{"id": "3/11", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/11/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-3", "title": "De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 11", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "686C–688C", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XI. Obijcit et respondet.\n\nSEd obijcietur forsitan contra dicta: Dictum est enim nono huius, quod licet omnes actus humani proueniant a necessitate naturaliter praecedente;\n\nideo tamen dicitur homo liber, et liberae voluntatis, quia non inuite nec coacte, sed spontanee, et cum vult facit, et cum non vult, non facit aliquos actus suos; eodem modo bestiae, licet faciant facta sua ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente, non tamen inuite nec coacte sed pure spontanee, et cum volunt seu appetunt, faciunt, et cum nolunt, seu non appetunt, non faciunt aliqua facta sua ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente; ergo ita libere, et ita meritorie sicut homo. Item nulla videtur ratio possibilis assignari, quare in actibus humanis necessitas respectu Dei siue voluntatis diuinae praecedens naturaliter tales actus potius comparitur meritum, sicut dicunt corollaria proximi et secundi, quam quaecunque necessitas alia, vel saltem quam necessitas respectu naturae vel fati, quod eis corollarium proximum denegauit, vel quam necessitas penitus absoluta. Haec autem soluuntur faciliter, si praeostensa memoriter teneantur. Nam sicut capitulum proximum\n\ndocuit, creatura rationalis est libera triplici libertate, scilicet a necessitate naturali, fatali, et violenta, imo et a necessitate respectu causarum omnium secundarum per tertium secundi: Irrationale autem non sic, sed subduntur in omnibus necessitati naturae, et, vt placet quibusdam, necessitati fati stellarum. Pro mente vero Augustini, cum dicit ideo hominem libere facere aliquid, quia cum vult, facit, et cum non vult, non facit, potest dici, quod loquitur ibi contra Pelagianos, et contra necessitatem violentam et inuitam, quam dixerunt sequi ex praescientia vel praedestinatione diuina, sicut capitulum proximum recitauit, illam ab homine remouendo; non tamen affirmat in homine illam tantummodo libertatem. Aliter et melius potest dici, quod ideo dicitur homo liber libertate contradictionis, quia positis omnibus causis secundis naturaliter praeuijs suae liberae volutioni cum omnibus dispositionibus necessario requisitis, non necessario sequitur ipsum velle, sed potest aequaliter velle et non velle,\n\nsicut ex 4. et sequentibus huius patet: ideoque his omnibus stantibus isto modo, cum vult, vult et efficit suum velle, et cum non vult, nec vult, nec efficit suum velle; quare posito secundum opinionem insipientis Deum non esse et hominem esse, posseque agere; vel secundum opinionem quorundam, puta Pelagianorum, qui dicunt se esse sapientes, hominem posse agere sine Deo aliqualiter coagente, homo in actibus suis liberis esset liber simpliciter libertate contradictionis, bestiae autem non sic. Imo et si ponatur ipsas posse agere Deo nullatenus coagente, adhuc posito appetibili et caeteris causis secundis cum dispositionibus requisitis et naturaliter praeuijs appetitui, actui scilicet appetendi, necessario sequitur ipsas appetere, necessitate scilicet naturali. Vnde Philosophus 9. Metaphys. 10. Irrationales, inquit, potentias necessario, quando vt possunt, passiuum et actiuum appropinquant, hoc quidem facere, illud vero pati: quod et testatur autoritas Damasceni dicentis, Irrationalia non sunt libera arbitrio; aguntur enim magis a natura quam agant, ideoque non contradicunt naturali\n\nappetitui, sed simul appetunt quid, et impetum faciunt ad actum, sicut superius plenius recitatur. Hanc etiam obiectionem Anselmus de libero arbitrio 5. simili modo soluit, vbi primo a discipulo ita quaerit; Quomodo non est libera voluntas, quam aliena potestas sine suo assensu subijcere non potest? Et discipulo requirente, Nonne simili ratione possumus dicere voluntatem equi esse liberam, quae non appetitui carnis seruit nisi volens? Respondet, Non hoc est similiter: in equo namque non ipsa voluntas se subijcit, sed naturaliter subiecta semper necessitate appetitui carnis seruit: in homine vero quamdiu ipsa voluntas recta est, nec seruit nec subiecta est cui non debet, nec ab ipsa rectitudine vlla vi aliena auertitur, nisi ipsa, cui non debet, volens consentiat, quem consensum non naturaliter nec ex necessitate, sicut equus, sed ex se aperte videtur habere. Beatus etiam Augustinus 3. de libero arbitrio 1. ad similem obiectionem de motu lapidis naturali simili modo respondet. Cum autem obijciens viterius arguebat; bestiae agunt libere, ergo meritorie; consecutio illa non tenet. Nam sicut\n\nin morali Philosophia, et in sacra Theologia docetur creberrime, ad meritum non sufficit facere tantum naturaliter vnum bonum, sed requiritur facere ipsum bene, quod non facit nisi intentio recta finis, vt patet ex 34. primi; hanc autem dirigit ratio recte praeiudicans; quare bestiae ratione carentes, et merito de necessitate carebunt. Imo et sicut forsitan est absolute possibile, quod Deus faceret aliquam naturam immaterialem omnino liberam ad volendum sine iudicio rationis: ex quo enim nunc facit vnam naturam habentem potentias illas ambas, posset, vt videtur, facere aliam, quae vtramlibet tantum haberet: si igitur talem faceret creaturam, ipsa esset aeque libera, sicut homo vel Angelus, quae tamen omnino mereri vel peccare non posset, eo quod careret iudicio rationis, cui se libere conformaret, vel etiam difformaret. Est etiam inexpugnabilis ratio possibilis assignari, quare necessitas in voluntate respectu voluntatis diuinae compatitur meritum, et alia nulla omnino. Ipsa enim comparitur meritum propter rationem quam ostensio corollarij primi huius assignat; et vt breuiter rationem\n\nhuius assignem, dico quod natura voluntatis creatae est talis, vt in suis actibus liberis nulli causae secundae de necessitate subdatur, vt tertium secundi ostendit, sed