De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 12
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 507B–509C; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/12/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[507B]
CHAPTER XII. He raises objections and replies.

[507C–508A]
By means of the corollary just set out, the reply is plain to some objections that could be raised against what has been said. For suppose that, as was said, perseverance did not differ in reality from charity. Since perseverance itself would then be the same in reality as charity, everyone who has charity would also have perseverance. That is false, because many who have charity are going to sin mortally and fall, as happened with Saul and Judas and very many others.

Moreover, as many Doctors testify, and as could undoubtedly have been the case, suppose that all the angels received charity, or grace, and held it for some time. Let A be the common instant of the reception of grace, for all, as it seems, received grace equally, just as they received essence. Let C be the instant of the confirmation of the good, and P the instant of the sin of the evil. Now it is certain, according to all the Doctors, that the time AP is the same as the time AC, or a part of it [n1]. For it is agreed that after the confirmation of the good none of the evil began to sin in heaven. Since the good had perseverance through the whole time AC, because they had charity, or grace, continuously remaining, they also had perseverance through the whole time AP. Therefore the evil had it likewise, which is false. Or, if the evil never had perseverance, neither did the good. For why would God, most just, make so great a distinction between them, before any demerit or sin, as to give the gift of perseverance to these and deny it to those?

It is for this very reason that Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 11, 24, and City of God 11, 11 and 13, Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 24, and Peter, Sentences 2, dist. 4, seem to deny this distinction with regard to the angels' foreknowledge [n2]. That is, they deny that the good had foreknowledge of their future beatitude and the evil lacked foreknowledge of their fall. Yet this seems far more worth weighing with regard to perseverance, without which there is no salvation.

Again, suppose perseverance is the same in reality as charity. Since charity is greater and lesser in different persons, it will consequently be the same with perseverance. Peter, then, was more certain to persevere than Linus, and so was more certain not to lose his charity, or more certain to keep it. That need not be so, since one can keep his lesser good from falling away from it just as much as another can keep his greater.

Again, perseverance adds to charity a relation of continuation through the whole time up to the end. If the quantity of that relation in some way follows the quantity of its foundation, namely charity, it follows that the relation is greater in a greater charity, and therefore that perseverance is greater too. For that relation is, as it were, the formal element in perseverance, and charity the material. It also follows that, since the time to the end is greater and lesser, and the end more remote and nearer, the relation arising from them is greater and lesser, and therefore perseverance is so consequently.

Indeed, arguing the other way round: the relation cannot be increased or diminished, and it is the form of perseverance itself. It follows that perseverance itself cannot be increased or diminished. And since perseverance is a created gift of God, it follows that God, by his infinite omnipotence, cannot in any way increase or diminish a created and finite gift of his.

Again, suppose perseverance is the same in reality as charity and adds a relation of continuity to the end. Then no one who has, and has continuously had, charity could reasonably ask the Lord for perseverance. For no one can reasonably ask of the Lord anything but what he can receive from the Lord, and such a man cannot receive perseverance. For suppose he could, and say that he now receives perseverance. Then he now receives charity with such a relation, or at least such a relation. But he does not receive that charity, because he had it before. Nor does he receive that relation to the end, because if he is now going to persevere finally, so was he before, as long as he continuously had charity. Or otherwise, in this way:

[508B–509A]
This man receives perseverance; therefore he is going to persevere to the end; therefore it was so before, as long as he had charity; therefore he previously had perseverance continuously; therefore he does not receive it now.

Again, let someone be in charity, about to sin mortally, and finally about to return to life [n3], and about to receive the same charity in number and finally to keep it. Then he will not persevere, because he will sin mortally, and yet he has perseverance; for tomorrow, after penance, he will have perseverance. Suppose that now too he has the same charity in number as he will then have, and the same relation to the end in number. Then he now also has the same relation in number, and therefore the same perseverance in number.

Again, this man, in this charity which he now has, is going to persevere to the end, because tomorrow he is so going to persevere; therefore he now has perseverance. Again, if this man does not have perseverance, he will not persevere and is not going to persevere. Yet tomorrow he will persevere and will be going to persevere. Therefore this man will begin to be going to persevere, and a proposition about the future, now false, will begin to be true, namely this one: "This man will persevere finally."

Again, if so, perseverance once had could not be lost, as the preceding chapter showed. Yet that charity of a wayfarer can be lost, and consequently the relation founded on it. It also follows that God has given someone some created gift which he himself can in no way take away or destroy. Indeed, it follows that man is more powerful in retaining that gift than God is in taking it away.

Again, if perseverance were a gift of God of this kind, he would at some time give it to one who is persevering. Then it would be given either in an instant or in time. If in some instant, then the one to whom it is given is at that moment receiving and having perseverance, and persevering. Therefore he persevered before, therefore he previously had perseverance continuously, therefore he does not receive it now. For to persevere implies a kind of succession, like moving, in which one part precedes and another follows; for it implies continuation in the good. Otherwise, too, someone could persevere finally for a mere instant, namely if immediately after the instant of receiving final perseverance he were removed from the scene by divine power. That is not true, because there would be neither beginning nor end, but the whole all together and indivisibly.

But if it is given in time, this would hold first of some whole period, as the Philosopher says in Physics 6, 44 [n4], where he defines it thus: "I call 'first,'" he says, "that which is not such through some other part of it being such." And I argue as the Philosopher argues there. Let the first time in which God gives perseverance be AC, and let B be its middle instant. Then in B this man has perseverance. Therefore it is either given to him in B, or was being given in AB. Whichever is granted, it is not then given in BC, and so not in the whole of AC as first.

