{"id": "2/19", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/19/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-2", "title": "De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 19", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "538B–540A", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XIX. Obijcit et respondet.\n\nSEd obijciet forsitan aliquis contra ista: Dicit enim Augustinus de Perfectione humanae iustitiae 5. quod peccatum est actus, non res. Idem Hypognost. 19. dicit, Malum natura non est, sed actus verissime accedens boni defectu; et in sententijs Prosperi, propositione 176. Nulla est substantia mali, quia quod\n\nAutorem Deum non habet, non est; itaque vitium corruptionis nihil est aliud, quam inordinatae desiderium vel actio voluntatis. Idem quoque de vera religione 37. dicit, Quod agere et pati non est substantia. Ad primum dicendum, quod ad modum loquendi Augustini, res dupliciter sumitur; generaliter scilicet et specialiter; generaliter vt conuertitur cum isto vocabulo ens, vel aliquid in sua generalissima communitate, vt scilicet est commune ad omne ens verum seu fictum, imaginatum, seu qualitercunque intellectum, sicut loquitur Philos. 2. peri hermenias 5. et 6. Metaphys. et alibi multis locis; et Anselmus de casu diaboli 11. manifeste, et sic dicitur a reri, sicque est commune ad quodcunque existens vel non existens, de quo potest quis reri; quare et sic comprehendit puram priuationem, cuiusmodi est peccatum; specialiter autem dicitur a ratitate seu rato, et sic tantummodo\n\ncomprehendit rate existens, siue rate existat per se, sicut substantia, siue per aliud, sicut accidentia per substantiam, et sic est commune ad decem praedicamenta tantummodo. Adhuc autem specialius dicitur res a rato permanenti, cuius esse non est in fluxu aut fieri; et adhuc specialissime dicitur res a rato quod per se rate existit, sicut sola substantia. Loquendo autem primo modo vel secundo, actus est res, loquendo vero tertio modo vel quarto, non; et hunc sensum verba Augustini testantur. Respondemus, inquit, peccatum quidem actum dici esse, non rem; sicut etiam in corpore claudicatio, eadem ratione actus est non res, quoniam res pes est ipse, vel corpus, vel homo, Ipsum sane vitium quo claudicat homo, nec pes est, nec corpus, nec homo. Quaerat ergo quod eidem vitio nomen imponat, vtrum rem velit dicere, an actum, an rei potius qualitatem malam qua deformis actus existit; sic et in homine interiore animus res est, rapina actus est, auaritia vitium est, id est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus, etiam quando nihil agit: Ecce quomodo hic vult nihil nisi substantiam rei nomine\n\nappellari; imo et qualitatem contra rem distinguit, innuens, quod ipsa non debeat res vocari. Ecce et alium testem Thomam de malo, quaestione 19. qui eandem Autoritatem sibi obiectam eodem modo intelligit et exponit, vnde sic ait; Ad tertium dicendum, quod ens et res simpliciter dicitur de substantia, de accidentibus autem secundum quid: Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit; Actus non est res. Aliter autem nec recedendo a mente Augustini potest dici, quod Augustinus hoc dicit non secundum veritatem, nec secundum sententiam propriam, sed secundum famo siorem quam veriorem modum loquendi ipsius Celestij, contra quem ibi disputat, et suorum similium, contra quos similiter disputat in libro de natura et gratia praenotato, quod satis ostendunt eius verba superius recitata; Respondemus, inquit, peccatum\n\nquidē actum dici esse, non tem: non respondet quod peccatum est actus non res, nec quod ipse dicat sic esse, sed dici sic esse, secundū scilicet famosum et communem modum loquendi quorundam; et addit, sed etiam in corpore claudicatio eadem ratione actus est non res: ipse tamen illam non approbat rationem. Et infra, Quaerat ergo quod eidem vitio nomen imponat, vtrum rem velit dicere, an actum, an rei potius qualitatem. Ecce quod Augustinus vtitur nominibus secundum impositionem et modum loquendi Caelestij. Vnde et infra eodem cap. 25. recitato a Caelestio testimonio Scripturae dicentis de Iob; Erat vir abstinens se ab omni re mala; quo volebat ostendere hominem posse hic viuere sine peccato, subiungit; Miror quod ausus est ponere hoc testimonium, vbi dictum est, Abstinens se ab omni re mala, cum hoc ab omni peccato vellet intelligi, cum superius dixerit peccatum actum malum esse, non rem: Reminiscatur ergo, quia etiam si actus sit, res potest dici. Idem de Natura et Gratia 19. recitat ab vno Caelestiano, contra quem ibi disputat, isto modo; Ante omnia quaerendum\n\nputo, inquit, scilicet Caelestianus, quid sit peccatum; substantia? an omnino substantia carens? nomen, quo non res, non existentia, non corpus aliquod, sed perperam factus actus exprimitur. Deinde adiungit, scilicet idem Caelestianus, Credo ita est; et cap. 20. Augustinus secundum sententiam propriam respondendo, dicit quod peccatum non est substantia, et tamen vitiat humanam naturam: Et capitulo 65. recitat Caelestianus a Ioanne Constantinopolitano Episcopo, peccatum non esse substantiam, sed actum malignum; et subdit Augustinus, Quis hoc negat? Augustinus ergo negans actum peccati esse rem, per rem intelligit rem per se ratam, scilicet substantiam, secundum famosum modum loquendi potius aliorum, quam suum; Quare et de perfectione iustitiae 25. reprobato illo modo loquendi secundum sententiam propriam, dicit actum esse rem, quod et dicunt multae aliae eius Autoritates capitulo proximo allegatae. Autoritates etiam sacrae Scripturae hoc idem copiosissime attestantur. Vnde Gen. 34. quod filij Iacob irati sunt valde, eo quod Sichem opprimendo Dinam sororem eorum\n\nrem foedam operatus est in Israel, et violata filia Iacob rem illicitam perpetrasset. Et 38. dicitur quod percussit Onan Dominus, qui semen fundebat in terram, eo quod rem detestabilem faceret; et 44. Pessimam rem fecistis, scilicet furando. Et Numer. 