{"id": "2/20", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-2", "title": "De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 20", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "540B–554E", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XX. Quod cuiuslibet actus voluntatis creatae Deus est necessarius coeffector.\n\nHIs itaque praeostensis, iam ordo debitus postulat consequenter ostendere quod cuiuslibet actus voluntatis creatae Deus est necessarius coeffector, cuius oppositum, Nemphrotea et Pelagiana haeresis oblatrabat: Iosephus namque 1. Antiquitatis Iudaicae 2. sic ait, Quia iuuentutis multitudine feruebant, rursus eos Deus a semetipsis migrare fecit, quoniam non illius\n\npropitiatione putabant se habere bona, sed propria fortitudine causam sibi credebant esse diuitiarum: Vnde apposuerunt, vt voluntati Dei inobedientes existerent. Et infra 3. Fecit, inquit, eos esse elatos ad iniuriam Dei atque contemptum Nemphrot filius Cham filij Noc, qui cum esset audacior, et manu fortissimus, suadebat eis vt non Deo ascriberent, quia hominibus per illum faelicitas eueniret, sed quia hoc eis propria virtute praeberetur, et cognatos generis sui ad causam tyrannidis adduxit, solus ipse praesumens homines a Dei timore reuocare, et spem suam in propria virtute reponere: Multitudo autem prona erat vt Nemphrotae praeceptionibus obedirent, graue putantes seruitium obsequi Deo. Pelagius quoque 3. libro pro libero arbitrio tria distinguens in homine, videlicet posse, velle, et esse, id est. possibilitatem, voluntatem, et actionem, primum dixit hominem habere ex Deo et ex gratia Dei, reliqua vero duo a seipso solummodo sine Deo. Vnde et beatus\n\nAugustinus 1. contra Pelagium et Caelestinum de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali 2. cum tria constituat atque distinguat, possibilitatem, voluntatem atque actionem; horum trium primum datum confitetur a Creatore naturae, duo vero reliqua nostra esse asserit, atque ita nobis haec tribuit, vt nobis non esse nisi a nobis contendat. Et infra 3. Scire quippe debemus, quod nec voluntatem nostram, nec actionem diuino adiuuari auxilio credit, sed solam possibilitatem voluntatis atque operis, quam solam in his tribus nos habere affirmat ex Deo; tanquam hoc sit in firmum, quod ipse Deus posuit in natura, caetera vero duo, quae nostra esse voluit, ita sint firma et fortia, et sibi sufficientia, vt nullo indigeant [eius] auxilio, et ideo non adiuuet vt velimus, non adiuuet vt agamus; sed tantummodo adiuuet vt velle et agere valeamus: quod et alia opera eiusdem Sancti Patris indicant multis locis. Deo igitur qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere actus nostros in suo beneplacito dirigente, aggrediendum est intrepide hunc errorem. Porro secundum duo capita proxima, quilibet actus voluntatis est aliquid, et non in aeternum; ergo factum; et hoc a voluntate creata, vt docer Corollarium tertij\n\nhuius secundi et non ab ipsa sola, quia per tertium primi efficientia Dei est ibi necessario requisita; Ergo Deus est ibi necessarius coeffector, scilicet coeffector cum voluntate creata necessario requisitus. Omnes etiam rationes probantes conclusionem principalem illius capituli tertij similiter et hanc probant, ex quibus tamen omnibus sufficiat nunc haec vna: Minus videtur seruare aliquam rem in esse, quam eam producere de non esse in esse; sed per secundum primi nulla creatura potest seruare aliquam rem in esse sine Deo etiam conseruante, quare nec producere aliquam rem in esse: et secundum duo capita proxima, actus voluntatis est aliqua res, non nihil. Item minus est perseuerare finaliter, vel ad tempus in bono actu voluntatis, seu in bono quocunque, quam efficere illud bonum: sed secundum 8um. 9um. et 10um.\n\nhuius secundi, nullus sine auxilio Dei potest perseuerare in bono finaliter, vel ad tempus. Item omnis actus voluntatis est quidam motus: Ergo per quartum primi, Deus ibi necessario commouet; quod et satis ostendunt rationes et Autoritates illius capituli, ex quibus ad praesens sufficiant istae duae: Minus est esse quam mouere, et per secundum primi, nulla creatura sufficit per se esse, quare nec mouere. Item si homo posset velle et mouere ex forma sua sufficienter sine Deo commouente, posset et quaelibet res alia naturalis ex forma sua similiter; quare nulla esset via sumpta a motu ad probandum vnum primum motorem, quod est contra Philosophiam, et Theologiam similiter, sicut memoratum capitulum allegauit. Et hoc nedum est verum in naturalibus, sed et in voluntarijs; Vnde Philosophus in de bona fortuna 2. sicut vigesimum nonum primi plenius recitauit, probat, quod appetitus non est causa qua quis est bene fortunatus per hoc quod illius appetitus est aliqua causa, et illa causa vel\n\nest natura vel fortuna. Et reprobato primo, subdit pro reprobatione secundi, si fortuna sit, fortuna erit causa omnium, scilicet actuum humanorum; etenim eius quod est intelligere et consiliari: Non enim consiliabatur consilians et antequam consiliaretur, sed est principium quoddam; neque intellexit intelligens priusquam intelligeret, et hoc in infinitum; Non ergo eius quod est intelligere intellectus principium, nec consiliandi consilium; quid igitur aliud quam fortuna? igitur a fortuna omnia sunt. Et respondet, Aut est aliquod principium cuius non est aliud extra, ipsum autem quia tale secundum esse, tale potest facere: Quod autem quaeritur, hoc est, quid motus principium in anima? Palam, quemadmodum in toto, Deus: Mouet enim aliquo modo omnia quae in nobis diuinum; rationis autem principium non ratio, sed aliquid melius: Quid igitur erit melius et scientia, et intellectu, nisi Deus? Virtus eenim intellectus organum. Ecce quod Deus est virtus motiua quasi artifex; et ars ipsa, et intellectus est organum motum ab eo, quod et testantur multae Autoritates Philosophicae et Theologicae allegatae capitulo 4. primi. Imo et Deus ipse per Esaiam capit. 10. docet idem,\n\nvbi vocat Senacherib virgam furoris sui, baculum, securim et serram; vbi dicit glossa quod sicut haec instrumenta inanimata nihil per se faciunt, sed per eum qui mouet ea; sic nec Senacherib per se, sed in Dei virtute operatus est: Quod et pulch•e multumque prosequitur Hieronymus libro 4. super Esaiam; sicut 32um. primi haec omnia plenius recitauit. Dicitque Auicenna 10. Metaphysicae suae 1. sicut 29um. primi plenius allegauit; Voluntates nostrae sunt postquam non fuerunt; quicquid autem est postquam non fuit, causam habet; Ergo omnis nostra voluntas causam habet: Causa autem huius voluntatis non intendit ad infinitum, sed ad aliqua quae accidunt ex trinsecus, terrena scilicet, vel caelestia; sed terrena perueniunt ad caelestia; Collectio ergo horum omnium prouenit necessario ex necessitate diuinae voluntatis. Istum quoque errorem et Abraham Patriarcha clarissimus Philosophus et Propheta redarguit et refellit per similem rationem, sicut apparet ex 35a. parte corollarij primi, primi. Quare et Sanctus Thomas de Christiana religione, siue de fide, spe, et charitate ad Raynaldum\n\n129. sic dicit; Cum omne mutabile et multiforme in aliquod principium immobile reducatur, sicut in causam, hominis autem intellectus et voluntas mutabilis et multiformis apparet, necesse est quod in aliquam superiorem causam immobilem et vniformem reducantur: et quia non reducuntur, sicut in causam, in corpora caelestia, oportet eas reducere in causas altiores. Et cap. sequenti, Quia vero secundae causae non agunt nisi per virtutem primae causae, sicut instrumenta agunt per directionem artis, necesse est quod omnia alia agentia, per quae Deus ordinem suae gubernationis adimplet, virtute ipsius Dei agant: Agere igitur cuiuslibet ipsorum a Deo causatur, sicut motus mobilis a motione mouentis; Mouens autem et motum oportet esse simul; oportet igitur quod Deus cuilibet agenti assit interius, quasi in ipso agens, dum ipsum ad agendum mouet. Quod etiam in libello quaestionum suarum de potentia Dei, quaestione 20a. de naturalibus et voluntarijs pariter probat et tenet, sicut in ostensione corollarij secundi capituli primi libri plenius recitatur: Et similiter tertio contra Gentiles,\n\net alijs locis multis. Item Iohannes Scotus super 1. sentent. dist. 2a. Ostendens quod primum efficiens est intelligens et volens, arguit in hunc modum; Aliquid causatur contingenter, ergo prima causa contingenter causat, ergo volens causat. Probatio primae consequentiae, Quaelibet causa secunda causat in quantum mouetur a prima; Ergo si prima necessario mouet, quaelibet alia necessario mouetur, et quidlibet necessario causatur; Ergo si aliqua causa contingenter mouet, et prima contingenter mouebit, quia non causat causa secunda, nisi in virtute primae causae, in quantum mouetur ab ipsa. Probatio secundae consequentiae, Nullum est principium contingenter operandi nisi voluntas vel aliquod concomitans voluntatem, quia quodlibet aliud ex necessitate naturae, et ita non contingenter. Et statim instat contra primam consequentiam isto modo; Nostrum velle potest aliquid contingenter causare; ergo non requiritur quod prima causa illud contingenter causet: et contra secundam consequentiam,\n\nscilicet, Causat contingenter, ergo volens; sic instat, Alia naturaliter mota possunt impediri, et ita oppositum contingenter et violenter eueniet. Ad primam autem instantiam sic respondet; Dicendum quod si Deus est primum mouens vel efficiens respectu voluntatis nostrae, idem sequitur de ipsa, quod de alijs, quia siue immediate necessario mouet eam, siue aliud immediate, et illud necessario moueat ex hoc quod mouetur, sequitur tandem, quod proximum voluntati necessario moueat voluntatem, etiamsi proximum sit ipsamet voluntas, et ita necessario volet, et sequitur vlterius impossibile, quod necessario causat quodlibet suum creatum. Ad secundam instantiam sic respondet; Dico quod si alia causa potest impedire istam, non hoc potest nisi in virtute superioris causae, et sic vsque ad primam causam, quae si immediatam causam sibi necessario mouet, vsque ad illam erit necessitas: ergo necessario impediet, et per consequens non potest alia causa naturaliter causare. Qui et infra super distinct. 39. ista breuius recitat sub his verbis dist. 2a. Probatum est Deum esse intelligentem\n\net volentem per contingentiam rerum, quia nulla contingentia potest esse in causatione alicuius causae respectu sui effectus, nisi prima causa contingenter se habeat ad causam proximam sibi vel ad suum effectum: quod probabatur breuiter ex hoc, quod causa mouens in quantum mouetur, si necessario mouetur, necessario mouet: quaelibet igitur causa secunda, quae producit in quantum mouetur a prima, necessario mouet proximam sibi, vel producit effectum suum: Tota igitur ordinatio causarum vsque ad vltimum effectum necessario producet; si habitudo primae causae ad sibi proximam causam sit necessaria: et hoc satis testatur illa vulgata propositio prima de causis. Omnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum, quam causa vniuersalis secunda, cum suo commento: sicut secundum primi plenius allegauit. Quare et Stephanus Episcopus Parisiensis iuste damnauit et excommunicauit duos articulos contrarios veritati praemissae: Quorum primus dicit, quod in causis efficientibus causa secunda habet actionem quam non accipit a prima causa: Secundus autem ponit, quod in\n\ncausis efficientibus cessante prima, non cessat secunda ab operatione, dum tamen secunda operetur secundū naturā suam: Ter. vero art. non damnat simpliciter, sed exponit, quod omnes scilicet motus voluntarij reducuntur in Motorem 1um error est, inquit, nisi intelligatur in Motorem primum simpliciter non causatum, et intelligendo de motu secundum substantiā, non secundum deformita em. Item per 22um. primi, Deus necessario habet actum voluntatis circa quemlibet actū voluntatis creatae, et non nolutionē, quia tunc non fieret, vt 10um. primi docet; ergo volutionem; et per idem 10um. illa de necessitate est efficax; Ergo necesse est, quod ipsa efficiat quemlibet actum talem; imo dato huius opposito, voluntas Dei non esset efficax, nec Deus omnipotens. Posito namque quod Deus velit voluntatem creatam producere suum actum, tunc si Deus nihil ibi agat, sed sola voluntas creata, ipsa potest libere ex se sola non producere suum actum, et per consequens frustrari voluntatem diuinam, et eius omnipotentiam similiter mutilare; quia si Deus vult aliquid fieri, et illud non fit, Deus non potest\n\nfacere quod hoc fiat▪ Nam ex opposito conclusionis cum maiori sequitur oppositum minoris, vt idem 10um. primi plenius deducebat. Et propter istas rationes tenet Iohannes Scotus istam conclusionem super 2. sent. dist. 37. quaestione secunda, quae quaerit Vtrum voluntas creata sit totalis causa et immediata respectu sui velle, ita quod Deus respectu illius non habeat aliquam efficientiam immediatam, sed tantum mediatam; et recitata opinione ponente partem affirmatiuam, sic ait, Contra istam opinionem arguitur dupliciter; Primo quia ex ipsa sequitur quod Deus non sit naturaliter praescius futurorum; Secundo, quod non sit optimus. Probatio primae consequentiae, Quia Deus non habet scientiam de futuris contingentibus, nisi quia certitudinaliter no uit determinationem voluntatis suae respectu eorum, quae voluntas est immutabilis et impotentialis; sed si voluntas sit totalis causa respectu sui velle, quantumcunque ponatur voluntas diuina determinata ad vnam partem eorum quae dependent a voluntate creata, poterit voluntas creata aliter velle, et ita non sequitur certitudo ex cognitione\n\ndeterminationis voluntatis diuinae. Probatio secundae consequentiae, Quia quicquid vult optimus, hoc fit: Sed si velit volutionem meam fore, et illa est in potestate voluntatis meae, vt totalis causae contingenter se habentis ad illam, ipsa de se potest determinari ad vnam partem vel ad aliam indifferenter; et ita potest non fieri illud ad quod voluntas diuina eam determinat. Item si voluntas creata sola efficeret suum actum, non omnes actiones nec res humanae per diuinam prouidentiam regerentur, contra vigesimum septimū, tricessimū, tricesimum primum, et trigesimum secundum capitula primi libri: Si enim Deus tales actiones prouideat, hoc est, voluntarie, et voluntas sua est efficax per decimum primi libri: Quare diuina voluntas efficit omnes huiusmodi actiones? Item aliter multa esse possent causalia et fortuita\n\nsimpliciter, quia respectu causarum secundarum, et etiam primae causae vigesimum nonum primi. Quare et Dominus Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus iuste damnauit duos articulos erroneos; quorum primus dicebat, quod Humani actus non reguntur prouidentia diuina; Secundus vero ponebat quod aliqua possunt casualiter euenire respectu primae causae, et quod falsum est omnia esse praeordinata a prima causa, quia tunc euenitent ex necessitate. Item si voluntas creata sola posset producere suum actum, posset et sola producere quando que actum intensiorem, et quandoque remissiorem, quare et posset sola intendere suum actum, et meritum suum bonum, contra quadragesimum sextum primi. Item si voluntas creata sola posset producere suum actum, posset et intellectus creatus similiter, quare posset intelligere, componere, et diuidere, discurrere, et multas veritates cognoscere sine adiutorio intellectus agentis, qui est Deus; quod est contra Philosophos, sicut sextum primi plenius allegauit. Quomodo namque homo ignorans scientias habitu simul et actu, per studium suum ipsas artificiose\n\nquaereret, et similiter inueniret, nisi dirigeretur ab aliquo sciente in actu, eumque docente? Non enim potest hoc fieri a fortuna vel casu. Vnde et Auerroes super de somno et vigilia assignans causam cognitionis acquisitae in somno, sic ait; Manifestum est quod istam cognitionem quae acquiritur in somno, non antecedit modus agens; vtrum autem praecedit eam modus praeparans, habet dubitationem; et cum ista cognitio est acquisita post ignorantiam, et postquam erat in potentia, et sine aliqua cognitione antecedenti, manifestum est, quod eodem modo acquiritur, sicut primae propositiones acquiruntur; et cum ita sit, necesse est, vt agens eas sit idem, et eiusdem generis; quia omne quod exit de potentia in actum habet agens quod est de genere illius rei, quod exit de potentia in actum; Ergo necesse est vt faciens istam cognitionem sit intellectus in actu, et iste dat principia vniuersalia in rebus speculatiuis, cuius esse declaratum est in libro de Anima. Item Deus agit vera somnia in intellectu hominis dormientis, et veram prophetiam in intellectu hominis vigilantis, vt docuit sextum primi;\n\nErgo Deus est intellectus agens cognitionem humanam, et non mediante corpore caelesti, vt quidam fingunt, sed per seipsū, sicut multipliciter possit ostendi. Sed gratia breuitatis tantum adduco Stephanum Episcopum Parisiensem, damnantem et excommunicantem quendam articulum in haec verba, quod Deus, vel intelligentia non infundit scientiam animae humanae in somno, nisi mediante corpore caelesti: Item intellectus humanus de se est potentialis, et in potentia ad intelligendum; Ergo ad hoc, quod exeat in actum intelligendi, requirit necessario aliquod actuale quod moueat ipsum de hac potentia in hunc actum: Hoc non potest esse corpus, nec aliquid corporale, nec aliquid quod non est intellectus, nec intellectus non in actu, sicut facile est ostendere singula: Hoc ergo intellectus in actu; hoc igitur est intellectus omnem intellectionem nostram agens. Et per hanc rationem ostendit Aristoteles hanc conclusionem 3. de Anima 17. et post, et Auerroes super illum locum similiter, et super 12um. Metaph. 18. super de somno et vigilia: Et Auicenna 5. de Anima 5. et 6. Algazel 5. Physicae\n\nsuae 1. et 6. Et est similiter vnus articulus damnatus et excommunicatus a Stephano Parisiensi Episcopo in haec verba; Quod intellectus agens non copulatur nostro possibili; Isti tamen videntur aliqualiter discrepare: Nam Aristoteles et Auerroes volunt hunc intellectum agentem esse Deum, vt patet cap. 6o. primi; Auicenna vero et Algazel volunt eum esse intelligentiam infimam, vt patet locis nunc allegatis; et etiam 9. Metaphysicae Auicen. 3. et 5. Metaphys. Algazelis. Sed hoc est erroneum, si sic intelligatur, quod illa intelligentia sola sine Deo est agens principaliter intellectionem humanam, quia illa cum sit entitatis terminatae et finitae, est necessario similis actiuitatis; quare tot possent esse homines, quod illa non sufficeret agere intellectionem in omnibus illis simul, cum tamen omnes intelligere simul possent. Item cum mouens et motum debeant esse simul, vt docet Philosophus 7. Phys. et in quotlibet locis quantumcunque distantibus possunt homines intelligere simul in actu, et nulla talis Intelligentia potest de se simul esse in quotlibet locis quantumcunque distantibus, cum ipsa de se sit\n\ndeterminatae entiratis; quare nulla talis intelligentia est intellectus agens. Ad idem posset argui per rationes sumptas a motu, et per multas alias Philosophicas et Theologicas rationes; sed sufficiant istae paucae: Oportet igitur quod intellectus agens sit actiuitatis infinitae, immensus, illocalis, praesens vbique et immobilis omniquaque, et talis nulla finita intelligentia potest esse, sed tantum Deus omnifarie infinitus. Nec potest quis dicere quod intellectus agens est necessarius intellectui possibili, vt intentiones materiales a materia abstrahat, et denudet, easque quodammodo ei infundat, sed ipsis iam habitis non indiget eius auxilio, sed potest facere omnia per seipsum; quia rationes praemissae concludunt, quod quando intellectus possibilis est intelligens vel sciens in potentia, ad hoc quod exeat in actum requirit necessario aliquem motorem in actu: Quare et Philosophus 3. de Anima 18. sic ait; Est intellectus hic quidem talis in omnia fieri, ille vero in omnia facere, sicut habitus quidam, sicut lumen: quodam\n\nenim modo et lumen facit potentia existentes colores actu colores; vbi translatio, quam Auerroes exponit, sic habet; Oporret vt in ea, scilicet Anima, sit intellectus, qui est intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne, et intellectus, qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne; et intellectus secundum quod intelligit omne, est quasi aliquis habitus, qui est quasi lux etc: vbi Auerroes super hoc verbum, et Intellectus secundum quod intelligit etc. ita dicit; Intendit per istum intelligentiam agentem, et per hoc, quod dixit, intelligit omne, quasi aliquis habitus, intendit quod facit omnem rem intellectam in potentia, intellectam in actu, postquam erat in potentia quasi habitus in forma. Auicenna quoque 5. de Anima 5. dicit; Causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibiliū abstractarum, cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est, sicut cōparatio solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut Sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in effectu, quod non videbatur in effectu, sic est dispositio huius intelligentiae quantū ad Animas\n\nnostras; et post multa dicta de ista materia 5. et 6. in fine sic ait, Possibile est ergo, vt alicuius hominis Anima eo quod est clara et cohaerens principijs intelligibilibus, ita sit inspirata, vt accendatur ingenio ad recipiendū omnes quaestiones ab intelligētia agente, aut subito aut pene subito, et firmiter impressas non probabiliter, sed cum ordine qui comprehendit medios terminos; et hic est vnus modus prophetiae qui omnibus virtutibus altior est, vnde congrue virtus sancta vocatur, et est altior gradus inter virtutes humanas. Algazel etiam 5. Physicae suae, dicit quod Intelligentia agens est semper agens in animas nostras incessanter; et capit. 6. dicit, Clarificatur Anima in tantum, quod coniungatur cum intelligentia agente, sic vt infundatur ei scientia: Nullus enim est speculator, qui non inveniat multa per se. Transit enim per mentem eius prius conclusio, et deinde exercitatur ad cognoscendum medium terminum, quasi veniat in animam eius, et nescit vnde; vel prius percipit medium terminum, et deinde praesentatur ei conclusio, et omne contingens eget causa, ex qua contingit; quare anima\n\neget intelligentia; haec autem et consimilia non est impossibile percipi. Quod cum intellectum fuerit, tunc non est impossibile sic peruenire vsque ad vltimum horum quae intelliguntur et in longo tempore, vel in paruo: Ille autem cui reuelantur haec omnia intellecta in tempore paruo sine doctrina, dicitur Sapientissimus vel Propheta; et hoc est magnificentia vel miraculum. Similem quoque sententiam a Platonicis, ab Aristotele et Auerroe recitauit capitulum sextum primi. Item secundum omnes istos Philosophos, et secundum ipsam veritatem, sicut lux corporalis visionem efficit corporalem, sic lux aliqua spiritualis spiritualem efficit visionem; haec autem lux est intellectus agens vel aliqua virtus eius. Haec autem Ethnicorum sententia Catholicorum Philosophiae concordat: Nam Sapientiae 7o. De ipsa Sapientia increata scribitur isto modo; Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est Sapientia; attingit autem vbique propter suam munditiam: Vapor enim est virtutis Dei, et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera; Candor est enim lucis aeternae, et speculum sine macula\n\nDei maiestatis, et cum sit vna, omnia potest, et in se permanens omnia innouat; et per notiones in animas sanctas se transfert; Amicos Dei et Prophetas constituit, neminem enim diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia inhabitat. Est enim haec speciosior sole, et super omnem dispositionem stellarum luci comparata, prior inuenitur. Et Ioh. 1. Deus lux est: Et Ioh. 1. Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Et Parabolarum 2. Dominus dat sapientiam, et ex ore eius scientia et prudentia; et multa similia occurrunt saepissime in Scriptura. Itē si homo iam habitis intentionibus denudatis posset ex se facere caetera, posset ex se per proprium studiū, vel per Doctorem alium sine Deo adinuenire plurimas veritates, cum tamen ille Auerroes super 1. de Coelo, comment. 32. vbi ostenditur motum circularem non habere contrarium, ita dicat; Ego autem longo tempore feci moram, in quo non intellexi explanationem istius loci vltimam, sed Deus induxit me ad veritatem. Robertus quo que Lincol. Episcopus super 1. Poster. 1. sic ait; Non solum illud voco doctrinam, quod ab ore Doctoris audimus,\n\nsed scripturā in loco Doctoris accipio: et si verius dicamus, nec qui exterius sonat, docet; nec litera Scripturae exterius visa docet; sed solum mouent haec duo, et excitant: sed verus Doctor est, qui interuis mentē illuminat et veritatem ostendit. Cui et clare concordant testimonia multa praeclara 38. primi praemissa. S. quo que Tho. de Christ. religione, siue de fide, spe, et charitate 129. ostenso quomodo homo mouetur ad intelligēdum ab homine, quia scilicet propositum intelligibile, et quomodo ab Angelo, quoniam dupliciter, quia scilicet per Angelum proponitur homini obiectum, et quia lumen naturale hominis per lumen Angeli confortatur, subiungit; Deus autem ad intelligendum hominē iuuat, non solum ex parte obiecti quod homini proponatur a Deo, aut per additionē luminis, sed etiam per hoc, quod ipsum lumen naturale\n\nhominis, quo intellectualis est a Deo; et per hoc etiam quod cum ipse sit veritas prima, a qua omnis alia veritas certitudinem habet, sicut secundae propositiones a primis inscientijs demonstratis, nihil intellectui certum fieri potest, nisi virtute diuina, sicut nec conclusiones sunt certae in scientijs, nisi secundum virtutem primorum principiorum. Beatus etiam Augustinus in toto libro suo de Magistro, hanc vnam conclusionem principaliter et ex intentione ostendit, quod in omni doctrina Deus tanquam summus Magister scientiam omnem docet: Vnde et 1. retract. 12. dicit ita; Scripsi liberum, cuius est titulus de Magistro, in quo disputatur et quaeritur, et inuenitur, Magistrum non esse qui docet hominem scientiam, nisi Deum; secundum illud quod in Euangelio scriptum est, Vnus est Magister vester; et supra eiusdem 4. dicit, propterea vera respondere de quibusdam disciplinis etiam imperitos earum quae bene interrogantur, quia praesens est eis quando id capere possunt lumen rationis aeternae, vbi haec immutabilia vera respiciunt. Etiam in sententijs Prosperi cap. 382. praenotato de\n\ncognoscendis creaturis quae non videntur, Humana anima naturaliter diuinis, ex quibus pendet, connexa rationibus, cum dicit melius hoc fieri quam illud, si verū dicit, et videt quod dicit in illis supernis rationibus videt: Non enim cogitatione cerneret faciendū fuisse, nisi in his rationibus quibus facta sunt omnia. Et 2. de lib. arb. c. 14. et post multis cap. ostendit, vnā esse veritatem communem, qua omnia vera sunt vera, et qua omnia vera cognita cognoscuntur; Vnde 21. sic ait; Hanc igitur veritatem, de qua iam diu loquimur, et in qua vna tam multa conspicimus, excel siorem putas esse quam mens nostra est. Et cap. 22. Haec enim veritas ostendit omnia bona quae vera sunt, quae sibi suo captu intelligentes homines, vel singula, vel plura eligunt quibus fruantur; sed quemadmodum illi qui in luce solis eligunt, quod libenter aspiciant, et eo aspectu laetificantur; in quibus si qui forte fuerint vegetioribus sanisque et fortissimis oculis praediti, nihil libentius quam ipsum solem intuentur, qui etiam caetera quibus in firmiotes oculi delectantur, illustrant; sic fortis acies mentis et vegeta, cum multa et vera et incommutabilia\n\ncerta ratione conspexerit, diriget in ipsam veritatem qua cuncta monstrantur, ei que inhaerens tanquam obliuiscitur caetera, et in illa omnibus simul fruitur. Idem 8. de Ciuit. Dei 8. dicit quod Philosophi, quos caeteris non immerito fama atque gloria praelatos videmus, lumen mentium esse dixerunt ad discendum omnia, eundem ipsum Deum a quo facta sunt omnia. Et cap. 9. Quicunque igitur Philosophi de Deo summo et vero ista senserunt, quod et rerum creatarum sit effector, et lumen cognoscendarum et bonum agendarum, et quod ab illo nobis sit et principium naturae et veritas doctrinae, et faelicitas vitae, siue Platonici accommodatius nuncupentur, siue quodlibet aliud sectae suae nomen imponant, siue Ionici, siue Italici propter Pythagoram et Pythagoreos, siue Atlantici Libyes, Aegyptij, Indi, Persae, Chaldaei, Scythae, Galli, Hispani, alijue reperiantur qui hoc viderunt et docuerunt, eos omnes caeteris anteponimus, eosque nobis propinquiores fatemur. Et capit. 10. Haec itaque causa est cur istos caeteris praeferamus, quia cum alij Philosophi ingenia sua, studia que contriuerint\n\nin requirendis rerum causis, et quinam esset modus discendi, atque viuendi; Isti, Deo cognito, reperierunt, vbi esset et causa cōstitutae vniuersitatis et lux percipiendae veritatis, et fons bibendae faelicitatis: Siue ergo isti Platonici, siue quicunque alij quarumlibet gentium Philosophi de Deo ista sentiunt, nobiscum sentiunt. Idemque 5. Confess. 6. sic ait, Me iam docueras Deus meus miris et occultis modis, et propterea credo quod tu me docueris, quoniam verum est, nec quisquam praeter te alius Doctor est veri, vbicun que et vndecunque claruerit. Item B. Greg. 7. Moral. 25. super illud Iob 37. Nonne vestimenta tua candida sunt, cum perflata fuerit terra Austro? per vestimenta Auditores; per terram, cor seu mentem; per Austrum Spiritum Sanctum intelligens, ita dicit; Nequaquam sibi Doctores tribuant, quod per exhortationem suam ad summa proficere Auditores vident; quia nisi Spiritus Sanctus eorum corda repleat, ad aures corporum vox docentium incassum sonat: Formare enim vocem Magistri exterius possunt, sed hanc imprimere interius non possunt: Neque enim qui plantat est\n\naliquid, nec qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat Deus. B. quo que Ambr. super illud 1. ad Cor. 12. Nemo potest dicere Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto, sic ait; Quicquid enim falsum est, ab homine est, et quicquid verum a quocunque dicitur, a sancto dicitur Spiritu; Vnde et Ioan. 11. recitato dicto Caiphae, scilicet, Expedit vobis vt vnus moriatur homo pro populo, et non tota gens pereat, subiungit; Hoc autem a semetipso non dixit, sed eum esset Pontifex anni illius prophetauit. Dicit que Origines, sicut allegatur in glossa, super illud Exod. 4. Obsecro Domine, non sum eloquens; Et infra; Ego ero in ore tuo. Eorum qui verba Dei loquuntur, os Deus aperit; eorum qui loquuntur mendacium, falsum testimonium, scurrilitates, turpitudines, susurronum quoque et detractorum, et eorum qui otiosa loquuntur, Diabolus aperit os. Tertij quoque Reg. 3. Offerente Domino Salomoni vt daret ei quodcunque voluerit postulare, ipsoque sapientiam postulante, et Domino eam dante, exemplo magnifico satis\n\nostenditur, quod omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est. Ecclesiastici 1. quod et libri legales, sapientiales et prophetales sapissime et clarissime contestantur. Non solum autem Sapientia speculatiua siue politca datur a Domino, sed et Sapientia manualis, quae ars mechanica nuncupatur; vnde Exod. 31. loquutus est Dominus ad Mosen dicens; Ecce vocaui ex nomine Besaleel, et impleui eum spiritu Dei sapientia et intelligentia, et scientia in omni opere ad ex cogitandum fabre quicquid fieri potest ex auro, et argento, et aere, marmore, et gemmis, et diuersitate lignorum, dedique ei socium Aholiab, et in corde eorum omnis eruditi posui sapientiam, vt faciant cuncta quae praecipi tibi, tabernaculum faederis et arcam testamenti etc. Nec etiam sapientia solorum fidelium, sed et infidelium a Domino Deo datur; Vnde Apostolus ad Rom. 1. loquens ad literam de Philosophis gentium, ita dicit; Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis, Deus enim illis reuelauit; inuisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque\n\neius virtus et diuinitas, ita vt sint inexcusabiles, quia cum cognouiscent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificauerunt, aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est cor eorum insipiens; Dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt: Ecce quod Deus suam illis notitiam reuelauit, pro qua et sibi gratias agere debuerunt, quod tamen non debuerant facere, nisi ipsam accepissent ab eo, vt docet 31. primi. Di entesque se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt. Sed quare cum verum dixerunt? quia dixerunt se esse sapientes, et hoc a se, non ab illo fonte sapientiae, a quo omnis sapientia velut quoddam flumen lucidum deriuatur, qui et solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super iustos et iniustos, Math. 5. Vnde Augustinus de Spiritu et Litera 7. Dicentes, inquir, se este sapientes, quod non aliter intelligendum est, nisi hoc ipsum sibi tribuentes, stulti facti sunt: et ad hoc idem facit autoritas venerabilis Bedae contra Iulianum 13. huius secundi superius recitata. Et Esai 10. a Domino dicitur, visitabo super fructum magnifici cordis regis Assur,\n\net super gloriam altitudinis oculorum eius: Dixit enim, In fortitudine manus meae, ego feci, et in sapientia mea intellexi. Quare et contra istud elationis venenum pestiferum parauit Dominus antidotum salutare: Non glorietur, inquit, sapiens in sapientia sua, et non glorietur fortis in fortitudine sua, et non glorietur diues in diuitijs suis, sed in hoc glorietur, qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me, quia ego sum Dominus qui facio misericordiam, iudicium et iusticiam in terra, Ierem. 9. ac si diceret manifeste, quod nihil horum facit sibi homo ex seipso, sed haec omnia omnibus secundum misericordiam et iudicium facit Deus. Et huic satis concordat autoritas venerabilis Bedae contra Iulianum 13. superius memorata, aliaque eiusdem supra eodem 7. dicit Iulianum dixisse blasphemiam, eo quod dixit animum hominis per se posse fieri sapientem. Hoc aurem totum autoritates vtriusque testamenti concorditer attestantur. Vnde Exod. 4. dixit Dominus ad Mosen;\n\nQuis fecit os hominis? Glossa, exterius vel interius; aut quis fabricauit mutum? Glossa, in re, vel in spiritu; et surdum, videntem et caecum? nonne Ego? Perge igitur, et ego ero tecum in ore tuo, doceboque te quid loquaris. Et Math. 10. Nolite cogitate quomodo, aut quid loquamini; Dabitur enim vobis in illa hora quid loquamini; Non enim os estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis: et Ioh. 16. Cum ergo veneri ille spititus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem, et 1. Ioh. 2. Vnctio docet vos de omnibus: et Psal. 17. Disciplina tua ipsa me docebit: et Psal. 70. Deus docuisti me a iuuentute mea: et 93. Qui docet hominem scientiam; Beatus homo quem tu erudieris Domine, et de lege tua docueris eum. Et Esaiae 48. Haec dicit Dominus; Ego Deus tuus docens te vtilia, et gubernans te in via qua ambulas, quod et glossae autoritatum istarum, et ceterae expositiones Catholicae clare docent, quas silendo pertranseo gratia breuiandi. Veruntamen ecce ad haec testimonium Apostoli docti a Domino, doctorisque gentium satis clarum; Fiduciam, inquit, talem habemus per Christum ad Deum, non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis,\n\nsed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. 2. ad Corinth 3. Proculdubio ergo nec sufficientes sumus intelligere, componere, syllogizare, aut scientiam vllam acquirere a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed in omnibus istis et singulis sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, qui aperit aures surdorum, et oculos caecorum illuminat, qui scientiarum Dominus est, qui et docet hominem scientiam, diuidens singulis prout vult. Si igitur secundum praemissa Deus est necessario requisitus tanquam coeffector cuiuslibet actus intellectus creati, ergo et cuiuslibet actus voluntatis creatae, et cuiuslibet operationis illius per similem rationem: et per hanc rationem Augustinus, Gregorius, Prosper et Bernardus eandem conclusionem ostendunt. Beatus igitur Augustinus de praedestinatione sanctorum 2. sic ait; Quis non videat prius esse cogitare? Nullus\n\nquippe credit aliquid nisi prius cogitauerit esse credendum. Si igitur non simus idonei cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, profecto non sumus idonei credere aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, sed sufficientia nostra, qua credere incipiamus, ex Deo est. Quocirca nemo sibi sufficit ad incipiendum vel perficiendum quodcunque opus bonum, sed in omni opere bono et incipiendo, et perficiendo sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. Et idem argumentum facit Augustinus de bono Perseuerantiae 18. et de gratia et libero arbitrio 17. et alijs locis multis. Beatus quoque Gregorius 33. Moral. 22. super illud Iob. 41. Quis ante dedit mihi, vt reddam ei? sic ait: Si saltem dona bonorum operum virtute nostra bene cogitando preuenimus, vbi est quod rursum per Paulum tam subtiliter dicitur; vbi omnis de se humanae menti fiducia ab ipsa cordis radice succiditur, cum ait, Non quia sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. Sanctus etiam Prosper contra Cassianum 6. recitat quartam definitionem Cassiani Dicentem; vt\n\nautem euidentius clareat etiam per naturae bonum quod beneficio creatoris indultum est, nonnunquam bonarum voluntatum prodire principia, quae tamen nisi a Deo dirigantur, ad consummationem virtutum peruenire non possunt, Apostolus testis est dicens; Velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio, cui e contrario dicit Prosper, falso igitur secundum hanc definitionem ante dixisti, non solum actuum, verum etiam cogitationum bonarum ex Deo esse principium, qui incipit quae bona sunt, et exequitur, et consummat in nobis. Sed hoc nullo modo ex aliqua parte potest esse falsum, cui nequaquam inferri contraria debuerunt, vt quod recte professus es ex gratia incipere, id postea confirmates per naturae bonum, et per liberum arbitrium nos habere. Dixit quidem beatus Apostolus, Velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere bonum non inuenio; sed idem dixit, Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est; et idem dixit, Deus est enim qui operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate; non ergo Apostolus sibi contrarius\n\nest, sed cum donatum nobis fuerit velle, non statim inuenimus et facere, nisi petentibus, querentibus, atque pulsantibus nobis, vt qui dedit desiderium prestet effectum: Vox ista dicentis, Velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio, vocati est etiam sub gratia constituti, qui delectatur quidem lege Dei secundum interiorem hominem, sed videt aliam legem in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae, et captiuantem se in lege peccati: et quamuis acceperit scientiam recte volendi, virtutem tamen in se non inuenit ea quae optat operandi, donec pro bona voluntate quam sumsit, virtutum mereatur facultatem inuenire quam quaerit. Et infra 25. vult idem. Beatus quoque Bernardus de Gratia, et libero arbitrio 22. sic dicit, Hinc coadiutores Dei, cooperatores Spiritus Sancti, et promeritores regni, nos esse praesumimus, quod per consensum voluntarium diuinae voluntati coniungimur. Quid igitur? Hoc ergo totum liberi arbitrij opus, hoc totum eius est meritum quod consentit? Est prorsus, non quidem quod vel ipse consensus in quo omne meritum consistit,\n\nab ipso sit; cum nec cogitare, quod minus est quam consentire, a nobis quasi ex nobis sufficientes simus. Verba sunt non mea sed Apostoli, qui omne quod boni potest esse 1. cogitare, et velle, et perficere pro bona voluntate attribuit Deo, non suo arbitrio; Ergo Deus tria haec, bonum cogitare, velle, et perficere operatur in nobis; primum sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. Vnde et Esaias 40. Ecce, inquit, gentes quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt ei: Super quod Glossa in comparatione eius, scilicet Dei, quod scilicet momentum ex nihilo in vtramlibet partem inclinatur. Et Parab. 21. Sicut diuisiones aquarum, ita cor Regis in manu Domini; quocunque voluerit inclinabit illud; omnis autem creatura rationalis Rex dicitur, quia ratione se regit: Non enim potest hoc tantum intelligi de corde magni Regis terreni, et non de corde parui subiecti, quoniam pusillum et magnum ipse fecit et aequaliter est illi cura de omnibus, Sapientiae 6. Quare et singuli Dominum humiliter deprecamur, cum Psalmista dicentes, Inclina cor meum Domine, in testimonia tua,\n\net non in auaritiam, Psalmo 118. super quod dicit Augustinus, Quid est inclinatum ad aliquid cor habere, nisi hoc velle? Quare et immediate ante super illum versum priorem; Deduc me in semita mandatorum tuorum, sic ait; Diuinum auxilium, quo deducatur, inquit; quia neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei: Denique quia et ipsum velle Deus operatur in omnibus, praeparatur enim voluntas a Domino. Ad hoc etiam facit illud Sapientiae 11. Omnia in mensura, et numero et pondere disposuisti; cum expositione Augustini 4. super Genesin ad literam 5. capitulo 9o. et 46o. primi plenius recitata; Est, inquit, pondus voluntatis et amoris, sed hoc pondus alio pondere rapitur; pondus sine pondere est, quo referuntur omnia vt quiescant. Item si homo posset velle ex se solo, posset similiter ex se solo resistere tentamento, contra 4.5. et 6. huius secundi; Item si homo posset velle ex se solo, posset sic male velle, et cum potentia rationalis possit in obiecta, posset ex se solo similiter\n\nbene velle, et sic sine Dei auxilio solius liberi arbitrij viribus posset mereri, quod est error Pelagij, sicut ex superioribus satis constat, possetque ex se solo se ad gratiam praeparare, et aperire Deo, hominiue pulsanti, contra 37um. et 38um. capitula primi libri. Et licet quis iam sit in gratia constitutus, adhuc per quintum huius secundi sine Dei auxilio non potest resistere tentamento, quare nec mereri. Nullus etiam, quantumlibet gratiosus, meretur, nisi gratia cooperante, sicut 40.um. primi docet, nec gratia operatur, nisi a Sancto Spiritu dirigatur, per 42um. eiusdem. Omnia quoque fidelium merita donantur a Deo, sicut superius est ostensum; Nullus ergo ex se solo sine Deo potest bene velle; ergo nec velle omnino. Nec potest quis fingere quod homo quantum est de se, et de potētia liberi arbitrij posset per se in vtrumlibet oppositorum, in malū scilicet et in bonum; sed Deus non vult permittere eū benefacere sine ipso; quoniā sic rediret error Pelag. Et Sap. 7. dicitur quod est amans bonum actum, seu bonum qui nullum vetat benefacere. Item nec Angelus, nec Adam ante lapsum\n\npotuit per se velle, vt docet decimum huius secundi, quare nec modo. Item si homo posset per se velle, posset et per se operari, et cum secundum Philosophum 2. Ethicorum, virtus generetur ex operibus, posset per se acquirere sibi virtutes, contra tertium primi, et contra Augustinum et Bedam in libris suis contra Iulianum, vt sextum huius secundi plenius allegauit; vbi volunt, quod omnis virtus, etiam infidelium, est a Deo. Item nulla creatura habet liberum arbitrium potentius quam habuit Iesus Christus, sed ipse non potuit per se velle, ipsomet testante: Non possum, inquit, ego a meipso sacere quicquam; sed sicut audio, iudico, et iudicium meum verum est, quia non quaero voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius, qui misit me, Patris, Ioh. 5. Vnde Augustinus super Iohannem lib. 2. Homilia 45. sic ait, Propter personam Filij vnam ex duabus substantijs, diuina, humanaque constantem, aliqu ando secundum id quod Deus est loquitur, vt est illud quod ait, Ego et Pater vnum sumus; aliquando secundum id quod est homo, vt est illud, Quoniam Pater maior me est, secundum\n\nquod accepimus ab eo dictum; et hoc vnde nunc disputo, Non possum a meipso facere quicquam, sed sicut audio, iudico, aliasque potuit Christus scienter voluisse contrarium voluntati diuinae, mortaliterque peccasse. Item, Pater facit omnia opera Filij, ergo et ipsemet Filius secundum suam diuinitatem similiter ipsa facit; Nam Iohan. 