tantum Deo, sicut 30. secundi, et 2. tertij docuerunt. Quod et bene in prima institutione hominis monstrabatur, quando fuerat institutus, vt soli Deo subesset, caeterisque praeesser, sicut historia Gen. 1. docet; quare et in merito simili modo erit: nulli etiam menti rationali dubium debet esse, quin Creator omnipotens super creaturam rationalem, sicut et super vniuersam creaturam, praerogatiua aliqua speciali caeteris actiuis agentibusve creatis aut creabilibus vniuersis sit rationabiliter praeferendus. Nec vlla necessitas alia compatitur meritum. Nam de necessitate violenta et omnino inuita nullus dubitat aut ignorat, omnisque necessitas naturalis est formae materialis et irrationalis, sicut ex tertio secundi potest haberi: quare secundum praeostensa isto capitulo meritum habere non potest. Vnde Augustinus in quaestionibus veteris et noui testamenti quaestione secunda; Diabolus si natura malus esset, voluntatem non haberet: nec enim\n\nposset discernere, sed vno atque eodem loco omnibus se quasi coecus immergeret. Porro autem iudicio quodam hoc facit; vnde manifestum est voluntatem eius esse in crimine. Et infra, Si haec naturaliter putatur facere, reus constitui non potest: quomodo enim reus constituitur qui nescit quid facit? Ita et diabolus si bonum nescit, quare damnandus censetur, qui non facit quod nescit? Nos autem iure rei constituimur, quia aliud facimus quam scimus debere nos facere. Omnis quoque forma, si quae sit subiecta necessitati fatali stellarum, necessario est materialis et per consequens irrationalis; quare secundum praemissa non est meriti susceptiua: nam nulla forma immaterialis et rationalis subijcitur necessitati cuiuscunque formae materialis et irrationalis per tertium secundi: non enim deceret rerum ordinem naturalem, vt perfectius imperfectiori, rationale irrationali, et sapiens nihil scienti omnino necessario subderetur. Neque necessitas penitus absoluta compatitur meritum, quia si in actibus hominis\n\nesset talis necessitas, nec in ipso, nec in Deo esset vlla possibilitas aliter faciendi; quare Deus sic necessario ageret actus humanos, et eadem ratione quicquid agit ad extra; quare non esset agens rationale et liberum, vt patet per ostensa 4. huius et 5. sed agens irrationale et de necessitate naturae; et cum per 30. secundi ipse sit omnium primus motor, omnis motor inferior similiter tantum ageret et moueret. Non enim deceret nec esset possibile vt motor secundus rationabilior aut liberior esset primo, sicut iam proximo est ostensum, argutum et 6. primi et 9. quare nec vllus motor inferior posset mereri, sicut superius est ostensum.\n\nCOROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium, qualis sit libertas in irrationabilibus creaturis, et quomodo differt et conuenit cum rationalium libertate.\n\nEX his autem cognoscitur luculenter qualis libertas est vel non est in irrationalibus creaturis, et quomodo differt rationalis libertas ab irrationabilium libertate, et quomodo conuenit cum eadem. Est enim in eis respectu suarum naturalium actionum libertas a violentia et coactione inuita. Nam cum appetunt, faciunt, et cum non appetunt, minime; quod primo et maxime verificatur in eis de appetitu eorum, sicut est in hominibus de voluntate eorum, sicut 9. huius plenius ostendebat: quare et Philosophus 3. Ethicorum 5. attribuit et pueris et animalibus voluntatem, voluntario quidem, inquiens, et pueri et animalia communicant. Anselmus etiam de libero arbitrio 5. innuit equum habere voluntatem, vt praesens capitulum superius recitauit, qui et infra 13. ita dicit, Seruat naturaliter canis rectitudinem voluntatis, cum amat catulos suos, aut Dominum suum sibi benefacientem. Est insuper in bestijs forsitan libertas a necessitate fati stellarum: Videtur enim quod si bestiae fuissent creatae\n\nperfectae primo die mundi ante creationem stellarum, quod tunc potuissent exercuisse suas actiones proprias naturales; cuius tamen certificationem quia non multum videtur ad pietatis scientiam pertinere, relinquo Philosophis naturalibus et Astrologis, quos magis exagitat studium curiosum. Non est autem in eis libertas simpliciter, quia non respectu causarum superiorum, scilicet causae primae, id est, voluntatis diuinae, sicut nec in rationalibus, sicut quintum et nonum huius ostendunt, nec est in eis libertas a necessitate naturae, sicut praesens capitulum superius demonstrauit; quare nec potest esse in eis libertas contradictionis simpliciter, nec respectu omnium causarum inferiorum, omnium scilicet secundarum, sicut corollarium quarti huius ostendit. Differentiam autem et conuenientiam istarum libertatum adinuicem ex praecedentibus reputo manifestum.", "english": "CHAPTER XI. He raises an objection and replies.\n\nBut an objection will perhaps be raised against what has been said. For it was said in the ninth of this book that although all human acts proceed from a naturally preceding necessity, a man is nevertheless called free, and of free will, because he does not act unwillingly or under compulsion but spontaneously, and does some act of his when he wills and does not do it when he does not will. In the same way beasts, although they do their deeds from a naturally preceding necessity, nevertheless do not act unwillingly or under compulsion but purely spontaneously. When they will or desire, they act, and when they do not will or do not desire, they do not do any of their deeds from a naturally preceding necessity. Therefore they act as freely, and as meritoriously, as man. Again, it seems that no possible reason can be given why, in human acts, a necessity with respect to God or the divine will, naturally preceding such acts, should be compatible with merit, as the corollaries of the last and of the second say, rather than any other necessity: or at least rather than a necessity with respect to nature or fate, which the last corollary denied to them, or than a thoroughly absolute necessity. But these points are easily resolved if what was shown before is kept in memory. For as the