11. dicitur quod murmur populi et desiderium carnium Mosi intoleranda res visa est. Et Iudicum 19. Nunquam res talis facta est in Israel? Et Psalmo 100. Non proponebam ante oculos meos rem iniustam. Et 1. Reg. 2. Dixit Heli filijs suis, quare facitis res huiusmodi, quas ego audio res pessimas abomni populo, scilicet rapinam, et fornicationem, seu adulterium. Et infra 24. dicit Sanctus Dauid, Propitius sit mihi Deus, ne faciam hanc rem Domino meo, Christo Domini, vt mittam manum meam in eum. Et 3. Reg. 20. Hanc autem rem facere non possum, scilicet dare quae habuit. Et Parab. 12. Confusione res dignas gerit. Et Dan. 13. Non est inuenta in ea res turpis, scilicet adulterium. Et ad Hebr. 6. Vocat Apostolus promissionem seu pollicitationem Dei et eius iusiurandum duas res; per duas res, inquit, immobiles, quibus impossibile\n\nest mentiri Deum, fortissimum solatium habeamus: Sic pater ad obiecta quae dicunt actum non esse rem. Ad alia vero quae dicunt, Malum non esse naturam aut substantiam, sed actum vel actionem, dicendum quod malum dupliciter sumitur, sicut docet 26um. primi, scilicet pro ipsa malitia, quae est pura priuatio, et pro subiecto illius priuationis; actus etiam malus similiter potest sumi dupliciter; vno modo pro ipsa substantia, siue essentia actus; alio modo figuratiue et tropice pro malitia seu deformitate ipsius; sic enim loquitur articulus Parisiensis, et aliae Autoritates capitulo proximo recitatae. Quare dicit Aug 12. de Ciuit. Dei 8. quod mala voluntas non est affectio, sed defectio. Et 2. de libero arbitrio vlt. dicit quod motus auersionis voluntatis, qui est peccatum, est defectiuus, et defectus, et ideo non est ex Deo. Et 1 contra Iulianum vltimo: Quid, inquit, est malitia, nisi boni indigentia? Non enim sunt mala, nisi quae priuantur bonis, quia indigentia boni radix malitiae est; et hinc intelligat ideo esse arborem malam, voluntatem malam, quia defectus est a summo bono. Et Bernardus de\n\nlibero arbitrio 10. Velle, inquit, malum defectus est voluntatis. Augustinus etiam 6. contra Iulianum 19. exponens dictum quorundam Philosophorum, scilicet quod libido est quaedam pars animi, ita dicit; Illi Philosophi loquutione tropica mihi videntur vitiosam partem animi appellasse libidinem, in qua parte est vitium, quae vocatur libido, sicut appellatur Domus pro eis qui sunt in domo: et est iste tropus quidam color Rhetoricus, qui vltimo nouae Rhetoricae Tullij vocatur denominatio, et ponitur ibi 33. inter colores, et est satis creber modus loquendi in sacra Scriptura. Vnde Apostolus ad Ephes. 5. Eratis, inquit, aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino. Et Zach. 8. Sicut eratis maledictio in gentibus domus Iuda, et domus Israel, sic saluabo vos, et eritis benedictio in gentibus domus Iuda et domus Israel. Et Deuter. 17. Non immolabis Domino Deo tuo bouem et ouem in quo est macula, aut quicquam vitij, quod abominatio est Domino Deo tuo et Parab. 3. Abominatio Domino omnis\n\nillusor. Et 11. Statera dolosa abominatio est apud Deum. Et 15. Abominatio Domini cogitationes malae. Et 16. Abominatio Domini est omnis arrogans. Et Esai 1. Incensum abominatio est mihi. Et infra 41. ad propositum plane dicit; Ecce vos estis ex nihilo, et opus vestrum ex eo quod non est, abominatio est qui elegit vos: et multa similia occurrunt saepissime in Scriptura. Malum ergo primo modo est actus secundo modo, et malum secundo modo est actus primo modo. Illud vero Augustini de vera religione, quod agere et pati non est substantia, verum est ad literam et ad mentem: Intelligit enim quod non est substantia proprie dicta, quia non per se subsistit, vel magis communiter, quod non est essentia permanens, sed consistens semper in fieri, aut in fluxu. Qua propter ex hoc probari non potest, quod agere, actus, siue actio nullam essentiam habeat etc sit nihil.", "english": "CHAPTER 19. He raises an objection and replies.\n\nBut perhaps someone will object against these claims. Augustine says in On the Perfection of Human Righteousness 5 that sin is an act, not a thing. The Hypognosticon 19 says the same: \"Evil is not a nature, but an act that, in the truest sense, comes about through a defect of good.\"[n1] And in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 176: \"Evil has no substance, because what does not have God as its author is not; and so the vice of corruption is nothing other than the disordered desire or action of the will.\" Augustine also says in On True Religion 37 that to act and to suffer is not a substance.\n\nTo the first, it must be said that, in Augustine's manner of speaking, \"thing\" is taken in two ways, generally and specially. Generally, it is convertible with the word \"being\" or \"something\" in its most general commonness, that is, as common to every being, whether true or fictive, imagined, or understood in any way whatever, as the Philosopher speaks in Peri hermeneias 2, 5, and in Metaphysics 6, and in many other places,[n2] and as Anselm plainly does in On the Fall of the Devil 11. In this sense \"thing\" is derived from reri (to reckon),[n3] and so it is common to whatever exists or does not exist, about which one can reckon. Hence in this sense it also includes pure privation, of which sin is one kind. Specially, however, \"thing\" is derived from ratitas or ratum (fixity, the fixed), and in this sense it includes only\n\nwhat exists fixedly, whether it exists fixedly through itself, as substance does, or through another, as accidents do through substance; and in this sense it is common to the ten categories only. More specially still, \"thing\" is derived from what is fixed and permanent, whose being is not in flux or in becoming; and most specially of all, \"thing\" is derived from what exists fixedly through itself, as substance alone does. Now, speaking in the first or second sense, an act is a thing; speaking in the third or fourth, it is not; and the words of Augustine bear witness to this sense. \"We reply,\" he says, \"that sin is indeed said to be an act, not a thing. So too in the body, lameness is by the same reasoning an act and not a thing, since the thing is the foot itself, or the body, or the man; but the very defect by which the man limps is neither foot, nor body, nor man. Let him therefore ask what name he should give to that same defect: whether he wants to call it a thing, or an act, or rather the evil quality of a thing by which the act exists as deformed. So also in the inner man, the mind is a thing, plunder is an act, and avarice is a vice, that is, the quality according to which the mind is evil even when it does nothing.