De causa Dei: Book III, Chapter 1
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 637B–646B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/3/1/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[637B]
Chapter I. That God can in a certain way necessitate every created will and its free act, and [necessitate it] to free cessation and abstention from act.

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But the Pelagians, pestilential and ungrateful for the manifold grace of God, strive to take away from God the thanks owed to him and the due acts of thanksgiving.[n1] For they deny predestination and divine providence in good and in evil. They also deny God's co-efficiency, and especially his pre-efficiency, together with free choice in its free act and in all merits. They rely chiefly on this motive: that then there would be necessity there, not freedom, and no merit. Other heretics, however, likewise strive to take away from God the due acts of thanksgiving. They say that he does whatever he does from necessity, and nothing gratis, nor by free will. Hence also certain heretics labor to destroy universally free choice, in God as in the creature, and all grace, and every gratuitous and free action. They say that all things that happen happen of necessity. Concerning these, then, and the like, we must henceforth inquire. To meet them, it seems we must investigate diligently whether necessity and freedom, and merit, are incompatible.

First, therefore, it must be shown that God can in a certain way necessitate every created will to its free act, indeed to its most free act, and likewise to cessation and abstention from act. For God can will that a created will produce its free act, and this antecedently, and naturally prior to the created will. So, by 10 of the first,[n2] that will would obey of necessity, and this for as long as God has so willed it to will. For cessation and abstention the reason is wholly the same. Hence Anselm, On Concord 2: "Just as whatever God wills must needs be," he says, "so what a man wills must needs be, in those things which God so subjects to the human will that, if it wills, they happen, and if it does not will, they do not happen."

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For since what God wills cannot fail to be, when he wills that the will of man be constrained or hindered by no necessity toward willing or not willing, and wills that the effect follow the will, then it is necessary that the will be free, and that what it wills come to be. Again, otherwise man could make God false and perjured. Suppose that God proclaims, and affirms by swearing by himself, that this man will freely do this or that, and will do all he can toward it. Then, if this man is not necessitated by God to do this or that freely, he can freely leave this and that undone. Again, otherwise man could frustrate providence and predestination and the divine will, indeed even make our most blessed God wretched. For no one doubts that God could make, provide, predestine and pre-will free human acts and what depends on them. Indeed from eternity he has so done, as 27 of the first and what follows, with 45, prove. The Apostle also plainly attests this in Eph. 2: "We are his handiwork," he says, "created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared that we should walk in them." And the Gloss says the same still more expressly, as the thirty-first of the first has cited more fully.

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Again, every power that is stronger in due proportion can necessitate a weaker one naturally subject to it in any action of its own. The divine, angelic and human wills stand in this relation to one another, as the first supposition and the tenth of the first, with 20 and 30 of the second, attest. Hence the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5, 16, distinguishing the senses of "prior," says:[n3] "Others, namely, are called prior according to power. For what exceeds in power is prior, and what is more powerful. And such is that whose pre-will the other, which is posterior, must follow, so that if the first does not move, the other is not moved, and if the first moves, it is moved; and the pre-will is the principle." Where the translation that Averroes expounds reads thus: "That too which is stronger is called before, and such is that which compels another to follow its will; so that if that which is before is not moved, the other which is after will not be moved, and if it is moved, the other will be moved; and the will is the principle here." On this Averroes says: "Universally, 'before' is said of that which is stronger and more worthy, and it is that which compels what is after, so that the will of the latter follows the will of the former, since the will of the weaker follows the will of the stronger."

Again, arguing further in physical terms, suppose there were only one man and one woman. Then, since the human species cannot fail, nor be preserved without generation, they must necessarily generate voluntarily. Nor can anyone pretend that, although they will necessarily generate voluntarily, yet they will not do so on this occasion, nor on that, and that therefore each of their couplings will be free and subject to no necessity. For suppose that the man or the woman has advanced so far in the days of their life fit for generation (which, according to the Philosopher in book 9 of On Animals, are fifty years in women and seventy in men, or according to Pliny and Solinus eighty in men) that no time remains to them except for a single such act. Then they will at once necessarily perform that one act voluntarily; for without will generation will never happen. And that which will thus constrain them is posited by the Philosophers to be universal nature. By the third of the second, this cannot be called any power of the stars, or of any second causes whatever. It is therefore necessarily the first cause, as 27 of the first showed through philosophical authorities.

And one can similarly argue theologically as well. Suppose there were only one man and one woman before the completion of the number of the elect and predestined by God, a number drawn from the natural propagation of men continuously derived from the first parents. Unless [for][n4] they themselves begot necessarily and voluntarily, the generation of men would cease and God's purpose would be frustrated, contrary to the tenth of the first book. Of Adam also and Eve, before they came together naturally, a similar argument can be made. Again, otherwise God could not necessitate a rational creature to be impeccable and perpetually blessed, contrary to 17 and 15 of the second. Again, Isaiah 40: "Behold," he says, "the nations are reckoned by him as the turn of the scales." The Gloss: in comparison with him, that is, with God; that is, a moment, which from nothing is inclined to either side.[n5] And Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; wherever he wills he will incline it," as the twentieth of the second cited more fully. Blessed Augustine too, in On Grace and Free Choice, having recited this authority of Solomon with many others, concludes thus in chapter 48:[n6] "By these and such testimonies of the divine utterances it is sufficiently made manifest, as far as I judge, that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills wherever he wills, whether to good things out of his mercy, or to evil things according to their deserts." The same in the Enchiridion 77: "Who could be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot turn to good the evil wills of men, which he wills, when he wills, and where he wills?" The same in On the Good of Perseverance 20, how possible it is for God to turn to the faith the wills of men, averse and hostile, and to work in their hearts so that they yield to no adversities and, overcome by no temptation, depart from him.[n7] The same Augustine also says in On Rebuke and Grace 69: "No will resists God when he wills to save a man. For willing or not willing is in the power of the one who wills or does not will in such a way that it fulfils the divine will and does not overcome his power." And further on, throughout the whole of chapter 70 and at the beginning of 71, he teaches the same most plainly and notably, as 20 of the second cited more fully.