Again, such a man is changed from not persevering to persevering. Therefore, according to the Philosopher in the place cited above, 44, when something has been changed it is first in that into which it has been changed. From 40 up to 44 he demonstrates that this holds universally in every change. In that 44 he demonstrates that everything into which something has first been changed must necessarily be an atom, that is, indivisible. The same Philosopher shows in Physics 8, 69, that in every change from one affection or disposition to its opposite there is one sign. This is one "now," common to the prior and the posterior, one and the same in number, the end of the former and the beginning of the latter, and it always belongs to the posterior affection. For example, if D is not white during the whole time AB, and white during the whole time BC, it will be white in B, the "now," or instant. So if someone is not persevering during the whole time AB and persevering during the whole time BC, he will necessarily be persevering in the instant B.

Anselm also says in On Truth 12 that justice, as soon as it is given, is kept by the will, and that therefore one then perseveres in it.

Again, if perseverance were a gift of God of this kind, it would be given to men either in the present life or after it. Not after, clearly, speaking of the final perseverance of a wayfarer; nor before [n5], because suppose that then Peter, a wayfarer, has it, and long before had perseverance. Then it is true that Peter has had perseverance; therefore it is necessary that he has had perseverance. For according to the Philosopher, Peri hermeneias 1, every truth about the past is necessary. And if it is necessary that Peter has had perseverance, then, since it follows from this that he will persevere finally, and from the necessary only the necessary follows, as the book of the Prior Analytics shows, it is necessary that Peter will persevere finally. Yet he is a wayfarer able to sin mortally, and so to lose charity.

Again, then, one who has charity, and has long had it, but is going to fall from it, does not now have perseverance and never had it. Yet he can have it for the present. Indeed, he can now have had it before, continuously. For he can fail to fall, and persevere finally, and from this it follows that he now perseveres and has persevered earlier through the whole time in which he had charity. And whatever follows from the possible is possible, as no logician or theologian doubts. Therefore one who now does not have perseverance, and never had it, can have it for the present and have had it before, continuously. Therefore there would be contingency in propositions about the past and the present, as in those about the future. That is contrary to the Philosopher, Peri hermeneias 1, last chapter, and contrary to Boethius

[509B–509C]
in his commentary there. And in On the Heavens 1, penultimate chapter, he says [n6]: "For there is no single power of that which is 'to have been done,' but of that which is 'to be' or 'to be going to be.'" Averroes the Commentator says this quite plainly there too.

The Lombard also says, in Sentences 2, dist. 25, that free choice is not referred to the present or the past, but to the future. Therefore neither is God's free choice. God, therefore, cannot now give perseverance. Nor can he now have given perseverance to one who does not have it, or to one who never had it. Hence neither can such a man now have it, or have had it before, continuously.

Again, Augustine says in On the Good of Perseverance 7 [n7]: "Let men not say that perseverance to the end has been given to anyone, except when the end itself has come, and the one to whom it was given has been found to have persevered to the end." And he says almost the same thing in the first chapter. But another passage resolves this and opens his mind. For he says: "Therefore whether anyone has received this gift is uncertain, as long as he leads this life. For if he falls before he dies, it is said most truly that he did not persevere. How, then, is a man who has not persevered to be said to have received or had perseverance?" He means, therefore, that of no one, as long as he leads this life, is it determined and certain that he has received final perseverance. He does not mean that no one has received it. Indeed he very frequently shows the opposite, as the preceding chapters recited.

The other objections, however, will easily be rejected by virtue of the corollary shown above, with common logic coming to our aid.

NOTES

1. A, C and P are instants. A is the common instant of the angels' reception of grace, C the instant of the good angels' confirmation, and P the instant of the evil angels' sin. The Latin says that the time AP "is the same as the time AC, or a part of it." The sense needed for the argument is that the evil angels' sin falls within, or at the end of, the span of grace that the good also shared. I translate as printed.
2. Savile's citations are compressed. They are to be read as Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11, ch. 24; De civitate Dei 11, chs. 11 and 13; Anselm, De casu diaboli ch. 24; and Peter Lombard, Sentences 2, dist. 4. The margin gives only the three names.
3. reuicturus. I take this as the future participle of revivere, "about to come back to life," meaning about to return to the life of grace after his mortal sin. The sense is confirmed by "after penance" a few lines later.
4. The numbers (Phys. 6, 44; 6, 40–44; 8, 69) are the textus numbers of the medieval Latin Aristotle with Averroes' commentary, not chapter numbers. The first passage is the discussion of the "first time of change" in Physics VI.5 (236a); the second is the passage on the "now" as the common limit of two states in Physics VIII.8. Under convention 5.4 they are left as Savile has them.
5. nec ante: "nor before" means not earlier in the present life, as opposed to "after it," that is, after death. The argument then runs on the supposition that Peter, a wayfarer, is now receiving the gift while having long had perseverance already.
6. The Aristotelian sentence is cited in Savile's Latin translation and is obscure. Una is rendered "single" (vna virtus), and factum esse is rendered as "to have been done." The point is that power concerns what is or will be, not what has already come to be.
7. The work is now titled De dono perseverantiae. Savile's chapter numbers follow the older division of the text.