{"id": "1/40", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 40", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "364A–370D", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XL. Quod gratia, quae est habitus gratis datus a Deo vna cum voluntate humana est causa efficiens proprie cuiuslibet boni et meritorij actus sui.\n\nPOST haec autem gratia Dei mecum ostendet, vt spero, quod ipsa est causa efficiens proprie cuiuslibet actus boni; gratia scilicet gratis data, quae est habitus animae a Deo gratis infusus, iuxta distinctionem de gratia 25. factam, de qua etiam capitula proxima loquebantur. Si nempe gratia non esset causa efficiens proprie actus boni, posset homo ex naturalibus proprijs sine ipsa implere Dei mandata, et perficere quemlibet actum bonum contra proximo praeostensa: Si enim habens gratiam efficit quemlibet actum suum, gratia nihil penitus coagente, sic posset et ipsa remota; Non enim remoueretur causa efficiens totalis, nec etiam partialis. Item si gratia seu charitas non faciat actum dilectionis humanae quo implet mandatum de dilectione, eadem ratione nec fides et spes, habitus infusi, vt patet per capitulo proximo allegata, faciunt actus credendi, et sperandi. Posset igitur homo ex se et suis naturalibus, et naturaliter acquisitis,\n\ncredere, sperare, diligere, et facere quicquid debet, quod est error Pelagij manifestus, et contra proximo praeostensa. Item virtutes Theologicae et supernaturales non sunt minus efficaces similum actuum, quam virtutes naturales, morales, et intellectuales; sed hae omnes efficiunt proprie actus suos: Quis enim dubitat formas et virtutes naturales efficere suos actus? Et quis nesciat virtutes morales efficere actus morales, et virtutes intellectuales conformiter actus tales? cur aliter, non similiter operarentur carentes istis virtutibus, sicut eas habentes, ex quo eis non deest aliquod principium effectiuum? Quare et Philos. 2. Eth. 1.2. et 3. ostendit virtutes morales ex operibus generari, ipsas que generatas similia opera generare; vbi et cap. 3. post ostensionem huius multiplicem, ita dicit; Supponitur ergo virtus esse talis circa voluptates et tristitias optimorum operatiua, malitia autem contrarium; Et infra finaliter concludendo, sic ait, Quoniam quidem igitur est virtus circa delectationes et tristitias; et quoniam ex quibus fit, ab his et augetur, et corrumpitur non similiter factis; et quoniam ex quibus fit,\n\ncirca haec et operatur, dictum sit. Qui et supra 1i 7o definit Felicem secundum virtutem perfectam operantē, quod et sae pissime innuit alijs locis multis. Itē gratia seu charitas facit intentionem rectā, eleuat et erigit voluntatē, sicut capitulo proximo est ostensum, sicuti et in moralibus facit virtus moralis, teste Philos. ibi, et 34. huius plenius allegato. Item virtus, et maxime summa virtus scilicet gratia seu charitas non est minus efficax quam vitium; vitiū autem efficit actus malos: quare et gratia seu charitas actus bonos. Vt autem taceā de vitijs moraliter acquisitis, quis nesciat, quis non sentiat quales actus efficiat vnum vitium radicale, lex membrorum tyrannus naturae, fomes peccati, concupiscentia seu concupiscibilitas carnis nostrae, quod et plerunque peccatum originale a Doctoribus appellatur? testis est experientia nimis crebra, nimium violenta; Testis est Apostolus, Ego inquiens, carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato; quod enim operor non intelligo: Non enim quod volo, hoc ago, sed quod odi, illud facio; Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Condelector enim\n\nlegi Dei secundum interiorem hominem, video autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captiuantem me in lege peccati, ad Rom. 7. Testes sunt Glossae et expositiones sanctorum hanc literam ex ponentes. Testis est pene tota 40. distinctio secundi sententiarum Lumbardi, vbi et istam sententiam plane tenet, et per Augustinum confirmat; Ait enim, Originale peccatum dicitur fomes peccati, scilicet concupiscentia, vel concupiscibilitas, quae dicitur lex membrorum, seu languor naturae, siue tyrannus qui est in membris nostris, siue lex carnis. Vnde Augustinus in libro De baptismo paruulorum; Est in nobis concupiscentia, quae non est permittenda regnare; sunt et eius desideria, quae sunt actuales concupiscentiae, quae sunt arma Diaboli, quae veniunt ex languore naturae;\n\nLanguor autem iste est tyrannus qui mouet mala desideria. Et infra; Nomine autem concupiscentiae non actum concupiscendi, sed vitium prauum significauit, cum eam dixit carnis legem. Vnde idem in Tractatu de verbis Apostoli, ait; Semper pugna est in corpore mortis huius, quia ipsa concupiscentia cum qua nati sumus, finiri non potest quamdiu viuimus; quotidie minui potest, finiri autem non potest. Quae est autem concupiscentia cum qua nati sumus? vitium vtique est, quod paruulum habilem concupiscere facit; adultum etiam concupiscentem reddit. Cum ergo cupiditas sit tam pugnax, tam efficax, et tam multipliciter actuosa, quomodo eam reprimit, minuit, et superat charitas, si penitus nihil agat, si nihil penitus moueat, si sit penitus otiosa? Non sic autem, non sic sentit Apost. 1. ad Cor. 13. Charitas, inquiens, patiens est, benigna est, non aemulatur, non agit perperam, non inflatur, non est ambitiosa, non quaerit quae sua sunt, non irritatur, non cogitat malum, non gaudet super iniquitate, quasi diceret euidenter; Non haec sed contraria horum facit; quare et statim subiungit; Congaudet autem veritati, omnia suffert, omnia credit, omnia sperat, omnia sustinet. Quod et\n\nAug. de 4. virtutibus charitatis; Quod omnia tolerat, omnia credit, omnia sperat, omnia sustinet, pulchre monstrat. Vnde inter caetera, in persona Abrahae, cui secundam harum virtutum attribuit, ita dicit; Virtus charitatis in me manens omnia credit, et facit, et dicit. Audio enim eam sine strepitu vocis intus ad cor loquentem, et infra; O charitas quae tantum potes in hac pugna mortalitatis adhuc sollicita, quantum poteris in illa perfecta pace secura? Qui et Enchirid. penult. Minuitur, inquit, cupiditas charitate crescente, donec veniat hic ad tantam magnitudinem qua maior esse non possit; ibi autem quis explicet quanta charitas erit, vbi cupiditas, quam coercendo superet, nulla erit? quando sanitas summa erit, quando contentio mortis nulla erit? Idem ad