last chapter taught, the rational creature is free with a threefold freedom: from natural, fatal and violent necessity; indeed also from the necessity with respect to all secondary causes, by the third of the second. The irrational creature is not so. In all things it is subject to the necessity of nature and, as some hold, to the necessity of the fate of the stars. As for Augustine's meaning, when he says that a man does something freely for this reason, that when he wills, he acts, and when he does not will, he does not act, it can be said that he is speaking there against the Pelagians and against the violent and unwilling necessity which they said follows from divine foreknowledge or predestination, as the last chapter recounted. He is removing that necessity from man, yet he does not affirm that this is the only freedom in man. It can be said otherwise, and better, that a man is called free with the freedom of contradiction [n1] because, when all secondary causes naturally prior to his free willing are posited, together with all the dispositions necessarily required, his willing does not necessarily follow, but he can equally will and not will, as is clear from 4 of this book and the chapters following.\n\nAnd so, all these conditions standing in this way, when he wills, he wills and brings about his willing, and when he does not will, he neither wills nor brings about his willing. Hence, supposing according to the opinion of the fool that God does not exist and that man exists and can act, or according to the opinion of certain people, namely the Pelagians, who say that they are wise, that man can act without God's in any way co-acting [n2], man in his free acts would be free simply, with the freedom of contradiction, but beasts would not be so. Indeed, even if it is posited that they can act with God not co-acting at all, still, given an appetible object and the other secondary causes with the dispositions required and naturally prior to the appetite (that is, to the act of desiring), it necessarily follows that they desire, namely by natural necessity. Hence the Philosopher, in Metaphysics 9, 10 [n3], says: Irrational potencies, when the passive and the active approach as they are able, must of necessity, the one act and the other be acted upon. The authority of Damascene also bears witness to this, saying, Irrational things are not free in choice; for they are driven by nature rather than act [n4]. And therefore they do not contradict their natural appetite, but at once desire something and make an impetus toward the act, as is recounted more fully above.\n\nAnselm, in On Free Choice 5, answers this same objection in a similar way. There he first asks, through the disciple: How is the will not free, when no alien power can subject it without its own assent? And when the disciple presses, Can we not say by a similar argument that the will of a horse is free, since it serves the appetite of the flesh only when willing? he replies: It is not similar. In the horse the will itself does not subject itself, but, subjected by nature, it always serves the appetite of the flesh of necessity. In man, however, as long as the will itself is upright, it neither serves nor is subject to what it ought not, and it is turned away from that very uprightness by no alien force, unless the will itself willingly consents to what it ought not; and this consent it plainly seems to have from itself, not naturally nor of necessity, as the horse has it. Blessed Augustine, too, in On Free Choice 3, 1, answers a similar objection, about the natural motion of a stone, in a similar way. But as to the further argument of the objector, beasts act freely, therefore meritoriously, that consequence does not hold [n5]. For as is taught very often in moral philosophy and in sacred theology, to merit it is not enough merely to do one good thing naturally; one must do it well, which only a right intention of the end brings about, as is clear from 34 of the first, and reason rightly pre-judging directs this intention. So beasts, lacking reason, will lack the necessity of merit as well. Indeed, just as it is perhaps absolutely possible that God should make some wholly immaterial nature free to will without the judgment of reason (for since he now makes one nature having both those powers, he could, it seems, make another that had only either one), so, if he made such a creature, it would be as free as man or angel, and yet it could not merit or sin at all, because it would lack the judgment of reason, to which it would freely conform itself or even fail to conform.\n\nThere is also an unassailable reason that can be assigned why the necessity in the will with respect to the divine will is compatible with merit, and no other at all. For this necessity is compatible with merit for the reason which the proof of the first corollary of this book assigns; and to state the reason briefly, I say that the nature of the created will is such that in its free acts it is not subject of necessity to any secondary cause, as the third of the second shows, but only to God, as the thirtieth of the second and the second of the third taught. This was also well shown in man's first institution, when he was set up to be subject to God alone and to have charge over all else, as the history of Genesis 1 teaches. So it will be likewise in merit. No rational mind ought to doubt that the omnipotent Creator, over the rational creature as over the whole creation, is reasonably to be preferred, by some special prerogative, to all other created or creatable agents, active or otherwise.