Antichrist will be,\" as no one is ignorant who has crossed the threshold of Logic; so again the opposite of what was posited follows. Moreover, if you deny both of them, you will concede that a middle is found between contradictories, which all Sophists, Logicians, Philosophers, and Theologians detest; which the Philosopher too\n\nin Metaphysics 4, 27, rejects and condemns in many ways; [n4] and in 29, that is the last, he says: \"It is necessary that one part of a contradiction be true\"; where he immediately adds: \"Further, if it is necessary either to affirm or to deny everything, it is impossible that both be false.\" Again: \"Antichrist will be or will not be\"; therefore \"Antichrist will be\" or \"Antichrist will not be\"; therefore that is a true disjunctive, therefore one of its parts also. Again, then neither God nor an Angel or Prophet would know of Antichrist, nor that anything possible is contingently future in the divided sense, or not future, but only that it is future or not future taken jointly, as any idiot knows too; so all foreknowledge would be utterly removed, and in this way the opinion coincides with the second, which was destroyed in the 13th of this book. Boethius also expressly refutes this opinion, in Consolation of Philosophy 5, prose 3; where he also compares it to the ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias, who said, \"Whatever I say will either be or not be\"; of this Tiresias Ovid tells at greater length in the 3rd book of his Mythology. [n5] Again, this free act, produced contingently, exists now and did not always exist; therefore at some time it was future; therefore it was then true that it was future. Again, if someone had said yesterday that I would speak today, he would have spoken truly, as the outcome of the matter proves; for today I am speaking. For he would have said that it was altogether going to be just as it actually happens now; therefore he would have said what is true; and if he had said the opposite of it, he would have said what is false, because it would not actually have happened so, according to that proposition common in the Categories: \"By the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is called true or false\"; and in On Interpretation 1, last: \"Likewise statements are true, just as things are.\" [n6] And Jeremiah 28: \"The Prophet who has prophesied peace, when his word comes, will be known as the Prophet whom the Lord truly sent.\" And Ezekiel 33: \"When what was foretold comes, then they will know that a Prophet was among them.\" And Deuteronomy 18: \"You will have this as a sign: that the Prophet foretold and it did not happen; this the Lord did not speak, but the Prophet fabricated it out of the swelling of his own mind.\" Again, then no one ought to believe, or hope for, anything of the kind as future;\n\nfor it seems foolish and frivolous for anyone to believe or hope that something will be, when he well knows, or firmly supposes, that it is not true that it will be. So no one ought to believe or hope that he himself or any human being will die, rise again, or receive eternal life. Again, this opinion removes all motion and all free, meritorious action that proceeds in succession. For according to it, in contingent things of this kind nothing is future; therefore there is no terminus ad quem of a motion, nor any having-been-changed; [n7] so there is no such motion, nor can there be. This overturns all moral science, indeed all natural science too, and every science that needs motion or time, as the opinion of the Sophists does; or else it [will overturn] divine omnipotence or freedom, or will itself be overturned by them. [n8] For every motion is subject to the free will of almighty God, as the 9th of the first and the 30th of the second show; therefore in motion and time there is something freely and contingently future with respect to the divine will, which conflicts with the opinion. Or, if nothing of the sort is freely and contingently future with respect to the divine will, then either that will by no means disposes freely, with freedom of contradiction, concerning future things, or, if it so disposes, it can dispose otherwise but has no power to carry it out. Moreover, according to that view no proposition about the future would be true, or could be, except a necessary proposition; which Logic, Philosophy, Theology, and every true science reckon false. Hence Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned at Oxford an article asserting that every true proposition about the future is necessary. [n9] As for what is alleged from the Philosopher, that no proposition