Again, otherwise God would not be omnipotent. For even if God did as much as he could so that you would will, or love, something, simply or at a fixed time, you could notwithstanding all this not will the same. For one part of the given time you could will it,[n8] and for another not will it, indeed even nill it. And so you could render God and the man Jesus Christ false, lying, perjured and wretched, as was argued at the beginning. Nor can anyone say that the free acts of the will are not at all contained under God's omnipotence. This is excluded by the tenth of the first, the twentieth and thirtieth of the second, and by the authorities of Augustine just recited. For then they would also in no way be enclosed under divine providence, governance and predestination, contrary to the twenty-seventh with what follows, and to 45 of the first. What, moreover, belongs more worthily to his omnipotence than to preserve his truth inviolable in all things, even in free acts? How, too, does it not belong to his omnipotence to be able to dispose freely of all possible things, natural and free, whatsoever?

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Hence Augustine also says in On Rebuke and Grace 70 that God has a most omnipotent power over human hearts, to incline them wherever it pleases him; and in 71, that God has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves do. Nor is there any doubt that the free acts of the will are the noblest of all, and that some acts are contained under God's omnipotence, and not merely the more ignoble. His infinite nobility forbids this, as do the first supposition of the first and the happiness of the blessed.

But if anyone should wish to say that God can necessitate a man to an act of will, but that once this is done the act will not be free in that way, he can easily be contradicted. For suppose God does this. His will alone suffices for everything that he does outwardly, as the corollary of the tenth of the first teaches, and as is demonstrated through his omnipotence. So God can do this through his will alone, namely without any habit or any created thing whatever (which does not now concur in the man's free willing), and only by willing, or by naturally pre-willing that the man will. And by the thirtieth of the second he now in fact so acts concerning any free act of the will whatsoever.

Again, suppose John elicits a free act A of the will, with second causes B and C that are sufficient and necessarily required. Then God can necessitate John to act A, and this without any other second cause, as is clear from the foregoing, namely only by willing, or by naturally pre-willing. And by the thirtieth of the second he so acted beforehand, when A was free. Therefore God then necessitated John to the free act A of the will. And even if A was then free, by the same reason it is so now; for all things stand altogether in the same way now and then, in all first and second causes. Or suppose further that God necessitates John to an act D similar to A as far as possible, with second causes B and C precisely or altogether similar. This he can do, as the foregoing have proved. Otherwise some second cause, namely that other cause necessarily required, would necessitate the will of man as of a brute, contrary to the third of the second. And A and D will be acts of altogether similar character; for in their first and second causes no diversity can be assigned. So if the one is free, or necessary in any way, both alike will be so.

But if it is said that D is necessary and A free for this reason, that God wills to make them such, the reply will be as follows. If God by so willing necessitates to act D, he does not do this by making act D necessary per se, because it can of itself not be, and because there is only one thing necessary to be per se, namely God himself, as is clear from the seventeenth part of the first corollary of the first of the first. Nor does he do it by any second causes necessitating the created will per se, as nature and object necessitate beasts per se, as was shown above. This, then, is only through the divine will, namely by willing [himself] to necessitate to D, or to make D necessary, as the hypothesis admits. Therefore either God by so willing necessitates to act D absolutely, and renders it necessary absolutely, or only with respect to his willing; that is, so that, that willing standing, it is impossible for it to happen otherwise, or else because it cannot in any way be hindered. The first cannot be said, as no one is ignorant and what has gone before has taught. The second therefore remains. And speaking in this way, the free act A, which God wills to make free, is as necessary with respect to that divine willing as D is with respect to the other. For, that willing standing, it is as impossible for it to happen otherwise, and as impossible for this willing to be hindered in anything, as that other, as 10 of the first teaches. Therefore A, and any most free act of the creature, is as necessary as D is.

Again, let it be supposed, as imaginary or, according to some, as truly possible, that God makes some act of a created will by simply willing to make that act, not willing to make it necessary, nor free. Then by hypothesis it will be neither. Again, if God, by simply willing alone, were to make the acts of irrational animate or inanimate things, they would not be necessary with respect to God, nor with respect to other causes. For no other cause necessitates except through the power, cooperation and co-necessitation of the first cause, which is the first necessary being, as the first and the following chapters of the first teach. Again, if God makes some act of a created will, not willing to necessitate to it but willing simply to bring it about, that act is still necessary with respect to the divine will, because that will cannot be hindered. The first and per se reason, therefore, why something is called necessary with respect to God, or to the divine will, is not that he wills to necessitate to it, but that he is the first cause, universally efficacious, omnipotent, and unable to be hindered.

Hence Stephen, Bishop of Paris, also condemned a certain error which said that, for all effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it is not enough that the first cause itself be unhinderable, but it is required that the intermediate causes be unhinderable.[n9] "An error," says the Bishop, "because then God could not make any effect necessary without posterior causes." Therefore all effects, even free ones, can be necessary with respect to the first cause, because they proceed from his will, which cannot in any way be hindered. Moreover, just as it is necessary that whatever God wills to happen happens, so too it is necessary that whatever happens happens in the way in which God wills it to happen, as the foregoing clearly show.

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Therefore, just as natural effects, being necessary, must necessarily come about necessarily with respect to their second natural causes, by reason of the efficacy of the divine will, so also free effects must come about freely with respect to their lower causes that act freely, by reason of the universal efficacy of the divine will. Therefore all free effects or acts of all lower free agents are necessary with respect to the divine will, just as they are necessarily free and are necessarily produced freely.

Moreover, no created will is freer than the human will of Christ, and his divine will could necessitate it. Indeed it did in fact necessitate it to each and all of his free acts, and to each and all free cessations and abstentions from any act or acts whatever. For if his human will had not necessarily consented to his divine will naturally preceding it, as the thirtieth of the second taught, it could have dissented from it, and willed something else, indeed even the contrary, and sinned. This conflicts, in each of its parts, with what was shown beforehand about Christ in 30 of the second. Hence also John 5: "I cannot do anything of myself; but as I hear, I judge." Christ says this according to that which he is as man, as Augustine attests, as is there more fully cited.