\n\nNor is any other necessity compatible with merit. For about violent and wholly unwilling necessity no one doubts or is ignorant; and every natural necessity belongs to a material and irrational form, as can be gathered from the third of the second. Hence, according to what was shown in this chapter, it cannot have merit. So Augustine, in the Questions on the Old and New Testament, question 2 [n6], says: If the devil were evil by nature, he would not have will; for he would not be able to discern, but would plunge into everything, in one and the same place, like a blind man. But as it is, he acts by a kind of judgment; hence it is clear that his will is in guilt. And later: If it is thought that he does these things naturally, he cannot be made guilty; for how is he made guilty who does not know what he does? So too the devil: if he does not know the good, why is he judged damnable, when he does not do what he does not know? But we are justly made guilty, because we do something other than what we know we ought to do. Every form, moreover, if there be any subject to the fatal necessity of the stars, is necessarily material and consequently irrational; so, by what has been said, it is not capable of merit. For no immaterial and rational form is subject to the necessity of any material and irrational form, by the third of the second; for it would not befit the natural order of things that the more perfect should be necessarily subjected to the less perfect, the rational to the irrational, and the wise to what knows nothing at all.\n\nNor is a thoroughly absolute necessity compatible with merit. For if there were such a necessity in man's acts, there would be no possibility of acting otherwise, either in him or in God. Hence God would act human acts necessarily, and by the same reasoning whatever he does outside himself. So he would not be a rational and free agent, as is clear from what was shown in 4 of this book and 5, but an irrational agent acting from necessity of nature. And since by the thirtieth of the second he is the first mover of all, every inferior mover would likewise act and move only so. For it would not be fitting, nor would it be possible, that a second mover should be more rational or freer than the first, as has just now been shown, and as is argued also by 6 of the first and 9 [n7]. So no inferior mover could merit either, as was shown above.\n\nCOROLLARY.\n\nA corollary on what kind of freedom there is in irrational creatures, and how it differs from the freedom of rational creatures and agrees with it.\n\nFrom these things it is clearly known what kind of freedom there is, or is not, in irrational creatures, and how rational freedom differs from the freedom of irrational ones and how it agrees with it. For in them there is, with respect to their natural actions, freedom from violence and unwilling compulsion. For when they desire, they act, and when they do not desire, they do not; this is verified primarily and above all of their appetite, as in men it is of their will, as the ninth of this book showed more fully. Hence the Philosopher too, in Ethics 3, 5, attributes will to both children and animals, saying, Children and animals share in the voluntary [n8]. Anselm, too, in On Free Choice 5, intimates that the horse has will, as the present chapter recounted above; and further on, at 13, he says: A dog naturally keeps uprightness of will when it loves its puppies, or its master who does it good. There is moreover in beasts perhaps a freedom from the necessity of the fate of the stars. For it seems that if beasts had been created perfect on the first day of the world, before the creation of the stars, they could then have exercised their own natural actions. But because the verification of this seems not to bear much on the knowledge of piety, I leave it to the natural philosophers and astrologers, whom curious study drives harder. There is not in them, however, freedom simply, because it is not with respect to higher causes, namely the first cause, that is, the divine will, any more than in rational creatures, as the fifth and ninth of this book show; nor is there in them freedom from the necessity of nature, as the present chapter showed above. So neither can freedom of contradiction simply be in them, nor with respect to all inferior causes, that is, all secondary causes, as the corollary of the fourth of this book shows. The difference and the agreement of these freedoms with one another I consider clear from what has gone before.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Libertas contradictionis is the freedom, with all prior conditions posited, to will or not to will (the two contradictory alternatives), as against freedom from some particular kind of necessity. Bradwardine will go on to deny it to beasts \"simply.\""}, {"n": 2, "text": "Two scriptural echoes mark the irony. \"The opinion of the fool\" recalls Ps 13 [14]:1 (\"The fool has said in his heart, There is no God\"), and \"who say they are wise\" recalls Rom 1:22 (\"saying they were wise, they became fools\"). The Pelagians are thus put in the fool's company."}, {"n": 3, "text": "Aristotle, Metaphysics 9 (Θ) 5, 1048a5–8. Savile's \"10\" is not a chapter number of the modern text. I take it to belong to the medieval translation's division or commentary numbering. It is kept as given (Conventions §5.4)."}, {"n": 4, "text": "John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa II, in the chapter on what is in our power, in Burgundio's Latin. The sentence is cited again as an authority at 688B only by implication."}, {"n": 5, "text": "The cum clause (\"Cum autem obijciens vlterius arguebat\") has no main verb of its own. I take it as introducing the objection that the following clause then denies, and translate \"as to the further argument of the objector.\""}, {"n": 6, "text": "Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti, q. 2, a work transmitted under Augustine's name and now commonly ascribed to Ambrosiaster. Bradwardine cites it as Augustine, and so do I in the text and the margin."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Savile prints argutum (\"argued,\" a participle without construction), apparently for arguitur or similar. The sense is that the same conclusion is also argued from chapters 6 and 9 of the first book. I translate that sense. The error is in the print and is not an emendation of mine."