about a contingent future is true or false, it is true according to the common expositors if taken determinately and of necessity, as it is in propositions of other kinds, of other times. [n10]", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Futurum ad utrumlibet is a future that may go either way, undetermined between the alternatives. The sixth opinion grants that the disjunction \"it will be or it will not be\" (the composite sense) is true, and denies that either member taken separately (the divided sense) is true. The whole refutation turns on this distinction. \"Equally true or false\" in the next unit likewise means \"indifferently,\" that is, not determinately one or the other."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Aristotle, De interpretatione 9 (18a28–19b4). Savile gives it as the last chapter of book 1 in the medieval division. The same chapter is cited again below (692E)."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The pronouns shift: the sentence passes from the opponent (\"if you say…\") to what seems to him vain. The sense is that an opponent who cannot understand either the argument or his own answer is no worthier of argument than a fool or a log, so he has no reason to complain of being refuted."}, {"n": 4, "text": "\"27\" and \"29\" are not Aristotle's chapter numbers. They follow the divisions of the medieval Latin Aristotle with Averroes' commentary. The passage is Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ (4) 7, 1011b23 ff., against any middle between contradictories. I have not tried to be more precise."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Savile's Muthologia is Ovid's Metamorphoses; Tiresias appears in book 3. I have not traced the quoted words \"Quicquid dixero, aut erit aut non erit\" in the Boethius passage, and I translate them as Bradwardine gives them."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The \"common\" proposition is Aristotle, Categories 5 (4a21–b2): a statement is true or false by the fact that the thing is or is not. The second quotation is De int. 9 (19a33). The three Scripture margins are Jer 28:9, Ezek 33:33, and Deut 18:22. The last is freely recast, with Bradwardine's own \"You will have this as a sign\" in place of the Vulgate's construction."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Terminus ad quem is the scholastic term for the end-point toward which a motion proceeds. Mutatum esse (\"having-been-changed\") is the Aristotelian instant at which a change is completed. The argument is that if nothing is future in these matters, no motion has an end-point to reach."}, {"n": 8, "text": "The sentence as printed is hard to construe: vel omnipotentiam aut libertatem diuinam, aut subuertetur per ipsas has no verb for its first alternative. I supply \"will overturn\" (subvertet) to match the passive that follows. The evident sense is that the opinion must either overturn divine omnipotence and freedom or be overturned by them. This is a gloss in English, not an emendation of the Latin."}, {"n": 9, "text": "Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury 1273–78, condemned a list of propositions at Oxford in 1277. I have not checked this article against the surviving list, and I translate Bradwardine's report as it stands."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The \"common expositors\" read Aristotle as saying that no proposition about a contingent future is determinately (and so necessarily) true or false. This is the sense in which contingent propositions of other tenses are also not necessarily true or false. It is not the sixth opinion's claim that such propositions have no truth value at all."}], "errata": []}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p692A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/17/#p692A", "locator_display": "692A", "source_text": "CAP. XVII. Corrigit sextam opionem quorundam, putantium quod aliquid est futurum ad vtrumlibet, vel non futurum in sensu composito, non diuiso.", "english": "CHAPTER XVII. It corrects the sixth opinion of certain people, who think that something is future either way, or not future, in the composite sense, not in the divided. [n1]", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p692A-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/17/#p692A-2", "locator_display": "692A–692B", "source_text": "OPinio sexta fingit quod aliquid est futurum ad vtrumlibet, vel non futurum in sensu composito, non autem in sensu diuiso, quam sic astruere moliuntur. Nulla propositio simplex de futuro in materia contingente aequaliter est vera vel falsa, Philosopho 1. peri hermenias