De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 20
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 540B–554E; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

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CHAPTER 20. That God is the necessary co-effector [n1] of every act of a created will.

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With these things thus shown beforehand, the due order now requires that we go on to show that God is the necessary co-effector of every act of a created will. The Nemphrotean and Pelagian heresy barked out the opposite of this. [n2] Josephus, for example, says in Antiquities of the Jews 1, 2: "Because they were seething with a multitude of young men, God again made them move away from their own selves. They did not think they had good things through his favor, but believed that their own strength was the cause of their riches. Hence they went on to be disobedient to the will of God." And further on, 3: "He made them," he says, "exalted to the injury and contempt of God. Nemphrot, son of Cham, son of Noe, was bolder than the rest and strongest of hand. He persuaded them not to ascribe to God the fact that happiness came to men through him, but to ascribe it to this, that it was supplied to them by their own power. He led his kinsmen of his own race into the cause of tyranny, presuming that he alone could call men back from the fear of God and place their hope in their own power. The multitude, for its part, was inclined to obey the commands of Nemphrot, thinking it a grievous servitude to obey God."

Pelagius also, in the third book For Free Choice [n3], distinguishes three things in man, namely to be able, to will, and to be, that is, possibility, will, and action. The first, he said, man has from God and from the grace of God, but the other two from himself alone, without God. Whence also blessed Augustine, in 1 Against Pelagius and Caelestius [n4] on the grace of Christ, and on original sin 2, writes: "Since he sets up and distinguishes three things, possibility, will, and action, he confesses that the first of these three is given by the Creator of nature, but asserts that the other two are ours. He attributes them to us in such a way that he contends they come to us from no one but ourselves." And further on, 3: "We ought indeed to know that he believes neither our will nor our action to be helped by divine assistance. He holds that we have from God only the possibility of will and of work, and this alone of the three. It is as though this were the weak thing, which God himself placed in nature, while the other two, which he wished to be ours, are so firm and strong and self-sufficient that they need no help of his. And so, on his view, God does not help us to will, and does not help us to act; he helps us only to be able to will and to act. Other works of the same holy Father show this in many places." Therefore, with God, who works in us to will and to accomplish, directing our acts according to his good pleasure, this error must be attacked without fear.

Moreover, according to the two preceding chapters, every act of will is something, and not eternal; therefore it is made. It is made by a created will, as the Corollary of the third of this second teaches, but not by that will alone, because by the third of the first God's efficient agency is necessarily required there. Therefore God is there a necessary co-effector, that is, a co-effector necessarily required along with the created will. All the arguments proving the principal conclusion of that third chapter prove this one likewise. Of all of them, let this one suffice for now. It seems less to preserve a thing in being than to produce it from non-being into being. But by the second of the first no creature can preserve anything in being without God's also preserving it, and so neither can it produce anything into being. And according to the two preceding chapters, an act of will is some thing, not nothing. Again, it is less to persevere finally, or for a time, in a good act of will, or in any good whatever, than to effect that good. But according to the 8th, 9th and 10th

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of this second, no one can persevere in good, finally or for a time, without God's help. Again, every act of will is a certain motion. Therefore by the fourth of the first God there necessarily moves along with it. The arguments and Authorities of that chapter also show this sufficiently, and of them these two are enough for the present. To be is less than to move, and by the second of the first no creature suffices of itself to be; therefore neither to move. Again, if man could will and move sufficiently from his own form without God's co-moving, any other natural thing could likewise do so from its form. Then no way would remain, taken from motion, to prove one first mover, which is against Philosophy and Theology alike, as the chapter just mentioned argued. This is true not only of natural things but also of voluntary things. Whence the Philosopher, in On Good Fortune 2 [n5], as the 29th of the first recounted more fully, proves that appetite is not the cause by which anyone is fortunate, because there is some cause of that appetite, and that cause is either nature or fortune.

And having rejected the first, he adds, for the rejection of the second: if it is fortune, fortune will be the cause of all things, namely of human acts. For fortune would be the cause even of what is understanding and deliberating. "For the one deliberating was not deliberating even before he deliberated, but there is some principle; nor did the one understanding understand before he understood, and so on to infinity. Therefore the principle of understanding is not intellect, nor of deliberating deliberation. What, then, other than fortune? Therefore all things are from fortune." And he answers: "Either there is some principle outside which there is nothing else, and that principle, because it is such in being, can make such. What is sought, however, is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul? Clearly, as in the whole, God. For in some way he moves all that in us is divine. But the principle of reason is not reason but something better. What, then, will be better than knowledge and intellect, except God? For virtue is the organ of intellect." See that God is the moving power, as an artisan, and that art itself, and intellect, is the organ moved by him. Many Philosophical and Theological Authorities cited in chapter 4 of the first bear witness to this. Indeed God himself teaches the same through Isaiah, chapter 10,

where he calls Sennacherib the rod of his fury, the staff, the axe and the saw. The Gloss there says that just as these inanimate instruments do nothing of themselves but only through him who moves them, so Sennacherib too acted not of himself but in the power of God. Jerome follows this out beautifully and at length in book 4 on Isaiah, as the 32nd of the first recounted more fully in all its parts. Avicenna also says, in his Metaphysics 10, 1, as the 29th of the first cited more fully: "Our wills exist after they were not; but whatever exists after it was not has a cause; therefore every will of ours has a cause. The cause of this will does not proceed to infinity but to certain things that befall from outside, earthly or heavenly; but earthly things come back to heavenly; therefore the sum of all these comes about necessarily from the necessity of the divine will."

The most renowned Abraham, patriarch, philosopher and prophet, also reproved and refuted this error by a similar argument, as appears from the 35th part of the first corollary of the first. For this reason Saint Thomas too, in On the Christian Religion, or on Faith, Hope, and Charity, to Raynaldus [n6], 129, says: "Since everything changeable and multiform is reduced to some immovable principle as to its cause, while the intellect and will of man appear changeable and multiform, they must be reduced to some higher cause, immovable and uniform. And since they are not reduced, as to their cause, to the celestial bodies, they must be reduced to higher causes." And in the following chapter: "Since second causes act only through the power of the first cause, as instruments act through the direction of art, it is necessary that all other agents, through which God fulfils the order of his governance, act by the power of God himself. The acting of each of them is therefore caused by God, as the motion of the movable by the motion of the mover. But mover and moved must be together; therefore God must be present within every agent, as acting in it, while he moves it to act." He also proves and holds this, equally of natural and of voluntary things, in his little book of questions On the Power of God, question 20, as is more fully recounted in the proof of the second corollary of the first chapter of the first book. He does likewise in book 3 Against the Gentiles,

and in many other places. Again, John Scotus on Sentences 1, dist. 2, showing that the first efficient cause is intelligent and willing, argues in this way: "Something is caused contingently; therefore the first cause causes contingently; therefore it causes willing. Proof of the first consequence: every second cause causes in so far as it is moved by the first. Therefore if the first moves necessarily, every other is moved necessarily, and everything is caused necessarily. Therefore if any cause moves contingently, the first will also move contingently, because a second cause does not cause except in the power of the first cause, in so far as it is moved by it. Proof of the second consequence: there is no principle of operating contingently except will, or something accompanying will, because everything else acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently." And he at once raises an objection against the first consequence in this way: "Our willing can cause something contingently; therefore it is not required that the first cause cause it contingently." And against the second consequence,

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namely, "It causes contingently, therefore willing," he objects thus: "Things moved naturally can be impeded, and so the opposite will come about contingently and by force." To the first objection he answers thus: "It must be said that if God is the first mover or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows about that will as about the others. For whether God moves it necessarily and immediately, or something else does so immediately, and that other moves necessarily by the fact that it is moved, it follows in the end that what is next to the will moves the will necessarily, even if what is next is the will itself. And so it will will necessarily; and it further follows, which is impossible, that God causes each of his creatures necessarily." To the second objection he answers thus: "I say that if another cause can impede this one, it can do so only in the power of a higher cause, and so up to the first cause. If the first cause moves its immediate cause necessarily, there will be necessity up to that point; therefore it will impede necessarily, and consequently no other cause can cause naturally." Further on, on distinction 39, he recounts these things more briefly in these words, dist. 2: "It has been proved that God is intelligent

and willing through the contingency of things, because there can be no contingency in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the first cause is contingently related to the cause next to it, or to its effect. This was proved briefly from the fact that a moving cause, in so far as it is moved, if it is moved necessarily, moves necessarily. Every second cause, therefore, which produces in so far as it is moved by the first, moves necessarily the cause next to it, or produces its effect. The whole ordering of causes up to the last effect will therefore produce necessarily, if the relation of the first cause to the cause next to it is necessary." The well-known first proposition of On Causes amply bears this witness: "Every primary cause is more influential upon its effect than a universal second cause," together with its commentary, as the second of the first cited more fully. For this reason also Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned and excommunicated two articles contrary to the truth stated above [n7]. The first of them says that in efficient causes the second cause has an action which it does not receive from the first cause. The second asserts that in

efficient causes, when the first ceases, the second does not cease from operating, provided the second operates according to its nature. The third article he does not condemn outright but qualifies [n8]. It says that all voluntary motions are reduced to the First Mover. This is an error, he says, unless it is understood of the First Mover simply uncaused, and, as for the motion, understood according to substance, not according to deformity. Again, by the 22nd of the first, God necessarily has an act of will about each act of a created will, and not a nilling [n9], because then it would not occur, as the 10th of the first teaches; therefore a willing. And by the same 10th, that willing is of necessity efficacious. Therefore it is necessary that it effect each such act. Indeed, if the opposite is granted, the will of God would not be efficacious, nor God omnipotent. For suppose that God wills the created will to produce its act. Then if God does nothing there, but the created will alone, that will can freely, of itself alone, fail to produce its act, and consequently frustrate the divine will and likewise maim its omnipotence. For if God wills something to be done, and it is not done, God cannot