}, {"n": 8, "text": "Ethics 3, 5 in Savile's numbering is Nicomachean Ethics III.2, 1111b8–9, where children and animals are said to share in the voluntary, though not in choice. Bradwardine reads voluntarium as proof that they have voluntas."}], "errata": [{"address": "686D", "keyed": "comparitur", "print": "compatitur"}, {"address": "687C", "keyed": "comparitur (in \"Ipsa enim comparitur meritum\")", "print": "compatitur"}, {"address": "687D", "keyed": "praeesser", "print": "praeesset"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p686C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/11/#p686C", "locator_display": "686C", "source_text": "CAP. XI. Obijcit et respondet.", "english": "CHAPTER XI. He raises an objection and replies.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p686C-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/11/#p686C-2", "locator_display": "686C–686E", "source_text": "SEd obijcietur forsitan contra dicta: Dictum est enim nono huius, quod licet omnes actus humani proueniant a necessitate naturaliter praecedente;\n\nideo tamen dicitur homo liber, et liberae voluntatis, quia non inuite nec coacte, sed spontanee, et cum vult facit, et cum non vult, non facit aliquos actus suos; eodem modo bestiae, licet faciant facta sua ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente, non tamen inuite nec coacte sed pure spontanee, et cum volunt seu appetunt, faciunt, et cum nolunt, seu non appetunt, non faciunt aliqua facta sua ex necessitate naturaliter praecedente; ergo ita libere, et ita meritorie sicut homo. Item nulla videtur ratio possibilis assignari, quare in actibus humanis necessitas respectu Dei siue voluntatis diuinae praecedens naturaliter tales actus potius comparitur meritum, sicut dicunt corollaria proximi et secundi, quam quaecunque necessitas alia, vel saltem quam necessitas respectu naturae vel fati, quod eis corollarium proximum denegauit, vel quam necessitas penitus absoluta. Haec autem soluuntur faciliter, si praeostensa memoriter teneantur. Nam sicut capitulum proximum\n\ndocuit, creatura rationalis est libera triplici libertate, scilicet a necessitate naturali, fatali, et violenta, imo et a necessitate respectu causarum omnium secundarum per tertium secundi: Irrationale autem non sic, sed subduntur in omnibus necessitati naturae, et, vt placet quibusdam, necessitati fati stellarum. Pro mente vero Augustini, cum dicit ideo hominem libere facere aliquid, quia cum vult, facit, et cum non vult, non facit, potest dici, quod loquitur ibi contra Pelagianos, et contra necessitatem violentam et inuitam, quam dixerunt sequi ex praescientia vel praedestinatione diuina, sicut capitulum proximum recitauit, illam ab homine remouendo; non tamen affirmat in homine illam tantummodo libertatem. Aliter et melius potest dici, quod ideo dicitur homo liber libertate contradictionis, quia positis omnibus causis secundis naturaliter praeuijs suae liberae volutioni cum omnibus dispositionibus necessario requisitis, non necessario sequitur ipsum velle, sed potest aequaliter velle et non velle,", "english": "But an objection will perhaps be raised against what has been said. For it was said in the ninth of this book that although all human acts proceed from a naturally preceding necessity, a man is nevertheless called free, and of free will, because he does not act unwillingly or under compulsion but spontaneously, and does some act of his when he wills and does not do it when he does not will. In the same way beasts, although they do their deeds from a naturally preceding necessity, nevertheless do not act unwillingly or under compulsion but purely spontaneously. When they will or desire, they act, and when they do not will or do not desire, they do not do any of their deeds from a naturally preceding necessity. Therefore they act as freely, and as meritoriously, as man. Again, it seems that no possible reason can be given why, in human acts, a necessity with respect to God or the divine will, naturally preceding such acts, should be compatible with merit, as the corollaries of the last and of the second say, rather than any other necessity: or at least rather than a necessity with respect to nature or fate, which the last corollary denied to them, or than a thoroughly absolute necessity. But these points are easily resolved if what was shown before is kept in memory. For as the last chapter taught, the rational creature is free with a threefold freedom: from natural, fatal and violent necessity; indeed also from the necessity with respect to all secondary causes, by the third of the second. The irrational creature is not so. In all things it is subject to the necessity of nature and, as some hold, to the necessity of the fate of the stars. As for Augustine's meaning, when he says that a man does something freely for this reason, that when he wills, he acts, and when he does not will, he does not act, it can be said that he is speaking there against the Pelagians and against the violent and unwilling necessity which they said follows from divine foreknowledge or predestination, as the last chapter recounted. He is removing that necessity from man, yet he does not affirm that this is the only freedom in man. It can be said otherwise, and better, that a man is called free with the freedom of contradiction [n1] because, when all secondary causes naturally prior to his free willing are posited, together with all the dispositions necessarily required, his willing does not necessarily follow, but he can equally will and not will, as is clear from 4 of this book and the chapters following.", "margins": [{"id": "686D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"only\" [tantum, for pure]."