De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 15
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 518A–521A; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/15/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[518A]
CHAPTER XV. On everlasting perseverance, that is, on the confirmation of the blessed and its cause, which is the eternal charity, the will, of God.

[518B–518D]
Having dealt, then, with temporal perseverance on the way, it remains to inquire into everlasting perseverance in the homeland: that is, into the beatific confirmation of the blessed, and its cause. This perseverance, or confirmation, of the blessed makes them certain; the perseverance of the wretched by no means does. This makes its own unable to sin; that one by no means. This makes the blessed comprehensors[n1] unable to fall back from the beatific act, from the enjoyment of God; that one by no means makes the wretched wayfarers so. So the account of perfect beatitude requires. Many Philosophers and all Theologians equally bear witness to it, and Peter [Lombard] in Sentences 2, distinctions five and seven, recounts and explains it in some measure. For that reason I do not think I should linger longer in this place on demonstrating it, since I am hurrying on to other matters.

Concerning the cause of this, however, a manifold opinion is found. To some it seems to be grace, Augustine saying in the third [book] Against Maximinus, 13: "Whatever rational creature is granted that it cannot sin, this belongs not to its own nature but to God's grace." Isidore too, in 1 On the Highest Good 10: "The nature of the Angels is mutable, because mutability is in them in their nature, but everlasting charity makes them incorruptible: it is by grace, not by nature, that the Angels are immutable." Peter [Lombard] also plainly holds this, in Sentences 2, distinction 7. Yet this, in the form in which it is stated, seems open to objection. For if grace confirmed sufficiently without distinction, the grace of a wayfarer would confirm him, especially since it is of the same nature as the grace of the blessed. Likewise, in demons and obstinate men one need not posit any habit of this kind as the cause of their obstinacy; so, by like reasoning, neither in confirmed Angels or men. Wherefore it seems to some that not just any grace, nor any amount of it, but a great abundance of grace confirms the blessed. Hence Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace 40: "The devil and his angels, even if they were blessed before they fell, and did not know that they would fall into misery, yet still had something that could be added to their beatitude, if through free choice they had stood in the truth, until they should receive that fullness of the highest beatitude as the reward of that very abiding; that is, that a great abundance of God's charity having been given through the Holy Spirit, they could no longer fall at all, and would know this of themselves with the greatest certainty. This fullness of beatitude they did not have; but because they did not know their future misery, they enjoyed a lesser beatitude indeed, yet beatitude, without any flaw." And he goes on, 41: "So too he made man with free choice, and though ignorant of his[n2] future fall, yet blessed for this reason, that he felt it to be in his power both not to die and not to become wretched. In that state, upright and without flaw, if through that same free choice he had willed to remain, he would surely have received, without any experience of death or unhappiness, by the merit of this abiding, that fullness of beatitude by which the holy Angels too are blessed; that is, that he could not fall any further, and would know this most certainly." And in 4 Against Julian 11 he says that at the end, when we shall see the highest good, the evil of pride will not be able to tempt our mind, and there will be nothing at all against which we must struggle, since each one will be so satisfied with the charity of the higher good that he cannot fail by pleasing himself, [and fall away] from delight in that good, or love of it. Lombard also says, in Sentences 2, distinction 7, that the good Angels have been confirmed in such great grace that they cannot become evil. But even this does not seem most certain. For it was shown in 3 of this [book] that no secondary cause can necessitate free choice, and so neither can any charity or grace, however great. Likewise, a perfect wayfarer has, it seems, on the way as much charity or grace as one of the least of the blessed, say a little infant,

[519A–519C]
cleansed of original sin by baptism, circumcision, or some other means, has in the homeland, or even more; and this does not suffice to confirm. However it may be in fact, it seems that God can confer on a wayfarer a greater charity than such an infant has, and can confirm the infant, and some adult, without so great a gift of charity; which being posited, the difficulty is restored. Likewise, in the obstinate no abundance of this habit is to be posited as the cause of obstinacy in evil; so neither in those confirmed in good.