Anastasium sicut allegat Petrus 2. Sent. dist. 26. Sine spiritu non est voluntas hominis libera. Cum enim cupiditatibus vincatur, non est libera ad bonum, nisi liberata fuerit, non autem liberatur, nisi per Spiritum charitas diffundatur in cordibus. Non est libera voluntas nisi gratia eam liberet per legem fidei, id est, non est libera sine fide operante per\n\ndilectionem, et illa sufficienter et vere bona est: Non enim est fructus bonus, qui de charitatis radice non surgit: Si vero assit fides operans per dilectionem, fit delectatio boni. Qui et de spiritu et litera, 13. Non est, inquit, fructus bonus, qui de charitatis radice non surgit; qui et recitante Petro, 3. Sentent. dist. 31. sic ait; Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas, et radix omnium bonorum est charitas. Sed qualis radix est charitas? viua, an mortua? non mor•ua; constat plane: et quomodo viua si nihil viuidi operis siue fructus germinet, aut producat? Qui etiam super Psalmum 31. Sermon. 1. tractans illud Apostoli ad Rom. 13. Plenitudo legis est dilectio seu charitas, secundum aliam translationem, sic ait; Nunquid charitas permittit aliquid mali te facere ei quem diligis? sed forte tantummodo mali nihil facis, nec aliquid boni. Ergo nec charitas permittit te non praestare quicquid potes ei quem diligis. Nonne illa est charitas quae orat etiam pro inimicis? ergo non deserit amicum, qui bene optat inimico. Itaque\n\nsi fides sine dilectione sit, sine opere erit. Ne autem multa cogites de opere fidei adde illi spem et dilectionem, et noli cogitare quod opereris; nam ipsa dilectio vacare non potest. Cui etiam concordanter Greg. hom. 27. super Euang. exponens illud Iohan. 15. Hoc est praeceptū meum vt diligatis inuicem, ita dicit; Omne mandatum de sola dilectione est, et omnia vnum praeceptum sunt, quia quicquid praecipitur in sola charitate solidatur. Vt enim multi arboris rami ex vna radice prodeunt, sic multae virtutes ex vna charitate generantur, nec habet aliquid viriditatis ramus boni operis, si non manet in radice charitatis. Praecepta ergo dominica et multa sunt, et vnum; multa sunt per diuersitatem operis, vnum in radice dilectionis. Qui et infra hom. 30. Nunquā, inquit, Dei amor est otiosus; operatur enim magna, si est; si vero operari ronuit, amor non est. Dicit que Petrus 2. Sent. dist. 26. Quod ipsa gratia non est otiosa, sed meretur augeri, vt aucta mereatur et perfici. Rursum Apost. ad Gal. 5. dicit; Quod fides per charitatem operatur; et iterum 1. ad Cor. 15. Gratia, inquit, Dei sum id quod sum, et gratia eius in me vacua\n\nnon fuit, sed abundantius illis omnibus laboraui, non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum. Quis ergo dixerit charitatē seu gratiam nihil penitus operari? Si quis sic senserit, legat libros, et expositiones Augustini et aliorum Doctorum super autoritates istas, et plurimas altas similes, et definet sic sentire. Hoc idem testantur autoritates quamplurimae capitulis proximis allegatae; inter quas ille Aug. Hypognost. 60. De bono perseu. 48.36. huius, et 1. ad Simplic. 24. et ille Anselmi De concordia, et de veritate tactae capitulo proximo sunt expressae. Quis etiam vel atrium exterius Theologiae parum ingressus, illam diuisionem communissimam de gratia operante et cooperante ignoret? cum omnes poene Doctores atque discipuli creberrime hanc affirment. Vnde et Petrus, secundo Sententiarum, Distinct. 5.26.27. et 29. ipsam diligenter explanat. Qui et distinct. 25. vlt. loquens de libertate naturae et gratiae. Vtramque inquit, Libertatem notat Apostolus, cum ex persona hominis non redempti, ait, velle adiacet\n\nmihi, perficere autem non inuenio, ac si diceret; Habeo libertatem naturae, sed non habeo libertatem gratiae, ideo non est apud me perfectio boni. Nam voluntas hominis quam naturaliter habet, non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum, vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur, et adiuuetur, vt perficiat, quia, vt ait Apostolus, Non est volentis velle, neque currentis currere, id est operari, sed miserentis Dei, qui operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum, cuius gratiam non aduocat hominis voluntas, vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praeuenit praeparando vt velit bonum, et praeparatam adiuuat ne frustra velit, id est vt perficiat; et dist. 26. immediate subiungit, Haec est gratia operans et cooperans; Operans enim gratia praeparat hominis voluntatem vt velit bonum, gratia cooperans adiuuat ne frustra velit: Vnde Augustinus in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio, Cooperando Deus in nobis perficit, quod operando incipit, quia ipse vt velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens: Vt ergo velimus operatur; cum ergo volumus, et sic\n\nvolumus, vt perficiamus, nobis cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante vt velimus, vel cooperante cum volumus, bona pietatis opera, nihil valemus. Et subdit Petrus, Ex his verbis satis aperitur, quae sit operans gratia, et quae cooperans; Operans enim est quae praeuenit voluntatem (Ea enim liberatur et praeparatur hominis voluntas vt sit bona, bonum que efficaciter velit) Cooperans vero gratia voluntatem iam bonam sequitur adiuuando; vbi et infra allegat Augustinum de praedestinatione Sanctorum dicentem, quod gratia non datur secundum alia merita, sed efficit omnia bona merita. Distinctione quoque vigesima septima ita scribit, Quidam non inerudite tradunt, virtutem esse mentis bonam qualitatem siue formam, quae animam informat, et ipsa non est motus, vel affectus animi, sed ea liberum arbitrium iuuatur, vt ad bonum moueatur, et erigatur; et ita ex virtute et libero arbitrio nascitur bonus motus vel affectus animi; vbi et statim dicit sic esse de gratia et voluntate humana. Et infra, In bonis merendis causae principalitas gratiae attribuitur, quia principalis causa bonorum\n\nmeritorum est ipsa gratia, qua excitatur liberum arbitrium, et sanatur at que iuuatur voluntas hominis vt sit bona, quae ipsa etiam donum Dei est, et hominis meritum, imo gratiae, quia ex gratia principaliter est, et gratia est: Vnde Augustinus ad Sixtum Presbyterum, Quid est meritum hominis ante gratiam, cum omne bonum meritum nostrum non in nobis facit nisi gratia? Ex gratia enim, vt dictum est, quae praeuenit et sanat arbitrium hominis, et