De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 9
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 498A–499B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/9/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[498A]
CHAPTER IX. That neither man nor angel, with however great a grace before the fall, could persevere finally, or even for a time, without another special help of God.

[498B–498D]
Having shown that man after the fall, though restored by grace, cannot persevere finally, or even for a time, by the strength of free choice alone, or even of any created grace whatever, without another help of God, it remains to show next that neither man nor angel before the fall, supported by however great a created grace, could so persevere finally, or even for an hour. This will be shown in like manner by the reasons that showed the principal conclusion of the preceding chapter.

Again, if free choice in grace before the fall were able to persevere in this way, it would likewise be able to overcome any temptation and guard against any sin. Since after the fall it is not infinitely weaker (for it would then have lost all its strength entirely), it could now also, with as much grace as it had then, overcome some temptation: a temptation weaker by exactly as much as free choice is now weaker than before, as due proportionality clearly proves. This is contrary to the fourth chapter of this second book.

Or again, to the same effect: by as much as free choice has been weakened through the fall, by so much let it have greater grace, so that the same proportion is always preserved, etc., as before.

And if someone wished to answer by saying that before the fall there was no difficulty at all in resisting the tempter, whereas after the fall there is always some difficulty, so that the argument does not go through: on the contrary, that answer recoils on him. For if free choice, by its own strength, or with grace but without another help of God, was then able to resist every temptation without any difficulty, it could do so now, though with some difficulty. Difficulty by no means rules out the whole possibility of free choice, nor does it entail impossibility; if it did, the thing would never be called difficult, but impossible. For the powers of free choice, though weakened and resisting with some difficulty, still exceed the powers of some temptation or tempter.

Many saints, moreover, in this present state, are believed to have overcome very many temptations without any difficulty or distress, indeed with great ease and joy; and many sins by which they were in no way tempted they guarded against without any difficulty, indeed with the greatest ease. Nor is it at all perfectly clear that angel or man before the fall had no difficulty whatever. It would seem astonishing if man could then move every weight, whatever its kind, without any difficulty, indeed with equal ease. It seems no less amazing if he could then have distinguished every letter or colour, in any light whatever, strong or faint, and at any distance, great or small, without any difficulty, uncertainty or error, indeed with equal ease, certainty and verification. I leave these matters, however, to a more eager inquirer, and pursue what I have begun.

Holy Augustine, then, speaking of man before the fall in Enchiridion 88 [n1], says this: "Man was made upright in such a way that he could remain in the same uprightness, though not without divine help, and could become perverse by his own choice."

[498E–499B]
The same author on the same subject, in On Rebuke and Grace 48, says: "God had then given man a good will; in it he had made him upright. He had given the help without which he could not remain in it, even if he wished." And in chapter 49, concerning man and angel before the fall: "If this help," he says, "had been lacking either to the angel or to the man when they were first made, since their nature had not been made such that it could remain without divine help if it wished, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault; for the help would have been lacking without which they could not remain." And further on in the same place: "The first man did not need grace in order to receive the good, because he had not yet lost it; but in order to remain in it he needed the help of grace, without which he could not possibly do so."

The same Augustine, in On Nature and Grace 50, after reciting the arguments of someone who strove to show by a topic from similarity that not sinning is placed in our power [n2], says: "Just as these similitudes are false, so is that for the sake of which he wanted to use them. For he goes on and says, 'In like manner, then, the possibility of not sinning is to be understood in this way: that not sinning is ours, that is, in our power.'" And Augustine adds: "If he were speaking of the whole and sound nature of man, which we do not now have, even so he could not rightly say that not sinning is ours alone, although sinning would be ours by nature, and God's help would be there too, like light to healthy eyes, by which they may see as they strive" [n3].

The same Augustine says to the same effect in City of God 14, next to last chapter [n4]: "Why should God not allow the first man, who had been created upright, that is, of good will, to be tempted by the evil angel? For he had been so constituted that if, as a good man, he relied on God's help, he would conquer the evil angel; but if, pleasing himself in pride, he abandoned God as his creator and helper, he would be conquered. He would have good merit in a right will helped by God, and evil merit in a perverse will abandoning God. For even to rely on God's help he could not do without God's help; yet he did have it in his power, by pleasing himself, to withdraw from these benefits of divine grace. For just as to live in this flesh without God's help and without the aid of food is not possible, whereas not to live in it is in one's power, as those do who kill themselves, so to live well in it without God's help was not in one's power even in Paradise, though to live badly was in his power."

From these things, then, the first part of the conclusion to be principally shown is evident. From them too, together with the preceding corollary and the reasons proving it, the second part will likewise be evident.

NOTES

1. Savile's chapter numbers for the Augustine citations in this chapter (Enchiridion 88; De correptione et gratia 48, 49; De natura et gratia 50) follow an older chapter division and do not match the modern numbering. The passages are Enchiridion (on Adam's uprightness); De correptione et gratia chs 11–12 (on Adam's "good will" and the adiutorium sine quo non); and De natura et gratia, late in the work. They are translated here as Bradwardine gives them. For the passage from City of God 14, "next to last" is chapter 27 of the modern numbering.
2. The "someone" (cuiusdam) whose similitudes Augustine rejects is Pelagius, whose On Nature Augustine is answering in De natura et gratia. The grammar is loose (recitatis cuiusdam argumentis … molientis): the genitive molientis agrees with cuiusdam, and recitatis argumentis is an ablative absolute.
3. quamuis peccare nostrum esset natura is translated as printed, and it does construe. The sense Augustine requires, however, is that even in sound nature not sinning would be "ours" only with God's help, so a negative (non peccare) may be expected. adniti videant (literally "may see to strive") is likewise awkward. Augustine's own text has a participle, "may see as they strive".
4. See note 1. Savile's "14 … penult." is City of God XIV.27.