The same about Christ, namely that his human will necessarily followed the divine, Anselm teaches in Why God Became Man 1, 10, and 2, 10.[n10] He shows that Christ could lie if he wished, but could not will to lie, as 30 of the second cited more fully. And in Why God Became Man 2, 17, he shows that God had power to preserve his life so that he would never die, although he could not will that. Therefore, by the same reason, he could not will anything that his divine will had not predisposed him to will, or the opposite of which it had disposed concerning him. Hence further on in the same chapter he says: "If you wish to know the true necessity of all that he did and suffered, know that all was from necessity, because he himself willed it; but no necessity preceded his will." No necessity, I say, preceded his divine will, but (it did) the human,[n11] as was cited from the same Anselm from 10 of the first. This, then, is the opinion of Christ, Augustine, Anselm, Damascene, and the Lombard, as the premises in this chapter and 30 of the second declare. Nor have I seen any of the Doctors holding the contrary. This opinion therefore seems sufficiently certain.

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COROLLARY.

Corollary: that some necessity and freedom, and merit, and chance and fortune, do not conflict with one another; and on the general concord of fate, foreknowledge, predestination and grace with free choice and merit.

From this it is made manifest that necessity and freedom, necessity also and any merit whatever, and necessity moreover and chance and fortune, do not conflict with one another. Hence the general concord of fate, foreknowledge, predestination and grace with free choice and merit is also plainly recognized. For the principal conclusion shows the first part of this most clearly, and the second is shown from this first; it can also be proved by the same means by which the principal conclusion is proved. Again, according to the Philosopher, Peri hermeneias 1, last chapter: it is necessary that what is, be, when it is [n12]; and some free and meritorious act now is; therefore it is necessary that it now be. Again, in God and in the confirmed Angels there is necessity as to many acts of the will, and the greatest freedom. Again Augustine, Enchiridion 86 [n13], speaks thus: "It was first necessary for man to be made so that he could will both well and ill. Afterwards, however, it will be such that he will not be able to will ill, nor will he for that reason lack free choice; indeed that choice will be far freer which will be altogether unable to serve sin. For neither is that will to be blamed, or is it no will, or is it to be called not free, by which we so wish to be well that we not only do not wish to be wretched, but can in no way at all will it." The same author, City of God 5, 10, after first arguing against the Stoics who say that our wills are not subject to necessity (because then they would not be free), answers their argument by distinguishing necessity in two ways. He shows that one necessity is unwilling, which takes away or removes freedom, and another voluntary, which is compatible with freedom. Whence in chapter 9 he also says: "However the twisted contests and disputes of the Philosophers may stand, we, as we confess the highest and true God, so confess his divine will, and his highest power and foreknowledge. Nor do we fear that we may not act by will what we act by will, because he foreknew that we would do it, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived. This Cicero feared, so as to attack foreknowledge; and the Stoics feared it, so as to say that not all things come about by necessity, though they contended that all things come about by fate," whom he refutes in what follows.

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And in chapter 10 he adds: "Nor is that necessity to be feared, from fear of which the Stoics labored to distinguish the causes of things so as to withdraw some from necessity and subject others. Among those which they would not have under necessity they placed even our wills, lest, that is, they should not be free if they were subjected to necessity." And he adds, distinguishing: "For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power but, even if we do not wish it, effects what it can, as is the necessity of death, it is manifest that our wills, by which we live rightly or wrongly, are not under such necessity. For we do many things which, if we did not will them, we would certainly not do, and to this willing itself belongs first of all: for if we will, it is; if we do not will, it is not; for we would not will, if we did not will." And for the second member he adds: "But if necessity is defined as that according to which we say it is necessary that something be so, or come about so, I do not know why we should fear it, lest it take away the freedom of the will from us. For neither do we place the life of God and the foreknowledge of God under necessity" (namely in the first way), "if we say that it is necessary that God always live and foreknow all things, just as his power is not diminished when it is said that he cannot die, and cannot be deceived." Whence also Josephus, Antiquities 18, 2, treating of the four sects of the Philosophers among the Jews, one of which was that of the Pharisees, says that they were the first, because they are reckoned better than the rest, and that these, as he says, believe that all things are done by fate. Yet they do not take away man's free choice, although fate implies necessity, as 28 of the first showed. And the same Josephus, Jewish War 7, 8, says that men cannot avoid fate, even if they have foreseen it.

It is clear, therefore, that necessity and freedom do not conflict at all; hence neither will necessity and merit conflict, which can also be shown otherwise. Suppose that God were to confirm some wayfarer to do freely all the good things which he will do here on the way, the man himself being wholly ignorant of it, just as the good Angels are confirmed to do their good deeds knowingly. Then such a man would do good things and do them well, because as voluntarily and as freely, as far as lies in him, as another wayfarer not confirmed at all; therefore also as meritoriously. This is also confirmed by an evident example. For suppose that some hidden force so accompanies, without his knowing it, a man going devoutly to Mass, that he cannot stop, delay or turn aside. Then such a man goes thus of necessity, and yet merits no less than he would if that aforesaid force were wholly removed. But lest I seem to beg an example of this kind from outside Sacred Scripture, suppose someone holding a rod or staff, wishing and intending to strike his neighbor rashly, but not able to by his own strength, and let such a blow be struck by some hidden force that directs him so powerfully that he cannot resist at all; yet he himself does not think so, but the contrary. Then he sins just as if he struck by his own power; and so of any free acts whatever. That in all free acts it not only could be so, but is so in fact, the Lord himself shows sufficiently, Isaiah 10: "Woe to Assur, the rod of my fury, and he is the staff; in their hand is my indignation [n14]. I will send him to a deceitful nation, and against the people of my fury I will command him, to take spoils and seize plunder, and to set it to be trodden down like the mire of the streets. But he will not think so, nor will his heart so reckon; rather it will be in his heart to crush, and to destroy many nations. For he will say, Are not my princes together kings?" etc. And below: "As my hand has found the kingdoms of the idol, so also the images of them, of Jerusalem and Samaria. Shall I not do to Jerusalem and its images as I did to Samaria and its idols?" And there follows the threat of punishment with the expression of guilt: "And it shall be, when the Lord has fulfilled all his works on Mount Sion and in Jerusalem, I will visit the fruit of the proud heart of the king of Assur, and the glory of the haughtiness of his eyes. For he said, By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom I have understood, and I have removed the boundaries of the peoples, and plundered their princes. Shall the axe glory against him who cuts with it? or shall the saw exalt itself against him who draws it? As if the rod should be raised against him who raises it, and the staff be exalted, which is of course wood? Therefore the ruler, God of hosts, shall send leanness among his fat ones, and beneath, glory — or, otherwise, his glory — shall burn, kindled, like the burning of fire" [n15]. On this the Gloss says: "Just as these are merely inanimate instruments, doing nothing of themselves but through him who moves them, so neither did Sennacherib act of himself, but by the power of God; hence his boasting too is foolish and worthy of punishment."