}]}, {"anchor": "p687A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/11/#p687A", "locator_display": "687A–687E", "source_text": "sicut ex 4. et sequentibus huius patet: ideoque his omnibus stantibus isto modo, cum vult, vult et efficit suum velle, et cum non vult, nec vult, nec efficit suum velle; quare posito secundum opinionem insipientis Deum non esse et hominem esse, posseque agere; vel secundum opinionem quorundam, puta Pelagianorum, qui dicunt se esse sapientes, hominem posse agere sine Deo aliqualiter coagente, homo in actibus suis liberis esset liber simpliciter libertate contradictionis, bestiae autem non sic. Imo et si ponatur ipsas posse agere Deo nullatenus coagente, adhuc posito appetibili et caeteris causis secundis cum dispositionibus requisitis et naturaliter praeuijs appetitui, actui scilicet appetendi, necessario sequitur ipsas appetere, necessitate scilicet naturali. Vnde Philosophus 9. Metaphys. 10. Irrationales, inquit, potentias necessario, quando vt possunt, passiuum et actiuum appropinquant, hoc quidem facere, illud vero pati: quod et testatur autoritas Damasceni dicentis, Irrationalia non sunt libera arbitrio; aguntur enim magis a natura quam agant, ideoque non contradicunt naturali\n\nappetitui, sed simul appetunt quid, et impetum faciunt ad actum, sicut superius plenius recitatur. Hanc etiam obiectionem Anselmus de libero arbitrio 5. simili modo soluit, vbi primo a discipulo ita quaerit; Quomodo non est libera voluntas, quam aliena potestas sine suo assensu subijcere non potest? Et discipulo requirente, Nonne simili ratione possumus dicere voluntatem equi esse liberam, quae non appetitui carnis seruit nisi volens? Respondet, Non hoc est similiter: in equo namque non ipsa voluntas se subijcit, sed naturaliter subiecta semper necessitate appetitui carnis seruit: in homine vero quamdiu ipsa voluntas recta est, nec seruit nec subiecta est cui non debet, nec ab ipsa rectitudine vlla vi aliena auertitur, nisi ipsa, cui non debet, volens consentiat, quem consensum non naturaliter nec ex necessitate, sicut equus, sed ex se aperte videtur habere. Beatus etiam Augustinus 3. de libero arbitrio 1. ad similem obiectionem de motu lapidis naturali simili modo respondet. Cum autem obijciens viterius arguebat; bestiae agunt libere, ergo meritorie; consecutio illa non tenet. Nam sicut\n\nin morali Philosophia, et in sacra Theologia docetur creberrime, ad meritum non sufficit facere tantum naturaliter vnum bonum, sed requiritur facere ipsum bene, quod non facit nisi intentio recta finis, vt patet ex 34. primi; hanc autem dirigit ratio recte praeiudicans; quare bestiae ratione carentes, et merito de necessitate carebunt. Imo et sicut forsitan est absolute possibile, quod Deus faceret aliquam naturam immaterialem omnino liberam ad volendum sine iudicio rationis: ex quo enim nunc facit vnam naturam habentem potentias illas ambas, posset, vt videtur, facere aliam, quae vtramlibet tantum haberet: si igitur talem faceret creaturam, ipsa esset aeque libera, sicut homo vel Angelus, quae tamen omnino mereri vel peccare non posset, eo quod careret iudicio rationis, cui se libere conformaret, vel etiam difformaret. Est etiam inexpugnabilis ratio possibilis assignari, quare necessitas in voluntate respectu voluntatis diuinae compatitur meritum, et alia nulla omnino. Ipsa enim comparitur meritum propter rationem quam ostensio corollarij primi huius assignat; et vt breuiter rationem\n\nhuius assignem, dico quod natura voluntatis creatae est talis, vt in suis actibus liberis nulli causae secundae de necessitate subdatur, vt tertium secundi ostendit, sed tantum Deo, sicut 30. secundi, et 2. tertij docuerunt. Quod et bene in prima institutione hominis monstrabatur, quando fuerat institutus, vt soli Deo subesset, caeterisque praeesser, sicut historia Gen. 1. docet; quare et in merito simili modo erit: nulli etiam menti rationali dubium debet esse, quin Creator omnipotens super creaturam rationalem, sicut et super vniuersam creaturam, praerogatiua aliqua speciali caeteris actiuis agentibusve creatis aut creabilibus vniuersis sit rationabiliter praeferendus. Nec vlla necessitas alia compatitur meritum. Nam de necessitate violenta et omnino inuita nullus dubitat aut ignorat, omnisque necessitas naturalis est formae materialis et irrationalis, sicut ex tertio secundi potest haberi: quare secundum praeostensa isto capitulo meritum habere non potest. Vnde Augustinus in quaestionibus veteris et noui testamenti quaestione secunda; Diabolus si natura malus esset, voluntatem non haberet: nec enim\n\nposset discernere, sed vno atque eodem loco omnibus se quasi coecus immergeret. Porro autem iudicio quodam hoc facit; vnde manifestum est voluntatem eius esse in crimine. Et infra, Si haec naturaliter putatur facere, reus constitui non potest: quomodo enim reus constituitur qui nescit quid facit? Ita et diabolus si bonum nescit, quare damnandus censetur, qui non facit quod nescit? Nos autem iure rei constituimur, quia aliud facimus quam scimus debere nos facere. Omnis quoque forma, si quae sit subiecta necessitati fatali stellarum, necessario est materialis et per consequens irrationalis; quare secundum praemissa non est meriti susceptiua: nam nulla forma immaterialis et rationalis subijcitur necessitati cuiuscunque formae materialis et irrationalis per tertium secundi: non enim deceret rerum ordinem naturalem, vt perfectius imperfectiori, rationale irrationali, et sapiens nihil scienti omnino necessario subderetur. Neque necessitas penitus absoluta compatitur meritum, quia si in actibus hominis", "english": "And so, all these conditions standing in this way, when he wills, he wills and brings about his willing, and when he does not will, he neither wills nor brings about his willing. Hence, supposing according to the opinion of the fool that God does not exist and that man exists and can act, or according to the opinion of certain people, namely the Pelagians, who say that they are wise, that man can act without God's in any way co-acting [n2], man in his free acts would be free simply, with the freedom of contradiction, but beasts would not be so. Indeed, even if it is posited that they can act with God not co-acting at all, still, given an appetible object and the other secondary causes with the dispositions required and naturally prior to the appetite (that is, to the act of desiring), it necessarily follows that they desire, namely by natural necessity. Hence the Philosopher, in Metaphysics 9, 10 [n3], says: Irrational potencies, when the passive and the active approach as they are able, must of necessity, the one act and the other be acted upon. The authority of Damascene also bears witness to this, saying, Irrational things are not free in choice; for they are driven by nature rather than act [n4]. And therefore they do not contradict their natural appetite, but at once desire something and make an impetus toward the act, as is recounted more fully above.