{"id": "2/22", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-2", "title": "De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 22", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "556D–559D", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXII. Specialiter corrigit primam harum.\n\nITem specialiter contra primos, Nulla res facta a Deo potest per se existere,\n\nnec aliam rem seruare in esse sine eo, vt secundum praemonstrauit; quare nec agere aut producere aliam rem in esse, vt capitulum proximum arguebat. Item Corollaria tertij et quarti primi cum rationibus et Autoritatibus illa probantibus specialiter hos refellunt. Item tunc Deus non haberet scientiam praesentium nec etiam futurorum, nec omnia per eius prouidentiam regetentur, multa que contingerent a casu et a fortuna, nec esset aliqua via sumpta a motu efficax ad probandum primum Motorem communem: Posset enim causa secunda mouere, causa prima totaliter quiescente, cum multis impossibilibus alijs et absurdis sicut capitulum proximum plenius\n\nmanifestat. Item tunc posset homo ex se solo aperire pulsanti ianuam cordis sui, contra 38. primi. Item hoc est contra Autoritates Anselmi de casu Diaboli 20. et de Concor. 6. et 7. vbi ostendit quod Deus tripliciter efficit omnem actum voluntatis creatae, sicut capitulum proximum allegauit. Adhuc autem et secundum similem rationem Deus diceretur et esset factor et Autor peccati, contra Doctores: vnde et Augustinus de spiritu et litera 29. sic ait; Vtique voluntate credimus de hac quaeritur vnde sit nobis. Si natura; quare non omnibus, cum sit idem Deus omnium Creator? Si dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines velit saluos fieri, et in agnitionem veritatis venire? Prius igitur illud dicamus, et videamus vtrum huic satisfaciat quaestioni, quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum a Creatore animae rationali, illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem potest, et ideo nec istam voluntatem, qua credit Deo, dici potest habere quam\n\nnon acceperit, quando quidem vocante Deo surgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum createtur, accepit. Et cap. 31. Si autem respondetur cauendum esse, ne quisquam Deo tribuendum putet peccatum, quod admittitur per liberum arbitrium, si in eo quod dicitur, quid habes quod non accepisti? propterea etiam voluntas qua credimus, dono Dei tribuitur, quia de libero existit arbitrio, quod cum crearemur, accepimus: Attendat et videat, non ideo tantum istam voluntatem diuino muneri tribuendam, quia ex libero arbitrio est quod nobis naturaliter concretum est, verumetiam quod visorum suasionibus agit Deus vt velimus, et vt credamus, siue extrinsecus per Angelicas exhortationes, siue intrinsecus, vbi nemo habet in potestate quid ei veniat in mentem, sed consentire vel dissentire propriae voluntatis est. His ergo modis quando Deus agit cum anima rationali vt ei credat (Neque enim credere potest quodlibet libero arbitrio, si nulla sit suasio, vel vocatio cui credat) profecto et ipsum velle credere Deus operatur in homine, et in omnibus misericordia eius praeuenit nos. Et ne forte moueat quempiam quod dicit consentire vel dissentire esse propriae voluntatis, quasi tantum\n\nsit voluntatis propriae et non Dei; Caueat, quaeso, quilibet, caueat; quia iste fuit error Pelagij, vt 37. et 38. capitulis primi patet: quem et Augustinus per totum librum de praedestinatione sanctorum nititur extirpare. Vnde et 4. cap. loquens de Autoritate Apostoli in de spiritu et litera superius memorata, scilicet, Quid habes quod non accepisti? sic ait; Quo praecipuo testimonio etiam ictus ipse conuictus sum, cum similiter errarem, putans fidem, qua in Deum credimus, non esse donum Dei, sed a nobis esse in nobis, et per illam nos impetrare Dei dona. Et accipit ibi fidem non pro habitu, sed pro actu; addit, Neque enim fidem putabam Dei gratia praeueniri, nisi quia credere non possemus, si non praecederet praeconium veritatis; vt autem praedicato nobis Euangelio consentiremus, nostrum esse proprium arbitrabar: Quem meum errorem nonnulla opuscula mea satis indicant, in quibus est illud quod commemorastis in libris vestris, vbi expositio est quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos. Denique cum mea cuncta opuscula retractarem, cuius operis iam duos libros absolueram,\n\ncum ad hunc librum retractandum in primo volumine peruenissem, sic inde loquutus sum, et est 1. Retract. 23. Item quod disputans inquit, Quid elegerit in nondum nato, scilicet Iacobo? ad hoc perduxi ratiocinationem, vt dicerem, Non ergo elegit Deus opera cuiusquam in praescientia quae ipse daturus est, sed fidem, scilicet actum; Vnde subiungit, vt quem sibi crediturum esse praesciuit, ipsum eligeret, cui Spiritum Sanctum daret vt bona operando etiam vitam aeternam consequeretur. Proinde quod continuo dixi, Dicit enim idem Apostolus, Idem Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus; Nusquam dictum est, Deus qui credit omnia in omnibus. Ac deinde subiunxi, Quod enim credimus, nostrum est; quod autem bonum operamur illius est, qui credentibus dat Spiritum Sanctum. Profecto non dicerem, si iam scirem etiam ipsam fidem inter Dei munera reperij, quae dantur in codem spiritu. Vtrumque ergo nostrum est propter arbitrium voluntatis, et vtrumque tamen datum est per spiritum fidei et charitatis: Non enim sola charitas, sed sicut scriptum est, charitas cum fide\n\na Deo. Et quod paulo post dixi, Nostrum est credere et velle; ecce quod loquitur de actu fidei, Nostrum est, inquit, credere et velle, ipsius autem dare credentibus facultatem bene operandi per spiritum sanctum, per quem charitas diffunditur in cordibus nostris. Verum est quidem, sed eadem regula et vtrumque ipsius est, quia ipse praeparat voluntatem, et vtrumque nostrum, quia non fit nisi volentibus nobis. Ecce quod Augustinus in his duobus locis retractat, quod dixit superepistolam ad Romanos, Credere et velle esse nostrum; et certum est ipsum nequaquam tam insani capitis tunc fuisse, quando scilicet post conuersionem suam exposuit illas propositiones epistolae memoratae, quod crederet, Credere et velle esse sic nostrum, vt anima rationalis, intellectus, et voluntas esset nostra, seu noster, et nobis ex nobis, ita quod non a Deo, imo sicut tam series illius expositionis, quam retractationis perhibet, tunc credebat intellectū et voluntatē esse nobis a Deo creante, sed actus illorum esse nobis ex solis\n\nnobis illos agentibus, sine Deo vlterius coagēte; et hoc est quod posterius retractauit. Est ergo posterior eius sententia, quod Deus cum homine coefficiat proprie actus potentiarū illarū, et non tantum improprie, quia scilicet potentias illas fecit. Vnde et infra eiusdē 18. de praedest. sanct. 6. tractans illud dictū Apostoli; Quis enim te discernit? quid autē habes quod non accepisti? sic ait. In hac Apostoli intentione dona Dei naturalia suspicari, siue ipsam totam perfectam naturam; qualis in prima conditione donata est, siue vitiatae naturae qualescunque reliquias, nimis quantum existimo, absurdum est: Nunquid enim per haec dona, quae omnibus sunt cōmunia hominibus, discernuntur homines ab hominibus? Hic enim prius dixit, Quis enim te discernit? et deinde addidit, Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Posset quippe homo dicere inflatus aduersus alterum, Discernit me fides mea, iustitia mea, vel si quid aliud. Qualibus occurrens cogitationibus bonus Doctor, Quid autem habes, inquit, quod non accepisti? a quo nisi ab illo qui te discernit ab alio, cui non donauit, quod donauit tibi? Ac per\n\nhoc quisquam audet dicere, Habeo fidem ex meipso; non ergo accepi? profecto contradicit apertissimae veritati; non quia credere, vel non credere non est in arbitrio voluntatis humanae, sed in electis praeparatur voluntas a Deo; ideo ad ipsam quoque fidem quae in voluntate est pertinet; Quis enim te discernit? quid autem habes quod non accepisti? et sequitur cap. 7. Multi audiunt verbum veritatis; sed alij credunt, alij contradicunt: volunt ergo isti credere, nolunt illi. Sed cum in alijs praeparetur, in alijs non praeparetur voluntas a Domino, discernendum est vtique quid eueniat de misericordia eius, quid de iudicio. Item Augustinus super illud Psalmi 118. Manus tuae fecerunt me etc. distinguens duplicem modum factionis hominis a Deo, sic ait; Vtrum hoc secundum Adam dictum est, ex quo cum sint omnes homines propagati, quis hominum, quando ille factus est, et se factum non potest dicere originis seminisque ratione? An etiam secundum hoc recte dici potuit, Manus tuae fecerunt me et plasmauerunt me, quod vnusquisque non sine opere Dei etiam de parentibus sit, ipso creante,\n\nillis generantibus, quoniam si operatoria Dei potentia rebus subtrahatur, intereunt, nec aliquid omnino siue de mundi elementis, siue de genitoribus, siue de seminibus nascitur, si ea non operetur Deus. Item tunc habens naturalia integra posset ex ex se solo, vel per Doctorem alium sine Deo proprie coagente acquirere sibi morales et intellectuales virtutes; cuius oppositum docet Augustinus 4. contra Iulianum multis capitulis, et Beda contra eundem Iulianum 13. sicut erat superius allegatum. Vnde et Beda satis expresse contra istam responsionem sic dicit: Quod ergo dicit