From this, therefore, it is clearly seen that although someone does some good or evil of necessity, yet if he does it in ignorance and freely, as far as lies in him, he merits or sins. Whence Theophilus, as cited in the Gloss on Luke 22, "The Son of man goes according to what has been determined," says thus: "Not as though unable to protect himself, but as determining death for himself for the sake of human salvation. But because Judas did what was written with a wicked intention, lest anyone think him innocent, as a minister of the dispensation, he adds, Nevertheless woe to that man by whom he shall be betrayed." Isidore agrees with this, as cited in the Gloss on Luke 24, "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things?" etc.: but if it was necessary [oportuit] that Christ suffer, yet those who crucified him are liable to punishment; for they were not eager to accomplish what God was arranging, whence their execution was impious.

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With these the authority of Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 27 [n16], also plainly agrees, with many similar ones more fully cited in 32 of the first. And reason plainly teaches that a good or evil act done by someone freely, as far as lies in him, though not wholly freely, ought to be counted to him as free merit, because it is so in all other human acts, good or evil, just or unjust. For one who says what is true, yet wishing and believing that he lies, is guilty of a lie; and conversely. Whence Augustine, Enchiridion 12: "No one who says what is false, which he thinks true, is rightly to be judged a liar, since, as far as lies in him, he does not deceive but is rather deceived. Conversely, as far as lies in him, he lies who says what is true, which he thinks false: for as far as his mind is concerned, because he does not say what he thinks, he does not speak truly, even though what he says is found to be true. Nor is he in any way free of lying who with his mouth unknowingly speaks the truth, but knowingly lies by will. Therefore, when the things themselves about which something is said are not considered, but only the intention of the speaker, better is he who unknowingly says what is false, because he thinks it true, than he who knowingly has a mind to lie, not knowing that what he says is true." Likewise one who wishes to kill someone, and does as far as lies in him what is needed to kill, is truly called a homicide. Whence 1 John 3: "Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer." In this manner the Apostle speaks in Hebrews 6, saying that those once enlightened and then fallen away are crucifying the Son of God afresh for themselves. Thus speaks blessed Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, an outstanding Doctor and Martyr, in letter 3, entitled On the Lapsed. Thus also Augustine speaks in letter 14 to Boniface [n17], citing and reciting Cyprian's words in sequence and expounding them: "Rightly," he says, "are parents, or any elders whatever, who try to bind their sons or any baptized little children to the sacrileges of demons, called spiritual murderers. For in those who do not commit the killing, but have been murderers as far as lies in them, it is rightly said, when they are prevented from this crime, 'Do not kill your little ones.' For the Apostle also says, 'Do not quench the Spirit,' not because he can be quenched, but because those who so act as to wish him quenched are deservedly called, as far as lies in them, his quenchers. In this sense what the most blessed Cyprian wrote in the letter on the lapsed can rightly be understood, when he rebukes those who in time of persecution had sacrificed to idols: 'And lest anything be lacking,' he says, 'to the heap of the crime, infants also, placed in their parents' hands or dragged along, lost, little ones, what they had obtained in the very first beginning of their birth.' 'They lost it,' he said, as far as it concerned the crime of those by whom they were forced to lose it; they lost it in the mind and will of those who committed so great a deed upon them. For if they had lost it in themselves, they would certainly have remained to be condemned by the divine sentence without any defense. But if holy Cyprian thought so, he would not immediately append their defense, saying, 'Will they not, when the day of judgment comes, say, We did nothing; nor, having abandoned the food and cup of the Lord, did we hasten of our own accord to profane contagions? Another's treachery destroyed us; we found our parents parricides: they denied to us the Church as mother, they denied God as father; so that while, small and unforeseeing and ignorant of so great a deed, we are joined by others into partnership in the crime, we were caught by another's fraud.' He would not append this defense unless he believed it most just, and that it would profit the little ones in God's judgment. For if the plea is made, 'We did nothing; the soul that has sinned, it shall itself die,' then neither shall those perish under God's just judgment whom their parents, as far as it concerns themselves, destroyed by their own crime."