14. Christus dicit, Pater in me manens ipse facit opera: Dicitque Augustinus 1. super Iohan. Hom. 20a. Ambulauit Filius Dei super mare; caro ambulabat, et diuinitas gubernabat; quando ergo caro ambulabat et diuinitas gubernabat, Pater absens erat; si absens erat, quomodo Filius ipse dicit, Pater autem in me manens facit opera sua? Si ergo Pater in Filio manens facit opera sua, ambulatio illa carnis super mare a Patre fiebat, per Filium fiebat; ergo illa ambulatio opus est Patris et Filij inseparabile; vtrumque ibi operantem video. Item ostensum est 46o. primi, quod illud quod petitur a Domino, sit ab eo, sed homo recte petit a Deo, vt ipsemet homo velit, eligat, et faciat semper bonum, nolit semper et fugiat omne malum, dicens cum Psalmista, Inclina\n\ncor meum in testimonia tua, et non in auaritiam, Psalmo 118. et iterum, Domine deducme in iustitia tua, propter inimicos meos dirige in conspectu tuo viam meam, Psalmo 5. et Hesterae 14. Da, inquit, mihi fiduciam Rex Deorum, et vniuersae Domine potestatis, tribue sermonem compositum in ore meo in conspectu Leonis, et transfer cor illius in odium hostis nostri, vt ipse pereat, et caeteri, qui ei consentiunt, cum multis similibus creberrime in Scriptura; oratque sancta Dei Ecclesia consequenter; Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, dirige actus nostros in beneplacito tuo, etc. et iterum, Fac nos amare quod praecipis. Orat etiam pro inimicis, vt Deus voluntates eorum malas conuertat in bonas; et Sacerdos in Missa Corpus Dominicum percepturus, Fac, inquit, me tuis semper obedire mandatis, etc. cum similibus suis multis. Item quicquid Deus promittit, facit; sicut docebatur in 46o. primi, sed Deus promisit hominibus voluntates et multa opera sua futura, vt idem capitulum allegauit, et patet Ismaele, Isaac, Samsone, Salomone, Ieremia, Iohanne Baptista, et Domino Iesu Christo, et alijs\n\nmultis valde; Vnde et Ezech 36. Auferam, inquit Dominus, cor lapideum de carne vestra, et dabo vobis cor carneum, et spiritum nouum ponam in medio vestri, et faciam vt in praeceptis meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea custodiatis, et operemini. Haec autem duo motiua adducit Augustinus ad hanc vnam conclusionem de Gratia et libero arbitrio 31. Item illud pro quo gratiae aguntur Deo, fit ab eo vt ostensum est 31o. primi. Sed quis tam ingratus vt pro nullo actu voluntatis suae, aut alterius agat gratias Domino Deo suo? Dicitur etiam 1. Esdr. 7. Benedictus Dominus Deus, qui dedit hoc in corde Regis, vt glorificaret domum Domini; Deus ergo omnes omnium efficit voluntates. Ad hanc etiam conclusionem, et specialiter de malis actibus voluntatis faciunt multae rationes et Autoritates adductae 26.31.33. et 34o. primi.\n\nHanc eandem quaestionem vtriusque series testamenti, et multiplex sanctorum Autoritas clare probat, et hoc vniuersaliter de quacunque volutione bona vel mala; vnde Esa. 26. Domine dabis pacem nobis; omnia enim opera nostra operatus es in nobis. Et infra 45. Ego Dominus, et non est alter, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum; ego Dominus faciens omnia haec; quod et testatur planissime textus et Glossa Esaiae. 10. superius allegati. Item Ier. 10. Scio Domine, quod non est hominis via eius, nec viri est vt ambulet et dirigat gressus suos: vbi Glossa, Erubescant, qui aiunt vnumquemque suo regi arbitrio: Non est enim hominis via eius, etc. Vnde Dauid, A Domino gressus hominis dirigetur; Et Parabolarum 20. A Domino diriguntur gressus viri: Glossa, Non a libertate arbitrij. Hinc enim Esaias dicit; Omnia enim opera nostra operatus es nobis: et sequitur consequenter, Quis autem hominum potest intelligere viam suam? Super quod Glossa, vere quod fecit, a\n\nDeo habet, quia qualis futurus sit, vel quamdiu victurus per se nescit, sed in Deo est. Et supra 16. Placuerint Domino viae eius hominis, inimicos quoque eius conuertet ad pacem. Et infra 21. Sicut diuisiones aquarum, ita cor Regis in manu Domini, quocunque voluerit, inclinabit illud. Et Psalmo 104. Conuertit cor eorum vt odirent populum eius, et dolum facerent in seruos eius. Item Exod. 3. legitur, Dabo, inquit Dominus, gratiam populo huic coram Aegyptijs: et infra 4. Ego indurabo cor eius, scilicet Pharaonis: et inferius 9o. Indurauitque Dominus cor Pharaonis, et non audiuit eos, sicut loquutus est Dominus ad Mosen: et iterum, Idcirco autem posui te, vt ostendam in te fortitudinem meam, et narretur nomen meum in omni terra; et 14. Ego indurabo cor Aegyptiorum, vt persequantur vos et glorificabor in Pharao ne, et in omni exercitu eius. Hanc autem eandem conclusionem probat Apostolus per hanc eandem Scripturam ad Rom. 9. Non volentis, inquit, nec currentis, sed miserentis est Dei: Dicit enim Scriptura Pharaoni, Quia in hoc ipsum excitaui te, vt ostendā in te virtutem meam, etc. Item Iosue 11. Non fuit ciuitas quae se non traderet filijs Israel praeter Eneum\n\nqui habitabat in Gabaon, omnes bellando caepit, scilicet Iosue; Domini enim sententia fuerat, vt indurarentur corda eorū et pugnarent contra Israel, et caderent, et non mererentur vllam clementiam, ac perirent, sicut praeceperat Dominus Mosi. Et 1. Esdr. 6. Dominus conuerterat cor Regis Assur ad eos, vt manus eorum adiuuaret in opere domus Dei: et 7. Benedictus Dominus qui dedit hoc in corde Regis, vt glorificaret domū Domini. Et Nehem. 7. Deus autem dedit in corde meo, et congregaui optimates. Item 1. Reg. 10. Saul abijt in domū suam, et abijt cum eo pars exercitus, quorum tetigerat Deus corda; sed quomodo corda eorum tetigerat? nisi quia eis inspirauit voluntatem. Et 2. Parab. 21. Ecce, inquit, Esaias ad Ioram, Dominus percutiet te plaga magna cum populo tuo, et filijs et vxoribus tuis, vniuersaque substantia tua; et sequitur, Suscitauit ergo Dominus contra Ioram spiritum Philistinorum et Arabum, et ascenderunt in terram Iuda, et vastauerunt eam, diripueruntque cunctam substantiam, quae inuenta est in domo Regis, etc. Item Hester. 14. Hester orauit Dominū isto modo; Transfer cor\n\nillius, scilicet Assueri, in odium hostis nostri, vt ipse pereat: Et infra 15. Cum que cleuasset faciem, et ardentibus oculis furorem pectoris indicasset, Regina corruit, etc. conuertit que Deus spiritū Regis in mansuetudinem, et festinus ac metuens exiluit de solio, etc. Item Ioh. 1. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil: Et infra 3. Non potest homo accipere quicquā, nisi fuerit ei datum de coelo, et Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum: Et 6. Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater qui misit me, traxerit eum; et infra, Nemo potest venire ad me nisi fuerit ei datū a Patre meo: et inferius 15. Sine me nihil potestis facere; Et ad Philipp. 2. Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle, et perficere pro bona voluntate; et ad Rom. 1. Tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum, vt faciant ea quae non conueniunt: Et 1. ad Cor. 3. Ne que qui plantat, est aliquid, ne que qui rigat, sed qui incrementū dat Deus. Dei agricultura estis, Dei aedificatio estis: et infra 4. Quid habes, quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis? Et inferius 12. Diuisiones operationum sunt; idem vero Deus, qui operatur omnia in omnibus;\n\ncum multis suis similibus, tam in testamento veteri, quam in nouo. B. etiam Aug. per Autoritates praemissas, et alias in varijs libris suis, sed specialiter in his quos contra Pelagianos conscripsit, hanc eandem conclusionem feruenti spiritu elaboratissime demonstrauit: Vnde de Gratia et libero arbitrio 35. sic ait; Certum est nos seruare mandata si volumus, sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo perendum est, vt tantum velimus, quantum sufficit vt volendo faciamus; certum est nos velle cum volumus, sed ille facit vt velimus bonum: de quo dictum est, quod paulo ante posui, quod voluntas praeparatur a Domino: de quo dictum est, A Domino gressus hominis dirigetur, et viam eius volet; de quo dictum est, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle: Certum est nos facere cum facimus, sed ille facit vt faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati, qui dixit, Faciam vt in iustificationibus meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea obseruetis et faciatis. Idem infra eodem 43. Scriptura\n\ndiuina si diligenter inspiciatur, ostendit non solas illas bonas hominum voluntates, quas ipse facit ex malis, et a se factas bonas in actus bonos, et in aeternam dirigit vitam; verumetiam illas, quae conseruant saeculi creaturas, ita esse in Dei potestate, vt eas quo voluerit, quando voluerit, faciat inclinari, vel ad beneficia quibusdam praestanda, vel ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, sicut ipse iudicat occultissimo quidem iudicio, sed sine dubitatione iustissimo. Nam inuenimus aliqua peccata etiam poenas esse aliorum peccatorum, sicut sunt vasa iraequae perfecta dicit Apostolus in perditionem, sicut est induratio Pharaonis, cuius et causa dicitur, ad ostendendam in illo virtutem Dei, sicut est fuga Israelitarum a facie hostium de ciuitate Hay. In animo enim factus est timor, vt fugerent, et hoc factum est, vt vindicaretur peccatum eo modo quo fuerat vindicandum. Vnde dicit Dominus ad Iesum naue; Non poterunt filij Israel subsistere a facie inimicorum suorum. Quid est, non poterunt subsistere? quare non subsistebant per liberum arbitrium, sed per timorem turbati voluntate fugiebant,\n\nnisi quia Dominus dominatur et voluntatibus hominum, et quos in formidinem conuertit iratus? Et idem ostendit per illud Iosue 11. quod superius allegaui. Idem cap. 44. Nunquid non sua voluntate homo improbus filius Iemini, scilicet Semei, de quo 2. Reg. 16. maledicebat Regi Dauidi? et tamen quid ait Dauid plenus vera, alta, et pia scientia? quid ait illi qui maledicentem percutere voluit? Quid mihi, inquit, et vobis filij Zaruiae? Dimitte eum vt maledicat quia Dominus dixit illi maledicere Dauidi; sinite illum vt maledicat, quoniam dixit illi Deus, vt videat Deus humilitatem meam, et retribuat mihi bona pro maledictione eius in die isto. Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere Dauidi? Quis sapiens, et intelliget: Non enin iubendo dixit, vbi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod Deus eius voluntatem propriam vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum iudicio suo iusto et occulto inclinauit: ideo dictum est, Dixit ei Dominus. Nam si iubenti obtemperasset Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato postea esse punitum nouimus. Nec\n\ncausa tacita est cur ei Dominus isto modo dixerit maledicere Dauidi, hoc est cor eius malum miserit, vel demiserit; vt videat, inquit, Dominus humilitatem meam, et retribuat mihi bona pro maledictione eius in die isto. Et sequitur capit. 45. Ecce quomodo probatur Deum vti cordibus etiam malorum, ad laudem atque adjumentum bonorum: Sic vsus est Iuda tradente Christum; sic vsus est Iudaeis crucifigentibus Christum: et quanta inde bona praestitit populis credituris? qui et ipso Diabolo vtitur pessimo, sed optime ad exercendam et probandam fidem et pietatem bonorum, non sibi, qui omnia scit antequam fiant, sed nobis, quibus erat necessarium, vt eo modo ageretur nobiscum. Nunquid non sua voluntate Absolon elegit consilium quod sibi oberat? et tamen ideo fecit, quia exaudierat Dominus eius patrem orantem vt hoc fieret; propter quod Scriptura ait, Et Dominus mandauit dissipare consilium Achitophelis bonum, vt inducat super Absolon omnia mala: Bonum consilium\n\ndixerat, quod ad tempus proderat causae, quia pro ipso erat contra patrem eius, contra quem rebellauerat, vt cum posset opprimere, nisi Dominus consilium dissipasset, quod dederat Achitophel, agendo in corde Absolon, vt tale repudiaret consilium, et aliud quod ei expediebat, eligeret. Et sequitur cap. 46. Quis non ista diuina iudicia contremiscat, quibus agit Deus in cordibus etiam malorum hominum quicquid vult, reddens tamen eis secundum merita eorum? Roboam filius Solomonis repulit consilium salubre seniorum, et verbis coaeuorum suorum potius acquieuit: vnde hoc nisi propria voluntate? sed hinc ab eo recesserunt decem tribus Israel, et alium Regem sibi constituerunt Ieroboam, vt irati Dei voluntas fieret, quod etiam futurum esse praedixerat. Quid enim Scriptura dicit? Et non audiuit Rex plebem, quoniam erat conuersio a Domino, vt statueret verbum suum quod loquutus est in manu Achiae Shilonitae de Ieroboam filio Nabat: Nempe sic factum est, et illud per hominis voluntatem, vt tamen conuersio esset a Domino. Legite libros Paral. et inuenietis in secundo libro scriptum, Et suscitauit Dominus spiritum super Ioram, spiritum Philistinorum\n\net Arabum, qui finitimi erant Aethiopibus, et ascenderunt in terram Iuda, et dissiparunt eam, et caeperunt omnem substantiam quae in domo Regis inuenta est. Hic ostenditur Deum suscitare hostes eis terris vastandis, quas tali poena iudicat dignas. Nunquid tamen Philistaei, et Arabes in terram Iudaeam dissipandam sine sua venerunt, aut sic venerunt sua voluntate, vt mendaciter scriptum sit, quod Dominus ad hoc faciendum eorum spiritum suscitauit? Imo vtrumque verum est, quia et sua voluntate venerunt, et tamen spiritum eorum Dominus suscitauit: quod etiam sic dici potest, et eorum spiritum Dominus suscitauit, et tamen cum sua voluntate venerunt. Agit enim omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum, vt per eos agat quod ipse agere voluerit. Et capit. 47. Quid est,\n\nquod homo Dei dixit ad Amasiam Regem, non veniat tecum exercitus Israel? non enim est Dominus cum Israel, quoniam putaueris obtinere te in illis, in fugam conuertet Deus ante inimicos. Quomodo est virtus Deo vel adjuuare, vel in fugam vertere? quomodo virtus Dei alios juuat in bello, dando eis fiduciam, alios immisso timore vertit in fugam, nisi quae in coelo et in terra omnia quae cunque voluit, fecit, etiam in cordibus hominum? Legimus quid dixerit Ioas Rex Israel, mittens nuntium ad Amasiam Regem volentem pugnare cum illo; Nam post aliqua dixit, Nunc sede id domo tua; quid prouocas in malum? et cades tu et Iuda tecum. Deinde Scriptura subjunxit, Et non audiuit Amasias, quoniam a Deo erat vt traderetur in malum, quoniam quaesierunt Deos Edom. Ecce Deus idolatriae peccatum volens vindicare, hoc operabatur in ejus corde, cui vtique juste irascebatur, vt admonitionem salubrem non audiret, sed ea contempta iret in bellum, vbi cum suo exercitu caderet. Idem ostendit per seductionem Prophetae a Domino, de quo Ezech. 14. et per Assuerum, de quo\n\nHesterae 15. sicut superius allegaui, et infra 48. sic ait, Scriptum est et in Prouerbijs Salomonis, Sicut impetus aquae, sic cor Regis in manu Domini, quocunque voluerit, declinabit illud. Et in Psalmo 104. legitur dictum de Aegyptijs, quid eis fecerit Deus; Et conuerrit cor eorum, vt odissent populum eius, vt dolum facerent in seruos eius. In literis etiam Apostolicis videte quae scripta sunt. In Epistola Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, Propterea tradidit illos Deus in desidetia cordis eorum et in immunditiam. Item paulo post, sicut non probauerunt Domini habere notitiam, tradidit illos Deus in reprobam mentem, vt faciant quae non conueniunt. Et ad Thessalon. in Epist. 2. ait de quibusdam, pro eo quod dilectionem veritatis non receperunt vt salui fierent, ideo mittet illis Deus operationem erroris vt credant mendacio, et iudicentur omnes, qui non crediderunt veritati, sed consenserunt falsitati: Et concludendo conclusionem principalem totius processus, sic ait; His et talibus testimonijs diuinorum eloquiorum satis, quantum existimo manifestatur operari Deum in\n\ncordibus hominum, ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunque voluerit, siue ad bona pro sua misericordia, siue ad mala pro meritis eorum, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto judicio, semper autem justo. Idem de correptione et gratia multis capitulis hanc eandem conclusionem ostendit, sicut allegauit pro parte 10um hujus secundi. Vnde et cap. 49. dicit de ipsa boni perseuerantia, Noluit Deus sanctos in viribus suis, sed in ipso gloriari, qui eis non solum dat adjutorium, quale primo homini dedit, sine quo non possint perseuerare si voluit, sed operatur et velle, vt quoniam non perseuerabunt nisi et possint et velint, perseuerandi eis et possibilitas, et voluntas diuinae gratiae largitate donetur. Tantum quippe spiritu sancto accenditur voluntas eorum, vt ideo possint, quia volunt, ideo sic velint, quia Deus operatur vt velint. Et infra ejusdem 70. dicit ita; Non est dubitandum, voluntati Dei, qui in coelo et in terra omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit, humanas voluntates non posse resistere, quo minus faciat ipse quod vult; quoniam quidem de ipsis hominum voluntatibus\n\nquod vult, facit: Nisi forte, vt ex multis aliqua commemorem, quando Deus voluit Sauli regnum dare, sic erat in potestate Israelitarum subdere se memorato viro, siue non subdere, quod vtique in eorum erat positum voluntate, vt etiam Deo valerent resistere; qui tamen hoc non fecit per ipsorum hominum voluntates, sine dubio habens humanorum cordium quo placet inclinandorum omnipotentissimam potestatem. Sic enim scriptum est, Et dimisit Samuel populum, et abijt vnusquisque in locum suum, et abijt Saul in domum suam in Gabaa, et abierunt potentes, quorum tetigit Deus corda, cum Saule; et filij pestilentes dixerunt, Num saluabit nos hic? et inhonorauerunt eum, et non obtulerunt ei munera. Nunquid aliquis dicturus est, non iuisse cum Saul quenquam corum, quorum tetigit Deus corda vt irent cum illo, aut isse aliquem pestilentium, quorum vt hoc facerent, corda non tetigit? Item de Dauide, quem Dominus in regnum successu prosperiore constituit, ita legitur; Et ambulabat Dauid proficiens, et magnificabatur, et Dominus erat cum illo. Et cum hoc\n\npraemissum fuisset, paulo post dictum est; Spiritus vero Domini induit Amasai principem inter triginta, et dixit, Tui sumus Dauid, et tecum futuri, fili Iesle; Pax tibi, et pax adjutoribus tuis, quia auxiliatus est tibi Deus; Nunquid posset ipse aduersari voluntati Dei, et non potius eius facere voluntatē qui in eius corde operatus est per spiritū suum quo indutus est, vt hoc vellet, diceret, et faceret? Item paulo post ait eadē Scriptura; Omnis hi viri bellatores ducentes aciem, corde pacifico venerunt in Hebron, vt constituerent Dauid super omnem Israel: sua voluntate vti que constituerunt regem Dauid, quis non videat? quis hoc neget? Non enim non ex animo, aut non ex bona voluntate corde fecerunt pacifico, et tamen in eis egit, qui in cordibus hominū quod voluerit, operatur; Propter quod praemisit scriptura, Et ambulauit Dauid proficiens, et magnificabatur, et Dominus omnipotens erat cū illo, ac per hoc Dominus omnipotens qui erat cū illo, adduxit istos vt eū regē cōstituerent: et quomodo adduxit? Nunquid\n\ncorporalibus vinculis alligauit? Intus egit, corda tenuit, corda mouit, eos que voluntatibus eorū quas ipse in illis operatus est, traxit. Et sequitur cap. proximo; Si ergo cū voluerit reges in terra constituere, magis habet in potestate voluntates hominum, quam ipsi suas, quis alius facit vt salubris sit correptio, et fiat in correpti corde correctio, vt caelesti constituatur in regno? Quid clarius, quid apertius posset dici? Ecce hic Augustinum velle expresse, quod nullus propria voluntate potuit iuisse cum Saule, nisi vt hoc faceret, Deus tetigisset cor eius; ergo eadem ratione nullus potest se vertere huc vel illuc, imo nec velle quicquam omnino, nisi ad hoc ipsum Deus tangat cor eius, et efficiat ipsum velle. Vnde et 4. contra Iulianum 16. Quid, inquit, iam vtuntur voluntatis arbitrio? nisi eo volente atque subueniente, a quo praeparatur voluntas, velle non possunt. Idem de praedestinatione Sanctorum 28. Agit quippe Deus quod vult in cordibus hominum, vel adiuuando, vel iudicando, vt per eos etiam impleatur quod manus eius et consilium praedestinauit fieri: Frustra ita que etiam illud quod Regum et Paralip. Scriptura\n\nteste probauimus, cum Deus vult fieri, quod non nisi volentibus hominibus oportet fieri, inclinari corda eorum vt hoc velint, eo scilicet inclinante, qui in nobis mirabili modo et ineffabili operatur et velle, ad causam de qua disserimus, non pertinere dixerunt. Idem de bono perseuerantiae 37. Deus est qui operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate: Nos ergo volumus, sed Deus in nobis operatur et velle: Nos operamur, sed Deus in nobis operatur etiam operari pro bona voluntate: Hoc nobis expedit et credere, et dicere, hoc est pium, hoc est verum, vt sit humilis et submissa confessio, et detur totum Deo. Hoc idem ostendit B. Prosp. contra Cassian. multis capitulis, vt patet aliqualiter ex superius allegatis: Vnde et 8. c. recitat ab Epis. Afris Papae Zozimo rescribentibus in hunc modum; Praeparatur voluntas a Domino, et vt boni agant aliquid, paternis inspirationibus suorum ipse tangit corda filiorum: Quotquot enim Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filij Dei sunt; vt nec nostrum deesse sentiamus arbitrium, et in bonis quo que voluntatis humanae singulis motibus magis illius valere non\n\ndubitemus auxilium. Idem in suis sententijs capit. 312. praenotato, Nil posse hominem sine Deo, recitat Aug. dicentem; Multa Deus facit in homine bona quae nō facit homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae non Deus facit vt faciat homo. Item Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio 23. Quid, inquit, nostra verba aliud sonant, quam illud quod, neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei? quod sane non ideo dicit Apost. quasi quis velle aut currere non possit in vanum, sed quod is qui vult et currit, non in se, sed in eo a quo accepit et velle et currere debeat gloriari: Denique ait, Quid habes quod non accepisti? et idem ostendit capit. 18.22. et alijs. Item Doctor et Martyr gloriosissimus Cyprianus, epistola 13. ad Quirinum intitulata, De disciplina Christianae religionis capit. 4. tantum hanc vnam conclusionem ostendit; In nullo nobis gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit: Et hoc per illud Ioh. 3. Nemo potest quicquam accipere, nisi datum illi fuerit de Coelo: Et per illud Apostoli 1. ad Cor. 4. Quid habes, quod non accepisti? Si ergo accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? et per multa\n\nalia loca Scripturae. Item venerabilis Anselmus de casu Diaboli 1. et consequenter ostendit, quod illud dictum Apostoli dicitur tam Angelis quam hominibus, et cuilibet creaturae; et quod nulla creatura potest ex se sola quicquam habere, nec velle, nec peruelle. Vnde et capit. 7o. opponenti discipulo per hunc modum; In nostra natura quaeri potest, quoniam credimus nullum hominem posse habere bonam voluntatem, nisi dante Deo, malam vero semper habere posse, sola permissione Dei, Cur Deus fecerit eam talē c. 8. Primo materialiter sic respondet, nec voluntatem, nec conuersionem voluntatis puto negari posse aliquid esse; Nametsi nō sunt substantiae, non tamen probari potest eas non esse essentias, quoniam multae sunt essentiae praeter illam quae proprie dicitur substātia. Deni que bona voluntas non magis est aliquid quam voluntas mala: Nec enim magis est aliquid voluntas, quae vult dare misericorditer, quam illa quae vult rapere violenter; et consequenter ostendit hanc conclusionē, quam concludendo in fine sic ait; Nec igitur voluntas mala, nec praua voluntatis conuersio est ipsum malū quo Angelus\n\nvel homo fit malus, quod nihil esse dicimus; nec bona voluntas, aut bona voluntatis cō uersio est ipsum bonum quo boni fiunt; Et per multa capitula consequenter ostēdit, quod malum siue malitia pura non sit res aliqua positiua, sed pura priuatio; Et ca. 20. vt formaliter magis respondeat, ostendit quod omnis actus voluntatis tripliciter sit a Deo. Vno modo, quia Deus, non, cū posset, prohibet, sed permittit: Alio modo, quod potestas volendi, scilicet ipsa voluntas, quae est potentia voluntaria, est a Deo: Tertio modo, quod ipsemet Deus vere per se coefficit omnem actum etiam malum secundum suam essentiā, quia sic bonus est; non autem secundū suā malitiam, sed sic tantum fit a voluntate iniusta. Vnde sic dicit, Quid mirum, si quemadmodum Deus dicitur inducere in tentationem, quando non liberet ab ea, ita fateamur\n\neum dare malam voluntatem non prohibendo eam cum potest, praesertim cum potestas volendi quidlibet non nisi ab illo sit? Ecce pro primo, et secundo, et addit pro tertio; cum Diabolus conuertit voluntatem suam ad quod non debuit, et ipsum velle, et ipsa conuersio fuit aliquid; et tamen non nisi a Deo, et de Deo aliquid habuit; nec velle aliquid nec mouere potuit voluntatem, nisi illo permittente, qui facit omnes naturas substantiales et accidentales, vniuersales et indiuiduas: In quantum enim voluntas et conuersio sine motus voluntatis est aliquid, bonum est, et Dei est; in quantum vero justitia caret, sine qua esse non debet, non simpliciter malum, sed aliquid malum est, et quod malum est non Dei est, sed voluntatis, siue mouentis voluntatem. Simplex quippe malum est iniustitia, quoniam non est aliud quam malum, quod nihil est; aliud vero malum est natura in qua est iniustitia, quoniam est aliquid, et aliud quam iniustitia, quae malum est, et nihil est. Quare quod aliquid est, a Deo\n\nfit, et Dei est; quod vero nihil est, id est, malum ab iniusto fit, et ejus est. Contra quae statim opponit Discipulus in haec verba; Quod quidem Deus rerum naturas omnium faciat, fatendum est; quod vero singulas actiones peruersarum voluntatum, vt ipsum prauum motum voluntatis, quo ipsa mala voluntas se mouet, faciat, quid condecet? Et respondet, Nihil mirum, si dicimus Deum facere singulas actiones quae fiunt mala voluntate, cum dicamus eum facere singulas substantias quae fiunt iniusta voluntate et inhonesta operatione. Et sequitur sub nomine Discipuli consequenter, Non habeo quid contradicam; quippe nec negare possum vere aliquid esse quamlibet actionem, nec fateri volo non fieri a Deo quod vere aliquam essentiam habet: nec ista tua ratio in vllo accusat Deum aut excusat Diabolum, sed omnino Deum excusat, et Diabolum accusat. Idem de Concor. 6. quaesito vtrum praescientia siue scientia Dei sit a rebus, aut e contra, et destructa prima parte, et per consequens constructa secunda, objecto que contra hanc sententiam hoc modo; Si vero quaecunque sunt, a scientia Dei sumunt essentiam, Deus est factor et autor malorum operum; ergo non juste\n\npunit malos. Respondet in haec verba; Hoc autem facile solui potest, si prius cognoscatur bonum, quod est iustitia vere aliquid esse; malum vero quod est iniustitia omni carere existentia: Non est enim iniustitia qualitas, aut actio, aut alia essentia, sed tantum absentia debitae iustitiae; omnis quippe qualitas, et omnis actio, et quicquid habet aliquam essentiam, a Deo est, a quo est omnis iustitia, et nulla iniustitia; facit ergo Deus omnia, quae iusta, siue iniusta voluntate fiunt, id est bona opera et mala. In bonis quidē facit quod sunt, et quod bona sunt; in malis vero quod sunt, sed non quod mala sunt: Nam omni rei esse iustam et bonam, est aliquid esse; nulli vero rei est esse aliquid, iniustam vel malam esse. Et infra eodem ostendit, quod Deus dupliciter efficit omnem volutionem, actionem et motum; primo, quia Deus efficit omnem rem actiuam et passiuam et omnem earum potentiam; secundo, quia vera efficienter mouet et agit; vnde sic dicit, Sicut Deus non facit iniustitiam, ita non facit aliquid iniustum esse, qui tamen facit omnes actiones, et omnes motus, quia ipse facit res a quibus,\n\net ex quibus, et per quas, et in quibus fiunt, et nulla res habet potestatē volendi aut faciendi, nisi illo dante. Ecce pro 1. et sequitur pro 2. Ipsum quo que velle, quod aliquando iustū est, aliquando iniustū, nec est aliud quam vti voluntate et potestate volendi, quas dat Deus in quantū est bonū, et est a Deo, quod tunc quidē quando est recte, bonū et iustū est; quando vero non recte, hoc solo quod non recte est, malum est et iniustum. Est autem aliquid recte esse, et hoc est a Deo: non esse vero recte, non est aliquid, nec est a Deo. Sic itaque facit Deus in omnib voluntatibus et operibus bonis, et quod essentialiter sunt, et quod bona sunt: in malis vero non quod mala sunt, sed tantum quod per essentiam sunt. Et 8. capit. dicit idem, vbi ponit modum alium faciendi, quo Deus dicitur facere mala, quia scilicet permittit, sicut dicitur hominem in durare cum non emollit, ac inducere in temptationem cum non liberat. Idem de conceptu virginali 4. dantur, inquit, quibusdam actionibus nomina, quibus significatur eas iniuste fieri, vt fornicatio et mendacium; sed aliud intelligitur cum ipsa actio vel proloquntio,\n\naliud cum vtrumque, iuste aut iniuste fiat, consideretur. Denique omnis essentia est a Deo, a quo nihil est iniustum: et alijs locis multis saepissime vult hoc idem. Item Williamus Altissiodorensis Episcopus super 2. sentent. quaerit, Vtrum mala actio sit a Deo operante et cooperante; et tenet quod sit, quod probat autoritate et similiter ratione. Primo autoritate Esaiae superius allegata, Nunquid gloriabitur securis contra cum qui secat in ea? etc. Vnde concludit quod destructionis Iudaeorum factae per Senacherib fuit Deus actor principalis, et Senacherib instrumentalis, vt securis vel virga. Secundo probat idem duplici ratione: pima est, quia passio Christi fuit bona, ergo processit a causa bona; ergo a bona voluntate Dei, et non tantum a mala voluntate Iudaeorum: secunda est, Aliquis fornicando generat sanctum Prophetam; tunc haec actio est causa boni, ergo ipsa est bona; et est mala, ergo actio mala in quantum actio est, bona est, et a Deo est: et subiungit, quod concedimus dicentes, quod Deus\n\nest causa efficiens, formalis, et finalis malae actionis, sed non materialis: efficiens eius causa est, quia est eius principalis Actor. Sanctus quoque Thomas in quaestionibus suis de malo, quaestione 19. quaerit, vtrum actio peccati sit a Deo, et respondendo sic ait, Dicendum quod apud Antiquos circa hoc erat duplex opinio: Quidā enim dixerunt antiquitus peccati actionē non esse a Deo, attendentes ad ipsam peccati deformitatē, quae a Deo non est; Quidam vero dixerunt actionē peccati esse a Deo, attendētes ad ipsam essentiā actus, quam oportet ponere a Deo esse, duplici ratione: Primo quidē ratione cōmuni, quia cum ipse Deus sit ens per suam essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum esse, oportet quod omne quod quocunque modo est, deriuetur ab ipso; Nihil enim aliud est quod sit suum esse, sed omnia dicuntur entia per quandam participationem; omne autem quod per participationem dicitur tale, deriuatur ab eo quod est per essentiam tale, sicut omnia ignita deriuantur ab eo quod est per essentiam ignis. Manifestum est autem quod actio peccati est quoddam ens, et in praedicamento entis positum;\n\nvnde necesse est dicere, quod sit a Deo. Secundo autem idem patet ratione speciali: Necesse est enim omnes motus secundarum causarum causari a primo mouente: Deus autem est primum mouens respectu omnium motuum et spiritualium et corporalium; vnde cum actus peccati sit quidam motus liberi arbitrij, necesse est dicere quod actus peccati, in quantum est actus, sit a Deo. Hoc idem et plane testatur Iohannes Scotus super 1. sentent. dist. 41. sicut 18o primi plenius recitatur. Ex praemissis, vt arbitror, satis claret, quod ad hoc quod voluntas creata efficiat suum actum quemcunque bonum vel malum, diuina coefficientia est necessario requisita.\n\nCOROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium quod quicquid effecerit voluntas creata, necesse est vt et illud coefficiat\n\nincreata; et quicquid operata fuerit voluntas Angelica, vel humana, necesse est vt et illud cooperetur diuina; et quod omnem actum voluntatis creatae totum efficit voluntas creata, et totum similiter increata.\n\nVNde et elicitur facile hoc porisma, Quicquid effecerit voluntas creata, necesse est vt et illud coefficiat increata; et quicquid operata fuerit voluntas Angelica vel humana, necesse est vt et illud cooperetur diuina; et quod omnem actum voluntatis creatae totum efficit voluntas creata, et totum similiter increata. Istud corollarium probat clarissime nonum primi: potest quoque ex praemissis demonstrari facillime, sicut et illud nonum fuerat demonstratum. Nam si Deus necessario requiratur ad coefficiendum et cooperandum omnem actum voluntatis creatae, et Deus nihil efficit aut operatur ad extra, imo nec hoc potest pure naturaliter aut ex sola cognitione, voluntas eius increata et efficax est necesiario requisita.\n\nQuare et Propheta sic ait, Inclina cor meum Deus in testimonia tua. Psalmo 108. et infra eodem, Inclinaui cor meum ad faciendas iustificationes tuas. Vnde et Augustinus de perfectione iustitiae 21. dicit. Orat homo vt praecepta Dei faciat, quae vt fierent, nec iuberetur, si nihil ibi nostra voluntas ageret, nec Deus oraretur, si sola sufficeret. Idem de correptione et gratia 7. Non se fallant, qui dicunt vt quid nobis praedicatur, atque praecipitur vt declinemus a malo, et faciamus bonum, si hoc nos non agimus, sed id velle et operari Deus operatur in nobis, sed potius intelligant, si filij Dei sunt, spiritu Dei se agi, vt quod agendum est agant, et cum congruit, illi a quo aguntur gratias agant: Aguntur enim vt agant, non vt ipsi nihil agant. Qui et in sententijs Prosperi 310. recitatur hoc modo; Plus est proculdubio agi quam regi: Qui enim regitur, aliquid agit, et ideo regitur vt recte agat; qui autem agitur, agere ipse aliquid vix intelligitur. Et tantum praestat voluntatibus nostris gratia Saluatoris, vt non dubitet Apostolus dicere, Quotquot spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filij Dei sunt: Nec aliquid in nobis\n\nlibera voluntas melius agere potest, quam vt illi se commendet qui male agere non potest. Quare et Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio 23. loquens de Gratia, scribit ita; Ipsa liberum excitat arbitrium; cum seminat cogitatum, sanat; cum immutat affectum, roborat, vt producat ad actum; seruat, ne sentiat defectum: sic autem ista cum libero arbitrio operatur, vt tantum in primo illud praeueniat; in caeteris comitetur. Ad hoc vtique praeuenit, vt iam sibi deinceps cooperetur; ita tamen quod a sola gratia caeptum est, pariter ab vtroque perficitur, vt mixtim, non sigillatim, simul non vicissim per singulos effectus operetur, non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opere indiuiduo peragunt: totum quidem hoc, et totum illa, sed vt totum in illa, sic totum ex illa.", "english": "CHAPTER 20. That God is the necessary co-effector [n1] of every act of a created will.\n\nWith these things thus shown beforehand, the due order now requires that we go on to show that God is the necessary co-effector of every act of a created will. The Nemphrotean and Pelagian heresy barked out the opposite of this. [n2] Josephus, for example, says in Antiquities of the Jews 1, 2: \"Because they were seething with a multitude of young men, God again made them move away from their own selves. They did not think they had good things through his favor, but believed that their own strength was the cause of their riches. Hence they went on to be disobedient to the will of God.\" And further on, 3: \"He made them,\" he says, \"exalted to the injury and contempt of God. Nemphrot, son of Cham, son of Noe, was bolder than the rest and strongest of hand. He persuaded them not to ascribe to God the fact that happiness came to men through him, but to ascribe it to this, that it was supplied to them by their own power. He led his kinsmen of his own race into the cause of tyranny, presuming that he alone could call men back from the fear of God and place their hope in their own power. The multitude, for its part, was inclined to obey the commands of Nemphrot, thinking it a grievous servitude to obey God.\"\n\nPelagius also, in the third book For Free Choice [n3], distinguishes three things in man, namely to be able, to will, and to be, that is, possibility, will, and action. The first, he said, man has from God and from the grace of God, but the other two from himself alone, without God. Whence also blessed Augustine, in 1 Against Pelagius and Caelestius [n4] on the grace of Christ, and on original sin 2, writes: \"Since he sets up and distinguishes three things, possibility, will, and action, he confesses that the first of these three is given by the Creator of nature, but asserts that the other two are ours. He attributes them to us in such a way that he contends they come to us from no one but ourselves.\" And further on, 3: \"We ought indeed to know that he believes neither our will nor our action to be helped by divine assistance. He holds that we have from God only the possibility of will and of work, and this alone of the three. It is as though this were the weak thing, which God himself placed in nature, while the other two, which he wished to be ours, are so firm and strong and self-sufficient that they need no help of his. And so, on his view, God does not help us to will, and does not help us to act; he helps us only to be able to will and to act. Other works of the same holy Father show this in many places.\" Therefore, with God, who works in us to will and to accomplish, directing our acts according to his good pleasure, this error must be attacked without fear.\n\nMoreover, according to the two preceding chapters, every act of will is something, and not eternal; therefore it is made. It is made by a created will, as the Corollary of the third of this second teaches, but not by that will alone, because by the third of the first God's efficient agency is necessarily required there. Therefore God is there a necessary co-effector, that is, a co-effector necessarily required along with the created will. All the arguments proving the principal conclusion of that third chapter prove this one likewise. Of all of them, let this one suffice for now. It seems less to preserve a thing in being than to produce it from non-being into being. But by the second of the first no creature can preserve anything in being without God's also preserving it, and so neither can it produce anything into being. And according to the two preceding chapters, an act of will is some thing, not nothing. Again, it is less to persevere finally, or for a time, in a good act of will, or in any good whatever, than to effect that good. But according to the 8th, 9th and 10th\n\nof this second, no one can persevere in good, finally or for a time, without God's help. Again, every act of will is a certain motion. Therefore by the fourth of the first God there necessarily moves along with it. The arguments and Authorities of that chapter also show this sufficiently, and of them these two are enough for the present. To be is less than to move, and by the second of the first no creature suffices of itself to be; therefore neither to move. Again, if man could will and move sufficiently from his own form without God's co-moving, any other natural thing could likewise do so from its form. Then no way would remain, taken from motion, to prove one first mover, which is against Philosophy and Theology alike, as the chapter just mentioned argued. This is true not only of natural things but also of voluntary things. Whence the Philosopher, in On Good Fortune 2 [n5], as the 29th of the first recounted more fully, proves that appetite is not the cause by which anyone is fortunate, because there is some cause of that appetite, and that cause is either nature or fortune.\n\nAnd having rejected the first, he adds, for the rejection of the second: if it is fortune, fortune will be the cause of all things, namely of human acts. For fortune would be the cause even of what is understanding and deliberating. \"For the one deliberating was not deliberating even before he deliberated, but there is some principle; nor did the one understanding understand before he understood, and so on to infinity. Therefore the principle of understanding is not intellect, nor of deliberating deliberation. What, then, other than fortune? Therefore all things are from fortune.\" And he answers: \"Either there is some principle outside which there is nothing else, and that principle, because it is such in being, can make such. What is sought, however, is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul? Clearly, as in the whole, God. For in some way he moves all that in us is divine. But the principle of reason is not reason but something better. What, then, will be better than knowledge and intellect, except God? For virtue is the organ of intellect.\" See that God is the moving power, as an artisan, and that art itself, and intellect, is the organ moved by him. Many Philosophical and Theological Authorities cited in chapter 4 of the first bear witness to this. Indeed God himself teaches the same through Isaiah, chapter 10,\n\nwhere he calls Sennacherib the rod of his fury, the staff, the axe and the saw. The Gloss there says that just as these inanimate instruments do nothing of themselves but only through him who moves them, so Sennacherib too acted not of himself but in the power of God. Jerome follows this out beautifully and at length in book 4 on Isaiah, as the 32nd of the first recounted more fully in all its parts. Avicenna also says, in his Metaphysics 10, 1, as the 29th of the first cited more fully: \"Our wills exist after they were not; but whatever exists after it was not has a cause; therefore every will of ours has a cause. The cause of this will does not proceed to infinity but to certain things that befall from outside, earthly or heavenly; but earthly things come back to heavenly; therefore the sum of all these comes about necessarily from the necessity of the divine will.\"\n\nThe most renowned Abraham, patriarch, philosopher and prophet, also reproved and refuted this error by a similar argument, as appears from the 35th part of the first corollary of the first. For this reason Saint Thomas too, in On the Christian Religion, or on Faith, Hope, and Charity, to Raynaldus [n6], 129, says: \"Since everything changeable and multiform is reduced to some immovable principle as to its cause, while the intellect and will of man appear changeable and multiform, they must be reduced to some higher cause, immovable and uniform. And since they are not reduced, as to their cause, to the celestial bodies, they must be reduced to higher causes.\" And in the following chapter: \"Since second causes act only through the power of the first cause, as instruments act through the direction of art, it is necessary that all other agents, through which God fulfils the order of his governance, act by the power of God himself. The acting of each of them is therefore caused by God, as the motion of the movable by the motion of the mover. But mover and moved must be together; therefore God must be present within every agent, as acting in it, while he moves it to act.\" He also proves and holds this, equally of natural and of voluntary things, in his little book of questions On the Power of God, question 20, as is more fully recounted in the proof of the second corollary of the first chapter of the first book. He does likewise in book 3 Against the Gentiles,\n\nand in many other places. Again, John Scotus on Sentences 1, dist. 2, showing that the first efficient cause is intelligent and willing, argues in this way: \"Something is caused contingently; therefore the first cause causes contingently; therefore it causes willing. Proof of the first consequence: every second cause causes in so far as it is moved by the first. Therefore if the first moves necessarily, every other is moved necessarily, and everything is caused necessarily. Therefore if any cause moves contingently, the first will also move contingently, because a second cause does not cause except in the power of the first cause, in so far as it is moved by it. Proof of the second consequence: there is no principle of operating contingently except will, or something accompanying will, because everything else acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently.\" And he at once raises an objection against the first consequence in this way: \"Our willing can cause something contingently; therefore it is not required that the first cause cause it contingently.\" And against the second consequence,\n\nnamely, \"It causes contingently, therefore willing,\" he objects thus: \"Things moved naturally can be impeded, and so the opposite will come about contingently and by force.\" To the first objection he answers thus: \"It must be said that if God is the first mover or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows about that will as about the others. For whether God moves it necessarily and immediately, or something else does so immediately, and that other moves necessarily by the fact that it is moved, it follows in the end that what is next to the will moves the will necessarily, even if what is next is the will itself. And so it will will necessarily; and it further follows, which is impossible, that God causes each of his creatures necessarily.\" To the second objection he answers thus: \"I say that if another cause can impede this one, it can do so only in the power of a higher cause, and so up to the first cause. If the first cause moves its immediate cause necessarily, there will be necessity up to that point; therefore it will impede necessarily, and consequently no other cause can cause naturally.\" Further on, on distinction 39, he recounts these things more briefly in these words, dist. 2: \"It has been proved that God is intelligent\n\nand willing through the contingency of things, because there can be no contingency in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the first cause is contingently related to the cause next to it, or to its effect. This was proved briefly from the fact that a moving cause, in so far as it is moved, if it is moved necessarily, moves necessarily. Every second cause, therefore, which produces in so far as it is moved by the first, moves necessarily the cause next to it, or produces its effect. The whole ordering of causes up to the last effect will therefore produce necessarily, if the relation of the first cause to the cause next to it is necessary.