De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 17
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 527A–528E; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/17/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[527A]
Chapter 17. That no rational creature can be confirmed or made obstinate immutably by nature.

[527A–527C]
Since it has been shown that a certain rational creature is immovably confirmed in good, and another immutably obstinate in evil, and this not through free choice and its own nature alone, we must inquire further whether this can come about through nature. Some argue that it can. In the confirmation of the Blessed, they say, no infinite aid is added to nature, but only a finite one; and just so much could be added to it by the addition of a greater, stronger natural aid; and likewise for the obstinate. But this does not seem so, except perhaps when one speaks equivocally, and far too sophistically, of the rational creature. That is, it would hold only if one supposed that God can create a rational creature that would have only the judgment of reason without freedom of acting; or the reverse, one that would have freedom of contradiction in acting, with only sensitive cognition and no judgment of reason. But if we do not speak so, and speak univocally of a rational creature of the same kind as it now is, it does not seem that anyone can be confirmed by nature alone in moral or supernatural good. For it seems more likely that a rational creature could be confirmed in a good of nature through itself alone, or by its own nature alone, than in a good that is not natural, namely a moral or supernatural one. But this cannot be, as the second and ninth of the first show.[n1]

Again, if the strength and natural power of a rational creature is naturally increased, as the power of the intellect is increased, then so is the free power of the will, that is, proportionally. As much as the creature can naturally use the power of the intellect, so much can it use the free power of the will. Hence it too can will as mutably as a lower will with less power. Again, such a power, however great it is posited to be, is a created rational power. As far as its nature goes, it is mutable in nature and in being, since it passes from non-being into being and the reverse; so too it is mutable in action and mutable in will, and is able to turn to opposites in succession, as was just now shown about the Angels. Again, whatever rational creature is posited, it is of itself mutable in intellect. For it can know something after not knowing it, and the reverse; and it can be deceived, when what it believes to be true has become false through some such secret change in the thing. Hence it is likewise mutable, deceivable, and able to sin in will. Again, suppose this rational creature has this act unceasingly by natural necessity;

[527D–528B]
then this is either by a natural necessity antecedent to this rational power, or by a necessity following upon this act. It is not by a natural necessity antecedent to this rational power. For that formally conflicts with a rational power, which, as far as its nature goes, and insofar as it naturally precedes its own free act, can freely, according to contradiction, produce that act or not produce it. Nor is it predetermined by an antecedent natural necessity to one side only, as irrational powers are, as the Philosopher teaches in Metaphysics 9, 10,[n2] and the first and second of this book.[n3] So the same must be held of perpetual continuation. Nor does it have this act unceasingly from a necessity that naturally follows upon the act, so that the act, once produced, compels the producer to retain it unceasingly. For by like reasoning a like act, produced in like manner in any rational creature whatever, would likewise compel that creature to retain it unceasingly; for the proportion is the same here and there. Again, as a weak rational creature, as far as its nature goes, can freely confirm itself or deform itself by its weak judgment of reason,[n4] and so merit and sin, so too can a more powerful rational creature by its more powerful judgment, because of the proportion between them. Again, suppose some excellent rational creature were immutably confirmed in good or in evil by natural necessity. Then so would any other, especially one of the same nature and grade of perfection of nature. For it is such per se, and per se necessarily carries with it universality of time and of individuals, as is clear from the twenty-sixth of the first. But who does not know that this would be false? One such creature can be blessed and another wretched, for this involves no contradiction, as everyone knows. Again, under whatever degree of perfection of nature, there can be a rational creature immutably confirmed in good or in evil; and there can equally be a similar creature that is mutable in the state of meriting. For this includes no contradiction. Indeed, under whatever degree of finite perfection of nature, there can be a rational creature that is mutable and able to merit,[n5] that is, fit for meriting. Otherwise the omnipotent hand of God would be most shamefully maimed and rendered far too powerless. Otherwise, too, there would be a fixed limit of perfection of nature, naturally bounded and meritable, which a rational creature could not pass, and beyond which almighty God could not create a creature of this kind. This agrees with no reason; for why up to this limit and not beyond? Let it also be admitted, as a possible supposition, that there is a rational creature, mutable and able to merit, above A, that given limit,[n6] and no contradiction will follow. So this is absolutely possible, according to what was established in the first of the first, and it could be shown also by many other ways. Let A, then, be taken as a rational creature, immutably confirmed in good or in evil according to the falsigraph,[n7] and immutable and unable to merit by nature; and let B be another creature of this kind, equal in natural endowments, but mutable and able to merit by what has been premised. B, therefore, is by its nature mutable in will and able to merit, and is so per se, because it is such through its nature and essence. But per se includes the universality of individuals and of time, as was shown in the twenty-sixth of the first. Every such individual, therefore, and always, as far as it and its nature go, is mutable in will and able to merit, well or ill. If it is firmed immutably and without power to merit in good or in evil, this is not sufficiently from itself, nor from its nature, but from another confirming cause, as the fifteenth and sixteenth of this book teach.