\" See how here he wishes nothing but substance to be called by the name of \"thing\"; indeed he distinguishes quality from thing, indicating that it ought not to be called a thing. See also another witness, Thomas, On Evil, question 19,[n4] who understands and explains this same authority, when it is raised as an objection against him, in the same way. Hence he says: \"To the third it must be said that 'being' and 'thing' are said without qualification of substance, but of accidents only with qualification; and according to this Augustine says: 'An act is not a thing.'\" Alternatively, too,[n5] without departing from the mind of Augustine, it can be said that Augustine says this not according to the truth, nor according to his own opinion, but according to the manner of speaking of Caelestius himself, against whom he is arguing there, and of those like him, against whom he argues in the same way in the book On Nature and Grace cited above. His words recited above show this well enough: \"We reply,\" he says, \"that sin\n\nis indeed said to be an act, not a thing.\" He does not reply that sin is an act and not a thing, nor that he himself says it is so, but that it is said to be so, that is, according to the well-known and common manner of speaking of certain people; and he adds, \"but in the body also, lameness is by the same reasoning an act and not a thing\": yet he himself does not approve that reasoning. And below: \"Let him therefore ask what name he should give to that same defect: whether he wants to call it a thing, or an act, or rather the evil quality of a thing.\" See how Augustine uses names according to the imposition and manner of speaking of Caelestius. Hence also below in the same chapter, 25, when a testimony of Scripture about Job has been cited by Caelestius (\"There was a man abstaining from every evil thing\"), by which he wished to show that a man can live here without sin, Augustine adds: \"I wonder that he dared to put forward this testimony, in which it is said 'abstaining from every evil thing,' when he wants this understood as 'from every sin,' though he said above that sin is an evil act, not a thing. Let him remember, then, that even if it is an act, it can be called a thing.\" The same Augustine, in On Nature and Grace 19, recites from one Caelestian, against whom he is arguing there, in this way: \"Before all else I think we must ask,\" he says, that is, the Caelestian, \"what sin is: a substance? or something altogether lacking substance? It is a name by which is expressed not a thing, not an existing being, not some body, but an act wrongly done.\" Then he adds, the same Caelestian, \"I believe it is so.\" And in chapter 20, Augustine, replying according to his own opinion, says that sin is not a substance, and yet it vitiates human nature. And in chapter 65 the Caelestian cites from John, bishop of Constantinople,[n6] that sin is not a substance but a malignant act; and Augustine adds, \"Who denies this?\" So when Augustine denies that the act of sin is a thing, by \"thing\" he means a thing fixed in itself, that is, substance, according to the well-known manner of speaking of others rather than his own. Therefore in On the Perfection of Righteousness 25, having rejected that manner of speaking, he says according to his own opinion that an act is a thing; many other authorities of his cited in the preceding chapter say the same. The authorities of Holy Scripture also testify to this very point most copiously. Hence Gen 34 says that the sons of Jacob were very angry because Shechem, by forcing Dinah their sister,\n\nhad done a foul thing in Israel, and, in violating the daughter of Jacob, had perpetrated an unlawful thing. And in Gen 38 it is said that the Lord struck down Onan, who spilled his seed on the ground, because he did a detestable thing; and in Gen 44: \"You have done a most wicked thing,\" namely by stealing. And in Num 11 it is said that the murmuring of the people and their desire for meat seemed to Moses an intolerable thing. And in Judges 19: \"Never was such a thing done in Israel?\" And in Psalm 100 [101]: \"I did not set an unjust thing before my eyes.\" And in 1 Kgs [1 Sam] 2: Eli said to his sons, \"Why do you do things of this kind, which I hear, the worst things, from the whole people?\", that is, plunder and fornication, or adultery. And below, in chapter 24, holy David says, \"May God be merciful to me, that I not do this thing to my lord, the Lord's anointed, to put forth my hand against him.\" And in 3 Kgs [1 Kgs] 20: \"But this thing I cannot do,\" namely to give what he had. And in Proverbs 12: \"He does things worthy of confusion.\" And in Daniel 13: \"No shameful thing was found in her,\" namely adultery. And in Hebrews 6 the Apostle calls the promise, or pledge, of God and his oath two things: \"by two immovable things,\" he says, \"in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest consolation.\"[n7] Thus the reply is clear to the objections which say that an act is not a thing.