\" The well-known first proposition of On Causes amply bears this witness: \"Every primary cause is more influential upon its effect than a universal second cause,\" together with its commentary, as the second of the first cited more fully. For this reason also Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned and excommunicated two articles contrary to the truth stated above [n7]. The first of them says that in efficient causes the second cause has an action which it does not receive from the first cause. The second asserts that in\n\nefficient causes, when the first ceases, the second does not cease from operating, provided the second operates according to its nature. The third article he does not condemn outright but qualifies [n8]. It says that all voluntary motions are reduced to the First Mover. This is an error, he says, unless it is understood of the First Mover simply uncaused, and, as for the motion, understood according to substance, not according to deformity. Again, by the 22nd of the first, God necessarily has an act of will about each act of a created will, and not a nilling [n9], because then it would not occur, as the 10th of the first teaches; therefore a willing. And by the same 10th, that willing is of necessity efficacious. Therefore it is necessary that it effect each such act. Indeed, if the opposite is granted, the will of God would not be efficacious, nor God omnipotent. For suppose that God wills the created will to produce its act. Then if God does nothing there, but the created will alone, that will can freely, of itself alone, fail to produce its act, and consequently frustrate the divine will and likewise maim its omnipotence. For if God wills something to be done, and it is not done, God cannot\n\nmake it be done. For from the opposite of a conclusion together with the major, the opposite of the minor follows, as the same 10th of the first deduced more fully. For these reasons John Scotus holds this conclusion on Sentences 2, dist. 37, second question, which asks whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its willing, so that God has no immediate efficiency with respect to it, but only a mediate one. Having recited the opinion that takes the affirmative side, he says: \"This opinion is argued against in two ways. First, because from it follows that God would not be by nature foreknowing of future things; second, that he would not be the best. Proof of the first consequence: God has no knowledge of future contingents except because he knows with certitude the determination of his will with respect to them, which will is immutable and devoid of potentiality. But if the will is the total cause with respect to its own willing, however much the divine will is posited as determined to one part of those things that depend on the created will, the created will will be able to will otherwise, and so certitude does not follow from knowledge of\n\nthe determination of the divine will. Proof of the second consequence: whatever the best wills, that happens. But if he wills that my willing be, and that willing is in the power of my will as of a total cause related contingently to it, that will can of itself be determined indifferently to one part or the other; and so that to which the divine will determines it can fail to occur.\" Again, if the created will alone effected its act, not all human actions and things would be ruled by divine providence, contrary to the 27th, 30th, 31st and 32nd chapters of the first book. For if God provides for such actions, that is, voluntarily, and his will is efficacious by the tenth of the first book, then does not the divine will effect all such actions? Again, otherwise many things could be casual [n10] and fortuitous\n\nabsolutely, since this would hold in respect of secondary causes, and also of the first cause: the 29th of the first. For this reason also Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned two erroneous articles. The first of them said that human acts are not governed by divine providence; the second asserted that some things can happen by chance with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause, because then they would happen from necessity. Again, if the created will alone could produce its act, it could alone produce at one time a more intense act and at another a weaker one, and so it could alone intensify its act and its good merit, contrary to the 46th of the first. Again, if the created will alone could produce its act, the created intellect could likewise. It could then understand, compose and divide, reason discursively, and know many truths without the help of the agent intellect, who is God. This is against the Philosophers, as the sixth of the first cited more fully. For how could a man ignorant of the sciences, both in habit and in act, seek them out skillfully by his own study\n\nand likewise find them, unless he were directed by someone knowing in act and teaching him? For this cannot happen by fortune or chance. Hence Averroes, on On Sleep and Waking, assigning the cause of knowledge acquired in sleep, says: \"It is clear that no acting mode precedes this knowledge which is acquired in sleep; whether a preparing mode precedes it is doubtful. And since this knowledge is acquired after ignorance, and after it was in potency, and without any preceding knowledge, it is clear that it is acquired in the same way as first propositions are acquired. And since this is so, it is necessary that the agent of them be the same, and of the same kind. For everything that passes from potency into act has an agent which is of the genus of that thing which passes from potency into act. Therefore it is necessary that what produces this knowledge be an intellect in act, and this intellect gives universal principles in speculative matters; its existence has been shown in the book On the Soul.\" Again, God makes true dreams in the intellect of a man asleep, and true prophecy in the intellect of a man awake, as the sixth of the first taught;\n\ntherefore God is the intellect acting human knowledge, not through a celestial body, as some imagine, but through himself, as could be shown in many ways. But for brevity I adduce only Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemning and excommunicating a certain article in these words: \"that God, or an intelligence, does not infuse knowledge into the human soul in sleep except by means of a celestial body.\" Again, the human intellect is of itself potential, and in potency to understanding. Therefore, for it to pass into the act of understanding, it necessarily requires something actual that moves it from this potency into this act. This cannot be a body, nor anything bodily, nor anything that is not an intellect, nor an intellect not in act, as it is easy to show of each. It is therefore an intellect in act; and so this is the intellect acting all our understanding. By this argument Aristotle shows this conclusion in On the Soul 3, 17 and following, and Averroes likewise on that passage, and on Metaphysics 12, 18, and on On Sleep and Waking; and Avicenna in On the Soul 5, 5 and 6; and Algazel, Physics 5\n\nof his work, 1 and 6. A further article was likewise condemned and excommunicated by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in these words: \"that the agent intellect is not joined to our possible intellect.\" These authorities, however, seem to differ somewhat. For Aristotle and Averroes hold that this agent intellect is God, as is clear from chapter 6 of the first; Avicenna and Algazel hold that it is the lowest intelligence, as is clear from the places now cited, and also from Metaphysics 9 of Avicenna, 3 and 5, and from the Metaphysics of Algazel. But this is erroneous if it is understood to mean that this intelligence alone, without God, is the principal agent of human understanding. For since that intelligence is of determinate and finite entity, it is necessarily of like activity. So there could be so many men that it would not suffice to produce understanding in all of them at once, although all could understand at once. Again, since mover and moved must be together, as the Philosopher teaches in Physics 7, and men can understand simultaneously in act in any number of places however far apart, and no such Intelligence can of itself be simultaneously in any number of places however far apart, since it is of itself of\n\ndeterminate entity, therefore no such intelligence is the agent intellect. The same could be argued by arguments taken from motion, and by many other Philosophical and Theological arguments; but let these few suffice. It is necessary, then, that the agent intellect be of infinite activity, immense, unlocalized, present everywhere, and immovable in every way; and no finite intelligence can be such, only God, infinite in every manner. Nor can anyone say that the agent intellect is necessary to the possible intellect in order to abstract material intentions [n11] from matter, strip them bare, and in some way infuse them into it, but that once these are had it does not need his help and can do everything by itself. For the arguments given above conclude that when the possible intellect is understanding or knowing in potency, then for it to pass into act it necessarily requires some mover in act. So the Philosopher too says in On the Soul 3, 18: \"There is an intellect of this kind, to become all things, and another to make all things, like a sort of habit, like light. For in a way light too makes colors that are in potency colors in act.\"\n\nOn this passage the translation which Averroes expounds reads thus: \"It is necessary that in it, that is, in the soul, there be an intellect which is intellect in so far as it becomes all things, and an intellect which is intellect in so far as it makes it understand all things; and the intellect in so far as it understands all things is like a certain habit, which is like light, etc.\" On the words \"and the intellect in so far as it understands, etc.\" Averroes says: \"By this he means the agent intelligence. By what he said, 'understands all things, like a certain habit,' he means that it makes everything understood in potency understood in act, after it was in potency, as a habit in form.\" Avicenna also says, in On the Soul 5, 5: \"The cause of giving intelligible form is nothing but an intelligence in act, with which are the principles of the abstracted intelligible forms. Its relation to our souls is like the relation of the sun to our sight. For as the sun is seen of itself in act, and what was not seen in act is seen by its light in act, so is the disposition of this intelligence in respect of our souls.\" And after much said on this subject in 5 and 6, he says at the end: \"It is possible, then, that the soul of some man, because it is clear and clings to intelligible principles, be so inspired as to be kindled in intelligence to receive all\n\nquestions [n12] from the agent intelligence, either suddenly or almost suddenly, firmly impressed, not probably but in the order which comprehends the middle terms. And this is one mode of prophecy, which is higher than all powers, whence it is fittingly called a holy power, and is a higher degree among human powers.\" Algazel also says, in his Physics 5, that the agent intelligence is always acting upon our souls without ceasing. And in chapter 6 he says: \"The soul is made clear to the point that it is joined with the agent intelligence, so that knowledge is poured into it. For there is no investigator who does not discover many things by himself. For the conclusion first passes through his mind, and then he is exercised toward knowing the middle term, as if it came into his soul, and he knows not whence; or he first perceives the middle term, and then the conclusion is presented to him; and every contingent thing needs a cause from which it comes about. Hence the soul\n\nneeds the intelligence; and it is not impossible for these and like things to be perceived. When this has been understood, then it is not impossible to arrive thus even at the last of the things that are understood, whether in a long time or a short. But he to whom all these things are revealed as understood in a short time, without teaching, is called most wise or a Prophet; and this is magnificence or a miracle.\" The sixth chapter of the first recounted a similar opinion from the Platonists, from Aristotle and from Averroes. Again, according to all these Philosophers, and according to the truth itself, as bodily light brings about bodily vision, so some spiritual light brings about spiritual vision; and this light is the agent intellect, or some power of it. And this opinion of the pagans agrees with the philosophy of the Catholics. For Wisdom 7 writes of uncreated Wisdom itself in this way: \"Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things, and reaches everywhere because of its purity. For it is a vapor of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the clarity of almighty God; for it is the brightness of eternal light, and a spotless mirror\n\nof God's majesty; and though it is one, it can do all things, and remaining in itself it renews all things; and through notions [n13] it passes into holy souls; it makes friends of God and Prophets, for God loves no one but him who dwells with wisdom. For she is more beautiful than the sun, and compared with light she is found to be above every arrangement of the stars.\" And John 1: \"God is light\"; and John 1: \"He enlightens every man coming into this world.\" And Proverbs 2: \"The Lord gives wisdom, and from his mouth come knowledge and prudence.\" Many similar things occur very often in Scripture. Again, if a man, once the intentions had been stripped bare, could do the rest from himself, he could discover very many truths from himself, by his own study or through another Teacher, without God. Yet that same Averroes, on On the Heavens 1, comment 32, where it is shown that circular motion has no contrary, says: \"I, however, tarried a long time, in which I did not understand the final explanation of this passage, but God led me to the truth.\" Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, also says on Posterior Analytics 1, 1: \"I call 'teaching' not only what we hear from the mouth of a Teacher,\n\nbut I take writing in the place of a Teacher; and, if we speak more truly, neither does he who sounds outwardly teach, nor does the letter of Scripture seen outwardly teach; these two only move and rouse; but the true Teacher is he who illumines the mind inwardly and shows the truth.\" With this many distinguished testimonies, set out in 38 of the first, clearly agree. Saint Thomas also, in On the Christian Religion, or on Faith, Hope, and Charity, 129, having shown how man is moved to understand by man, namely because an intelligible matter is set before him [n14], and how by an Angel, which is in two ways, namely because the object is set before man through an Angel, and because man's natural light is strengthened through the light of the Angel, adds: \"God, however, helps man to understand not only on the side of the object, which is set before man by God, or by an addition of light, but also by this, that the natural light itself\n\nof man, by which he is intellectual, is from God; and also by this, that since he is himself the first truth, from which all other truth has its certitude, as second propositions have theirs from first propositions demonstrated in the sciences [n15], nothing can be made certain to the intellect except by divine power, just as conclusions in the sciences are not certain except by the power of the first principles.\" Blessed Augustine also, in the whole of his book On the Teacher, shows this one conclusion principally and by intention, that in all teaching God, as the supreme Teacher, teaches all knowledge. Whence he also says in Retractations 1, 12: \"I wrote a book [n16] whose title is On the Teacher, in which it is discussed and inquired and found that no one teaches man knowledge except God, according to what is written in the Gospel: One is your Teacher.\" And above, in the 4th of the same [n17], he says that for this reason even those unskilled in certain disciplines, when they are well questioned, answer truly [n18] about them, because the light of eternal reason is present to them, when they can grasp it, where they behold these immutable truths. Also in the Sentences of Prosper, chapter 382, headed \"On knowing creatures that are not seen\": \"The human [n19] soul, being naturally joined to the divine reasons on which it depends, when it says that this is better done than that, if it says it truly and sees what it says, sees in those supernal reasons. For it would not discern by thought what ought to have been done, except in those reasons by which all things were made.\" And in On Free Choice 2, ch. 14 and after, in many chapters, he shows that there is one common truth by which all true things are true, and by which all true things that are known are known. Whence in 21 he says: \"This truth, then, of which we have long been speaking, and in which, being one, we behold so many things, you think to be higher than our mind is.\" And in chapter 22: \"For this truth shows all the good things that are true, which men who understand, each according to his capacity, choose, whether singly or several, to enjoy. But just as those who choose in the light of the sun what they gladly look upon, and are gladdened by that sight; and if some of them happen to be endowed with sharper and healthy and very strong eyes, they gaze on nothing more gladly than on the sun itself, which also lights up the other things in which weaker eyes delight; so the strong and vigorous gaze of the mind, when many things, both true and unchangeable— [n20]\n\n…by sure reason, it will direct itself to the very truth by which all things are shown. Clinging to it, it forgets the rest, as it were, and in it enjoys all things at once. The same Augustine, in City of God 8, chapter 8, says that the Philosophers, whom we see, not undeservedly, set above the rest by fame and glory, said that the light of minds for learning all things is that very God by whom all things were made. And in chapter 9: \"Whichever Philosophers, then, have thought these things about the supreme and true God, that he is both the maker of created things, and the light for things to be known and the good for things to be done, and that from him we have both the principle of nature and the truth of teaching and the happiness of life, whether they are more fittingly called Platonists, or give their sect any other name, whether Ionic, or Italic (on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans), or the Atlantic Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or others are found who have seen and taught this, we put all of them before the rest, and we confess them to be nearer to us.\" And in chapter 10: \"This, then, is the reason why we prefer these to the rest: while other Philosophers wore out their talents and their studies in seeking the causes of things, and what the manner of learning and of living should be, these, having come to know God, discovered where were both the cause of the established universe, and the light for perceiving truth, and the fountain for drinking happiness. Whether, therefore, these Platonists, or any other Philosophers of whatever nations, think such things about God, they think with us.\" The same, in Confessions 5, chapter 6, says: \"You had already taught me, my God, in wondrous and hidden ways; and for that reason I believe that you taught me, because it is true, and no one other than you is a teacher of the true, wherever and from wherever it has shone forth.\"\n\nLikewise the blessed Gregory, Moralia 7, chapter 25, on that of Job 37, \"Are not your garments white, when the earth is blown upon by the south wind?\"[n21] understanding by the garments the hearers, by the earth the heart or mind, and by the south wind the Holy Spirit, says: \"Let teachers by no means claim for themselves that they see their hearers advance to the highest things through their exhortation. For unless the Holy Spirit fills their hearts, the voice of the teachers sounds in vain at the ears of the body. They can form the voice of the master outwardly, but this they cannot imprint inwardly. For neither is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase.\" The blessed Ambrose also, on that of 1 Corinthians 12, \"No one can say 'Lord Jesus' except in the Holy Spirit,\" says: \"For whatever is false is from man, and whatever is true, by whomever it is said, is said by the Holy Spirit.\"[n22] Hence also in John 11, when the saying of Caiaphas has been recited, namely, \"It is expedient for you that one man die for the people, and the whole nation not perish,\" it adds: \"But this he did not say of himself, but, being high priest of that year, he prophesied.\" And Origen, as he is cited in the Gloss, on that of Exodus 4, \"I beg you, Lord, I am not eloquent,\" and further on, \"I will be in your mouth,\" says: \"The mouth of those who speak the words of God, God opens; the mouth of those who speak a lie, false witness, buffoonery, and foulness, and also of whisperers and detractors, and of those who speak idle things, the Devil opens.\" Also in the third book of Kings, chapter 3,[n23] when the Lord offered Solomon to give him whatever he wished to ask, and Solomon asked for wisdom and the Lord gave it, it is amply shown by a magnificent example[n24]\n\nthat all wisdom is from the Lord God; Ecclesiasticus 1. The books of the law, of wisdom and of the prophets also attest this very often and very clearly. Not only speculative or political wisdom is given by the Lord, but also [n25] manual wisdom, which is called mechanical art. Hence in Exodus 31 the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: \"Behold, I have called by name Bezalel, and I have filled him with the spirit of God, with wisdom and understanding and knowledge in every work, to devise skillfully whatever can be made of gold, and silver, and bronze, marble, and gems, and the variety of woods; and I have given him as companion Aholiab, and in the heart of every skilled man I have put wisdom, that they may make all that I commanded you: the tabernacle of the covenant and the ark of the testament,\" etc. Nor is the wisdom of the faithful alone given by the Lord God, but that of unbelievers too. Hence the Apostle, in Romans 1, speaking literally of the Philosophers of the Gentiles, says: \"What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has revealed it to them; for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that were made, and also his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse; because, when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God, nor give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For, saying that they were wise, they became fools.\" Behold that God revealed his knowledge to them, for which they ought also to have given thanks to him; and they would not have had to do this unless they had received it from him, as the 31st of the first teaches. \"Saying that they were wise, they became fools.\" But why, when what they said was true? Because they said that they were wise, and this from themselves, not from that fountain of wisdom from which all wisdom is derived like a shining river, who also makes his sun rise on the good and the evil, and sends rain on the just and the unjust, Matthew 5. Hence Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter 7: \"'Saying that they were wise,'\" he says, \"which is to be understood no otherwise than that, attributing this very thing to themselves, they became fools.\" To the same effect is the authority of the venerable Bede against Julian 13, cited above in this second book. And in Isaiah 10 it is said by the Lord: \"I will visit the fruit of the magnificent heart of the king of Assur,\n\nand the glory of the height of his eyes. For he said, 'By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom I have understood.'\" Against this pestilential poison of pride the Lord has therefore prepared a saving antidote: \"Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom,\" he says, \"and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him who glories glory in this, that he knows and knows me, because I am the Lord who do mercy, judgment and justice in the earth,\" Jeremiah 9. It is as if he were saying plainly that man does none of these things for himself from himself, but God does all these things for all, according to mercy and judgment. The authority of the venerable Bede against Julian 13, cited above, agrees well with this; and he says in other passages of the same work, above in the same 7th, that Julian uttered blasphemy in saying that the mind of man can of itself become wise. All this, moreover, the authorities of both Testaments attest in harmony. Hence in Exodus 4 the Lord said to Moses:\n\n\"Who made the mouth of man? Gloss: outwardly or inwardly; or who fashioned the mute? Gloss: in fact, or in spirit;[n26] and the deaf, and the seeing, and the blind? Is it not I? Go, therefore, and I will be with you in your mouth, and I will teach you what you shall say.\" And Matthew 10: \"Do not think how or what you are to speak; for what you are to speak will be given to you in that hour. For it is not you who speak, but the spirit of your Father who speaks in you.\" And John 16: \"When that spirit of truth has come, he will teach you all truth.\" And 1 John 2: \"The anointing teaches you about all things.\" And Psalm 17 [18]: \"Your discipline itself will teach me.\" And Psalm 70 [71]: \"God, you have taught me from my youth.\" And Psalm 93 [94]: \"He who teaches man knowledge\"; \"Blessed is the man whom you instruct, Lord, and whom you teach out of your law.\" And Isaiah 48: \"Thus says the Lord: I, your God, teaching you what is useful and guiding you in the way you walk.\" The Glosses of these authorities and the other Catholic expositions teach this plainly, and I pass them over in silence for the sake of brevity. But behold, to these things the testimony of the Apostle, taught by the Lord and teacher of the Gentiles, is quite clear: \"Such confidence,\" he says, \"we have through Christ toward God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,\n\nbut our sufficiency is from God,\" 2 Corinthians 3. Without doubt, then, we are not sufficient to understand, to compose, to syllogize, or to acquire any science from ourselves as if from ourselves;[n27] but in all these and in each our sufficiency is from God, who opens the ears of the deaf and enlightens the eyes of the blind, who is Lord of the sciences, who also teaches man science, dividing to each as he wills. If, therefore, according to what has been premised, God is necessarily required as co-effector of every act of the created intellect, then he is so also of every act of the created will, and of every operation of it, by a similar reasoning; and by this reasoning Augustine, Gregory, Prosper and Bernard show the same conclusion. The blessed Augustine, then, On the Predestination of the Saints 2, says thus: \"Who would not see that thinking comes first? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. If, then, we are not capable of thinking anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, surely we are not capable of believing anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is from God. Wherefore no one suffices for himself to begin or to complete any good work, but in every good work, both in beginning and in completing, our sufficiency is from God.\" Augustine makes the same argument in On the Gift of Perseverance 18, and in On Grace and Free Choice 17, and in many other places. The blessed Gregory also, Moralia 33, chapter 22, on that of Job 41, \"Who has first given to me, that I may repay him?\", says thus: \"If at least we anticipate the gifts of good works by our own power in thinking well, where is that which is said again through Paul so subtly, where all confidence of the human mind in itself is cut off at the very root of the heart, when he says, 'Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God'?\" Saint Prosper also, Against Cassian 6, recites the fourth definition of Cassian, which says:[n28]\n\n\"So that it may appear more clearly that even through the good of nature, which has been granted by the kindness of the Creator, beginnings of good wills sometimes arise, which nevertheless, unless they are directed by God, cannot reach the consummation of virtues, the Apostle is witness, saying: 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find.'\" To this, on the contrary, Prosper says: \"Falsely, therefore, according to this definition you said before that not only of acts but also of good thoughts the beginning is from God, who begins what is good, and carries it out, and completes it in us. But this can in no way be false in any part, and contrary things ought never to have been brought against it, so that what you rightly professed, that it begins from grace, you should afterwards affirm that we have through the good of nature and through free choice. The blessed Apostle said, indeed, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find'; but the same said, 'Not that we are capable of thinking anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God'; and the same said, 'For it is God who works in us both to will and to work according to good will.' The Apostle is not, therefore, contrary to himself; but when the willing has been given to us, we do not at once find also the doing, unless we ask, seek and knock, so that he who gave the desire may grant the effect. This voice of one saying, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find,' is that of one called and also established under grace, who delights indeed in the law of God according to the inner man, but sees another law in his members, fighting against the law of his mind and making him captive in the law of sin; and although he has received knowledge of willing rightly, he nevertheless does not find in himself the power of working what he desires, until, for the good will which he has taken up, he may merit to find the capacity for the virtues which he seeks.\" And below, in 25, he wills the same. The blessed Bernard also, On Grace and Free Choice 22, says thus: \"Hence we presume that we are God's co-helpers, co-workers of the Holy Spirit, and earners of the kingdom, because by voluntary consent we are joined to the divine will. What then? Is this wholly the work of free choice, is this wholly its merit, that it consents? It is indeed; not, however, that even the consent itself, in which all merit consists,\n\nis from it; since neither are we sufficient to think, which is less than to consent, from ourselves as if from ourselves. These are not my words but the Apostle's, who attributes everything of good that can be, that is, to think, and to will, and to accomplish according to good will,[n29] to God, not to his own choice. Therefore God works in us these three things, to think the good, to will it, and to accomplish it: the first he does without us, the second with us, the third through us.\" Hence also Isaiah 40: \"Behold, the nations are reckoned by him as a moment of the balance.\" On this the Gloss: \"in comparison with him,\" namely God, \"since the moment, namely, is inclined from nothing to either side.\"[n30] And Proverbs 21: \"As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; wherever he wills, he will incline it.\" Now every rational creature is called a king, because it rules itself by reason; for this cannot be understood only of the heart of a great earthly king and not of the heart of a small subject, since \"he himself made the small and the great, and he cares equally for all,\" Wisdom 6. Wherefore each of us, too, humbly entreats the Lord, saying with the Psalmist: \"Incline my heart, Lord, to your testimonies,\n\nand not to avarice,\" Psalm 118 [119]. On this Augustine says: \"What is it to have a heart inclined to something, but to will this?\" Wherefore also, immediately before, on the preceding verse, \"Lead me in the path of your commandments,\" he says: \"The divine help by which he may be led,\" he says, \"because it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy. Finally, because God works even the willing itself in all; for the will is prepared by the Lord.\" To this also pertains that of Wisdom 11: \"You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight\"; with the exposition of Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 4, recited more fully in 5, chapter 9, and in the 46th of the first:[n31] \"There is,\" he says, \"a weight of will and of love, but this weight is drawn off by another weight; a weight without weight is that to which all things are brought back, that they may be at rest.\" Likewise, if man could will from himself alone, he could likewise from himself alone resist temptation, against 4, 5 and 6 of this second book. Likewise, if man could will from himself alone, he could will badly in this way; and since a rational power can reach its objects,[n32] he could likewise will well from himself alone, and so, without God's help, by the powers of free choice alone he could merit, which is the error of Pelagius, as is sufficiently clear from the above. He could also from himself alone prepare himself for grace, and open to God, or to a man, knocking,[n33] against chapters 37 and 38 of the first book. And although someone may already be established in grace, he still, by the fifth of this second book, cannot resist temptation without God's help, and so cannot merit either. Nor does anyone, however richly graced, merit unless grace cooperates, as the 40th of the first teaches; nor does grace work unless it is directed by the Holy Spirit, by the 42nd of the same. All the merits of the faithful, too, are given by God, as has been shown above. Therefore no one can will well from himself alone without God; therefore not will at all. Nor can anyone pretend that man, so far as lies in himself and in the power of free choice, could by himself go to either of the opposites, to evil, that is, and to good, but that God does not wish to permit him to do well without himself; for thus the error of Pelagius would return. And Wisdom 7 says that it is a lover of the good deed, or of the good, who forbids no one to do good.[n34] Likewise neither an Angel, nor Adam before the fall,\n\ncould will by himself, as the tenth of this second book teaches; wherefore neither can he now. Likewise, if man could will by himself, he could also work by himself, and since, according to the Philosopher, Ethics 2, virtue is generated from works,[n35] he could acquire virtues for himself by himself, against the third of the first, and against Augustine and Bede in their books against Julian, as the sixth of this second book alleged more fully, where they hold that all virtue, even that of unbelievers, is from God. Likewise, no creature has a more powerful free choice than Jesus Christ had; but he could not will by himself, as he himself testifies: \"I cannot,\" he says, \"do anything of myself; but as I hear, I judge, and my judgment is true, because I do not seek my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father,\" John 5. Hence Augustine, On John, book 2, Homily 45,[n36] says thus: \"On account of the person of the Son, one person consisting of two substances, divine and human, he speaks sometimes according to what God is, as in that which he says, 'I and the Father are one'; sometimes according to what is man, as in that, 'Because the Father is greater than I,' according to\n\nwhat we have received as said by him; and this, about which I now dispute, 'I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge'\" —; otherwise[n37] Christ could knowingly have willed the contrary of the divine will, and have sinned mortally. Likewise, the Father does all the works of the Son, therefore the Son himself also, according to his divinity, likewise does them; for in John 14 Christ says, \"The Father, abiding in me, himself does the works.\" And Augustine says, On John 1, Homily 20: \"The Son of God walked upon the sea; the flesh walked, and the divinity governed. When, therefore, the flesh walked and the divinity governed, the Father was absent; if he was absent, how does the Son himself say, 'But the Father, abiding in me, does his works'? If, therefore, the Father, abiding in the Son, does his works, that walking of the flesh upon the sea was done by the Father, was done through the Son; therefore that walking is an inseparable work of the Father and the Son; I see both working there.\" Likewise, it was shown in the 46th of the first that what is asked of the Lord comes from him; but man rightly asks of God that the man himself may will, choose and do the good always, and may always not will, and flee, every evil, saying with the Psalmist, \"Incline\n\nmy heart to your testimonies, and not to avarice,\" Psalm 118 [119]; and again, \"Lord, lead me in your justice; because of my enemies direct my way in your sight,\" Psalm 5; and Esther 14:[n38] \"Give me,\" she says, \"confidence, King of gods and Lord of all power; put a well-composed speech in my mouth in the sight of the Lion, and turn his heart to hatred of our enemy, that he himself may perish, and the others who consent to him\"; with many similar passages, very frequently, in Scripture. And the holy Church of God prays accordingly:[n39] \"Almighty eternal God, direct our acts according to your good pleasure,\" etc.; and again, \"Make us love what you command.\" She also prays for her enemies, that God may turn their evil wills into good; and the Priest at Mass, about to receive the Lord's Body, says, \"Make me always obey your commandments,\" etc., with many similar prayers of his own. Likewise, whatever God promises, he does, as was taught in the 46th of the first; but God promised to men wills and many of their future works, as the same chapter alleged, and it is evident in Ishmael, Isaac, Samson, Solomon, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and in very many others besides. Hence also Ezekiel 36: \"I will take away,\" says the Lord, \"the heart of stone from your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh, and I will put a new spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause you to walk in my precepts, and to keep my judgments, and to do them.\" These two motives Augustine adduces for this one conclusion in On Grace and Free Choice 31. Likewise, that for which thanks are given to God is done by him, as was shown in the 31st of the first. But who is so ungrateful as to give thanks to the Lord his God for no act of his own will, or of another's?[n40] It is also said in 1 Esdras 7: \"Blessed be the Lord God, who put this in the heart of the King, to glorify the house of the Lord.\" God, therefore, effects all the wills of all. Many reasons and authorities adduced in the 26th, 31st, 33rd and 34th of the first also bear on this conclusion, and especially on evil acts of the will.\n\nThe whole run of each Testament, and the manifold authority of the saints, clearly prove this same question, and prove it universally of any willing whatever, good or bad. So Isaiah 26: \"Lord, you will give us peace; for you have worked all our works in us.\" And below, 45: \"I am the Lord, and there is no other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil; I am the Lord, doing all these things.\" The text and the Gloss of Isaiah 10, cited above, bear the plainest witness to this too. Likewise Jeremiah 10: \"I know, Lord, that a man's way is not his own, nor is it in a man to walk and to direct his own steps.\" Here the Gloss says: \"Let them blush who say that each person is governed by his own choice: for a man's way is not his own,\" etc. So David: \"A man's steps are directed by the Lord\"; and Proverbs 20: \"A man's steps are directed by the Lord.\" Gloss: \"Not by freedom of choice.\" For this is why Isaiah says: \"For you have worked all our works for us\"; and he continues, \"But who among men can understand his own way?\" On which the Gloss says: \"Truly, what he has done he has from God, because what he will be, or how long he is to live, he does not know of himself, but it rests in God.\" And above, 16: \"When the ways of the man have pleased the Lord, he will turn even his enemies to peace.\" And below, 21: \"Like the divisions of the waters, so is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord: wherever he wills, he will incline it.\" And in Psalm 104: \"He turned their heart to hate his people, and to deal craftily with his servants.\" Likewise Exodus 3 reads: \"I will give,\" says the Lord, \"favour to this people before the Egyptians\": and below, 4: \"I will harden his heart,\" that is, Pharaoh's: and further on, 9: \"And the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, and he did not listen to them, as the Lord had spoken to Moses\": and again, \"For this purpose I have set you up, to show my strength in you, and that my name be proclaimed in all the earth\"; and 14: \"I will harden the heart of the Egyptians, so that they pursue you, and I shall be glorified in Pharaoh and in all his army.\" The Apostle proves this same conclusion from this same Scripture, in Romans 9: \"It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy\": for Scripture says to Pharaoh, \"For this very purpose I raised you up, to show my power in you,\" etc. Likewise Joshua 11: \"There was not a city that did not surrender to the children of Israel, except the Hivite[n41] who dwelt in Gibeon; they took all by war,\" that is, Joshua did. For it had been the Lord's decree that their hearts should be hardened, that they should fight against Israel and fall, and not deserve any clemency, but perish, as the Lord had commanded Moses. And 1 Esdras 6:[n42] \"The Lord had turned the heart of the king of Assyria toward them, to strengthen their hands in the work of the house of God\": and 7: \"Blessed be the Lord who put this in the king's heart, to glorify the house of the Lord.\" And Nehemiah 7: \"But God put it into my heart, and I gathered the nobles.\" Likewise 1 Kings 10: \"Saul went away to his house, and with him went part of the army, whose hearts God had touched\"; but how had he touched their hearts, if not by inspiring them with the will? And 2 Chronicles 21: \"Behold,\" says Isaiah to Joram,[n43] \"the Lord will strike you with a great plague, with your people, and your sons and wives, and all your substance\"; and it continues, \"Therefore the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and of the Arabs, and they went up into the land of Judah and laid it waste, and plundered all the substance that was found in the king's house,\" etc. Likewise Esther 14: Esther prayed to the Lord in this way: \"Turn his heart\" — that is, Ahasuerus's — \"to hatred of our enemy, that he himself may perish.\" And below, 15: \"And when he had lifted his face, and with burning eyes had shown the fury of his heart, the queen fell down,\" etc., \"and God turned the spirit of the king to gentleness, and in haste and fear he leapt from his throne,\" etc. Likewise John 1: \"All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing.\" And below, 3: \"A man cannot receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven, and the Father who sent me has drawn him.\" And 6: \"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him\"; and below, \"No one can come to me unless it has been given him by my Father\"; and further on, 15: \"Without me you can do nothing.\" And Philippians 2: \"It is God who works in us to will and to accomplish, according to good will\"; and Romans 1: \"God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not fitting.\" And 1 Corinthians 3: \"Neither is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. You are God's cultivation, God's building\"; and below, 4: \"What do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you glory as though you had not received?