To some it seems that the contemplation of God is the cause of the confirmation of the blessed in good. For Isidore says, in 1 On the Highest Good 10: "In the good Angels the contemplation of the Creator offers support against the mutability of nature,[n3] and of this the apostate Angel was deprived; and while they are mutable by nature, yet divine contemplation does not allow them to be changed." And Augustine says, in On True Religion 33, that by the contemplation and vision of God Angels and men are blessed; and many similar things are often read in many authors. But this opinion will be argued against just as the preceding one. Moreover, the Angels before their confirmation contemplated and saw God; man also, according to Peter [Lombard], Sentences 4, distinction 1, saw God without a medium before sin, and after sin many holy Prophets contemplated and saw God, as very many places of Scripture clearly show. Likewise, if the vision of God confirms the good in good, what vision confirms the wicked in wickedness? And if it be said that the privation of the divine vision confirms them in wickedness, why then are not all sleeping wayfarers, and the like, who are deprived of the divine vision, confirmed in wickedness? Perhaps others will say that not just any vision of God confirms, but a clear and very intense one. This opinion, however, can be refuted as the one next after the second [was]. Alongside these, a fifth and sixth opinion could further be devised, which would say that delight in God, or a certain intense delight in God, is the cause of confirmation that we seek; but these two can be refuted like the two immediately preceding. Others hold, that adhesion to God, and a kind of gluing together with him, is the cause of the beatific confirmation of the blessed. For Augustine says, in 12 City of God 1: "The cause of the beatitude of the good Angels is to adhere to God." But this opinion seems open to refutation like the earlier ones. And if someone were to correct it, as some of the earlier ones [were corrected], by saying that great adhesion to God is the cause of confirmation that we seek, this opinion of his too will be corrected, as the similar preceding ones. Others judge that because the saints in heaven see no good that they lack, which they could wrongly desire, therefore they cannot sin, but are immovably confirmed in the good that they have. Hence Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 6, says of the good Angels that they were advanced by God so that they have obtained whatever they could will, and now see nothing more that they can will, and for this reason cannot sin. But this cannot stand. For confirmation is a positive effect; it has, therefore, some positive cause, and so a privative cause of it does not suffice. By this reasoning, moreover, a wayfarer having some small good, and seeing no greater or other (for in this way his eyes could be held), would be immovably confirmed. Nor does the argument from opposition ground it reasonably. For although one who wills or loves one good cannot sin by willing or loving another, he could nevertheless sin

[519D–519E]
by not willing or not loving that good, simply omitting it;[n5] or if he cannot desist from such an act, but of necessity always holds to it, what positive cause of confirmation is there in him? Likewise, if it were so, there would be some proportional cause obstinating the wicked in wickedness, which however does not seem able to be assigned reasonably. Others, following Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 22 and after, judge that the cause of the confirmation of the blessed [is perfect,][n6] is the one we seek, because they know that they would be eternally wretched if they sinned, and no one can will that; whence he knows that he will be eternally wretched. But God forbid! For on this account the blessed would avoid sins rather from fear of punishment than from love of justice, which is not fitting. Again, even if infernal misery had never been ordained for sinners, God could confirm the good in good eternally. Likewise, in that case one would have to assign a proportional cause in the obstinate, which however does not seem possible to assign. Others dream that the blessed, from the great vehemence of the beatitude and of the delight joined to it, become as it were drunk, and thus free choice is so bound in them that they cannot at all spring back from the beatific act, nor proceed to any other act, according to similar things premised in the third [part] of this [book]. Hence the Prophet too: "They will be inebriated with the abundance of your house, and from the torrent of your pleasure you will give them to drink," etc., Ps 35 [36]; and Song of Songs 5: "Eat, friends, and drink, and be inebriated, dearest ones." But no sober person supposes these things, nor does anyone dream so, unless perhaps he is drunk or mad. For who would be so foolish, or rather so mad, as to affirm that in beatitude, which according to the Philosophers as much as the Theologians is the ultimate perfection of man, the human soul with its powers will not be supremely perfect; or, when it is supremely perfect, cannot have the use of free choice and its perfect act? Hence the Apostle, 1 Cor 13: "Charity does not act perversely; charity never falls away. We know in part, and we prophesy in part; but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part will be emptied out. We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know