\n\nAs to the other statements, which say that evil is not a nature or a substance but an act or an action, it must be said that \"evil\" is taken in two ways, as the 26th of the first teaches:[n8] for malice itself, which is a pure privation, and for the subject of that privation. An evil act likewise can be taken in two ways: in one way for the very substance, or essence, of the act; in the other way, figuratively and tropically, for its malice or deformity. For that is how the Parisian article speaks, and the other authorities cited in the preceding chapter. Hence Augustine says in City of God 12, 8, that an evil will is not an affection but a defection. And in On Free Choice 2, last chapter, he says that the movement of aversion of the will, which is sin, is defective and a defect, and therefore is not from God. And in Against Julian 1, at the end: \"What,\" he says, \"is malice but the lack of good? For things are not evil unless they are deprived of goods, since the lack of good is the root of malice; and from this let him understand that the tree is evil, and the will evil, because it is a falling away from the highest good.\" And Bernard, On Free Choice 10:\n\n\"To will evil,\" he says, \"is a defect of the will.\" Augustine also, in Against Julian 6, 19, expounding the saying of certain Philosophers, namely that lust is a certain part of the soul, speaks thus: \"Those Philosophers seem to me to have called by the name 'lust' the vicious part of the soul, the part in which is the vice that is called lust, just as a house is called by the name 'house' for those who are in the house; and this trope is a certain rhetorical colour, which in the last book of Tully's New Rhetoric is called denominatio[n9] and is set down there, at 33, among the colours, and it is a quite frequent manner of speaking in Holy Scripture. Hence the Apostle says in Ephesians 5: \"You were once darkness, but now light in the Lord.\" And Zechariah 8: \"As you were a curse among the nations, house of Judah and house of Israel, so I will save you, and you will be a blessing among the nations, house of Judah and house of Israel.\" And Deuteronomy 17: \"You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox or a sheep in which there is a blemish, or any vice at all, [n10] because that is an abomination to the Lord your God.\" And Proverbs 3: \"Every mocker is an abomination to the Lord.\"\n\nAnd Proverbs 11: \"A deceitful scale is an abomination with God.\" And 15: \"Evil thoughts are an abomination of the Lord.\" And 16: \"Every arrogant person is an abomination of the Lord.\" And Isaiah 1: \"Incense is an abomination to me.\" And below, in 41, he says plainly to the purpose: \"Behold, you are from nothing, and your work from that which is not; an abomination is he who chose you.\" And many similar things occur very often in Scripture. Evil in the first sense, therefore, is act in the second sense, and evil in the second sense is act in the first sense.[n11] That saying of Augustine in On True Religion, that to act and to suffer is not a substance, is true to the letter and to the mind: for he understands that it is not substance properly so called, because it does not subsist through itself, or, more commonly, that it is not a permanent essence but one that consists always in becoming, or in flux. For this reason it cannot be proved from this that to act, or an act, or an action, has no essence and is nothing.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Hypognosticon (Hypomnesticon) is pseudo-Augustinian, not by Augustine; Bradwardine and Savile cite it under his name. The Prosper cited just after is the compiler of the Sentences drawn from Augustine."}, {"n": 2, "text": "\"Philos. 2. peri hermenias 5. et 6. Metaphys.\": the Latin gives only these bare numerals, and the grouping is ambiguous. Following rule 4 I keep them without expansion: Peri hermeneias \"2, 5\" and Metaphysics \"6\"."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The argument depends on two etymologies of res: from reri (\"to reckon, think\"), which makes res anything that can be thought; and from ratus (hence ratitas, ratum, \"fixed, established\"), which makes it what exists \"fixedly\" (rate). Hence \"fixed in itself\" (per se ratam) below means substance. The pun cannot be kept in English; the senses are four: (1) anything thinkable; (2) what exists fixedly, in substance or accident; (3) what is fixed and permanent, not in flux; (4) substance alone."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Thomas's De malo has only sixteen questions, so \"question 19\" cannot be right as a reference to that work. The number is translated as printed and the passage is not identified."}, {"n": 5, "text": "\"nec recedendo\": the nec does not construe naturally, since the sentence is affirmative (\"it can be said that Augustine says this not according to the truth…\"). I take it as \"and, too,\" continuing the preceding explanation, and render accordingly."}, {"n": 6, "text": "John of Constantinople is John Chrysostom, whom Caelestius and the Caelestians (and Augustine in De natura et gratia) cite as a witness."}, {"n": 7, "text": "The keyed margins are grouped under single markers (539C·2, 539C·4), and the markers do not stand level with their citations in the print (for example 539C·1 falls at Gen 38, while the margin entry \"Num.\" belongs beside Num 11). They are reproduced exactly as given."}, {"n": 8, "text": "\"sicut docet 26um. primi\" is left unexpanded, as given (rule 4); it presumably refers to a numbered section of Book I, but I have not resolved it."}, {"n": 9, "text": "The Rhetorica ad Herennium, which the Middle Ages attributed to Cicero (\"Tully\") and called the \"new Rhetoric\" (as against the De inventione, the \"old\"); book 4 treats the figures. Denominatio is what we call metonymy, the substitution of the container for the contents (\"house\" for its occupants) or of an attribute for the thing named."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The marker is printed in the keyed Latin as 540E·1, but page 540 has no section E; the \"Parab.