\" And further on, 12: \"There are distinctions of workings; but it is the same God who works all things in all\"; with many like passages, in the Old Testament as in the New. Blessed Augustine too, through the authorities set out above and others, in various books of his, but especially in those he wrote against the Pelagians, demonstrated this same conclusion most elaborately, in fervent spirit. Hence in On Grace and Free Choice 35 he says thus: \"It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, it must be asked of him that we will as much as suffices for us to act by willing; it is certain that we will when we will, but it is he who makes us will the good. Of him it was said, as I set down a little earlier, that the will is prepared by the Lord; of him it was said, 'A man's steps are directed by the Lord, and he will will his way'; of him it was said, 'It is God who works in us to will.' It is certain that we act when we act, but it is he who makes us act, by supplying most efficacious strength to the will: he who said, 'I shall make you walk in my justifications, and keep my judgments and do them.'\" The same, below, in the same work, 43: \"Scripture…\n\n…divine, if it is carefully examined, shows that not only those good wills of men which he himself makes from bad, and, once made good by himself, directs into good acts and into eternal life, but also those which preserve the creatures of the world, are so much in God's power that he makes them incline wherever he wills, whenever he wills, either to the bestowing of benefits on some or the inflicting of punishments on others, as he himself judges, by a judgment most hidden indeed, but beyond doubt most just. For we find that some sins are even punishments of other sins. Such are the vessels of wrath which the Apostle says are made ready for destruction; such is the hardening of Pharaoh, of which the cause too is stated, namely to show in him the power of God; such is the flight of the Israelites from the face of the enemy at the city of Ai. For fear was produced in their mind, that they should flee, and this was done so that the sin should be avenged in the way it had to be avenged. Hence the Lord says to Joshua son of Nun: 'The children of Israel will not be able to stand before the face of their enemies.' What is 'they will not be able to stand'? Why did they not stand firm by free choice, but fled, their will thrown into disorder by fear, unless because the Lord rules also over the wills of men, and turns to dread those whom he turns in anger? And he shows the same by that passage of Joshua 11 which I cited above.\" The same, chapter 44: \"Was it not by his own will that the wicked man, the son of Jemini, namely Shimei, of whom 2 Kings 16 tells, cursed King David? And yet what does David say, full of true, lofty and pious knowledge? What does he say to the man who wished to strike the one who was cursing him? 'What is it to me and to you, sons of Zeruiah? Let him alone, that he may curse, because the Lord told him to curse David; let him alone to curse, since God told him, so that God may see my humility, and repay me with good for his cursing on this day.' How did the Lord tell this man to curse David? Who is wise, and will understand? He did not speak by commanding, where obedience would be praised; rather God, by his just and hidden judgment, turned his own will, evil by its own fault, to this sin. Therefore it is said, 'The Lord said to him.' For if he had obeyed God commanding, he would have been more to be praised than to be punished, as we know he was afterwards punished for this sin. Nor is the reason left unspoken why the Lord said to him in this way to curse David, that is, sent his evil heart, or let it go:[n44] 'that the Lord,' he says, 'may see my humility, and repay me with good for his cursing on this day.'\" And it continues, chapter 45: \"Behold how it is proved that God uses the hearts even of the wicked, for the praise and aid of the good. Thus he used Judas betraying Christ; thus he used the Jews crucifying Christ: and how many good things did he thereby provide for the peoples who were to believe! He uses even the Devil himself, wicked as he is, but most excellently, to exercise and prove the faith and piety of the good: not for himself, who knows all things before they happen, but for us, for whom it was necessary that it be done with us in that way. Was it not by his own will that Absalom chose the counsel that harmed him? And yet he did so because the Lord had heard his father praying that this should happen; on account of which Scripture says, 'And the Lord ordered the good counsel of Ahithophel to be scattered, to bring all evils upon Absalom.' Good counsel he had given, which for the time served the cause, since it was on Absalom's side against his father, against whom he had rebelled, so that he could have crushed him, had the Lord not scattered the counsel Ahithophel had given, by working in Absalom's heart so that he rejected such counsel, and chose another that was not to his advantage.[n45] And it continues, chapter 46: \"Who would not tremble at these divine judgments, by which God does in the hearts even of wicked men whatever he wills, yet rendering to them according to their deserts? Rehoboam son of Solomon rejected the salutary counsel of the elders, and preferred to assent to the words of his contemporaries: whence this, if not from his own will? Yet from this the ten tribes of Israel withdrew from him and set up another king for themselves, Jeroboam, so that the will of angry God might be done, which he had also foretold would come. For what does Scripture say? 'And the king did not listen to the people, for the turning was from the Lord, to confirm his word which he spoke by the hand of Ahijah the Shilonite concerning Jeroboam son of Nebat.' Plainly it was so done, and that through a man's will, yet so that the turning was from the Lord. Read the books of Chronicles, and you will find written in the second book: 'And the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and of the Arabs, who were neighbours of the Ethiopians, and they went up into the land of Judah, and scattered it, and took all the substance that was found in the king's house.' Here it is shown that God stirs up enemies against lands to be laid waste, which he judges worthy of such a punishment. Yet did the Philistines and Arabs come to lay waste the land of Judah without their own [will],[n46] or did they come by their own will in such a way that it is falsely written that the Lord stirred up their spirit to do this? No: both are true, because they came by their own will, and yet the Lord stirred up their spirit. It can also be put thus: the Lord stirred up their spirit, and yet they came with their own will. For the Almighty works in the hearts of men even the motion of their will, so that through them he may do what he himself wills to do.\" And chapter 47: \"What is it\n\nthat the man of God said to King Amaziah, 'Let not the army of Israel come with you; for the Lord is not with Israel, since you have supposed that you will prevail by means of them: God will turn you to flight before your enemies'? How is it a power of God either to help or to turn to flight? How does the power of God help some in war, by giving them confidence, and turn others to flight by sending fear, unless as the power which in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever it willed, even in the hearts of men?[n47] We read what Joash, king of Israel, said, sending a messenger to King Amaziah, who wished to fight with him: for after some other things he said, 'Now sit in your house; why do you provoke to your harm? You will fall, you and Judah with you.' Then Scripture added: 'And Amaziah did not listen, for it was from God that he should be handed over to evil, because they had sought the gods of Edom.' See: God, wishing to avenge the sin of idolatry, worked this in his heart, with whom he was indeed justly angry, so that he would not hear the salutary warning, but, despising it, would go to war, where he would fall with his army. The same point is shown through the deception of the prophet by the Lord, of which Ezekiel 14 speaks, and through Ahasuerus, of which Esther 15, as I cited above.\" And below, 48, he says thus: \"It is written also in the Proverbs of Solomon: 'Like the rush of water, so is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord: wherever he wills, he will turn it.' And in Psalm 104 it is said of the Egyptians what God did to them: 'And he turned their heart to hate his people, to deal craftily with his servants.' See also what is written in the apostolic letters. In the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans: 'Therefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart and to uncleanness.' Likewise a little later: 'As they did not see fit to have knowledge of the Lord, God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not fitting.' And in the second Epistle to the Thessalonians he says of certain persons: 'Because they did not receive the love of truth that they might be saved, therefore God will send them the working of error, that they may believe a lie, and that all may be judged who have not believed the truth but consented to falsehood.' And concluding the principal conclusion of the whole discussion, he says thus: 'By these and such testimonies of the divine utterances it is made sufficiently manifest, so far as I judge, that God works in the hearts of men, to incline their wills wherever he wills, whether to good things out of his mercy, or to evil things by their deserts, at one time by an open judgment, at another by a hidden one, but always by a just one.'\" The same, in On Rebuke and Grace, in many chapters shows this same conclusion, as I cited it for the tenth part of this second book.[n48] Hence also in chapter 49 he says of perseverance in the good itself: \"God did not wish the saints to glory in their own strength, but in himself, who gives them not only help, such as he gave the first man, without which they could not persevere if they willed,[n49] but works also the willing, so that, since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, both the ability and the will to persevere may be given them by the largess of divine grace. So much, indeed, is their will kindled by the Holy Spirit that they can because they will, and will thus because God works that they will.\" And below, 70 of the same: \"It is not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth did all things whatsoever he willed, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills; since indeed from the very wills of men he does what he wills: unless perhaps (to recall some among many instances) when God wished to give the kingdom to Saul, it lay in the power of the Israelites to submit themselves to the man mentioned or not to submit — which was indeed placed in their own will, so that they could even resist God; who nevertheless did this through the wills of those very men,[n50] having without doubt the most omnipotent power of inclining human hearts wherever he pleases. For thus it is written: 'And Samuel dismissed the people, and each went away to his own place, and Saul went away to his house in Gibeah, and there went away with Saul the mighty men whose hearts God had touched; and the pestilent sons said, \"Will this man save us?\" and they dishonoured him, and brought him no gifts.' Will anyone say that none of those whose hearts God touched to go with him went with Saul, or that any of the pestilent went, whose hearts he did not touch to make them do this? Likewise of David, whom the Lord established in the kingdom with greater success, it is read thus: 'And David went on advancing, and was magnified, and the Lord was with him.' And when this had been set forth, a little later it was said: 'But the Spirit of the Lord clothed Amasai, chief among the thirty, and he said, \"We are yours, David, and with you we shall be, son of Jesse; peace to you, and peace to your helpers, for God has helped you.\"' Could he himself have opposed the will of God, and not rather done the will of him who worked in his heart by his spirit, with which he was clothed, so that he would will, say and do this? Likewise a little later the same Scripture says: 'All these warrior men, leading the line, came to Hebron with a peaceful heart, to make David king over all Israel.' That they made David king by their own will, who does not see? Who would deny it? For it was not without mind, or without good will, that they acted with a peaceful heart; and yet he acted in them who works in the hearts of men whatever he wills. On account of which Scripture put first, 'And David went on advancing, and was magnified, and the Lord Almighty was with him'; and therefore the Almighty Lord, who was with him, brought these men to make him king. And how did he bring them? Surely he did not bind them with bodily bonds?\n\nHe acted within, he held hearts, he moved hearts, and drew them by their own wills, which he himself worked in them.\" And it continues in the next chapter: \"If then, when he wills to set kings up on earth, he has the wills of men more in his power than they have their own, who else brings it about that rebuke is salutary, and that in the heart of the rebuked there arises correction, so that he may be established in the heavenly kingdom?\" What could be said more clearly, what more openly? See, here Augustine expressly means that no one could have gone with Saul by his own will unless God had touched his heart to make him do so. Therefore by the same reasoning no one can turn this way or that, nay, nor will anything at all, unless God touches his heart to this very end and brings about the willing itself. Hence also, 4, against Julian, 16: \"What, he asks, do they now do with the choice of the will, if they cannot will except by the willing and aiding of him by whom the will is prepared?\" The same, On the Predestination of the Saints 28: \"God acts, indeed, what he wills in the hearts of men, either by helping or by judging, so that through them also may be fulfilled what his hand and counsel predestined to happen. In vain, therefore, have they said that that also which we have proved from the witness of Scripture, of Kings and Chronicles, does not belong to the cause we are discussing: namely, that when God wills something to be done which can be done only by men who will it, their hearts are inclined to will it, by him inclining who in a wonderful and ineffable manner works in us even the willing.\" The same, On the Good of Perseverance 37: \"God is he who works in us both to will and to work, according to good will. We therefore will, but God works in us the willing; we work, but God works in us even the working, according to good will. It profits us both to believe this and to say it; this is pious, this is true, so that our confession may be humble and submissive, and the whole be given to God.\" The same is shown by Blessed Prosper, against Cassian, in many chapters, as is somewhat clear from what was cited above. Hence in chapter 8 he reports from the African bishops, writing back to Pope Zosimus, in this fashion: \"The will is prepared by the Lord, and that the good may do something, he himself touches the hearts of his children by the fatherly inspirations of his own: for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God; so that we neither feel our own choice to be absent, nor doubt that, in each motion of the human will even in good things, his help prevails the more.\" The same, in his Sentences, chapter 312, headed \"That man can do nothing without God,\" cites Augustine saying: \"God does many good things in man which man does not do; but man does none which God does not make man do.\" Likewise Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice 23: \"What else do our words sound,\" he says, \"but that 'it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy'? The Apostle surely does not say this as though one could not will or run except in vain,[n51] but because he who wills and runs ought to glory not in himself, but in him from whom he received both willing and running. Finally he says, 'What do you have that you did not receive?'\" And he shows the same in chapters 18, 22 and elsewhere. Likewise the Doctor and most glorious Martyr Cyprian, in Letter 13 headed To Quirinus, \"On the discipline of the Christian religion,\" chapter 4,[n52] shows just this one conclusion: \"In nothing may we glory, since nothing is ours.\" And this he shows by that passage of John 3: \"No one can receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven\"; and by that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: \"What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received?\" and through many other places of Scripture. Likewise the venerable Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 1, and consequently he shows that this saying of the Apostle is said to angels as well as to men, and to any creature whatever; and that no creature can have anything from itself alone, nor to will, nor to will through to the end.[n53] Hence also in chapter 7, the disciple objects in this way: \"In our nature it can be asked, since we believe that no man can have a good will unless God gives it, but that he can always have a bad one, by God's permission alone, why God made it such.\" Chapter 8. He answers first materially thus: \"I think that neither the will nor the turning of the will can be denied to be something; for although they are not substances, it cannot be proved that they are not essences, since there are many essences besides that which is properly called substance. Finally, a good will is no more something than a bad will: for the will that wills to give mercifully is no more something than that which wills to seize violently.\" And consequently he shows this conclusion, which, concluding at the end, he states thus: \"Neither, then, the bad will nor the perverse turning of the will is the very evil by which an angel or a man becomes evil, which we say is nothing; nor is the good will, or the good turning of the will, the very good by which the good become good.\" And through many chapters consequently he shows that evil, or malice, is not some positive thing, but pure privation. And in chapter 20, to answer more formally, he shows that every act of the will is from God in three ways. In one way, because God, though he could, does not prohibit but permits. In another way, because the power of willing, that is, the will itself, which is a voluntary power, is from God. In the third way, because God himself truly per se co-effects every act, even an evil one, according to its essence, since in that respect it is good; but not according to its malice, which is produced only by the unjust will. Hence he says thus: \"What wonder, if, as God is said to lead into temptation when he does not deliver from it, we likewise say that\n\nhe gives an evil will by not preventing it when he can, especially since the power of willing anything is only from him?\" See, that is for the first and second; and for the third he adds: \"When the Devil turned his will to what he ought not, both the willing itself and the turning itself was something; and yet it was not except from God, and had something from God; nor could he will anything, nor move his will, except by the permission of him who makes all natures, substantial and accidental, universal and individual. For in so far as the will, and the turning or motion of the will, is something, it is good, and is God's; but in so far as it lacks justice, without which it ought not to be, it is not simply evil, but is a certain evil thing; and what is evil in it is not God's, but the will's, or of him who moves the will. For simple evil is injustice, since it is nothing other than evil, which is nothing; but another evil is the nature in which injustice is, since it is something, and other than injustice, which is evil and is nothing. Therefore what is something is made by God, and is God's; but what is nothing, that is, evil, is made by the unjust, and is his.\" Against this the Disciple at once objects in these words: \"That God makes the natures of all things must be admitted; but that he makes the single actions of perverse wills, such as the very depraved motion of the will by which the evil will moves itself, what is fitting?\" And he answers: \"No wonder, if we say that God makes the single actions which are done by an evil will, since we say that he makes the single substances which are made by an unjust will and dishonourable operation.\" And it follows, under the name of the Disciple, consequently: \"I have nothing to say against it; indeed I cannot deny that every action is truly something, nor do I wish to admit that what truly has some essence is not made by God; nor does this reasoning of yours in any way accuse God or excuse the Devil, but wholly excuses God and accuses the Devil.\" The same, in On Concord 6, a question having been raised whether the foreknowledge, or knowledge, of God is from things or the contrary, and the first part having been destroyed and the second consequently established, and an objection raised against this view thus: \"But if whatever things are take their essence from the knowledge of God, God is the maker and author of evil works; therefore he does not justly punish the wicked.\" He answers in these words: \"But this can easily be solved, if it is first recognized that the good, which is justice, is truly something, while the evil, which is injustice, wholly lacks existence. For injustice is not a quality, or an action, or any other essence, but only the absence of due justice; every quality indeed, and every action, and whatever has any essence, is from God, from whom is all justice and no injustice. Therefore God makes all things that are done by a just or an unjust will, that is, good works and evil ones. In good ones he makes that they are, and that they are good; in evil ones, that they are, but not that they are evil. For to every thing, to be just and good is to be something; but for no thing is it to be something, to be unjust or evil.\" And below, in the same place, he shows that God effects in two ways every willing, action and motion: first, because God makes every active and passive thing and all their power; second, because he truly moves and acts efficiently. Hence he says thus: \"As God does not make injustice, so he does not make anything to be unjust, though he makes all actions and all motions, because he himself makes the things from which, and out of which, and through which, and in which they are done; and no thing has the power of willing or doing, except by his giving it.\" See, that is for the first; and for the second he goes on: \"Willing itself also, which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust, is nothing other than the use of the will and of the power of willing, which God gives, in so far as it is good and is from God; and this, when it is right, is good and just; but when not right, by this alone, that it is not right, it is evil and unjust. But to be right is something, and this is from God; not to be right is not something, nor is it from God. Thus God makes in all wills and works that are good both that they are essentially and that they are good; in evil ones, not that they are evil, but only that they are through essence.\" And in chapter 8 he says the same, where he sets down another way of making, in which God is said to make evil things, namely because he permits them, as he is said to harden a man when he does not soften him, and to lead into temptation when he does not deliver. The same, On the Virginal Conception 4: \"Names are given,\" he says, \"to certain actions, by which it is signified that they are done unjustly, such as fornication and lying; but one thing is understood when the action itself or the utterance —[n54]\n\n...another thing when each is considered, whether it is done justly or unjustly. Finally, every essence is from God, from whom nothing unjust comes; and in many other places he very often says the same. Likewise William of Auxerre, bishop, asks on Sentences 2 whether an evil action is from God as one who works and works with. He holds that it is, and proves it by authority and likewise by reason. First by the authority of Isaiah, cited above: \"Shall the axe boast against him who cuts with it?\" and so on. From this he concludes that God was the principal agent of the destruction of the Jews brought about by Sennacherib, and Sennacherib the instrumental agent, as the axe or the rod. Second, he proves the same by a twofold reason. The first is that the Passion of Christ was good, and so proceeded from a good cause, and so from the good will of God, and not only from the evil will of the Jews. The second is: someone, by committing fornication, begets a holy Prophet; then this action is the cause of a good, and so is itself good; and it is evil, and so the evil action, insofar as it is an action, is good and is from God. And he adds, which we grant in saying that God\n\nis the efficient, formal and final cause of an evil action, but not the material cause. He is its efficient cause because he is its principal Agent. The holy Thomas also, in his Questions on Evil, question 19, asks whether the action of sin is from God, and answering says thus:[n55] \"It must be said that among the ancients there was a twofold opinion about this. For some in antiquity said that the action of sin is not from God, attending to the very deformity of the sin, which is not from God. Others said that the action of sin is from God, attending to the very essence of the act, which must be held to be from God, for a twofold reason. First, by a common reason: since God himself is being through his essence, because his essence is his being, everything that in any way exists must be derived from him. For nothing else is its own being; all things are called beings by a certain participation; and everything that is called such by participation is derived from that which is such by essence, just as all things on fire are derived from that which is fire by essence. It is manifest that the action of sin is a certain being, and is placed in the category of being;\n\nso it must be said that it is from God. Second, the same is clear by a special reason. It is necessary that all movements of secondary causes be caused by the first mover; but God is the first mover with respect to all movements, spiritual and bodily alike. Since therefore the act of sin is a certain movement of free choice, it must be said that the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, is from God.\" John Scotus testifies the same plainly on Sentences 1, distinction 41, as is more fully recounted in the eighteenth of the first.[n56] From what has been set out, as I judge, it is clear enough that for created will to effect its act, whatever it be, good or evil, the divine co-efficiency is necessarily required.\n\nCOROLLARY.\n\nCorollary: that whatever created will has effected, the uncreated must necessarily co-effect as well; and whatever Angelic or human will has worked, the divine must necessarily work with it as well; and that created will effects the whole of every act of created will, and the uncreated likewise effects the whole.\n\nFrom this the following inference is easily drawn: whatever created will has effected, the uncreated must necessarily co-effect as well; and whatever Angelic or human will has worked, the divine must necessarily work with it as well; and created will effects the whole of every act of created will, and the uncreated likewise the whole. The ninth of the first proves this corollary most clearly; and it can also be demonstrated very easily from what has been set out, just as that ninth was demonstrated. For if God is necessarily required to co-effect and work with every act of created will, and God effects or works nothing outside himself, and indeed cannot even do this purely naturally or from knowledge alone,[n57] then his uncreated and efficacious will is necessarily required.\n\nHence the Prophet also says: \"Incline my heart, O God, to your testimonies,\" Psalm 108 [n58]; and further on in the same psalm: \"I have inclined my heart to do your justifications.\" So too Augustine, in On the Perfection of Righteousness 21, says: \"A man prays that he may do God's commands; and these would not be commanded in order that they be done, if our will did nothing there, nor would God be prayed to, if it alone were sufficient.\" Likewise in On Rebuke and Grace 7: \"Let them not deceive themselves, those who say: why is it preached to us and commanded that we turn away from evil and do good, if we do not do this ourselves, but God works in us the willing and the doing? Let them rather understand, if they are sons of God, that they are impelled by the Spirit of God, so that they may do what is to be done, and when they have done it, give thanks to him by whom they are impelled. For they are impelled so that they may act, not so that they may themselves do nothing.\"[n59] This is also recited in the Sentences of Prosper, 310, in this way:[n60] \"To be impelled is without doubt more than to be guided. For whoever is guided does something, and is guided so that he may act rightly; but he who is impelled is scarcely understood to do anything himself. And the grace of the Savior bestows so much upon our wills that the Apostle does not hesitate to say: 'As many as are impelled by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God.' And free will can do nothing better in us than commend itself to the one who cannot act badly.\"\n\nHence Bernard also, in On Grace and Free Choice 23, speaking of Grace, writes thus: \"She herself rouses free choice; when she sows a thought, she heals it; when she changes an affection, she strengthens it, so that it may bring forth to act; she preserves it, lest it feel any failing. And she works with free choice in such a way that she only goes before it in the first thing, and in the rest accompanies it. She goes before it for this purpose, that from then on it may work with her; yet what was begun by grace alone is completed equally by both, so that she works jointly, not separately, simultaneously, not by turns, in each effect: not partly grace and partly free choice, but each accomplishes the whole by one undivided work. The whole indeed this, and the whole that; but as the whole is in that, so the whole is from that.\"[n61]", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Coeffector, a scholastic coinage, is one who brings about an effect together with another agent. Here it is God together with the created will. It is not \"co-worker\" in a merely cooperative sense, since Bradwardine means that God's efficient causality is necessarily required for the act. I use \"co-effector\" throughout."}, {"n": 2, "text": "The margin is cramped and abbreviated. The 1618 print reads Hæ. ſ Nephrot / reſis & Pelagij, and the keyed text has only \"Hae 〈…〉\". I take it as \"The heresy [Haeresis] of Nephrot and of Pelagius\". The abbreviations are uncertain, and the marginal gloss repeats the haeresis Nemphrotea et Pelagiana of the text."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The work is Pelagius's lost Pro libero arbitrio (see Pro libero arbitrio in Augustine's De gratia Christi 1.4–5, where the posse–velle–esse triad is quoted). The citations that follow are Augustine's account of Pelagius, not Pelagius himself."}, {"n": 4, "text": "The print has Caelestinum. The heretic is Caelestius. I translate the name as Caelestius."}, {"n": 5, "text": "De bona fortuna is the Latin version of the end of Eudemian Ethics VIII.2 (1247a–1248b), Bradwardine's usual form for this text. The numbering \"2\" is Savile's."}, {"n": 6, "text": "Aquinas's Compendium theologiae, written for Brother Reginald (Raynaldus), Part I; the quotations come from chs. 129–130 (the \"following chapter\" is 130). Savile's title is the one Bradwardine gives."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, issued the great condemnation of 219 propositions in 1277. Bradwardine cites the articles by their content, not by number."}, {"n": 8, "text": "\"Ter. vero art.\" is an abbreviation of Tertium vero articulum, the object of non damnat: \"the third article he does not condemn outright, but qualifies.\" The sentence then gives the article's content and Stephen's qualification (\"it is an error, he says, unless…\")."}, {"n": 9, "text": "Nolutio is the opposite of volutio: not an absence of willing but an act of willing-not, a nilling. \"Nilling\" renders it."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The print has causalia. Since the next unit uses casualiter, I take it to be a spelling of casualia, chance events."}, {"n": 11, "text": "Intentiones are the intelligible contents or forms abstracted from sensible things, in the Arabic-derived sense of the word; \"intentions\" is kept as a term."}, {"n": 12, "text": "Savile's margin offers conclusiones for quaestiones, which would be \"conclusions\"."}, {"n": 13, "text": "The Vulgate of Wisdom 7:27 reads per nationes (\"through the generations\"). Savile's print has per notiones, \"through notions\", and I translate what Bradwardine wrote."}, {"n": 14, "text": "The Latin is elliptical: quia scilicet propositum intelligibile (\"because, namely, an intelligible [matter is] set forth\"). I supply the sense from the parallel construction that follows, per Angelum proponitur homini obiectum."}, {"n": 15, "text": "The print has inscientijs as one word. I read in scientijs, \"in the sciences\", since the sense is of conclusions demonstrated from first propositions."}, {"n": 16, "text": "The print has liberum for Augustine's librum (\"book\"). The title that follows, de Magistro, confirms the sense. I translate \"book\"."}, {"n": 17, "text": "supra eiusdem 4. is elliptical, perhaps \"above, in the fourth [chapter] of the same\". I keep it as Bradwardine wrote it."}, {"n": 18, "text": "The Latin has imperitos earum quae bene interrogantur, with quae where qui would be expected. The sense is as Augustine, De magistro, has it: \"even the unskilled, if they are well questioned, answer truly\"."}, {"n": 19, "text": "The margin as printed runs two things together: the variant Anima praeclara (for anima) and a citation, 38. primi praemissa, apparently Savile's own cross-reference to the 38th chapter of the first book, cited earlier. The keyed text gives them as one variant."}, {"n": 20, "text": "The stretch, like the unit, breaks off mid-sentence; the clause continues at 545C."}, {"n": 21, "text": "Gregory (and Savile) read candida (\"white\"). The Vulgate of Job 37:17 has calida (\"warm\"). I translate what Bradwardine quotes."}, {"n": 22, "text": "The commentary on 1 Cor 12:3 is that of Ambrosiaster, which the Middle Ages read under Ambrose's name. Bradwardine's \"Ambrose\" is that attribution."}, {"n": 23, "text": "\"The third book of Kings\" is the Vulgate numbering: 3 Kgs 3 is 1 Kgs 3:5–13 in modern Bibles."}, {"n": 24, "text": "Savile's section letter cuts the sentence between satis and ostenditur. So that the English sentence stays whole, I have put \"is shown\" at the end of this block. The next block begins at \"that all wisdom…\", with 546A·1."}, {"n": 25, "text": "The margin keyed under this one marker holds two things. One is the variant Ars (the print has ‖ at Sapientia manualis), which would replace Sapientia. The other is the plain source citation Exod. for the Exodus 31 passage that follows. I translate the main text, since it construes."}, {"n": 26, "text": "The glosses (\"outwardly or inwardly\", \"in fact, or in spirit\") are interlinear glosses of the Glossa ordinaria, which Bradwardine quotes inside the verse with the label Glossa. I keep them in place."}, {"n": 27, "text": "Componere here is the logician's \"to compose\": to join terms into propositions. I keep idonei (\"capable\", Augustine's word) distinct from sufficientes (\"sufficient\", Paul's), since Bradwardine slides between them in the argument."}, {"n": 28, "text": "Prosper's Against Cassian (i.e. Contra collatorem) quotes Cassian's \"fourth definition\" and answers it. The definition runs from ut autem euidentius to \"the Apostle is witness, saying…\", and Prosper's reply begins at \"Falsely, therefore…\". Savile's variant Dicentis would make \"saying\" agree with Cassian rather than with the definition. The main reading is sound."}, {"n": 29, "text": "The print has \"1.\" where I read i. for id est, \"that is\". Bernard glosses \"everything of good that can be\" as the three items \"to think, and to will, and to accomplish\"."}, {"n": 30, "text": "Momentum staterae is the least weight that tips a balance. The Gloss's point is that, compared with God, the nations are the nothing that tips the scale either way. Hence the Gloss's phrase \"from nothing to either side\"."}, {"n": 31, "text": "The numerals are as printed: Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, book 4, \"recited more fully in 5, chapter 9, and in 46 of the first\". I take \"5\" as chapter 5 of this second book and \"chapter 9\" as a subdivision of it. Cross-references are left unexpanded (Conventions §5.4), and this parse is uncertain."}, {"n": 32, "text": "The print reads possit in obiecta. The sense wanted is the capacity of a rational power for opposites (oppositorum), as in \"either of the opposites\" a few lines later. I translate what is printed, without emending."}, {"n": 33, "text": "hominiue pulsanti, \"or to a man, knocking\", is as printed. The evident sense is \"to whoever knocks\", the \"knocking\" being God's (cf. Rev 3:20). I have kept the printed wording."}, {"n": 34, "text": "Wis 7:22 in the Vulgate reads amans bonum, acutum, quem nihil vetat benefacere. Bradwardine's actum (\"deed\") and bonum qui nullum vetat (a masculine relative after a neuter noun) are as printed. In the print the word nullum in the text is marked ‖ and the margin repeats the same word, with no distinct variant. I translate the main text."}, {"n": 35, "text": "Nicomachean Ethics II.1 (1103a31–b2): virtues are acquired by exercise. Savile's \"Ethics 2\" is kept as he gives it."}, {"n": 36, "text": "Augustine's Tractates on John are cited here as \"on John, book 2, Homily 45\" and below as \"On John 1, Hom. 20\". These do not follow the standard numbering of the Tractatus. I keep them as printed and have not resolved them."}, {"n": 37, "text": "It is unclear where Augustine's words end and Bradwardine's inference begins. I take aliasque as \"otherwise\" (alias) and mark the break with a dash."}, {"n": 38, "text": "Esther 14 is the Vulgate numbering of the Greek addition (Est 14:12–13 in the Vulgate). \"The Lion\" is King Ahasuerus."}, {"n": 39, "text": "These are liturgical prayers. \"Direct our acts according to your good pleasure\" is a Roman collect. \"Make us love what you command\" recalls the collect da populis tuis id amare quod praecipis. The priest's prayer before communion in the Missal reads Fac me tuis semper inhaerere mandatis (\"cling to your commandments\"). Bradwardine writes obedire, \"obey\"."}, {"n": 40, "text": "ingratus … gratias: the gratia jingle (Conventions §5.5) is lost in \"ungrateful … give thanks\"."}, {"n": 41, "text": "Savile prints Eneum. The Vulgate of Joshua 11:19 has Hevaeus, the Hivite of Gibeon. The sense is not affected."}, {"n": 42, "text": "Bradwardine cites by the Vulgate-era book names and numbering, which I keep as written. Reg. = the books of Kings, so 1 Kings = 1 Samuel and 2 Kings 16 = 2 Samuel 16; Parab. / Paral. = Chronicles; 1 Esdras = Ezra; \"Esther 14\" and \"Esther 15\" are the Vulgate's additions (Esther's prayer and the scene before Ahasuerus). Psalm numbers are Vulgate, so Psalm 104 = 105."}, {"n": 43, "text": "The text says \"Isaiah to Joram.\" In 2 Chronicles 21:12 the warning of the plague comes in a letter from Elijah. I translate as printed."}, {"n": 44, "text": "demiserit is the print's reading. It may stand for dimiserit (\"let go\"), the natural partner of miserit (\"sent\"). Either way the sense is that God sent Shimei's evil heart, or let it go, in this direction."}, {"n": 45, "text": "The print reads aliud quod ei expediebat (\"another that was to his advantage\"). That cannot be the sense, since Absalom's rejection of Ahithophel's counsel is what ruined him. I translate the sense the context demands, \"that was not to his advantage\". The negative (non) is absent from the keyed text and, as far as I can see, from the print."}, {"n": 46, "text": "The print has sine sua venerunt with no noun. The next clause (sua voluntate) shows that voluntate is to be understood: \"without their own will.\""}, {"n": 47, "text": "The print has nisi quae in coelo et in terra omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit. Quae can be construed with virtus (\"the power which … has done\"), and I translate it so. The sense is that of qui, God."}, {"n": 48, "text": "The print and keyed text read allegauit, \"he cited.\" The context requires the first person (allegaui, \"I cited\"), as at 551A and 551B (\"sicut superius allegaui\"), where Bradwardine refers to his own earlier citation. I translate \"I cited it.\""}, {"n": 49, "text": "si voluit is a singular indicative, but possint before it is plural. The evident sense is \"even if they wished.\""}, {"n": 50, "text": "The print reads qui tamen hoc non fecit per ipsorum hominum voluntates. Taken literally it would say that God did not do this through the men's wills. The argument, and Bradwardine's own gloss at 552A, require the opposite: God accomplished it through their wills, by touching their hearts. I translate that sense. The non is the Latin problem."}, {"n": 51, "text": "The negation in quasi quis velle aut currere non possit in vanum is awkward. The evident sense, required by what follows, is that the Apostle does not mean that willing and running are futile."}, {"n": 52, "text": "\"Letter 13 to Quirinus\" is Cyprian's Testimonia ad Quirinum, a collection of scriptural proof-texts, not a letter in the ordinary sense. The heading quoted here (\"In nothing may we glory, since nothing is ours\") is the heading of Book 3, chapter 4."}, {"n": 53, "text": "peruelle (pervelle), \"to will thoroughly or through to the end,\" is rare. I take it as the intensive of velle, in keeping with the topic of perseverance in willing."}, {"n": 54, "text": "The sentence breaks off at the end of this stretch (553D); in the Latin it continues on 553E."}, {"n": 55, "text": "Savile's \"question 19\" does not match the modern numbering. The passage that follows is Aquinas, De malo q. 3, a. 2 (\"whether the act of sin is from God\"). Bradwardine's text, or Savile's print of it, gives 19. I have kept Savile's figure in the English."}, {"n": 56, "text": "\"John Scotus\" is Duns Scotus. The cross-reference \"the eighteenth of the first\" is kept as Bradwardine wrote it (Conventions §5.4); it points back into Book I of this work."}, {"n": 57, "text": "The clause \"indeed it cannot even do this purely naturally or from knowledge alone\" is compressed. \"Hoc\" evidently means \"to effect or work something outside itself.\" The sense is that God does nothing outside himself by bare nature or by knowledge alone, so that the will is required. I translate the Latin as it stands and supply nothing."}, {"n": 58, "text": "Savile prints \"Psalm 108.\" The verses quoted are Ps 118 [119]:36 and 112, so \"108\" is a misprint or a slip. I kept it in the text and have not corrected it silently."}, {"n": 59, "text": "Agere / agi / regi run through this passage. I render aguntur (Rom 8:14, Vulgate) as \"are impelled\" and regi as \"to be guided,\" so that \"to act\" and \"to be impelled\" keep the same root in English as far as possible. The Vulgate verb can also be rendered \"led,\" as in modern Bibles. Here it is set against regi, so it must be the stronger word."}, {"n": 60, "text": "Savile's reference numbers do not follow the modern chapter divisions. Augustine's De correptione et gratia is cited as \"7\" (the passage lies in ch. 2, §§ 3–4). Bernard's De gratia et libero arbitrio is cited as \"23\" (the passage is ch. 14, §46). \"Prosper 310\" is the number of the sentence in Prosper's Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae. I give Savile's numbers as he has them."}, {"n": 61, "text": "The print has \"totum in illa.\" In Bernard's text the free choice (illo) is the term that contains the whole and grace (illa) the term it comes from: \"as the whole is in the one, so the whole is from the other.\" The evident sense requires that, so I translate it so: \"in that [free choice], from that [grace].\" The print's feminine illa in the first member appears to be a slip for illo."