Likewise one who wishes and does, as far as lies in him, that he know another man's wife, yet knows his own wife believed to be another's, is condemned as guilty of adultery. Whence Matthew 5: "Everyone who has looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." In the same way one who wishes to know his own wife and unwittingly knows another's, or his own wife's sister believed to be his own wife, is excused from the crime, as the canon attests, not only about this but about many similar cases, and the Lombard, as the first of the first has more fully recounted [n18]. Again, by 10 of the first, no one can act simply against the divine will; and by the same 10 together with 22 of the same first, it is necessary that everyone always act in conformity with the divine will; therefore no one merits or sins unless by freely doing, as far as lies in him, what is conformable or disconformable to the divine will. Whence Augustine, Enchiridion 80: "These," he says, "are the great works of the Lord, searched out according to all his wills, and so wisely searched out that when the angelic and human creature had sinned, that is, had done not what he willed but what it itself willed, he fulfilled what he himself willed even through that same will of the creature, by which was done what the Creator did not will, making good use even of the evil, as one supremely good [n19], for the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment, and for the salvation of those whom he kindly predestined to grace. For as far as concerns themselves, they did what God did not will; but as far as concerns the omnipotence of God, they could in no way bring it about." The same, book 22 Against Faustus: "A man becomes unjust when he loves for their own sake things that are to be taken up for the sake of something else, and desires for another's sake things that are to be loved for their own sake. For thus, as far as lies in him, he disturbs in himself the natural order which the eternal law commands to be preserved." Agreeing with him, Anselm, Cur Deus homo 1, 15, says thus: "Nothing can be added to or taken from the honor of God, as far as it pertains to him; for he himself is to himself an incorruptible honor, in no way changeable."

[642E–643E]
"But when each creature keeps its own order, laid down as if for itself as a precept, whether naturally or rationally, it is said to obey God and to honor him; and this most of all the rational nature, to which it is given to understand what it ought, and which, when it wills what it ought, honors God, not because it confers anything on him, but because it freely subjects itself to his will and disposition, and preserves, as far as lies in it, its own order in the universe of things, and the beauty of that same universe. But when it does not will what it ought, it dishonors God, as far as it pertains to it, since it does not freely subject itself to his disposition, and disturbs, as far as lies in itself, the order and beauty of the universe. Yet this it cannot do absolutely, as he shows in the same chapter in what follows, by leading to two impossibilities. The first is that, if it were so, there would come about in the universe itself, which God must order, a certain deformity in its beauty, arising from violence done to order. The second is that God would seem to fail in his disposition. These two, he says, as they are inconvenient, so are impossible." But in another way, more briefly and perhaps more easily, this same thing can still be shown likewise thus. For it is doubtful to no Philosopher or Theologian that a man merits or sins for this reason, that in the state of meriting and of sinning he knowingly, voluntarily, freely and of his own accord consents, wills and does good or evil; but he can do this, and so, even though he does this or that of necessity, as the foregoing attest.

Whence also William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris, in his tripartite work [n20], of which the first principal part is on faith and laws, the second on virtues, the third on vices and sins, in the last part, chapter 10, after reciting the error of those who say that man cannot sin because he has a necessity or impossibility of doing or not doing whatever he does or does not do (wherefore, as they argue, he has neither free choice, nor blame, nor praise), and after refuting them, answering their argument, says: "On this account," he says, "we used to distinguish that one necessity is that of violence, and imposed; and whatever is done by it is to be imputed not to the one acting but to the one inflicting violence; indeed that to which violence is done is to be called no agent, but rather the thing that inflicts the violence is the agent, as in the case of a mill wheel. And the second is the necessity of stability and immutability, such as we say is the necessity of God, by which he is immutably good; and whatever holds by this necessity, it is necessary that he always act well, and the contrary is impossible [n21]; and this necessity does not take away freedom but perfects it. The third necessity is extraneous or extrinsic, which some call necessity per accidens; and we make the same distinctions about impossibilities, and in this way some things about the past are called necessary or impossible, as that you have eaten and done whatever you did. There is also a fourth necessity, which Aristotle calls determinate, as that Socrates sits while he sits; and perhaps it can be referred to the necessity we called extraneous. For as it is necessary that you have done what you did, because time does not admit a change of return or recall, so also that Socrates sit while he sits; wherefore the flow of time is the cause of both necessity and impossibility. The necessity of violence, when the violence has been against the will, makes one blameless; but we call necessity, or impossibility, or even violence 'against the will' when it is neither desired, nor procured, nor tolerated, nor neglected." And below, in 11 of the same: "According to the error of those who say that all things happen of necessity, it is not necessary that for this reason no one can sin, or act well. This appears from what we have said about necessity and impossibility, namely which of them, and when, and how far, excuse from blame and obligation. We have shown that the necessity by which it is necessary that God always act well, and the impossibility by which it is impossible that he act ill, in no way prevent or impede either from being done well and laudably. And this is because they neither violently impel him to act well, nor violently impede him or turn him from acting ill, nor does that impossibility resist or contradict his will in any of the ways. So the necessity of celestial power or of fate, which according to them it is impossible to avert or impede, and which, as they suppose, also moves human souls (moves them, I say, to the thoughts and affections that are in them, and through these to operations and to turnings aside of works), since it does not move them violently but voluntarily, does not excuse human souls from sins and faults. And this is because, from whatever principle a voluntary work is done, provided it is voluntary, that is, willed [volutum] [n22] in any of the three ways we have described (that is, either desired, or tolerated, or neglected), it is always to be imputed to the one willing and acting by will. Nor does it follow, 'If he cannot do otherwise, or even will otherwise, he is for this reason excused,' because he neither wishes to be able to do otherwise, or to do otherwise, nor wishes anything else. For this reason Seneca says [n23] that every sin is so voluntary because, if it is not voluntary, it is not sin. Therefore a necessity or impossibility which does not take away from the work that it be voluntary, that is, one that comes from a necessity which it is impossible should not be free, takes away from that same work neither blame nor merit.