\" margin stands at the top of 540A beside the first line. The marker is kept as given. The sentence runs over the page turn (catchword quam / quam vitij)."}, {"n": 11, "text": "Evil \"in the first sense\" is malice itself, a pure privation; this is \"act in the second sense\", namely the figurative use of \"act\" for its malice or deformity. Evil \"in the second sense\", the subject of the privation, is \"act in the first sense\", namely the substance or essence of the act."}], "errata": [{"address": "538E", "keyed": "famo siorem", "print": "famosiorem"}, {"address": "539A", "keyed": "tem", "print": "rem"}, {"address": "539C", "keyed": "abomni", "print": "ab omni"}, {"address": "539C", "keyed": "Parah. (margin)", "print": "Parab."}, {"address": "539D", "keyed": "pater", "print": "patet"}, {"address": "540A", "keyed": "etc sit nihil", "print": "et sit nihil"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p538B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/19/#p538B", "locator_display": "538B–538C", "source_text": "CAP. XIX. Obijcit et respondet.\n\nSEd obijciet forsitan aliquis contra ista: Dicit enim Augustinus de Perfectione humanae iustitiae 5. quod peccatum est actus, non res. Idem Hypognost. 19. dicit, Malum natura non est, sed actus verissime accedens boni defectu; et in sententijs Prosperi, propositione 176. Nulla est substantia mali, quia quod\n\nAutorem Deum non habet, non est; itaque vitium corruptionis nihil est aliud, quam inordinatae desiderium vel actio voluntatis. Idem quoque de vera religione 37. dicit, Quod agere et pati non est substantia. Ad primum dicendum, quod ad modum loquendi Augustini, res dupliciter sumitur; generaliter scilicet et specialiter; generaliter vt conuertitur cum isto vocabulo ens, vel aliquid in sua generalissima communitate, vt scilicet est commune ad omne ens verum seu fictum, imaginatum, seu qualitercunque intellectum, sicut loquitur Philos. 2. peri hermenias 5. et 6. Metaphys. et alibi multis locis; et Anselmus de casu diaboli 11. manifeste, et sic dicitur a reri, sicque est commune ad quodcunque existens vel non existens, de quo potest quis reri; quare et sic comprehendit puram priuationem, cuiusmodi est peccatum; specialiter autem dicitur a ratitate seu rato, et sic tantummodo", "english": "CHAPTER 19. He raises an objection and replies.\n\nBut perhaps someone will object against these claims. Augustine says in On the Perfection of Human Righteousness 5 that sin is an act, not a thing. The Hypognosticon 19 says the same: \"Evil is not a nature, but an act that, in the truest sense, comes about through a defect of good.\"[n1] And in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 176: \"Evil has no substance, because what does not have God as its author is not; and so the vice of corruption is nothing other than the disordered desire or action of the will.\" Augustine also says in On True Religion 37 that to act and to suffer is not a substance.\n\nTo the first, it must be said that, in Augustine's manner of speaking, \"thing\" is taken in two ways, generally and specially. Generally, it is convertible with the word \"being\" or \"something\" in its most general commonness, that is, as common to every being, whether true or fictive, imagined, or understood in any way whatever, as the Philosopher speaks in Peri hermeneias 2, 5, and in Metaphysics 6, and in many other places,[n2] and as Anselm plainly does in On the Fall of the Devil 11. In this sense \"thing\" is derived from reri (to reckon),[n3] and so it is common to whatever exists or does not exist, about which one can reckon. Hence in this sense it also includes pure privation, of which sin is one kind. Specially, however, \"thing\" is derived from ratitas or ratum (fixity, the fixed), and in this sense it includes only", "margins": [{"id": "538B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Objection. Augustine."}, {"id": "538C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Response."}]}, {"anchor": "p538D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/19/#p538D", "locator_display": "538D–538E", "source_text": "comprehendit rate existens, siue rate existat per se, sicut substantia, siue per aliud, sicut accidentia per substantiam, et sic est commune ad decem praedicamenta tantummodo. Adhuc autem specialius dicitur res a rato permanenti, cuius esse non est in fluxu aut fieri; et adhuc specialissime dicitur res a rato quod per se rate existit, sicut sola substantia. Loquendo autem primo modo vel secundo, actus est res, loquendo vero tertio modo vel quarto, non; et hunc sensum verba Augustini testantur. Respondemus, inquit, peccatum quidem actum dici esse, non rem; sicut etiam in corpore claudicatio, eadem ratione actus est non res, quoniam res pes est ipse, vel corpus, vel homo, Ipsum sane vitium quo claudicat homo, nec pes est, nec corpus, nec homo. Quaerat ergo quod eidem vitio nomen imponat, vtrum rem velit dicere, an actum, an rei potius qualitatem malam qua deformis actus existit; sic et in homine interiore animus res est, rapina actus est, auaritia vitium est, id est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus, etiam quando nihil agit: Ecce quomodo hic vult nihil nisi substantiam rei nomine\n\nappellari; imo et qualitatem contra rem distinguit, innuens, quod ipsa non debeat res vocari. Ecce et alium testem Thomam de malo, quaestione 19. qui eandem Autoritatem sibi obiectam eodem modo intelligit et exponit, vnde sic ait; Ad tertium dicendum, quod ens et res simpliciter dicitur de substantia, de accidentibus autem secundum quid: Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit; Actus non est res. Aliter autem nec recedendo a mente Augustini potest dici, quod Augustinus hoc dicit non secundum veritatem, nec secundum sententiam propriam, sed secundum famo siorem quam veriorem modum loquendi ipsius Celestij, contra quem ibi disputat, et suorum similium, contra quos similiter disputat