make it be done. For from the opposite of a conclusion together with the major, the opposite of the minor follows, as the same 10th of the first deduced more fully. For these reasons John Scotus holds this conclusion on Sentences 2, dist. 37, second question, which asks whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its willing, so that God has no immediate efficiency with respect to it, but only a mediate one. Having recited the opinion that takes the affirmative side, he says: "This opinion is argued against in two ways. First, because from it follows that God would not be by nature foreknowing of future things; second, that he would not be the best. Proof of the first consequence: God has no knowledge of future contingents except because he knows with certitude the determination of his will with respect to them, which will is immutable and devoid of potentiality. But if the will is the total cause with respect to its own willing, however much the divine will is posited as determined to one part of those things that depend on the created will, the created will will be able to will otherwise, and so certitude does not follow from knowledge of

the determination of the divine will. Proof of the second consequence: whatever the best wills, that happens. But if he wills that my willing be, and that willing is in the power of my will as of a total cause related contingently to it, that will can of itself be determined indifferently to one part or the other; and so that to which the divine will determines it can fail to occur." Again, if the created will alone effected its act, not all human actions and things would be ruled by divine providence, contrary to the 27th, 30th, 31st and 32nd chapters of the first book. For if God provides for such actions, that is, voluntarily, and his will is efficacious by the tenth of the first book, then does not the divine will effect all such actions? Again, otherwise many things could be casual [n10] and fortuitous

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absolutely, since this would hold in respect of secondary causes, and also of the first cause: the 29th of the first. For this reason also Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned two erroneous articles. The first of them said that human acts are not governed by divine providence; the second asserted that some things can happen by chance with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause, because then they would happen from necessity. Again, if the created will alone could produce its act, it could alone produce at one time a more intense act and at another a weaker one, and so it could alone intensify its act and its good merit, contrary to the 46th of the first. Again, if the created will alone could produce its act, the created intellect could likewise. It could then understand, compose and divide, reason discursively, and know many truths without the help of the agent intellect, who is God. This is against the Philosophers, as the sixth of the first cited more fully. For how could a man ignorant of the sciences, both in habit and in act, seek them out skillfully by his own study

and likewise find them, unless he were directed by someone knowing in act and teaching him? For this cannot happen by fortune or chance. Hence Averroes, on On Sleep and Waking, assigning the cause of knowledge acquired in sleep, says: "It is clear that no acting mode precedes this knowledge which is acquired in sleep; whether a preparing mode precedes it is doubtful. And since this knowledge is acquired after ignorance, and after it was in potency, and without any preceding knowledge, it is clear that it is acquired in the same way as first propositions are acquired. And since this is so, it is necessary that the agent of them be the same, and of the same kind. For everything that passes from potency into act has an agent which is of the genus of that thing which passes from potency into act. Therefore it is necessary that what produces this knowledge be an intellect in act, and this intellect gives universal principles in speculative matters; its existence has been shown in the book On the Soul." Again, God makes true dreams in the intellect of a man asleep, and true prophecy in the intellect of a man awake, as the sixth of the first taught;

therefore God is the intellect acting human knowledge, not through a celestial body, as some imagine, but through himself, as could be shown in many ways. But for brevity I adduce only Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemning and excommunicating a certain article in these words: "that God, or an intelligence, does not infuse knowledge into the human soul in sleep except by means of a celestial body." Again, the human intellect is of itself potential, and in potency to understanding. Therefore, for it to pass into the act of understanding, it necessarily requires something actual that moves it from this potency into this act. This cannot be a body, nor anything bodily, nor anything that is not an intellect, nor an intellect not in act, as it is easy to show of each. It is therefore an intellect in act; and so this is the intellect acting all our understanding. By this argument Aristotle shows this conclusion in On the Soul 3, 17 and following, and Averroes likewise on that passage, and on Metaphysics 12, 18, and on On Sleep and Waking; and Avicenna in On the Soul 5, 5 and 6; and Algazel, Physics 5

of his work, 1 and 6. A further article was likewise condemned and excommunicated by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in these words: "that the agent intellect is not joined to our possible intellect." These authorities, however, seem to differ somewhat. For Aristotle and Averroes hold that this agent intellect is God, as is clear from chapter 6 of the first; Avicenna and Algazel hold that it is the lowest intelligence, as is clear from the places now cited, and also from Metaphysics 9 of Avicenna, 3 and 5, and from the Metaphysics of Algazel. But this is erroneous if it is understood to mean that this intelligence alone, without God, is the principal agent of human understanding. For since that intelligence is of determinate and finite entity, it is necessarily of like activity. So there could be so many men that it would not suffice to produce understanding in all of them at once, although all could understand at once. Again, since mover and moved must be together, as the Philosopher teaches in Physics 7, and men can understand simultaneously in act in any number of places however far apart, and no such Intelligence can of itself be simultaneously in any number of places however far apart, since it is of itself of

determinate entity, therefore no such intelligence is the agent intellect. The same could be argued by arguments taken from motion, and by many other Philosophical and Theological arguments; but let these few suffice. It is necessary, then, that the agent intellect be of infinite activity, immense, unlocalized, present everywhere, and immovable in every way; and no finite intelligence can be such, only God, infinite in every manner. Nor can anyone say that the agent intellect is necessary to the possible intellect in order to abstract material intentions [n11] from matter, strip them bare, and in some way infuse them into it, but that once these are had it does not need his help and can do everything by itself. For the arguments given above conclude that when the possible intellect is understanding or knowing in potency, then for it to pass into act it necessarily requires some mover in act. So the Philosopher too says in On the Soul 3, 18: "There is an intellect of this kind, to become all things, and another to make all things, like a sort of habit, like light. For in a way light too makes colors that are in potency colors in act."

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On this passage the translation which Averroes expounds reads thus: "It is necessary that in it, that is, in the soul, there be an intellect which is intellect in so far as it becomes all things, and an intellect which is intellect in so far as it makes it understand all things; and the intellect in so far as it understands all things is like a certain habit, which is like light, etc." On the words "and the intellect in so far as it understands, etc." Averroes says: "By this he means the agent intelligence. By what he said, 'understands all things, like a certain habit,' he means that it makes everything understood in potency understood in act, after it was in potency, as a habit in form." Avicenna also says, in On the Soul 5, 5: "The cause of giving intelligible form is nothing but an intelligence in act, with which are the principles of the abstracted intelligible forms. Its relation to our souls is like the relation of the sun to our sight. For as the sun is seen of itself in act, and what was not seen in act is seen by its light in act, so is the disposition of this intelligence in respect of our souls." And after much said on this subject in 5 and 6, he says at the end: "It is possible, then, that the soul of some man, because it is clear and clings to intelligible principles, be so inspired as to be kindled in intelligence to receive all

questions [n12] from the agent intelligence, either suddenly or almost suddenly, firmly impressed, not probably but in the order which comprehends the middle terms. And this is one mode of prophecy, which is higher than all powers, whence it is fittingly called a holy power, and is a higher degree among human powers." Algazel also says, in his Physics 5, that the agent intelligence is always acting upon our souls without ceasing. And in chapter 6 he says: "The soul is made clear to the point that it is joined with the agent intelligence, so that knowledge is poured into it. For there is no investigator who does not discover many things by himself. For the conclusion first passes through his mind, and then he is exercised toward knowing the middle term, as if it came into his soul, and he knows not whence; or he first perceives the middle term, and then the conclusion is presented to him; and every contingent thing needs a cause from which it comes about. Hence the soul

needs the intelligence; and it is not impossible for these and like things to be perceived. When this has been understood, then it is not impossible to arrive thus even at the last of the things that are understood, whether in a long time or a short. But he to whom all these things are revealed as understood in a short time, without teaching, is called most wise or a Prophet; and this is magnificence or a miracle." The sixth chapter of the first recounted a similar opinion from the Platonists, from Aristotle and from Averroes. Again, according to all these Philosophers, and according to the truth itself, as bodily light brings about bodily vision, so some spiritual light brings about spiritual vision; and this light is the agent intellect, or some power of it. And this opinion of the pagans agrees with the philosophy of the Catholics. For Wisdom 7 writes of uncreated Wisdom itself in this way: "Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things, and reaches everywhere because of its purity. For it is a vapor of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the clarity of almighty God; for it is the brightness of eternal light, and a spotless mirror

of God's majesty; and though it is one, it can do all things, and remaining in itself it renews all things; and through notions [n13] it passes into holy souls; it makes friends of God and Prophets, for God loves no one but him who dwells with wisdom. For she is more beautiful than the sun, and compared with light she is found to be above every arrangement of the stars." And John 1: "God is light"; and John 1: "He enlightens every man coming into this world." And Proverbs 2: "The Lord gives wisdom, and from his mouth come knowledge and prudence." Many similar things occur very often in Scripture. Again, if a man, once the intentions had been stripped bare, could do the rest from himself, he could discover very many truths from himself, by his own study or through another Teacher, without God. Yet that same Averroes, on On the Heavens 1, comment 32, where it is shown that circular motion has no contrary, says: "I, however, tarried a long time, in which I did not understand the final explanation of this passage, but God led me to the truth." Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, also says on Posterior Analytics 1, 1: "I call 'teaching' not only what we hear from the mouth of a Teacher,

but I take writing in the place of a Teacher; and, if we speak more truly, neither does he who sounds outwardly teach, nor does the letter of Scripture seen outwardly teach; these two only move and rouse; but the true Teacher is he who illumines the mind inwardly and shows the truth." With this many distinguished testimonies, set out in 38 of the first, clearly agree. Saint Thomas also, in On the Christian Religion, or on Faith, Hope, and Charity, 129, having shown how man is moved to understand by man, namely because an intelligible matter is set before him [n14], and how by an Angel, which is in two ways, namely because the object is set before man through an Angel, and because man's natural light is strengthened through the light of the Angel, adds: "God, however, helps man to understand not only on the side of the object, which is set before man by God, or by an addition of light, but also by this, that the natural light itself