[643E–644E]
In truth, however, if the whole of what moves our souls were outside us, and we had no motive principle of our works within us or in us, the whole would seem to be attributable to the extrinsic mover, or to the movers, if there were several. Therefore it would not be imputable to us either for praise or for blame, nor likewise for merit or for fault; for neither the one nor the other would, on this supposition, be in our power. For since our wills, and the turnings toward or restraints of those wills, would come from the sole mover who is outside us, and such a mover is in no way in our power, they would not be in our power, nor would they be in us as our actions and works, but only as passions from an extrinsic agent. We should be merely receivers of such impressions and in no way agents, so that we should act neither well nor ill, but celestial power or fate would do all these things that seem to be our actions, and we should be merely instruments of celestial power and fate. But it is manifest that to an instrument the operation which is done through it is not to be imputed, for praise or blame, fault or merit. So the motion of a mill wheel, in its various respects, neither as to its essence nor as to slowness or speed, can be blamably imputed to the wheel itself, but only to the water that drives and turns it. Therefore it is manifest that if celestial power or fate, or any other extrinsic mover, were to move human souls to willing or not willing, it does not take away from them dominion and rule, or authority over their wills and actions, since they can inflict neither force, nor violence, nor compulsion upon them for these things. And this is because of the freedom and imperiousness of the will, on account of which it neither endures compulsion nor is receptive in any way of it.

From these things it evidently appears that although someone has been necessitated to do something good or evil, yet if he is ignorant of that necessitation, and does it voluntarily and freely, as far as lies in him, he merits. But because ignorance is not of itself a cause of meriting, nor is merit necessarily consequent upon it, someone can merit by doing something, not in ignorance but truly knowing that he is necessitated to do it. For if ignorance were necessarily required in advance for merit, it would be its essential cause, as is taught by the fourth and the thirteenth of the first. For every effect is posited, or can be posited, when all and only its essential causes are posited; but ignorance is not any essential cause of merit, as induction shows; and ignorance itself is a pure privation and nothing, so that it causes no real thing. And by the eighteenth of the second of this work, merit is a truly existing thing. Therefore, with the aforesaid ignorance removed, and all the essential causes of merit standing, there will be merit as before; especially because the habit opposed to ignorance, that is, knowledge, does not conflict formally with merit, nor with any other positive thing necessarily concurring with such merit. So it also seems that the essential and per se ground of meriting is this: being meritive [n24], if I may so speak, that is, apt to do something moral freely, as far as lies in him, or simply freely, that is, voluntarily or spontaneously. I have put "meritive" to mark the difference from God and from the saints perfectly confirmed, as they will be after the final judgment, who can do such a thing and so without meriting, because they are not, and will not be, apt for meriting. And this seems very consonant with reason. For if someone, though knowingly necessitated to do something for a friend, does it for him not unwillingly, as if compelled by necessity, but, as far as lies in him, freely and wholly spontaneously and devoutly and with most willing love, it seems that reason requires and gratitude compels that the one benefited return some thanks to his benefactor [n25], or at least repay some grateful effect; for the very force of gratitude, in its inmost part, does not permit him to be to him [n26] as other men are, as the Gentile and the Publican, who never loved him freely, never wished him good, nor ever did him the least kindness.

All this is demonstrated most clearly in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was in a certain manner necessitated to all his meritorious works, as the present chapter showed, yet not in ignorance but distinctly knowing, as no Christian doubts. This he himself also expressly attests, saying, "I cannot," "do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge," John 5; which he said of himself according to his human nature, as the thirtieth of the second alleges. Whence Anselm, Cur Deus homo 2, 5, dividing necessity in two, according to Augustine's distinction set out above, shows that one kind implies prohibition or compulsion, and renders the one necessitated unwilling ; and the other implies none of these, but only the immutability of the spontaneous will. The first, as he says, takes away thanks and merit from the doer ; but the second does not take them away, but is compatible with them and increases them. There, to the point, he first asks: "How shall we impute our salvation to his free gift [gratis], if he saves us by necessity?" [n27] And he answers at once: "There is a necessity which takes away or diminishes the thanks due to the benefactor, and there is a necessity by which greater thanks are owed for the benefit. For when someone does good unwillingly, by the necessity to which he is subject, either no thanks or less is owed him. But when he himself of his own accord subjects himself to the necessity of doing good, and does not bear it unwillingly, then surely he deserves greater thanks for the benefit. For this is not to be called necessity, but grace, because he took it up, or keeps it, with no one compelling, but freely."

[644E–645C]
"For if what today you freely promise to give tomorrow, you give tomorrow with the same will, though it be necessary for you tomorrow to render what you promised, if you can, or else to lie [n28], yet he to whom you give owes you no less for the benefit bestowed than if you had not promised, since you were not necessitated to make yourself his debtor before the time of giving. Such is the case when someone of his own accord vows a purpose of holy way of life. For although after the vow he ought to keep it by necessity, lest he incur the damnation of an apostate, and although he could be compelled to keep it if he were unwilling, yet if he keeps what he vowed not unwillingly, he is no less but more pleasing to God than if he had not vowed, since for God's sake he has denied himself not only the common life but even the licence of it. Nor is he to be said to live holily by necessity, but by the same freedom by which he vowed." And he recites the same distinction in the tenth and the seventeenth, where he also shows at length that Christ did and suffered whatever he did and suffered by this second necessity [n29]. Whence he also says that God-man was unable to will to preserve his life so as never to die, and since he had this from himself, namely that he could not will it, not by necessity but by free power he laid down his life; and this he also demonstrates in what follows, by the impossible and ostensively [n30]. First by the impossible, in this way: Christ was able not to die; therefore the faith of the blessed Virgin and of the ancient saints, by which they believed that Christ would suffer, and in which faith they were cleansed from sin, could then have been false, always before; and if it had been false, it would have cleansed no one. Therefore it could be, at that time, that the blessed Virgin and the ancient saints had never before been cleansed, although it was then true of the past that they had been cleansed. Secondly he demonstrates this ostensively, arguing from the contrary, in this way: at the time of Christ incarnate and not yet suffered, it was true of the past, and necessary, that the blessed Virgin and the ancient saints had been cleansed in a faith not feigned but true, of Christ's future passion; therefore it was then necessary that Christ suffer. For if the antecedent is necessary, the consequent will likewise be, as he supposes, which the Philosopher shows in Prior Analytics 1. For otherwise, from what is true something false would follow at some time. For if the consequent were not necessary, it would either be false or could become false. Therefore, according to Anselm, as necessary as it was, at the time of Christ incarnate and not yet suffered, that the blessed Virgin and the ancient saints had been cleansed, so necessary was it that Christ would suffer, in the second mode of necessity, not the first. Whence among other things he says thus: "He was truly going to die, since if he had not truly been going to die, there would have been no true faith of his future death, by which both that Virgin, of whom he was born, and many others were cleansed from sin. For if it had not been true, it could have profited nothing. Wherefore, if he could not die, he could make not true what was true." Then, asking why it was true, before he died, that he was going to die, and the disciple answering that he himself freely willed it, and with an immutable will, Anselm adds: "If then, as you say, he could not not die for this reason, that he was truly going to die, and he was truly going to die for this reason, that he himself freely and immutably willed it, it follows that for no other reason was he unable not to die than that with an immutable will he willed to die." And a little after he says thus: "When we say that that man, who, according to the unity of the person, as was said above, is the same as the Son of God, God, was unable not to die, or to will not to die, after

