{"id": "3/12", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/12/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 12", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "688C–689A", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XII.\n\nJncipit disputare illam famosissimam quaestionem, nunquid omnia quae euenient, de necessitate euenient; et recitat opinionem Mathematicorum seu Stoicorum dicentem, quod omnia quae euenient, euenient de necessitate simpliciter absoluta.\n\nHIc autem ex praemissis patenter suboritur illa famosissima quaestio, acerrimum axioma, difficillimumque problema, Nunquid scilicet omnia quae eueniunt, de necessitate euenient? Restat igitur iam ipsum\n\ndiscutere consequenter. Sunt autem opiniones variae et plurimae circa illud: quarum prima constanter affirmat, quod omnia quae euenient, euenient de necessitate penitus absoluta. Et haec est opinio Mathematicorum quorundam, et ponentium fatum; quam et Boetius super 1. peri hermenias asserit Stoicorum. Pro hac autem opinione communissimū motivū est istud: Quaecun que Deus praescit certitudinaliter euentura, euenient de necessitate penitus absoluta; aliter enim nequaquam certe praesciret, eius que praescientia falli posset: sed omnia quae cuenient, Deus praescit certitudinaliter cuentura. Quod et potest violentius confirmari, si addatur scientiam Dei nullo modo\n\ndepēdere a rebus ipsā que includere voluntatē diuinā necessariā et immutabilē respectu omniū futurorū, sicut ex praehabitis potest probabiliter apparere. Pro ista quo que opinione, referente Ioanne Sarisburiensi, deinde Episcopo Carnutensi secundi Policratici 23. quem B. Thomae Cantuariensi Archiepiscopo, dum Cancellariatus Angliae officio fungebatur, conscripsit, vbi et diffuse materiam istam tractat, quidam Stoicus et motiuum aliud afferebat; quaerebat enim, An posses aliquid facere eorum, quae minime facturus es. Quod cum admisisses, mille tibi aureos afferebat dum illud efficeres; quos si forte respueres, eos tibi quantalibet summa multiplicari iubebat, vt quod leniter fieri potest, efficias. Sed haec opinio tollit omnem libertatem arbitrij, libertatem scilicet contradictionis, et omnem contingentiam ad vtrumlibet simulaufert; quod primum secundi et quartum huius cum sequentibus non permittunt. Quare et Robertus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus damnauit Oxoniae articulum asserentem, quod omnis propositio vera de futuro est necessaria.", "english": "CHAPTER XII.\n\nHere he begins to dispute that most famous question, whether all things that will happen will happen of necessity; and he sets out the opinion of the Mathematicians or Stoics, who say that all things that will happen will happen of necessity, simply and absolutely. [n1]\n\nFrom what has been premised there plainly arises here that most famous question, a most pointed axiom and a most difficult problem: whether all things that come to pass will come to pass of necessity. It remains, then, to discuss it in due order. There are many and various opinions about it. The first holds firmly that all things that will happen will happen of necessity, wholly absolute. This is the opinion of certain Mathematicians and of those who posit fate, and Boethius, in his commentary on the first book of On Interpretation, ascribes it to the Stoics. [n2] The commonest argument for this opinion is the following. Whatever God foreknows with certainty will happen, will happen of necessity, wholly absolute; for otherwise he would by no means foreknow it with certainty, and his foreknowledge could be deceived. But God foreknows with certainty that all things that will happen will happen. This can also be confirmed more forcefully, if it is added that God's knowledge in no way depends on {689A} the things themselves, and that it includes the divine will, necessary and immutable with respect to all future things, as can plausibly appear from what has been established before.\n\nFor this opinion, too, a certain Stoic offered another argument, as John of Salisbury reports. He was afterwards Bishop of Chartres, and the report is in Book 2, chapter 23 of the Policraticus, which he wrote for Blessed Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, while Thomas held the office of Chancellor of England; there he also treats this subject at length. [n3] The Stoic asked whether you could do something among those things that you are least going to do. When you had granted that, he offered you a thousand gold pieces on condition that you did it; and if perhaps you refused them, he ordered them multiplied for you to whatever sum you liked, so that you might do what can easily be done. [n4]\n\nBut this opinion removes all freedom of choice, namely freedom of contradiction, and at the same time takes away all contingency to either alternative. The first of the second [book] and the fourth of this [book], with the chapters that follow, do not allow this. [n5] For this reason also Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned at Oxford the article asserting that every true proposition about the future is necessary. [n6]", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Mathematici here means those who make fate depend on the heavens (astrologers and fatalists), not mathematicians in the modern sense. Bradwardine's chapter argument equates them with the Stoics. I keep \"Mathematicians\" so that the identification stays his."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Boethius, In librum Aristotelis Peri hermeneias, ed. secunda (on ch. 9). Bradwardine cites it as a source for the Stoic doctrine of fate."}, {"n": 3, "text": "John of Salisbury, Policraticus II.23 as Savile numbers it. John was Bishop of Chartres from 1176, and the work is dedicated to Thomas Becket, then Chancellor of Henry II. Bradwardine's wording of the Stoic's question follows John's account closely. Quod cum admisisses, \"when you had granted this\", keeps John's second-person address."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Ut quod leniter fieri potest, efficias: the sense is that the act is so slight that no one could reasonably refuse it for such a price. The Stoic's point is that since you could do it but never will, what you will do is already fixed."