Iulianus multos Philosophorum patientiam, castitatem, modestiam, aliasque de naturae bono habuisse virtutes, constat quod quicunque Philosophorum Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam nescierunt; hi nullam veram virtutem, nec veram sapientiam vllam habere potuerunt: In quantum vero vel gustum aliquem sapientae cuiuslibet, vel virtutis imaginem habebant, desuper hoc totum acceperunt, non solum munere primae conditionis, verumetiam quotidiana eius gratia qui creaturam suam nec deserentem deserens,\n\ndona sua, prout ipse iudicauerit, hominibus et magna magnis, et parua largitur paruis. Ad illud autem quod pro ista opinione adducitur, potest faciliter responderi, quod ille est vnus bonus et verus modus loquendi, apud quos fuerit consuetus; sed per hoc non probatur, quin formae elementares moueant elementa: Certum est enim, quod corrupto generante, et impediens remouente, elementa mouentur; ergo ob aliquo motore, et non a generante, vel prohibens remouente, quia neutrum illorum est, et per consequens nihil facit, causat, aut mouet; est igitur forma mouens. In omni quoque motu mouens et motum sent simul, vt docetur 7. Phys. 8. et post. et 2. de Anima 74. sed neutrum praedictorum est simul cum elemento moto, quia omnino non est. Tunc etiam elementa mouentur naturaliter, ergo a natura: Ipsa enim, vt docetur 2. Phys. 3. est principium et causa mouendi et quiescendi in quo primum est; et haec est duplex, scilicet materia, et forma, vt ibi ostenditur consequenter: sed materia prima non est principium motiuum localiter, vt nulli Philosopho est ignotum,\n\nergo forma elementi naturaliter ipsum mouet. Per idem quoque quod elementum quiescit in loco suo naturali mouetur ad eum: sed ibi quiescit per formam suam. Maior etiam terra vel ignis descendit velocius vel ascendit; ergo non tantum ab extrinseco, sed ab in• seca sibi forma. Corpora quoque mixta mouentur ad motum elementi dominant• •o ipsum elementum dominans per se naturaliter habet motum. Ipse etiam idem Philosophus 4. Phys. tractans de vacuo 71. et post, supponit planissime, elementa moueri naturaliter ex seipsis: et similiter 1. de Coelo, vbi reprobat infinitum. Auerroes quoque super loca praedicta vult idem: et super 3. de Coelo. 28. et super 4.22. ostendit diffuse quod in corporibus simplicibus, motor et motum non distinguntur in actu ab inuicem, et quod formae eorum sunt\n\nmotores eorum; et glossat ibi processum Philosophi in 7. Physicorum probantis quod nihil mouet se, sed quod omne quod mouetur, mouetur ab alio, isto modo; Aristoteles, inquit, non intendebat per istum sermonem quem scripsit in 7. Physicorum, nisi declarare quod nihil mouet se, scilicet ita quod motor sit idem cum moto, et eodem modo, et ideo posuit, quod quicquid quiescit per quietem alterius, necesse est vt motus eius non sit nisi ab altero, id est, necesse est, vt motor in eo differat essentia et definitione a moto, licet non differat in subiecto. Et similiter potest glossari similis processus Philosophi 8. Physicorum, et 4. de Coelo superius memoratus. Item si elementa non haberent ex se, sed tantum a generante, vel impediens remouente, motum seu motionem localē, eadem ratione nec aliquam aliam actionem: ergo nec ignis ex se combureret, vel luceret vtroque illorum corrupto, plurimumue remoto. Mirabilis quoque modus loquendi videtur, et a veritate nimis extraneus dicere, quod lucerna, seu candela socij mei, quae illuminauit lucernam meam, seu candelam illuminantem studium\n\nmeum, illuminat studium meum cum camera sua, forsitan nimis dister, murisque lapideis includatur, vel praedicta eius lucerna forsitan extinguatur. Per similem etiam rationem, quicquid nunc scribo Oxoniae, scriberet pater meus Cicestriae, quia genuit me scribentem, imo avus, et proavus, ac caeteri genitores, ipsi quoque primi parentes nunc facerent omnia facta nostra. Illud autem Anselmi non mouet, quia non dicit quod Deus illo modo tantum efficitactus nostros, sed illo modo transumtine, et alio proprio, sicut capitulum proximum recitauit. Ad rationem dicendum, quod licet Deus sit omnipotens, nihil tamen potest facere quod contradictionem includit, sed sicut contradictionem includit aliquam naturam esse sine Deo per se, et proprie eam actualiter et specialiter conseruante, sicut secundum primi docebat: sic vel amplius contradictionem includit aliquam naturam agere, seu mouere sine Deo per se et proprie actualiter et specialiter coagente et similiter commouente, sicut tertium et quartum primi plenius ostendebant. Et sic respondet sanctus Thomas de potentia Dei\n\nquaestione 20. qua quaeritur, Vtrum Deus operetur in omni operatione naturae, ad simile argumentum pro parte negatiua, quinto loco adductum: quandocunque inquit arguens, Deus aliquam naturam instituit, ex hoc ipso dat ei omnia illa quae sunt de ratione illius naturae. Similiter ex hoc ipso quod facit hominem, det ei animam rationalem: sed de ratione virtutis est quod sit principium agendi, cum virtus sit vltimum potentiae quae est principium agendi in aliud, secundum quod est aliud, vt dicitur in 5. Metaphys. ergo ex hoc ipso, quod virtutes naturales rebus indidit, dedit eis quod operationes perficerent: non ergo oportet quod vlterius in rebus naturalibus operetur. Et post septimo loco adducit aliud argumentum simile huic quinto, ad quorum primum sic respondet; Ad quintum dicendum quod de ratione virtutis inferioris est, quod sit aliquo modo operationis principium in suo ordine, id est, vt agat vt instrumentum superioris virtutis: vnde exclusa superiori virtute, inferior virtus operationem non habet. Et consequenter ad aliud sic respondet; Ad septimum dicendum, quod virtus\n\nnaturalis, quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis vt quaedam forma, habens esse ratum et firmum in natura; sed id quod a Deo sit in re naturali quo actualiter agat, est vt intentio sola habens quoddam esse incompletum, per modum quo colores sunt in aere, et virtus artis in instrumento artificis. Sicut igitur securi per artem dari potuit acumen, vt esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit, quod vis artis esset in ea quasi quaedam forma in ea permanens, nisi haberet intellectum: ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria, vt forma in ipsa permanens, non autem vis qua agit ad esse, vt instrumentum primae causae, nisi daretur ei quod esset vniuersale essendi principium: nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit vt moueret seipsam, nec vt conseruaret se in esse. Vnde sicut patet, quod instrumento artificis conferri non potuit, quod operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit, quod operaretur absque operatione diuina.", "english": "CHAPTER XXII. He corrects the first of these in particular.\n\nAgain, in particular against the first: No thing made by God can exist of itself, nor preserve another thing in being without him, as the second [n1] showed beforehand. Therefore neither can it act or produce another thing in being, as the preceding chapter argued. Again, the third and fourth Corollaries of the first book, with the reasons and authorities that prove them, refute these men in particular. Again, in that case God would have no knowledge of present things, nor even of future ones. Not all things would be governed by his providence, and many things would happen by chance and by fortune. Nor would there be any valid route, taken from motion, for proving the common First Mover, for a second cause could move while the first cause was wholly at rest. And there would be many other impossibilities and absurdities, as the preceding chapter shows more fully\n\nAgain, in that case a man could by himself alone open the door of his heart to the one who knocks, contrary to the 38th of the first. Again, this is against the authorities of Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 20 and On Concord 6 and 7, where he shows that God brings about every act of a created will in three ways, as the preceding chapter cited. Furthermore, by a similar reasoning God would be called, and would be, the maker and author of sin, contrary to the Doctors. Hence Augustine too, in On the Spirit and the Letter 29, says: \"We believe, of course, by the will; about this will the question is whence it is in us [n2]. If from nature, why not in everyone, since the same God is Creator of all? If from the gift of God, why again not in everyone, since he wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth? Let us therefore first say this, and see whether it satisfies this question: that free choice, naturally attributed by the Creator to the rational soul, is that middle power which can either be stretched toward faith or inclined toward unbelief. And therefore it cannot be said to have, as the will by which it believes God, one that it has not received, since indeed, when God calls, that will rises out of free choice, which it received naturally when it was created.