ex ipso arbitrio procuratur in anima bonus affectus, siue bonus motus mentis, et hoc est primum hominis bonum meritum; sicut verbi gratia ex fide, virtute, et hominis arbitrio generatur in mente bonus quidam motus, et remunerabilis, scilicet ipsum credere, ita ex charitate et libero arbitrio alius quidam motus prouenit valde bonus, scilicet diligere: sic de caeteris virtutibus intelligendum est. Idem 3. sentent. dist. 36. dicit, quod charitas est mater omnium virtutum, sed qualis mater? sterilis, an foecunda? et quomodo sterilis cum sit mater? si autem sit foecunda, quomodo nihil parit? Hic autem multi Pelagianorū amici conantur multipliciter respondere,\n\nqui tamen omnes in hoc vno concordant, quod gratia virtus creata seu charitas non vere et proprie efficit actus bonos secundū substantiam actuū, sed vel omnino non efficit, vel tantum efficit aliquo modo improprio et transūpto. Aliqui nam que dicunt quod gratia seu charitas virtus creata nullo modo efficit actus bonos, sed gratia et charitas increata quae est Deus et Spiritus Sanctus Dei, et sic intelligunt omnes autoritates dicentes gratiam seu charitatem efficere quenquam actum. Sed isti etsi possent vtcunque subterfugere isto modo quasdam autoritates praemissas, rationes tamen non possunt. Quisquis etiam catholicus Authoritates huiusmodi quasdam in superficie literae, quasdam vero parum interius sanis oculis intuetur, statim potest percipere alium intellectum, de gratia scilicet et charitate creata. Vnde et Petrus 2i. sent. dist. 27 inter caetera superius allegata, Cum, inquit, ex gratia dicuntur esse bona merita et incipere, aut intelligitur gratia gratis dans, id est, Deus, vel potius gratia gratis data, quae voluntatem hominis praeuenit, (Non enim esset magnum, si haec a Deo dicerentur esse, a quo sunt\n\nomnia) sed potius eius gratia gratis data intelligitur, ex qua incipiunt bona merita, quae cum ex gratia sola esse dicantur, non excluditur liberum arbitrium, quia nullum meritū est in homine adulto quod non sit per liberum arbitrium, sed in bonis merendis causa principalitas gratiae attribuitur, quia principalis causa bonorum meritorum est ipsa gratia qua excitatur liberum arbitriū, et sanatur at que iuuatur voluntas hominis, vt sit bona. Alij vero dicunt, quod ideo dicitur gratia efficere bonū actum, quia excitat voluntatem vt ipsa efficiat bonū actum. Sed hi etiā per rationes praemisias rationabiliter conuincuntur. Itē si gratia excitet voluntatē, mouet aliqualiter voluntatē, et aliquem actum agit, et si hoc faciat praeueniendo voluntatē nondum agentē, cut non potest simili ratione coagere actū meritorium cum ipsa agente? quis etiam nisi\n\ningratus gratiae, dabit gratiae Dei actum peiorem seu minus bonum, et proprijs naturalib, magis bonum? quis enim ignorat actum meritorium esse incomparabiliter meliorem, quam nudam excitationem ad illum, cum qua stat nihil mereri, imo peccare; hoc autem non sinunt superioribus capitulis allegata. Posset quoque homo vel Angelus velle, et facere sine huiusmodi excitante, cum nihil coagat hic nec ibi; quare et sine gratia implere omnia Dei mandata, quod est error Pelagij, sicut capitulum proximum recitauit. Posset insuper voluntas humana similiter a non gratia excitari, puta a ratione, a virtute morali, a Doctore, ab instinctu seu inclinatione naturali, ab alijsque diuersis; haec igitur alia sine gratia sufficiunt ad faciendum mandata. Secundum hoc etiam voluntas creata esset principalior causa meriti, quam gratia; haec enim principaliter imo singulariter efficit meritum, illa vero tantummodo excitat ad agendum: hoc autem est plane contra Apostolum superius allegatum, Abundantius illis omnibus\n\nlaboraui, non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum. Quomodo namque debet istud intelligi, nisi quod non ego principaliter et gratia instrumentaliter, sed e contra, quod et plane testatur dictum Lumbardi contra responsionem proximam allegatum. Alij aestimant quod gratia facit actus bonos, non effectiue, sed tantum formaliter, sicut albedo facit subiectum album, et anima animatum, et quaelibet forma suum formatum: Sed ista possunt refelli per rationes et autoritates praemissas. Item gratia quae est habitus infusus, non est forma naturalis et essentialis actus volendi ipsius grati, sicut nec aliquis habitus sui actus; est enim actus actualior habitu, nec subiectum habitus naturale, nec compositus ex habitu et actu sicut ex forma et materia, sed est simplex; nec gratia est causa materialis actus boni, puta debitae dilectionis Dei et proximi, nec causa finalis sicut nullus ignorat; nec causa efficiens vt hi dicunt; posset ergo homo facere illum actum, et implere mandata sine gratia, ex naturalibus suis tantum sicut Pelagius delirabat; nulla enim causa deficeret requisita. Siquis autem dixerit, quod gratia est forma improprie, et actualis quodammodo actus boni, quia videlicet informat voluntatem\n\nillum agentem, incidit in pelagus Pelagij supra dictum. Habet etiam dicere consequenter quod omnis actus a tali voluntate procedens est bonus et gratus, quia gratia similiter informatus, quod non est verum de actibus paruulorum, nec de actibus omnibus adultorum, quia non de actibus indifferentibus venialibus que peccatis. Eadē etiam ratione omnis actus sapientis esset sapiens, sapienterue factus, temperati temperatus, temperateue factus, et eodem modo de virtutibus et vitijs vniuersis, quodnullus dubitat esse falsum. Isti quoque contra Apostolum ponunt gratiam vacuam, id est otiosam, sicut glossa exponit; quare videntur gratia vacui et inanes. Alij adhuc putant, quod ideo gratia dicitur agere bonos actus, quia ligat et reprimit concupiscentiā repugnantem, qua ligata grata voluntas efficit gratos actus. Sed istos rationes et autoritates praemissae conuincunt. Quomodo etiam gratia ligat et reprimit concupiscentiam repugnantē, si penitus nihil agat, sicut superius tangebatur? aut si gratia ad repressionem concupiscentiae quicquam agat, cur non ad productionem actus boni simili ratione, sicut\n\ncontra 2am responsionē superius est argutum? Item homines in gratia constituti habent quando que concupiscentiam ita fortem, et aliquoties fortiorem quam homines gratia destituti, sicut vita multorum sanctorum, et specialiter S. Paulus 1. ad Cor. 12. de scipso euidenter ostendunt. Possunt ergo tales