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of man, by which he is intellectual, is from God; and also by this, that since he is himself the first truth, from which all other truth has its certitude, as second propositions have theirs from first propositions demonstrated in the sciences [n15], nothing can be made certain to the intellect except by divine power, just as conclusions in the sciences are not certain except by the power of the first principles." Blessed Augustine also, in the whole of his book On the Teacher, shows this one conclusion principally and by intention, that in all teaching God, as the supreme Teacher, teaches all knowledge. Whence he also says in Retractations 1, 12: "I wrote a book [n16] whose title is On the Teacher, in which it is discussed and inquired and found that no one teaches man knowledge except God, according to what is written in the Gospel: One is your Teacher." And above, in the 4th of the same [n17], he says that for this reason even those unskilled in certain disciplines, when they are well questioned, answer truly [n18] about them, because the light of eternal reason is present to them, when they can grasp it, where they behold these immutable truths. Also in the Sentences of Prosper, chapter 382, headed "On knowing creatures that are not seen": "The human [n19] soul, being naturally joined to the divine reasons on which it depends, when it says that this is better done than that, if it says it truly and sees what it says, sees in those supernal reasons. For it would not discern by thought what ought to have been done, except in those reasons by which all things were made." And in On Free Choice 2, ch. 14 and after, in many chapters, he shows that there is one common truth by which all true things are true, and by which all true things that are known are known. Whence in 21 he says: "This truth, then, of which we have long been speaking, and in which, being one, we behold so many things, you think to be higher than our mind is." And in chapter 22: "For this truth shows all the good things that are true, which men who understand, each according to his capacity, choose, whether singly or several, to enjoy. But just as those who choose in the light of the sun what they gladly look upon, and are gladdened by that sight; and if some of them happen to be endowed with sharper and healthy and very strong eyes, they gaze on nothing more gladly than on the sun itself, which also lights up the other things in which weaker eyes delight; so the strong and vigorous gaze of the mind, when many things, both true and unchangeable— [n20]

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…by sure reason, it will direct itself to the very truth by which all things are shown. Clinging to it, it forgets the rest, as it were, and in it enjoys all things at once. The same Augustine, in City of God 8, chapter 8, says that the Philosophers, whom we see, not undeservedly, set above the rest by fame and glory, said that the light of minds for learning all things is that very God by whom all things were made. And in chapter 9: "Whichever Philosophers, then, have thought these things about the supreme and true God, that he is both the maker of created things, and the light for things to be known and the good for things to be done, and that from him we have both the principle of nature and the truth of teaching and the happiness of life, whether they are more fittingly called Platonists, or give their sect any other name, whether Ionic, or Italic (on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans), or the Atlantic Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or others are found who have seen and taught this, we put all of them before the rest, and we confess them to be nearer to us." And in chapter 10: "This, then, is the reason why we prefer these to the rest: while other Philosophers wore out their talents and their studies in seeking the causes of things, and what the manner of learning and of living should be, these, having come to know God, discovered where were both the cause of the established universe, and the light for perceiving truth, and the fountain for drinking happiness. Whether, therefore, these Platonists, or any other Philosophers of whatever nations, think such things about God, they think with us." The same, in Confessions 5, chapter 6, says: "You had already taught me, my God, in wondrous and hidden ways; and for that reason I believe that you taught me, because it is true, and no one other than you is a teacher of the true, wherever and from wherever it has shone forth."

Likewise the blessed Gregory, Moralia 7, chapter 25, on that of Job 37, "Are not your garments white, when the earth is blown upon by the south wind?"[n21] understanding by the garments the hearers, by the earth the heart or mind, and by the south wind the Holy Spirit, says: "Let teachers by no means claim for themselves that they see their hearers advance to the highest things through their exhortation. For unless the Holy Spirit fills their hearts, the voice of the teachers sounds in vain at the ears of the body. They can form the voice of the master outwardly, but this they cannot imprint inwardly. For neither is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase." The blessed Ambrose also, on that of 1 Corinthians 12, "No one can say 'Lord Jesus' except in the Holy Spirit," says: "For whatever is false is from man, and whatever is true, by whomever it is said, is said by the Holy Spirit."[n22] Hence also in John 11, when the saying of Caiaphas has been recited, namely, "It is expedient for you that one man die for the people, and the whole nation not perish," it adds: "But this he did not say of himself, but, being high priest of that year, he prophesied." And Origen, as he is cited in the Gloss, on that of Exodus 4, "I beg you, Lord, I am not eloquent," and further on, "I will be in your mouth," says: "The mouth of those who speak the words of God, God opens; the mouth of those who speak a lie, false witness, buffoonery, and foulness, and also of whisperers and detractors, and of those who speak idle things, the Devil opens." Also in the third book of Kings, chapter 3,[n23] when the Lord offered Solomon to give him whatever he wished to ask, and Solomon asked for wisdom and the Lord gave it, it is amply shown by a magnificent example[n24]

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that all wisdom is from the Lord God; Ecclesiasticus 1. The books of the law, of wisdom and of the prophets also attest this very often and very clearly. Not only speculative or political wisdom is given by the Lord, but also [n25] manual wisdom, which is called mechanical art. Hence in Exodus 31 the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: "Behold, I have called by name Bezalel, and I have filled him with the spirit of God, with wisdom and understanding and knowledge in every work, to devise skillfully whatever can be made of gold, and silver, and bronze, marble, and gems, and the variety of woods; and I have given him as companion Aholiab, and in the heart of every skilled man I have put wisdom, that they may make all that I commanded you: the tabernacle of the covenant and the ark of the testament," etc. Nor is the wisdom of the faithful alone given by the Lord God, but that of unbelievers too. Hence the Apostle, in Romans 1, speaking literally of the Philosophers of the Gentiles, says: "What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has revealed it to them; for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that were made, and also his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse; because, when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God, nor give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For, saying that they were wise, they became fools." Behold that God revealed his knowledge to them, for which they ought also to have given thanks to him; and they would not have had to do this unless they had received it from him, as the 31st of the first teaches. "Saying that they were wise, they became fools." But why, when what they said was true? Because they said that they were wise, and this from themselves, not from that fountain of wisdom from which all wisdom is derived like a shining river, who also makes his sun rise on the good and the evil, and sends rain on the just and the unjust, Matthew 5. Hence Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter 7: "'Saying that they were wise,'" he says, "which is to be understood no otherwise than that, attributing this very thing to themselves, they became fools." To the same effect is the authority of the venerable Bede against Julian 13, cited above in this second book. And in Isaiah 10 it is said by the Lord: "I will visit the fruit of the magnificent heart of the king of Assur,

[546C–546D]
and the glory of the height of his eyes. For he said, 'By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom I have understood.'" Against this pestilential poison of pride the Lord has therefore prepared a saving antidote: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom," he says, "and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him who glories glory in this, that he knows and knows me, because I am the Lord who do mercy, judgment and justice in the earth," Jeremiah 9. It is as if he were saying plainly that man does none of these things for himself from himself, but God does all these things for all, according to mercy and judgment. The authority of the venerable Bede against Julian 13, cited above, agrees well with this; and he says in other passages of the same work, above in the same 7th, that Julian uttered blasphemy in saying that the mind of man can of itself become wise. All this, moreover, the authorities of both Testaments attest in harmony. Hence in Exodus 4 the Lord said to Moses:

"Who made the mouth of man? Gloss: outwardly or inwardly; or who fashioned the mute? Gloss: in fact, or in spirit;[n26] and the deaf, and the seeing, and the blind? Is it not I? Go, therefore, and I will be with you in your mouth, and I will teach you what you shall say." And Matthew 10: "Do not think how or what you are to speak; for what you are to speak will be given to you in that hour. For it is not you who speak, but the spirit of your Father who speaks in you." And John 16: "When that spirit of truth has come, he will teach you all truth." And 1 John 2: "The anointing teaches you about all things." And Psalm 17 [18]: "Your discipline itself will teach me." And Psalm 70 [71]: "God, you have taught me from my youth." And Psalm 93 [94]: "He who teaches man knowledge"; "Blessed is the man whom you instruct, Lord, and whom you teach out of your law." And Isaiah 48: "Thus says the Lord: I, your God, teaching you what is useful and guiding you in the way you walk." The Glosses of these authorities and the other Catholic expositions teach this plainly, and I pass them over in silence for the sake of brevity. But behold, to these things the testimony of the Apostle, taught by the Lord and teacher of the Gentiles, is quite clear: "Such confidence," he says, "we have through Christ toward God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,