\" And in chapter 31: \"But if the answer is given that one must beware lest anyone think that sin committed through free choice is to be attributed to God, if, in what is said, 'What do you have that you did not receive?', the will by which we believe is also therefore attributed to God's gift, because it comes from free choice, which we received when we were created: let him attend and see that this will is to be attributed to the divine gift not only because it comes from free choice, which was naturally implanted in us, but also because God acts through persuasions by things seen so that we may will and believe. He does so either from outside, through angelic exhortations, or from within, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind, but to consent or dissent belongs to one's own will. In these ways, therefore, when God acts upon the rational soul so that it may believe him (for no one can believe just anything by free choice if there is no persuasion or calling to which he may assent), surely God works even the very willing to believe in man, and in all things his mercy goes before us. And lest it perhaps trouble anyone that he says that to consent or dissent belongs to one's own will, as if it were only\n\na matter of one's own will and not of God's: let everyone take care, I beg you, let him take care; for that was the error of Pelagius, as is clear from chapters 37 and 38 of the first book, and Augustine strives to root it out throughout the whole book On the Predestination of the Saints. Hence in chapter 4 too, speaking of the authority of the Apostle mentioned above in On the Spirit and the Letter, namely, \"What do you have that you did not receive?\", he says: \"By which chief testimony I myself too was struck and convinced, when I was likewise in error, thinking that faith, by which we believe in God, is not a gift of God but is from ourselves in us, and that through it we obtain the gifts of God.\" And he takes faith there not as a habit but as an act. He adds: \"For I did not think that faith was anticipated by the grace of God, except in that we could not believe if the proclamation of the truth did not come first. But that, when the Gospel was preached to us, we should consent, I supposed to be our own doing. Several of my little works show this error of mine well enough, among them the one you mention in your books, where there is an exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans. Finally, when I was reviewing all my little works, of which work I had already finished two books,\n\nwhen I had come to the revising of this book in the first volume, I spoke of it thus\" (and it is Retractations 1, 23). Again, as to what he says in his disputation, \"What did he choose in one not yet born, namely Jacob?\", \"I carried the reasoning to the point of saying: God therefore did not choose anyone's works in foreknowledge, works he himself would give, but faith, that is, the act\" [n3]. Whence he adds that he chose the man he foreknew would believe in him, to whom he would give the Holy Spirit so that by working good he might also attain eternal life. \"Then, as to what I said immediately after: 'For the same Apostle says, \"the same God who works all things in all\"; nowhere is it said, \"God who believes all things in all.\"' And then I added: 'What we believe is ours; but what good we work is of him who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe.' Surely I would not have said this if I already knew that faith itself is also found among the gifts of God, which are given in the same Spirit. Both, therefore, are ours on account of the choice of the will, and yet both are given through the spirit of faith and charity. For it is not charity alone, but, as it is written, charity with faith\n\nfrom God.' And what I said a little later, 'It is ours to believe and to will'\": behold, he speaks of the act of faith. \"'It is ours,' he says, 'to believe and to will; but it is his to give to believers the ability to work well through the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured out in our hearts.' It is true indeed, but by the same rule both are his, because he himself prepares the will, and both are ours, because it is done only when we are willing.\" Behold what Augustine retracts in these two places, namely what he said on the Epistle to the Romans, that believing and willing are ours. It is certain that he was by no means of so insane a mind at that time, namely when, after his conversion, he expounded those propositions of the aforementioned epistle, as to believe that believing and willing are ours in such a way that the rational soul, the intellect and the will would be ours, and ours from ourselves, so as not to be from God. Rather, as both the course of that exposition and that of the retraction attest, he believed then that intellect and will are ours from God as creator, but that their acts are ours from ourselves alone acting, without God further co-acting. And this is what he later retracted. His later opinion, therefore, is that God co-effects with man, properly, the acts of those powers, and not merely improperly, namely because he made those powers. Hence below, in the same author, 18, On the Predestination of the Saints, 6 [n4], treating that saying of the Apostle, \"For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive?\", he says: \"To suppose the natural gifts of God in this intention of the Apostle, whether the whole perfect nature itself, such as was given in the first creation, or whatever remnants of a vitiated nature, is, I judge, exceedingly absurd. For is it by these gifts, which are common to all men, that men are distinguished from men? For here he first said, 'Who distinguishes you?' and then added, 'What do you have that you did not receive?' A man puffed up against another might indeed say, 'My faith distinguishes me, my justice, or whatever else.' Meeting such thoughts, the good Teacher says: 'What do you have that you did not receive?' From whom, if not from him who distinguishes you from another, to whom he did not give what he gave you? And hence\n\ndoes anyone dare to say, 'I have faith from myself; therefore I did not receive it'? Surely he contradicts the plainest truth. This is not because believing or not believing is not in the choice of the human will, but because in the elect the will is prepared by God, and so it pertains also to faith itself, which is in the will: 'For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive?'\" And it follows in chapter 7: \"Many hear the word of truth, but some believe and others contradict: these therefore will to believe, those do not will. But since in some the will is prepared by the Lord and in others it is not prepared, it must be discerned what comes of his mercy, what of his judgment.\" Again, Augustine on that verse of Psalm 118 [119], \"Your hands have made me,\" etc., distinguishing a twofold manner of man's being made by God, says: \"Was this said in respect of Adam? Since all men have been propagated from him, which of men, when that one was made, cannot say that he too was made, by reason of origin and seed? Or could it rightly be said also in this respect, 'Your hands have made me and fashioned me', that each one comes to be even from his parents not without the work of God, he creating while they beget? For if the operative power of God is withdrawn from things, they perish, and nothing at all is born, whether from the elements of the world, or from parents, or from seeds, if God does not work in them.\" Again, in that case one who had his natural endowments intact could by himself alone, or through another teacher, without God properly co-acting, acquire for himself moral and intellectual virtues. Augustine teaches the opposite of this in Against Julian 4, in many chapters, and Bede against the same Julian, 13, as was cited above. Hence Bede too says quite expressly against this response: \"As to what Julian says, that many of the philosophers had patience, chastity, modesty, and other virtues from the good of nature: it is clear that whichever of the philosophers did not know Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God, these could have no true virtue and no true wisdom. But insofar as they had any taste of wisdom or image of virtue, they received it all from above, not only by the gift of the first creation, but also by the daily grace of him who does not forsake even a creature that forsakes him [n5],\n\nand who bestows his gifts as he himself has judged, great ones to the great and small ones to the small.