}], "errata": [{"address": "540B (margin 540B·1)", "keyed": "Hae 〈…〉", "print": "Hæ. ſ Nephrot / reſis & Pelagij"}, {"address": "540C", "keyed": "Noc", "print": "Noe"}, {"address": "540D", "keyed": "in firmum", "print": "infirmum"}, {"address": "540D", "keyed": "docer", "print": "docet"}, {"address": "541B", "keyed": "eenim", "print": "enim (print: \"e-\" at line end, \"enim\" at the start of the next line)"}, {"address": "541C", "keyed": "pulch•e", "print": "pulchrè"}, {"address": "541C", "keyed": "ex trinsecus", "print": "extrinsecus"}, {"address": "542C", "keyed": "deformita em", "print": "deformitatem"}, {"address": "542D", "keyed": "no uit", "print": "nouit"}, {"address": "543A", "keyed": "euenitent", "print": "euenirent"}, {"address": "543C (margin 543C·1)", "keyed": "Step •", "print": "Stephanus."}, {"address": "543E", "keyed": "entiratis", "print": "entitatis"}, {"address": "544A", "keyed": "Oporret", "print": "Oportet"}, {"address": "544E", "keyed": "interuis", "print": "interius"}, {"address": "545B", "keyed": "excel siorem", "print": "excelsiorem"}, {"address": "545B", "keyed": "in firmiotes", "print": "infirmiores"}, {"address": "545B (margin 545B·1)", "keyed": "one variant: Anima praeclara 38. primi praemissa.", "print": "two entries merged: variant Anima praeclara + citation 38. primi praemissa."}, {"address": "545E", "keyed": "eum esset Pontifex", "print": "cum esset Pontifex"}, {"address": "546A", "keyed": "politca", "print": "politica"}, {"address": "546B", "keyed": "cognouiscent", "print": "cognouissent"}, {"address": "546B", "keyed": "Di entesque", "print": "Dicentesque"}, {"address": "546B", "keyed": "inquir", "print": "inquit"}, {"address": "546B", "keyed": "este sapientes", "print": "esse sapientes"}, {"address": "546C", "keyed": "Hoc aurem", "print": "Hoc autem"}, {"address": "546D", "keyed": "Nolite cogitate", "print": "Nolite cogitare"}, {"address": "546D", "keyed": "os estis", "print": "vos estis"}, {"address": "546D", "keyed": "veneri ille spititus", "print": "venerit ille spiritus"}, {"address": "547B", "keyed": "confirmates", "print": "confirmares"}, {"address": "548B", "keyed": "sacere", "print": "facere"}, {"address": "548B", "keyed": "aliqu ando", "print": "aliquando"}, {"address": "548D", "keyed": "deducme", "print": "deduc me"}, {"address": "549D", "keyed": "cleuasset", "print": "eleuasset"}, {"address": "549E", "keyed": "perendum", "print": "petendum"}, {"address": "550A", "keyed": "iraequae", "print": "irae quae"}, {"address": "550B", "keyed": "margin 550B·1 \"• tinus.\"", "print": "\"Augustinus.\""}, {"address": "550D", "keyed": "vt cum posset opprimere", "print": "vt eum posset opprimere"}, {"address": "551A", "keyed": "sede id domo", "print": "sede in domo"}, {"address": "551B", "keyed": "desidetia", "print": "desideria"}, {"address": "551E", "keyed": "fili Iesle", "print": "fili Iesse"}, {"address": "551E", "keyed": "margin 551E·1 \"prinpem\"", "print": "\"principem\""}, {"address": "553A", "keyed": "conuersio sine motus voluntatis", "print": "conuersio siue motus voluntatis"}, {"address": "553B", "keyed": "margin 553B·1 \"mala •\"", "print": "\"mala.\""}, {"address": "553D", "keyed": "margin 553D·1 \"hominis. Anselmus. Anselmus.\" (one entry)", "print": "three marginal entries: variant \"hominis.\" at bonis; sources \"Anselmus.\" at \"Et 8. capit.\" and \"Anselmus.\" at \"Idem de conceptu virginali\""}, {"address": "553D", "keyed": "proloquntio", "print": "proloquutio"}, {"address": "553E", "keyed": "contra cum", "print": "contra eum"}, {"address": "554C", "keyed": "necesiario", "print": "necessariò"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p540B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p540B", "locator_display": "540B", "source_text": "CAP. XX. Quod cuiuslibet actus voluntatis creatae Deus est necessarius coeffector.", "english": "CHAPTER 20. That God is the necessary co-effector [n1] of every act of a created will.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p540B-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p540B-2", "locator_display": "540B–540E", "source_text": "HIs itaque praeostensis, iam ordo debitus postulat consequenter ostendere quod cuiuslibet actus voluntatis creatae Deus est necessarius coeffector, cuius oppositum, Nemphrotea et Pelagiana haeresis oblatrabat: Iosephus namque 1. Antiquitatis Iudaicae 2. sic ait, Quia iuuentutis multitudine feruebant, rursus eos Deus a semetipsis migrare fecit, quoniam non illius\n\npropitiatione putabant se habere bona, sed propria fortitudine causam sibi credebant esse diuitiarum: Vnde apposuerunt, vt voluntati Dei inobedientes existerent. Et infra 3. Fecit, inquit, eos esse elatos ad iniuriam Dei atque contemptum Nemphrot filius Cham filij Noc, qui cum esset audacior, et manu fortissimus, suadebat eis vt non Deo ascriberent, quia hominibus per illum faelicitas eueniret, sed quia hoc eis propria virtute praeberetur, et cognatos generis sui ad causam tyrannidis adduxit, solus ipse praesumens homines a Dei timore reuocare, et spem suam in propria virtute reponere: Multitudo autem prona erat vt Nemphrotae praeceptionibus obedirent, graue putantes seruitium obsequi Deo. Pelagius quoque 3. libro pro libero arbitrio tria distinguens in homine, videlicet posse, velle, et esse, id est. possibilitatem, voluntatem, et actionem, primum dixit hominem habere ex Deo et ex gratia Dei, reliqua vero duo a seipso solummodo sine Deo. Vnde et beatus\n\nAugustinus 1. contra Pelagium et Caelestinum de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali 2. cum tria constituat atque distinguat, possibilitatem, voluntatem atque actionem; horum trium primum datum confitetur a Creatore naturae, duo vero reliqua nostra esse asserit, atque ita nobis haec tribuit, vt nobis non esse nisi a nobis contendat. Et infra 3. Scire quippe debemus, quod nec voluntatem nostram, nec actionem diuino adiuuari auxilio credit, sed solam possibilitatem voluntatis atque operis, quam solam in his tribus nos habere affirmat ex Deo; tanquam hoc sit in firmum, quod ipse Deus posuit in natura, caetera vero duo, quae nostra esse voluit, ita sint firma et fortia, et sibi sufficientia, vt nullo indigeant [eius] auxilio, et ideo non adiuuet vt velimus, non adiuuet vt agamus; sed tantummodo adiuuet vt velle et agere valeamus: quod et alia opera eiusdem Sancti Patris indicant multis locis. Deo igitur qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere actus nostros in suo beneplacito dirigente, aggrediendum est intrepide hunc errorem. Porro secundum duo capita proxima, quilibet actus voluntatis est aliquid, et non in aeternum; ergo factum; et hoc a voluntate creata, vt docer Corollarium tertij\n\nhuius secundi et non ab ipsa sola, quia per tertium primi efficientia Dei est ibi necessario requisita; Ergo Deus est ibi necessarius coeffector, scilicet coeffector cum voluntate creata necessario requisitus. Omnes etiam rationes probantes conclusionem principalem illius capituli tertij similiter et hanc probant, ex quibus tamen omnibus sufficiat nunc haec vna: Minus videtur seruare aliquam rem in esse, quam eam producere de non esse in esse; sed per secundum primi nulla creatura potest seruare aliquam rem in esse sine Deo etiam conseruante, quare nec producere aliquam rem in esse: et secundum duo capita proxima, actus voluntatis est aliqua res, non nihil. Item minus est perseuerare finaliter, vel ad tempus in bono actu voluntatis, seu in bono quocunque, quam efficere illud bonum: sed secundum 8um. 9um. et 10um.", "english": "With these things thus shown beforehand, the due order now requires that we go on to show that God is the necessary co-effector of every act of a created will. The Nemphrotean and Pelagian heresy barked out the opposite of this. [n2] Josephus, for example, says in Antiquities of the Jews 1, 2: \"Because they were seething with a multitude of young men, God again made them move away from their own selves. They did not think they had good things through his favor, but believed that their own strength was the cause of their riches. Hence they went on to be disobedient to the will of God.\" And further on, 3: \"He made them,\" he says, \"exalted to the injury and contempt of God. Nemphrot, son of Cham, son of Noe, was bolder than the rest and strongest of hand. He persuaded them not to ascribe to God the fact that happiness came to men through him, but to ascribe it to this, that it was supplied to them by their own power. He led his kinsmen of his own race into the cause of tyranny, presuming that he alone could call men back from the fear of God and place their hope in their own power. The multitude, for its part, was inclined to obey the commands of Nemphrot, thinking it a grievous servitude to obey God.\"\n\nPelagius also, in the third book For Free Choice [n3], distinguishes three things in man, namely to be able, to will, and to be, that is, possibility, will, and action. The first, he said, man has from God and from the grace of God, but the other two from himself alone, without God. Whence also blessed Augustine, in 1 Against Pelagius and Caelestius [n4] on the grace of Christ, and on original sin 2, writes: \"Since he sets up and distinguishes three things, possibility, will, and action, he confesses that the first of these three is given by the Creator of nature, but asserts that the other two are ours. He attributes them to us in such a way that he contends they come to us from no one but ourselves.\" And further on, 3: \"We ought indeed to know that he believes neither our will nor our action to be helped by divine assistance. He holds that we have from God only the possibility of will and of work, and this alone of the three. It is as though this were the weak thing, which God himself placed in nature, while the other two, which he wished to be ours, are so firm and strong and self-sufficient that they need no help of his. And so, on his view, God does not help us to will, and does not help us to act; he helps us only to be able to will and to act. Other works of the same holy Father show this in many places.\" Therefore, with God, who works in us to will and to accomplish, directing our acts according to his good pleasure, this error must be attacked without fear.\n\nMoreover, according to the two preceding chapters, every act of will is something, and not eternal; therefore it is made. It is made by a created will, as the Corollary of the third of this second teaches, but not by that will alone, because by the third of the first God's efficient agency is necessarily required there. Therefore God is there a necessary co-effector, that is, a co-effector necessarily required along with the created will. All the arguments proving the principal conclusion of that third chapter prove this one likewise. Of all of them, let this one suffice for now. It seems less to preserve a thing in being than to produce it from non-being into being. But by the second of the first no creature can preserve anything in being without God's also preserving it, and so neither can it produce anything into being. And according to the two preceding chapters, an act of will is some thing, not nothing. Again, it is less to persevere finally, or for a time, in a good act of will, or in any good whatever, than to effect that good. But according to the 8th, 9th and 10th", "margins": [{"id": "540B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The heresy of Nephrot and of Pelagius 2."}, {"id": "540D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p541A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p541A", "locator_display": "541A–541E", "source_text": "huius secundi, nullus sine auxilio Dei potest perseuerare in bono finaliter, vel ad tempus. Item omnis actus voluntatis est quidam motus: Ergo per quartum primi, Deus ibi necessario commouet; quod et satis ostendunt rationes et Autoritates illius capituli, ex quibus ad praesens sufficiant istae duae: Minus est esse quam mouere, et per secundum primi, nulla creatura sufficit per se esse, quare nec mouere. Item si homo posset velle et mouere ex forma sua sufficienter sine Deo commouente, posset et quaelibet res alia naturalis ex forma sua similiter; quare nulla esset via sumpta a motu ad probandum vnum primum motorem, quod est contra Philosophiam, et Theologiam similiter, sicut memoratum capitulum allegauit. Et hoc nedum est verum in naturalibus, sed et in voluntarijs; Vnde Philosophus in de bona fortuna 2. sicut vigesimum nonum primi plenius recitauit, probat, quod appetitus non est causa qua quis est bene fortunatus per hoc quod illius appetitus est aliqua causa, et illa causa vel\n\nest natura vel fortuna. Et reprobato primo, subdit pro reprobatione secundi, si fortuna sit, fortuna erit causa omnium, scilicet actuum humanorum; etenim eius quod est intelligere et consiliari: Non enim consiliabatur consilians et antequam consiliaretur, sed est principium quoddam; neque intellexit intelligens priusquam intelligeret, et hoc in infinitum; Non ergo eius quod est intelligere intellectus principium, nec consiliandi consilium; quid igitur aliud quam fortuna? igitur a fortuna omnia sunt. Et respondet, Aut est aliquod principium cuius non est aliud extra, ipsum autem quia tale secundum esse, tale potest facere: Quod autem quaeritur, hoc est, quid motus principium in anima? Palam, quemadmodum in toto, Deus: Mouet enim aliquo modo omnia quae in nobis diuinum; rationis autem principium non ratio, sed aliquid melius: Quid igitur erit melius et scientia, et intellectu, nisi Deus? Virtus eenim intellectus organum. Ecce quod Deus est virtus motiua quasi artifex; et ars ipsa, et intellectus est organum motum ab eo, quod et testantur multae Autoritates Philosophicae et Theologicae allegatae capitulo 4. primi. Imo et Deus ipse per Esaiam capit. 10. docet idem,\n\nvbi vocat Senacherib virgam furoris sui, baculum, securim et serram; vbi dicit glossa quod sicut haec instrumenta inanimata nihil per se faciunt, sed per eum qui mouet ea; sic nec Senacherib per se, sed in Dei virtute operatus est: Quod et pulch•e multumque prosequitur Hieronymus libro 4. super Esaiam; sicut 32um. primi haec omnia plenius recitauit. Dicitque Auicenna 10. Metaphysicae suae 1. sicut 29um. primi plenius allegauit; Voluntates nostrae sunt postquam non fuerunt; quicquid autem est postquam non fuit, causam habet; Ergo omnis nostra voluntas causam habet: Causa autem huius voluntatis non intendit ad infinitum, sed ad aliqua quae accidunt ex trinsecus, terrena scilicet, vel caelestia; sed terrena perueniunt ad caelestia; Collectio ergo horum omnium prouenit necessario ex necessitate diuinae voluntatis. Istum quoque errorem et Abraham Patriarcha clarissimus Philosophus et Propheta redarguit et refellit per similem rationem, sicut apparet ex 35a. parte corollarij primi, primi. Quare et Sanctus Thomas de Christiana religione, siue de fide, spe, et charitate ad Raynaldum\n\n129. sic dicit; Cum omne mutabile et multiforme in aliquod principium immobile reducatur, sicut in causam, hominis autem intellectus et voluntas mutabilis et multiformis apparet, necesse est quod in aliquam superiorem causam immobilem et vniformem reducantur: et quia non reducuntur, sicut in causam, in corpora caelestia, oportet eas reducere in causas altiores. Et cap. sequenti, Quia vero secundae causae non agunt nisi per virtutem primae causae, sicut instrumenta agunt per directionem artis, necesse est quod omnia alia agentia, per quae Deus ordinem suae gubernationis adimplet, virtute ipsius Dei agant: Agere igitur cuiuslibet ipsorum a Deo causatur, sicut motus mobilis a motione mouentis; Mouens autem et motum oportet esse simul; oportet igitur quod Deus cuilibet agenti assit interius, quasi in ipso agens, dum ipsum ad agendum mouet. Quod etiam in libello quaestionum suarum de potentia Dei, quaestione 20a. de naturalibus et voluntarijs pariter probat et tenet, sicut in ostensione corollarij secundi capituli primi libri plenius recitatur: Et similiter tertio contra Gentiles,\n\net alijs locis multis. Item Iohannes Scotus super 1. sentent. dist. 2a. Ostendens quod primum efficiens est intelligens et volens, arguit in hunc modum; Aliquid causatur contingenter, ergo prima causa contingenter causat, ergo volens causat. Probatio primae consequentiae, Quaelibet causa secunda causat in quantum mouetur a prima; Ergo si prima necessario mouet, quaelibet alia necessario mouetur, et quidlibet necessario causatur; Ergo si aliqua causa contingenter mouet, et prima contingenter mouebit, quia non causat causa secunda, nisi in virtute primae causae, in quantum mouetur ab ipsa. Probatio secundae consequentiae, Nullum est principium contingenter operandi nisi voluntas vel aliquod concomitans voluntatem, quia quodlibet aliud ex necessitate naturae, et ita non contingenter. Et statim instat contra primam consequentiam isto modo; Nostrum velle potest aliquid contingenter causare; ergo non requiritur quod prima causa illud contingenter causet: et contra secundam consequentiam,", "english": "of this second, no one can persevere in good, finally or for a time, without God's help. Again, every act of will is a certain motion. Therefore by the fourth of the first God there necessarily moves along with it. The arguments and Authorities of that chapter also show this sufficiently, and of them these two are enough for the present. To be is less than to move, and by the second of the first no creature suffices of itself to be; therefore neither to move. Again, if man could will and move sufficiently from his own form without God's co-moving, any other natural thing could likewise do so from its form. Then no way would remain, taken from motion, to prove one first mover, which is against Philosophy and Theology alike, as the chapter just mentioned argued. This is true not only of natural things but also of voluntary things. Whence the Philosopher, in On Good Fortune 2 [n5], as the 29th of the first recounted more fully, proves that appetite is not the cause by which anyone is fortunate, because there is some cause of that appetite, and that cause is either nature or fortune.\n\nAnd having rejected the first, he adds, for the rejection of the second: if it is fortune, fortune will be the cause of all things, namely of human acts. For fortune would be the cause even of what is understanding and deliberating. \"For the one deliberating was not deliberating even before he deliberated, but there is some principle; nor did the one understanding understand before he understood, and so on to infinity. Therefore the principle of understanding is not intellect, nor of deliberating deliberation. What, then, other than fortune? Therefore all things are from fortune.\" And he answers: \"Either there is some principle outside which there is nothing else, and that principle, because it is such in being, can make such. What is sought, however, is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul? Clearly, as in the whole, God. For in some way he moves all that in us is divine. But the principle of reason is not reason but something better. What, then, will be better than knowledge and intellect, except God? For virtue is the organ of intellect.\" See that God is the moving power, as an artisan, and that art itself, and intellect, is the organ moved by him. Many Philosophical and Theological Authorities cited in chapter 4 of the first bear witness to this. Indeed God himself teaches the same through Isaiah, chapter 10,\n\nwhere he calls Sennacherib the rod of his fury, the staff, the axe and the saw. The Gloss there says that just as these inanimate instruments do nothing of themselves but only through him who moves them, so Sennacherib too acted not of himself but in the power of God. Jerome follows this out beautifully and at length in book 4 on Isaiah, as the 32nd of the first recounted more fully in all its parts. Avicenna also says, in his Metaphysics 10, 1, as the 29th of the first cited more fully: \"Our wills exist after they were not; but whatever exists after it was not has a cause; therefore every will of ours has a cause. The cause of this will does not proceed to infinity but to certain things that befall from outside, earthly or heavenly; but earthly things come back to heavenly; therefore the sum of all these comes about necessarily from the necessity of the divine will.\"\n\nThe most renowned Abraham, patriarch, philosopher and prophet, also reproved and refuted this error by a similar argument, as appears from the 35th part of the first corollary of the first. For this reason Saint Thomas too, in On the Christian Religion, or on Faith, Hope, and Charity, to Raynaldus [n6], 129, says: \"Since everything changeable and multiform is reduced to some immovable principle as to its cause, while the intellect and will of man appear changeable and multiform, they must be reduced to some higher cause, immovable and uniform. And since they are not reduced, as to their cause, to the celestial bodies, they must be reduced to higher causes.\" And in the following chapter: \"Since second causes act only through the power of the first cause, as instruments act through the direction of art, it is necessary that all other agents, through which God fulfils the order of his governance, act by the power of God himself. The acting of each of them is therefore caused by God, as the motion of the movable by the motion of the mover. But mover and moved must be together; therefore God must be present within every agent, as acting in it, while he moves it to act.\" He also proves and holds this, equally of natural and of voluntary things, in his little book of questions On the Power of God, question 20, as is more fully recounted in the proof of the second corollary of the first chapter of the first book. He does likewise in book 3 Against the Gentiles,\n\nand in many other places. Again, John Scotus on Sentences 1, dist. 2, showing that the first efficient cause is intelligent and willing, argues in this way: \"Something is caused contingently; therefore the first cause causes contingently; therefore it causes willing. Proof of the first consequence: every second cause causes in so far as it is moved by the first. Therefore if the first moves necessarily, every other is moved necessarily, and everything is caused necessarily. Therefore if any cause moves contingently, the first will also move contingently, because a second cause does not cause except in the power of the first cause, in so far as it is moved by it. Proof of the second consequence: there is no principle of operating contingently except will, or something accompanying will, because everything else acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently.\" And he at once raises an objection against the first consequence in this way: \"Our willing can cause something contingently; therefore it is not required that the first cause cause it contingently.\" And against the second consequence,", "margins": [{"id": "541A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher."}, {"id": "541B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Isaiah."}, {"id": "541C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Avicenna."}, {"id": "541C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Thomas."}, {"id": "541E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Scotus."}]}, {"anchor": "p542A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p542A", "locator_display": "542A–542E", "source_text": "scilicet, Causat contingenter, ergo volens; sic instat, Alia naturaliter mota possunt impediri, et ita oppositum contingenter et violenter eueniet. Ad primam autem instantiam sic respondet; Dicendum quod si Deus est primum mouens vel efficiens respectu voluntatis nostrae, idem sequitur de ipsa, quod de alijs, quia siue immediate necessario mouet eam, siue aliud immediate, et illud necessario moueat ex hoc quod mouetur, sequitur tandem, quod proximum voluntati necessario moueat voluntatem, etiamsi proximum sit ipsamet voluntas, et ita necessario volet, et sequitur vlterius impossibile, quod necessario causat quodlibet suum creatum. Ad secundam instantiam sic respondet; Dico quod si alia causa potest impedire istam, non hoc potest nisi in virtute superioris causae, et sic vsque ad primam causam, quae si immediatam causam sibi necessario mouet, vsque ad illam erit necessitas: ergo necessario impediet, et per consequens non potest alia causa naturaliter causare. Qui et infra super distinct. 39. ista breuius recitat sub his verbis dist. 2a. Probatum est Deum esse intelligentem\n\net volentem per contingentiam rerum, quia nulla contingentia potest esse in causatione alicuius causae respectu sui effectus, nisi prima causa contingenter se habeat ad causam proximam sibi vel ad suum effectum: quod probabatur breuiter ex hoc, quod causa mouens in quantum mouetur, si necessario mouetur, necessario mouet: quaelibet igitur causa secunda, quae producit in quantum mouetur a prima, necessario mouet proximam sibi, vel producit effectum suum: Tota igitur ordinatio causarum vsque ad vltimum effectum necessario producet; si habitudo primae causae ad sibi proximam causam sit necessaria: et hoc satis testatur illa vulgata propositio prima de causis. Omnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum, quam causa vniuersalis secunda, cum suo commento: sicut secundum primi plenius allegauit. Quare et Stephanus Episcopus Parisiensis iuste damnauit et excommunicauit duos articulos contrarios veritati praemissae: Quorum primus dicit, quod in causis efficientibus causa secunda habet actionem quam non accipit a prima causa: Secundus autem ponit, quod in\n\ncausis efficientibus cessante prima, non cessat secunda ab operatione, dum tamen secunda operetur secundū naturā suam: Ter. vero art. non damnat simpliciter, sed exponit, quod omnes scilicet motus voluntarij reducuntur in Motorem 1um error est, inquit, nisi intelligatur in Motorem primum simpliciter non causatum, et intelligendo de motu secundum substantiā, non secundum deformita em. Item per 22um. primi, Deus necessario habet actum voluntatis circa quemlibet actū voluntatis creatae, et non nolutionē, quia tunc non fieret, vt 10um. primi docet; ergo volutionem; et per idem 10um. illa de necessitate est efficax; Ergo necesse est, quod ipsa efficiat quemlibet actum talem; imo dato huius opposito, voluntas Dei non esset efficax, nec Deus omnipotens. Posito namque quod Deus velit voluntatem creatam producere suum actum, tunc si Deus nihil ibi agat, sed sola voluntas creata, ipsa potest libere ex se sola non producere suum actum, et per consequens frustrari voluntatem diuinam, et eius omnipotentiam similiter mutilare; quia si Deus vult aliquid fieri, et illud non fit, Deus non potest\n\nfacere quod hoc fiat▪ Nam ex opposito conclusionis cum maiori sequitur oppositum minoris, vt idem 10um. primi plenius deducebat. Et propter istas rationes tenet Iohannes Scotus istam conclusionem super 2. sent. dist. 37. quaestione secunda, quae quaerit Vtrum voluntas creata sit totalis causa et immediata respectu sui velle, ita quod Deus respectu illius non habeat aliquam efficientiam immediatam, sed tantum mediatam; et recitata opinione ponente partem affirmatiuam, sic ait, Contra istam opinionem arguitur dupliciter; Primo quia ex ipsa sequitur quod Deus non sit naturaliter praescius futurorum; Secundo, quod non sit optimus. Probatio primae consequentiae, Quia Deus non habet scientiam de futuris contingentibus, nisi quia certitudinaliter no uit determinationem voluntatis suae respectu eorum, quae voluntas est immutabilis et impotentialis; sed si voluntas sit totalis causa respectu sui velle, quantumcunque ponatur voluntas diuina determinata ad vnam partem eorum quae dependent a voluntate creata, poterit voluntas creata aliter velle, et ita non sequitur certitudo ex cognitione\n\ndeterminationis voluntatis diuinae. Probatio secundae consequentiae, Quia quicquid vult optimus, hoc fit: Sed si velit volutionem meam fore, et illa est in potestate voluntatis meae, vt totalis causae contingenter se habentis ad illam, ipsa de se potest determinari ad vnam partem vel ad aliam indifferenter; et ita potest non fieri illud ad quod voluntas diuina eam determinat. Item si voluntas creata sola efficeret suum actum, non omnes actiones nec res humanae per diuinam prouidentiam regerentur, contra vigesimum septimū, tricessimū, tricesimum primum, et trigesimum secundum capitula primi libri: Si enim Deus tales actiones prouideat, hoc est, voluntarie, et voluntas sua est efficax per decimum primi libri: Quare diuina voluntas efficit omnes huiusmodi actiones? Item aliter multa esse possent causalia et fortuita", "english": "namely, \"It causes contingently, therefore willing,\" he objects thus: \"Things moved naturally can be impeded, and so the opposite will come about contingently and by force.\" To the first objection he answers thus: \"It must be said that if God is the first mover or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows about that will as about the others. For whether God moves it necessarily and immediately, or something else does so immediately, and that other moves necessarily by the fact that it is moved, it follows in the end that what is next to the will moves the will necessarily, even if what is next is the will itself. And so it will will necessarily; and it further follows, which is impossible, that God causes each of his creatures necessarily.\" To the second objection he answers thus: \"I say that if another cause can impede this one, it can do so only in the power of a higher cause, and so up to the first cause. If the first cause moves its immediate cause necessarily, there will be necessity up to that point; therefore it will impede necessarily, and consequently no other cause can cause naturally.\" Further on, on distinction 39, he recounts these things more briefly in these words, dist. 2: \"It has been proved that God is intelligent\n\nand willing through the contingency of things, because there can be no contingency in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the first cause is contingently related to the cause next to it, or to its effect. This was proved briefly from the fact that a moving cause, in so far as it is moved, if it is moved necessarily, moves necessarily. Every second cause, therefore, which produces in so far as it is moved by the first, moves necessarily the cause next to it, or produces its effect. The whole ordering of causes up to the last effect will therefore produce necessarily, if the relation of the first cause to the cause next to it is necessary.\" The well-known first proposition of On Causes amply bears this witness: \"Every primary cause is more influential upon its effect than a universal second cause,\" together with its commentary, as the second of the first cited more fully. For this reason also Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned and excommunicated two articles contrary to the truth stated above [n7]. The first of them says that in efficient causes the second cause has an action which it does not receive from the first cause. The second asserts that in\n\nefficient causes, when the first ceases, the second does not cease from operating, provided the second operates according to its nature. The third article he does not condemn outright but qualifies [n8]. It says that all voluntary motions are reduced to the First Mover. This is an error, he says, unless it is understood of the First Mover simply uncaused, and, as for the motion, understood according to substance, not according to deformity. Again, by the 22nd of the first, God necessarily has an act of will about each act of a created will, and not a nilling [n9], because then it would not occur, as the 10th of the first teaches; therefore a willing. And by the same 10th, that willing is of necessity efficacious. Therefore it is necessary that it effect each such act. Indeed, if the opposite is granted, the will of God would not be efficacious, nor God omnipotent. For suppose that God wills the created will to produce its act. Then if God does nothing there, but the created will alone, that will can freely, of itself alone, fail to produce its act, and consequently frustrate the divine will and likewise maim its omnipotence. For if God wills something to be done, and it is not done, God cannot\n\nmake it be done. For from the opposite of a conclusion together with the major, the opposite of the minor follows, as the same 10th of the first deduced more fully. For these reasons John Scotus holds this conclusion on Sentences 2, dist. 37, second question, which asks whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its willing, so that God has no immediate efficiency with respect to it, but only a mediate one. Having recited the opinion that takes the affirmative side, he says: \"This opinion is argued against in two ways. First, because from it follows that God would not be by nature foreknowing of future things; second, that he would not be the best. Proof of the first consequence: God has no knowledge of future contingents except because he knows with certitude the determination of his will with respect to them, which will is immutable and devoid of potentiality. But if the will is the total cause with respect to its own willing, however much the divine will is posited as determined to one part of those things that depend on the created will, the created will will be able to will otherwise, and so certitude does not follow from knowledge of\n\nthe determination of the divine will. Proof of the second consequence: whatever the best wills, that happens. But if he wills that my willing be, and that willing is in the power of my will as of a total cause related contingently to it, that will can of itself be determined indifferently to one part or the other; and so that to which the divine will determines it can fail to occur.\" Again, if the created will alone effected its act, not all human actions and things would be ruled by divine providence, contrary to the 27th, 30th, 31st and 32nd chapters of the first book. For if God provides for such actions, that is, voluntarily, and his will is efficacious by the tenth of the first book, then does not the divine will effect all such actions? Again, otherwise many things could be casual [n10] and fortuitous", "margins": [{"id": "542B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Stephen."}, {"id": "542D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Scotus."}]}, {"anchor": "p543A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p543A", "locator_display": "543A–543E", "source_text": "simpliciter, quia respectu causarum secundarum, et etiam primae causae vigesimum nonum primi. Quare et Dominus Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus iuste damnauit duos articulos erroneos; quorum primus dicebat, quod Humani actus non reguntur prouidentia diuina; Secundus vero ponebat quod aliqua possunt casualiter euenire respectu primae causae, et quod falsum est omnia esse praeordinata a prima causa, quia tunc euenitent ex necessitate. Item si voluntas creata sola posset producere suum actum, posset et sola producere quando que actum intensiorem, et quandoque remissiorem, quare et posset sola intendere suum actum, et meritum suum bonum, contra quadragesimum sextum primi. Item si voluntas creata sola posset producere suum actum, posset et intellectus creatus similiter, quare posset intelligere, componere, et diuidere, discurrere, et multas veritates cognoscere sine adiutorio intellectus agentis, qui est Deus; quod est contra Philosophos, sicut sextum primi plenius allegauit. Quomodo namque homo ignorans scientias habitu simul et actu, per studium suum ipsas artificiose\n\nquaereret, et similiter inueniret, nisi dirigeretur ab aliquo sciente in actu, eumque docente? Non enim potest hoc fieri a fortuna vel casu. Vnde et Auerroes super de somno et vigilia assignans causam cognitionis acquisitae in somno, sic ait; Manifestum est quod istam cognitionem quae acquiritur in somno, non antecedit modus agens; vtrum autem praecedit eam modus praeparans, habet dubitationem; et cum ista cognitio est acquisita post ignorantiam, et postquam erat in potentia, et sine aliqua cognitione antecedenti, manifestum est, quod eodem modo acquiritur, sicut primae propositiones acquiruntur; et cum ita sit, necesse est, vt agens eas sit idem, et eiusdem generis; quia omne quod exit de potentia in actum habet agens quod est de genere illius rei, quod exit de potentia in actum; Ergo necesse est vt faciens istam cognitionem sit intellectus in actu, et iste dat principia vniuersalia in rebus speculatiuis, cuius esse declaratum est in libro de Anima. Item Deus agit vera somnia in intellectu hominis dormientis, et veram prophetiam in intellectu hominis vigilantis, vt docuit sextum primi;\n\nErgo Deus est intellectus agens cognitionem humanam, et non mediante corpore caelesti, vt quidam fingunt, sed per seipsū, sicut multipliciter possit ostendi. Sed gratia breuitatis tantum adduco Stephanum Episcopum Parisiensem, damnantem et excommunicantem quendam articulum in haec verba, quod Deus, vel intelligentia non infundit scientiam animae humanae in somno, nisi mediante corpore caelesti: Item intellectus humanus de se est potentialis, et in potentia ad intelligendum; Ergo ad hoc, quod exeat in actum intelligendi, requirit necessario aliquod actuale quod moueat ipsum de hac potentia in hunc actum: Hoc non potest esse corpus, nec aliquid corporale, nec aliquid quod non est intellectus, nec intellectus non in actu, sicut facile est ostendere singula: Hoc ergo intellectus in actu; hoc igitur est intellectus omnem intellectionem nostram agens. Et per hanc rationem ostendit Aristoteles hanc conclusionem 3. de Anima 17. et post, et Auerroes super illum locum similiter, et super 12um. Metaph. 18. super de somno et vigilia: Et Auicenna 5. de Anima 5. et 6. Algazel 5. Physicae\n\nsuae 1. et 6. Et est similiter vnus articulus damnatus et excommunicatus a Stephano Parisiensi Episcopo in haec verba; Quod intellectus agens non copulatur nostro possibili; Isti tamen videntur aliqualiter discrepare: Nam Aristoteles et Auerroes volunt hunc intellectum agentem esse Deum, vt patet cap. 6o. primi; Auicenna vero et Algazel volunt eum esse intelligentiam infimam, vt patet locis nunc allegatis; et etiam 9. Metaphysicae Auicen. 3. et 5. Metaphys. Algazelis. Sed hoc est erroneum, si sic intelligatur, quod illa intelligentia sola sine Deo est agens principaliter intellectionem humanam, quia illa cum sit entitatis terminatae et finitae, est necessario similis actiuitatis; quare tot possent esse homines, quod illa non sufficeret agere intellectionem in omnibus illis simul, cum tamen omnes intelligere simul possent. Item cum mouens et motum debeant esse simul, vt docet Philosophus 7. Phys. et in quotlibet locis quantumcunque distantibus possunt homines intelligere simul in actu, et nulla talis Intelligentia potest de se simul esse in quotlibet locis quantumcunque distantibus, cum ipsa de se sit\n\ndeterminatae entiratis; quare nulla talis intelligentia est intellectus agens. Ad idem posset argui per rationes sumptas a motu, et per multas alias Philosophicas et Theologicas rationes; sed sufficiant istae paucae: Oportet igitur quod intellectus agens sit actiuitatis infinitae, immensus, illocalis, praesens vbique et immobilis omniquaque, et talis nulla finita intelligentia potest esse, sed tantum Deus omnifarie infinitus. Nec potest quis dicere quod intellectus agens est necessarius intellectui possibili, vt intentiones materiales a materia abstrahat, et denudet, easque quodammodo ei infundat, sed ipsis iam habitis non indiget eius auxilio, sed potest facere omnia per seipsum; quia rationes praemissae concludunt, quod quando intellectus possibilis est intelligens vel sciens in potentia, ad hoc quod exeat in actum requirit necessario aliquem motorem in actu: Quare et Philosophus 3. de Anima 18. sic ait; Est intellectus hic quidem talis in omnia fieri, ille vero in omnia facere, sicut habitus quidam, sicut lumen: quodam", "english": "absolutely, since this would hold in respect of secondary causes, and also of the first cause: the 29th of the first. For this reason also Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned two erroneous articles. The first of them said that human acts are not governed by divine providence; the second asserted that some things can happen by chance with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause, because then they would happen from necessity. Again, if the created will alone could produce its act, it could alone produce at one time a more intense act and at another a weaker one, and so it could alone intensify its act and its good merit, contrary to the 46th of the first. Again, if the created will alone could produce its act, the created intellect could likewise. It could then understand, compose and divide, reason discursively, and know many truths without the help of the agent intellect, who is God. This is against the Philosophers, as the sixth of the first cited more fully. For how could a man ignorant of the sciences, both in habit and in act, seek them out skillfully by his own study\n\nand likewise find them, unless he were directed by someone knowing in act and teaching him? For this cannot happen by fortune or chance. Hence Averroes, on On Sleep and Waking, assigning the cause of knowledge acquired in sleep, says: \"It is clear that no acting mode precedes this knowledge which is acquired in sleep; whether a preparing mode precedes it is doubtful. And since this knowledge is acquired after ignorance, and after it was in potency, and without any preceding knowledge, it is clear that it is acquired in the same way as first propositions are acquired. And since this is so, it is necessary that the agent of them be the same, and of the same kind. For everything that passes from potency into act has an agent which is of the genus of that thing which passes from potency into act. Therefore it is necessary that what produces this knowledge be an intellect in act, and this intellect gives universal principles in speculative matters; its existence has been shown in the book On the Soul.\" Again, God makes true dreams in the intellect of a man asleep, and true prophecy in the intellect of a man awake, as the sixth of the first taught;\n\ntherefore God is the intellect acting human knowledge, not through a celestial body, as some imagine, but through himself, as could be shown in many ways. But for brevity I adduce only Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemning and excommunicating a certain article in these words: \"that God, or an intelligence, does not infuse knowledge into the human soul in sleep except by means of a celestial body.\" Again, the human intellect is of itself potential, and in potency to understanding. Therefore, for it to pass into the act of understanding, it necessarily requires something actual that moves it from this potency into this act. This cannot be a body, nor anything bodily, nor anything that is not an intellect, nor an intellect not in act, as it is easy to show of each. It is therefore an intellect in act; and so this is the intellect acting all our understanding. By this argument Aristotle shows this conclusion in On the Soul 3, 17 and following, and Averroes likewise on that passage, and on Metaphysics 12, 18, and on On Sleep and Waking; and Avicenna in On the Soul 5, 5 and 6; and Algazel, Physics 5\n\nof his work, 1 and 6. A further article was likewise condemned and excommunicated by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in these words: \"that the agent intellect is not joined to our possible intellect.\" These authorities, however, seem to differ somewhat. For Aristotle and Averroes hold that this agent intellect is God, as is clear from chapter 6 of the first; Avicenna and Algazel hold that it is the lowest intelligence, as is clear from the places now cited, and also from Metaphysics 9 of Avicenna, 3 and 5, and from the Metaphysics of Algazel. But this is erroneous if it is understood to mean that this intelligence alone, without God, is the principal agent of human understanding. For since that intelligence is of determinate and finite entity, it is necessarily of like activity. So there could be so many men that it would not suffice to produce understanding in all of them at once, although all could understand at once. Again, since mover and moved must be together, as the Philosopher teaches in Physics 7, and men can understand simultaneously in act in any number of places however far apart, and no such Intelligence can of itself be simultaneously in any number of places however far apart, since it is of itself of\n\ndeterminate entity, therefore no such intelligence is the agent intellect. The same could be argued by arguments taken from motion, and by many other Philosophical and Theological arguments; but let these few suffice. It is necessary, then, that the agent intellect be of infinite activity, immense, unlocalized, present everywhere, and immovable in every way; and no finite intelligence can be such, only God, infinite in every manner. Nor can anyone say that the agent intellect is necessary to the possible intellect in order to abstract material intentions [n11] from matter, strip them bare, and in some way infuse them into it, but that once these are had it does not need his help and can do everything by itself. For the arguments given above conclude that when the possible intellect is understanding or knowing in potency, then for it to pass into act it necessarily requires some mover in act. So the Philosopher too says in On the Soul 3, 18: \"There is an intellect of this kind, to become all things, and another to make all things, like a sort of habit, like light. For in a way light too makes colors that are in potency colors in act.