[546E–547A]
but our sufficiency is from God," 2 Corinthians 3. Without doubt, then, we are not sufficient to understand, to compose, to syllogize, or to acquire any science from ourselves as if from ourselves;[n27] but in all these and in each our sufficiency is from God, who opens the ears of the deaf and enlightens the eyes of the blind, who is Lord of the sciences, who also teaches man science, dividing to each as he wills. If, therefore, according to what has been premised, God is necessarily required as co-effector of every act of the created intellect, then he is so also of every act of the created will, and of every operation of it, by a similar reasoning; and by this reasoning Augustine, Gregory, Prosper and Bernard show the same conclusion. The blessed Augustine, then, On the Predestination of the Saints 2, says thus: "Who would not see that thinking comes first? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. If, then, we are not capable of thinking anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, surely we are not capable of believing anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is from God. Wherefore no one suffices for himself to begin or to complete any good work, but in every good work, both in beginning and in completing, our sufficiency is from God." Augustine makes the same argument in On the Gift of Perseverance 18, and in On Grace and Free Choice 17, and in many other places. The blessed Gregory also, Moralia 33, chapter 22, on that of Job 41, "Who has first given to me, that I may repay him?", says thus: "If at least we anticipate the gifts of good works by our own power in thinking well, where is that which is said again through Paul so subtly, where all confidence of the human mind in itself is cut off at the very root of the heart, when he says, 'Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God'?" Saint Prosper also, Against Cassian 6, recites the fourth definition of Cassian, which says:[n28]

[547B–547D]
"So that it may appear more clearly that even through the good of nature, which has been granted by the kindness of the Creator, beginnings of good wills sometimes arise, which nevertheless, unless they are directed by God, cannot reach the consummation of virtues, the Apostle is witness, saying: 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find.'" To this, on the contrary, Prosper says: "Falsely, therefore, according to this definition you said before that not only of acts but also of good thoughts the beginning is from God, who begins what is good, and carries it out, and completes it in us. But this can in no way be false in any part, and contrary things ought never to have been brought against it, so that what you rightly professed, that it begins from grace, you should afterwards affirm that we have through the good of nature and through free choice. The blessed Apostle said, indeed, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find'; but the same said, 'Not that we are capable of thinking anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God'; and the same said, 'For it is God who works in us both to will and to work according to good will.' The Apostle is not, therefore, contrary to himself; but when the willing has been given to us, we do not at once find also the doing, unless we ask, seek and knock, so that he who gave the desire may grant the effect. This voice of one saying, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find,' is that of one called and also established under grace, who delights indeed in the law of God according to the inner man, but sees another law in his members, fighting against the law of his mind and making him captive in the law of sin; and although he has received knowledge of willing rightly, he nevertheless does not find in himself the power of working what he desires, until, for the good will which he has taken up, he may merit to find the capacity for the virtues which he seeks." And below, in 25, he wills the same. The blessed Bernard also, On Grace and Free Choice 22, says thus: "Hence we presume that we are God's co-helpers, co-workers of the Holy Spirit, and earners of the kingdom, because by voluntary consent we are joined to the divine will. What then? Is this wholly the work of free choice, is this wholly its merit, that it consents? It is indeed; not, however, that even the consent itself, in which all merit consists,

is from it; since neither are we sufficient to think, which is less than to consent, from ourselves as if from ourselves. These are not my words but the Apostle's, who attributes everything of good that can be, that is, to think, and to will, and to accomplish according to good will,[n29] to God, not to his own choice. Therefore God works in us these three things, to think the good, to will it, and to accomplish it: the first he does without us, the second with us, the third through us." Hence also Isaiah 40: "Behold, the nations are reckoned by him as a moment of the balance." On this the Gloss: "in comparison with him," namely God, "since the moment, namely, is inclined from nothing to either side."[n30] And Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; wherever he wills, he will incline it." Now every rational creature is called a king, because it rules itself by reason; for this cannot be understood only of the heart of a great earthly king and not of the heart of a small subject, since "he himself made the small and the great, and he cares equally for all," Wisdom 6. Wherefore each of us, too, humbly entreats the Lord, saying with the Psalmist: "Incline my heart, Lord, to your testimonies,

[547E–548A]
and not to avarice," Psalm 118 [119]. On this Augustine says: "What is it to have a heart inclined to something, but to will this?" Wherefore also, immediately before, on the preceding verse, "Lead me in the path of your commandments," he says: "The divine help by which he may be led," he says, "because it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy. Finally, because God works even the willing itself in all; for the will is prepared by the Lord." To this also pertains that of Wisdom 11: "You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight"; with the exposition of Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 4, recited more fully in 5, chapter 9, and in the 46th of the first:[n31] "There is," he says, "a weight of will and of love, but this weight is drawn off by another weight; a weight without weight is that to which all things are brought back, that they may be at rest." Likewise, if man could will from himself alone, he could likewise from himself alone resist temptation, against 4, 5 and 6 of this second book. Likewise, if man could will from himself alone, he could will badly in this way; and since a rational power can reach its objects,[n32] he could likewise will well from himself alone, and so, without God's help, by the powers of free choice alone he could merit, which is the error of Pelagius, as is sufficiently clear from the above. He could also from himself alone prepare himself for grace, and open to God, or to a man, knocking,[n33] against chapters 37 and 38 of the first book. And although someone may already be established in grace, he still, by the fifth of this second book, cannot resist temptation without God's help, and so cannot merit either. Nor does anyone, however richly graced, merit unless grace cooperates, as the 40th of the first teaches; nor does grace work unless it is directed by the Holy Spirit, by the 42nd of the same. All the merits of the faithful, too, are given by God, as has been shown above. Therefore no one can will well from himself alone without God; therefore not will at all. Nor can anyone pretend that man, so far as lies in himself and in the power of free choice, could by himself go to either of the opposites, to evil, that is, and to good, but that God does not wish to permit him to do well without himself; for thus the error of Pelagius would return. And Wisdom 7 says that it is a lover of the good deed, or of the good, who forbids no one to do good.[n34] Likewise neither an Angel, nor Adam before the fall,

[548B–548E]
could will by himself, as the tenth of this second book teaches; wherefore neither can he now. Likewise, if man could will by himself, he could also work by himself, and since, according to the Philosopher, Ethics 2, virtue is generated from works,[n35] he could acquire virtues for himself by himself, against the third of the first, and against Augustine and Bede in their books against Julian, as the sixth of this second book alleged more fully, where they hold that all virtue, even that of unbelievers, is from God. Likewise, no creature has a more powerful free choice than Jesus Christ had; but he could not will by himself, as he himself testifies: "I cannot," he says, "do anything of myself; but as I hear, I judge, and my judgment is true, because I do not seek my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father," John 5. Hence Augustine, On John, book 2, Homily 45,[n36] says thus: "On account of the person of the Son, one person consisting of two substances, divine and human, he speaks sometimes according to what God is, as in that which he says, 'I and the Father are one'; sometimes according to what is man, as in that, 'Because the Father is greater than I,' according to

what we have received as said by him; and this, about which I now dispute, 'I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge'" —; otherwise[n37] Christ could knowingly have willed the contrary of the divine will, and have sinned mortally. Likewise, the Father does all the works of the Son, therefore the Son himself also, according to his divinity, likewise does them; for in John 14 Christ says, "The Father, abiding in me, himself does the works." And Augustine says, On John 1, Homily 20: "The Son of God walked upon the sea; the flesh walked, and the divinity governed. When, therefore, the flesh walked and the divinity governed, the Father was absent; if he was absent, how does the Son himself say, 'But the Father, abiding in me, does his works'? If, therefore, the Father, abiding in the Son, does his works, that walking of the flesh upon the sea was done by the Father, was done through the Son; therefore that walking is an inseparable work of the Father and the Son; I see both working there." Likewise, it was shown in the 46th of the first that what is asked of the Lord comes from him; but man rightly asks of God that the man himself may will, choose and do the good always, and may always not will, and flee, every evil, saying with the Psalmist, "Incline

my heart to your testimonies, and not to avarice," Psalm 118 [119]; and again, "Lord, lead me in your justice; because of my enemies direct my way in your sight," Psalm 5; and Esther 14:[n38] "Give me," she says, "confidence, King of gods and Lord of all power; put a well-composed speech in my mouth in the sight of the Lion, and turn his heart to hatred of our enemy, that he himself may perish, and the others who consent to him"; with many similar passages, very frequently, in Scripture. And the holy Church of God prays accordingly:[n39] "Almighty eternal God, direct our acts according to your good pleasure," etc.; and again, "Make us love what you command." She also prays for her enemies, that God may turn their evil wills into good; and the Priest at Mass, about to receive the Lord's Body, says, "Make me always obey your commandments," etc., with many similar prayers of his own. Likewise, whatever God promises, he does, as was taught in the 46th of the first; but God promised to men wills and many of their future works, as the same chapter alleged, and it is evident in Ishmael, Isaac, Samson, Solomon, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and in very many others besides. Hence also Ezekiel 36: "I will take away," says the Lord, "the heart of stone from your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh, and I will put a new spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause you to walk in my precepts, and to keep my judgments, and to do them." These two motives Augustine adduces for this one conclusion in On Grace and Free Choice 31. Likewise, that for which thanks are given to God is done by him, as was shown in the 31st of the first. But who is so ungrateful as to give thanks to the Lord his God for no act of his own will, or of another's?[n40] It is also said in 1 Esdras 7: "Blessed be the Lord God, who put this in the heart of the King, to glorify the house of the Lord." God, therefore, effects all the wills of all. Many reasons and authorities adduced in the 26th, 31st, 33rd and 34th of the first also bear on this conclusion, and especially on evil acts of the will.