homines gratia destituti facere actus bonos, et implere Dei mandata, sicut et tales in gratia constituti. Quare et isti sicut priores pelagi Pelagiani voragine absorbentur. Hoc idem potest et aliter sic ostendi; quia quantum concupiscentia ligatur, et sedatur per gratiam, tantum posset sedari per virtutes morales, per medicinam, per alterationem naturalem, et in quibusdam per complexionem propriam naturalem. Possent ergo tales virtute naturae, sine huiusmodi gratia seruare omnia Dei mandata; quare et isti in pelagus Pelagij relabuntur. Ad idem, si gratus, concupiscentia per gratiam parum repressa, potest producere magnum actum, magnumque meritum, potest et non gratus per concupiscentiam in modico ampliorem modicum amplius impeditus, similem actum producere, licet proportionaliter forte\n\nminorem, et forte tanto meliorem quanto difficiliorem, sicut capitulum proximum arguebat: causae namque similes inaequales producunt effectus similes inaequales. Vnde Philosophus 3. de Coelo 72. reprobans ponentes ignem ardere propter angulos, propter acutiem scilicet angulorum; Si, inquit, calefacit et ardet ignis propter angulos, omnia erunt elementa calefactiua; magis autem forte alterum altero; Omnia enim habent angulos, puta et quod octo basium, et quod duodecim basium, et pyramis, Democrito autem et sphaera, angulus quidem ens ardet; quare differunt eo quod magis et minus. Item tunc Angelus et homo in statu innocentiae ante lapsum, nequaquam indiguit gratia ad merendum; non enim habebat concupiscentiam reluctantē, cuius oppositum cap. proximum ostendebat. Vnde et August. Enchir. 87. Illam, inquit, immortalitatem in qua posset non mori natura humana perdidit per liberum arbitrium; hanc in qua non possit mori, est acceptura per gratiam, quam iuerat, si non peccasset,\n\nacceptura per meritum, quamuis sine gratia nec fuerat tunc, nec vllum meritum esse potuisset. Quia etsi peccatum in solo erat libero arbitrio constitutum, non tamen iustitiae retinendae sufficiebat liberum arbitrium, nisi participatione immutabilis boni diuinum adiutorium praeberetur. Hoc idem et Petrus 2. Sentent. dist. 5.24. et 29. probat, et tenet. Alij opinantur quod ideo gratia dicitur facere actus bonos, quia characterizando animam Domino, et veste Domini induendo, reddit eam terribilem aduersariae potestati, vt eam non audeat aggredi, sicut aliam, quae his caret; sic que potest anima talis grata, grata opera libere operari. Sed hi vt proximi in puteum interitus, in Pelagij pelagus propellentur. Alij arbitrantur, quod ideo gratia dicitur efficere actus bonos, quia liberat et iustificat hominem a peccato, quod impediuit eum ne faceret actus bonos. Sed isti per rationes et autoritates principales; et etiam contra 4tam responsionem praemissas, cum Patre eorum Pelagio refellentur. Pelagiani etiam propter istam sententiam specialiter reprobantur: Ponunt enim, vt recitat Augustinus de gratia et lib.\n\narbitrio 16. quod illa gratia sola non secundum merita nostra datur, qua nobis dimittuntur peccata; illam vero quam expectamus in fine, scilicet vitam aeternam secundum merita nostra dari, intelligentes merita nostra existere nobis a nobis, non a gratia Dei neque a Deo. Vnde Augustinus recitato isto Pelagianorum errore, subiungit, respondendum est eis, Si merita nostra sic intelligerent, vt etiam ipsa dona Dei esse cognoscerent, non esset reprobanda ista sententia quoniam vero merita humana sic praedicant, vt ea ex semetipso habere hominem dicant, prorsus rectissime respondet Apostolus, Quis enim te discernet? quid autem habes quod non accepisti? si autem acceperis, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Prorsus talia cogitanti verissime dicitur, dona sua coronat Deus, non merita tua. Si tibi a te ipso non ab illo sunt merita tua, mala sunt quae coronat Deus; si autem bona sunt, Dei dona sunt, per eius scilicet gratiā gratis datam. In Mileuitano quo que concilio contra Pelagianos celebrato, cui interfuit Augustinus vt patet Epistola 134. inter eius Epistolas, et habetur in Canone de Consecrat.\n\ndistinct. 4. concorditer est sancitum, vt quicunque dixerit gratiam Dei qua iustificamur per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum ad solam remissionem peccatorum valere, quae iam commissa sunt, non adiutorium vt non committantur, anathema sit. Sunt autem et multae aliae responsiunculae tortuosae, quae per praemissa hic et prioribus capitulis iuuante Dei gratia, imo principaliter operante, faciliter dirigentur. Post haec autem obijcitur contra ista; Nam si gratia proprie efficiat actum gratum, gratus facilius et fortius operabitur quam non gratus. Iste nam que habet magnum adiutorium gratiae, ille nullum; cuius oppositum, vt videtur, per experimentum ostendunt ingratissimi peccatores. Item sit A totus vnus actus meritorius factus a gratia et voluntate humana; Et B. pars A facta a gratia; C vero pars eius facta a voluntate humana tantum; ergo C est meritorium, seu A pro C tantum, quia C tantum fit ab hominis libera voluntate; In ipsa namque meritum omne consistit. Item praestituat sibi homo certum\n\ngradum dilectionis, quem haberet sine gratia coagente; tunc si diligat gratia coagente, diliget vltra illum gradum; diliget ergo saltem tam intense, violente et inuite; quare non meritorie. Gratia ergo si ponatur actiua, tollit meritum et arbitrij libertatem. Item gratia et voluntas humana vel sunt aeque potentes, vel non aeque, si aeque, vtra que potest impedire reliquam nequid agat, sicque gratia posset violenter prohibere hominem ne peccaret, et ne vellet hoc vel illud: sic que omnis habens huiusmodi gratiam, esset finaliter confirmatus: si non aeque, aut ergo gratia est potentior vel voluntas; si gratia, redit absurditas proxima; potest quoque gratia facere voluntatem velle inuite, inuitamque detinere in actu volendi: Si voluntas sit potentior gratia, potest debilitari voluntas, vel fortificari gratia, donec sit aeque potens vel potentior, quod si ponatur reponitur difficultas. Item cum gratia sit agens irrationale, et non ex electione, si sit agens, necessario semper agit secundum vltimum suae potentiae quantum potest; quamcunque ergo actionem cuiuscun que speciei vel gradus agit semel gratia siue gratus, et semper. Nec etiam\n\nvidetur consonum rationi, quod agens irrationale agat actum liberum, et libere, sed