\" To what is adduced for this opinion, it can easily be answered that that is one good and true way of speaking among those with whom it was customary. But this does not prove that elemental forms do not move the elements. For it is certain that when the generator has been destroyed and the impediment removed, the elements are moved. Therefore they are moved by some mover, and not by the generator or by the one removing the preventer, because neither of these exists, and consequently does nothing, causes nothing, and moves nothing. So there is a moving form. Again, in every motion the mover and the moved are together, as is taught in Physics 7, 8 and following, and in On the Soul 2, 74. But neither of the aforesaid is together with the moved element, because it does not exist at all. Then also, the elements are moved naturally, therefore by nature. For nature, as is taught in Physics 2, 3, is the principle and cause of moving and being at rest in that in which it is primarily, and this is twofold, namely matter and form, as is shown there in what follows. But prime matter is not a principle of motion with respect to place, as is unknown to no Philosopher. Therefore the form of the element naturally moves it. By the same token, an element that rests in its natural place is moved to it, but it rests there through its form. Again, the larger the earth or fire, the faster it descends or ascends. Therefore it is moved not only from something extrinsic but from a form intrinsic to it. Mixed bodies also are moved to the motion of the dominant element, so the dominant element itself has motion naturally through itself. The same Philosopher too, in Physics 4, treating the void, 71 and following, supposes most plainly that the elements are moved naturally from themselves, and similarly in On the Heavens 1, where he refutes the infinite. Averroes too on the aforesaid passages wants the same; and on On the Heavens 3, 28, and on 4, 22, he shows at length that in simple bodies mover and moved are not distinguished in act from each other, and that their forms are\n\ntheir movers. And he glosses there the procedure of the Philosopher in Physics 7, who proves that nothing moves itself but that everything that is moved is moved by another, in this way: \"Aristotle,\" he says, \"did not intend by this discourse which he wrote in Physics 7 anything except to declare that nothing moves itself, namely such that the mover is the same as the moved and in the same respect. And therefore he laid down that whatever is at rest through the rest of another, its motion must be only from another. That is, the mover in it must differ in essence and definition from the moved, though it need not differ in subject.\" The similar procedure of the Philosopher in Physics 8 and On the Heavens 4, mentioned above, can be glossed in the same way. Again, if the elements did not have local motion or movement from themselves but only from the generator or from the one removing the impediment, then by the same reasoning they would have no other action either. So fire would neither burn nor shine of itself, with both of them destroyed or very far removed. It also seems a wondrous way of speaking, and much too foreign to the truth, to say that the lamp or candle of my colleague, which lit my lamp or candle that lights my study, lights my study\n\nmy study even though his room is perhaps too far off and shut in by stone walls, or that lamp of his is perhaps put out [n6]. By a similar reasoning also, whatever I now write at Oxford, my father would write at Chichester [n7], because he begot me writing; indeed my grandfather and great-grandfather and the other progenitors, and even the first parents themselves, would now do all our deeds. But that saying of Anselm does not move us, because he does not say that God brings about our acts only in that way, but in that way figuratively, and in another, proper way, as the preceding chapter recited. To the argument it must be said that although God is omnipotent, he nevertheless can do nothing that includes a contradiction. [n8] But just as it includes a contradiction that some nature exist without God per se and properly conserving it actually and specially, as the second of the first taught, so, or even more, it includes a contradiction that some nature act or move without God per se and properly co-acting and likewise co-moving it, actually and specially, as the third and fourth of the first showed more fully. And so St Thomas answers in On the Power of God,\n\nquestion 20 [n9], where it is asked whether God works in every operation of nature, to a similar argument on the negative side, adduced in fifth place. \"Whenever,\" says the objector, \"God institutes some nature, by that very fact he gives it all the things that belong to the notion of that nature. Likewise, by the very fact that he makes a man, he gives him a rational soul. But it belongs to the notion of a power that it be a principle of acting, since a power is the limit of the potency that is a principle of acting upon another, insofar as it is other, as is said in Metaphysics 5. Therefore, by the very fact that he implanted natural powers in things, he gave them to complete their operations. Therefore it is not necessary that he work further in natural things.\" And later, in seventh place, he adduces another argument similar to this fifth, to the first of which he answers thus: \"To the fifth it must be said that it belongs to the notion of a lower power that it be in some way a principle of operation in its own order, that is, that it act as an instrument of the higher power. Hence, with the higher power excluded, the lower power has no operation.\" And consequently he answers the other thus: \"To the seventh it must be said that natural power, which is conferred on natural things in their institution, is in them as a kind of form, having firm and settled being in nature. But what is made by God in a natural thing, by which it actually acts, is as a mere intention [n10], having a kind of incomplete being, in the way colors are in the air and the power of art in the artisan's instrument. Just as, therefore, an axe could be given sharpness through art, so as to be a form remaining in it, but could not be given that the force of the art should be in it as a kind of form remaining in it, unless it had intellect: so a natural thing could be given its proper power as a form remaining in it, but not the force by which it acts toward being, as an instrument of the first cause, unless it were given that it be the universal principle of being. Nor again could a natural power be given that it move itself, or that it conserve itself in being. Hence, just as it is clear that to the artisan's instrument it could not be conferred that it operate without the motion of the art, so to a natural thing it could not be conferred that it operate without divine operation.\"", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "secundum has no noun in the main text. Later in this chapter Bradwardine cites \"the second of the first\" (559B), so he means the second Corollary of Book I. Savile's variant primi in the margin supplies \"of the first\". I translate the main text and give the variant in the margin line."}, {"n": 2, "text": "The print has no punctuation or sed between credimus and de hac quaeritur. I have supplied the break the sense requires: \"by the will we believe; about this will the question is whence it is in us.\""}, {"n": 3, "text": "Bradwardine splices Augustine's Retractations 1, 23 with comments of his own. inquit and scilicet actum are his interpolations, and the shift between \"he\" and \"I\" is his. In the quoted sentence the print has sed fidem with no verb. The verb (elegit) is understood from the preceding clause, and I have carried it over."}, {"n": 4, "text": "The citation eiusdem 18. de praedest. sanct. 6. is obscure in Savile. The quotation is from Augustine's De praedestinatione sanctorum (the passage on \"Who distinguishes you?\"); the \"18\" and \"6\" cannot be reconciled with the modern chapter numbers. I keep the citation as printed."}, {"n": 5, "text": "creaturam suam nec deserentem deserens is compressed. I take nec as \"not even\": God does not forsake even a creature that forsakes him."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The keyed text has dister, but the print reads distet. The sentence is construed with cum as concessive: the lamp \"lights my study although his room is perhaps too far off, and shut in by stone walls, or his lamp perhaps put out.\" The subjunctives distet, includatur, extinguatur all depend on cum."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Bradwardine speaks of himself here: Oxford, where he writes, and Chichester, which tradition gives as his birthplace and his father's home. I have not expanded the names."}, {"n": 8, "text": "The margin beside \"To the argument…\" is only partly legible in the facsimile. It reads \"Respons… argumen…\", which I restore as Responsio ad argumentum. The variant demonstrabant and the separate source note Thomas are keyed together in the TCP text; in the print they are two margin entries."}, {"n": 9, "text": "The passage is Aquinas, De potentia q. 3, a. 7, \"Whether God works in every operation of nature\" (objections 5 and 7). Savile's quaestione 20 does not match the modern numbering. I keep it as printed."}, {"n": 10, "text": "intentio is used in the sense of Aquinas's \"intentional\" being, a transient, incomplete being such as colours have in air. It is not \"intention\" as purpose. I keep the English word for the technical term so that the analogies of colour and of the art in the instrument stay recognizable."