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The whole run of each Testament, and the manifold authority of the saints, clearly prove this same question, and prove it universally of any willing whatever, good or bad. So Isaiah 26: "Lord, you will give us peace; for you have worked all our works in us." And below, 45: "I am the Lord, and there is no other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil; I am the Lord, doing all these things." The text and the Gloss of Isaiah 10, cited above, bear the plainest witness to this too. Likewise Jeremiah 10: "I know, Lord, that a man's way is not his own, nor is it in a man to walk and to direct his own steps." Here the Gloss says: "Let them blush who say that each person is governed by his own choice: for a man's way is not his own," etc. So David: "A man's steps are directed by the Lord"; and Proverbs 20: "A man's steps are directed by the Lord." Gloss: "Not by freedom of choice." For this is why Isaiah says: "For you have worked all our works for us"; and he continues, "But who among men can understand his own way?" On which the Gloss says: "Truly, what he has done he has from God, because what he will be, or how long he is to live, he does not know of himself, but it rests in God." And above, 16: "When the ways of the man have pleased the Lord, he will turn even his enemies to peace." And below, 21: "Like the divisions of the waters, so is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord: wherever he wills, he will incline it." And in Psalm 104: "He turned their heart to hate his people, and to deal craftily with his servants." Likewise Exodus 3 reads: "I will give," says the Lord, "favour to this people before the Egyptians": and below, 4: "I will harden his heart," that is, Pharaoh's: and further on, 9: "And the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, and he did not listen to them, as the Lord had spoken to Moses": and again, "For this purpose I have set you up, to show my strength in you, and that my name be proclaimed in all the earth"; and 14: "I will harden the heart of the Egyptians, so that they pursue you, and I shall be glorified in Pharaoh and in all his army." The Apostle proves this same conclusion from this same Scripture, in Romans 9: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy": for Scripture says to Pharaoh, "For this very purpose I raised you up, to show my power in you," etc. Likewise Joshua 11: "There was not a city that did not surrender to the children of Israel, except the Hivite[n41] who dwelt in Gibeon; they took all by war," that is, Joshua did. For it had been the Lord's decree that their hearts should be hardened, that they should fight against Israel and fall, and not deserve any clemency, but perish, as the Lord had commanded Moses. And 1 Esdras 6:[n42] "The Lord had turned the heart of the king of Assyria toward them, to strengthen their hands in the work of the house of God": and 7: "Blessed be the Lord who put this in the king's heart, to glorify the house of the Lord." And Nehemiah 7: "But God put it into my heart, and I gathered the nobles." Likewise 1 Kings 10: "Saul went away to his house, and with him went part of the army, whose hearts God had touched"; but how had he touched their hearts, if not by inspiring them with the will? And 2 Chronicles 21: "Behold," says Isaiah to Joram,[n43] "the Lord will strike you with a great plague, with your people, and your sons and wives, and all your substance"; and it continues, "Therefore the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and of the Arabs, and they went up into the land of Judah and laid it waste, and plundered all the substance that was found in the king's house," etc. Likewise Esther 14: Esther prayed to the Lord in this way: "Turn his heart" — that is, Ahasuerus's — "to hatred of our enemy, that he himself may perish." And below, 15: "And when he had lifted his face, and with burning eyes had shown the fury of his heart, the queen fell down," etc., "and God turned the spirit of the king to gentleness, and in haste and fear he leapt from his throne," etc. Likewise John 1: "All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing." And below, 3: "A man cannot receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven, and the Father who sent me has drawn him." And 6: "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him"; and below, "No one can come to me unless it has been given him by my Father"; and further on, 15: "Without me you can do nothing." And Philippians 2: "It is God who works in us to will and to accomplish, according to good will"; and Romans 1: "God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not fitting." And 1 Corinthians 3: "Neither is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. You are God's cultivation, God's building"; and below, 4: "What do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you glory as though you had not received?" And further on, 12: "There are distinctions of workings; but it is the same God who works all things in all"; with many like passages, in the Old Testament as in the New. Blessed Augustine too, through the authorities set out above and others, in various books of his, but especially in those he wrote against the Pelagians, demonstrated this same conclusion most elaborately, in fervent spirit. Hence in On Grace and Free Choice 35 he says thus: "It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, it must be asked of him that we will as much as suffices for us to act by willing; it is certain that we will when we will, but it is he who makes us will the good. Of him it was said, as I set down a little earlier, that the will is prepared by the Lord; of him it was said, 'A man's steps are directed by the Lord, and he will will his way'; of him it was said, 'It is God who works in us to will.' It is certain that we act when we act, but it is he who makes us act, by supplying most efficacious strength to the will: he who said, 'I shall make you walk in my justifications, and keep my judgments and do them.'" The same, below, in the same work, 43: "Scripture…

[550A–550E]
…divine, if it is carefully examined, shows that not only those good wills of men which he himself makes from bad, and, once made good by himself, directs into good acts and into eternal life, but also those which preserve the creatures of the world, are so much in God's power that he makes them incline wherever he wills, whenever he wills, either to the bestowing of benefits on some or the inflicting of punishments on others, as he himself judges, by a judgment most hidden indeed, but beyond doubt most just. For we find that some sins are even punishments of other sins. Such are the vessels of wrath which the Apostle says are made ready for destruction; such is the hardening of Pharaoh, of which the cause too is stated, namely to show in him the power of God; such is the flight of the Israelites from the face of the enemy at the city of Ai. For fear was produced in their mind, that they should flee, and this was done so that the sin should be avenged in the way it had to be avenged. Hence the Lord says to Joshua son of Nun: 'The children of Israel will not be able to stand before the face of their enemies.' What is 'they will not be able to stand'? Why did they not stand firm by free choice, but fled, their will thrown into disorder by fear, unless because the Lord rules also over the wills of men, and turns to dread those whom he turns in anger? And he shows the same by that passage of Joshua 11 which I cited above." The same, chapter 44: "Was it not by his own will that the wicked man, the son of Jemini, namely Shimei, of whom 2 Kings 16 tells, cursed King David? And yet what does David say, full of true, lofty and pious knowledge? What does he say to the man who wished to strike the one who was cursing him? 'What is it to me and to you, sons of Zeruiah? Let him alone, that he may curse, because the Lord told him to curse David; let him alone to curse, since God told him, so that God may see my humility, and repay me with good for his cursing on this day.' How did the Lord tell this man to curse David? Who is wise, and will understand? He did not speak by commanding, where obedience would be praised; rather God, by his just and hidden judgment, turned his own will, evil by its own fault, to this sin. Therefore it is said, 'The Lord said to him.' For if he had obeyed God commanding, he would have been more to be praised than to be punished, as we know he was afterwards punished for this sin. Nor is the reason left unspoken why the Lord said to him in this way to curse David, that is, sent his evil heart, or let it go:[n44] 'that the Lord,' he says, 'may see my humility, and repay me with good for his cursing on this day.'" And it continues, chapter 45: "Behold how it is proved that God uses the hearts even of the wicked, for the praise and aid of the good. Thus he used Judas betraying Christ; thus he used the Jews crucifying Christ: and how many good things did he thereby provide for the peoples who were to believe! He uses even the Devil himself, wicked as he is, but most excellently, to exercise and prove the faith and piety of the good: not for himself, who knows all things before they happen, but for us, for whom it was necessary that it be done with us in that way. Was it not by his own will that Absalom chose the counsel that harmed him? And yet he did so because the Lord had heard his father praying that this should happen; on account of which Scripture says, 'And the Lord ordered the good counsel of Ahithophel to be scattered, to bring all evils upon Absalom.' Good counsel he had given, which for the time served the cause, since it was on Absalom's side against his father, against whom he had rebelled, so that he could have crushed him, had the Lord not scattered the counsel Ahithophel had given, by working in Absalom's heart so that he rejected such counsel, and chose another that was not to his advantage.[n45] And it continues, chapter 46: "Who would not tremble at these divine judgments, by which God does in the hearts even of wicked men whatever he wills, yet rendering to them according to their deserts? Rehoboam son of Solomon rejected the salutary counsel of the elders, and preferred to assent to the words of his contemporaries: whence this, if not from his own will? Yet from this the ten tribes of Israel withdrew from him and set up another king for themselves, Jeroboam, so that the will of angry God might be done, which he had also foretold would come. For what does Scripture say? 'And the king did not listen to the people, for the turning was from the Lord, to confirm his word which he spoke by the hand of Ahijah the Shilonite concerning Jeroboam son of Nebat.' Plainly it was so done, and that through a man's will, yet so that the turning was from the Lord. Read the books of Chronicles, and you will find written in the second book: 'And the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and of the Arabs, who were neighbours of the Ethiopians, and they went up into the land of Judah, and scattered it, and took all the substance that was found in the king's house.' Here it is shown that God stirs up enemies against lands to be laid waste, which he judges worthy of such a punishment. Yet did the Philistines and Arabs come to lay waste the land of Judah without their own [will],[n46] or did they come by their own will in such a way that it is falsely written that the Lord stirred up their spirit to do this? No: both are true, because they came by their own will, and yet the Lord stirred up their spirit. It can also be put thus: the Lord stirred up their spirit, and yet they came with their own will. For the Almighty works in the hearts of men even the motion of their will, so that through them he may do what he himself wills to do." And chapter 47: "What is it

