De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 41
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 371A–374A; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/41/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

[371A–371D]
CHAPTER XLI. That grace produces good acts naturally prior to the human will.

Having shown that grace produces good acts together with the will, we must inquire further whether the two are equally first in the order of nature, or whether one of them is naturally prior to the other; and if so, which of them. I hold that grace, freely infused,[n1] produces good acts naturally prior to the will. For the human will is so weighed down by the heaviness of sin, or of nature, that it can love only itself and its own advantage as a final end, for its own sake (that is, for the will's own sake). The one exception is when it is raised by the power of grace to love God above all things, for his own sake alone, gratuitously, as the thirty-ninth chapter proves. Now such a raiser necessarily goes before the one so raised in its ascent. This is evident in the case of a stone lifted upward. It is the more so because a soul so weighed down cannot, of itself, enter upon any ascent of that kind, as is plain from the preceding chapter. For a man who is heavy and weak, lying on the ground, cannot by himself raise himself much or even a little. He can nevertheless raise himself in some way together with another, who goes before him, continually lifts him ahead, and continually supports him lest he fall back. To raise himself he needs such a one, necessarily and from the start, to lift him beforehand and to support him continually. So it is with the created will, which is destitute of grace and is aided by grace. And this is true not only because of the weighing down of free choice by sin, but because of the natural heaviness of free choice, by which it is, for these reasons, naturally bound to love itself and its own advantage principally, etc., and cannot ascend to anything above itself, say to loving God above itself, etc., gratuitously. It cannot do so unless it is anticipated and continually raised by grace, and, lest it fall back, continually sustained, as is plain from the thirty-ninth and fortieth chapters of this book. Daniel seems to have figured all this fittingly when he said: "No strength remained in me; my appearance too was changed in me, and I withered away, and I had no strength at all. And I heard the voice of his words; and hearing, I lay stunned upon my face, and my countenance clung to the earth. And behold, a hand touched me, and raised me upon my knees and the joints of my hands, and said to me: Daniel, man of desires, understand the words that I speak to you, and stand in your degree;[n2] for now I am sent to you. And when he had spoken this word to me, I stood trembling. And he said to me: Do not be afraid, Daniel" (Dan. 10). Hence Gregory, in Moralia 22, 18,[n3] on that text of Job 31, "At each of my steps I will declare it," says: "No one," he says, "leaves the lowest place and suddenly becomes the highest, since in order to obtain the merit of perfection, while the mind is led upward day by day, one comes to it without doubt as by certain steps of ascent; whence it is aptly added: 'At each of my steps I will declare it.' Hence the Prophet says: 'I was roused, and my spirit failed for a little while.' What does he mean by 'my spirit' but the spirit of man, that is, the spirit of pride? And since, through hidden grace, we advance toward the love of God by a measure tempered from above, the more the power of God's Spirit grows in us each day, the more our own spirit fails. That spirit of error, because it is not suddenly and utterly cut off from us, is rightly said to have failed for a little while. For we are fully perfected in God only when we have utterly failed from ourselves. These measures of growing virtues, then, are called steps in the words of the holy man. He confirms this also below, in the following chapter, by that deed of Daniel cited above. 'Well,' he says, 'did the Prophet Daniel, when the Lord spoke to him, signify these increases of merit, in his effort to make known to us the position of his body. For he says: I heard the voice of words, and hearing, I lay stunned upon my face, and my countenance