}], "errata": [{"address": "556E", "keyed": "regetentur", "print": "regerentur"}, {"address": "557B", "keyed": "createtur", "print": "crearetur"}, {"address": "557D", "keyed": "reperij", "print": "reperiri"}, {"address": "558B", "keyed": "(margin 558B·2) sit", "print": "fit"}, {"address": "558C", "keyed": "ex ex se solo", "print": "ex se solo"}, {"address": "558D", "keyed": "(margin 558D·1) ch • ecta", "print": "obiecta"}, {"address": "558D", "keyed": "ob aliquo motore", "print": "ab aliquo motore"}, {"address": "558D", "keyed": "sent simul", "print": "sunt simul"}, {"address": "558E", "keyed": "ab in• seca sibi forma", "print": "ab intrinseca sibi forma"}, {"address": "558E", "keyed": "dominant• •o ipsum elementum", "print": "dominantis; ergo ipsum elementum"}, {"address": "559A", "keyed": "(margin 559A·1) Auer ••••", "print": "Auerroes"}, {"address": "559B", "keyed": "forsitan nimis dister", "print": "forsitan nimis distet"}, {"address": "559B", "keyed": "transumtine", "print": "transumtiue"}, {"address": "559B", "keyed": "(margin 559B·2) R • spon 〈…〉 • argum 〈…〉", "print": "Responsio ad argumentum (partly illegible in the facsimile)"}, {"address": "559B", "keyed": "(margin 559B·3) \"demonstrabant. Thomas.\" as one variant", "print": "two entries: variant demonstrabant; source Thomas"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p556D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p556D", "locator_display": "556D–556E", "source_text": "CAP. XXII. Specialiter corrigit primam harum.\n\nITem specialiter contra primos, Nulla res facta a Deo potest per se existere,\n\nnec aliam rem seruare in esse sine eo, vt secundum praemonstrauit; quare nec agere aut producere aliam rem in esse, vt capitulum proximum arguebat. Item Corollaria tertij et quarti primi cum rationibus et Autoritatibus illa probantibus specialiter hos refellunt. Item tunc Deus non haberet scientiam praesentium nec etiam futurorum, nec omnia per eius prouidentiam regetentur, multa que contingerent a casu et a fortuna, nec esset aliqua via sumpta a motu efficax ad probandum primum Motorem communem: Posset enim causa secunda mouere, causa prima totaliter quiescente, cum multis impossibilibus alijs et absurdis sicut capitulum proximum plenius", "english": "CHAPTER XXII. He corrects the first of these in particular.\n\nAgain, in particular against the first: No thing made by God can exist of itself, nor preserve another thing in being without him, as the second [n1] showed beforehand. Therefore neither can it act or produce another thing in being, as the preceding chapter argued. Again, the third and fourth Corollaries of the first book, with the reasons and authorities that prove them, refute these men in particular. Again, in that case God would have no knowledge of present things, nor even of future ones. Not all things would be governed by his providence, and many things would happen by chance and by fortune. Nor would there be any valid route, taken from motion, for proving the common First Mover, for a second cause could move while the first cause was wholly at rest. And there would be many other impossibilities and absurdities, as the preceding chapter shows more fully", "margins": [{"id": "556D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Special response to the first."}, {"id": "556E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) primi (\"of the first\")."}]}, {"anchor": "p557A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p557A", "locator_display": "557A–557B", "source_text": "manifestat. Item tunc posset homo ex se solo aperire pulsanti ianuam cordis sui, contra 38. primi. Item hoc est contra Autoritates Anselmi de casu Diaboli 20. et de Concor. 6. et 7. vbi ostendit quod Deus tripliciter efficit omnem actum voluntatis creatae, sicut capitulum proximum allegauit. Adhuc autem et secundum similem rationem Deus diceretur et esset factor et Autor peccati, contra Doctores: vnde et Augustinus de spiritu et litera 29. sic ait; Vtique voluntate credimus de hac quaeritur vnde sit nobis. Si natura; quare non omnibus, cum sit idem Deus omnium Creator? Si dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines velit saluos fieri, et in agnitionem veritatis venire? Prius igitur illud dicamus, et videamus vtrum huic satisfaciat quaestioni, quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum a Creatore animae rationali, illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem potest, et ideo nec istam voluntatem, qua credit Deo, dici potest habere quam\n\nnon acceperit, quando quidem vocante Deo surgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum createtur, accepit. Et cap. 31. Si autem respondetur cauendum esse, ne quisquam Deo tribuendum putet peccatum, quod admittitur per liberum arbitrium, si in eo quod dicitur, quid habes quod non accepisti? propterea etiam voluntas qua credimus, dono Dei tribuitur, quia de libero existit arbitrio, quod cum crearemur, accepimus: Attendat et videat, non ideo tantum istam voluntatem diuino muneri tribuendam, quia ex libero arbitrio est quod nobis naturaliter concretum est, verumetiam quod visorum suasionibus agit Deus vt velimus, et vt credamus, siue extrinsecus per Angelicas exhortationes, siue intrinsecus, vbi nemo habet in potestate quid ei veniat in mentem, sed consentire vel dissentire propriae voluntatis est. His ergo modis quando Deus agit cum anima rationali vt ei credat (Neque enim credere potest quodlibet libero arbitrio, si nulla sit suasio, vel vocatio cui credat) profecto et ipsum velle credere Deus operatur in homine, et in omnibus misericordia eius praeuenit nos. Et ne forte moueat quempiam quod dicit consentire vel dissentire esse propriae voluntatis, quasi tantum", "english": "Again, in that case a man could by himself alone open the door of his heart to the one who knocks, contrary to the 38th of the first. Again, this is against the authorities of Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 20 and On Concord 6 and 7, where he shows that God brings about every act of a created will in three ways, as the preceding chapter cited. Furthermore, by a similar reasoning God would be called, and would be, the maker and author of sin, contrary to the Doctors. Hence Augustine too, in On the Spirit and the Letter 29, says: \"We believe, of course, by the will; about this will the question is whence it is in us [n2]. If from nature, why not in everyone, since the same God is Creator of all? If from the gift of God, why again not in everyone, since he wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth? Let us therefore first say this, and see whether it satisfies this question: that free choice, naturally attributed by the Creator to the rational soul, is that middle power which can either be stretched toward faith or inclined toward unbelief. And therefore it cannot be said to have, as the will by which it believes God, one that it has not received, since indeed, when God calls, that will rises out of free choice, which it received naturally when it was created.\" And in chapter 31: \"But if the answer is given that one must beware lest anyone think that sin committed through free choice is to be attributed to God, if, in what is said, 'What do you have that you did not receive?', the will by which we believe is also therefore attributed to God's gift, because it comes from free choice, which we received when we were created: let him attend and see that this will is to be attributed to the divine gift not only because it comes from free choice, which was naturally implanted in us, but also because God acts through persuasions by things seen so that we may will and believe. He does so either from outside, through angelic exhortations, or from within, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind, but to consent or dissent belongs to one's own will. In these ways, therefore, when God acts upon the rational soul so that it may believe him (for no one can believe just anything by free choice if there is no persuasion or calling to which he may assent), surely God works even the very willing to believe in man, and in all things his mercy goes before us. And lest it perhaps trouble anyone that he says that to consent or dissent belongs to one's own will, as if it were only", "margins": [{"id": "557A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p557C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p557C", "locator_display": "557C–557D", "source_text": "sit voluntatis propriae et non Dei; Caueat, quaeso, quilibet, caueat; quia iste fuit error Pelagij, vt 37. et 38. capitulis primi patet: quem et Augustinus per totum librum de praedestinatione sanctorum nititur extirpare. Vnde et 4. cap. loquens de Autoritate Apostoli in de spiritu et litera superius memorata, scilicet, Quid habes quod non accepisti? sic ait; Quo praecipuo testimonio etiam ictus ipse conuictus sum, cum similiter errarem, putans fidem, qua in Deum credimus, non esse donum Dei, sed a nobis esse in nobis, et per illam nos impetrare Dei dona. Et accipit ibi fidem non pro habitu, sed pro actu; addit, Neque enim fidem putabam Dei gratia praeueniri, nisi quia credere non possemus, si non praecederet praeconium veritatis; vt autem praedicato nobis Euangelio consentiremus, nostrum esse proprium arbitrabar: Quem meum errorem nonnulla opuscula mea satis indicant, in quibus est illud quod commemorastis in libris vestris, vbi expositio est quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos. Denique cum mea cuncta opuscula retractarem, cuius operis iam duos libros absolueram,\n\ncum ad hunc librum retractandum in primo volumine peruenissem, sic inde loquutus sum, et est 1. Retract. 