vlt. attestante;\n\nquare nec aliquid est futurum ad vtrumlibet, vel non futurum diuisim. Hanc autem opinionem audiui in Curia Romana a quodam famoso Philosopho Tolosano in quadam disputatione solenni de contingentia futurorum, secundum eam totaliter publice respondente, quam et Oxoniae similiter audiebam. Sed haec faciliter conuincetur: Nam secundum eam nihil est futurum ad vtrumlibet contingenter, sed omnia quae euenient, euenient de necessitate penitus absoluta, quod 12. huius damnat. Item sic opinans propriae opinionis laqueo irretitur: dicit enim nihil esse contingenter futurum vel non futurum in sensu diuiso; ergo nihil est contingenter futurum, ergo Antichristus non est contingenter futurus, quod opinioni repugnat: sequitur quo que hanc esse veram, Antichristus non est futurus, et eius oppositam esse falsam, quod rationem positionis irrationabilem manifestat. Item tibi sic opinanti propono, Antichristus erit; si concedis vel negas, habes concedere consequenter oppositum positionis et", "english": "The sixth opinion imagines that something is future either way, or not future, in the composite sense but not in the divided sense, and they labor to establish this as follows. No simple proposition about the future, in contingent matter, is equally true or false, as the Philosopher attests in On Interpretation 1, last [chapter]; [n2] therefore nothing is future either way, or not future, taken in the divided sense. I heard this opinion in the Roman Curia from a certain famous Toulousan philosopher, in a solemn disputation on the contingency of future things, in which he answered publicly and wholly according to it; and I heard it likewise at Oxford. But it is easily refuted. For according to it nothing is future contingently either way, but everything that will happen will happen by utterly absolute necessity, which the 12th of this book condemns. Again, one who so opines is caught in the snare of his own opinion. For he says that nothing is contingently future or not future in the divided sense; therefore nothing is contingently future; therefore Antichrist is not contingently future, which conflicts with the opinion. It follows also that this is true, \"Antichrist is not future,\" and its opposite false, which shows the rationale of the position to be irrational. Again, I put to you, who so opine, \"Antichrist will be.\" If you grant it or deny it, you must consequently grant the opposite of your position, and likewise of your", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p692C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/17/#p692C", "locator_display": "692C", "source_text": "rationis tuae similiter, nec potes eam dubitare, quia bene scis quod nec est vera nec falsa, nec potes eam distinguere propter simplicitatem et vniuocationem maximam terminorum ac totius complexi. Si autem dicas te non intelligere, nec intelligere posse illam, redargueris sicut quarta opinio fuerat redarguta, nisi forsitan vanum et fatuum videatur tibi quic quam arguere non potenti intelligere arguentem, nec te ipsum etiam respondentem; quare non videtur tibi dignius arguendum, quam homini fatuo, mortuo, bestiae, siue ligno. Si autem inprimis negaueris mihi istam, Antichristus erit, et hanc similiter, Antichristus non erit, vel non Antichristus erit, adhuc redit oppositum positi, imo et sequitur, Non Antichristus erit, ergo Antichristus erit, sicut nullus ignorat qui limen Logicae est ingressus, quare et iterum oppositum positi consequitur. Praeterea si vtramque illarum negaueris, concedes inter contradictoria medium reperiri, quod omnes Sophistae, Logici, Philosophi, et Theologi detestantur; quod et Philosophus", "english": "rationale; nor can you hold it in doubt, since you know well that it is neither true nor false; nor can you distinguish it, on account of the utmost simplicity and univocity of the terms and of the whole complex. If, however, you say that you do not understand it, nor can understand it, you will be refuted as the fourth opinion was refuted, unless perhaps it seems vain and foolish to you to argue anything against one who cannot understand the arguer, nor even yourself as you answer; [n3] whence it does not seem to you that he is to be argued with more worthily than a foolish man, a dead man, a beast, or a log of wood. If, however, in the first place you deny me this, \"Antichrist will be,\" and likewise this, \"Antichrist will not be,\" or \"Not Antichrist will be,\" the opposite of what was posited still returns; indeed it even follows, \"Not Antichrist will be, therefore Antichrist will be,\" as no one is ignorant who has crossed the threshold of Logic; so again the opposite of what was posited follows. Moreover, if you deny both of them, you will concede that a middle is found between contradictories, which all Sophists, Logicians, Philosophers, and Theologians detest; which the Philosopher too", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p692D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/17/#p692D", "locator_display": "692D–692E", "source_text": "4. Metaphys. 