[551A–551E]
that the man of God said to King Amaziah, 'Let not the army of Israel come with you; for the Lord is not with Israel, since you have supposed that you will prevail by means of them: God will turn you to flight before your enemies'? How is it a power of God either to help or to turn to flight? How does the power of God help some in war, by giving them confidence, and turn others to flight by sending fear, unless as the power which in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever it willed, even in the hearts of men?[n47] We read what Joash, king of Israel, said, sending a messenger to King Amaziah, who wished to fight with him: for after some other things he said, 'Now sit in your house; why do you provoke to your harm? You will fall, you and Judah with you.' Then Scripture added: 'And Amaziah did not listen, for it was from God that he should be handed over to evil, because they had sought the gods of Edom.' See: God, wishing to avenge the sin of idolatry, worked this in his heart, with whom he was indeed justly angry, so that he would not hear the salutary warning, but, despising it, would go to war, where he would fall with his army. The same point is shown through the deception of the prophet by the Lord, of which Ezekiel 14 speaks, and through Ahasuerus, of which Esther 15, as I cited above." And below, 48, he says thus: "It is written also in the Proverbs of Solomon: 'Like the rush of water, so is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord: wherever he wills, he will turn it.' And in Psalm 104 it is said of the Egyptians what God did to them: 'And he turned their heart to hate his people, to deal craftily with his servants.' See also what is written in the apostolic letters. In the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans: 'Therefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart and to uncleanness.' Likewise a little later: 'As they did not see fit to have knowledge of the Lord, God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not fitting.' And in the second Epistle to the Thessalonians he says of certain persons: 'Because they did not receive the love of truth that they might be saved, therefore God will send them the working of error, that they may believe a lie, and that all may be judged who have not believed the truth but consented to falsehood.' And concluding the principal conclusion of the whole discussion, he says thus: 'By these and such testimonies of the divine utterances it is made sufficiently manifest, so far as I judge, that God works in the hearts of men, to incline their wills wherever he wills, whether to good things out of his mercy, or to evil things by their deserts, at one time by an open judgment, at another by a hidden one, but always by a just one.'" The same, in On Rebuke and Grace, in many chapters shows this same conclusion, as I cited it for the tenth part of this second book.[n48] Hence also in chapter 49 he says of perseverance in the good itself: "God did not wish the saints to glory in their own strength, but in himself, who gives them not only help, such as he gave the first man, without which they could not persevere if they willed,[n49] but works also the willing, so that, since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, both the ability and the will to persevere may be given them by the largess of divine grace. So much, indeed, is their will kindled by the Holy Spirit that they can because they will, and will thus because God works that they will." And below, 70 of the same: "It is not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth did all things whatsoever he willed, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills; since indeed from the very wills of men he does what he wills: unless perhaps (to recall some among many instances) when God wished to give the kingdom to Saul, it lay in the power of the Israelites to submit themselves to the man mentioned or not to submit — which was indeed placed in their own will, so that they could even resist God; who nevertheless did this through the wills of those very men,[n50] having without doubt the most omnipotent power of inclining human hearts wherever he pleases. For thus it is written: 'And Samuel dismissed the people, and each went away to his own place, and Saul went away to his house in Gibeah, and there went away with Saul the mighty men whose hearts God had touched; and the pestilent sons said, "Will this man save us?" and they dishonoured him, and brought him no gifts.' Will anyone say that none of those whose hearts God touched to go with him went with Saul, or that any of the pestilent went, whose hearts he did not touch to make them do this? Likewise of David, whom the Lord established in the kingdom with greater success, it is read thus: 'And David went on advancing, and was magnified, and the Lord was with him.' And when this had been set forth, a little later it was said: 'But the Spirit of the Lord clothed Amasai, chief among the thirty, and he said, "We are yours, David, and with you we shall be, son of Jesse; peace to you, and peace to your helpers, for God has helped you."' Could he himself have opposed the will of God, and not rather done the will of him who worked in his heart by his spirit, with which he was clothed, so that he would will, say and do this? Likewise a little later the same Scripture says: 'All these warrior men, leading the line, came to Hebron with a peaceful heart, to make David king over all Israel.' That they made David king by their own will, who does not see? Who would deny it? For it was not without mind, or without good will, that they acted with a peaceful heart; and yet he acted in them who works in the hearts of men whatever he wills. On account of which Scripture put first, 'And David went on advancing, and was magnified, and the Lord Almighty was with him'; and therefore the Almighty Lord, who was with him, brought these men to make him king. And how did he bring them? Surely he did not bind them with bodily bonds?

[552A–552E]
He acted within, he held hearts, he moved hearts, and drew them by their own wills, which he himself worked in them." And it continues in the next chapter: "If then, when he wills to set kings up on earth, he has the wills of men more in his power than they have their own, who else brings it about that rebuke is salutary, and that in the heart of the rebuked there arises correction, so that he may be established in the heavenly kingdom?" What could be said more clearly, what more openly? See, here Augustine expressly means that no one could have gone with Saul by his own will unless God had touched his heart to make him do so. Therefore by the same reasoning no one can turn this way or that, nay, nor will anything at all, unless God touches his heart to this very end and brings about the willing itself. Hence also, 4, against Julian, 16: "What, he asks, do they now do with the choice of the will, if they cannot will except by the willing and aiding of him by whom the will is prepared?" The same, On the Predestination of the Saints 28: "God acts, indeed, what he wills in the hearts of men, either by helping or by judging, so that through them also may be fulfilled what his hand and counsel predestined to happen. In vain, therefore, have they said that that also which we have proved from the witness of Scripture, of Kings and Chronicles, does not belong to the cause we are discussing: namely, that when God wills something to be done which can be done only by men who will it, their hearts are inclined to will it, by him inclining who in a wonderful and ineffable manner works in us even the willing." The same, On the Good of Perseverance 37: "God is he who works in us both to will and to work, according to good will. We therefore will, but God works in us the willing; we work, but God works in us even the working, according to good will. It profits us both to believe this and to say it; this is pious, this is true, so that our confession may be humble and submissive, and the whole be given to God." The same is shown by Blessed Prosper, against Cassian, in many chapters, as is somewhat clear from what was cited above. Hence in chapter 8 he reports from the African bishops, writing back to Pope Zosimus, in this fashion: "The will is prepared by the Lord, and that the good may do something, he himself touches the hearts of his children by the fatherly inspirations of his own: for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God; so that we neither feel our own choice to be absent, nor doubt that, in each motion of the human will even in good things, his help prevails the more." The same, in his Sentences, chapter 312, headed "That man can do nothing without God," cites Augustine saying: "God does many good things in man which man does not do; but man does none which God does not make man do." Likewise Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice 23: "What else do our words sound," he says, "but that 'it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy'? The Apostle surely does not say this as though one could not will or run except in vain,[n51] but because he who wills and runs ought to glory not in himself, but in him from whom he received both willing and running. Finally he says, 'What do you have that you did not receive?'" And he shows the same in chapters 18, 22 and elsewhere. Likewise the Doctor and most glorious Martyr Cyprian, in Letter 13 headed To Quirinus, "On the discipline of the Christian religion," chapter 4,[n52] shows just this one conclusion: "In nothing may we glory, since nothing is ours." And this he shows by that passage of John 3: "No one can receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven"; and by that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: "What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received?" and through many other places of Scripture. Likewise the venerable Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 1, and consequently he shows that this saying of the Apostle is said to angels as well as to men, and to any creature whatever; and that no creature can have anything from itself alone, nor to will, nor to will through to the end.[n53] Hence also in chapter 7, the disciple objects in this way: "In our nature it can be asked, since we believe that no man can have a good will unless God gives it, but that he can always have a bad one, by God's permission alone, why God made it such." Chapter 8. He answers first materially thus: "I think that neither the will nor the turning of the will can be denied to be something; for although they are not substances, it cannot be proved that they are not essences, since there are many essences besides that which is properly called substance. Finally, a good will is no more something than a bad will: for the will that wills to give mercifully is no more something than that which wills to seize violently." And consequently he shows this conclusion, which, concluding at the end, he states thus: "Neither, then, the bad will nor the perverse turning of the will is the very evil by which an angel or a man becomes evil, which we say is nothing; nor is the good will, or the good turning of the will, the very good by which the good become good." And through many chapters consequently he shows that evil, or malice, is not some positive thing, but pure privation. And in chapter 20, to answer more formally, he shows that every act of the will is from God in three ways. In one way, because God, though he could, does not prohibit but permits. In another way, because the power of willing, that is, the will itself, which is a voluntary power, is from God. In the third way, because God himself truly per se co-effects every act, even an evil one, according to its essence, since in that respect it is good; but not according to its malice, which is produced only by the unjust will. Hence he says thus: "What wonder, if, as God is said to lead into temptation when he does not deliver from it, we likewise say that