23. Item quod disputans inquit, Quid elegerit in nondum nato, scilicet Iacobo? ad hoc perduxi ratiocinationem, vt dicerem, Non ergo elegit Deus opera cuiusquam in praescientia quae ipse daturus est, sed fidem, scilicet actum; Vnde subiungit, vt quem sibi crediturum esse praesciuit, ipsum eligeret, cui Spiritum Sanctum daret vt bona operando etiam vitam aeternam consequeretur. Proinde quod continuo dixi, Dicit enim idem Apostolus, Idem Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus; Nusquam dictum est, Deus qui credit omnia in omnibus. Ac deinde subiunxi, Quod enim credimus, nostrum est; quod autem bonum operamur illius est, qui credentibus dat Spiritum Sanctum. Profecto non dicerem, si iam scirem etiam ipsam fidem inter Dei munera reperij, quae dantur in codem spiritu. Vtrumque ergo nostrum est propter arbitrium voluntatis, et vtrumque tamen datum est per spiritum fidei et charitatis: Non enim sola charitas, sed sicut scriptum est, charitas cum fide", "english": "a matter of one's own will and not of God's: let everyone take care, I beg you, let him take care; for that was the error of Pelagius, as is clear from chapters 37 and 38 of the first book, and Augustine strives to root it out throughout the whole book On the Predestination of the Saints. Hence in chapter 4 too, speaking of the authority of the Apostle mentioned above in On the Spirit and the Letter, namely, \"What do you have that you did not receive?\", he says: \"By which chief testimony I myself too was struck and convinced, when I was likewise in error, thinking that faith, by which we believe in God, is not a gift of God but is from ourselves in us, and that through it we obtain the gifts of God.\" And he takes faith there not as a habit but as an act. He adds: \"For I did not think that faith was anticipated by the grace of God, except in that we could not believe if the proclamation of the truth did not come first. But that, when the Gospel was preached to us, we should consent, I supposed to be our own doing. Several of my little works show this error of mine well enough, among them the one you mention in your books, where there is an exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans. Finally, when I was reviewing all my little works, of which work I had already finished two books,\n\nwhen I had come to the revising of this book in the first volume, I spoke of it thus\" (and it is Retractations 1, 23). Again, as to what he says in his disputation, \"What did he choose in one not yet born, namely Jacob?\", \"I carried the reasoning to the point of saying: God therefore did not choose anyone's works in foreknowledge, works he himself would give, but faith, that is, the act\" [n3]. Whence he adds that he chose the man he foreknew would believe in him, to whom he would give the Holy Spirit so that by working good he might also attain eternal life. \"Then, as to what I said immediately after: 'For the same Apostle says, \"the same God who works all things in all\"; nowhere is it said, \"God who believes all things in all.\"' And then I added: 'What we believe is ours; but what good we work is of him who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe.' Surely I would not have said this if I already knew that faith itself is also found among the gifts of God, which are given in the same Spirit. Both, therefore, are ours on account of the choice of the will, and yet both are given through the spirit of faith and charity. For it is not charity alone, but, as it is written, charity with faith", "margins": [{"id": "557C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p557E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p557E", "locator_display": "557E–558A", "source_text": "a Deo. Et quod paulo post dixi, Nostrum est credere et velle; ecce quod loquitur de actu fidei, Nostrum est, inquit, credere et velle, ipsius autem dare credentibus facultatem bene operandi per spiritum sanctum, per quem charitas diffunditur in cordibus nostris. Verum est quidem, sed eadem regula et vtrumque ipsius est, quia ipse praeparat voluntatem, et vtrumque nostrum, quia non fit nisi volentibus nobis. Ecce quod Augustinus in his duobus locis retractat, quod dixit superepistolam ad Romanos, Credere et velle esse nostrum; et certum est ipsum nequaquam tam insani capitis tunc fuisse, quando scilicet post conuersionem suam exposuit illas propositiones epistolae memoratae, quod crederet, Credere et velle esse sic nostrum, vt anima rationalis, intellectus, et voluntas esset nostra, seu noster, et nobis ex nobis, ita quod non a Deo, imo sicut tam series illius expositionis, quam retractationis perhibet, tunc credebat intellectū et voluntatē esse nobis a Deo creante, sed actus illorum esse nobis ex solis\n\nnobis illos agentibus, sine Deo vlterius coagēte; et hoc est quod posterius retractauit. Est ergo posterior eius sententia, quod Deus cum homine coefficiat proprie actus potentiarū illarū, et non tantum improprie, quia scilicet potentias illas fecit. Vnde et infra eiusdē 18. de praedest. sanct. 6. tractans illud dictū Apostoli; Quis enim te discernit? quid autē habes quod non accepisti? sic ait. In hac Apostoli intentione dona Dei naturalia suspicari, siue ipsam totam perfectam naturam; qualis in prima conditione donata est, siue vitiatae naturae qualescunque reliquias, nimis quantum existimo, absurdum est: Nunquid enim per haec dona, quae omnibus sunt cōmunia hominibus, discernuntur homines ab hominibus? Hic enim prius dixit, Quis enim te discernit? et deinde addidit, Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Posset quippe homo dicere inflatus aduersus alterum, Discernit me fides mea, iustitia mea, vel si quid aliud. Qualibus occurrens cogitationibus bonus Doctor, Quid autem habes, inquit, quod non accepisti? a quo nisi ab illo qui te discernit ab alio, cui non donauit, quod donauit tibi? Ac per", "english": "from God.' And what I said a little later, 'It is ours to believe and to will'\": behold, he speaks of the act of faith. \"'It is ours,' he says, 'to believe and to will; but it is his to give to believers the ability to work well through the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured out in our hearts.' It is true indeed, but by the same rule both are his, because he himself prepares the will, and both are ours, because it is done only when we are willing.\" Behold what Augustine retracts in these two places, namely what he said on the Epistle to the Romans, that believing and willing are ours. It is certain that he was by no means of so insane a mind at that time, namely when, after his conversion, he expounded those propositions of the aforementioned epistle, as to believe that believing and willing are ours in such a way that the rational soul, the intellect and the will would be ours, and ours from ourselves, so as not to be from God. Rather, as both the course of that exposition and that of the retraction attest, he believed then that intellect and will are ours from God as creator, but that their acts are ours from ourselves alone acting, without God further co-acting. And this is what he later retracted. His later opinion, therefore, is that God co-effects with man, properly, the acts of those powers, and not merely improperly, namely because he made those powers. Hence below, in the same author, 18, On the Predestination of the Saints, 6 [n4], treating that saying of the Apostle, \"For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive?\", he says: \"To suppose the natural gifts of God in this intention of the Apostle, whether the whole perfect nature itself, such as was given in the first creation, or whatever remnants of a vitiated nature, is, I judge, exceedingly absurd. For is it by these gifts, which are common to all men, that men are distinguished from men? For here he first said, 'Who distinguishes you?' and then added, 'What do you have that you did not receive?' A man puffed up against another might indeed say, 'My faith distinguishes me, my justice, or whatever else.' Meeting such thoughts, the good Teacher says: 'What do you have that you did not receive?' From whom, if not from him who distinguishes you from another, to whom he did not give what he gave you? And hence", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p558B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p558B", "locator_display": "558B–558C", "source_text": "hoc quisquam audet dicere, Habeo fidem ex meipso; non ergo accepi? profecto contradicit apertissimae veritati; non quia credere, vel non credere non est in arbitrio voluntatis humanae, sed in electis praeparatur voluntas a Deo; ideo ad ipsam quoque fidem quae in voluntate est pertinet; Quis enim te discernit? quid autem habes quod non accepisti? et sequitur cap. 7. Multi audiunt verbum veritatis; sed alij credunt, alij contradicunt: volunt ergo isti credere, nolunt illi. Sed cum in alijs praeparetur, in alijs non praeparetur voluntas a Domino, discernendum est vtique quid eueniat de misericordia eius, quid de iudicio. Item Augustinus super illud Psalmi 118. Manus tuae fecerunt me etc. distinguens duplicem