in libro de natura et gratia praenotato, quod satis ostendunt eius verba superius recitata; Respondemus, inquit, peccatum", "english": "what exists fixedly, whether it exists fixedly through itself, as substance does, or through another, as accidents do through substance; and in this sense it is common to the ten categories only. More specially still, \"thing\" is derived from what is fixed and permanent, whose being is not in flux or in becoming; and most specially of all, \"thing\" is derived from what exists fixedly through itself, as substance alone does. Now, speaking in the first or second sense, an act is a thing; speaking in the third or fourth, it is not; and the words of Augustine bear witness to this sense. \"We reply,\" he says, \"that sin is indeed said to be an act, not a thing. So too in the body, lameness is by the same reasoning an act and not a thing, since the thing is the foot itself, or the body, or the man; but the very defect by which the man limps is neither foot, nor body, nor man. Let him therefore ask what name he should give to that same defect: whether he wants to call it a thing, or an act, or rather the evil quality of a thing by which the act exists as deformed. So also in the inner man, the mind is a thing, plunder is an act, and avarice is a vice, that is, the quality according to which the mind is evil even when it does nothing.\" See how here he wishes nothing but substance to be called by the name of \"thing\"; indeed he distinguishes quality from thing, indicating that it ought not to be called a thing. See also another witness, Thomas, On Evil, question 19,[n4] who understands and explains this same authority, when it is raised as an objection against him, in the same way. Hence he says: \"To the third it must be said that 'being' and 'thing' are said without qualification of substance, but of accidents only with qualification; and according to this Augustine says: 'An act is not a thing.'\" Alternatively, too,[n5] without departing from the mind of Augustine, it can be said that Augustine says this not according to the truth, nor according to his own opinion, but according to the manner of speaking of Caelestius himself, against whom he is arguing there, and of those like him, against whom he argues in the same way in the book On Nature and Grace cited above. His words recited above show this well enough: \"We reply,\" he says, \"that sin", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p539A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/19/#p539A", "locator_display": "539A–539B", "source_text": "quidē actum dici esse, non tem: non respondet quod peccatum est actus non res, nec quod ipse dicat sic esse, sed dici sic esse, secundū scilicet famosum et communem modum loquendi quorundam; et addit, sed etiam in corpore claudicatio eadem ratione actus est non res: ipse tamen illam non approbat rationem. Et infra, Quaerat ergo quod eidem vitio nomen imponat, vtrum rem velit dicere, an actum, an rei potius qualitatem. Ecce quod Augustinus vtitur nominibus secundum impositionem et modum loquendi Caelestij. Vnde et infra eodem cap. 25. recitato a Caelestio testimonio Scripturae dicentis de Iob; Erat vir abstinens se ab omni re mala; quo volebat ostendere hominem posse hic viuere sine peccato, subiungit; Miror quod ausus est ponere hoc testimonium, vbi dictum est, Abstinens se ab omni re mala, cum hoc ab omni peccato vellet intelligi, cum superius dixerit peccatum actum malum esse, non rem: Reminiscatur ergo, quia etiam si actus sit, res potest dici. Idem de Natura et Gratia 19. recitat ab vno Caelestiano, contra quem ibi disputat, isto modo; Ante omnia quaerendum\n\nputo, inquit, scilicet Caelestianus, quid sit peccatum; substantia? an omnino substantia carens? nomen, quo non res, non existentia, non corpus aliquod, sed perperam factus actus exprimitur. Deinde adiungit, scilicet idem Caelestianus, Credo ita est; et cap. 20. Augustinus secundum sententiam propriam respondendo, dicit quod peccatum non est substantia, et tamen vitiat humanam naturam: Et capitulo 65. recitat Caelestianus a Ioanne Constantinopolitano Episcopo, peccatum non esse substantiam, sed actum malignum; et subdit Augustinus, Quis hoc negat? Augustinus ergo negans actum peccati esse rem, per rem intelligit rem per se ratam, scilicet substantiam, secundum famosum modum loquendi potius aliorum, quam suum; Quare et de perfectione iustitiae 25. reprobato illo modo loquendi secundum sententiam propriam, dicit actum esse rem, quod et dicunt multae aliae eius Autoritates capitulo proximo allegatae. Autoritates etiam sacrae Scripturae hoc idem copiosissime attestantur. Vnde Gen. 34. quod filij Iacob irati sunt valde, eo quod Sichem opprimendo Dinam sororem eorum", "english": "is indeed said to be an act, not a thing.\" He does not reply that sin is an act and not a thing, nor that he himself says it is so, but that it is said to be so, that is, according to the well-known and common manner of speaking of certain people; and he adds, \"but in the body also, lameness is by the same reasoning an act and not a thing\": yet he himself does not approve that reasoning. And below: \"Let him therefore ask what name he should give to that same defect: whether he wants to call it a thing, or an act, or rather the evil quality of a thing.\" See how Augustine uses names according to the imposition and manner of speaking of Caelestius. Hence also below in the same chapter, 25, when a testimony of Scripture about Job has been cited by Caelestius (\"There was a man abstaining from every evil thing\"), by which he wished to show that a man can live here without sin, Augustine adds: \"I wonder that he dared to put forward this testimony, in which it is said 'abstaining from every evil thing,' when he wants this understood as 'from every sin,' though he said above that sin is an evil act, not a thing. Let him remember, then, that even if it is an act, it can be called a thing.