De causa Dei: Book II
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 443B; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/2/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[443B]
THOMAS BRADWARDINE'S BOOK II. [n1]

[prelims]
CHAPTERS OF THE SECOND BOOK. [n2]

CH. I. That there is Free Choice, and what it is.

CH. II. On the act of Free Choice and its object. It has a Corollary: Free Choice is not so called because it can freely will and nill whatever you like, but because it can freely will whatever object of its own is willable, and nill whatever object of its own is nillable. [n3]

CH. III. That no lower cause can necessitate the created will to its rational and free act, to merit properly speaking, or to sin. It has a Corollary: the will of a rational creature is not merely passive but active; and a will most sufficiently disposed to act by secondary causes can on one occasion not act, and on another perform its free act [n4]. Hence also, when unequal goods are set before the will, it will not necessarily will the greater; indeed, even when an honourable good is set before it together with a dishonourable evil that is pleasant, yet in great measure, or useful, it can knowingly neglect that good and choose that evil [n5]. Hence also, even with right reason in the intellect, error is possible in the affection. Further: irrational appetite does not necessitate a man to act; the heavenly bodies do not necessitate the will; the Devil does not necessitate the will; and no temptation necessitates the will. Yet pure evil, when shown to the will, does necessitate it not to will, and pure good necessitates it not to nill positively, that is, not to hate it; and the will itself, by natural necessity, necessarily cannot do these things [n6]. There it is also shown, as a consequence, that it would perhaps be very fitting, and most advantageous, for theologians and perfect Catholics not to be ignorant of astrology and other such sciences.

CH. IV. That Free Choice, when tempted, cannot by its own powers, without God's help and his grace, overcome any temptation.

CH. V. That Free Choice, however much supported by created grace, cannot overcome any temptation without another, special help of God.

CH. VI. That this special help of God is his invincible will.

CH. VII. That no one who is untempted can avoid any sin by the powers of Free Choice alone, without grace, or with grace however great, if it is created, without another help of God. It has a Corollary: the divine will, as it preserves the tempted from falling, so also preserves the untempted, from temptation as well as from sin.

CH. VIII. On perseverance: what it is, and that no wayfarer, however much he rests on created grace, can persevere to the end by the powers of Free Choice alone, or even with the aid of grace, without another special help of God. It has a Corollary: no wayfarer can persevere for any time at all by the powers of Free Choice alone, or of grace, or of both together, without another special help of God.

CH. IX. That neither man nor angel, with however great grace before the fall, could persevere finally, or for a time, without another special help of God.

CH. X. He raises objections and replies.

CH. XI. That perseverance is not some created gift of God, really different and distinct from charity and grace. It has a Corollary: the name Perseverance signifies no absolute thing essentially, but accidentally and relatively, namely charity or justice [n7] with respect to its future continuous remaining until the end; and it could be said, not improbably, that perseverance is the very relation of this.

CH. XII. He raises objections and replies.

CH. XIII. That the help without which no one perseveres, and through which everyone perseveres, is the Holy Spirit, the divine goodness and will.

CH. XIV. That Perseverance is given freely by God and is not obtained by merits.

CH. XV. On everlasting Perseverance, namely the confirmation of the blessed and its cause: that it is eternal charity, the will of God.

CH. XVI. On everlasting Perseverance, or the obstinacy of the wicked in evil, and its cause.

CH. XVII. That no rational creature can be confirmed or hardened immutably by nature. It has a Corollary: no rational creature is, or can be, immutable, inconvertible or impeccable by nature.

CH. XVIII. Against certain people who say that the act of Free Choice is nothing.

CH. XIX. He raises objections and replies.

CH. XX. That God is the necessary co-effector of every act of the created will. It has a Corollary: whatever the created will effects, the uncreated will must also co-effect; and whatever the angelic or human will has worked, the divine will must also co-work; and the created will effects the whole of every act of the created will, and the uncreated will likewise effects the whole.

CH. XXI. He recites six false responses. The first says that God is said to do every act of the created will only because he makes every created will, which alone truly and properly effects its own act. The second says that God is said to make the good act of the created will because he makes the charity or grace that effects it. The third says that God conserves the will. The fourth says that God makes the object and all the things that move the will. The fifth says that he permits. The sixth says that God properly effects every good act of the will, but absolutely no evil one. He corrects them generally and jointly.

CH. XXII. He corrects the first of these in particular.

CH. XXIII. The second.

CH. XXIV. The third.

CH. XXV. The fourth.

CH. XXVI. The fifth.