27. multipliciter reprobat et condemnat; qui et 29. scilicet vlt. Est, inquit, necesse contradictionis partem alteram esse veram; vbi et immediate subiungit. Amplius si omne aut dicere aut negare est necesse, vtraque falsa esse impossibile est. Item Antichristus erit vel non erit; ergo Antichristus erit, vel Antichristus non erit; ergo illa est disiunctiua vera, ergo et altera partium. Item tunc nec Deus, nec Angelus aut Propheta sciret Antichristum, nec quicquam possibilium contingenter esse futurum diuisim vel non futurum, sed tantum esse futurum vel non futurum coniunctim, sicut et scit quilibet idiota; quare et omnis praescientia penitus tolleretur, sicque haec opinio coincidit in secundam 13. huius destructam. Hanc etiam opinionem expresse refellit Boetius 5. de consolatione philosophiae: prosa tertia; vbi et comparat eam ridiculoso vaticinio Tiresiae dicentis, Quicquid dixero, aut erit aut non erit: de quo Tiresia Ouidius 3. Muthologiae suae plenius fabulatur. Item iste actus liber et contingenter productus nunc est, et non semper fuit, ergo aliquando fuit futurus, ergo tunc verum fuit ipsum esse futurum. Item si quis heri dixisset me hodie locuturum, verū\n\ndixisset, sicut exitus rei probat; hodie nam que loquor: dixisset enim totaliter sic fuisse futurū, sicut realiter nunc contingit; ergo verū dixisset; et si oppositum eius dixisset, falsum dixisset, eo quod non sic realiter eueniret, iuxta illā propositionē in praedicamentis communem; in eo quod res est, vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa dicitur; et 1. peri hermenias vlt. Similiter orationes verae sunt, quemadmodum et res. Et Ier. 28 Propheta qui vaticinatus est pacem, cum venerit verbum eius, scietur Propheta quem miserit Dominus in veritate. Et Ezech. 33. Cum venerit quod prae dictum est, tunc scient quod Propheta fuerit inter eos. Et Deut. 18. Hoc habebis signū, quod Propheta praedixerit, et non euenerit; hoc Dominus non locutus est sed per tumorem animi sui Propheta confinxit. Item tunc nullus deberet credere, nec sperare aliquid", "english": "in Metaphysics 4, 27, rejects and condemns in many ways; [n4] and in 29, that is the last, he says: \"It is necessary that one part of a contradiction be true\"; where he immediately adds: \"Further, if it is necessary either to affirm or to deny everything, it is impossible that both be false.\" Again: \"Antichrist will be or will not be\"; therefore \"Antichrist will be\" or \"Antichrist will not be\"; therefore that is a true disjunctive, therefore one of its parts also. Again, then neither God nor an Angel or Prophet would know of Antichrist, nor that anything possible is contingently future in the divided sense, or not future, but only that it is future or not future taken jointly, as any idiot knows too; so all foreknowledge would be utterly removed, and in this way the opinion coincides with the second, which was destroyed in the 13th of this book. Boethius also expressly refutes this opinion, in Consolation of Philosophy 5, prose 3; where he also compares it to the ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias, who said, \"Whatever I say will either be or not be\"; of this Tiresias Ovid tells at greater length in the 3rd book of his Mythology. [n5] Again, this free act, produced contingently, exists now and did not always exist; therefore at some time it was future; therefore it was then true that it was future. Again, if someone had said yesterday that I would speak today, he would have spoken truly, as the outcome of the matter proves; for today I am speaking. For he would have said that it was altogether going to be just as it actually happens now; therefore he would have said what is true; and if he had said the opposite of it, he would have said what is false, because it would not actually have happened so, according to that proposition common in the Categories: \"By the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is called true or false\"; and in On Interpretation 1, last: \"Likewise statements are true, just as things are.\" [n6] And Jeremiah 28: \"The Prophet who has prophesied peace, when his word comes, will be known as the Prophet whom the Lord truly sent.