De causa Dei: Book II, Chapter 10
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 499B–505B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/10/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

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CHAPTER 10. He raises an objection and replies.

Here perhaps someone will object to what has been said. For Lombard, in Sentences 2, dist. 24, after citing certain of the aforesaid authorities, which assert that God's help is necessary to man or Angel before the fall for remaining in the good they had then received, speaks as follows: Here it must be considered what that help was which was given to man in creation, by which he could remain if he wished. And he answers: It was surely the freedom of choice, immune from every stain and corruption, and the uprightness of the will, and the soundness and vigor of all the natural powers of the soul. To this bears what Augustine says in On Rebuke and Grace, 48: He had given help without which he could not remain if he wished; but that he should wish he left to his free choice; so he could remain if he wished. And in chapter 57: that the first man should not receive this gift of God, that is, perseverance in the good, but that persevering or not persevering should be left to his choice, his will had such powers, having been established without any sin, and nothing in it resisted it of itself through desire, that the choice of persevering could fittingly be entrusted to it, in keeping with so great a goodness and with the happiness of living well. The same in On the Good of Perseverance, 10: Not to depart from God, and not to be led into temptation, is not at all within the powers of free choice such as they now are; but it was in man before he fell. How much this freedom of the will availed in the excellence of that first condition appeared in the Angels, who, when the Devil fell with his followers, stood in the truth. And the same in the Hypognosticon [n1] 28: So that you may understand free choice to have been made with the good of possibility, by which Adam could fulfill what he wished, hear what Holy Scripture says in the book of Ecclesiasticus: God, it says, made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his counsel, etc. What does it mean, however, that he left him in the hand of his counsel, if not that he dismissed him in the possibility of his free choice? For by "hand" possibility is understood. This is the first grace, by which the first man could have stood, if he had wished to keep the commands of the Lord.

But without doubt I am no little amazed that a good master, a Catholic Doctor, a foremost follower of Augustine, has despised Augustine's true teaching and has deceitfully slipped back, in this matter, into Pelagian fallacies. For as the 39th of the first has unfolded, the Pelagians said that the grace which is necessary to man for fulfilling the divine commands is man's natural endowments, and that the free choice of the will is given to man freely by God. How, then, does he assert that that divine help, necessarily required for man and Angel before the fall in order to stand in the good, is their natural endowments and the free choice of the will? He will perhaps say that to stand in the good is not the same as to fulfill the divine commands; so that although the free choice of the will was then sufficient help for man or Angel to stand in the good, it was not sufficient for fulfilling the divine commands, as Pelagius posited.

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But if free choice then sufficed for man to stand in the good, then it also sufficed for not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, since it was by eating from it that he fell. Therefore it was also sufficient for man to fulfill the divine command about not eating from the aforesaid tree, which was the only thing commanded him, as is plain from Gen. 2. So the aforesaid error of the Pelagian returns once more, namely that man can keep God's commands by free choice alone. And if he should still reply that the case of man before the fall differs from his case after the fall (for after the fall man cannot keep God's commands by free choice without grace, as Pelagius lied, but before the fall he could), I argue in reply: if man by free choice alone, without grace, could then keep God's commands, then he could also merit. For there seems to be no other reason why God commanded him not to eat from that tree, which would in no way have been evil if it had not been forbidden, except that he might have something in which he could merit. For who would dare to say that God commanded man something useful to God, or useless to man, and that it would then have been of no use to man to obey the divine orders?