[371E–372D]
clung to the earth, and behold, a hand touched me, and raised me upon my knees and the joints of my hands, and said to me: Daniel, man of desires, understand the words that I speak to you, and stand in your degree, for now I am sent to you. And when he had spoken this word to me, I stood trembling, and he said to me: Do not be afraid.' This position of his body, while he heard the words of one speaking within, he would never have taken such care to express to us if he had known it to be empty of mysteries. For in Sacred Scripture the words of just men are prophecy, and so, for the most part, are their deeds. The holy man, then, full of mysteries within, expresses the power of the voice even through the position of his body. By the fact that at first he lay prostrate on the earth, by the fact that afterward he raised himself on the joints of his hands and on his knees, by the fact that at the last he stood erect indeed, but trembling, he makes known to us in himself the whole order of our progress. Where also, the words of the Prophet having been set out in order, on the last of them, namely "Do not be afraid," he says: 'Aptly is it added by the divine voice, "Do not be afraid." For as we ourselves recognize more things to fear, more is poured into us of God, through inward grace, to love, so that our contempt may pass for a time into fear, and fear pass into charity. Since to God, who seeks us, we resist through contempt and flee through fear, we may at length, contempt and fear having been set aside, be joined to him by love alone. For we unlearn, for a time, fearing him, and cling to him by the force of love alone. With these as if certain steps set before us for our advance, we first plant the foot of the mind low, in fear, and afterward raise it by charity to the heights of love.'" With this also agrees a saying of the same Gregory, Moralia 22, 9, cited above in chapter 35 of this book. With this likewise Ezekiel agrees well enough, saying: "I fell upon my face, and I heard the voice of one speaking, and he said to me: Son of man, stand upon your feet, and I will speak with you; and the Spirit entered into me, after he had spoken to me, and set me upon my feet" (Ezek. 1). With these the Apostle also agrees: "By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been in vain, but I have labored more abundantly than all of them; yet not I, but the grace of God with me" (1 Cor. 15). These words plainly suggest the priority of grace. For it is certain that the Apostle labored, as he himself testifies. Why, then, does he say "not I, but grace," unless to intimate that grace first and principally, as a principal efficient cause, produces good acts, while man does not do so in this way, but secondarily, instrumentally, and subserviently to grace so acting? Wherefore Gregory, in the first book on Ezekiel, homily 9, treating the words of Ezekiel and of the Apostle just set out, says: "Behold, the divine voice commanded the Prophet as he lay there to rise, but he could not rise at all unless the Spirit of almighty God had entered into him. For by the grace of almighty God we can indeed strive toward good works, but we cannot accomplish them if he who commands does not help. So Paul, when he admonished his disciples, saying, 'With fear and trembling work out your own salvation,' at once adds who it is that works these very goods in them, saying: 'For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will.' Hence it is that Truth itself says to the disciples: 'Without me you can do nothing.'" And below: "But it must be understood that our evils are ours alone; our goods, however, are both the almighty God's and ours. They are ours because he goes before us by inspiring us to will, and follows by helping, lest we will in vain, but be able to accomplish what we will. And when grace goes before and good will follows, what is the gift of almighty God becomes our merit. Paul explains this well in a short sentence, saying, 'I have labored more than all of them.' So that he might not seem to have attributed to his own virtue what he had done, he added: 'Yet not I, but the grace of God with me.' For because he was anticipated by the heavenly gift, he acknowledged himself, as it were, a stranger to his own good work, saying, 'Yet not I.' But because the grace that anticipated him had made free choice in him free for good, and by that free choice he followed the same grace in the work, he added, 'But the grace of God with me.' It is as if he said: 'In the good work I labored, not I, but I also.' In that I was anticipated by the Lord's gift alone, not I; in that I followed God with my will, I also. With these things said briefly against Pelagius and Celestius, let us return to the order of exposition. 'Son of man, stand upon your feet, and I will speak with you.' We must note the order of the speaking and of the work. First the likeness of the glory of the Lord appears, to cast down; afterward he speaks, to reveal; then he sends the Spirit of superabundant grace, and raises up, and sets the prophet upon his feet. For unless we saw something of eternity in our mind, we should never fall upon our face in repentance. But now the voice of the Lord consoles us as we lie prostrate, though we cannot do this by our own power. His Spirit, then, fills us and raises us, and sets us upon our feet, so that we who lay prone in penitence for our fault may afterward stand upright in good work."[n4] When these words of Gregory are carefully examined, it clearly appears that it is the heresy of Pelagius to say that grace does not precede free choice, but the reverse. Augustine, Isidore, and the Canon plainly attest this, as was recited in chapter 36 of this book. Hence also Lombard, Sentences 2, dist. 26, citing Augustine to the same effect, says: "Good will accompanies grace; grace does not accompany will."