[528B]
COROLLARY.

Corollary: that no rational creature is, or can be, immutable, unturnable, or impeccable by nature.

[528B–528E]
From these things, I consider it manifest that no rational creature is, or can be, immutable, unable to merit, or impeccable by nature. This follows so evidently that it needs no proof. And Augustine says, in Against Maximinus 3, 13:[n8] "The nature of heavenly creatures could die, because it could sin; for the Angels too sinned and became demons, whose prince is the devil; and those who did not sin could have sinned. And whatever rational creature is granted that it cannot sin, this belongs not to its own nature but to God's grace. Therefore God alone is he who, not by anyone's grace but by his own nature, neither could, nor can, nor will be able to sin." Jerome too, in his Letter 13 to Pope Damasus on the prodigal son, 16, namely the next to last,[n9] says that from many testimonies of Scripture we are taught that God's justice alone is perfect, and further on it is said in the Psalms: "No one living shall be justified in your sight." It does not say "no man shall be justified," but "no one living"; that is, not the Evangelist, not the Apostle, not the Prophet; I ascend to greater things: not the Angel, not the Thrones, not the Dominations, not the Powers, nor the other virtues. God alone is he in whom sin does not fall. The rest, since they are of free choice, according to which man too was made in the image and likeness of God, can bend their will in either direction. This must be understood

as far as their bare nature goes. Anselm too, in Why God Became Man 2, 10, after showing that Christ as God and man cannot sin and yet is to be praised for his justice, asks as follows: "I think we should ask: since God could make such a man, why did he not make the Angels, and the first two men, such, so that likewise they could not sin, and would also be worthy of praise for their justice?" And in answering he adds: "Because it was not fitting, nor was it possible, that each of them should be the very same as God, as we say of that man."[n10] What was argued above about the addition of only a finite aid in the confirmation of good seems to speak only of the addition of a created aid. But no such aid suffices; what is necessarily required is an aid firm per se. That aid is therefore necessarily uncreated and infinite, namely the will of God, God himself, as the fifteenth of this book teaches. However much, moreover, the merely natural strength of a rational creature is naturally increased, just so much its freedom of contradiction and its mutability are increased along with it, as was argued above. Such an increase, therefore, in no way

confirms or immobilizes what has been increased.

NOTES

1. "The second and ninth of the first": Bradwardine's cross-references name a chapter and the book by ordinal. Here "primi" is Book 1; elsewhere "huius" is this book (Book 2). Kept as written (Conventions §5.4).
2. Savile prints "9. Metaph. 10." The doctrine is that of Aristotle, Metaphysics IX (Θ), where rational powers are powers of opposites and irrational powers are determined to one. Savile's second number is kept as printed and not tied to a modern division.
3. "Primum ac secundum istius" is literally "the first and second of this." I take it as the first and second chapters of this book, by analogy with "15. huius." The noun is not supplied in the Latin.
4. Print has confirmare … aut difformare. The contrast with difformare suggests conformare ("conform to"), but confirmare se ("confirm itself," in good) construes and is translated as it stands.
5. Meribilis ("able to merit") and its negative immeribilis are Bradwardine's own forms. They are rendered "able to merit" / "unable to merit." In "terminus … naturaliter limitatus et meribilis" below, I take meribilis as qualifying the limit in the same sense, literally "meritable."
6. The Latin has "supra A. terminum illum datum." A is the limit; in the next sentence A is also the creature taken to set that limit. The letter is used for both.
7. Falsigraphus is the "false writer," the one who writes up the false supposition: here, the opponent who holds that a rational creature can be immutably confirmed by nature. "According to the falsigraph" means in the opponent's false hypothesis.
8. Savile's reference is Augustine, Contra Maximinum "3, 13." That work has two books, so "3" cannot be the book number as printed. The reference is left as Savile gives it.
9. Savile's "Epistola 13 ad Damasum … de filio prodigo 16. scilicet penult." is given as printed; "16" and "the next to last" are not further specified. The Scripture is Ps 142 [143]:2, "No one living shall be justified in your sight." The words "and further on" (et infra) mark a gap in the quotation from Jerome.
10. The print has "sicut de homine isto decimus," an evident misprint for dicimus ("as we say of that man"), the reading of Anselm, Cur Deus homo II.10. Translated accordingly.