\n\nAnselm, in On Free Choice 5, answers this same objection in a similar way. There he first asks, through the disciple: How is the will not free, when no alien power can subject it without its own assent? And when the disciple presses, Can we not say by a similar argument that the will of a horse is free, since it serves the appetite of the flesh only when willing? he replies: It is not similar. In the horse the will itself does not subject itself, but, subjected by nature, it always serves the appetite of the flesh of necessity. In man, however, as long as the will itself is upright, it neither serves nor is subject to what it ought not, and it is turned away from that very uprightness by no alien force, unless the will itself willingly consents to what it ought not; and this consent it plainly seems to have from itself, not naturally nor of necessity, as the horse has it. Blessed Augustine, too, in On Free Choice 3, 1, answers a similar objection, about the natural motion of a stone, in a similar way. But as to the further argument of the objector, beasts act freely, therefore meritoriously, that consequence does not hold [n5]. For as is taught very often in moral philosophy and in sacred theology, to merit it is not enough merely to do one good thing naturally; one must do it well, which only a right intention of the end brings about, as is clear from 34 of the first, and reason rightly pre-judging directs this intention. So beasts, lacking reason, will lack the necessity of merit as well. Indeed, just as it is perhaps absolutely possible that God should make some wholly immaterial nature free to will without the judgment of reason (for since he now makes one nature having both those powers, he could, it seems, make another that had only either one), so, if he made such a creature, it would be as free as man or angel, and yet it could not merit or sin at all, because it would lack the judgment of reason, to which it would freely conform itself or even fail to conform.\n\nThere is also an unassailable reason that can be assigned why the necessity in the will with respect to the divine will is compatible with merit, and no other at all. For this necessity is compatible with merit for the reason which the proof of the first corollary of this book assigns; and to state the reason briefly, I say that the nature of the created will is such that in its free acts it is not subject of necessity to any secondary cause, as the third of the second shows, but only to God, as the thirtieth of the second and the second of the third taught. This was also well shown in man's first institution, when he was set up to be subject to God alone and to have charge over all else, as the history of Genesis 1 teaches. So it will be likewise in merit. No rational mind ought to doubt that the omnipotent Creator, over the rational creature as over the whole creation, is reasonably to be preferred, by some special prerogative, to all other created or creatable agents, active or otherwise.\n\nNor is any other necessity compatible with merit. For about violent and wholly unwilling necessity no one doubts or is ignorant; and every natural necessity belongs to a material and irrational form, as can be gathered from the third of the second. Hence, according to what was shown in this chapter, it cannot have merit. So Augustine, in the Questions on the Old and New Testament, question 2 [n6], says: If the devil were evil by nature, he would not have will; for he would not be able to discern, but would plunge into everything, in one and the same place, like a blind man. But as it is, he acts by a kind of judgment; hence it is clear that his will is in guilt. And later: If it is thought that he does these things naturally, he cannot be made guilty; for how is he made guilty who does not know what he does? So too the devil: if he does not know the good, why is he judged damnable, when he does not do what he does not know? But we are justly made guilty, because we do something other than what we know we ought to do. Every form, moreover, if there be any subject to the fatal necessity of the stars, is necessarily material and consequently irrational; so, by what has been said, it is not capable of merit. For no immaterial and rational form is subject to the necessity of any material and irrational form, by the third of the second; for it would not befit the natural order of things that the more perfect should be necessarily subjected to the less perfect, the rational to the irrational, and the wise to what knows nothing at all.", "margins": [{"id": "687A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "The Philosopher."}, {"id": "687A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Damascene."}, {"id": "687B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Anselm."}, {"id": "687B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}, {"id": "687D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}, {"id": "687E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"could\" [posset, for potest]."