modum factionis hominis a Deo, sic ait; Vtrum hoc secundum Adam dictum est, ex quo cum sint omnes homines propagati, quis hominum, quando ille factus est, et se factum non potest dicere originis seminisque ratione? An etiam secundum hoc recte dici potuit, Manus tuae fecerunt me et plasmauerunt me, quod vnusquisque non sine opere Dei etiam de parentibus sit, ipso creante,\n\nillis generantibus, quoniam si operatoria Dei potentia rebus subtrahatur, intereunt, nec aliquid omnino siue de mundi elementis, siue de genitoribus, siue de seminibus nascitur, si ea non operetur Deus. Item tunc habens naturalia integra posset ex ex se solo, vel per Doctorem alium sine Deo proprie coagente acquirere sibi morales et intellectuales virtutes; cuius oppositum docet Augustinus 4. contra Iulianum multis capitulis, et Beda contra eundem Iulianum 13. sicut erat superius allegatum. Vnde et Beda satis expresse contra istam responsionem sic dicit: Quod ergo dicit Iulianus multos Philosophorum patientiam, castitatem, modestiam, aliasque de naturae bono habuisse virtutes, constat quod quicunque Philosophorum Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam nescierunt; hi nullam veram virtutem, nec veram sapientiam vllam habere potuerunt: In quantum vero vel gustum aliquem sapientae cuiuslibet, vel virtutis imaginem habebant, desuper hoc totum acceperunt, non solum munere primae conditionis, verumetiam quotidiana eius gratia qui creaturam suam nec deserentem deserens,", "english": "does anyone dare to say, 'I have faith from myself; therefore I did not receive it'? Surely he contradicts the plainest truth. This is not because believing or not believing is not in the choice of the human will, but because in the elect the will is prepared by God, and so it pertains also to faith itself, which is in the will: 'For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive?'\" And it follows in chapter 7: \"Many hear the word of truth, but some believe and others contradict: these therefore will to believe, those do not will. But since in some the will is prepared by the Lord and in others it is not prepared, it must be discerned what comes of his mercy, what of his judgment.\" Again, Augustine on that verse of Psalm 118 [119], \"Your hands have made me,\" etc., distinguishing a twofold manner of man's being made by God, says: \"Was this said in respect of Adam? Since all men have been propagated from him, which of men, when that one was made, cannot say that he too was made, by reason of origin and seed? Or could it rightly be said also in this respect, 'Your hands have made me and fashioned me', that each one comes to be even from his parents not without the work of God, he creating while they beget? For if the operative power of God is withdrawn from things, they perish, and nothing at all is born, whether from the elements of the world, or from parents, or from seeds, if God does not work in them.\" Again, in that case one who had his natural endowments intact could by himself alone, or through another teacher, without God properly co-acting, acquire for himself moral and intellectual virtues. Augustine teaches the opposite of this in Against Julian 4, in many chapters, and Bede against the same Julian, 13, as was cited above. Hence Bede too says quite expressly against this response: \"As to what Julian says, that many of the philosophers had patience, chastity, modesty, and other virtues from the good of nature: it is clear that whichever of the philosophers did not know Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God, these could have no true virtue and no true wisdom. But insofar as they had any taste of wisdom or image of virtue, they received it all from above, not only by the gift of the first creation, but also by the daily grace of him who does not forsake even a creature that forsakes him [n5],", "margins": [{"id": "558B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "558B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) fit (\"is made\"; the main text has sit)."}]}, {"anchor": "p558D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p558D", "locator_display": "558D–558E", "source_text": "dona sua, prout ipse iudicauerit, hominibus et magna magnis, et parua largitur paruis. Ad illud autem quod pro ista opinione adducitur, potest faciliter responderi, quod ille est vnus bonus et verus modus loquendi, apud quos fuerit consuetus; sed per hoc non probatur, quin formae elementares moueant elementa: Certum est enim, quod corrupto generante, et impediens remouente, elementa mouentur; ergo ob aliquo motore, et non a generante, vel prohibens remouente, quia neutrum illorum est, et per consequens nihil facit, causat, aut mouet; est igitur forma mouens. In omni quoque motu mouens et motum sent simul, vt docetur 7. Phys. 8. et post. et 2. de Anima 74. sed neutrum praedictorum est simul cum elemento moto, quia omnino non est. Tunc etiam elementa mouentur naturaliter, ergo a natura: Ipsa enim, vt docetur 2. Phys. 3. est principium et causa mouendi et quiescendi in quo primum est; et haec est duplex, scilicet materia, et forma, vt ibi ostenditur consequenter: sed materia prima non est principium motiuum localiter, vt nulli Philosopho est ignotum,\n\nergo forma elementi naturaliter ipsum mouet. Per idem quoque quod elementum quiescit in loco suo naturali mouetur ad eum: sed ibi quiescit per formam suam. Maior etiam terra vel ignis descendit velocius vel ascendit; ergo non tantum ab extrinseco, sed ab in• seca sibi forma. Corpora quoque mixta mouentur ad motum elementi dominant• •o ipsum elementum dominans per se naturaliter habet motum. Ipse etiam idem Philosophus 4. Phys. tractans de vacuo 71. et post, supponit planissime, elementa moueri naturaliter ex seipsis: et similiter 1. de Coelo, vbi reprobat infinitum. Auerroes quoque super loca praedicta vult idem: et super 3. de Coelo. 28. et super 4.22. ostendit diffuse quod in corporibus simplicibus, motor et motum non distinguntur in actu ab inuicem, et quod formae eorum sunt", "english": "and who bestows his gifts as he himself has judged, great ones to the great and small ones to the small.\" To what is adduced for this opinion, it can easily be answered that that is one good and true way of speaking among those with whom it was customary. But this does not prove that elemental forms do not move the elements. For it is certain that when the generator has been destroyed and the impediment removed, the elements are moved. Therefore they are moved by some mover, and not by the generator or by the one removing the preventer, because neither of these exists, and consequently does nothing, causes nothing, and moves nothing. So there is a moving form. Again, in every motion the mover and the moved are together, as is taught in Physics 7, 8 and following, and in On the Soul 2, 74. But neither of the aforesaid is together with the moved element, because it does not exist at all. Then also, the elements are moved naturally, therefore by nature. For nature, as is taught in Physics 2, 3, is the principle and cause of moving and being at rest in that in which it is primarily, and this is twofold, namely matter and form, as is shown there in what follows. But prime matter is not a principle of motion with respect to place, as is unknown to no Philosopher. Therefore the form of the element naturally moves it. By the same token, an element that rests in its natural place is moved to it, but it rests there through its form. Again, the larger the earth or fire, the faster it descends or ascends. Therefore it is moved not only from something extrinsic but from a form intrinsic to it. Mixed bodies also are moved to the motion of the dominant element, so the dominant element itself has motion naturally through itself. The same Philosopher too, in Physics 4, treating the void, 71 and following, supposes most plainly that the elements are moved naturally from themselves, and similarly in On the Heavens 1, where he refutes the infinite. Averroes too on the aforesaid passages wants the same; and on On the Heavens 3, 28, and on 4, 22, he shows at length that in simple bodies mover and moved are not distinguished in act from each other, and that their forms are", "margins": [{"id": "558D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Response to the objections."