[520A–520C]
even as I am known." Others, still seeing that no one good by itself alone can be the sufficient cause of confirmation, hold that total beatitude, which is the collection and sum of all goods together, is the cause of confirmation that we seek. For that satisfies fully, since everything desirable is present there and everything to be shunned is far away; and it is the end of natural free choice, and any movable thing, once it has attained its natural end, comes to rest. Hence Boethius, 3 Consolation of Philosophy, prose 2: "Every care of mortals, which the labor of many various pursuits occupies, proceeds indeed by a different path, yet strives to reach one end, that of beatitude. That, however, is the good, once obtained, beyond which no one can desire anything further; which is indeed the highest of all goods, and contains all goods within itself; and if anything were lacking to it, it could not be the highest, since something would be left outside it that could be wished for. It is clear, therefore, that beatitude is a state made perfect by the gathering together of all goods." And Augustine says, Confessions 1, 1: "Lord, because you made us for yourself, our heart is restless until it rests in you." But this opinion, like the others, seems to err, especially if it speaks of total created beatitude. For no created thing, simple or manifold, can necessitate a rational and free will, as is clear from the third of this [book]. Moreover, a will willing one of two equal goods can not will that one and will the other; indeed it can even give up the willing of a greater good and freely will a lesser; it can also be free of love for any such good, as is clear from the second and third of this [book]. Likewise, total beatitude contains within itself confirmation as a splendid part of itself; so total beatitude is not primarily the cause of the confirmation we seek, since the same thing, namely confirmation itself, is not the cause of itself. Likewise, if it were so, there would also be some corresponding cause of the obstinacy of the wicked, which however it seems impossible to assign.

There are, besides these, many other possible opinions, which for the sake of brevity I think better committed to silence. To me, however, it seems that grace, abundance of grace, contemplation of God, and such things stated above are in a certain way a cause of confirmation in good; but none of these suffices [n7] by itself. The sufficient cause of confirmation is not, nor can it be, any inferior or secondary cause, but the supreme and first, namely God himself, the Holy Spirit, uncreated grace and charity, the eternal, insuperable and immutable will of God, as can be clearly drawn from the 13th of this [book], the 6th, and the 3rd from the 2nd, [and] of the first [book] the 9th and 10th, with the 23rd.[n8] That saying of Plato in Timaeus 2 seems especially to attest this, where he introduces God speaking thus to the Angels:[n9] "Gods, of whom I am the maker and father: you are my works, dissoluble by nature, yet by my will indissoluble, because my will is a greater bond, and more vigorous for the keeping of eternity, than those vital bonds from which your eternity was joined together and composed," as is more fully alleged in the first and second [chapters] of the first [book]. In agreement with this the Prophet says: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and by the breath of his mouth all their power," Psalm 32 [33]. And what are these heavens, more fittingly, than the heavenly rational creatures dwelling in the heavens? Treating which,

[520D–520E]
Augustine, together with that [clause] of the preceding verse, "The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord," writes thus in his tract 3: "'The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord': what of the heavens? Hear what of the heavens. For there is no need of mercy where there is no misery. On earth the misery of man abounds; the mercy of the Lord superabounds. The earth is full of man's misery, and the earth is full of the mercy of the Lord. As for the heavens, then, where there is no misery, is it because they do not need mercy that they do not need the Lord? All things need the Lord, wretched and happy alike: without him the wretched is not raised up, without him the happy lacks. So lest perhaps you should ask about the heavens, when you hear 'The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord,' hear that the heavens too need the Lord. By the word of the Lord the heavens have been made solid; they were not a foundation for themselves from themselves, nor did the heavens themselves provide a firmness of their own. 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and by the breath of his mouth all their power': they had nothing from themselves, and received as a supplement from the Lord; for by the breath of his mouth was not a part but all their power." This "word," moreover, can fittingly be understood as the word, or act, of the divine intellect, or of the divine will. For as Rabbi Moses says in the Guide of the Doubtful 63,[n11] a word

is threefold: namely, uttered by the tongue; a concept of the mind ("the fool said in his heart:"); and will ("Saul said that he should kill David"). The last two modes apply to the Creator. There too, treating that verse of the Psalm cited above, "By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm," etc., he says that just as "the breath of the mouth" and "mouth" are words adapted to him, so also "word" and "saying" are adapted to him; that is to say, they are found to coincide with his intention and will. This Moses also shows figuratively in the first origin of things, saying first that heaven was created, and afterwards that the firmament was made, and this through the saying or word of God: "God said," he says, "Let there be a firmament," etc., "and it was so." Wherefore Job 37 too, under the same metaphor, first recounts that the heavens were fabricated, and afterwards that they were made solid: "Perhaps you," he says, "with him have fabricated the heavens, which are most solid, as if cast in bronze." On which