[645D–645E]
…was born of the Virgin, no inability to preserve his life or to will to preserve his life immortal is signified in him. What is signified is the immutability of his will, by which he of his own accord made himself man for this purpose, that persevering in the same will he should die, and because nothing could change that will. For it would be more an inability than a power if he could will to lie, or to deceive, or to change a will which he had previously willed to be immutable.[n31] And as I said above, when someone of his own accord proposes to do some good, and afterwards carries out by the same will what he proposed, then even though he could be compelled to discharge the promise if he were unwilling, he is still not to be said to do what he does by necessity. He does it by the free will with which he proposed it. For a thing ought not to be said to happen or not to happen by necessity or inability where neither necessity nor inability brings anything about, but will does. If this is so in a man, then much more are necessity and inability in no way to be named in God, who does nothing except what he wills, and whose will no force can compel or prohibit. Finally, the Virgin, who was made pure through faith so that he could be taken from her, in no way believed that he would die, except because he would will it. She had learned this through the Prophet, who said of him, "He was offered because he himself willed it."[n32] Since her faith was true, therefore, it was necessary that it should be as she believed. Reading and rereading this book of Anselm, the Christian Philosopher, with care, I dare to assert that it was his settled conviction that Christ suffered, and did whatever he did, by the second necessity described, not the first.[n33] There is no doubt that Christ merited abundantly in both ways. Hence, according to the same Anselm, there is no doubt either that known necessity and merit do not conflict. Lombard seems to bear the same witness. In Sentences II, distinctions 5 and 11, he says that the confirmed holy angels progress continually in meriting.[n34] In Sentences IV, distinction 45, he says that the angels know what is in the will of God, and will it themselves, for they are so devoted to the heavenly will that they can will nothing beyond his will.

[646A–646B]
[n35] Nor is it likely that the angels themselves are ignorant of that necessity, when we ignorant men know it. Again, you know that you are now meriting; let this be supposed. And you know, according to the Philosopher, On Interpretation 1, the last chapter, that what is, when it is, necessarily is.[n36] You therefore know that you necessarily merit now; hence you also know that known necessity and merit do not conflict. The first of those demonstrations, then, which showed through ignorance that necessity and merit do not conflict, is a demonstration of knowledge only.[n37] For it is neither propter quid nor quia, since it proceeds neither from cause to effect nor the reverse. Yet it makes the truth known more openly and more easily. The second is propter quid, because it proceeds from the cause. The third, that is, the last argument, is a demonstration quia only, because it is taken from the effect. Averroes touches briefly on these three demonstrations on Physics 8, 58, though in other words.[n38] The third part of the corollary is clear from the first, together with the twenty-ninth of the first.[n39] Its fourth part, which labors to reconcile fate, foreknowledge, predestination, and grace with free choice and merit, follows evidently from the first and second. For the only reason they seem to be in discord is that the former are believed to import necessity and the latter freedom. But these do not conflict with one another; they stand together in harmony, the aforesaid parts bearing witness.