}, {"id": "558E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p559A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p559A", "locator_display": "559A–559B", "source_text": "motores eorum; et glossat ibi processum Philosophi in 7. Physicorum probantis quod nihil mouet se, sed quod omne quod mouetur, mouetur ab alio, isto modo; Aristoteles, inquit, non intendebat per istum sermonem quem scripsit in 7. Physicorum, nisi declarare quod nihil mouet se, scilicet ita quod motor sit idem cum moto, et eodem modo, et ideo posuit, quod quicquid quiescit per quietem alterius, necesse est vt motus eius non sit nisi ab altero, id est, necesse est, vt motor in eo differat essentia et definitione a moto, licet non differat in subiecto. Et similiter potest glossari similis processus Philosophi 8. Physicorum, et 4. de Coelo superius memoratus. Item si elementa non haberent ex se, sed tantum a generante, vel impediens remouente, motum seu motionem localē, eadem ratione nec aliquam aliam actionem: ergo nec ignis ex se combureret, vel luceret vtroque illorum corrupto, plurimumue remoto. Mirabilis quoque modus loquendi videtur, et a veritate nimis extraneus dicere, quod lucerna, seu candela socij mei, quae illuminauit lucernam meam, seu candelam illuminantem studium\n\nmeum, illuminat studium meum cum camera sua, forsitan nimis dister, murisque lapideis includatur, vel praedicta eius lucerna forsitan extinguatur. Per similem etiam rationem, quicquid nunc scribo Oxoniae, scriberet pater meus Cicestriae, quia genuit me scribentem, imo avus, et proavus, ac caeteri genitores, ipsi quoque primi parentes nunc facerent omnia facta nostra. Illud autem Anselmi non mouet, quia non dicit quod Deus illo modo tantum efficitactus nostros, sed illo modo transumtine, et alio proprio, sicut capitulum proximum recitauit. Ad rationem dicendum, quod licet Deus sit omnipotens, nihil tamen potest facere quod contradictionem includit, sed sicut contradictionem includit aliquam naturam esse sine Deo per se, et proprie eam actualiter et specialiter conseruante, sicut secundum primi docebat: sic vel amplius contradictionem includit aliquam naturam agere, seu mouere sine Deo per se et proprie actualiter et specialiter coagente et similiter commouente, sicut tertium et quartum primi plenius ostendebant. Et sic respondet sanctus Thomas de potentia Dei", "english": "their movers. And he glosses there the procedure of the Philosopher in Physics 7, who proves that nothing moves itself but that everything that is moved is moved by another, in this way: \"Aristotle,\" he says, \"did not intend by this discourse which he wrote in Physics 7 anything except to declare that nothing moves itself, namely such that the mover is the same as the moved and in the same respect. And therefore he laid down that whatever is at rest through the rest of another, its motion must be only from another. That is, the mover in it must differ in essence and definition from the moved, though it need not differ in subject.\" The similar procedure of the Philosopher in Physics 8 and On the Heavens 4, mentioned above, can be glossed in the same way. Again, if the elements did not have local motion or movement from themselves but only from the generator or from the one removing the impediment, then by the same reasoning they would have no other action either. So fire would neither burn nor shine of itself, with both of them destroyed or very far removed. It also seems a wondrous way of speaking, and much too foreign to the truth, to say that the lamp or candle of my colleague, which lit my lamp or candle that lights my study, lights my study\n\nmy study even though his room is perhaps too far off and shut in by stone walls, or that lamp of his is perhaps put out [n6]. By a similar reasoning also, whatever I now write at Oxford, my father would write at Chichester [n7], because he begot me writing; indeed my grandfather and great-grandfather and the other progenitors, and even the first parents themselves, would now do all our deeds. But that saying of Anselm does not move us, because he does not say that God brings about our acts only in that way, but in that way figuratively, and in another, proper way, as the preceding chapter recited. To the argument it must be said that although God is omnipotent, he nevertheless can do nothing that includes a contradiction. [n8] But just as it includes a contradiction that some nature exist without God per se and properly conserving it actually and specially, as the second of the first taught, so, or even more, it includes a contradiction that some nature act or move without God per se and properly co-acting and likewise co-moving it, actually and specially, as the third and fourth of the first showed more fully. And so St Thomas answers in On the Power of God,", "margins": [{"id": "559A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes."}, {"id": "559A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) totalem (\"total\"; the main text has localē)."}, {"id": "559B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) -tiuo (i.e. transumtiuo, agreeing with modo)."}, {"id": "559B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Response to the argument (partly lost in the facsimile)."}, {"id": "559B·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) demonstrabant (\"demonstrated\"; the main text has ostendebant); (source) Thomas."}]}, {"anchor": "p559C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/22/#p559C", "locator_display": "559C–559D", "source_text": "quaestione 20. qua quaeritur, Vtrum Deus operetur in omni operatione naturae, ad simile argumentum pro parte negatiua, quinto loco adductum: quandocunque inquit arguens, Deus aliquam naturam instituit, ex hoc ipso dat ei omnia illa quae sunt de ratione illius naturae. Similiter ex hoc ipso quod facit hominem, det ei animam rationalem: sed de ratione virtutis est quod sit principium agendi, cum virtus sit vltimum potentiae quae est principium agendi in aliud, secundum quod est aliud, vt dicitur in 5. Metaphys. ergo ex hoc ipso, quod virtutes naturales rebus indidit, dedit eis quod operationes perficerent: non ergo oportet quod vlterius in rebus naturalibus operetur. Et post septimo loco adducit aliud argumentum simile huic quinto, ad quorum primum sic respondet; Ad quintum dicendum quod de ratione virtutis inferioris est, quod sit aliquo modo operationis principium in suo ordine, id est, vt agat vt instrumentum superioris virtutis: vnde exclusa superiori virtute, inferior virtus operationem non habet. Et consequenter ad aliud sic respondet; Ad septimum dicendum, quod virtus\n\nnaturalis, quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis vt quaedam forma, habens esse ratum et firmum in natura; sed id quod a Deo sit in re naturali quo actualiter agat, est vt intentio sola habens quoddam esse incompletum, per modum quo colores sunt in aere, et virtus artis in instrumento artificis. Sicut igitur securi per artem dari potuit acumen, vt esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit, quod vis artis esset in ea quasi quaedam forma in ea permanens, nisi haberet intellectum: ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria, vt forma in ipsa permanens, non autem vis qua agit ad esse, vt instrumentum primae causae, nisi daretur ei quod esset vniuersale essendi principium: nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit vt moueret seipsam, nec vt conseruaret se in esse. Vnde sicut patet, quod instrumento artificis conferri non potuit, quod operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit, quod operaretur absque operatione diuina.", "english": "question 20 [n9], where it is asked whether God works in every operation of nature, to a similar argument on the negative side, adduced in fifth place. \"Whenever,\" says the objector, \"God institutes some nature, by that very fact he gives it all the things that belong to the notion of that nature. Likewise, by the very fact that he makes a man, he gives him a rational soul. But it belongs to the notion of a power that it be a principle of acting, since a power is the limit of the potency that is a principle of acting upon another, insofar as it is other, as is said in Metaphysics 5. Therefore, by the very fact that he implanted natural powers in things, he gave them to complete their operations. Therefore it is not necessary that he work further in natural things.\" And later, in seventh place, he adduces another argument similar to this fifth, to the first of which he answers thus: \"To the fifth it must be said that it belongs to the notion of a lower power that it be in some way a principle of operation in its own order, that is, that it act as an instrument of the higher power. Hence, with the higher power excluded, the lower power has no operation.\" And consequently he answers the other thus: \"To the seventh it must be said that natural power, which is conferred on natural things in their institution, is in them as a kind of form, having firm and settled being in nature. But what is made by God in a natural thing, by which it actually acts, is as a mere intention [n10], having a kind of incomplete being, in the way colors are in the air and the power of art in the artisan's instrument. Just as, therefore, an axe could be given sharpness through art, so as to be a form remaining in it, but could not be given that the force of the art should be in it as a kind of form remaining in it, unless it had intellect: so a natural thing could be given its proper power as a form remaining in it, but not the force by which it acts toward being, as an instrument of the first cause, unless it were given that it be the universal principle of being. Nor again could a natural power be given that it move itself, or that it conserve itself in being. Hence, just as it is clear that to the artisan's instrument it could not be conferred that it operate without the motion of the art, so to a natural thing it could not be conferred that it operate without divine operation.\"", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}