}]}, {"anchor": "p688A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/11/#p688A", "locator_display": "688A", "source_text": "esset talis necessitas, nec in ipso, nec in Deo esset vlla possibilitas aliter faciendi; quare Deus sic necessario ageret actus humanos, et eadem ratione quicquid agit ad extra; quare non esset agens rationale et liberum, vt patet per ostensa 4. huius et 5. sed agens irrationale et de necessitate naturae; et cum per 30. secundi ipse sit omnium primus motor, omnis motor inferior similiter tantum ageret et moueret. Non enim deceret nec esset possibile vt motor secundus rationabilior aut liberior esset primo, sicut iam proximo est ostensum, argutum et 6. primi et 9. quare nec vllus motor inferior posset mereri, sicut superius est ostensum.", "english": "Nor is a thoroughly absolute necessity compatible with merit. For if there were such a necessity in man's acts, there would be no possibility of acting otherwise, either in him or in God. Hence God would act human acts necessarily, and by the same reasoning whatever he does outside himself. So he would not be a rational and free agent, as is clear from what was shown in 4 of this book and 5, but an irrational agent acting from necessity of nature. And since by the thirtieth of the second he is the first mover of all, every inferior mover would likewise act and move only so. For it would not be fitting, nor would it be possible, that a second mover should be more rational or freer than the first, as has just now been shown, and as is argued also by 6 of the first and 9 [n7]. So no inferior mover could merit either, as was shown above.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p688A-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/11/#p688A-2", "locator_display": "688A", "source_text": "COROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium, qualis sit libertas in irrationabilibus creaturis, et quomodo differt et conuenit cum rationalium libertate.", "english": "COROLLARY.\n\nA corollary on what kind of freedom there is in irrational creatures, and how it differs from the freedom of rational creatures and agrees with it.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p688B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/11/#p688B", "locator_display": "688B–688C", "source_text": "EX his autem cognoscitur luculenter qualis libertas est vel non est in irrationalibus creaturis, et quomodo differt rationalis libertas ab irrationabilium libertate, et quomodo conuenit cum eadem. Est enim in eis respectu suarum naturalium actionum libertas a violentia et coactione inuita. Nam cum appetunt, faciunt, et cum non appetunt, minime; quod primo et maxime verificatur in eis de appetitu eorum, sicut est in hominibus de voluntate eorum, sicut 9. huius plenius ostendebat: quare et Philosophus 3. Ethicorum 5. attribuit et pueris et animalibus voluntatem, voluntario quidem, inquiens, et pueri et animalia communicant. Anselmus etiam de libero arbitrio 5. innuit equum habere voluntatem, vt praesens capitulum superius recitauit, qui et infra 13. ita dicit, Seruat naturaliter canis rectitudinem voluntatis, cum amat catulos suos, aut Dominum suum sibi benefacientem. Est insuper in bestijs forsitan libertas a necessitate fati stellarum: Videtur enim quod si bestiae fuissent creatae\n\nperfectae primo die mundi ante creationem stellarum, quod tunc potuissent exercuisse suas actiones proprias naturales; cuius tamen certificationem quia non multum videtur ad pietatis scientiam pertinere, relinquo Philosophis naturalibus et Astrologis, quos magis exagitat studium curiosum. Non est autem in eis libertas simpliciter, quia non respectu causarum superiorum, scilicet causae primae, id est, voluntatis diuinae, sicut nec in rationalibus, sicut quintum et nonum huius ostendunt, nec est in eis libertas a necessitate naturae, sicut praesens capitulum superius demonstrauit; quare nec potest esse in eis libertas contradictionis simpliciter, nec respectu omnium causarum inferiorum, omnium scilicet secundarum, sicut corollarium quarti huius ostendit. Differentiam autem et conuenientiam istarum libertatum adinuicem ex praecedentibus reputo manifestum.", "english": "From these things it is clearly known what kind of freedom there is, or is not, in irrational creatures, and how rational freedom differs from the freedom of irrational ones and how it agrees with it. For in them there is, with respect to their natural actions, freedom from violence and unwilling compulsion. For when they desire, they act, and when they do not desire, they do not; this is verified primarily and above all of their appetite, as in men it is of their will, as the ninth of this book showed more fully. Hence the Philosopher too, in Ethics 3, 5, attributes will to both children and animals, saying, Children and animals share in the voluntary [n8]. Anselm, too, in On Free Choice 5, intimates that the horse has will, as the present chapter recounted above; and further on, at 13, he says: A dog naturally keeps uprightness of will when it loves its puppies, or its master who does it good. There is moreover in beasts perhaps a freedom from the necessity of the fate of the stars. For it seems that if beasts had been created perfect on the first day of the world, before the creation of the stars, they could then have exercised their own natural actions. But because the verification of this seems not to bear much on the knowledge of piety, I leave it to the natural philosophers and astrologers, whom curious study drives harder. There is not in them, however, freedom simply, because it is not with respect to higher causes, namely the first cause, that is, the divine will, any more than in rational creatures, as the fifth and ninth of this book show; nor is there in them freedom from the necessity of nature, as the present chapter showed above. So neither can freedom of contradiction simply be in them, nor with respect to all inferior causes, that is, all secondary causes, as the corollary of the fourth of this book shows. The difference and the agreement of these freedoms with one another I consider clear from what has gone before.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}