necessitate naturae. Item tunc non esset in potestate hominis seruare mandata, ne que saluari; cum non sit in potestate sua habere huiusmodi gratiam necessario requisitam. Multa quo que similia possent opponi, sed istis solutis patebit solutio aliorum similium Dei gratia reuelante. Ad has autem ingratas instantias iuuante gratia respondendum. Pro prima igitur quis Theologus dubitat charitatem et gratiam facere iugum Domini suaue, et onus eius leue, cum tot Doctores doceant hoc, tot locis? Quod et videns ille Dei secretarius Esaias, Qui, inquit, dat lasso virtutem, et his, qui non sunt, fortitudinem et robur multiplicat. Deficient pueri, et laborabunt, et iuuenes in infirmitate cadent. Qui autem sperant in Domino mutabunt fortitudinē, assument pennas sicut Aquilae, currēt et non laborabunt; ambulabunt et non deficient, Esa. 40. Quocirca\n\nde malis in persona malorū Sapiens ita dicit, Lassati sumus in via iniquitatis et perditionis, et ambulauimus vias difficiles; vias autem Domini ignorauimus; quibus et multa similia profert Scriptura. Verum pro sufficientiori et subtiliori solutione huius instantiae aduertendum, quod secundum capitulo proximo praeostensa, operatio propria charitatis et gratiae est diligere Deum chare et gratuite super omnia finaliter propter ipsum, et sic facere reliqua propter Deum; huiusmodi autem dilectionem et operationem nullus carens charitate et gratia potest habere; sed quamdiu his caret, necessario diligit maxime proprium commodum et seipsum, et propter commodum proprium et seipsum finaliter reliqua operatur. Dilectio ergo et operatio charitatis seu gratiae, siue chari et grati, procedens a charitate et gratia differt specifice a dilectione et operatione non chari et non grati. Sicut enim obiecta dilectionum et dilecta finaliter differunt specie, sic et propriae dilectiones eorum: sic enim est in cognitione et visione propria et distincta; alias etiam omnes volutiones et dilectiones essent eiusdem speciel\n\nspecialissimae, et omnes cognitiones et visiones similiter; et ita de potentijs alijs, et operationibus proprijs quibuscun que . Vnde et Philosophus, 8. Eth. 3. Ex hoc quod sunt tres species amabilium, scilicet vtile, et delectabile, honestum seu virtus, oportet tres esse species amationum et amicitiarum: Dicit enim, differunt autem haec adinuicem specie; et amationes ergo et amicitiae aequales numero amabilibus. Et infra 7. Altera autē est amicitiae species, quae secundū superabundantiam, puta patri ad filium, et totaliter seniori ad iuniorem, viroque ad vxorem, et omni imperanti ad imperatum: Differunt autem hae adinuicem; non enim eadē parentibus ad filios, et imperantibus ad imperatos, sed neque patri ad filium, et filio ad patrem; neque viro ad vxorem, et vxori ad virum; Altera enim vnicuique eorum virtus et opus, altera autem et propter quae amant, alterae igitur et amationes et amicitiae. Anselmus quoque De libero arbitrio, 7. facta distinctione de voluntate, in instrumentum naturale, quo volumus, et in vsum seu opus illius, subiungit; Illa quae opus est tam multiplex est quam multa, et quam\n\nsaepe volumus, sicut et visus qui est opus, et visio nominatur tam numerosus est quam numerosa, et quam numerose videmus. Hoc idem potest et breuiter Theologice sic ostendi; Si non gratus posset diligere et facere quodlibet dilectione et factione eiusdem speciet cum grato, posset sine gratia similiter implere omnia mandata, sicut gratus, quod est error Pelagij, sicut capitulum proximum manifestat. Dilectio ergo grati ex gratia et non grati sunt specie differentes. Potest tamen gratus quandoque diligere et operari, non ex gratia sed ex amicitia naturali, ex affectione commodi, ex appetitu delectabilis et vtilis sibi ipsi faciendo actum indifferentem, vel etiam veniale peccatum. Vel ergo instantia comparat actum grati ex gratia procedentem ad actum quemcunque non grati, et tunc illi differunt specie, nec aliquod experimentum ostendit, quod non gratus potest ita fortiter agere actum eiusdem speciei cum actu grati ex gratia procedente; quare non instat; vel comparat actum grati non ex gratia procedentem ad actum non grati similem specie, et sic bene possunt aeque fortiter agere, quia\n\ngratia non coagit, nec adiuuat ibi gratum; quare nec instantia ista instat. Pro secunda, sciendum quod illa nullo modo procedit, quia similiter posset ostendi, quod Deus non agit actum meritorium voluntatis, cuius oppositum patet ex tertio huius, et quarto, et multis capitulis alijs praelibatis. Imaginatur etiam vnum falsum: Si enim A habeat, et sicut habet, partes diuersas, tam gratia quam voluntas efficit ipsum totum, et quamlibet eius partem non diuisim sed coniunctim, non successiue sed simul, sicut Deus et voluntas; sicut etiam duo homines trahunt nauem. Vnde Bernardus De gratia, et libero arbitrio, vicesimo tertio; Ad hoc, inquit, gratia praeuenit liberum arbitrium, vt iam sibi deinceps cooperetur, ita tamen quod a sola gratia caeptum est pariter ab vtroque perficitur, vt mixtim non singillatim, simul non vicissim per singulos effectus operetur, non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opere indiuiduo peragunt, totum quidem hoc, et totum illa, sed vt totum in illa, sic totum ex illa. Tertia tollitur, sicut secunda: Similiter namque posset ostendi, quod Deus non\n\nagit actum liberum et meritorium voluntatis. Quae et ex abundanti nihilominus soluitur, sicut prima: Non enim potest homo sine gratia diligere sub aliquo gradu dilectione illius speciei, cum dilectione a gratia procedente. Vt tamen radicem eius effodiam, dico quod licet non gratus posset diligere similiter specie, sicut gratus ex gratia, instantia non instaret: Non enim ipsum faceret violente et inuite velle aut tam intense velle; sed de volente et reluctante faceret gratis volentem, et voluntarie diligentem; Hoc enim est propriū gratiae, sicut praemissa hic de gratia manifestant. Quod et specialiter manifestat conuersio S. Pauli, et ille quem ad preces Sancti Stephani fundatoris Grandimontensis ordinis, diuina gratia conuertebat. Refert siquidem Williamus de Aluernia partis tertiae sui tripartiti 22 hoc modo, pro quodam tali, qui etiam prohibebat, ne pro eo oraretur, et qui dicebat se nolle vllo modo obtinere gratiam poenitentiae vel conuersionis, eo inuito et renitente orationem fecit pro eo sanctus