[553A–553D]
he gives an evil will by not preventing it when he can, especially since the power of willing anything is only from him?" See, that is for the first and second; and for the third he adds: "When the Devil turned his will to what he ought not, both the willing itself and the turning itself was something; and yet it was not except from God, and had something from God; nor could he will anything, nor move his will, except by the permission of him who makes all natures, substantial and accidental, universal and individual. For in so far as the will, and the turning or motion of the will, is something, it is good, and is God's; but in so far as it lacks justice, without which it ought not to be, it is not simply evil, but is a certain evil thing; and what is evil in it is not God's, but the will's, or of him who moves the will. For simple evil is injustice, since it is nothing other than evil, which is nothing; but another evil is the nature in which injustice is, since it is something, and other than injustice, which is evil and is nothing. Therefore what is something is made by God, and is God's; but what is nothing, that is, evil, is made by the unjust, and is his." Against this the Disciple at once objects in these words: "That God makes the natures of all things must be admitted; but that he makes the single actions of perverse wills, such as the very depraved motion of the will by which the evil will moves itself, what is fitting?" And he answers: "No wonder, if we say that God makes the single actions which are done by an evil will, since we say that he makes the single substances which are made by an unjust will and dishonourable operation." And it follows, under the name of the Disciple, consequently: "I have nothing to say against it; indeed I cannot deny that every action is truly something, nor do I wish to admit that what truly has some essence is not made by God; nor does this reasoning of yours in any way accuse God or excuse the Devil, but wholly excuses God and accuses the Devil." The same, in On Concord 6, a question having been raised whether the foreknowledge, or knowledge, of God is from things or the contrary, and the first part having been destroyed and the second consequently established, and an objection raised against this view thus: "But if whatever things are take their essence from the knowledge of God, God is the maker and author of evil works; therefore he does not justly punish the wicked." He answers in these words: "But this can easily be solved, if it is first recognized that the good, which is justice, is truly something, while the evil, which is injustice, wholly lacks existence. For injustice is not a quality, or an action, or any other essence, but only the absence of due justice; every quality indeed, and every action, and whatever has any essence, is from God, from whom is all justice and no injustice. Therefore God makes all things that are done by a just or an unjust will, that is, good works and evil ones. In good ones he makes that they are, and that they are good; in evil ones, that they are, but not that they are evil. For to every thing, to be just and good is to be something; but for no thing is it to be something, to be unjust or evil." And below, in the same place, he shows that God effects in two ways every willing, action and motion: first, because God makes every active and passive thing and all their power; second, because he truly moves and acts efficiently. Hence he says thus: "As God does not make injustice, so he does not make anything to be unjust, though he makes all actions and all motions, because he himself makes the things from which, and out of which, and through which, and in which they are done; and no thing has the power of willing or doing, except by his giving it." See, that is for the first; and for the second he goes on: "Willing itself also, which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust, is nothing other than the use of the will and of the power of willing, which God gives, in so far as it is good and is from God; and this, when it is right, is good and just; but when not right, by this alone, that it is not right, it is evil and unjust. But to be right is something, and this is from God; not to be right is not something, nor is it from God. Thus God makes in all wills and works that are good both that they are essentially and that they are good; in evil ones, not that they are evil, but only that they are through essence." And in chapter 8 he says the same, where he sets down another way of making, in which God is said to make evil things, namely because he permits them, as he is said to harden a man when he does not soften him, and to lead into temptation when he does not deliver. The same, On the Virginal Conception 4: "Names are given," he says, "to certain actions, by which it is signified that they are done unjustly, such as fornication and lying; but one thing is understood when the action itself or the utterance —[n54]

[553E]
...another thing when each is considered, whether it is done justly or unjustly. Finally, every essence is from God, from whom nothing unjust comes; and in many other places he very often says the same. Likewise William of Auxerre, bishop, asks on Sentences 2 whether an evil action is from God as one who works and works with. He holds that it is, and proves it by authority and likewise by reason. First by the authority of Isaiah, cited above: "Shall the axe boast against him who cuts with it?" and so on. From this he concludes that God was the principal agent of the destruction of the Jews brought about by Sennacherib, and Sennacherib the instrumental agent, as the axe or the rod. Second, he proves the same by a twofold reason. The first is that the Passion of Christ was good, and so proceeded from a good cause, and so from the good will of God, and not only from the evil will of the Jews. The second is: someone, by committing fornication, begets a holy Prophet; then this action is the cause of a good, and so is itself good; and it is evil, and so the evil action, insofar as it is an action, is good and is from God. And he adds, which we grant in saying that God

[554A]
is the efficient, formal and final cause of an evil action, but not the material cause. He is its efficient cause because he is its principal Agent. The holy Thomas also, in his Questions on Evil, question 19, asks whether the action of sin is from God, and answering says thus:[n55] "It must be said that among the ancients there was a twofold opinion about this. For some in antiquity said that the action of sin is not from God, attending to the very deformity of the sin, which is not from God. Others said that the action of sin is from God, attending to the very essence of the act, which must be held to be from God, for a twofold reason. First, by a common reason: since God himself is being through his essence, because his essence is his being, everything that in any way exists must be derived from him. For nothing else is its own being; all things are called beings by a certain participation; and everything that is called such by participation is derived from that which is such by essence, just as all things on fire are derived from that which is fire by essence. It is manifest that the action of sin is a certain being, and is placed in the category of being;

[554B]
so it must be said that it is from God. Second, the same is clear by a special reason. It is necessary that all movements of secondary causes be caused by the first mover; but God is the first mover with respect to all movements, spiritual and bodily alike. Since therefore the act of sin is a certain movement of free choice, it must be said that the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, is from God." John Scotus testifies the same plainly on Sentences 1, distinction 41, as is more fully recounted in the eighteenth of the first.[n56] From what has been set out, as I judge, it is clear enough that for created will to effect its act, whatever it be, good or evil, the divine co-efficiency is necessarily required.

[554B–554C]
COROLLARY.

Corollary: that whatever created will has effected, the uncreated must necessarily co-effect as well; and whatever Angelic or human will has worked, the divine must necessarily work with it as well; and that created will effects the whole of every act of created will, and the uncreated likewise effects the whole.

From this the following inference is easily drawn: whatever created will has effected, the uncreated must necessarily co-effect as well; and whatever Angelic or human will has worked, the divine must necessarily work with it as well; and created will effects the whole of every act of created will, and the uncreated likewise the whole. The ninth of the first proves this corollary most clearly; and it can also be demonstrated very easily from what has been set out, just as that ninth was demonstrated. For if God is necessarily required to co-effect and work with every act of created will, and God effects or works nothing outside himself, and indeed cannot even do this purely naturally or from knowledge alone,[n57] then his uncreated and efficacious will is necessarily required.

[554D]
Hence the Prophet also says: "Incline my heart, O God, to your testimonies," Psalm 108 [n58]; and further on in the same psalm: "I have inclined my heart to do your justifications." So too Augustine, in On the Perfection of Righteousness 21, says: "A man prays that he may do God's commands; and these would not be commanded in order that they be done, if our will did nothing there, nor would God be prayed to, if it alone were sufficient." Likewise in On Rebuke and Grace 7: "Let them not deceive themselves, those who say: why is it preached to us and commanded that we turn away from evil and do good, if we do not do this ourselves, but God works in us the willing and the doing? Let them rather understand, if they are sons of God, that they are impelled by the Spirit of God, so that they may do what is to be done, and when they have done it, give thanks to him by whom they are impelled. For they are impelled so that they may act, not so that they may themselves do nothing."[n59] This is also recited in the Sentences of Prosper, 310, in this way:[n60] "To be impelled is without doubt more than to be guided. For whoever is guided does something, and is guided so that he may act rightly; but he who is impelled is scarcely understood to do anything himself. And the grace of the Savior bestows so much upon our wills that the Apostle does not hesitate to say: 'As many as are impelled by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God.' And free will can do nothing better in us than commend itself to the one who cannot act badly."

[554E]
Hence Bernard also, in On Grace and Free Choice 23, speaking of Grace, writes thus: "She herself rouses free choice; when she sows a thought, she heals it; when she changes an affection, she strengthens it, so that it may bring forth to act; she preserves it, lest it feel any failing. And she works with free choice in such a way that she only goes before it in the first thing, and in the rest accompanies it. She goes before it for this purpose, that from then on it may work with her; yet what was begun by grace alone is completed equally by both, so that she works jointly, not separately, simultaneously, not by turns, in each effect: not partly grace and partly free choice, but each accomplishes the whole by one undivided work. The whole indeed this, and the whole that; but as the whole is in that, so the whole is from that."[n61]