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Quod primum secundi et quartum huius cum sequentibus non permittunt. The ellipsis is Bradwardine's. I take primum and quartum to be chapters, \"the first [chapter] of the second [book] and the fourth [chapter] of this [book]\". Under convention §5.4 I leave the reference unexpanded."}, {"n": 6, "text": "Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned this and other propositions at Oxford in 1277 (the Oxford articles of 18 March).\n\n## Errata\n\n688E | omnia quae cuenient | omnia quae euenient\n688E | certitudinaliter cuentura | certitudinaliter euentura\n688E | Quaecun que | Quaecunq; (i.e. Quaecunque, one word)\n689A | simulaufert | simul aufert"}], "errata": []}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p688C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/12/#p688C", "locator_display": "688C–688D", "source_text": "CAP. XII.\n\nJncipit disputare illam famosissimam quaestionem, nunquid omnia quae euenient, de necessitate euenient; et recitat opinionem Mathematicorum seu Stoicorum dicentem, quod omnia quae euenient, euenient de necessitate simpliciter absoluta.", "english": "CHAPTER XII.\n\nHere he begins to dispute that most famous question, whether all things that will happen will happen of necessity; and he sets out the opinion of the Mathematicians or Stoics, who say that all things that will happen will happen of necessity, simply and absolutely. [n1]", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p688D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/12/#p688D", "locator_display": "688D–689A", "source_text": "HIc autem ex praemissis patenter suboritur illa famosissima quaestio, acerrimum axioma, difficillimumque problema, Nunquid scilicet omnia quae eueniunt, de necessitate euenient? Restat igitur iam ipsum\n\ndiscutere consequenter. Sunt autem opiniones variae et plurimae circa illud: quarum prima constanter affirmat, quod omnia quae euenient, euenient de necessitate penitus absoluta. Et haec est opinio Mathematicorum quorundam, et ponentium fatum; quam et Boetius super 1. peri hermenias asserit Stoicorum. Pro hac autem opinione communissimū motivū est istud: Quaecun que Deus praescit certitudinaliter euentura, euenient de necessitate penitus absoluta; aliter enim nequaquam certe praesciret, eius que praescientia falli posset: sed omnia quae cuenient, Deus praescit certitudinaliter cuentura. Quod et potest violentius confirmari, si addatur scientiam Dei nullo modo\n\ndepēdere a rebus ipsā que includere voluntatē diuinā necessariā et immutabilē respectu omniū futurorū, sicut ex praehabitis potest probabiliter apparere. Pro ista quo que opinione, referente Ioanne Sarisburiensi, deinde Episcopo Carnutensi secundi Policratici 23. quem B. Thomae Cantuariensi Archiepiscopo, dum Cancellariatus Angliae officio fungebatur, conscripsit, vbi et diffuse materiam istam tractat, quidam Stoicus et motiuum aliud afferebat; quaerebat enim, An posses aliquid facere eorum, quae minime facturus es. Quod cum admisisses, mille tibi aureos afferebat dum illud efficeres; quos si forte respueres, eos tibi quantalibet summa multiplicari iubebat, vt quod leniter fieri potest, efficias. Sed haec opinio tollit omnem libertatem arbitrij, libertatem scilicet contradictionis, et omnem contingentiam ad vtrumlibet simulaufert; quod primum secundi et quartum huius cum sequentibus non permittunt. Quare et Robertus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus damnauit Oxoniae articulum asserentem, quod omnis propositio vera de futuro est necessaria.", "english": "From what has been premised there plainly arises here that most famous question, a most pointed axiom and a most difficult problem: whether all things that come to pass will come to pass of necessity. It remains, then, to discuss it in due order. There are many and various opinions about it. The first holds firmly that all things that will happen will happen of necessity, wholly absolute. This is the opinion of certain Mathematicians and of those who posit fate, and Boethius, in his commentary on the first book of On Interpretation, ascribes it to the Stoics. [n2] The commonest argument for this opinion is the following. Whatever God foreknows with certainty will happen, will happen of necessity, wholly absolute; for otherwise he would by no means foreknow it with certainty, and his foreknowledge could be deceived. But God foreknows with certainty that all things that will happen will happen. This can also be confirmed more forcefully, if it is added that God's knowledge in no way depends on {689A} the things themselves, and that it includes the divine will, necessary and immutable with respect to all future things, as can plausibly appear from what has been established before.\n\nFor this opinion, too, a certain Stoic offered another argument, as John of Salisbury reports. He was afterwards Bishop of Chartres, and the report is in Book 2, chapter 23 of the Policraticus, which he wrote for Blessed Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, while Thomas held the office of Chancellor of England; there he also treats this subject at length. [n3] The Stoic asked whether you could do something among those things that you are least going to do. When you had granted that, he offered you a thousand gold pieces on condition that you did it; and if perhaps you refused them, he ordered them multiplied for you to whatever sum you liked, so that you might do what can easily be done. [n4]\n\nBut this opinion removes all freedom of choice, namely freedom of contradiction, and at the same time takes away all contingency to either alternative. The first of the second [book] and the fourth of this [book], with the chapters that follow, do not allow this. [n5] For this reason also Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned at Oxford the article asserting that every true proposition about the future is necessary. [n6]", "margins": [{"id": "689A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) Carnotensi [= \"of Chartres\", the same word as the main text's Carnutensi; Savile's manuscripts differ only in spelling]."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}