[372E–373B]
Hence Augustine, writing to Pope Boniface against the Pelagians, says: "Since faith obtains justification, as God has apportioned to each the measure of faith, no merit of man's goes before the grace of God, but grace itself deserves to be increased, so that, increased, it may deserve also to be perfected, the will accompanying it, not leading it, as its attendant, not its forerunner."[n5] And Lombard adds: "Behold, here you have it expressly that grace goes before the merit of the good will, and that the good will itself is the attendant of grace, not its forerunner." Fulgentius also, Bishop of the Church of Ruspe,[n6] as Isidore reports in the Catalogue of Illustrious Men, chapter fourteen, wrote and sent to the bishops two books on the truth of Predestination, in which he shows that the grace of God goes before the human will in good things. The Apostle likewise teaches this opinion plainly: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy" (Rom. 9). Why would he say that willing is not of him who wills, nor running (that is, working) of him who runs, but of God who has mercy, unless to show that this is of God, of the divine mercy and grace, first and principally, as of the prior agent; but of the one who wills and runs not in this way, but secondarily and instrumentally, as of a posterior agent? This was also shown above of a similar saying of his. The expositions of Augustine, in the Enchiridion 23 and in On the Two Souls, written out in chapters 15, 36 and 37 of this book,[n7] show well enough this understanding of this saying of the Apostle. Hence also Peter [Lombard], Sentences 2, dist. 25, last chapter, says: "The will of man, as it has it by nature, cannot be raised to willing the good effectively, or to fulfilling it in work, unless it is freed and helped by grace: freed so that it may will, and helped so that it may accomplish. For as the Apostle says, 'It is not of him who wills to will, nor of him who runs to run,' that is, to work, 'but of God who has mercy,' who works in us to will and to work the good. The will or work of man does not summon grace; rather, grace itself goes before the will by preparing it to will the good, and, once prepared, helps

[373A–373B]
it, lest it will in vain; that is, so that it may accomplish." The same writer, below, dist. 26, treating certain authorities that seem to assert that faith and the act of faith belong to a free will, says: "These things are said thus because there is no faith except in one who wills to believe, whose good will faith precedes not in time but in cause and nature." Whence Augustine, above, rightly said that good will is among those gifts that it does not precede, and it itself helps, because it helps those by which it is preceded, while it consents to them for the effect of good, and it is in them, because in time it is not preceded by them. Again, who does not know that a prior cause is more principal than a posterior? But grace is the principal cause of every good act, as appears in the preceding chapter, against the second reply. Very many authorities, cited in chapter 36 of this book and the following chapters, plainly teach this opinion, and the whole Catholic Church professes it Catholicly, praying in this way: "May your grace, Lord, always go before us and follow us, and make us ever intent on good works." But if we work first by nature, before grace, why do we ask that it go before us by working?

[373C–373D]
Rather, we ourselves would be granting that it be intent on good works, than it granting that to us. But if it is said that grace goes before us by freeing us from sin, and not by properly making meritorious acts, the preceding chapter contradicts this, by showing that grace properly produces good acts. It can also be contradicted specifically, as the sixth reply of that same chapter was contradicted. Another reply says that grace naturally first produces the first good human act, but that the will naturally first works the other acts that follow. But why so varied a view? What is the reason for the difference, when the agent as a whole and the act are of a like character at the first and afterward? Against this reply too the arguments and authorities already set out proceed, and specifically that of the Apostle, "Not I, but the grace of God with me." For the Apostle speaks of himself not for the moment of his conversion, but for the time that followed, during which he was always in grace and labored with grace; and Gregory, expounding the passage, plainly attests this, as cited above. Augustine, cited above, likewise bears the same witness, saying that grace deserves to be increased, so that, increased, it may deserve also to be perfected, the will accompanying it, not leading it, as its attendant, not its forerunner. For he speaks expressly of the merit by which grace deserves to be increased, which follows the first good act.

[373D]
COROLLARY.

Corollary: that both God and his created grace properly produce, naturally prior to the rational creature itself, every good act of that creature; and that authors who say God does our good works do not exclude, but include, the grace of God doing the same likewise; and those who say the grace of God does our good works do not exclude, but include, God working the same likewise.