Hence Augustine, in book 8 On Genesis Literally, 21, inquiring into the cause of that divine command, sets out a threefold prohibition. For sometimes something evil in itself is forbidden, such as tasting a deadly herb, which, whether it is forbidden or not, is always an evil for the one who does it, and so it is forbidden lest the one forbidden incur harm. Sometimes, however, something is forbidden which, if it is done, is a harm to the one forbidding, as if a rich man were to forbid someone to touch his money; and so it is forbidden lest the forbidder incur harm. And sometimes something is forbidden which is no harm to the one forbidding nor to the one to whom it is forbidden, except because it is forbidden, and so it is forbidden not that the forbidder or the forbidden may avoid harm, but only that the forbidden may gain a good, a good, I mean, of merit, namely by obeying the one who forbids. And this prohibitory command of God is included under the third member. Augustine says among other things: From that tree, which was not an evil, he was forbidden, so that the keeping of the precept would in itself be a good for him, and the transgression an evil. And further on in the same: But when that is touched which would not harm the one touching if it were not forbidden, nor, by being touched, [n2] would harm anyone else in any way, why was it forbidden, unless so that the good of obedience in itself, and the evil of disobedience in itself, might be shown? And still further on in the same: The Lord indeed may see to why he commanded; what he commanded must be done by the servant, and then perhaps it is for the one who has earned it to see why he commanded; for the one who has earned it, he says; and he adds: But yet, so that we need not seek the cause of this command any longer, if this very thing is a great benefit to man, that he serves God, then by commanding, God makes useful whatever he chooses to command. And this authority is cited in the Gloss on Gen. 2 and in Lombard's Sentences 2, dist. 17.

Again, if man had persisted in the good, he would have merited by this confirmation and everlasting blessedness, and this he could do by free choice without grace; therefore he could do the former also. That he would have merited confirmation and blessedness by standing is evident enough, since the Angels merited in this way, as Augustine says in On Rebuke and Grace, [89] 39 [n3]: The good Angels stood in the truth by that same free choice, and merited to know with the greatest certainty that their fall would never happen. And in chapter 40: The Devil and his Angels, although they were blessed before they fell, still had something yet to be added to their blessedness, if they had stood in the truth by free choice, until they should receive the fullness of that highest blessedness as the reward of that very abiding. And in 41: He made man with free choice, and although ignorant of his future fall, yet good, because he sensed that both to die and not to become wretched were in his own power [n4]. In which upright state, free from fault, if by that same free choice he had wished to remain, then without any experience of death and unhappiness he would surely have received that fullness of blessedness, by the merit of this abiding, by which the holy Angels too are blessed, that is, so that he could fall no further, and would know this most certainly. And in 48: God had then given man a good will; for he who had made him upright had made him in it. He had given help without which he could not remain in it if he wished; but because he did not wish to remain, the fault is surely his, whose merit it would have been if he had wished to remain, just as the holy Angels did, who, when others fell by free choice, stood by that same free choice, and deserved to receive the due reward of this abiding: so great a fullness of blessedness that it is most certain to them that they will always remain in it. And in On the Good of Perseverance 10: The Angels who, when the Devil fell with his followers, stood in the truth, deserved to attain the perpetual security of not falling.

Blessed Gregory also, in Moralia 27.25, on that text of Job 37, With him perhaps you made the heavens, which are most solid, as if cast of bronze, says: By the heavens can be signified those angelic spirits who were established in the heavenly realms, of whom it is well said, who are most solid, as if cast of bronze. For it is the nature of bronze to be consumed only with difficulty by rust; and the angelic powers, which stood fixed in divine love when the proud Angels fell, received this in the gift of recompense: that they are no longer gnawed by any rust of stealthy sin, that they remain in the contemplation of the Creator without end to their happiness [n5], and that in this, in which they were created, they subsist in eternal stability.

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From these authorities it appears incidentally that, besides the aforesaid error of Lombard, there is another, and this twofold. The first says that before their very confirmation the Angels did not merit at all; this is set down in his Sentences 2, dist. 5. I could refute it by many other authorities of many saints, were I not thereby forced to turn aside from the purpose I began. For at present I was proposing only to show that man, if he had remained in the good and, by keeping God's command, had resisted the tempter, would have merited something thereby, just as the holy Angels likewise merited; and this I reckon I have shown even by the authorities set out above. Hence the second error of Lombard is clear, which he sets down in Sentences 2, dist. 24. To use his own words: to withdraw from evil, and not to consent to temptation, would not have been a merit for him, namely for Adam before the fall, even if he had not consented, because there was nothing in him that would drive him to evil; just as for the Angels who did not fall it was no merit that they stood, that is, that they did not fall. But for us it is sometimes a merit if we do not do evil but resist, only there, however, where there is a cause which moves us to do it, because from the corruption of sin our steps are prone to falling; but where no cause intervenes driving us to evil, we do not merit if we turn away from it. And yet Augustine says in City of God 14, the penultimate chapter, as the preceding chapter cited, that the first man was so constituted that, if he trusted in the help of God, the good man would conquer the evil Angel, having a good merit in a right will divinely helped. Anselm also, in On the Fall of the Devil 14, inquiring how the good Angel merited his blessedness, speaks thus: The Angel neither can nor ought to be blessed unless he wills it, and unless he wills it justly; it is necessary that God so make both wills agree in him that he wills both to be blessed and to will justly, so that the added justice may temper the will for blessedness in such a way as to cut off the excess of the will, and yet not remove the power of exceeding; so that, since for the very reason that he will wish to be blessed he could exceed the measure, by the fact that he will wish justly and will not wish to exceed, and so having a just will for blessedness, he may be able to be, and ought to be, blessed, who by not willing what he ought not to will, though he could, deserves that he can never will what he ought not to will.