\" And Ezekiel 33: \"When what was foretold comes, then they will know that a Prophet was among them.\" And Deuteronomy 18: \"You will have this as a sign: that the Prophet foretold and it did not happen; this the Lord did not speak, but the Prophet fabricated it out of the swelling of his own mind.\" Again, then no one ought to believe, or hope for, anything of the kind as future;", "margins": [{"id": "692D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) libere"}, {"id": "692E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher"}, {"id": "692E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Jeremiah. Ezekiel. Deuteronomy."}]}, {"anchor": "p693A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/17/#p693A", "locator_display": "693A–693B", "source_text": "tale futurum: fatuum namque videtur et friuolum quenquam credere vel sperare quicquam futurum, quod bene scit, aut firmiter opinatur non esse verum quod sit futurum: quare nullus debet credere vel sperare quod ipse vel aliquis hominum morietur, resurget, aut vitam percipiet sempiternam. Item haec opinio tollit omnem motionem et actionem liberam, et meritoriam successiuam. Nam secundum eam in contingentibus talibus nihil est futurum; ergo nullus terminus ad quem motus, nec aliquod mutatum esse; quare nec vllus talis motus est, nec etiam esse potest, quod totam scientiam moralem subuertit, imo et totam scientiam naturalem, et omnem scientiam motu vel tempore indigentem, sicut et opinio Sophistarum, velomnipotentiam aut libertatem diuinam, aut subuertetur per ipsas: omnis namque motus subiacet omnipotentis Dei liberae voluntati, sicut 9. primi et 30. secundi ostendunt; ergo in motu et tempore est aliquid libere et contingenter futurum respectu voluntatis diuinae, quod opinioni repugnat, vel si nihil tale sit libere et contingenter futurum respectu voluntatis diuinae,\n\naut ipsa nequaquam libere libertate contradictionis de futuris disponit, aut si sic disponit, potest disponere aliter, sed non habet potentiam exequendi. Amplius autem secundum istam sententiam, nulla propositio de futuro esset vera, aut esse posset nisi propositio necessaria; quod Logica, Philosophia, Theologia, et omnis vera scientia reputat esse falsum. Quare et Robertus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus damnauit Oxoniae articulum asserentem, quod omnis propositio vera de futuro est necessaria. Quod autem a Philosopho allegatur, Nullam scilicet propositionem de futuro contingenti esse veram vel falsam, verum est secundum communiter exponentes determinate et de necessitate, sicut est in propositionibus alijs temporum aliorum.", "english": "for it seems foolish and frivolous for anyone to believe or hope that something will be, when he well knows, or firmly supposes, that it is not true that it will be. So no one ought to believe or hope that he himself or any human being will die, rise again, or receive eternal life. Again, this opinion removes all motion and all free, meritorious action that proceeds in succession. For according to it, in contingent things of this kind nothing is future; therefore there is no terminus ad quem of a motion, nor any having-been-changed; [n7] so there is no such motion, nor can there be. This overturns all moral science, indeed all natural science too, and every science that needs motion or time, as the opinion of the Sophists does; or else it [will overturn] divine omnipotence or freedom, or will itself be overturned by them. [n8] For every motion is subject to the free will of almighty God, as the 9th of the first and the 30th of the second show; therefore in motion and time there is something freely and contingently future with respect to the divine will, which conflicts with the opinion. Or, if nothing of the sort is freely and contingently future with respect to the divine will, then either that will by no means disposes freely, with freedom of contradiction, concerning future things, or, if it so disposes, it can dispose otherwise but has no power to carry it out. Moreover, according to that view no proposition about the future would be true, or could be, except a necessary proposition; which Logic, Philosophy, Theology, and every true science reckon false. Hence Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned at Oxford an article asserting that every true proposition about the future is necessary. [n9] As for what is alleged from the Philosopher, that no proposition about a contingent future is true or false, it is true according to the common expositors if taken determinately and of necessity, as it is in propositions of other kinds, of other times. [n10]", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}