Stephanus\n\ninstitutor Grandimon. ordinis cum conuentu suo, et exauditus fuit. Cum enim pro illo orastent, venit ad eos homo ille annuntians eis, qualiter visitatus esset, et faciens confessionem de peccatis cum multa deuotione et lacrymis poenitentiam egit: Peccat etiam grauiter eo quod ignorat elenchum. Quomodo namque repugnant, quod aliquis nunc vult vnum, et prius noluit illud, aut voluit eius oppositum? quae repugnantia? aut quare vult talis inuite? Exempli siquidem causa, ponatur quod iste praestituit sibi heri, quod hodie pasceret vnicum pauperem; et quod hodie vberiori gratia visitatus velit pascere duos, et pascat, quae violentia? quae repugnantia inter ista? Videtur quoque multum probabile quod homo potest cum gratia et ex ipsa velle quantumcunque remisse: Potest ergo homo ex gratia diligere sub tanto gradu, quantum sibi praestituit, et quantum fuisset sine gratia habiturus, et etiam sub minori. Quarta peccat vt tertia, et secunda: sic enim posset probari quod Deus non agit liberos actus nostros, et etiam quod gratia confirmationis violentaret voluntatem\n\nconfirmati ad non peccandum, et ad beatificum actum suum, quae tamen vt tertia potest solui. Quinta si quid probaret, probaret similiter quod nec finis, nec species eius in anima, nec eius cognitio mouerent volentem, nec aliquo modo efficerent actum liberum voluntatis contra praemissa 19. et 21 o. huius. Quis etiam Philosophiam parum ingressus, non legit illud capitulum 3i. de Anima, De mouente; vbi satis ostenditur quod phantasia est vna causa mouens animalia, et intellectus homines processiue; quod quomodo debet intelligi, nisi quod phantasia est vna causa efficiens appetitus in illis; intellectus vero, scilicet species obiecti in intellectu, seu actus intelligendi, ipsa scilicet intellectio, voluntatis in istis, quo et qua mouentur animalia et homines processiue, sicut euidenter colligitur ex processu? Quis non videt illum processum 12. Metaphys. vbi ostendit Philosophus quod primum mouens quod est Deus, mouet, vt dicit noua translatio, sicut appetibile et intelligibile mouent non mota, et sicut amatum; et sicut dicit translatio quam Auerroes exponit, mouet sicut desideratum et intellectum,\n\net sicut amatum. Super quod Auerroes comment. 36. Hoc, inquit, mouens est mouens quia agit motum, et quia est finis motus; haec autem differunt in nobis, scilicet id quod mouet nos in loco, secundum quod est agens, et quod mouet nos secundum quod est finis; et habet duplex esse; in anima, et extra animam: Quod enim est in anima, est agens motum, secundum vero quod est extra animam est mouens secundum finem; verbi gratia, quoniam balneum duplicem habet formam, in anima, et extra animam; et extra illlam formam quae est in anima desideramus aliam formam, quae est extra animam, et propter illam formam quae est in anima desideramus aliam formam quae est extra animam; Forma igitur balnei in quantum est in anima, est agens desiderium et motum; secundum autem quod est extra animam, est finis motus non agens. Hoc idem et ratio manifestat; Agnitio namque est necessario praesupposita volutioni; est ergo aliqua causa eius sicut in superioribus est ostensum; et non causa materialis, formalis, neque finalis; est ergo\n\nefficiens causa eius: et haec videtur ratio Philosophi tertio de Anima, vbi fuerat allegatus. Est etiam cognitio naturaliter et essentialiter prior volutione, quare et aliqua causa eius, sicut decimo tertio huius patet, etc. sicut prius. Ex his autem cognoscitur quod non est dissonum rationi sicut sexta supponit, quod agens irrationabile liberum actum agat, imo necessaria ratio hoc requirit; quod tamen solum agens irrationabile hunc faceret, esset, sed quod cum rationabili hunc faciat, nullo modo dissonat rationi. Vltima vero instantia est pure Pelagiana. Probaret enim gratiam non esse necessario requisitam ad obseruantiam mandatorum, nec ad salutem perpetuam consequendam, nec magis obuiat dicenti gratiam esse actiuam, quam non actiuam, dum tamen dicat ipsam requiri necessario ad salutem, sicut necesse est quemlibet dicere, qui Pelagianam haeresin noluerit profiteri, sicut priora capitula manifestant.", "english": "CHAPTER 40. That grace, which is a habit freely given by God, together with the human will, is properly the efficient cause of every good and meritorious act of its own.\n\nAfter this, the grace of God with me will show, as I hope, that grace is properly the efficient cause of every good act [n1]. I mean grace freely given, which is a habit of the soul poured into it freely by God, according to the distinction concerning grace made in 25, of which the preceding chapters also spoke. For if grace were not properly the efficient cause of a good act, a man could fulfil God's commands from his own natural powers without it, and complete any good act, contrary to what was just shown. If one who has grace brings about each of his acts with grace contributing nothing whatever, then he could do so equally with grace removed; for neither the total efficient cause nor even a partial one would be removed. Likewise, if grace or charity does not make the act of human love by which he fulfils the commandment of love, then by the same reasoning faith and hope, which are infused habits, do not make the acts of believing and hoping either, as is clear from what was cited in the preceding chapter. A man could therefore, from himself and his natural endowments, and from what he has naturally acquired, believe, hope, love, and do whatever he ought. That is the manifest error of Pelagius, and contrary to what was just shown.\n\nLikewise, the theological and supernatural virtues are no less effective in bringing about their like acts than the natural virtues, moral and intellectual; yet all of these properly bring about their own acts. For who doubts that natural forms and virtues bring about their acts? And who does not know that moral virtues bring about moral acts, and intellectual virtues likewise such acts? Why else would those lacking these virtues not act in the same way as those who have them, since no effective principle is wanting to them? Hence the Philosopher too, in Ethics 2, chapters 1, 2 and 3 [n2], shows that moral virtues are generated from works, and that, once generated, they generate like works. In chapter 3, after a manifold demonstration of this, he speaks thus: \"It is supposed, then, that virtue is of such a kind as to be productive of the best acts concerning pleasures and pains, and vice the contrary.