\" The same Augustine, in On Nature and Grace 19, recites from one Caelestian, against whom he is arguing there, in this way: \"Before all else I think we must ask,\" he says, that is, the Caelestian, \"what sin is: a substance? or something altogether lacking substance? It is a name by which is expressed not a thing, not an existing being, not some body, but an act wrongly done.\" Then he adds, the same Caelestian, \"I believe it is so.\" And in chapter 20, Augustine, replying according to his own opinion, says that sin is not a substance, and yet it vitiates human nature. And in chapter 65 the Caelestian cites from John, bishop of Constantinople,[n6] that sin is not a substance but a malignant act; and Augustine adds, \"Who denies this?\" So when Augustine denies that the act of sin is a thing, by \"thing\" he means a thing fixed in itself, that is, substance, according to the well-known manner of speaking of others rather than his own. Therefore in On the Perfection of Righteousness 25, having rejected that manner of speaking, he says according to his own opinion that an act is a thing; many other authorities of his cited in the preceding chapter say the same. The authorities of Holy Scripture also testify to this very point most copiously. Hence Gen 34 says that the sons of Jacob were very angry because Shechem, by forcing Dinah their sister,", "margins": [{"id": "539A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}, {"id": "539B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Genesis."}]}, {"anchor": "p539C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/19/#p539C", "locator_display": "539C–539D", "source_text": "rem foedam operatus est in Israel, et violata filia Iacob rem illicitam perpetrasset. Et 38. dicitur quod percussit Onan Dominus, qui semen fundebat in terram, eo quod rem detestabilem faceret; et 44. Pessimam rem fecistis, scilicet furando. Et Numer. 11. dicitur quod murmur populi et desiderium carnium Mosi intoleranda res visa est. Et Iudicum 19. Nunquam res talis facta est in Israel? Et Psalmo 100. Non proponebam ante oculos meos rem iniustam. Et 1. Reg. 2. Dixit Heli filijs suis, quare facitis res huiusmodi, quas ego audio res pessimas abomni populo, scilicet rapinam, et fornicationem, seu adulterium. Et infra 24. dicit Sanctus Dauid, Propitius sit mihi Deus, ne faciam hanc rem Domino meo, Christo Domini, vt mittam manum meam in eum. Et 3. Reg. 20. Hanc autem rem facere non possum, scilicet dare quae habuit. Et Parab. 12. Confusione res dignas gerit. Et Dan. 13. Non est inuenta in ea res turpis, scilicet adulterium. Et ad Hebr. 6. Vocat Apostolus promissionem seu pollicitationem Dei et eius iusiurandum duas res; per duas res, inquit, immobiles, quibus impossibile\n\nest mentiri Deum, fortissimum solatium habeamus: Sic pater ad obiecta quae dicunt actum non esse rem. Ad alia vero quae dicunt, Malum non esse naturam aut substantiam, sed actum vel actionem, dicendum quod malum dupliciter sumitur, sicut docet 26um. primi, scilicet pro ipsa malitia, quae est pura priuatio, et pro subiecto illius priuationis; actus etiam malus similiter potest sumi dupliciter; vno modo pro ipsa substantia, siue essentia actus; alio modo figuratiue et tropice pro malitia seu deformitate ipsius; sic enim loquitur articulus Parisiensis, et aliae Autoritates capitulo proximo recitatae. Quare dicit Aug 12. de Ciuit. Dei 8. quod mala voluntas non est affectio, sed defectio. Et 2. de libero arbitrio vlt. dicit quod motus auersionis voluntatis, qui est peccatum, est defectiuus, et defectus, et ideo non est ex Deo. Et 1 contra Iulianum vltimo: Quid, inquit, est malitia, nisi boni indigentia? Non enim sunt mala, nisi quae priuantur bonis, quia indigentia boni radix malitiae est; et hinc intelligat ideo esse arborem malam, voluntatem malam, quia defectus est a summo bono. Et Bernardus de", "english": "had done a foul thing in Israel, and, in violating the daughter of Jacob, had perpetrated an unlawful thing. And in Gen 38 it is said that the Lord struck down Onan, who spilled his seed on the ground, because he did a detestable thing; and in Gen 44: \"You have done a most wicked thing,\" namely by stealing. And in Num 11 it is said that the murmuring of the people and their desire for meat seemed to Moses an intolerable thing. And in Judges 19: \"Never was such a thing done in Israel?\" And in Psalm 100 [101]: \"I did not set an unjust thing before my eyes.\" And in 1 Kgs [1 Sam] 2: Eli said to his sons, \"Why do you do things of this kind, which I hear, the worst things, from the whole people?\", that is, plunder and fornication, or adultery. And below, in chapter 24, holy David says, \"May God be merciful to me, that I not do this thing to my lord, the Lord's anointed, to put forth my hand against him.\" And in 3 Kgs [1 Kgs] 20: \"But this thing I cannot do,\" namely to give what he had. And in Proverbs 12: \"He does things worthy of confusion.\" And in Daniel 13: \"No shameful thing was found in her,\" namely adultery. And in Hebrews 6 the Apostle calls the promise, or pledge, of God and his oath two things: \"by two immovable things,\" he says, \"in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest consolation.\"[n7] Thus the reply is clear to the objections which say that an act is not a thing.\n\nAs to the other statements, which say that evil is not a nature or a substance but an act or an action, it must be said that \"evil\" is taken in two ways, as the 26th of the first teaches:[n8] for malice itself, which is a pure privation, and for the subject of that privation. An evil act likewise can be taken in two ways: in one way for the very substance, or essence, of the act; in the other way, figuratively and tropically, for its malice or deformity. For that is how the Parisian article speaks, and the other authorities cited in the preceding chapter. Hence Augustine says in City of God 12, 8, that an evil will is not an affection but a defection. And in On Free Choice 2, last chapter, he says that the movement of aversion of the will, which is sin, is defective and a defect, and therefore is not from God. And in Against Julian 1, at the end: \"What,\" he says, \"is malice but the lack of good? For things are not evil unless they are deprived of goods, since the lack of good is the root of malice; and from this let him understand that the tree is evil, and the will evil, because it is a falling away from the highest good.