NOTES

1. The sentence plays on gratia: gratiae Dei ingrati (ungrateful for God's grace), debitas gratias (the thanks owed; also "graces due"), gratiarum actiones (acts of thanksgiving), and nihil gratis in the next sentence. English keeps "ungrateful," "grace," "thanks" and "gratis." It cannot give gratias debitas both senses at once.
2. "10 of the first," "the tenth of the first," "20 and 30 of the second," and similar forms are Bradwardine's cross-references to his own chapters of Book I (primi) and Book II (secundi). "Corollary of the tenth of the first" is the corollary to I.10. They are left as Savile gives them (Conventions §5.4).
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics Δ 11 (1019a2–4). The "5, 16" is the numbering of the medieval Latin text with Averroes's commentary. Praevoluntas is the Latin rendering of Aristotle's prohairesis (choice). It is translated literally as "pre-will," which also matches Bradwardine's own praevelle, "to pre-will."
4. Savile prints Nisi[enim]. The brackets are kept. The sentence construes with nisi ("unless") alone, and [for] is a redundant insertion.
5. Momentum staterae (Vulgate Is 40:15) is the smallest weight that tips the scale. The Gloss reads momentum as that which, from nothing, inclines the balance either way. "Turn" and "moment" cannot carry both senses together. In Savile's margin at this place Isaiah, the Gloss, Proverbs and Augustine are cited. The keyed Latin gives these four entries no anchors, so they are listed without markers.
6. These three Augustine passages appear in modern numbering at De gratia et libero arbitrio 21 (§§42–43); Enchiridion 98; and De correptione et gratia 14 (§§43–45). Savile's chapter numbers (48; 77; 69–71) belong to an older division. De bono perseverantiae is the older title of De dono perseverantiae.
7. Savile prints ab illo aliquo tentatione; aliquo is a misprint for aliqua. The sense given is the evident one: "overcome by any temptation, depart from him."
8. Illam is feminine and has no feminine antecedent in the sentence (quippiam is neuter). The margin variant illud would agree. The main reading construes if illam is taken as "that volition," so the main reading is kept and illam is rendered "it."
9. Bradwardine refers to the Paris condemnation of 1277 under Bishop Stephen Tempier. I have not checked the article against the editions. "An error, says the Bishop" is Bradwardine's own reporting of the condemnation.
10. Savile prints "2ⁱ. 10." (keyed 2i. 10.) with a superscript or stray mark after the 2. I take it as Cur Deus homo 2, 10; the numeral is doubtful in the print.
11. The Latin is elliptical: sed humanam. The sense is that a necessity did precede his human will, as Anselm was cited in 10 of the first.
12. De interpretatione 9, 19a23 ("it is necessary that what is, be, when it is"); Bradwardine's "1 … last" is the last chapter of Book I in the Latin division. Savile's variant omne ("that everything which is …") is not adopted.
13. Bradwardine's chapter numbers for the Enchiridion do not follow the modern division. The passage "Prius oportebat hominem fieri" is Enchiridion 105 and "Magna opera Domini" is Enchiridion 100. I keep his numbers (§5.4).
14. Vulgate Isa 10:5: "et baculus ipse est; in manu eorum indignatio mea." The Latin as printed has no punctuation; I follow the Vulgate sense, so "he is the staff" is a separate clause.
15. The words "et subtus gloria, seu alias gloriam eius" carry a doubled reading (gloria / gloriam), a variant incorporated into the text. I give both, as the Latin does; Vulgate has "et subtus gloriam eius".
16. "Aug. 83. q. 27": Augustine's De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 27. "83" is the work's title-number, not a chapter. I have not checked the question number.
17. Cyprian's De lapsis (Bradwardine: "epist. 3 intitulata de lapsis"). Augustine's letter to Boniface on infant baptism, which quotes it, is Ep. 98 in the modern numbering; Savile prints "14".
18. "primum primi": Bradwardine's usual form for a cross-reference ("the first of the first"), presumably Book I, chapter 1. Kept without expansion (§5.4).
19. The print has tanquam summe bonis. That would make the evil ones used "as supremely good ones", which does not suit Augustine's sense. The sentence needs summe bonus, "as one supremely good", i.e. God using even evil well, and I translate so. The misprint does not alter the argument.
20. William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (d. 1249). Bradwardine's "tripartito" evidently designates the three-part work described (faith and laws; virtues; vices and sins). I have not tried to match it to a modern title.
21. The Latin is compressed ("quicquid est hac necessitate, necesse est ipsum bene agere semper"). I read it as "whatever holds by this necessity, it is necessary that he always act well."
22. volutum is Bradwardine's participle for what is the object of volutio, "willing" (Conventions §3). I render it "willed", glossing once with the Latin.
23. The saying that sin is so voluntary that if it is not voluntary it is not sin is Augustine's (De vera religione 14.27), but Bradwardine's text, as printed, gives it to Seneca. Translated as printed.
24. meritiuum is a coinage; Bradwardine himself apologizes ("vt sic loquar"). I keep a parallel English coinage, "meritive."
25. In this passage gratia, gratus, gratitudo and gratis are played off against each other. The jingle cannot be kept in English. Gratiam referre is "to return thanks"; gratissimo amore is "most willing love" (literally, "most welcome"); gratis is "freely"; and in Anselm's last sentence below gratia is both "thanks" and "grace" (§5.5).
26. The pronouns sibi and eum are ambiguous. I take both to refer to the benefactor: gratitude forbids the beneficiary to be to him as the Gentile and the Publican are to those who do them good (cf. Matt 5:46–47).
27. The print's eius gratis is awkward; one expects eius gratiae, "to his grace". I translate the evident sense and keep the gratis of the print, which anticipates Anselm's answer that follows.
28. The clause "si potes, aut mentiri" is elliptical; I follow the print's punctuation and translate "if you can, or else to lie".
29. Savile's margin names Augustine here, but the sentence is still reporting Anselm (Cur Deus homo II, chapters 10 and 17, continuing the report of II.5). Augustine's distinction is the one set out above, from City of God 5. I keep Savile's margin as printed.
30. per impossibile is a reductio argument. ostensiue is a direct (positive) demonstration. I keep both as terms.
31. The passage from "Cum dicimus quod homo ille" through this point is Anselm, Cur Deus homo II.17, quoted with slight abridgment. The sentence begun in the preceding block ("When we say that that man … could not die, or will not to die, after he was born of the Virgin") is completed here.
32. Isaiah 53:7 in the Vulgate: oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Anselm cites it in Cur Deus homo II.17.
33. "First necessity" and "second necessity" are the two necessities distinguished earlier in this corollary: the first is antecedent, the second consequent (concomitant). The consequent necessity is the one that follows from a thing's being or being willed, and Bradwardine takes it to be compatible with free willing and merit. The distinction is used again at the head of chapter 2.
34. Lombard, Sent. II, d. 5 and d. 11, on the angels; IV, d. 45, on the knowledge of the blessed. Savile prints the distinction numbers as Bradwardine gave them; I have not altered them.
35. The sentence "nec est verisimile quod ipsi Angeli…" in the Latin is continuous with the preceding quotation of Lombard, and the page turn falls in the middle of the word ipsi ("ip-si"). The break between blocks is mine.
36. Aristotle, De Interpretatione 9 (19a23–24). Savile's "1. peri hermenias vlt." means the last chapter of Book 1 in the medieval division. Following the convention for such references, I give Savile's numbering.
37. Demonstratio cognitionis tantummodo: a demonstration that establishes only our knowledge, as distinct from demonstratio propter quid (from cause to effect) and demonstratio quia (from effect to cause). Bradwardine says it is neither of the two, since it works from our ignorance and not from the causal order. I keep the Scholastic terms as terms.
38. Averroes, Commentary on Physics VIII. I take Savile's "58" to be the comment number, but have not checked it against a modern edition.
39. "The twenty-ninth of the first" refers to the twenty-ninth part of the first corollary. This is a cross-reference kept as Bradwardine wrote it (Conventions §5.4).