\" And at the end, concluding, he says: \"Since, then, virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains; and since it is increased by the things from which it comes about, and destroyed when they are not done in like manner; and since it operates concerning the things from which it comes about—let this much be said.\" He also defines, above in the first book, chapter seven [n3], the happy man as one operating according to perfect virtue, and he hints at this very often in many other places.\n\nLikewise grace or charity makes the intention right, lifts up and raises the will, as was shown in the preceding chapter, just as in moral matters moral virtue does, as the Philosopher testifies there, and as is cited more fully in 34 of this book. Likewise virtue, and above all the highest virtue, namely grace or charity, is not less effective than vice; but vice brings about evil acts, and therefore grace or charity brings about good acts. To say nothing of vices morally acquired, who does not know, who does not feel, what sort of acts one radical vice brings about: the law of the members, the tyrant of nature, the tinder of sin, the concupiscence or concupiscibility of our flesh, which the Doctors also commonly call original sin? Our all too frequent and all too violent experience bears witness. The Apostle bears witness: \"I am carnal,\" he says, \"sold under sin; for what I do I do not understand. For I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do. But now it is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me. For I delight in the law of God according to the inner man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and making me captive in the law of sin,\" Rom. 7. The Glosses and the expositions of the saints expounding this passage bear witness. Almost the whole of the 40th distinction of the second book of Lombard's Sentences bears witness [n4], where he also plainly holds this opinion and confirms it from Augustine. For he says: \"Original sin is called the tinder of sin, namely concupiscence, or concupiscibility, which is called the law of the members, or the languor of nature, or the tyrant that is in our members, or the law of the flesh.\" Hence Augustine, in the book On the Baptism of Infants: \"There is in us concupiscence, which must not be permitted to reign; and there are its desires, which are actual concupiscences, which are the weapons of the Devil, which come from the languor of nature;\n\nbut that languor is the tyrant who stirs up evil desires.\" And below: \"By the name of concupiscence he signified not the act of desiring but the depraved vice, when he called it the law of the flesh.\" Hence the same Augustine, in the Treatise on the Words of the Apostle, says: \"There is always a fight in the body of this death, because the concupiscence itself with which we were born cannot be ended as long as we live; it can be diminished daily, but it cannot be ended. And what is the concupiscence with which we were born? It is a vice, to be sure, which makes an infant capable of desiring, and renders an adult desirous.\" Since cupidity is so combative, so effective, and so manifoldly active, how does charity restrain it, diminish it and overcome it, if it does absolutely nothing, if it moves nothing at all, if it is utterly idle? Not so, the Apostle does not so think, in 1 Cor. 13: \"Charity,\" he says, \"is patient, is kind, is not envious, does not act perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, does not seek its own, is not provoked, thinks no evil, does not rejoice over iniquity,\" as though he were plainly saying: it does not do these things but their contraries. So he immediately adds: \"but rejoices together with the truth; it bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.\" Augustine too, in On the Four Virtues of Charity, beautifully shows that it tolerates all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Hence among other things, in the person of Abraham, to whom he assigns the second of these virtues, he says: \"The virtue of charity abiding in me believes all things, and does, and says. For I hear it speaking within, to the heart, without the noise of a voice.\" And below: \"O charity, you who can do so much in this fight of mortality, still anxious, how much will you be able to do in that perfect peace, secure?\" The same Augustine, in the Enchiridion, next to last: \"Cupidity is diminished as charity grows, until it comes here to so great a magnitude that none greater can be; but there, who could set out how great charity will be, where there will be no cupidity for it to overcome by restraining? When health will be supreme, when there will be no struggle of death?\" The same, to Anastasius, as Peter cites in Sentences 2, dist. 26: \"Without the Spirit the will of man is not free. For since it is conquered by desires, it is not free for the good unless it has been set free; and it is not set free unless charity is poured out in hearts through the Spirit. The will is not free unless grace sets it free through the law of faith; that is, it is not free without faith working through love, and that will is sufficiently and truly good. For the fruit that does not spring from the root of charity is not good; but if faith working through love is present, delight in the good comes about.\"\n\nHe also, in On the Spirit and the Letter, 13, says: \"That fruit is not good which does not spring from the root of charity.\" And, as Peter recites in Sentences 3, dist. 31, he speaks thus: \"The root of all evils is cupidity, and the root of all goods is charity. But what sort of root is charity? Living or dead? Not dead; that is plain. And how can it be living, if it sprouts or produces no living work or fruit?