NOTES

1. Coeffector, a scholastic coinage, is one who brings about an effect together with another agent. Here it is God together with the created will. It is not "co-worker" in a merely cooperative sense, since Bradwardine means that God's efficient causality is necessarily required for the act. I use "co-effector" throughout.
2. The margin is cramped and abbreviated. The 1618 print reads Hæ. ſ Nephrot / reſis & Pelagij, and the keyed text has only "Hae 〈…〉". I take it as "The heresy [Haeresis] of Nephrot and of Pelagius". The abbreviations are uncertain, and the marginal gloss repeats the haeresis Nemphrotea et Pelagiana of the text.
3. The work is Pelagius's lost Pro libero arbitrio (see Pro libero arbitrio in Augustine's De gratia Christi 1.4–5, where the posse–velle–esse triad is quoted). The citations that follow are Augustine's account of Pelagius, not Pelagius himself.
4. The print has Caelestinum. The heretic is Caelestius. I translate the name as Caelestius.
5. De bona fortuna is the Latin version of the end of Eudemian Ethics VIII.2 (1247a–1248b), Bradwardine's usual form for this text. The numbering "2" is Savile's.
6. Aquinas's Compendium theologiae, written for Brother Reginald (Raynaldus), Part I; the quotations come from chs. 129–130 (the "following chapter" is 130). Savile's title is the one Bradwardine gives.
7. Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, issued the great condemnation of 219 propositions in 1277. Bradwardine cites the articles by their content, not by number.
8. "Ter. vero art." is an abbreviation of Tertium vero articulum, the object of non damnat: "the third article he does not condemn outright, but qualifies." The sentence then gives the article's content and Stephen's qualification ("it is an error, he says, unless…").
9. Nolutio is the opposite of volutio: not an absence of willing but an act of willing-not, a nilling. "Nilling" renders it.
10. The print has causalia. Since the next unit uses casualiter, I take it to be a spelling of casualia, chance events.
11. Intentiones are the intelligible contents or forms abstracted from sensible things, in the Arabic-derived sense of the word; "intentions" is kept as a term.
12. Savile's margin offers conclusiones for quaestiones, which would be "conclusions".
13. The Vulgate of Wisdom 7:27 reads per nationes ("through the generations"). Savile's print has per notiones, "through notions", and I translate what Bradwardine wrote.
14. The Latin is elliptical: quia scilicet propositum intelligibile ("because, namely, an intelligible [matter is] set forth"). I supply the sense from the parallel construction that follows, per Angelum proponitur homini obiectum.
15. The print has inscientijs as one word. I read in scientijs, "in the sciences", since the sense is of conclusions demonstrated from first propositions.
16. The print has liberum for Augustine's librum ("book"). The title that follows, de Magistro, confirms the sense. I translate "book".
17. supra eiusdem 4. is elliptical, perhaps "above, in the fourth [chapter] of the same". I keep it as Bradwardine wrote it.
18. The Latin has imperitos earum quae bene interrogantur, with quae where qui would be expected. The sense is as Augustine, De magistro, has it: "even the unskilled, if they are well questioned, answer truly".
19. The margin as printed runs two things together: the variant Anima praeclara (for anima) and a citation, 38. primi praemissa, apparently Savile's own cross-reference to the 38th chapter of the first book, cited earlier. The keyed text gives them as one variant.
20. The stretch, like the unit, breaks off mid-sentence; the clause continues at 545C.
21. Gregory (and Savile) read candida ("white"). The Vulgate of Job 37:17 has calida ("warm"). I translate what Bradwardine quotes.
22. The commentary on 1 Cor 12:3 is that of Ambrosiaster, which the Middle Ages read under Ambrose's name. Bradwardine's "Ambrose" is that attribution.
23. "The third book of Kings" is the Vulgate numbering: 3 Kgs 3 is 1 Kgs 3:5–13 in modern Bibles.
24. Savile's section letter cuts the sentence between satis and ostenditur. So that the English sentence stays whole, I have put "is shown" at the end of this block. The next block begins at "that all wisdom…", with 546A·1.
25. The margin keyed under this one marker holds two things. One is the variant Ars (the print has ‖ at Sapientia manualis), which would replace Sapientia. The other is the plain source citation Exod. for the Exodus 31 passage that follows. I translate the main text, since it construes.
26. The glosses ("outwardly or inwardly", "in fact, or in spirit") are interlinear glosses of the Glossa ordinaria, which Bradwardine quotes inside the verse with the label Glossa. I keep them in place.
27. Componere here is the logician's "to compose": to join terms into propositions. I keep idonei ("capable", Augustine's word) distinct from sufficientes ("sufficient", Paul's), since Bradwardine slides between them in the argument.
28. Prosper's Against Cassian (i.e. Contra collatorem) quotes Cassian's "fourth definition" and answers it. The definition runs from ut autem euidentius to "the Apostle is witness, saying…", and Prosper's reply begins at "Falsely, therefore…". Savile's variant Dicentis would make "saying" agree with Cassian rather than with the definition. The main reading is sound.
29. The print has "1." where I read i. for id est, "that is". Bernard glosses "everything of good that can be" as the three items "to think, and to will, and to accomplish".
30. Momentum staterae is the least weight that tips a balance. The Gloss's point is that, compared with God, the nations are the nothing that tips the scale either way. Hence the Gloss's phrase "from nothing to either side".
31. The numerals are as printed: Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, book 4, "recited more fully in 5, chapter 9, and in 46 of the first". I take "5" as chapter 5 of this second book and "chapter 9" as a subdivision of it. Cross-references are left unexpanded (Conventions §5.4), and this parse is uncertain.
32. The print reads possit in obiecta. The sense wanted is the capacity of a rational power for opposites (oppositorum), as in "either of the opposites" a few lines later. I translate what is printed, without emending.
33. hominiue pulsanti, "or to a man, knocking", is as printed. The evident sense is "to whoever knocks", the "knocking" being God's (cf. Rev 3:20). I have kept the printed wording.
34. Wis 7:22 in the Vulgate reads amans bonum, acutum, quem nihil vetat benefacere. Bradwardine's actum ("deed") and bonum qui nullum vetat (a masculine relative after a neuter noun) are as printed. In the print the word nullum in the text is marked ‖ and the margin repeats the same word, with no distinct variant. I translate the main text.
35. Nicomachean Ethics II.1 (1103a31–b2): virtues are acquired by exercise. Savile's "Ethics 2" is kept as he gives it.
36. Augustine's Tractates on John are cited here as "on John, book 2, Homily 45" and below as "On John 1, Hom. 20". These do not follow the standard numbering of the Tractatus. I keep them as printed and have not resolved them.
37. It is unclear where Augustine's words end and Bradwardine's inference begins. I take aliasque as "otherwise" (alias) and mark the break with a dash.
38. Esther 14 is the Vulgate numbering of the Greek addition (Est 14:12–13 in the Vulgate). "The Lion" is King Ahasuerus.
39. These are liturgical prayers. "Direct our acts according to your good pleasure" is a Roman collect. "Make us love what you command" recalls the collect da populis tuis id amare quod praecipis. The priest's prayer before communion in the Missal reads Fac me tuis semper inhaerere mandatis ("cling to your commandments"). Bradwardine writes obedire, "obey".
40. ingratus … gratias: the gratia jingle (Conventions §5.5) is lost in "ungrateful … give thanks".
41. Savile prints Eneum. The Vulgate of Joshua 11:19 has Hevaeus, the Hivite of Gibeon. The sense is not affected.
42. Bradwardine cites by the Vulgate-era book names and numbering, which I keep as written. Reg. = the books of Kings, so 1 Kings = 1 Samuel and 2 Kings 16 = 2 Samuel 16; Parab. / Paral. = Chronicles; 1 Esdras = Ezra; "Esther 14" and "Esther 15" are the Vulgate's additions (Esther's prayer and the scene before Ahasuerus). Psalm numbers are Vulgate, so Psalm 104 = 105.
43. The text says "Isaiah to Joram." In 2 Chronicles 21:12 the warning of the plague comes in a letter from Elijah. I translate as printed.
44. demiserit is the print's reading. It may stand for dimiserit ("let go"), the natural partner of miserit ("sent"). Either way the sense is that God sent Shimei's evil heart, or let it go, in this direction.
45. The print reads aliud quod ei expediebat ("another that was to his advantage"). That cannot be the sense, since Absalom's rejection of Ahithophel's counsel is what ruined him. I translate the sense the context demands, "that was not to his advantage". The negative (non) is absent from the keyed text and, as far as I can see, from the print.
46. The print has sine sua venerunt with no noun. The next clause (sua voluntate) shows that voluntate is to be understood: "without their own will."
47. The print has nisi quae in coelo et in terra omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit. Quae can be construed with virtus ("the power which … has done"), and I translate it so. The sense is that of qui, God.
48. The print and keyed text read allegauit, "he cited." The context requires the first person (allegaui, "I cited"), as at 551A and 551B ("sicut superius allegaui"), where Bradwardine refers to his own earlier citation. I translate "I cited it."
49. si voluit is a singular indicative, but possint before it is plural. The evident sense is "even if they wished."
50. The print reads qui tamen hoc non fecit per ipsorum hominum voluntates. Taken literally it would say that God did not do this through the men's wills. The argument, and Bradwardine's own gloss at 552A, require the opposite: God accomplished it through their wills, by touching their hearts. I translate that sense. The non is the Latin problem.
51. The negation in quasi quis velle aut currere non possit in vanum is awkward. The evident sense, required by what follows, is that the Apostle does not mean that willing and running are futile.
52. "Letter 13 to Quirinus" is Cyprian's Testimonia ad Quirinum, a collection of scriptural proof-texts, not a letter in the ordinary sense. The heading quoted here ("In nothing may we glory, since nothing is ours") is the heading of Book 3, chapter 4.
53. peruelle (pervelle), "to will thoroughly or through to the end," is rare. I take it as the intensive of velle, in keeping with the topic of perseverance in willing.
54. The sentence breaks off at the end of this stretch (553D); in the Latin it continues on 553E.
55. Savile's "question 19" does not match the modern numbering. The passage that follows is Aquinas, De malo q. 3, a. 2 ("whether the act of sin is from God"). Bradwardine's text, or Savile's print of it, gives 19. I have kept Savile's figure in the English.
56. "John Scotus" is Duns Scotus. The cross-reference "the eighteenth of the first" is kept as Bradwardine wrote it (Conventions §5.4); it points back into Book I of this work.
57. The clause "indeed it cannot even do this purely naturally or from knowledge alone" is compressed. "Hoc" evidently means "to effect or work something outside itself." The sense is that God does nothing outside himself by bare nature or by knowledge alone, so that the will is required. I translate the Latin as it stands and supply nothing.
58. Savile prints "Psalm 108." The verses quoted are Ps 118 [119]:36 and 112, so "108" is a misprint or a slip. I kept it in the text and have not corrected it silently.
59. Agere / agi / regi run through this passage. I render aguntur (Rom 8:14, Vulgate) as "are impelled" and regi as "to be guided," so that "to act" and "to be impelled" keep the same root in English as far as possible. The Vulgate verb can also be rendered "led," as in modern Bibles. Here it is set against regi, so it must be the stronger word.
60. Savile's reference numbers do not follow the modern chapter divisions. Augustine's De correptione et gratia is cited as "7" (the passage lies in ch. 2, §§ 3–4). Bernard's De gratia et libero arbitrio is cited as "23" (the passage is ch. 14, §46). "Prosper 310" is the number of the sentence in Prosper's Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae. I give Savile's numbers as he has them.
61. The print has "totum in illa." In Bernard's text the free choice (illo) is the term that contains the whole and grace (illa) the term it comes from: "as the whole is in the one, so the whole is from the other." The evident sense requires that, so I translate it so: "in that [free choice], from that [grace]." The print's feminine illa in the first member appears to be a slip for illo.