\"", "margins": [{"id": "543A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Stephen."}, {"id": "543A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) Virtutes [for veritates]."}, {"id": "543B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes."}, {"id": "543B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) quae [for quod]."}, {"id": "543C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Stephen."}]}, {"anchor": "p544A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p544A", "locator_display": "544A–544E", "source_text": "enim modo et lumen facit potentia existentes colores actu colores; vbi translatio, quam Auerroes exponit, sic habet; Oporret vt in ea, scilicet Anima, sit intellectus, qui est intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne, et intellectus, qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne; et intellectus secundum quod intelligit omne, est quasi aliquis habitus, qui est quasi lux etc: vbi Auerroes super hoc verbum, et Intellectus secundum quod intelligit etc. ita dicit; Intendit per istum intelligentiam agentem, et per hoc, quod dixit, intelligit omne, quasi aliquis habitus, intendit quod facit omnem rem intellectam in potentia, intellectam in actu, postquam erat in potentia quasi habitus in forma. Auicenna quoque 5. de Anima 5. dicit; Causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibiliū abstractarum, cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est, sicut cōparatio solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut Sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in effectu, quod non videbatur in effectu, sic est dispositio huius intelligentiae quantū ad Animas\n\nnostras; et post multa dicta de ista materia 5. et 6. in fine sic ait, Possibile est ergo, vt alicuius hominis Anima eo quod est clara et cohaerens principijs intelligibilibus, ita sit inspirata, vt accendatur ingenio ad recipiendū omnes quaestiones ab intelligētia agente, aut subito aut pene subito, et firmiter impressas non probabiliter, sed cum ordine qui comprehendit medios terminos; et hic est vnus modus prophetiae qui omnibus virtutibus altior est, vnde congrue virtus sancta vocatur, et est altior gradus inter virtutes humanas. Algazel etiam 5. Physicae suae, dicit quod Intelligentia agens est semper agens in animas nostras incessanter; et capit. 6. dicit, Clarificatur Anima in tantum, quod coniungatur cum intelligentia agente, sic vt infundatur ei scientia: Nullus enim est speculator, qui non inveniat multa per se. Transit enim per mentem eius prius conclusio, et deinde exercitatur ad cognoscendum medium terminum, quasi veniat in animam eius, et nescit vnde; vel prius percipit medium terminum, et deinde praesentatur ei conclusio, et omne contingens eget causa, ex qua contingit; quare anima\n\neget intelligentia; haec autem et consimilia non est impossibile percipi. Quod cum intellectum fuerit, tunc non est impossibile sic peruenire vsque ad vltimum horum quae intelliguntur et in longo tempore, vel in paruo: Ille autem cui reuelantur haec omnia intellecta in tempore paruo sine doctrina, dicitur Sapientissimus vel Propheta; et hoc est magnificentia vel miraculum. Similem quoque sententiam a Platonicis, ab Aristotele et Auerroe recitauit capitulum sextum primi. Item secundum omnes istos Philosophos, et secundum ipsam veritatem, sicut lux corporalis visionem efficit corporalem, sic lux aliqua spiritualis spiritualem efficit visionem; haec autem lux est intellectus agens vel aliqua virtus eius. Haec autem Ethnicorum sententia Catholicorum Philosophiae concordat: Nam Sapientiae 7o. De ipsa Sapientia increata scribitur isto modo; Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est Sapientia; attingit autem vbique propter suam munditiam: Vapor enim est virtutis Dei, et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera; Candor est enim lucis aeternae, et speculum sine macula\n\nDei maiestatis, et cum sit vna, omnia potest, et in se permanens omnia innouat; et per notiones in animas sanctas se transfert; Amicos Dei et Prophetas constituit, neminem enim diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia inhabitat. Est enim haec speciosior sole, et super omnem dispositionem stellarum luci comparata, prior inuenitur. Et Ioh. 1. Deus lux est: Et Ioh. 1. Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Et Parabolarum 2. Dominus dat sapientiam, et ex ore eius scientia et prudentia; et multa similia occurrunt saepissime in Scriptura. Itē si homo iam habitis intentionibus denudatis posset ex se facere caetera, posset ex se per proprium studiū, vel per Doctorem alium sine Deo adinuenire plurimas veritates, cum tamen ille Auerroes super 1. de Coelo, comment. 32. vbi ostenditur motum circularem non habere contrarium, ita dicat; Ego autem longo tempore feci moram, in quo non intellexi explanationem istius loci vltimam, sed Deus induxit me ad veritatem. Robertus quo que Lincol. Episcopus super 1. Poster. 1. sic ait; Non solum illud voco doctrinam, quod ab ore Doctoris audimus,\n\nsed scripturā in loco Doctoris accipio: et si verius dicamus, nec qui exterius sonat, docet; nec litera Scripturae exterius visa docet; sed solum mouent haec duo, et excitant: sed verus Doctor est, qui interuis mentē illuminat et veritatem ostendit. Cui et clare concordant testimonia multa praeclara 38. primi praemissa. S. quo que Tho. de Christ. religione, siue de fide, spe, et charitate 129. ostenso quomodo homo mouetur ad intelligēdum ab homine, quia scilicet propositum intelligibile, et quomodo ab Angelo, quoniam dupliciter, quia scilicet per Angelum proponitur homini obiectum, et quia lumen naturale hominis per lumen Angeli confortatur, subiungit; Deus autem ad intelligendum hominē iuuat, non solum ex parte obiecti quod homini proponatur a Deo, aut per additionē luminis, sed etiam per hoc, quod ipsum lumen naturale", "english": "On this passage the translation which Averroes expounds reads thus: \"It is necessary that in it, that is, in the soul, there be an intellect which is intellect in so far as it becomes all things, and an intellect which is intellect in so far as it makes it understand all things; and the intellect in so far as it understands all things is like a certain habit, which is like light, etc.\" On the words \"and the intellect in so far as it understands, etc.\" Averroes says: \"By this he means the agent intelligence. By what he said, 'understands all things, like a certain habit,' he means that it makes everything understood in potency understood in act, after it was in potency, as a habit in form.\" Avicenna also says, in On the Soul 5, 5: \"The cause of giving intelligible form is nothing but an intelligence in act, with which are the principles of the abstracted intelligible forms. Its relation to our souls is like the relation of the sun to our sight. For as the sun is seen of itself in act, and what was not seen in act is seen by its light in act, so is the disposition of this intelligence in respect of our souls.\" And after much said on this subject in 5 and 6, he says at the end: \"It is possible, then, that the soul of some man, because it is clear and clings to intelligible principles, be so inspired as to be kindled in intelligence to receive all\n\nquestions [n12] from the agent intelligence, either suddenly or almost suddenly, firmly impressed, not probably but in the order which comprehends the middle terms. And this is one mode of prophecy, which is higher than all powers, whence it is fittingly called a holy power, and is a higher degree among human powers.\" Algazel also says, in his Physics 5, that the agent intelligence is always acting upon our souls without ceasing. And in chapter 6 he says: \"The soul is made clear to the point that it is joined with the agent intelligence, so that knowledge is poured into it. For there is no investigator who does not discover many things by himself. For the conclusion first passes through his mind, and then he is exercised toward knowing the middle term, as if it came into his soul, and he knows not whence; or he first perceives the middle term, and then the conclusion is presented to him; and every contingent thing needs a cause from which it comes about. Hence the soul\n\nneeds the intelligence; and it is not impossible for these and like things to be perceived. When this has been understood, then it is not impossible to arrive thus even at the last of the things that are understood, whether in a long time or a short. But he to whom all these things are revealed as understood in a short time, without teaching, is called most wise or a Prophet; and this is magnificence or a miracle.\" The sixth chapter of the first recounted a similar opinion from the Platonists, from Aristotle and from Averroes. Again, according to all these Philosophers, and according to the truth itself, as bodily light brings about bodily vision, so some spiritual light brings about spiritual vision; and this light is the agent intellect, or some power of it. And this opinion of the pagans agrees with the philosophy of the Catholics. For Wisdom 7 writes of uncreated Wisdom itself in this way: \"Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things, and reaches everywhere because of its purity. For it is a vapor of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the clarity of almighty God; for it is the brightness of eternal light, and a spotless mirror\n\nof God's majesty; and though it is one, it can do all things, and remaining in itself it renews all things; and through notions [n13] it passes into holy souls; it makes friends of God and Prophets, for God loves no one but him who dwells with wisdom. For she is more beautiful than the sun, and compared with light she is found to be above every arrangement of the stars.\" And John 1: \"God is light\"; and John 1: \"He enlightens every man coming into this world.\" And Proverbs 2: \"The Lord gives wisdom, and from his mouth come knowledge and prudence.\" Many similar things occur very often in Scripture. Again, if a man, once the intentions had been stripped bare, could do the rest from himself, he could discover very many truths from himself, by his own study or through another Teacher, without God. Yet that same Averroes, on On the Heavens 1, comment 32, where it is shown that circular motion has no contrary, says: \"I, however, tarried a long time, in which I did not understand the final explanation of this passage, but God led me to the truth.\" Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, also says on Posterior Analytics 1, 1: \"I call 'teaching' not only what we hear from the mouth of a Teacher,\n\nbut I take writing in the place of a Teacher; and, if we speak more truly, neither does he who sounds outwardly teach, nor does the letter of Scripture seen outwardly teach; these two only move and rouse; but the true Teacher is he who illumines the mind inwardly and shows the truth.\" With this many distinguished testimonies, set out in 38 of the first, clearly agree. Saint Thomas also, in On the Christian Religion, or on Faith, Hope, and Charity, 129, having shown how man is moved to understand by man, namely because an intelligible matter is set before him [n14], and how by an Angel, which is in two ways, namely because the object is set before man through an Angel, and because man's natural light is strengthened through the light of the Angel, adds: \"God, however, helps man to understand not only on the side of the object, which is set before man by God, or by an addition of light, but also by this, that the natural light itself", "margins": [{"id": "544A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes."}, {"id": "544B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) conclusiones [for quaestiones]."}, {"id": "544C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Wisdom."}, {"id": "544D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Proverbs."}, {"id": "544D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) in [for ad]."}]}, {"anchor": "p545A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p545A", "locator_display": "545A–545B", "source_text": "hominis, quo intellectualis est a Deo; et per hoc etiam quod cum ipse sit veritas prima, a qua omnis alia veritas certitudinem habet, sicut secundae propositiones a primis inscientijs demonstratis, nihil intellectui certum fieri potest, nisi virtute diuina, sicut nec conclusiones sunt certae in scientijs, nisi secundum virtutem primorum principiorum. Beatus etiam Augustinus in toto libro suo de Magistro, hanc vnam conclusionem principaliter et ex intentione ostendit, quod in omni doctrina Deus tanquam summus Magister scientiam omnem docet: Vnde et 1. retract. 12. dicit ita; Scripsi liberum, cuius est titulus de Magistro, in quo disputatur et quaeritur, et inuenitur, Magistrum non esse qui docet hominem scientiam, nisi Deum; secundum illud quod in Euangelio scriptum est, Vnus est Magister vester; et supra eiusdem 4. dicit, propterea vera respondere de quibusdam disciplinis etiam imperitos earum quae bene interrogantur, quia praesens est eis quando id capere possunt lumen rationis aeternae, vbi haec immutabilia vera respiciunt. Etiam in sententijs Prosperi cap. 382. praenotato de\n\ncognoscendis creaturis quae non videntur, Humana anima naturaliter diuinis, ex quibus pendet, connexa rationibus, cum dicit melius hoc fieri quam illud, si verū dicit, et videt quod dicit in illis supernis rationibus videt: Non enim cogitatione cerneret faciendū fuisse, nisi in his rationibus quibus facta sunt omnia. Et 2. de lib. arb. c. 14. et post multis cap. ostendit, vnā esse veritatem communem, qua omnia vera sunt vera, et qua omnia vera cognita cognoscuntur; Vnde 21. sic ait; Hanc igitur veritatem, de qua iam diu loquimur, et in qua vna tam multa conspicimus, excel siorem putas esse quam mens nostra est. Et cap. 22. Haec enim veritas ostendit omnia bona quae vera sunt, quae sibi suo captu intelligentes homines, vel singula, vel plura eligunt quibus fruantur; sed quemadmodum illi qui in luce solis eligunt, quod libenter aspiciant, et eo aspectu laetificantur; in quibus si qui forte fuerint vegetioribus sanisque et fortissimis oculis praediti, nihil libentius quam ipsum solem intuentur, qui etiam caetera quibus in firmiotes oculi delectantur, illustrant; sic fortis acies mentis et vegeta, cum multa et vera et incommutabilia", "english": "of man, by which he is intellectual, is from God; and also by this, that since he is himself the first truth, from which all other truth has its certitude, as second propositions have theirs from first propositions demonstrated in the sciences [n15], nothing can be made certain to the intellect except by divine power, just as conclusions in the sciences are not certain except by the power of the first principles.\" Blessed Augustine also, in the whole of his book On the Teacher, shows this one conclusion principally and by intention, that in all teaching God, as the supreme Teacher, teaches all knowledge. Whence he also says in Retractations 1, 12: \"I wrote a book [n16] whose title is On the Teacher, in which it is discussed and inquired and found that no one teaches man knowledge except God, according to what is written in the Gospel: One is your Teacher.\" And above, in the 4th of the same [n17], he says that for this reason even those unskilled in certain disciplines, when they are well questioned, answer truly [n18] about them, because the light of eternal reason is present to them, when they can grasp it, where they behold these immutable truths. Also in the Sentences of Prosper, chapter 382, headed \"On knowing creatures that are not seen\": \"The human [n19] soul, being naturally joined to the divine reasons on which it depends, when it says that this is better done than that, if it says it truly and sees what it says, sees in those supernal reasons. For it would not discern by thought what ought to have been done, except in those reasons by which all things were made.\" And in On Free Choice 2, ch. 14 and after, in many chapters, he shows that there is one common truth by which all true things are true, and by which all true things that are known are known. Whence in 21 he says: \"This truth, then, of which we have long been speaking, and in which, being one, we behold so many things, you think to be higher than our mind is.\" And in chapter 22: \"For this truth shows all the good things that are true, which men who understand, each according to his capacity, choose, whether singly or several, to enjoy. But just as those who choose in the light of the sun what they gladly look upon, and are gladdened by that sight; and if some of them happen to be endowed with sharper and healthy and very strong eyes, they gaze on nothing more gladly than on the sun itself, which also lights up the other things in which weaker eyes delight; so the strong and vigorous gaze of the mind, when many things, both true and unchangeable— [n20]", "margins": [{"id": "545A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "545B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) Anima praeclara; and a cross-reference, \"38. primi praemissa\" (chapter 38 of the first, cited above) 19."}]}, {"anchor": "p545C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p545C", "locator_display": "545C–545E", "source_text": "certa ratione conspexerit, diriget in ipsam veritatem qua cuncta monstrantur, ei que inhaerens tanquam obliuiscitur caetera, et in illa omnibus simul fruitur. Idem 8. de Ciuit. Dei 8. dicit quod Philosophi, quos caeteris non immerito fama atque gloria praelatos videmus, lumen mentium esse dixerunt ad discendum omnia, eundem ipsum Deum a quo facta sunt omnia. Et cap. 9. Quicunque igitur Philosophi de Deo summo et vero ista senserunt, quod et rerum creatarum sit effector, et lumen cognoscendarum et bonum agendarum, et quod ab illo nobis sit et principium naturae et veritas doctrinae, et faelicitas vitae, siue Platonici accommodatius nuncupentur, siue quodlibet aliud sectae suae nomen imponant, siue Ionici, siue Italici propter Pythagoram et Pythagoreos, siue Atlantici Libyes, Aegyptij, Indi, Persae, Chaldaei, Scythae, Galli, Hispani, alijue reperiantur qui hoc viderunt et docuerunt, eos omnes caeteris anteponimus, eosque nobis propinquiores fatemur. Et capit. 10. Haec itaque causa est cur istos caeteris praeferamus, quia cum alij Philosophi ingenia sua, studia que contriuerint\n\nin requirendis rerum causis, et quinam esset modus discendi, atque viuendi; Isti, Deo cognito, reperierunt, vbi esset et causa cōstitutae vniuersitatis et lux percipiendae veritatis, et fons bibendae faelicitatis: Siue ergo isti Platonici, siue quicunque alij quarumlibet gentium Philosophi de Deo ista sentiunt, nobiscum sentiunt. Idemque 5. Confess. 6. sic ait, Me iam docueras Deus meus miris et occultis modis, et propterea credo quod tu me docueris, quoniam verum est, nec quisquam praeter te alius Doctor est veri, vbicun que et vndecunque claruerit. Item B. Greg. 7. Moral. 25. super illud Iob 37. Nonne vestimenta tua candida sunt, cum perflata fuerit terra Austro? per vestimenta Auditores; per terram, cor seu mentem; per Austrum Spiritum Sanctum intelligens, ita dicit; Nequaquam sibi Doctores tribuant, quod per exhortationem suam ad summa proficere Auditores vident; quia nisi Spiritus Sanctus eorum corda repleat, ad aures corporum vox docentium incassum sonat: Formare enim vocem Magistri exterius possunt, sed hanc imprimere interius non possunt: Neque enim qui plantat est\n\naliquid, nec qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat Deus. B. quo que Ambr. super illud 1. ad Cor. 12. Nemo potest dicere Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto, sic ait; Quicquid enim falsum est, ab homine est, et quicquid verum a quocunque dicitur, a sancto dicitur Spiritu; Vnde et Ioan. 11. recitato dicto Caiphae, scilicet, Expedit vobis vt vnus moriatur homo pro populo, et non tota gens pereat, subiungit; Hoc autem a semetipso non dixit, sed eum esset Pontifex anni illius prophetauit. Dicit que Origines, sicut allegatur in glossa, super illud Exod. 4. Obsecro Domine, non sum eloquens; Et infra; Ego ero in ore tuo. Eorum qui verba Dei loquuntur, os Deus aperit; eorum qui loquuntur mendacium, falsum testimonium, scurrilitates, turpitudines, susurronum quoque et detractorum, et eorum qui otiosa loquuntur, Diabolus aperit os. Tertij quoque Reg. 3. Offerente Domino Salomoni vt daret ei quodcunque voluerit postulare, ipsoque sapientiam postulante, et Domino eam dante, exemplo magnifico satis", "english": "…by sure reason, it will direct itself to the very truth by which all things are shown. Clinging to it, it forgets the rest, as it were, and in it enjoys all things at once. The same Augustine, in City of God 8, chapter 8, says that the Philosophers, whom we see, not undeservedly, set above the rest by fame and glory, said that the light of minds for learning all things is that very God by whom all things were made. And in chapter 9: \"Whichever Philosophers, then, have thought these things about the supreme and true God, that he is both the maker of created things, and the light for things to be known and the good for things to be done, and that from him we have both the principle of nature and the truth of teaching and the happiness of life, whether they are more fittingly called Platonists, or give their sect any other name, whether Ionic, or Italic (on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans), or the Atlantic Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or others are found who have seen and taught this, we put all of them before the rest, and we confess them to be nearer to us.\" And in chapter 10: \"This, then, is the reason why we prefer these to the rest: while other Philosophers wore out their talents and their studies in seeking the causes of things, and what the manner of learning and of living should be, these, having come to know God, discovered where were both the cause of the established universe, and the light for perceiving truth, and the fountain for drinking happiness. Whether, therefore, these Platonists, or any other Philosophers of whatever nations, think such things about God, they think with us.\" The same, in Confessions 5, chapter 6, says: \"You had already taught me, my God, in wondrous and hidden ways; and for that reason I believe that you taught me, because it is true, and no one other than you is a teacher of the true, wherever and from wherever it has shone forth.\"\n\nLikewise the blessed Gregory, Moralia 7, chapter 25, on that of Job 37, \"Are not your garments white, when the earth is blown upon by the south wind?\"[n21] understanding by the garments the hearers, by the earth the heart or mind, and by the south wind the Holy Spirit, says: \"Let teachers by no means claim for themselves that they see their hearers advance to the highest things through their exhortation. For unless the Holy Spirit fills their hearts, the voice of the teachers sounds in vain at the ears of the body. They can form the voice of the master outwardly, but this they cannot imprint inwardly. For neither is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase.\" The blessed Ambrose also, on that of 1 Corinthians 12, \"No one can say 'Lord Jesus' except in the Holy Spirit,\" says: \"For whatever is false is from man, and whatever is true, by whomever it is said, is said by the Holy Spirit.\"[n22] Hence also in John 11, when the saying of Caiaphas has been recited, namely, \"It is expedient for you that one man die for the people, and the whole nation not perish,\" it adds: \"But this he did not say of himself, but, being high priest of that year, he prophesied.\" And Origen, as he is cited in the Gloss, on that of Exodus 4, \"I beg you, Lord, I am not eloquent,\" and further on, \"I will be in your mouth,\" says: \"The mouth of those who speak the words of God, God opens; the mouth of those who speak a lie, false witness, buffoonery, and foulness, and also of whisperers and detractors, and of those who speak idle things, the Devil opens.\" Also in the third book of Kings, chapter 3,[n23] when the Lord offered Solomon to give him whatever he wished to ask, and Solomon asked for wisdom and the Lord gave it, it is amply shown by a magnificent example[n24]", "margins": [{"id": "545C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "545D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Gregory (source)."}, {"id": "545E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Ambrose (source)."}, {"id": "545E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "John (source)."}, {"id": "545E·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Kings [Reg.] (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p546A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p546A", "locator_display": "546A–546B", "source_text": "ostenditur, quod omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est. Ecclesiastici 1. quod et libri legales, sapientiales et prophetales sapissime et clarissime contestantur. Non solum autem Sapientia speculatiua siue politca datur a Domino, sed et Sapientia manualis, quae ars mechanica nuncupatur; vnde Exod. 31. loquutus est Dominus ad Mosen dicens; Ecce vocaui ex nomine Besaleel, et impleui eum spiritu Dei sapientia et intelligentia, et scientia in omni opere ad ex cogitandum fabre quicquid fieri potest ex auro, et argento, et aere, marmore, et gemmis, et diuersitate lignorum, dedique ei socium Aholiab, et in corde eorum omnis eruditi posui sapientiam, vt faciant cuncta quae praecipi tibi, tabernaculum faederis et arcam testamenti etc. Nec etiam sapientia solorum fidelium, sed et infidelium a Domino Deo datur; Vnde Apostolus ad Rom. 1. loquens ad literam de Philosophis gentium, ita dicit; Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis, Deus enim illis reuelauit; inuisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque\n\neius virtus et diuinitas, ita vt sint inexcusabiles, quia cum cognouiscent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificauerunt, aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est cor eorum insipiens; Dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt: Ecce quod Deus suam illis notitiam reuelauit, pro qua et sibi gratias agere debuerunt, quod tamen non debuerant facere, nisi ipsam accepissent ab eo, vt docet 31. primi. Di entesque se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt. Sed quare cum verum dixerunt? quia dixerunt se esse sapientes, et hoc a se, non ab illo fonte sapientiae, a quo omnis sapientia velut quoddam flumen lucidum deriuatur, qui et solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super iustos et iniustos, Math. 5. Vnde Augustinus de Spiritu et Litera 7. Dicentes, inquir, se este sapientes, quod non aliter intelligendum est, nisi hoc ipsum sibi tribuentes, stulti facti sunt: et ad hoc idem facit autoritas venerabilis Bedae contra Iulianum 13. huius secundi superius recitata. Et Esai 10. a Domino dicitur, visitabo super fructum magnifici cordis regis Assur,", "english": "that all wisdom is from the Lord God; Ecclesiasticus 1. The books of the law, of wisdom and of the prophets also attest this very often and very clearly. Not only speculative or political wisdom is given by the Lord, but also [n25] manual wisdom, which is called mechanical art. Hence in Exodus 31 the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: \"Behold, I have called by name Bezalel, and I have filled him with the spirit of God, with wisdom and understanding and knowledge in every work, to devise skillfully whatever can be made of gold, and silver, and bronze, marble, and gems, and the variety of woods; and I have given him as companion Aholiab, and in the heart of every skilled man I have put wisdom, that they may make all that I commanded you: the tabernacle of the covenant and the ark of the testament,\" etc. Nor is the wisdom of the faithful alone given by the Lord God, but that of unbelievers too. Hence the Apostle, in Romans 1, speaking literally of the Philosophers of the Gentiles, says: \"What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has revealed it to them; for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that were made, and also his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse; because, when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God, nor give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For, saying that they were wise, they became fools.\" Behold that God revealed his knowledge to them, for which they ought also to have given thanks to him; and they would not have had to do this unless they had received it from him, as the 31st of the first teaches. \"Saying that they were wise, they became fools.\" But why, when what they said was true? Because they said that they were wise, and this from themselves, not from that fountain of wisdom from which all wisdom is derived like a shining river, who also makes his sun rise on the good and the evil, and sends rain on the just and the unjust, Matthew 5. Hence Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter 7: \"'Saying that they were wise,'\" he says, \"which is to be understood no otherwise than that, attributing this very thing to themselves, they became fools.\" To the same effect is the authority of the venerable Bede against Julian 13, cited above in this second book. And in Isaiah 10 it is said by the Lord: \"I will visit the fruit of the magnificent heart of the king of Assur,", "margins": [{"id": "546A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Ecclesiasticus [Sirach] (source)."}, {"id": "546A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: Ars; and source: Exod."}, {"id": "546A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Apostle (source)."}, {"id": "546B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: Obstinatum."}, {"id": "546B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Matthew; Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "546B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Bede; Isaiah (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p546C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p546C", "locator_display": "546C–546D", "source_text": "et super gloriam altitudinis oculorum eius: Dixit enim, In fortitudine manus meae, ego feci, et in sapientia mea intellexi. Quare et contra istud elationis venenum pestiferum parauit Dominus antidotum salutare: Non glorietur, inquit, sapiens in sapientia sua, et non glorietur fortis in fortitudine sua, et non glorietur diues in diuitijs suis, sed in hoc glorietur, qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me, quia ego sum Dominus qui facio misericordiam, iudicium et iusticiam in terra, Ierem. 9. ac si diceret manifeste, quod nihil horum facit sibi homo ex seipso, sed haec omnia omnibus secundum misericordiam et iudicium facit Deus. Et huic satis concordat autoritas venerabilis Bedae contra Iulianum 13. superius memorata, aliaque eiusdem supra eodem 7. dicit Iulianum dixisse blasphemiam, eo quod dixit animum hominis per se posse fieri sapientem. Hoc aurem totum autoritates vtriusque testamenti concorditer attestantur. Vnde Exod. 4. dixit Dominus ad Mosen;\n\nQuis fecit os hominis? Glossa, exterius vel interius; aut quis fabricauit mutum? Glossa, in re, vel in spiritu; et surdum, videntem et caecum? nonne Ego? Perge igitur, et ego ero tecum in ore tuo, doceboque te quid loquaris. Et Math. 10. Nolite cogitate quomodo, aut quid loquamini; Dabitur enim vobis in illa hora quid loquamini; Non enim os estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis: et Ioh. 16. Cum ergo veneri ille spititus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem, et 1. Ioh. 2. Vnctio docet vos de omnibus: et Psal. 17. Disciplina tua ipsa me docebit: et Psal. 70. Deus docuisti me a iuuentute mea: et 93. Qui docet hominem scientiam; Beatus homo quem tu erudieris Domine, et de lege tua docueris eum. Et Esaiae 48. Haec dicit Dominus; Ego Deus tuus docens te vtilia, et gubernans te in via qua ambulas, quod et glossae autoritatum istarum, et ceterae expositiones Catholicae clare docent, quas silendo pertranseo gratia breuiandi. Veruntamen ecce ad haec testimonium Apostoli docti a Domino, doctorisque gentium satis clarum; Fiduciam, inquit, talem habemus per Christum ad Deum, non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis,", "english": "and the glory of the height of his eyes. For he said, 'By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom I have understood.'\" Against this pestilential poison of pride the Lord has therefore prepared a saving antidote: \"Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom,\" he says, \"and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him who glories glory in this, that he knows and knows me, because I am the Lord who do mercy, judgment and justice in the earth,\" Jeremiah 9. It is as if he were saying plainly that man does none of these things for himself from himself, but God does all these things for all, according to mercy and judgment. The authority of the venerable Bede against Julian 13, cited above, agrees well with this; and he says in other passages of the same work, above in the same 7th, that Julian uttered blasphemy in saying that the mind of man can of itself become wise. All this, moreover, the authorities of both Testaments attest in harmony. Hence in Exodus 4 the Lord said to Moses:\n\n\"Who made the mouth of man? Gloss: outwardly or inwardly; or who fashioned the mute? Gloss: in fact, or in spirit;[n26] and the deaf, and the seeing, and the blind? Is it not I? Go, therefore, and I will be with you in your mouth, and I will teach you what you shall say.\" And Matthew 10: \"Do not think how or what you are to speak; for what you are to speak will be given to you in that hour. For it is not you who speak, but the spirit of your Father who speaks in you.\" And John 16: \"When that spirit of truth has come, he will teach you all truth.\" And 1 John 2: \"The anointing teaches you about all things.\" And Psalm 17 [18]: \"Your discipline itself will teach me.\" And Psalm 70 [71]: \"God, you have taught me from my youth.\" And Psalm 93 [94]: \"He who teaches man knowledge\"; \"Blessed is the man whom you instruct, Lord, and whom you teach out of your law.\" And Isaiah 48: \"Thus says the Lord: I, your God, teaching you what is useful and guiding you in the way you walk.\" The Glosses of these authorities and the other Catholic expositions teach this plainly, and I pass them over in silence for the sake of brevity. But behold, to these things the testimony of the Apostle, taught by the Lord and teacher of the Gentiles, is quite clear: \"Such confidence,\" he says, \"we have through Christ toward God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,", "margins": [{"id": "546C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Jeremiah (source)."}, {"id": "546C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Bede (source)."}, {"id": "546C·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Exodus (source)."}, {"id": "546D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Matthew (source)."}, {"id": "546D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "John; Psalms (source)."}, {"id": "546D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Isaiah (source)."}, {"id": "546D·4", "kind": "source", "text": "Apostle (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p546E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p546E", "locator_display": "546E–547A", "source_text": "sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. 2. ad Corinth 3. Proculdubio ergo nec sufficientes sumus intelligere, componere, syllogizare, aut scientiam vllam acquirere a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed in omnibus istis et singulis sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, qui aperit aures surdorum, et oculos caecorum illuminat, qui scientiarum Dominus est, qui et docet hominem scientiam, diuidens singulis prout vult. Si igitur secundum praemissa Deus est necessario requisitus tanquam coeffector cuiuslibet actus intellectus creati, ergo et cuiuslibet actus voluntatis creatae, et cuiuslibet operationis illius per similem rationem: et per hanc rationem Augustinus, Gregorius, Prosper et Bernardus eandem conclusionem ostendunt. Beatus igitur Augustinus de praedestinatione sanctorum 2. sic ait; Quis non videat prius esse cogitare? Nullus\n\nquippe credit aliquid nisi prius cogitauerit esse credendum. Si igitur non simus idonei cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, profecto non sumus idonei credere aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, sed sufficientia nostra, qua credere incipiamus, ex Deo est. Quocirca nemo sibi sufficit ad incipiendum vel perficiendum quodcunque opus bonum, sed in omni opere bono et incipiendo, et perficiendo sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. Et idem argumentum facit Augustinus de bono Perseuerantiae 18. et de gratia et libero arbitrio 17. et alijs locis multis. Beatus quoque Gregorius 33. Moral. 22. super illud Iob. 41. Quis ante dedit mihi, vt reddam ei? sic ait: Si saltem dona bonorum operum virtute nostra bene cogitando preuenimus, vbi est quod rursum per Paulum tam subtiliter dicitur; vbi omnis de se humanae menti fiducia ab ipsa cordis radice succiditur, cum ait, Non quia sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. Sanctus etiam Prosper contra Cassianum 6. recitat quartam definitionem Cassiani Dicentem; vt", "english": "but our sufficiency is from God,\" 2 Corinthians 3. Without doubt, then, we are not sufficient to understand, to compose, to syllogize, or to acquire any science from ourselves as if from ourselves;[n27] but in all these and in each our sufficiency is from God, who opens the ears of the deaf and enlightens the eyes of the blind, who is Lord of the sciences, who also teaches man science, dividing to each as he wills. If, therefore, according to what has been premised, God is necessarily required as co-effector of every act of the created intellect, then he is so also of every act of the created will, and of every operation of it, by a similar reasoning; and by this reasoning Augustine, Gregory, Prosper and Bernard show the same conclusion. The blessed Augustine, then, On the Predestination of the Saints 2, says thus: \"Who would not see that thinking comes first? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. If, then, we are not capable of thinking anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, surely we are not capable of believing anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is from God. Wherefore no one suffices for himself to begin or to complete any good work, but in every good work, both in beginning and in completing, our sufficiency is from God.\" Augustine makes the same argument in On the Gift of Perseverance 18, and in On Grace and Free Choice 17, and in many other places. The blessed Gregory also, Moralia 33, chapter 22, on that of Job 41, \"Who has first given to me, that I may repay him?\", says thus: \"If at least we anticipate the gifts of good works by our own power in thinking well, where is that which is said again through Paul so subtly, where all confidence of the human mind in itself is cut off at the very root of the heart, when he says, 'Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God'?\" Saint Prosper also, Against Cassian 6, recites the fourth definition of Cassian, which says:[n28]", "margins": [{"id": "546E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "547A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Gregory (source)."}, {"id": "547A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: Dicentis."}]}, {"anchor": "p547B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p547B", "locator_display": "547B–547D", "source_text": "autem euidentius clareat etiam per naturae bonum quod beneficio creatoris indultum est, nonnunquam bonarum voluntatum prodire principia, quae tamen nisi a Deo dirigantur, ad consummationem virtutum peruenire non possunt, Apostolus testis est dicens; Velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio, cui e contrario dicit Prosper, falso igitur secundum hanc definitionem ante dixisti, non solum actuum, verum etiam cogitationum bonarum ex Deo esse principium, qui incipit quae bona sunt, et exequitur, et consummat in nobis. Sed hoc nullo modo ex aliqua parte potest esse falsum, cui nequaquam inferri contraria debuerunt, vt quod recte professus es ex gratia incipere, id postea confirmates per naturae bonum, et per liberum arbitrium nos habere. Dixit quidem beatus Apostolus, Velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere bonum non inuenio; sed idem dixit, Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est; et idem dixit, Deus est enim qui operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate; non ergo Apostolus sibi contrarius\n\nest, sed cum donatum nobis fuerit velle, non statim inuenimus et facere, nisi petentibus, querentibus, atque pulsantibus nobis, vt qui dedit desiderium prestet effectum: Vox ista dicentis, Velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio, vocati est etiam sub gratia constituti, qui delectatur quidem lege Dei secundum interiorem hominem, sed videt aliam legem in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae, et captiuantem se in lege peccati: et quamuis acceperit scientiam recte volendi, virtutem tamen in se non inuenit ea quae optat operandi, donec pro bona voluntate quam sumsit, virtutum mereatur facultatem inuenire quam quaerit. Et infra 25. vult idem. Beatus quoque Bernardus de Gratia, et libero arbitrio 22. sic dicit, Hinc coadiutores Dei, cooperatores Spiritus Sancti, et promeritores regni, nos esse praesumimus, quod per consensum voluntarium diuinae voluntati coniungimur. Quid igitur? Hoc ergo totum liberi arbitrij opus, hoc totum eius est meritum quod consentit? Est prorsus, non quidem quod vel ipse consensus in quo omne meritum consistit,\n\nab ipso sit; cum nec cogitare, quod minus est quam consentire, a nobis quasi ex nobis sufficientes simus. Verba sunt non mea sed Apostoli, qui omne quod boni potest esse 1. cogitare, et velle, et perficere pro bona voluntate attribuit Deo, non suo arbitrio; Ergo Deus tria haec, bonum cogitare, velle, et perficere operatur in nobis; primum sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. Vnde et Esaias 40. Ecce, inquit, gentes quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt ei: Super quod Glossa in comparatione eius, scilicet Dei, quod scilicet momentum ex nihilo in vtramlibet partem inclinatur. Et Parab. 21. Sicut diuisiones aquarum, ita cor Regis in manu Domini; quocunque voluerit inclinabit illud; omnis autem creatura rationalis Rex dicitur, quia ratione se regit: Non enim potest hoc tantum intelligi de corde magni Regis terreni, et non de corde parui subiecti, quoniam pusillum et magnum ipse fecit et aequaliter est illi cura de omnibus, Sapientiae 6. Quare et singuli Dominum humiliter deprecamur, cum Psalmista dicentes, Inclina cor meum Domine, in testimonia tua,", "english": "\"So that it may appear more clearly that even through the good of nature, which has been granted by the kindness of the Creator, beginnings of good wills sometimes arise, which nevertheless, unless they are directed by God, cannot reach the consummation of virtues, the Apostle is witness, saying: 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find.'