Blessed Gregory also, in Moralia 34.6, on that text of Job 41, When he is taken away, that is, Leviathan, the Angels will fear, and being terrified will be purified, says that past things are described under the manner of future time, and adds: Nor do we depart from the sense of right understanding if we believe that when Leviathan fell from the height of blessedness, the elect angels too were struck with fear at his ruin, so that when the fall of pride cast him out from their number, that fear itself might make them firmer for standing. Hence it is added also, and being terrified will be purified. For they were purified, because when he went out with the reprobate legions, only those remained in the heavenly seats who would live blessedly forever. The fall of this one, then, both terrified them and purified them: it terrified them lest they proudly despise their Creator by seeking his likeness; it purified them because, when the reprobate went out, it came about that the elect alone remained; and because God, the maker of all, knows how to use even an evil deed well for the keeping of the good, he turned the fall of the reprobate who fell into the advance of those who remained, and whence the fault of the proud was punished, among the humble Angels increases of merits were both found and made firm. For when the former fell, to the latter it was given as a reward that they cannot fall at all.

Therefore, according to Anselm and Gregory, the confirmed Angels merited their confirmation through conduct of this kind: that they did not will what they ought not, and by this: that when the fall of pride cast Leviathan out, these stood the more firmly and solidly from fear; and by this: that being terrified they by no means proudly despised their Creator along with the others. Therefore, according to both, they merited their blessedness by not consenting when tempted. For as Eve was tempted by the ancient serpent, so the good Angels were tempted by that Leviathan; of whom one explanation is given of that text of Apoc. 12: There was a great battle in heaven; Michael and his Angels fought with the Dragon, that is, by resisting; and the Dragon fought, and his Angels, that is, by tempting; and they did not prevail, nor was their place found any more in heaven; and that great Dragon was cast out, the ancient serpent, who is called the Devil and Satan, who seduces the whole world, was cast out to the earth, and his Angels were sent with him. Hence, if Lombard's argument is sifted by more careful scrutiny, it will be seen to be very weak. For although in man before the fall, and in the Angels already blessed, there was nothing that would drive them to evil, there was nevertheless outside them a most powerful tempter, who drove them to sin as far as he could; and perhaps he then drove them to evil only as far as some small temptation drives man now: for there is no power upon earth that can be compared to him, Job 41. And how, according to the Catholic expositors, is the sin of the Angel irremediable because he sinned tempted from himself and not from elsewhere, while the sin of man is remediable because he sinned tempted not wholly from himself but from elsewhere, [n6] unless that temptation had driven man somewhat to sin? Otherwise in no respect would he seem more excusable, because he sinned when tempted, than if he had sinned untempted. And how was the woman in no way driven to eat from the forbidden tree, when Scripture says, Gen. 3: The woman saw, then, that the tree was good for eating and fair to the eyes and delightful to behold, and she took of its fruit, and ate:

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Did not that goodness, beauty, and delightfulness, appearing to her, in some way drive and draw her to eat, as Virgil says in the Bucolics, "each is drawn by his own pleasure"? The Philosopher, too, bears witness to this sufficiently in On the Soul 3, at the end of the chapter on the mover, and in the Ethics almost throughout. And blessed Gregory says in Moralia 21.2, on that text of Job 31, I made a covenant with my eyes, that I would not so much as think upon a virgin: Nor would Eve have touched the tree of life, had she not first looked at it incautiously; for it is written, the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, etc. Let this, then, be weighed: with how much restraint we ought to hold back our sight from forbidden things, we who live as mortals, if even the mother of the living came to death through her eyes. Hence the Prophet says, My eye has plundered my soul: for by desiring visible things she lost invisible virtues; she who lost the inner fruit through outward sight, through the eye of the body bore the plunder of the heart. And the Gloss on Genesis cites this, where earlier. And how did the evil Angel seek the likeness of God, if this had not first appeared good to him, since by philosophers as by theologians nothing else is desired [n7]? And how, consequently, had he not been in any way allured or driven toward the desire of it by such an appearance? And Augustine says, Enchiridion 87: That immortality in which man could not die, human nature lost through free choice; this immortality, in which he cannot die, it is to receive through grace, which, had it not sinned, it was to receive through merit, though not without grace [n8]; nor could there have been any merit even then, because, although sin was situated in free choice alone, free choice was nevertheless not sufficient for retaining justice, unless divine help were furnished by participation in the unchangeable good. Lombard cites this authority in Sentences 4 [n9], dist. 29, and adds: See, by these words he shows sufficiently that before sin man needed operating and cooperating grace. For he had not that by which he could move his foot without the help of operating and cooperating grace; yet he had that by which he could stand.

Hence it is plain that Lombard's exposition, recited at the beginning of the chapter, of the authorities of Augustine saying that divine help was necessary to man before the fall for standing in the good, asserting that this is his free choice, is not truthful: for it does not truthfully express the mind of the Author, but is contrary to his mind, nor does it faithfully recite his words, from which his mind itself could faithfully be established. For when he recited that passage of Enchiridion 87, So man first had to be made that he could will both well and ill; and not unrewarded or in vain if well, nor with impunity if ill, why did he pass over in silence what is set down next in the same chapter, and had been recited just above, namely: although sin was situated in free choice alone, free choice was nevertheless not sufficient for retaining justice, unless divine help were furnished by participation in the unchangeable good? How, then, can that divine help, through which free choice would have sufficed for retaining justice, and without which free choice does not suffice, be called free choice? For if so, nothing else would be said than that free choice would by itself have sufficed for retaining justice, and without itself would by no means have sufficed. Of these Augustine expressly denies the first, and of the second no layman could be in any doubt. Why, then, after this passage recited by him in Sentences 2, dist. 29, did he add that man before sin, without the help of operating and cooperating grace, had that by which he could stand, when the authority says that free choice did not then sufficiently suffice thus for retaining justice? Then neither did it suffice thus for standing in it. Why also in dist. 24 did he suppress what Augustine adds immediately in the same chapter? For as dying is in man's power when he wishes (for there is no one who cannot kill himself, to say nothing else, even by not eating), so, for holding on to life, the will is not enough if helps, whether of food or of any protections, are lacking; thus man in Paradise was fit, by his will, to kill himself by abandoning justice; but that the life of justice might be held by him, it was little to will, unless he who had made him helped him. Unless perhaps because by this it is expressly signified that, for holding the justice which man had in Paradise, his own free choice of the will did not suffice without another help of God.

Why also, I ask, when he was reciting in the same distinction the authorities of Augustine from On Rebuke and Grace, chapters 49 and 48, recited more fully in this chapter just above, why, I say, did he pass over in silence other sayings of Augustine in the same place, which destroy his aforesaid exposition, or rather by which it is destroyed? For in chapter 47 he says thus: This grace man had not had, by which he would never wish to be evil; but he certainly had that in which, if he wished to remain, he would never be evil, and without which, even with free choice, he could not be good, but which he could nevertheless abandon through free choice. The same in the same place, chapter 48: God had then given man a good will; for he who had made him upright had made him in it. He had given help without which he could not remain in it if he wished; where he always distinguishes between this grace, or this help, and the free choice of the will.