[373E–374A]
From these things it is plainly inferred that both God and the created grace of God properly produce, and naturally prior to the rational creature itself, every good act of that creature; and that authors who say that God does our good works do not exclude but include the grace of God doing the same likewise; and those who say that the grace of God does our good works do not exclude but include God working the same likewise. That God properly produces every good act is evident from the third and fourth chapters of this book. It is evident likewise from the twenty-seventh and those following, together with the tenth, plainly. That grace likewise acts, and also naturally prior to the rational creature, is evident from the fortieth and forty-first chapters of this book. As to God's acting naturally prior to the rational creature in the good making common to both: who would not concede it, once it is conceded that the grace of God there acts naturally prior to a creature of this kind? For who will so much as lightly suppose that created grace of God acts naturally prior to its own author in an action common to them, prior to its own and everyone's first mover? The arguments and authorities of the thirty-fifth chapter of this book and those following, and specially the passages of Gregory on Ezekiel cited above, prove this same point well enough. The remaining parts follow clearly from what has been set out. These things are also evident very often in Sacred Scripture and in its sacred expositors, who affirm in mingled and indifferent fashion now that the grace of God does our good works, and now that God does; they hold these for the same thing. Those too who expound Sacred Scripture where it says that the grace of God does a good act in man very often say that God does that act, and likewise the other way round. When they wish to show that God does good human acts, they show that the grace of God does them, and the reverse. Many authorities in the chapters already set out, and elsewhere in Sacred Scripture and in the writings of the Saints, bear plainest witness to this. There was no need to touch on them here, since they offer themselves abundantly not only to the careful reader, but even to the careless one.

NOTES

1. Gratia gratis infusa: the gratia/gratis jingle ("grace, graciously infused") cannot be kept without strain. "Freely" carries the sense (grace given without prior merit), and the same root recurs in gratuito/gratuite ("gratuitously") a few lines later.
2. Sta in gradu tuo (Dan. 10:11). Gradus means "step" or "degree." Gregory's whole exposition turns on "steps" (Job 31:37, per singulos gradus meos), so "degree" is used here, as in the Douay, to keep the word near to the "steps" of the commentary.
3. Savile's "22. moralium 18" is Gregory, Moralia in Iob 22, ch. 18, on Job 31:37. The long passage that follows, "No one... leaves the lowest place..." through "I heard the voice of words...", is Gregory's own text. His "following chapter" is the next chapter of the Moralia, not of the De causa Dei. The homily cited at 372B ("1. super Ezechielem homilia 9") is Gregory, Homiliae in Hiezechielem 1, 9. Savile prints no quotation marks, so the extent of each quotation is inferred from "ait" and "inquit."
4. The sentence "Sed iam iacentes vox Domini consolatur, quod tamen nos facere nostra virtute non possumus" has no expressed object for quod. The sense is that the voice consoles those lying prostrate, yet to stand is what we cannot do by our own strength; hence the next clause, "his Spirit therefore fills us." The English supplies no word that the Latin lacks. Also at 372D: "His igitur breviter contra Pelagium et Coelestium dictis" is probably Bradwardine's own interjection into the Gregory text, since Gregory has no occasion to name Pelagius. Savile's print gives no mark of this. Celestius is the Pelagian disciple Caelestius.
5. The print reads "sed ipso meretur augeri," and the keyed text agrees. "Ipso" cannot be the subject of meretur, which must be grace (ipsa). Compare 373D: "gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici." The English follows the evident sense, with grace as the subject. The passage is Augustine, Ep. 98 (to Boniface), as quoted by Peter Lombard, Sent. 2, d. 26.
6. The print has "Imspensis" (so also the keyed text), a misprint for Ruspensis: Fulgentius, Bishop of Ruspe in North Africa. The identification matters here because the reference is to his De veritate praedestinationis et gratiae, in two books. Isidore's De viris illustribus is the Catalogue of Illustrious Men cited.
7. "15. 36. et 37. huius scriptae" is taken to refer to chapters of this book in which the Augustine passages were set out ("written out"), not to chapters of Augustine. Augustine's Enchiridion is cited by Savile as ch. 23 (the traditional division has the relevant passage at ch. 32), and kept as printed.