\" To this, on the contrary, Prosper says: \"Falsely, therefore, according to this definition you said before that not only of acts but also of good thoughts the beginning is from God, who begins what is good, and carries it out, and completes it in us. But this can in no way be false in any part, and contrary things ought never to have been brought against it, so that what you rightly professed, that it begins from grace, you should afterwards affirm that we have through the good of nature and through free choice. The blessed Apostle said, indeed, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find'; but the same said, 'Not that we are capable of thinking anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God'; and the same said, 'For it is God who works in us both to will and to work according to good will.' The Apostle is not, therefore, contrary to himself; but when the willing has been given to us, we do not at once find also the doing, unless we ask, seek and knock, so that he who gave the desire may grant the effect. This voice of one saying, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find,' is that of one called and also established under grace, who delights indeed in the law of God according to the inner man, but sees another law in his members, fighting against the law of his mind and making him captive in the law of sin; and although he has received knowledge of willing rightly, he nevertheless does not find in himself the power of working what he desires, until, for the good will which he has taken up, he may merit to find the capacity for the virtues which he seeks.\" And below, in 25, he wills the same. The blessed Bernard also, On Grace and Free Choice 22, says thus: \"Hence we presume that we are God's co-helpers, co-workers of the Holy Spirit, and earners of the kingdom, because by voluntary consent we are joined to the divine will. What then? Is this wholly the work of free choice, is this wholly its merit, that it consents? It is indeed; not, however, that even the consent itself, in which all merit consists,\n\nis from it; since neither are we sufficient to think, which is less than to consent, from ourselves as if from ourselves. These are not my words but the Apostle's, who attributes everything of good that can be, that is, to think, and to will, and to accomplish according to good will,[n29] to God, not to his own choice. Therefore God works in us these three things, to think the good, to will it, and to accomplish it: the first he does without us, the second with us, the third through us.\" Hence also Isaiah 40: \"Behold, the nations are reckoned by him as a moment of the balance.\" On this the Gloss: \"in comparison with him,\" namely God, \"since the moment, namely, is inclined from nothing to either side.\"[n30] And Proverbs 21: \"As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; wherever he wills, he will incline it.\" Now every rational creature is called a king, because it rules itself by reason; for this cannot be understood only of the heart of a great earthly king and not of the heart of a small subject, since \"he himself made the small and the great, and he cares equally for all,\" Wisdom 6. Wherefore each of us, too, humbly entreats the Lord, saying with the Psalmist: \"Incline my heart, Lord, to your testimonies,", "margins": [{"id": "547D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Proverbs (source)."}, {"id": "547D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Wisdom (source)."}, {"id": "547D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Psalms (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p547E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p547E", "locator_display": "547E–548A", "source_text": "et non in auaritiam, Psalmo 118. super quod dicit Augustinus, Quid est inclinatum ad aliquid cor habere, nisi hoc velle? Quare et immediate ante super illum versum priorem; Deduc me in semita mandatorum tuorum, sic ait; Diuinum auxilium, quo deducatur, inquit; quia neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei: Denique quia et ipsum velle Deus operatur in omnibus, praeparatur enim voluntas a Domino. Ad hoc etiam facit illud Sapientiae 11. Omnia in mensura, et numero et pondere disposuisti; cum expositione Augustini 4. super Genesin ad literam 5. capitulo 9o. et 46o. primi plenius recitata; Est, inquit, pondus voluntatis et amoris, sed hoc pondus alio pondere rapitur; pondus sine pondere est, quo referuntur omnia vt quiescant. Item si homo posset velle ex se solo, posset similiter ex se solo resistere tentamento, contra 4.5. et 6. huius secundi; Item si homo posset velle ex se solo, posset sic male velle, et cum potentia rationalis possit in obiecta, posset ex se solo similiter\n\nbene velle, et sic sine Dei auxilio solius liberi arbitrij viribus posset mereri, quod est error Pelagij, sicut ex superioribus satis constat, possetque ex se solo se ad gratiam praeparare, et aperire Deo, hominiue pulsanti, contra 37um. et 38um. capitula primi libri. Et licet quis iam sit in gratia constitutus, adhuc per quintum huius secundi sine Dei auxilio non potest resistere tentamento, quare nec mereri. Nullus etiam, quantumlibet gratiosus, meretur, nisi gratia cooperante, sicut 40.um. primi docet, nec gratia operatur, nisi a Sancto Spiritu dirigatur, per 42um. eiusdem. Omnia quoque fidelium merita donantur a Deo, sicut superius est ostensum; Nullus ergo ex se solo sine Deo potest bene velle; ergo nec velle omnino. Nec potest quis fingere quod homo quantum est de se, et de potētia liberi arbitrij posset per se in vtrumlibet oppositorum, in malū scilicet et in bonum; sed Deus non vult permittere eū benefacere sine ipso; quoniā sic rediret error Pelag. Et Sap. 7. dicitur quod est amans bonum actum, seu bonum qui nullum vetat benefacere. Item nec Angelus, nec Adam ante lapsum", "english": "and not to avarice,\" Psalm 118 [119]. On this Augustine says: \"What is it to have a heart inclined to something, but to will this?\" Wherefore also, immediately before, on the preceding verse, \"Lead me in the path of your commandments,\" he says: \"The divine help by which he may be led,\" he says, \"because it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy. Finally, because God works even the willing itself in all; for the will is prepared by the Lord.\" To this also pertains that of Wisdom 11: \"You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight\"; with the exposition of Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 4, recited more fully in 5, chapter 9, and in the 46th of the first:[n31] \"There is,\" he says, \"a weight of will and of love, but this weight is drawn off by another weight; a weight without weight is that to which all things are brought back, that they may be at rest.\" Likewise, if man could will from himself alone, he could likewise from himself alone resist temptation, against 4, 5 and 6 of this second book. Likewise, if man could will from himself alone, he could will badly in this way; and since a rational power can reach its objects,[n32] he could likewise will well from himself alone, and so, without God's help, by the powers of free choice alone he could merit, which is the error of Pelagius, as is sufficiently clear from the above. He could also from himself alone prepare himself for grace, and open to God, or to a man, knocking,[n33] against chapters 37 and 38 of the first book. And although someone may already be established in grace, he still, by the fifth of this second book, cannot resist temptation without God's help, and so cannot merit either. Nor does anyone, however richly graced, merit unless grace cooperates, as the 40th of the first teaches; nor does grace work unless it is directed by the Holy Spirit, by the 42nd of the same. All the merits of the faithful, too, are given by God, as has been shown above. Therefore no one can will well from himself alone without God; therefore not will at all. Nor can anyone pretend that man, so far as lies in himself and in the power of free choice, could by himself go to either of the opposites, to evil, that is, and to good, but that God does not wish to permit him to do well without himself; for thus the error of Pelagius would return. And Wisdom 7 says that it is a lover of the good deed, or of the good, who forbids no one to do good.[n34] Likewise neither an Angel, nor Adam before the fall,", "margins": [{"id": "547E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Wisdom (source)."}, {"id": "547E·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: explicatione."}, {"id": "548A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: nullum (see note 34)."}]}, {"anchor": "p548B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p548B", "locator_display": "548B–548E", "source_text": "potuit per se velle, vt docet decimum huius secundi, quare nec modo. Item si homo posset per se velle, posset et per se operari, et cum secundum Philosophum 2. Ethicorum, virtus generetur ex operibus, posset per se acquirere sibi virtutes, contra tertium primi, et contra Augustinum et Bedam in libris suis contra Iulianum, vt sextum huius secundi plenius allegauit; vbi volunt, quod omnis virtus, etiam infidelium, est a Deo. Item nulla creatura habet liberum arbitrium potentius quam habuit Iesus Christus, sed ipse non potuit per se velle, ipsomet testante: Non possum, inquit, ego a meipso sacere quicquam; sed sicut audio, iudico, et iudicium meum verum est, quia non quaero voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius, qui misit me, Patris, Ioh. 5. Vnde Augustinus super Iohannem lib. 2. Homilia 45. sic ait, Propter personam Filij vnam ex duabus substantijs, diuina, humanaque constantem, aliqu ando secundum id quod Deus est loquitur, vt est illud quod ait, Ego et Pater vnum sumus; aliquando secundum id quod est homo, vt est illud, Quoniam Pater maior me est, secundum\n\nquod accepimus ab eo dictum; et hoc vnde nunc disputo, Non possum a meipso facere quicquam, sed sicut audio, iudico, aliasque potuit Christus scienter voluisse contrarium voluntati diuinae, mortaliterque peccasse. Item, Pater facit omnia opera Filij, ergo et ipsemet Filius secundum suam diuinitatem similiter ipsa facit; Nam Iohan. 14. Christus dicit, Pater in me manens ipse facit opera: Dicitque Augustinus 1. super Iohan. Hom. 20a. Ambulauit Filius Dei super mare; caro ambulabat, et diuinitas gubernabat; quando ergo caro ambulabat et diuinitas gubernabat, Pater absens erat; si absens erat, quomodo Filius ipse dicit, Pater autem in me manens facit opera sua? Si ergo Pater in Filio manens facit opera sua, ambulatio illa carnis super mare a Patre fiebat, per Filium fiebat; ergo illa ambulatio opus est Patris et Filij inseparabile; vtrumque ibi operantem video. Item ostensum est 46o. primi, quod illud quod petitur a Domino, sit ab eo, sed homo recte petit a Deo, vt ipsemet homo velit, eligat, et faciat semper bonum, nolit semper et fugiat omne malum, dicens cum Psalmista, Inclina\n\ncor meum in testimonia tua, et non in auaritiam, Psalmo 118. et iterum, Domine deducme in iustitia tua, propter inimicos meos dirige in conspectu tuo viam meam, Psalmo 5. et Hesterae 14. Da, inquit, mihi fiduciam Rex Deorum, et vniuersae Domine potestatis, tribue sermonem compositum in ore meo in conspectu Leonis, et transfer cor illius in odium hostis nostri, vt ipse pereat, et caeteri, qui ei consentiunt, cum multis similibus creberrime in Scriptura; oratque sancta Dei Ecclesia consequenter; Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, dirige actus nostros in beneplacito tuo, etc. et iterum, Fac nos amare quod praecipis. Orat etiam pro inimicis, vt Deus voluntates eorum malas conuertat in bonas; et Sacerdos in Missa Corpus Dominicum percepturus, Fac, inquit, me tuis semper obedire mandatis, etc. cum similibus suis multis. Item quicquid Deus promittit, facit; sicut docebatur in 46o. primi, sed Deus promisit hominibus voluntates et multa opera sua futura, vt idem capitulum allegauit, et patet Ismaele, Isaac, Samsone, Salomone, Ieremia, Iohanne Baptista, et Domino Iesu Christo, et alijs\n\nmultis valde; Vnde et Ezech 36. Auferam, inquit Dominus, cor lapideum de carne vestra, et dabo vobis cor carneum, et spiritum nouum ponam in medio vestri, et faciam vt in praeceptis meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea custodiatis, et operemini. Haec autem duo motiua adducit Augustinus ad hanc vnam conclusionem de Gratia et libero arbitrio 31. Item illud pro quo gratiae aguntur Deo, fit ab eo vt ostensum est 31o. primi. Sed quis tam ingratus vt pro nullo actu voluntatis suae, aut alterius agat gratias Domino Deo suo? Dicitur etiam 1. Esdr. 7. Benedictus Dominus Deus, qui dedit hoc in corde Regis, vt glorificaret domum Domini; Deus ergo omnes omnium efficit voluntates. Ad hanc etiam conclusionem, et specialiter de malis actibus voluntatis faciunt multae rationes et Autoritates adductae 26.31.33. et 34o. primi.", "english": "could will by himself, as the tenth of this second book teaches; wherefore neither can he now. Likewise, if man could will by himself, he could also work by himself, and since, according to the Philosopher, Ethics 2, virtue is generated from works,[n35] he could acquire virtues for himself by himself, against the third of the first, and against Augustine and Bede in their books against Julian, as the sixth of this second book alleged more fully, where they hold that all virtue, even that of unbelievers, is from God. Likewise, no creature has a more powerful free choice than Jesus Christ had; but he could not will by himself, as he himself testifies: \"I cannot,\" he says, \"do anything of myself; but as I hear, I judge, and my judgment is true, because I do not seek my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father,\" John 5. Hence Augustine, On John, book 2, Homily 45,[n36] says thus: \"On account of the person of the Son, one person consisting of two substances, divine and human, he speaks sometimes according to what God is, as in that which he says, 'I and the Father are one'; sometimes according to what is man, as in that, 'Because the Father is greater than I,' according to\n\nwhat we have received as said by him; and this, about which I now dispute, 'I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge'\" —; otherwise[n37] Christ could knowingly have willed the contrary of the divine will, and have sinned mortally. Likewise, the Father does all the works of the Son, therefore the Son himself also, according to his divinity, likewise does them; for in John 14 Christ says, \"The Father, abiding in me, himself does the works.\" And Augustine says, On John 1, Homily 20: \"The Son of God walked upon the sea; the flesh walked, and the divinity governed. When, therefore, the flesh walked and the divinity governed, the Father was absent; if he was absent, how does the Son himself say, 'But the Father, abiding in me, does his works'? If, therefore, the Father, abiding in the Son, does his works, that walking of the flesh upon the sea was done by the Father, was done through the Son; therefore that walking is an inseparable work of the Father and the Son; I see both working there.\" Likewise, it was shown in the 46th of the first that what is asked of the Lord comes from him; but man rightly asks of God that the man himself may will, choose and do the good always, and may always not will, and flee, every evil, saying with the Psalmist, \"Incline\n\nmy heart to your testimonies, and not to avarice,\" Psalm 118 [119]; and again, \"Lord, lead me in your justice; because of my enemies direct my way in your sight,\" Psalm 5; and Esther 14:[n38] \"Give me,\" she says, \"confidence, King of gods and Lord of all power; put a well-composed speech in my mouth in the sight of the Lion, and turn his heart to hatred of our enemy, that he himself may perish, and the others who consent to him\"; with many similar passages, very frequently, in Scripture. And the holy Church of God prays accordingly:[n39] \"Almighty eternal God, direct our acts according to your good pleasure,\" etc.; and again, \"Make us love what you command.\" She also prays for her enemies, that God may turn their evil wills into good; and the Priest at Mass, about to receive the Lord's Body, says, \"Make me always obey your commandments,\" etc., with many similar prayers of his own. Likewise, whatever God promises, he does, as was taught in the 46th of the first; but God promised to men wills and many of their future works, as the same chapter alleged, and it is evident in Ishmael, Isaac, Samson, Solomon, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and in very many others besides. Hence also Ezekiel 36: \"I will take away,\" says the Lord, \"the heart of stone from your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh, and I will put a new spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause you to walk in my precepts, and to keep my judgments, and to do them.\" These two motives Augustine adduces for this one conclusion in On Grace and Free Choice 31. Likewise, that for which thanks are given to God is done by him, as was shown in the 31st of the first. But who is so ungrateful as to give thanks to the Lord his God for no act of his own will, or of another's?[n40] It is also said in 1 Esdras 7: \"Blessed be the Lord God, who put this in the heart of the King, to glorify the house of the Lord.\" God, therefore, effects all the wills of all. Many reasons and authorities adduced in the 26th, 31st, 33rd and 34th of the first also bear on this conclusion, and especially on evil acts of the will.", "margins": [{"id": "548B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosopher (source)."}, {"id": "548B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "John; Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "548C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "548E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Esdras [Ezra] (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p549A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p549A", "locator_display": "549A–549E", "source_text": "Hanc eandem quaestionem vtriusque series testamenti, et multiplex sanctorum Autoritas clare probat, et hoc vniuersaliter de quacunque volutione bona vel mala; vnde Esa. 26. Domine dabis pacem nobis; omnia enim opera nostra operatus es in nobis. Et infra 45. Ego Dominus, et non est alter, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum; ego Dominus faciens omnia haec; quod et testatur planissime textus et Glossa Esaiae. 10. superius allegati. Item Ier. 10. Scio Domine, quod non est hominis via eius, nec viri est vt ambulet et dirigat gressus suos: vbi Glossa, Erubescant, qui aiunt vnumquemque suo regi arbitrio: Non est enim hominis via eius, etc. Vnde Dauid, A Domino gressus hominis dirigetur; Et Parabolarum 20. A Domino diriguntur gressus viri: Glossa, Non a libertate arbitrij. Hinc enim Esaias dicit; Omnia enim opera nostra operatus es nobis: et sequitur consequenter, Quis autem hominum potest intelligere viam suam? Super quod Glossa, vere quod fecit, a\n\nDeo habet, quia qualis futurus sit, vel quamdiu victurus per se nescit, sed in Deo est. Et supra 16. Placuerint Domino viae eius hominis, inimicos quoque eius conuertet ad pacem. Et infra 21. Sicut diuisiones aquarum, ita cor Regis in manu Domini, quocunque voluerit, inclinabit illud. Et Psalmo 104. Conuertit cor eorum vt odirent populum eius, et dolum facerent in seruos eius. Item Exod. 3. legitur, Dabo, inquit Dominus, gratiam populo huic coram Aegyptijs: et infra 4. Ego indurabo cor eius, scilicet Pharaonis: et inferius 9o. Indurauitque Dominus cor Pharaonis, et non audiuit eos, sicut loquutus est Dominus ad Mosen: et iterum, Idcirco autem posui te, vt ostendam in te fortitudinem meam, et narretur nomen meum in omni terra; et 14. Ego indurabo cor Aegyptiorum, vt persequantur vos et glorificabor in Pharao ne, et in omni exercitu eius. Hanc autem eandem conclusionem probat Apostolus per hanc eandem Scripturam ad Rom. 9. Non volentis, inquit, nec currentis, sed miserentis est Dei: Dicit enim Scriptura Pharaoni, Quia in hoc ipsum excitaui te, vt ostendā in te virtutem meam, etc. Item Iosue 11. Non fuit ciuitas quae se non traderet filijs Israel praeter Eneum\n\nqui habitabat in Gabaon, omnes bellando caepit, scilicet Iosue; Domini enim sententia fuerat, vt indurarentur corda eorū et pugnarent contra Israel, et caderent, et non mererentur vllam clementiam, ac perirent, sicut praeceperat Dominus Mosi. Et 1. Esdr. 6. Dominus conuerterat cor Regis Assur ad eos, vt manus eorum adiuuaret in opere domus Dei: et 7. Benedictus Dominus qui dedit hoc in corde Regis, vt glorificaret domū Domini. Et Nehem. 7. Deus autem dedit in corde meo, et congregaui optimates. Item 1. Reg. 10. Saul abijt in domū suam, et abijt cum eo pars exercitus, quorum tetigerat Deus corda; sed quomodo corda eorum tetigerat? nisi quia eis inspirauit voluntatem. Et 2. Parab. 21. Ecce, inquit, Esaias ad Ioram, Dominus percutiet te plaga magna cum populo tuo, et filijs et vxoribus tuis, vniuersaque substantia tua; et sequitur, Suscitauit ergo Dominus contra Ioram spiritum Philistinorum et Arabum, et ascenderunt in terram Iuda, et vastauerunt eam, diripueruntque cunctam substantiam, quae inuenta est in domo Regis, etc. Item Hester. 14. Hester orauit Dominū isto modo; Transfer cor\n\nillius, scilicet Assueri, in odium hostis nostri, vt ipse pereat: Et infra 15. Cum que cleuasset faciem, et ardentibus oculis furorem pectoris indicasset, Regina corruit, etc. conuertit que Deus spiritū Regis in mansuetudinem, et festinus ac metuens exiluit de solio, etc. Item Ioh. 1. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil: Et infra 3. Non potest homo accipere quicquā, nisi fuerit ei datum de coelo, et Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum: Et 6. Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater qui misit me, traxerit eum; et infra, Nemo potest venire ad me nisi fuerit ei datū a Patre meo: et inferius 15. Sine me nihil potestis facere; Et ad Philipp. 2. Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle, et perficere pro bona voluntate; et ad Rom. 1. Tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum, vt faciant ea quae non conueniunt: Et 1. ad Cor. 3. Ne que qui plantat, est aliquid, ne que qui rigat, sed qui incrementū dat Deus. Dei agricultura estis, Dei aedificatio estis: et infra 4. Quid habes, quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis? Et inferius 12. Diuisiones operationum sunt; idem vero Deus, qui operatur omnia in omnibus;\n\ncum multis suis similibus, tam in testamento veteri, quam in nouo. B. etiam Aug. per Autoritates praemissas, et alias in varijs libris suis, sed specialiter in his quos contra Pelagianos conscripsit, hanc eandem conclusionem feruenti spiritu elaboratissime demonstrauit: Vnde de Gratia et libero arbitrio 35. sic ait; Certum est nos seruare mandata si volumus, sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo perendum est, vt tantum velimus, quantum sufficit vt volendo faciamus; certum est nos velle cum volumus, sed ille facit vt velimus bonum: de quo dictum est, quod paulo ante posui, quod voluntas praeparatur a Domino: de quo dictum est, A Domino gressus hominis dirigetur, et viam eius volet; de quo dictum est, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle: Certum est nos facere cum facimus, sed ille facit vt faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati, qui dixit, Faciam vt in iustificationibus meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea obseruetis et faciatis. Idem infra eodem 43. Scriptura", "english": "The whole run of each Testament, and the manifold authority of the saints, clearly prove this same question, and prove it universally of any willing whatever, good or bad. So Isaiah 26: \"Lord, you will give us peace; for you have worked all our works in us.\" And below, 45: \"I am the Lord, and there is no other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil; I am the Lord, doing all these things.\" The text and the Gloss of Isaiah 10, cited above, bear the plainest witness to this too. Likewise Jeremiah 10: \"I know, Lord, that a man's way is not his own, nor is it in a man to walk and to direct his own steps.\" Here the Gloss says: \"Let them blush who say that each person is governed by his own choice: for a man's way is not his own,\" etc. So David: \"A man's steps are directed by the Lord\"; and Proverbs 20: \"A man's steps are directed by the Lord.\" Gloss: \"Not by freedom of choice.\" For this is why Isaiah says: \"For you have worked all our works for us\"; and he continues, \"But who among men can understand his own way?\" On which the Gloss says: \"Truly, what he has done he has from God, because what he will be, or how long he is to live, he does not know of himself, but it rests in God.\" And above, 16: \"When the ways of the man have pleased the Lord, he will turn even his enemies to peace.\" And below, 21: \"Like the divisions of the waters, so is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord: wherever he wills, he will incline it.\" And in Psalm 104: \"He turned their heart to hate his people, and to deal craftily with his servants.\" Likewise Exodus 3 reads: \"I will give,\" says the Lord, \"favour to this people before the Egyptians\": and below, 4: \"I will harden his heart,\" that is, Pharaoh's: and further on, 9: \"And the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, and he did not listen to them, as the Lord had spoken to Moses\": and again, \"For this purpose I have set you up, to show my strength in you, and that my name be proclaimed in all the earth\"; and 14: \"I will harden the heart of the Egyptians, so that they pursue you, and I shall be glorified in Pharaoh and in all his army.\" The Apostle proves this same conclusion from this same Scripture, in Romans 9: \"It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy\": for Scripture says to Pharaoh, \"For this very purpose I raised you up, to show my power in you,\" etc. Likewise Joshua 11: \"There was not a city that did not surrender to the children of Israel, except the Hivite[n41] who dwelt in Gibeon; they took all by war,\" that is, Joshua did. For it had been the Lord's decree that their hearts should be hardened, that they should fight against Israel and fall, and not deserve any clemency, but perish, as the Lord had commanded Moses. And 1 Esdras 6:[n42] \"The Lord had turned the heart of the king of Assyria toward them, to strengthen their hands in the work of the house of God\": and 7: \"Blessed be the Lord who put this in the king's heart, to glorify the house of the Lord.\" And Nehemiah 7: \"But God put it into my heart, and I gathered the nobles.\" Likewise 1 Kings 10: \"Saul went away to his house, and with him went part of the army, whose hearts God had touched\"; but how had he touched their hearts, if not by inspiring them with the will? And 2 Chronicles 21: \"Behold,\" says Isaiah to Joram,[n43] \"the Lord will strike you with a great plague, with your people, and your sons and wives, and all your substance\"; and it continues, \"Therefore the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and of the Arabs, and they went up into the land of Judah and laid it waste, and plundered all the substance that was found in the king's house,\" etc. Likewise Esther 14: Esther prayed to the Lord in this way: \"Turn his heart\" — that is, Ahasuerus's — \"to hatred of our enemy, that he himself may perish.\" And below, 15: \"And when he had lifted his face, and with burning eyes had shown the fury of his heart, the queen fell down,\" etc., \"and God turned the spirit of the king to gentleness, and in haste and fear he leapt from his throne,\" etc. Likewise John 1: \"All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing.\" And below, 3: \"A man cannot receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven, and the Father who sent me has drawn him.\" And 6: \"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him\"; and below, \"No one can come to me unless it has been given him by my Father\"; and further on, 15: \"Without me you can do nothing.\" And Philippians 2: \"It is God who works in us to will and to accomplish, according to good will\"; and Romans 1: \"God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not fitting.\" And 1 Corinthians 3: \"Neither is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. You are God's cultivation, God's building\"; and below, 4: \"What do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you glory as though you had not received?\" And further on, 12: \"There are distinctions of workings; but it is the same God who works all things in all\"; with many like passages, in the Old Testament as in the New. Blessed Augustine too, through the authorities set out above and others, in various books of his, but especially in those he wrote against the Pelagians, demonstrated this same conclusion most elaborately, in fervent spirit. Hence in On Grace and Free Choice 35 he says thus: \"It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, it must be asked of him that we will as much as suffices for us to act by willing; it is certain that we will when we will, but it is he who makes us will the good. Of him it was said, as I set down a little earlier, that the will is prepared by the Lord; of him it was said, 'A man's steps are directed by the Lord, and he will will his way'; of him it was said, 'It is God who works in us to will.' It is certain that we act when we act, but it is he who makes us act, by supplying most efficacious strength to the will: he who said, 'I shall make you walk in my justifications, and keep my judgments and do them.'\" The same, below, in the same work, 43: \"Scripture…", "margins": [{"id": "549A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: David."}, {"id": "549A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Proverbs."}, {"id": "549A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Isaiah."}, {"id": "549B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Exodus."}, {"id": "549B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: the Apostle."}, {"id": "549C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Kings."}, {"id": "549C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Chronicles."}, {"id": "549C·3", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Esther."}, {"id": "549E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}, {"id": "550E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p550A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p550A", "locator_display": "550A–550E", "source_text": "diuina si diligenter inspiciatur, ostendit non solas illas bonas hominum voluntates, quas ipse facit ex malis, et a se factas bonas in actus bonos, et in aeternam dirigit vitam; verumetiam illas, quae conseruant saeculi creaturas, ita esse in Dei potestate, vt eas quo voluerit, quando voluerit, faciat inclinari, vel ad beneficia quibusdam praestanda, vel ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, sicut ipse iudicat occultissimo quidem iudicio, sed sine dubitatione iustissimo. Nam inuenimus aliqua peccata etiam poenas esse aliorum peccatorum, sicut sunt vasa iraequae perfecta dicit Apostolus in perditionem, sicut est induratio Pharaonis, cuius et causa dicitur, ad ostendendam in illo virtutem Dei, sicut est fuga Israelitarum a facie hostium de ciuitate Hay. In animo enim factus est timor, vt fugerent, et hoc factum est, vt vindicaretur peccatum eo modo quo fuerat vindicandum. Vnde dicit Dominus ad Iesum naue; Non poterunt filij Israel subsistere a facie inimicorum suorum. Quid est, non poterunt subsistere? quare non subsistebant per liberum arbitrium, sed per timorem turbati voluntate fugiebant,\n\nnisi quia Dominus dominatur et voluntatibus hominum, et quos in formidinem conuertit iratus? Et idem ostendit per illud Iosue 11. quod superius allegaui. Idem cap. 44. Nunquid non sua voluntate homo improbus filius Iemini, scilicet Semei, de quo 2. Reg. 16. maledicebat Regi Dauidi? et tamen quid ait Dauid plenus vera, alta, et pia scientia? quid ait illi qui maledicentem percutere voluit? Quid mihi, inquit, et vobis filij Zaruiae? Dimitte eum vt maledicat quia Dominus dixit illi maledicere Dauidi; sinite illum vt maledicat, quoniam dixit illi Deus, vt videat Deus humilitatem meam, et retribuat mihi bona pro maledictione eius in die isto. Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere Dauidi? Quis sapiens, et intelliget: Non enin iubendo dixit, vbi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod Deus eius voluntatem propriam vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum iudicio suo iusto et occulto inclinauit: ideo dictum est, Dixit ei Dominus. Nam si iubenti obtemperasset Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato postea esse punitum nouimus. Nec\n\ncausa tacita est cur ei Dominus isto modo dixerit maledicere Dauidi, hoc est cor eius malum miserit, vel demiserit; vt videat, inquit, Dominus humilitatem meam, et retribuat mihi bona pro maledictione eius in die isto. Et sequitur capit. 45. Ecce quomodo probatur Deum vti cordibus etiam malorum, ad laudem atque adjumentum bonorum: Sic vsus est Iuda tradente Christum; sic vsus est Iudaeis crucifigentibus Christum: et quanta inde bona praestitit populis credituris? qui et ipso Diabolo vtitur pessimo, sed optime ad exercendam et probandam fidem et pietatem bonorum, non sibi, qui omnia scit antequam fiant, sed nobis, quibus erat necessarium, vt eo modo ageretur nobiscum. Nunquid non sua voluntate Absolon elegit consilium quod sibi oberat? et tamen ideo fecit, quia exaudierat Dominus eius patrem orantem vt hoc fieret; propter quod Scriptura ait, Et Dominus mandauit dissipare consilium Achitophelis bonum, vt inducat super Absolon omnia mala: Bonum consilium\n\ndixerat, quod ad tempus proderat causae, quia pro ipso erat contra patrem eius, contra quem rebellauerat, vt cum posset opprimere, nisi Dominus consilium dissipasset, quod dederat Achitophel, agendo in corde Absolon, vt tale repudiaret consilium, et aliud quod ei expediebat, eligeret. Et sequitur cap. 46. Quis non ista diuina iudicia contremiscat, quibus agit Deus in cordibus etiam malorum hominum quicquid vult, reddens tamen eis secundum merita eorum? Roboam filius Solomonis repulit consilium salubre seniorum, et verbis coaeuorum suorum potius acquieuit: vnde hoc nisi propria voluntate? sed hinc ab eo recesserunt decem tribus Israel, et alium Regem sibi constituerunt Ieroboam, vt irati Dei voluntas fieret, quod etiam futurum esse praedixerat. Quid enim Scriptura dicit? Et non audiuit Rex plebem, quoniam erat conuersio a Domino, vt statueret verbum suum quod loquutus est in manu Achiae Shilonitae de Ieroboam filio Nabat: Nempe sic factum est, et illud per hominis voluntatem, vt tamen conuersio esset a Domino. Legite libros Paral. et inuenietis in secundo libro scriptum, Et suscitauit Dominus spiritum super Ioram, spiritum Philistinorum\n\net Arabum, qui finitimi erant Aethiopibus, et ascenderunt in terram Iuda, et dissiparunt eam, et caeperunt omnem substantiam quae in domo Regis inuenta est. Hic ostenditur Deum suscitare hostes eis terris vastandis, quas tali poena iudicat dignas. Nunquid tamen Philistaei, et Arabes in terram Iudaeam dissipandam sine sua venerunt, aut sic venerunt sua voluntate, vt mendaciter scriptum sit, quod Dominus ad hoc faciendum eorum spiritum suscitauit? Imo vtrumque verum est, quia et sua voluntate venerunt, et tamen spiritum eorum Dominus suscitauit: quod etiam sic dici potest, et eorum spiritum Dominus suscitauit, et tamen cum sua voluntate venerunt. Agit enim omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum, vt per eos agat quod ipse agere voluerit. Et capit. 47. Quid est,", "english": "…divine, if it is carefully examined, shows that not only those good wills of men which he himself makes from bad, and, once made good by himself, directs into good acts and into eternal life, but also those which preserve the creatures of the world, are so much in God's power that he makes them incline wherever he wills, whenever he wills, either to the bestowing of benefits on some or the inflicting of punishments on others, as he himself judges, by a judgment most hidden indeed, but beyond doubt most just. For we find that some sins are even punishments of other sins. Such are the vessels of wrath which the Apostle says are made ready for destruction; such is the hardening of Pharaoh, of which the cause too is stated, namely to show in him the power of God; such is the flight of the Israelites from the face of the enemy at the city of Ai. For fear was produced in their mind, that they should flee, and this was done so that the sin should be avenged in the way it had to be avenged. Hence the Lord says to Joshua son of Nun: 'The children of Israel will not be able to stand before the face of their enemies.' What is 'they will not be able to stand'? Why did they not stand firm by free choice, but fled, their will thrown into disorder by fear, unless because the Lord rules also over the wills of men, and turns to dread those whom he turns in anger? And he shows the same by that passage of Joshua 11 which I cited above.\" The same, chapter 44: \"Was it not by his own will that the wicked man, the son of Jemini, namely Shimei, of whom 2 Kings 16 tells, cursed King David? And yet what does David say, full of true, lofty and pious knowledge? What does he say to the man who wished to strike the one who was cursing him? 'What is it to me and to you, sons of Zeruiah? Let him alone, that he may curse, because the Lord told him to curse David; let him alone to curse, since God told him, so that God may see my humility, and repay me with good for his cursing on this day.' How did the Lord tell this man to curse David? Who is wise, and will understand? He did not speak by commanding, where obedience would be praised; rather God, by his just and hidden judgment, turned his own will, evil by its own fault, to this sin. Therefore it is said, 'The Lord said to him.' For if he had obeyed God commanding, he would have been more to be praised than to be punished, as we know he was afterwards punished for this sin. Nor is the reason left unspoken why the Lord said to him in this way to curse David, that is, sent his evil heart, or let it go:[n44] 'that the Lord,' he says, 'may see my humility, and repay me with good for his cursing on this day.'\" And it continues, chapter 45: \"Behold how it is proved that God uses the hearts even of the wicked, for the praise and aid of the good. Thus he used Judas betraying Christ; thus he used the Jews crucifying Christ: and how many good things did he thereby provide for the peoples who were to believe! He uses even the Devil himself, wicked as he is, but most excellently, to exercise and prove the faith and piety of the good: not for himself, who knows all things before they happen, but for us, for whom it was necessary that it be done with us in that way. Was it not by his own will that Absalom chose the counsel that harmed him? And yet he did so because the Lord had heard his father praying that this should happen; on account of which Scripture says, 'And the Lord ordered the good counsel of Ahithophel to be scattered, to bring all evils upon Absalom.' Good counsel he had given, which for the time served the cause, since it was on Absalom's side against his father, against whom he had rebelled, so that he could have crushed him, had the Lord not scattered the counsel Ahithophel had given, by working in Absalom's heart so that he rejected such counsel, and chose another that was not to his advantage.[n45] And it continues, chapter 46: \"Who would not tremble at these divine judgments, by which God does in the hearts even of wicked men whatever he wills, yet rendering to them according to their deserts? Rehoboam son of Solomon rejected the salutary counsel of the elders, and preferred to assent to the words of his contemporaries: whence this, if not from his own will? Yet from this the ten tribes of Israel withdrew from him and set up another king for themselves, Jeroboam, so that the will of angry God might be done, which he had also foretold would come. For what does Scripture say? 'And the king did not listen to the people, for the turning was from the Lord, to confirm his word which he spoke by the hand of Ahijah the Shilonite concerning Jeroboam son of Nebat.' Plainly it was so done, and that through a man's will, yet so that the turning was from the Lord. Read the books of Chronicles, and you will find written in the second book: 'And the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and of the Arabs, who were neighbours of the Ethiopians, and they went up into the land of Judah, and scattered it, and took all the substance that was found in the king's house.' Here it is shown that God stirs up enemies against lands to be laid waste, which he judges worthy of such a punishment. Yet did the Philistines and Arabs come to lay waste the land of Judah without their own [will],[n46] or did they come by their own will in such a way that it is falsely written that the Lord stirred up their spirit to do this? No: both are true, because they came by their own will, and yet the Lord stirred up their spirit. It can also be put thus: the Lord stirred up their spirit, and yet they came with their own will. For the Almighty works in the hearts of men even the motion of their will, so that through them he may do what he himself wills to do.\" And chapter 47: \"What is it", "margins": [{"id": "550B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}, {"id": "550B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: enim (i.e. \"Who then is wise\")."}, {"id": "550C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}, {"id": "550D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}, {"id": "550E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p551A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p551A", "locator_display": "551A–551E", "source_text": "quod homo Dei dixit ad Amasiam Regem, non veniat tecum exercitus Israel? non enim est Dominus cum Israel, quoniam putaueris obtinere te in illis, in fugam conuertet Deus ante inimicos. Quomodo est virtus Deo vel adjuuare, vel in fugam vertere? quomodo virtus Dei alios juuat in bello, dando eis fiduciam, alios immisso timore vertit in fugam, nisi quae in coelo et in terra omnia quae cunque voluit, fecit, etiam in cordibus hominum? Legimus quid dixerit Ioas Rex Israel, mittens nuntium ad Amasiam Regem volentem pugnare cum illo; Nam post aliqua dixit, Nunc sede id domo tua; quid prouocas in malum? et cades tu et Iuda tecum. Deinde Scriptura subjunxit, Et non audiuit Amasias, quoniam a Deo erat vt traderetur in malum, quoniam quaesierunt Deos Edom. Ecce Deus idolatriae peccatum volens vindicare, hoc operabatur in ejus corde, cui vtique juste irascebatur, vt admonitionem salubrem non audiret, sed ea contempta iret in bellum, vbi cum suo exercitu caderet. Idem ostendit per seductionem Prophetae a Domino, de quo Ezech. 14. et per Assuerum, de quo\n\nHesterae 15. sicut superius allegaui, et infra 48. sic ait, Scriptum est et in Prouerbijs Salomonis, Sicut impetus aquae, sic cor Regis in manu Domini, quocunque voluerit, declinabit illud. Et in Psalmo 104. legitur dictum de Aegyptijs, quid eis fecerit Deus; Et conuerrit cor eorum, vt odissent populum eius, vt dolum facerent in seruos eius. In literis etiam Apostolicis videte quae scripta sunt. In Epistola Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, Propterea tradidit illos Deus in desidetia cordis eorum et in immunditiam. Item paulo post, sicut non probauerunt Domini habere notitiam, tradidit illos Deus in reprobam mentem, vt faciant quae non conueniunt. Et ad Thessalon. in Epist. 