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The same in the same place, chapter 49: But if this help had been lacking to the Angel or to man when they were first made, since nature was not made so that it could remain without divine help if it wished, it would not have fallen by its own fault: for the help would have been lacking without which it could not remain. But if this help is the free choice of the will, how could it have been lacking to the Angel or to man? Certainly it could have been lacking to him no otherwise than his own nature could be lacking to him while he exists. He understands, then, of another help, by which free choice would be helped; hence he adds: But now, namely for the state of man after sin, those to whom such help is lacking, it is already the punishment of sin; but those to whom it is given, it is given according to grace, not according to what is owed. The same in the same place, chapter 52: To the first man, certainly, who in that good in which he was made upright had received the ability not to sin, the ability not to die, the ability not to abandon that good itself, there was given the help of perseverance, not that by which it would come about that he should persevere, but without which he could not persevere by free choice. And in chapter 60: So it has come about that the will of man, weak and feeble, that is, after sin, perseveres in a good still small through the power of God, while the will of the first man, strong and sound, did not persevere in a greater good, though it had the power of free choice and the help of God was not going to fail it [n10], without which it could not persevere if it wished. From these, as I think, it appears sufficiently to those who read, and do not neglect, the letters of Augustine cited by Lombard in the aforesaid places, that Augustine himself, in those same places, wishes free choice, and that help of God necessarily required for man or Angel for persevering in the good, always to be distinguished really and to differ. The authorities of the same from On Nature and Grace and from City of God, cited in the preceding chapter, show the same. And if I have spoken anything too sharply, and with less reverence than would become one speaking against my lord Master Peter Lombard, indeed even against the Lord's anointed, Bishop of Paris, [n11] let the zeal for the House of God and for Catholic truth, which fires me fiercely against the inventions of the Pelagians, excuse me, I beg. For I have said nothing against him but against his error, because it is very closely akin to the error of Pelagius. For granted that Angel or man before sin could persevere, by free choice alone, in the good which he had, it would easily follow that man after sin, repaired by grace, could persevere in it to the end by the free choice of the will alone; as the preceding chapter set out more fully, which is against chapter seven already set before.

As to that saying of Augustine in On Rebuke and Grace 48, which seems to tell for this side (He had given, he says, help without which he could not remain, if he wished; but that he should wish he left to his free choice; so he could remain if he wished), it must be said that this does not prove that that help is free choice, but rather seems to suggest the contrary, namely that it is distinct from free choice, as was shown above. He could, he says, remain if he wished; the cause of which he adds immediately, since, in saying that help was not lacking by which he could hold the good with perseverance, if he wished, he means that that help was not free choice itself, but something set over against it, by which, if he wished to rely on it, he could persevere, and which if he abandoned he could not persevere. For this, above, in chapter 47 of the same, it is said more expressly in this way: This grace the first man had, in which, if he wished to remain, he would never be evil, and without which, even with free choice, he could not be good, but which he could abandon through free choice; for free choice suffices for evil, but for good it is little unless it is helped by almighty God who is good. If that man had not abandoned this help through free choice, he would always be good; but he abandoned it, and was abandoned; for such was the help that he could abandon it when he wished, and remain in it if he wished. That other saying of his, chapter 57, is clear from the same: for it does not follow, though persevering and not persevering were left to man's choice, that God's help, without which he could not persevere if he wished, is his free choice; rather, that he could have persevered if he had wished, though not by the powers of free choice alone, but by that divine help so often mentioned, which would have helped him to persevere to the end, had he not first culpably thrust it away [n12], as was said just above. And when he says in On the Good of Perseverance 10: Not to depart from God, and not to be led into temptation, is not within the powers of free choice such as they now are, but was in man before he fell; he understands that, with equal help and other things equal, this is less within the powers of free choice now, and harder, than it was then; so that then he needed not no help at all, but a lesser help than he now needs. The reason for this is that then, according to Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace 57, so that persevering or not persevering was left to man's choice, his will had such powers, having been established without any sin, and nothing in it of itself resisted it through desire, that the choice of persevering could fittingly be entrusted to it, in keeping with so great a goodness and with the happiness of living well. But now, since that great freedom has been lost by the merit of sin, a weakness remains that must be helped even by greater gifts: Now, he says, a weakness remains that must be helped by greater gifts, namely the weakness of freedom of choice; therefore at that time at least freedom had to be helped by lesser ones;