\" And Bernard, On Free Choice 10:", "margins": [{"id": "539C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Numbers."}, {"id": "539C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Judges. Psalm. Kings [Reg., i.e. 1 Sam]."}, {"id": "539C·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: Dominus [for Deus]."}, {"id": "539C·4", "kind": "source", "text": "Proverbs. Daniel. Apostle."}, {"id": "539D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p539E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/19/#p539E", "locator_display": "539E", "source_text": "libero arbitrio 10. Velle, inquit, malum defectus est voluntatis. Augustinus etiam 6. contra Iulianum 19. exponens dictum quorundam Philosophorum, scilicet quod libido est quaedam pars animi, ita dicit; Illi Philosophi loquutione tropica mihi videntur vitiosam partem animi appellasse libidinem, in qua parte est vitium, quae vocatur libido, sicut appellatur Domus pro eis qui sunt in domo: et est iste tropus quidam color Rhetoricus, qui vltimo nouae Rhetoricae Tullij vocatur denominatio, et ponitur ibi 33. inter colores, et est satis creber modus loquendi in sacra Scriptura. Vnde Apostolus ad Ephes. 5. Eratis, inquit, aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino. Et Zach. 8. Sicut eratis maledictio in gentibus domus Iuda, et domus Israel, sic saluabo vos, et eritis benedictio in gentibus domus Iuda et domus Israel. Et Deuter. 17. Non immolabis Domino Deo tuo bouem et ouem in quo est macula, aut quicquam vitij, quod abominatio est Domino Deo tuo et Parab. 3. Abominatio Domino omnis", "english": "\"To will evil,\" he says, \"is a defect of the will.\" Augustine also, in Against Julian 6, 19, expounding the saying of certain Philosophers, namely that lust is a certain part of the soul, speaks thus: \"Those Philosophers seem to me to have called by the name 'lust' the vicious part of the soul, the part in which is the vice that is called lust, just as a house is called by the name 'house' for those who are in the house; and this trope is a certain rhetorical colour, which in the last book of Tully's New Rhetoric is called denominatio[n9] and is set down there, at 33, among the colours, and it is a quite frequent manner of speaking in Holy Scripture. Hence the Apostle says in Ephesians 5: \"You were once darkness, but now light in the Lord.\" And Zechariah 8: \"As you were a curse among the nations, house of Judah and house of Israel, so I will save you, and you will be a blessing among the nations, house of Judah and house of Israel.\" And Deuteronomy 17: \"You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox or a sheep in which there is a blemish, or any vice at all, [n10] because that is an abomination to the Lord your God.\" And Proverbs 3: \"Every mocker is an abomination to the Lord.\"", "margins": [{"id": "539E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: quidem [for quidam]."}, {"id": "539E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Apostle. Zechariah."}, {"id": "539E·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Deuteronomy."}, {"id": "540E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Proverbs."}]}, {"anchor": "p540A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/19/#p540A", "locator_display": "540A", "source_text": "illusor. Et 11. Statera dolosa abominatio est apud Deum. Et 15. Abominatio Domini cogitationes malae. Et 16. Abominatio Domini est omnis arrogans. Et Esai 1. Incensum abominatio est mihi. Et infra 41. ad propositum plane dicit; Ecce vos estis ex nihilo, et opus vestrum ex eo quod non est, abominatio est qui elegit vos: et multa similia occurrunt saepissime in Scriptura. Malum ergo primo modo est actus secundo modo, et malum secundo modo est actus primo modo. Illud vero Augustini de vera religione, quod agere et pati non est substantia, verum est ad literam et ad mentem: Intelligit enim quod non est substantia proprie dicta, quia non per se subsistit, vel magis communiter, quod non est essentia permanens, sed consistens semper in fieri, aut in fluxu. Qua propter ex hoc probari non potest, quod agere, actus, siue actio nullam essentiam habeat etc sit nihil.", "english": "And Proverbs 11: \"A deceitful scale is an abomination with God.\" And 15: \"Evil thoughts are an abomination of the Lord.\" And 16: \"Every arrogant person is an abomination of the Lord.\" And Isaiah 1: \"Incense is an abomination to me.\" And below, in 41, he says plainly to the purpose: \"Behold, you are from nothing, and your work from that which is not; an abomination is he who chose you.\" And many similar things occur very often in Scripture. Evil in the first sense, therefore, is act in the second sense, and evil in the second sense is act in the first sense.[n11] That saying of Augustine in On True Religion, that to act and to suffer is not a substance, is true to the letter and to the mind: for he understands that it is not substance properly so called, because it does not subsist through itself, or, more commonly, that it is not a permanent essence but one that consists always in becoming, or in flux. For this reason it cannot be proved from this that to act, or an act, or an action, has no essence and is nothing.", "margins": [{"id": "540A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Isaiah."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}