2. ait de quibusdam, pro eo quod dilectionem veritatis non receperunt vt salui fierent, ideo mittet illis Deus operationem erroris vt credant mendacio, et iudicentur omnes, qui non crediderunt veritati, sed consenserunt falsitati: Et concludendo conclusionem principalem totius processus, sic ait; His et talibus testimonijs diuinorum eloquiorum satis, quantum existimo manifestatur operari Deum in\n\ncordibus hominum, ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunque voluerit, siue ad bona pro sua misericordia, siue ad mala pro meritis eorum, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto judicio, semper autem justo. Idem de correptione et gratia multis capitulis hanc eandem conclusionem ostendit, sicut allegauit pro parte 10um hujus secundi. Vnde et cap. 49. dicit de ipsa boni perseuerantia, Noluit Deus sanctos in viribus suis, sed in ipso gloriari, qui eis non solum dat adjutorium, quale primo homini dedit, sine quo non possint perseuerare si voluit, sed operatur et velle, vt quoniam non perseuerabunt nisi et possint et velint, perseuerandi eis et possibilitas, et voluntas diuinae gratiae largitate donetur. Tantum quippe spiritu sancto accenditur voluntas eorum, vt ideo possint, quia volunt, ideo sic velint, quia Deus operatur vt velint. Et infra ejusdem 70. dicit ita; Non est dubitandum, voluntati Dei, qui in coelo et in terra omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit, humanas voluntates non posse resistere, quo minus faciat ipse quod vult; quoniam quidem de ipsis hominum voluntatibus\n\nquod vult, facit: Nisi forte, vt ex multis aliqua commemorem, quando Deus voluit Sauli regnum dare, sic erat in potestate Israelitarum subdere se memorato viro, siue non subdere, quod vtique in eorum erat positum voluntate, vt etiam Deo valerent resistere; qui tamen hoc non fecit per ipsorum hominum voluntates, sine dubio habens humanorum cordium quo placet inclinandorum omnipotentissimam potestatem. Sic enim scriptum est, Et dimisit Samuel populum, et abijt vnusquisque in locum suum, et abijt Saul in domum suam in Gabaa, et abierunt potentes, quorum tetigit Deus corda, cum Saule; et filij pestilentes dixerunt, Num saluabit nos hic? et inhonorauerunt eum, et non obtulerunt ei munera. Nunquid aliquis dicturus est, non iuisse cum Saul quenquam corum, quorum tetigit Deus corda vt irent cum illo, aut isse aliquem pestilentium, quorum vt hoc facerent, corda non tetigit? Item de Dauide, quem Dominus in regnum successu prosperiore constituit, ita legitur; Et ambulabat Dauid proficiens, et magnificabatur, et Dominus erat cum illo. Et cum hoc\n\npraemissum fuisset, paulo post dictum est; Spiritus vero Domini induit Amasai principem inter triginta, et dixit, Tui sumus Dauid, et tecum futuri, fili Iesle; Pax tibi, et pax adjutoribus tuis, quia auxiliatus est tibi Deus; Nunquid posset ipse aduersari voluntati Dei, et non potius eius facere voluntatē qui in eius corde operatus est per spiritū suum quo indutus est, vt hoc vellet, diceret, et faceret? Item paulo post ait eadē Scriptura; Omnis hi viri bellatores ducentes aciem, corde pacifico venerunt in Hebron, vt constituerent Dauid super omnem Israel: sua voluntate vti que constituerunt regem Dauid, quis non videat? quis hoc neget? Non enim non ex animo, aut non ex bona voluntate corde fecerunt pacifico, et tamen in eis egit, qui in cordibus hominū quod voluerit, operatur; Propter quod praemisit scriptura, Et ambulauit Dauid proficiens, et magnificabatur, et Dominus omnipotens erat cū illo, ac per hoc Dominus omnipotens qui erat cū illo, adduxit istos vt eū regē cōstituerent: et quomodo adduxit? Nunquid", "english": "that the man of God said to King Amaziah, 'Let not the army of Israel come with you; for the Lord is not with Israel, since you have supposed that you will prevail by means of them: God will turn you to flight before your enemies'? How is it a power of God either to help or to turn to flight? How does the power of God help some in war, by giving them confidence, and turn others to flight by sending fear, unless as the power which in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever it willed, even in the hearts of men?[n47] We read what Joash, king of Israel, said, sending a messenger to King Amaziah, who wished to fight with him: for after some other things he said, 'Now sit in your house; why do you provoke to your harm? You will fall, you and Judah with you.' Then Scripture added: 'And Amaziah did not listen, for it was from God that he should be handed over to evil, because they had sought the gods of Edom.' See: God, wishing to avenge the sin of idolatry, worked this in his heart, with whom he was indeed justly angry, so that he would not hear the salutary warning, but, despising it, would go to war, where he would fall with his army. The same point is shown through the deception of the prophet by the Lord, of which Ezekiel 14 speaks, and through Ahasuerus, of which Esther 15, as I cited above.\" And below, 48, he says thus: \"It is written also in the Proverbs of Solomon: 'Like the rush of water, so is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord: wherever he wills, he will turn it.' And in Psalm 104 it is said of the Egyptians what God did to them: 'And he turned their heart to hate his people, to deal craftily with his servants.' See also what is written in the apostolic letters. In the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans: 'Therefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart and to uncleanness.' Likewise a little later: 'As they did not see fit to have knowledge of the Lord, God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not fitting.' And in the second Epistle to the Thessalonians he says of certain persons: 'Because they did not receive the love of truth that they might be saved, therefore God will send them the working of error, that they may believe a lie, and that all may be judged who have not believed the truth but consented to falsehood.' And concluding the principal conclusion of the whole discussion, he says thus: 'By these and such testimonies of the divine utterances it is made sufficiently manifest, so far as I judge, that God works in the hearts of men, to incline their wills wherever he wills, whether to good things out of his mercy, or to evil things by their deserts, at one time by an open judgment, at another by a hidden one, but always by a just one.'\" The same, in On Rebuke and Grace, in many chapters shows this same conclusion, as I cited it for the tenth part of this second book.[n48] Hence also in chapter 49 he says of perseverance in the good itself: \"God did not wish the saints to glory in their own strength, but in himself, who gives them not only help, such as he gave the first man, without which they could not persevere if they willed,[n49] but works also the willing, so that, since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, both the ability and the will to persevere may be given them by the largess of divine grace. So much, indeed, is their will kindled by the Holy Spirit that they can because they will, and will thus because God works that they will.\" And below, 70 of the same: \"It is not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth did all things whatsoever he willed, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills; since indeed from the very wills of men he does what he wills: unless perhaps (to recall some among many instances) when God wished to give the kingdom to Saul, it lay in the power of the Israelites to submit themselves to the man mentioned or not to submit — which was indeed placed in their own will, so that they could even resist God; who nevertheless did this through the wills of those very men,[n50] having without doubt the most omnipotent power of inclining human hearts wherever he pleases. For thus it is written: 'And Samuel dismissed the people, and each went away to his own place, and Saul went away to his house in Gibeah, and there went away with Saul the mighty men whose hearts God had touched; and the pestilent sons said, \"Will this man save us?\" and they dishonoured him, and brought him no gifts.' Will anyone say that none of those whose hearts God touched to go with him went with Saul, or that any of the pestilent went, whose hearts he did not touch to make them do this? Likewise of David, whom the Lord established in the kingdom with greater success, it is read thus: 'And David went on advancing, and was magnified, and the Lord was with him.' And when this had been set forth, a little later it was said: 'But the Spirit of the Lord clothed Amasai, chief among the thirty, and he said, \"We are yours, David, and with you we shall be, son of Jesse; peace to you, and peace to your helpers, for God has helped you.\"' Could he himself have opposed the will of God, and not rather done the will of him who worked in his heart by his spirit, with which he was clothed, so that he would will, say and do this? Likewise a little later the same Scripture says: 'All these warrior men, leading the line, came to Hebron with a peaceful heart, to make David king over all Israel.' That they made David king by their own will, who does not see? Who would deny it? For it was not without mind, or without good will, that they acted with a peaceful heart; and yet he acted in them who works in the hearts of men whatever he wills. On account of which Scripture put first, 'And David went on advancing, and was magnified, and the Lord Almighty was with him'; and therefore the Almighty Lord, who was with him, brought these men to make him king. And how did he bring them? Surely he did not bind them with bodily bonds?", "margins": [{"id": "551C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}, {"id": "551C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}, {"id": "551D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: Unde (\"Whence shall this man save us?\")."}, {"id": "551E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: \"And the Spirit clothed Semei, chief of the thirty.\""}]}, {"anchor": "p552A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p552A", "locator_display": "552A–552E", "source_text": "corporalibus vinculis alligauit? Intus egit, corda tenuit, corda mouit, eos que voluntatibus eorū quas ipse in illis operatus est, traxit. Et sequitur cap. proximo; Si ergo cū voluerit reges in terra constituere, magis habet in potestate voluntates hominum, quam ipsi suas, quis alius facit vt salubris sit correptio, et fiat in correpti corde correctio, vt caelesti constituatur in regno? Quid clarius, quid apertius posset dici? Ecce hic Augustinum velle expresse, quod nullus propria voluntate potuit iuisse cum Saule, nisi vt hoc faceret, Deus tetigisset cor eius; ergo eadem ratione nullus potest se vertere huc vel illuc, imo nec velle quicquam omnino, nisi ad hoc ipsum Deus tangat cor eius, et efficiat ipsum velle. Vnde et 4. contra Iulianum 16. Quid, inquit, iam vtuntur voluntatis arbitrio? nisi eo volente atque subueniente, a quo praeparatur voluntas, velle non possunt. Idem de praedestinatione Sanctorum 28. Agit quippe Deus quod vult in cordibus hominum, vel adiuuando, vel iudicando, vt per eos etiam impleatur quod manus eius et consilium praedestinauit fieri: Frustra ita que etiam illud quod Regum et Paralip. Scriptura\n\nteste probauimus, cum Deus vult fieri, quod non nisi volentibus hominibus oportet fieri, inclinari corda eorum vt hoc velint, eo scilicet inclinante, qui in nobis mirabili modo et ineffabili operatur et velle, ad causam de qua disserimus, non pertinere dixerunt. Idem de bono perseuerantiae 37. Deus est qui operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate: Nos ergo volumus, sed Deus in nobis operatur et velle: Nos operamur, sed Deus in nobis operatur etiam operari pro bona voluntate: Hoc nobis expedit et credere, et dicere, hoc est pium, hoc est verum, vt sit humilis et submissa confessio, et detur totum Deo. Hoc idem ostendit B. Prosp. contra Cassian. multis capitulis, vt patet aliqualiter ex superius allegatis: Vnde et 8. c. recitat ab Epis. Afris Papae Zozimo rescribentibus in hunc modum; Praeparatur voluntas a Domino, et vt boni agant aliquid, paternis inspirationibus suorum ipse tangit corda filiorum: Quotquot enim Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filij Dei sunt; vt nec nostrum deesse sentiamus arbitrium, et in bonis quo que voluntatis humanae singulis motibus magis illius valere non\n\ndubitemus auxilium. Idem in suis sententijs capit. 312. praenotato, Nil posse hominem sine Deo, recitat Aug. dicentem; Multa Deus facit in homine bona quae nō facit homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae non Deus facit vt faciat homo. Item Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio 23. Quid, inquit, nostra verba aliud sonant, quam illud quod, neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei? quod sane non ideo dicit Apost. quasi quis velle aut currere non possit in vanum, sed quod is qui vult et currit, non in se, sed in eo a quo accepit et velle et currere debeat gloriari: Denique ait, Quid habes quod non accepisti? et idem ostendit capit. 18.22. et alijs. Item Doctor et Martyr gloriosissimus Cyprianus, epistola 13. ad Quirinum intitulata, De disciplina Christianae religionis capit. 4. tantum hanc vnam conclusionem ostendit; In nullo nobis gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit: Et hoc per illud Ioh. 3. Nemo potest quicquam accipere, nisi datum illi fuerit de Coelo: Et per illud Apostoli 1. ad Cor. 4. Quid habes, quod non accepisti? Si ergo accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? et per multa\n\nalia loca Scripturae. Item venerabilis Anselmus de casu Diaboli 1. et consequenter ostendit, quod illud dictum Apostoli dicitur tam Angelis quam hominibus, et cuilibet creaturae; et quod nulla creatura potest ex se sola quicquam habere, nec velle, nec peruelle. Vnde et capit. 7o. opponenti discipulo per hunc modum; In nostra natura quaeri potest, quoniam credimus nullum hominem posse habere bonam voluntatem, nisi dante Deo, malam vero semper habere posse, sola permissione Dei, Cur Deus fecerit eam talē c. 8. Primo materialiter sic respondet, nec voluntatem, nec conuersionem voluntatis puto negari posse aliquid esse; Nametsi nō sunt substantiae, non tamen probari potest eas non esse essentias, quoniam multae sunt essentiae praeter illam quae proprie dicitur substātia. Deni que bona voluntas non magis est aliquid quam voluntas mala: Nec enim magis est aliquid voluntas, quae vult dare misericorditer, quam illa quae vult rapere violenter; et consequenter ostendit hanc conclusionē, quam concludendo in fine sic ait; Nec igitur voluntas mala, nec praua voluntatis conuersio est ipsum malū quo Angelus\n\nvel homo fit malus, quod nihil esse dicimus; nec bona voluntas, aut bona voluntatis cō uersio est ipsum bonum quo boni fiunt; Et per multa capitula consequenter ostēdit, quod malum siue malitia pura non sit res aliqua positiua, sed pura priuatio; Et ca. 20. vt formaliter magis respondeat, ostendit quod omnis actus voluntatis tripliciter sit a Deo. Vno modo, quia Deus, non, cū posset, prohibet, sed permittit: Alio modo, quod potestas volendi, scilicet ipsa voluntas, quae est potentia voluntaria, est a Deo: Tertio modo, quod ipsemet Deus vere per se coefficit omnem actum etiam malum secundum suam essentiā, quia sic bonus est; non autem secundū suā malitiam, sed sic tantum fit a voluntate iniusta. Vnde sic dicit, Quid mirum, si quemadmodum Deus dicitur inducere in tentationem, quando non liberet ab ea, ita fateamur", "english": "He acted within, he held hearts, he moved hearts, and drew them by their own wills, which he himself worked in them.\" And it continues in the next chapter: \"If then, when he wills to set kings up on earth, he has the wills of men more in his power than they have their own, who else brings it about that rebuke is salutary, and that in the heart of the rebuked there arises correction, so that he may be established in the heavenly kingdom?\" What could be said more clearly, what more openly? See, here Augustine expressly means that no one could have gone with Saul by his own will unless God had touched his heart to make him do so. Therefore by the same reasoning no one can turn this way or that, nay, nor will anything at all, unless God touches his heart to this very end and brings about the willing itself. Hence also, 4, against Julian, 16: \"What, he asks, do they now do with the choice of the will, if they cannot will except by the willing and aiding of him by whom the will is prepared?\" The same, On the Predestination of the Saints 28: \"God acts, indeed, what he wills in the hearts of men, either by helping or by judging, so that through them also may be fulfilled what his hand and counsel predestined to happen. In vain, therefore, have they said that that also which we have proved from the witness of Scripture, of Kings and Chronicles, does not belong to the cause we are discussing: namely, that when God wills something to be done which can be done only by men who will it, their hearts are inclined to will it, by him inclining who in a wonderful and ineffable manner works in us even the willing.\" The same, On the Good of Perseverance 37: \"God is he who works in us both to will and to work, according to good will. We therefore will, but God works in us the willing; we work, but God works in us even the working, according to good will. It profits us both to believe this and to say it; this is pious, this is true, so that our confession may be humble and submissive, and the whole be given to God.\" The same is shown by Blessed Prosper, against Cassian, in many chapters, as is somewhat clear from what was cited above. Hence in chapter 8 he reports from the African bishops, writing back to Pope Zosimus, in this fashion: \"The will is prepared by the Lord, and that the good may do something, he himself touches the hearts of his children by the fatherly inspirations of his own: for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God; so that we neither feel our own choice to be absent, nor doubt that, in each motion of the human will even in good things, his help prevails the more.\" The same, in his Sentences, chapter 312, headed \"That man can do nothing without God,\" cites Augustine saying: \"God does many good things in man which man does not do; but man does none which God does not make man do.\" Likewise Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice 23: \"What else do our words sound,\" he says, \"but that 'it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy'? The Apostle surely does not say this as though one could not will or run except in vain,[n51] but because he who wills and runs ought to glory not in himself, but in him from whom he received both willing and running. Finally he says, 'What do you have that you did not receive?'\" And he shows the same in chapters 18, 22 and elsewhere. Likewise the Doctor and most glorious Martyr Cyprian, in Letter 13 headed To Quirinus, \"On the discipline of the Christian religion,\" chapter 4,[n52] shows just this one conclusion: \"In nothing may we glory, since nothing is ours.\" And this he shows by that passage of John 3: \"No one can receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven\"; and by that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: \"What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received?\" and through many other places of Scripture. Likewise the venerable Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 1, and consequently he shows that this saying of the Apostle is said to angels as well as to men, and to any creature whatever; and that no creature can have anything from itself alone, nor to will, nor to will through to the end.[n53] Hence also in chapter 7, the disciple objects in this way: \"In our nature it can be asked, since we believe that no man can have a good will unless God gives it, but that he can always have a bad one, by God's permission alone, why God made it such.\" Chapter 8. He answers first materially thus: \"I think that neither the will nor the turning of the will can be denied to be something; for although they are not substances, it cannot be proved that they are not essences, since there are many essences besides that which is properly called substance. Finally, a good will is no more something than a bad will: for the will that wills to give mercifully is no more something than that which wills to seize violently.\" And consequently he shows this conclusion, which, concluding at the end, he states thus: \"Neither, then, the bad will nor the perverse turning of the will is the very evil by which an angel or a man becomes evil, which we say is nothing; nor is the good will, or the good turning of the will, the very good by which the good become good.\" And through many chapters consequently he shows that evil, or malice, is not some positive thing, but pure privation. And in chapter 20, to answer more formally, he shows that every act of the will is from God in three ways. In one way, because God, though he could, does not prohibit but permits. In another way, because the power of willing, that is, the will itself, which is a voluntary power, is from God. In the third way, because God himself truly per se co-effects every act, even an evil one, according to its essence, since in that respect it is good; but not according to its malice, which is produced only by the unjust will. Hence he says thus: \"What wonder, if, as God is said to lead into temptation when he does not deliver from it, we likewise say that", "margins": [{"id": "552A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}, {"id": "552B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Prosper."}, {"id": "552C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Bernard."}, {"id": "552C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Cyprian."}, {"id": "552D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Anselm."}]}, {"anchor": "p553A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p553A", "locator_display": "553A–553D", "source_text": "eum dare malam voluntatem non prohibendo eam cum potest, praesertim cum potestas volendi quidlibet non nisi ab illo sit? Ecce pro primo, et secundo, et addit pro tertio; cum Diabolus conuertit voluntatem suam ad quod non debuit, et ipsum velle, et ipsa conuersio fuit aliquid; et tamen non nisi a Deo, et de Deo aliquid habuit; nec velle aliquid nec mouere potuit voluntatem, nisi illo permittente, qui facit omnes naturas substantiales et accidentales, vniuersales et indiuiduas: In quantum enim voluntas et conuersio sine motus voluntatis est aliquid, bonum est, et Dei est; in quantum vero justitia caret, sine qua esse non debet, non simpliciter malum, sed aliquid malum est, et quod malum est non Dei est, sed voluntatis, siue mouentis voluntatem. Simplex quippe malum est iniustitia, quoniam non est aliud quam malum, quod nihil est; aliud vero malum est natura in qua est iniustitia, quoniam est aliquid, et aliud quam iniustitia, quae malum est, et nihil est. Quare quod aliquid est, a Deo\n\nfit, et Dei est; quod vero nihil est, id est, malum ab iniusto fit, et ejus est. Contra quae statim opponit Discipulus in haec verba; Quod quidem Deus rerum naturas omnium faciat, fatendum est; quod vero singulas actiones peruersarum voluntatum, vt ipsum prauum motum voluntatis, quo ipsa mala voluntas se mouet, faciat, quid condecet? Et respondet, Nihil mirum, si dicimus Deum facere singulas actiones quae fiunt mala voluntate, cum dicamus eum facere singulas substantias quae fiunt iniusta voluntate et inhonesta operatione. Et sequitur sub nomine Discipuli consequenter, Non habeo quid contradicam; quippe nec negare possum vere aliquid esse quamlibet actionem, nec fateri volo non fieri a Deo quod vere aliquam essentiam habet: nec ista tua ratio in vllo accusat Deum aut excusat Diabolum, sed omnino Deum excusat, et Diabolum accusat. Idem de Concor. 6. quaesito vtrum praescientia siue scientia Dei sit a rebus, aut e contra, et destructa prima parte, et per consequens constructa secunda, objecto que contra hanc sententiam hoc modo; Si vero quaecunque sunt, a scientia Dei sumunt essentiam, Deus est factor et autor malorum operum; ergo non juste\n\npunit malos. Respondet in haec verba; Hoc autem facile solui potest, si prius cognoscatur bonum, quod est iustitia vere aliquid esse; malum vero quod est iniustitia omni carere existentia: Non est enim iniustitia qualitas, aut actio, aut alia essentia, sed tantum absentia debitae iustitiae; omnis quippe qualitas, et omnis actio, et quicquid habet aliquam essentiam, a Deo est, a quo est omnis iustitia, et nulla iniustitia; facit ergo Deus omnia, quae iusta, siue iniusta voluntate fiunt, id est bona opera et mala. In bonis quidē facit quod sunt, et quod bona sunt; in malis vero quod sunt, sed non quod mala sunt: Nam omni rei esse iustam et bonam, est aliquid esse; nulli vero rei est esse aliquid, iniustam vel malam esse. Et infra eodem ostendit, quod Deus dupliciter efficit omnem volutionem, actionem et motum; primo, quia Deus efficit omnem rem actiuam et passiuam et omnem earum potentiam; secundo, quia vera efficienter mouet et agit; vnde sic dicit, Sicut Deus non facit iniustitiam, ita non facit aliquid iniustum esse, qui tamen facit omnes actiones, et omnes motus, quia ipse facit res a quibus,\n\net ex quibus, et per quas, et in quibus fiunt, et nulla res habet potestatē volendi aut faciendi, nisi illo dante. Ecce pro 1. et sequitur pro 2. Ipsum quo que velle, quod aliquando iustū est, aliquando iniustū, nec est aliud quam vti voluntate et potestate volendi, quas dat Deus in quantū est bonū, et est a Deo, quod tunc quidē quando est recte, bonū et iustū est; quando vero non recte, hoc solo quod non recte est, malum est et iniustum. Est autem aliquid recte esse, et hoc est a Deo: non esse vero recte, non est aliquid, nec est a Deo. Sic itaque facit Deus in omnib voluntatibus et operibus bonis, et quod essentialiter sunt, et quod bona sunt: in malis vero non quod mala sunt, sed tantum quod per essentiam sunt. Et 8. capit. dicit idem, vbi ponit modum alium faciendi, quo Deus dicitur facere mala, quia scilicet permittit, sicut dicitur hominem in durare cum non emollit, ac inducere in temptationem cum non liberat. Idem de conceptu virginali 4. dantur, inquit, quibusdam actionibus nomina, quibus significatur eas iniuste fieri, vt fornicatio et mendacium; sed aliud intelligitur cum ipsa actio vel proloquntio,", "english": "he gives an evil will by not preventing it when he can, especially since the power of willing anything is only from him?\" See, that is for the first and second; and for the third he adds: \"When the Devil turned his will to what he ought not, both the willing itself and the turning itself was something; and yet it was not except from God, and had something from God; nor could he will anything, nor move his will, except by the permission of him who makes all natures, substantial and accidental, universal and individual. For in so far as the will, and the turning or motion of the will, is something, it is good, and is God's; but in so far as it lacks justice, without which it ought not to be, it is not simply evil, but is a certain evil thing; and what is evil in it is not God's, but the will's, or of him who moves the will. For simple evil is injustice, since it is nothing other than evil, which is nothing; but another evil is the nature in which injustice is, since it is something, and other than injustice, which is evil and is nothing. Therefore what is something is made by God, and is God's; but what is nothing, that is, evil, is made by the unjust, and is his.\" Against this the Disciple at once objects in these words: \"That God makes the natures of all things must be admitted; but that he makes the single actions of perverse wills, such as the very depraved motion of the will by which the evil will moves itself, what is fitting?\" And he answers: \"No wonder, if we say that God makes the single actions which are done by an evil will, since we say that he makes the single substances which are made by an unjust will and dishonourable operation.\" And it follows, under the name of the Disciple, consequently: \"I have nothing to say against it; indeed I cannot deny that every action is truly something, nor do I wish to admit that what truly has some essence is not made by God; nor does this reasoning of yours in any way accuse God or excuse the Devil, but wholly excuses God and accuses the Devil.\" The same, in On Concord 6, a question having been raised whether the foreknowledge, or knowledge, of God is from things or the contrary, and the first part having been destroyed and the second consequently established, and an objection raised against this view thus: \"But if whatever things are take their essence from the knowledge of God, God is the maker and author of evil works; therefore he does not justly punish the wicked.\" He answers in these words: \"But this can easily be solved, if it is first recognized that the good, which is justice, is truly something, while the evil, which is injustice, wholly lacks existence. For injustice is not a quality, or an action, or any other essence, but only the absence of due justice; every quality indeed, and every action, and whatever has any essence, is from God, from whom is all justice and no injustice. Therefore God makes all things that are done by a just or an unjust will, that is, good works and evil ones. In good ones he makes that they are, and that they are good; in evil ones, that they are, but not that they are evil. For to every thing, to be just and good is to be something; but for no thing is it to be something, to be unjust or evil.\" And below, in the same place, he shows that God effects in two ways every willing, action and motion: first, because God makes every active and passive thing and all their power; second, because he truly moves and acts efficiently. Hence he says thus: \"As God does not make injustice, so he does not make anything to be unjust, though he makes all actions and all motions, because he himself makes the things from which, and out of which, and through which, and in which they are done; and no thing has the power of willing or doing, except by his giving it.\" See, that is for the first; and for the second he goes on: \"Willing itself also, which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust, is nothing other than the use of the will and of the power of willing, which God gives, in so far as it is good and is from God; and this, when it is right, is good and just; but when not right, by this alone, that it is not right, it is evil and unjust. But to be right is something, and this is from God; not to be right is not something, nor is it from God. Thus God makes in all wills and works that are good both that they are essentially and that they are good; in evil ones, not that they are evil, but only that they are through essence.\" And in chapter 8 he says the same, where he sets down another way of making, in which God is said to make evil things, namely because he permits them, as he is said to harden a man when he does not soften him, and to lead into temptation when he does not deliver. The same, On the Virginal Conception 4: \"Names are given,\" he says, \"to certain actions, by which it is signified that they are done unjustly, such as fornication and lying; but one thing is understood when the action itself or the utterance —[n54]", "margins": [{"id": "553B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: mala (\"by an evil will\")."}, {"id": "553B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Anselm."}, {"id": "553D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: hominis (for bonis). Two further source margins, each Anselmus (Anselm), stand beside \"Et 8. capit.\" and \"Idem de conceptu virginali\"; the keyed text gives them no markers."}, {"id": "553D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: prolatio (for proloquutio)."}]}, {"anchor": "p553E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p553E", "locator_display": "553E", "source_text": "aliud cum vtrumque, iuste aut iniuste fiat, consideretur. Denique omnis essentia est a Deo, a quo nihil est iniustum: et alijs locis multis saepissime vult hoc idem. Item Williamus Altissiodorensis Episcopus super 2. sentent. quaerit, Vtrum mala actio sit a Deo operante et cooperante; et tenet quod sit, quod probat autoritate et similiter ratione. Primo autoritate Esaiae superius allegata, Nunquid gloriabitur securis contra cum qui secat in ea? etc. Vnde concludit quod destructionis Iudaeorum factae per Senacherib fuit Deus actor principalis, et Senacherib instrumentalis, vt securis vel virga. Secundo probat idem duplici ratione: pima est, quia passio Christi fuit bona, ergo processit a causa bona; ergo a bona voluntate Dei, et non tantum a mala voluntate Iudaeorum: secunda est, Aliquis fornicando generat sanctum Prophetam; tunc haec actio est causa boni, ergo ipsa est bona; et est mala, ergo actio mala in quantum actio est, bona est, et a Deo est: et subiungit, quod concedimus dicentes, quod Deus", "english": "...another thing when each is considered, whether it is done justly or unjustly. Finally, every essence is from God, from whom nothing unjust comes; and in many other places he very often says the same. Likewise William of Auxerre, bishop, asks on Sentences 2 whether an evil action is from God as one who works and works with. He holds that it is, and proves it by authority and likewise by reason. First by the authority of Isaiah, cited above: \"Shall the axe boast against him who cuts with it?\" and so on. From this he concludes that God was the principal agent of the destruction of the Jews brought about by Sennacherib, and Sennacherib the instrumental agent, as the axe or the rod. Second, he proves the same by a twofold reason. The first is that the Passion of Christ was good, and so proceeded from a good cause, and so from the good will of God, and not only from the evil will of the Jews. The second is: someone, by committing fornication, begets a holy Prophet; then this action is the cause of a good, and so is itself good; and it is evil, and so the evil action, insofar as it is an action, is good and is from God. And he adds, which we grant in saying that God", "margins": [{"id": "553E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Altissiodorensis [William of Auxerre]."}]}, {"anchor": "p554A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p554A", "locator_display": "554A", "source_text": "est causa efficiens, formalis, et finalis malae actionis, sed non materialis: efficiens eius causa est, quia est eius principalis Actor. Sanctus quoque Thomas in quaestionibus suis de malo, quaestione 19. quaerit, vtrum actio peccati sit a Deo, et respondendo sic ait, Dicendum quod apud Antiquos circa hoc erat duplex opinio: Quidā enim dixerunt antiquitus peccati actionē non esse a Deo, attendentes ad ipsam peccati deformitatē, quae a Deo non est; Quidam vero dixerunt actionē peccati esse a Deo, attendētes ad ipsam essentiā actus, quam oportet ponere a Deo esse, duplici ratione: Primo quidē ratione cōmuni, quia cum ipse Deus sit ens per suam essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum esse, oportet quod omne quod quocunque modo est, deriuetur ab ipso; Nihil enim aliud est quod sit suum esse, sed omnia dicuntur entia per quandam participationem; omne autem quod per participationem dicitur tale, deriuatur ab eo quod est per essentiam tale, sicut omnia ignita deriuantur ab eo quod est per essentiam ignis. Manifestum est autem quod actio peccati est quoddam ens, et in praedicamento entis positum;", "english": "is the efficient, formal and final cause of an evil action, but not the material cause. He is its efficient cause because he is its principal Agent. The holy Thomas also, in his Questions on Evil, question 19, asks whether the action of sin is from God, and answering says thus:[n55] \"It must be said that among the ancients there was a twofold opinion about this. For some in antiquity said that the action of sin is not from God, attending to the very deformity of the sin, which is not from God. Others said that the action of sin is from God, attending to the very essence of the act, which must be held to be from God, for a twofold reason. First, by a common reason: since God himself is being through his essence, because his essence is his being, everything that in any way exists must be derived from him. For nothing else is its own being; all things are called beings by a certain participation; and everything that is called such by participation is derived from that which is such by essence, just as all things on fire are derived from that which is fire by essence. It is manifest that the action of sin is a certain being, and is placed in the category of being;", "margins": [{"id": "554A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Thomas [Aquinas]."}]}, {"anchor": "p554B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p554B", "locator_display": "554B", "source_text": "vnde necesse est dicere, quod sit a Deo. Secundo autem idem patet ratione speciali: Necesse est enim omnes motus secundarum causarum causari a primo mouente: Deus autem est primum mouens respectu omnium motuum et spiritualium et corporalium; vnde cum actus peccati sit quidam motus liberi arbitrij, necesse est dicere quod actus peccati, in quantum est actus, sit a Deo. Hoc idem et plane testatur Iohannes Scotus super 1. sentent. dist. 41. sicut 18o primi plenius recitatur. Ex praemissis, vt arbitror, satis claret, quod ad hoc quod voluntas creata efficiat suum actum quemcunque bonum vel malum, diuina coefficientia est necessario requisita.", "english": "so it must be said that it is from God. Second, the same is clear by a special reason. It is necessary that all movements of secondary causes be caused by the first mover; but God is the first mover with respect to all movements, spiritual and bodily alike. Since therefore the act of sin is a certain movement of free choice, it must be said that the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, is from God.\" John Scotus testifies the same plainly on Sentences 1, distinction 41, as is more fully recounted in the eighteenth of the first.[n56] From what has been set out, as I judge, it is clear enough that for created will to effect its act, whatever it be, good or evil, the divine co-efficiency is necessarily required.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p554B-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p554B-2", "locator_display": "554B–554C", "source_text": "COROLLARIVM.\n\nCorollarium quod quicquid effecerit voluntas creata, necesse est vt et illud coefficiat\n\nincreata; et quicquid operata fuerit voluntas Angelica, vel humana, necesse est vt et illud cooperetur diuina; et quod omnem actum voluntatis creatae totum efficit voluntas creata, et totum similiter increata.\n\nVNde et elicitur facile hoc porisma, Quicquid effecerit voluntas creata, necesse est vt et illud coefficiat increata; et quicquid operata fuerit voluntas Angelica vel humana, necesse est vt et illud cooperetur diuina; et quod omnem actum voluntatis creatae totum efficit voluntas creata, et totum similiter increata. Istud corollarium probat clarissime nonum primi: potest quoque ex praemissis demonstrari facillime, sicut et illud nonum fuerat demonstratum. Nam si Deus necessario requiratur ad coefficiendum et cooperandum omnem actum voluntatis creatae, et Deus nihil efficit aut operatur ad extra, imo nec hoc potest pure naturaliter aut ex sola cognitione, voluntas eius increata et efficax est necesiario requisita.", "english": "COROLLARY.\n\nCorollary: that whatever created will has effected, the uncreated must necessarily co-effect as well; and whatever Angelic or human will has worked, the divine must necessarily work with it as well; and that created will effects the whole of every act of created will, and the uncreated likewise effects the whole.\n\nFrom this the following inference is easily drawn: whatever created will has effected, the uncreated must necessarily co-effect as well; and whatever Angelic or human will has worked, the divine must necessarily work with it as well; and created will effects the whole of every act of created will, and the uncreated likewise the whole. The ninth of the first proves this corollary most clearly; and it can also be demonstrated very easily from what has been set out, just as that ninth was demonstrated. For if God is necessarily required to co-effect and work with every act of created will, and God effects or works nothing outside himself, and indeed cannot even do this purely naturally or from knowledge alone,[n57] then his uncreated and efficacious will is necessarily required.", "margins": [{"id": "554C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) efficit."}]}, {"anchor": "p554D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p554D", "locator_display": "554D", "source_text": "Quare et Propheta sic ait, Inclina cor meum Deus in testimonia tua. Psalmo 108. et infra eodem, Inclinaui cor meum ad faciendas iustificationes tuas. Vnde et Augustinus de perfectione iustitiae 21. dicit. Orat homo vt praecepta Dei faciat, quae vt fierent, nec iuberetur, si nihil ibi nostra voluntas ageret, nec Deus oraretur, si sola sufficeret. Idem de correptione et gratia 7. Non se fallant, qui dicunt vt quid nobis praedicatur, atque praecipitur vt declinemus a malo, et faciamus bonum, si hoc nos non agimus, sed id velle et operari Deus operatur in nobis, sed potius intelligant, si filij Dei sunt, spiritu Dei se agi, vt quod agendum est agant, et cum congruit, illi a quo aguntur gratias agant: Aguntur enim vt agant, non vt ipsi nihil agant. Qui et in sententijs Prosperi 310. recitatur hoc modo; Plus est proculdubio agi quam regi: Qui enim regitur, aliquid agit, et ideo regitur vt recte agat; qui autem agitur, agere ipse aliquid vix intelligitur. Et tantum praestat voluntatibus nostris gratia Saluatoris, vt non dubitet Apostolus dicere, Quotquot spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filij Dei sunt: Nec aliquid in nobis", "english": "Hence the Prophet also says: \"Incline my heart, O God, to your testimonies,\" Psalm 108 [n58]; and further on in the same psalm: \"I have inclined my heart to do your justifications.\" So too Augustine, in On the Perfection of Righteousness 21, says: \"A man prays that he may do God's commands; and these would not be commanded in order that they be done, if our will did nothing there, nor would God be prayed to, if it alone were sufficient.\" Likewise in On Rebuke and Grace 7: \"Let them not deceive themselves, those who say: why is it preached to us and commanded that we turn away from evil and do good, if we do not do this ourselves, but God works in us the willing and the doing? Let them rather understand, if they are sons of God, that they are impelled by the Spirit of God, so that they may do what is to be done, and when they have done it, give thanks to him by whom they are impelled. For they are impelled so that they may act, not so that they may themselves do nothing.\"[n59] This is also recited in the Sentences of Prosper, 310, in this way:[n60] \"To be impelled is without doubt more than to be guided. For whoever is guided does something, and is guided so that he may act rightly; but he who is impelled is scarcely understood to do anything himself. And the grace of the Savior bestows so much upon our wills that the Apostle does not hesitate to say: 'As many as are impelled by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God.' And free will can do nothing better in us than commend itself to the one who cannot act badly.\"", "margins": [{"id": "554D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Prophet."}, {"id": "554D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine. Augustine."}, {"id": "554D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Prosper."}]}, {"anchor": "p554E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/20/#p554E", "locator_display": "554E", "source_text": "libera voluntas melius agere potest, quam vt illi se commendet qui male agere non potest. Quare et Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio 23. loquens de Gratia, scribit ita; Ipsa liberum excitat arbitrium; cum seminat cogitatum, sanat; cum immutat affectum, roborat, vt producat ad actum; seruat, ne sentiat defectum: sic autem ista cum libero arbitrio operatur, vt tantum in primo illud praeueniat; in caeteris comitetur. Ad hoc vtique praeuenit, vt iam sibi deinceps cooperetur; ita tamen quod a sola gratia caeptum est, pariter ab vtroque perficitur, vt mixtim, non sigillatim, simul non vicissim per singulos effectus operetur, non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opere indiuiduo peragunt: totum quidem hoc, et totum illa, sed vt totum in illa, sic totum ex illa.", "english": "Hence Bernard also, in On Grace and Free Choice 23, speaking of Grace, writes thus: \"She herself rouses free choice; when she sows a thought, she heals it; when she changes an affection, she strengthens it, so that it may bring forth to act; she preserves it, lest it feel any failing. And she works with free choice in such a way that she only goes before it in the first thing, and in the rest accompanies it. She goes before it for this purpose, that from then on it may work with her; yet what was begun by grace alone is completed equally by both, so that she works jointly, not separately, simultaneously, not by turns, in each effect: not partly grace and partly free choice, but each accomplishes the whole by one undivided work. The whole indeed this, and the whole that; but as the whole is in that, so the whole is from that.\"[n61]", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}