CH. XXVII. The sixth.

CH. XXVIII. He raises an objection against the twentieth, and replies.

CH. XXIX. That the uncreated and the created will, in co-effecting the act of the created will, are not co-equal, nor co-eval in the natural order.

CH. XXX. That in every action common to the uncreated and the created wills, the uncreated naturally precedes the created. It has a threefold porism [n8]. The first is natural, and holds in all causation common to God and a secondary cause: God causes naturally before the secondary cause. The second is theological: namely, God wills nothing conditionally. The third is logical: no proposition that attributes any causation whatever to any cause lower than, and posterior to, the divine will, or that attributes any other positive thing to anything lower, under God, is "of the first" simply [n9]. The exception is perhaps a proposition said to be "of the first" simply by reason of the primacy of its subject, not of its cause; yet very many such propositions are "of the first" in a certain respect and in a certain genus.

CH. XXXI. He raises objections and replies. It has a notable Corollary: sacred theology requires a devout and prudent reader.

CH. XXXII. That in every non-action common to God and creature, it is naturally prior that God does not act there than that the creature does not; that is [n10], because God does not perform a certain action through the creature, the creature does not perform it, and not the other way round.

CH. XXXIII. He raises objections and replies. It has a Corollary: not only do beings necessarily need God for their true being, and non-beings for their non-being, but God also holds the most worthy principate not only over beings but even over non-beings.

CH. XXXIV. Through the foregoing he draws men to fear and love, to confidence, to patience and humility, to prayer, and to the giving of thanks. It has a manifold Corollary, welcome to all the grateful [n11].

NOTES

1. The unit supplied for this stretch is only the title line of Book II, set in large capitals on 443B. The same page also carries the chapter heading "Cap. I. Quod liberum arbitrium sit, et quid sit" and the opening text of II.1, beginning "Tractatu siquidem praemissorum…". These fall under later units, which were not supplied, so they are not translated here. The page has no margin entries of its own for this unit. The marginal notes visible lower on the page ("‖ sic", "Augustinus") belong to the text of II.1.
2. I did not have the page images for this unit. The reading below is the keyed TCP text, not checked against the print. The keyed text has several evident misprints, most likely the print's own: egere, institiam, persenerat, iliud, porissima, positinum, considentiam, cuinslibet, idem. Only those that touch the sense are noted below. The `•` in relati•e (ch. XI) is the one TCP gap and needs checking on the image.
3. Volubile and nolubile (like volutio) are Bradwardine's coinages from velle and nolle. I render them "willable" and "nillable", and nolle as "nill", to keep the symmetry that the corollary depends on.
4. The keyed alias egere liberum actum suum is unconstruable (egere is "to lack"). I take it as agere or edere and translate "perform". This is an evident-sense reading and has not been confirmed on the image.
5. Malo inhonesto delectabili, tamen multum vel vtili is awkward as keyed. I take multum adverbially with delectabili ("pleasant, yet in great measure") and vel utili as the alternative, "or useful", i.e. the evil is either pleasant or useful. The sense is clear, but the construction is not secure.
6. The clause ad non odiendum ipsaue voluntas naturali necessitate necessario haec non potest does not construe cleanly. Ipsaue looks like a misprint (perhaps ipsum; ipsa uero, or ipsamue). I translate the evident sense: the will is necessitated not to will pure evil and not to nill pure good, and the will itself, by natural necessity, cannot do the opposite. I have not emended the Latin.
7. The keyed institiam is a misprint for iustitiam ("justice"). "Charity or justice" is the sense.
8. Porissima (keyed porissima) is presumably a form of Greek porisma, a corollary in the geometers' sense, here used for a derived consequence of ch. XXX. I keep "porism" because Savile distinguishes it from corollarium, and I assume that distinction is deliberate.
9. De primo simpliciter: "of the first" is the technical Aristotelian de primo. A predicate belongs to its subject "as first", that is, primarily and commensurately, with no prior subject. The "primacy of the subject" is the sense in which a proposition can be de primo without causal priority. I leave the phrase in its scholastic form so the logic of the third porism stays visible.
10. The keyed idem, quia can hardly be right. I read id est ("that is"), since the clause restates the preceding one. This is the evident sense, taken from the keyed text and not checked on the image.
11. Omnibus gratis gratum plays on gratis as the dative plural of gratus ("welcome", "grateful") and as the adverb "freely, for nothing", picking up the gratia/gratis jingle of the book. English cannot hold both. I give "welcome to all the grateful" and leave the other sense, "freely welcome to all", to this note.