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and above, in the 54th of the same, he says: A greater freedom is needed against so many and such great temptations, which did not exist in Paradise, fortified and perfected with the gift of perseverance, so that with all its loves, terrors, and errors this world may be conquered. And 55 follows: The martyrdoms of the Saints have taught this. Then that Adam, namely, with no one terrifying him, and moreover against the command of the threatening God, using free choice, did not stand in so great a happiness, in so great an ease of not sinning. But these, I do not say with the world terrifying them, but raging so that they should not stand, stood in faith. Whence this, if not by the gift of him from whom they obtained mercy to be faithful, from whom they received the spirit not of fear, by which they would yield to persecutions, but of power, and of charity, and of self-control, by which they would overcome everything threatening, everything enticing, everything torturing? This, then, is one understanding of Augustine in his authority set out above. Another understanding of him is this: that man in the state of this misery needs divine help in more ways for persevering in the good than the first man needed in the state of innocence. For in this twofold state he needs God's help, in one way to be freed from the servitude of sin, in another to be preserved in the freedom of the good. The first the first man did not need for the first state, but the second he did, as is plain partly from what has gone before, partly from other things. For this Augustine too says in On Rebuke and Grace 49: But now those to whom such help is lacking, it is the punishment of sin; but those to whom it is given, it is given according to grace, not according to what is owed; and so much the more abundantly is it given through Jesus Christ our Lord to those to whom it pleased God to give it, that not only is that present without which we cannot remain even if we wish, but it is so great and of such a kind that we wish. For there is made in us, through this grace of God, in receiving the good and holding it perseveringly, not only that we can do what we wish, but even that we wish what we can, which was not in the first man; for one of these was in him, the other not. For to receive the good he did not need grace, because he had not yet lost it; but to remain in it he needed help, without which he could not do so at all. And the same, in the same Enchiridion 87, says thus: Man in Paradise was fit, by his will, to kill himself by abandoning justice; but that the life of justice might be held by him, it was little to will, unless he who had made him helped him; but after that ruin God's mercy is greater, since the will itself must be freed from the servitude over which sin rules together with death.

But that authority of the Hypognosticon cited to the contrary, which says that the free choice of Adam was made with the good of possibility, by which he could fulfill what he wished, and that this was the first grace, by which he could have stood, if he had wished to keep the commands of the Lord, does not prove that that good of possibility, and that first grace, or that divine help so often mentioned, is free choice, but rather seems to prove the contrary. For when he says that free choice was created with that good, and does not mean to say that it was created with itself, he seems to distinguish between them, suggesting that free choice was not created from the beginning wholly bare, but resplendent and clothed with so great a grace that what he wished,

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...could have fulfilled it, that is, could have kept the commandments of the Lord and stood firm, if he had willed to do so. But beyond the grace already mentioned, he still needed another help of God for this willing. For not even then could he have willed anything without the help of his hand, who, according to the Apostle in Philippians 2, "works in us both to will and to accomplish." That Augustine understands it in this way, I call himself as witness, in On Rebuke and Grace 47 [n13], where he speaks thus on the same subject: "The first man did not have that grace by which he would never will to be evil; but he certainly had a grace in which, if he willed to remain, he would never be evil, and without which, even with free choice, he could not be good." Therefore that grace differed from free choice. And he adds immediately: "Yet he could abandon it through free choice. And so God did not will that even his existence be without his grace, since he left him in his free choice, because free choice suffices for evil, but is little for good unless it is helped by the good of almighty God. If that man had not abandoned this help through free choice, he would always have been good; but he abandoned it, and was abandoned. Such, indeed, was the help: one he could abandon when he willed, and one in which he would remain if he willed, but not one by which he would be made to will. This is the first grace, which was given to the first Adam; but in the second Adam it is more powerful. For the first is that by which a man has justice if he wills; the second is therefore more powerful, in that by it he is also made to will, and to will so much, and to love with such ardor, that by the will of the spirit he overcomes the will of the flesh, which desires contrary things. Nor was that first grace small, by which the power of free choice was also displayed, since the man was so helped that without this help he would not remain in the good, but this help he could abandon if he willed. This second grace, however, is so much greater that it is little for man to recover by it the freedom he had lost; it is, finally, little that without it he cannot either lay hold of the good or, if he wills, remain in the good, unless he is also made to will." And further on, in chapter 49, he says: "If this help had been lacking either to the angel or to man, when