[521A]
Gregory, Moralia 27, 25: "By the Heavens," he says, "can be designated those Angelic spirits who were created in the heavenly places, of whom it is well said that they are most solid, as if cast in bronze. For it is the nature of bronze to be consumed only with difficulty by rust; and the Angelic powers, who stood firm in divine love when the proud Angels fell, received this in the gift of recompense: that they should no longer be bitten by any rust of stealing guilt, that in the contemplation of their maker they should remain without[n12] end of happiness, and that in this, that they have been created, they should subsist in eternal stability. This the very words of the history of the world's origin well attest in Moses, when it is said both that heaven was made first, and that this same heaven is afterwards called firmament: namely because the Angelic nature was first created subtle in the heights above, and afterwards, [so that] they could never fall,[n13] was confirmed more wonderfully."

NOTES

1. Viator and comprehensor are the standard pair. The viator is still on the road (in via) to beatitude; the comprehensor has "grasped" the end (comprehendit; cf. 1 Cor 9:24, Phil 3:12) and is in the homeland (in patria). Here Bradwardine pairs "blessed comprehensors" with "wretched wayfarers", meaning those who persevere in evil, whose obstinacy is the subject of ch. 16. "Wayfarer" and "comprehensor" are used throughout.
2. The print reads si i futuri casus ignarum. The words of Augustine's text are sui futuri casus ignarum, and I translate so. The print also has the accusative ignarum agreeing with hominem.
3. The print reads Mutabilitatem naturae suffragatur, with the accusative. Suffragari normally takes the dative (mutabilitati). I construe it as "offers support against the mutability of nature", which is plainly the sense required by the rest of the sentence.
4. In the print the margin entry Opinio 8a stands beside "Et si quis eam correxerit" in 519C (the corrected form of opinion 7), not beside the Augustine citation at 519B. The keyed text has gathered it under 519B·3. Since no marker is assigned to it in 519C, it is kept here.
5. The first variant, aliud, is a word to be inserted after volendo. The second reads amando illud, sed simpliciter in place of amando illud simpliciter. The main text is construable and has been translated. Neither variant is adopted.
6. The bracketed [perfecta est,] (Savile's or a scribe's insertion) makes the clause hard to construe: "the cause … [is perfect,] is the one sought, because …". The evident sense is that the cause of confirmation that is being sought is the blessed's knowledge of the eternal misery that sin would bring. The words are kept in brackets and the sentence is translated around them.
7. The Latin margin carries two distinct entries here: the variant existimo (for aestimo, at 520B) and the label Opinio propria. In the print the label stands beside "Mihi autem videtur", where Bradwardine begins to give his own opinion. The keyed text has merged them under 520B·2. Both are given on the margin line.
8. The chain of cross-references (ex 13o. huius. 6o. et 3o. ex 2o. primi 9o. et 10o. cum 23o.) is ambiguous. I have translated it literally and without expansion, as the conventions require, since the intended chapters and parts cannot be fixed with certainty.
9. The speech is from Plato's Timaeus 41a–b, in Calcidius's Latin version. Plato's created "gods" are taken here to be Angels. Vegetatior means "more vigorous".
10. The margin numbering jumps from Opinio 10a (the "drunkenness" opinion, 519D) to 12a (total beatitude, 520A). No 11a appears in the margins. The fear-of-punishment opinion at 519D, which follows Anselm, has no label, and the missing number probably belongs to it.
11. "Rabbi Moses" is Maimonides, whose Dux dubiorum (Guide of the Perplexed) was known in Latin. The discussion of "speech" and the divine will corresponds to Guide I.65. Savile's number "63" is kept as printed.
12. The print reads siue felicitatis fine ("or at the end of felicity"), which cannot be construed. The marginal variant sine gives "without end of felicity", and this is the sense the context demands (remaining in contemplation without an end to happiness). The variant is adopted on that ground.
13. The print reads et post nunquam potuissent cadere, mirabilius confirmata, with no conjunction to govern the pluperfect subjunctive. I translate the evident sense ("[so that] they could never fall"). The keyed text's post ne nunquam is not in the print.