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they were first made, [n14] then, since their nature was not made such that without divine help it could remain if it willed, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault: for the help would have been lacking without which it could not remain. But now, those who lack such help lack it as the penalty of sin; and those to whom it is given have it given according to grace, not according to debt. And it is given all the more abundantly through Jesus Christ our Lord to those to whom it pleased God to give it, so that there is present not only that help without which we cannot remain, even if we will, but also a help so great and of such a kind that we do will. For through this grace of God, in receiving the good and holding it with perseverance, there is in us not only the ability to do what we will, but also the will to do what we are able. This was not in the first man; for one of these was in him, the other not. He had received the ability, if he willed, but he did not have the will by which he would be able. For had he had it, he would have persevered; for he would also have been able to persevere, if he willed." The authority of the same Augustine, in City of God 14, in the next-to-last chapter, cited just above, bears witness to the same thing: "The first man," he says, "was so established that if he trusted in the help of God, he, a good man, would overcome the evil angel, having a good merit in a right will helped by God; because even this trusting in the help of God he could not do without the help of God." It is clear, therefore, that although the first man before sin could have persevered if he had willed, nevertheless without God's help he could not will it; hence neither could he persevere finally, nor even for a time, as the preceding chapter asserted.

NOTES

1. The Hypognosticon (also Hypomnesticon) is a pseudo-Augustinian work of the fifth century. Bradwardine, like Lombard, cites it as Augustine's; the margin reads "Augustine".
2. The Latin nec cuilibet alteri quamlibet tangeretur cannot be construed as it stands ("nor would it be touched by anyone else in any way"). I supply the evident sense from the preceding clause: it would harm no one else by being touched. The same passage is quoted in the Gloss on Gen. 2.
3. The print has "[89]39", with 89 in brackets. The reference is to On Rebuke and Grace, the chapter numbering of Savile's text of Augustine; the bracketed number is not explained and I keep both.
4. The clause quia et mori et miserum non fieri in sua potestate esse sentiebat is awkward, and bonum may stand for beatum. I translate the print literally.
5. The print reads siue faelicitatis fine, which cannot be construed. The type is ambiguous between siue and sine, and the sense requires sine ("without end of happiness"), which I translate.
6. Quomodo etiam here and in the sentence on the woman is taken as a rhetorical question. The nisi clause in the first question means that the argument holds only if the temptation did drive man somewhat.
7. nil aliud appetatur: the sense understood is "than what appears good", as the preceding clause shows.
8. The print reads quamuis sine gratia, which contradicts the next clause (no merit without divine help) and Lombard's conclusion that man needed grace before sin. The Augustinian original must mean "though not without grace". I translate that sense and keep the problem here.
9. The print reads "4. sent. dist. 29", but Bradwardine later cites the same passage as "2. sentent. dist. 29" (Lombard, Sent. II). The print's "4" is evidently a misprint, and I translate it as printed.
10. The print has non de futuro adiutotio Dei (two words, and adiutotio a misprint). I read defuturo (from deesse): "the help was not going to fail", which suits the argument.
11. Christum Domini: an echo of 1 Sam 24:7 and 26:9 ("the Lord's anointed"). Lombard was bishop of Paris.
12. The print reads impulisset here and again at the head of the next unit. The sense requires "repulisset" (thrust away, rejected); I translate that sense.
13. Savile's references are to De correptione et gratia, "47" and "49" (below). They are his own chapter numbers. The passages are Corrept. 11.31 and 12.34 (PL 44, 936–937) in the modern division. The quotation is a continuous passage of Augustine; Bradwardine's "And he adds immediately" marks the clause beginning "Yet he could abandon it." I have set the whole as quotation, and it runs on through the page break.
14. The sentence "Si hoc adiutorium..." breaks across the page turn: "cum / primum" at the foot of 504E, "primum facti sunt" at the head of 505A. It is translated as a single sentence, and the English of the quotation straddles the two blocks.