\" The same, in the first sermon on Psalm 31, treating that saying of the Apostle in Rom. 13, \"The fullness of the law is love,\" or charity, according to another translation, speaks thus: \"Does charity permit you to do anything evil to him whom you love? But perhaps all you do is no evil, and no good either. Therefore charity does not permit you not to render to him whom you love whatever you can. Is not that charity which prays even for enemies? Therefore he does not desert a friend who wishes his enemy well. And so, if faith is without love, it will be without work. But lest you think much about the work of faith, add to it hope and love, and do not wonder what you will do; for love itself cannot be idle.\" Gregory agrees with this, in Homily 27 on the Gospel, expounding that saying of John 15, \"This is my commandment, that you love one another\": \"Every commandment is of love alone, and all are one commandment, because whatever is commanded is made firm in charity alone. For as the many branches of a tree come forth from one root, so many virtues are generated from one charity, and a branch of good work has nothing of greenness if it does not remain in the root of charity. The Lord's precepts, therefore, are both many and one: many by the diversity of work, one in the root of love.\" He also says below, Homily 30: \"The love of God is never idle; for it works great things, if it is; but if it refuses to work, it is not love.\" And Peter, in Sentences 2, dist. 26, says that grace itself is not idle, but merits to be increased, that once increased it may merit also to be perfected. Again the Apostle, to the Galatians 5, says that faith works through charity; and again in 1 Cor. 15: \"By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been empty, but I have laboured more abundantly than all of them: yet not I, but the grace of God with me.\"\n\nWho, then, would say that charity or grace does absolutely nothing? If anyone thinks so, let him read the books and expositions of Augustine and the other Doctors on these authorities, and on very many other similar ones, and he will cease to think so. The very many authorities cited in the preceding chapters bear the same witness. Among them, those of Augustine in the Hypognosticon 60 [n5], in On the Gift of Perseverance 48, 36 of this book, and in To Simplicianus 1, 24, and that of Anselm's On Concord and On Truth, were touched on and set out in the preceding chapter. And who, having entered even a little way into the outer court of Theology, would be ignorant of that very common division concerning operating and cooperating grace, when nearly all the Doctors and their disciples affirm it most frequently? Hence Peter too, in the second book of the Sentences, Distinctions 5, 26, 27 and 29, carefully expounds it. He also, in distinction 25, last, speaking of the liberty of nature and of grace, says: \"The Apostle notes both liberties when, in the person of a man not redeemed, he says, 'To will is present\n\nwith me, but to accomplish I do not find,' as if he were saying: I have the liberty of nature, but I do not have the liberty of grace; therefore the perfection of the good is not in me. For the will of man, which he has by nature, cannot be raised to effectively willing the good, or to fulfilling it in deed, unless it is freed and helped through grace so that it may complete it. For, as the Apostle says, 'It is not of the one who wills to will, nor of the one who runs to run'—that is, to act—'but of God who has mercy,' who works in us both to will and to work the good. The will or work of man does not summon his grace; rather grace itself comes before the will, preparing it to will the good, and helps the prepared will lest it will in vain, that is, so that it may complete.\" And in dist. 26 he adds immediately: \"This is operating and cooperating grace. For operating grace prepares the will of man to will the good; cooperating grace helps lest it will in vain.\" Hence Augustine, in the book On Grace and Free Choice: \"By cooperating, God completes in us what he began by operating, because he himself works, beginning, that we may will; and he cooperates, completing, with those who will. That we may will, then, he works; when we will, and so will that we complete, he cooperates with us; yet without him, whether working that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we can do nothing in the good works of piety.\"\n\nAnd Peter adds: \"From these words it is sufficiently clear which grace is operating and which cooperating. For operating grace is that which comes before the will (for by it the will of man is freed and prepared, so that it may be good and will the good effectively); but cooperating grace follows the already good will, helping it.\" Further on he also cites Augustine, in On the Predestination of the Saints, saying that grace is not given according to other merits, but brings about all good merits. In the twenty-seventh distinction too he writes thus: \"Some, not unlearnedly, teach that virtue is a good quality or form of the mind, which informs the soul, and is not itself a motion or affection of the mind; but by it free choice is helped to be moved and raised toward the good; and thus from virtue and free choice a good motion or affection of the mind is born.\" Straightaway he says that it is likewise with grace and the human will. And below: \"In meriting good things the position of principal cause is attributed to grace, because the principal cause of good merits is grace itself, by which free choice is aroused, and the will of man is healed and helped to be good. That will is itself also a gift of God, and a merit of man—indeed of grace, because it is principally from grace, and is grace.\" Hence Augustine, to Sixtus the priest: \"What is the merit of man before grace, when it is grace alone that makes in us every good merit of ours?\" For from grace, as has been said, which comes before and heals the choice of man, and from that choice itself, a good affection, or good motion of the mind, is procured in the soul, and this is man's first good merit. For example, from faith, virtue, and man's choice there is generated in the mind a certain good and remunerable motion, namely believing itself; so too from charity and free choice there arises another motion, very good, namely loving. So is it to be understood of the other virtues. The same Peter says [n6], in Sentences 3, dist. 36, that charity is the mother of all virtues. But what sort of mother? Barren or fruitful? And how barren, when she is a mother? But if she is fruitful, how does she bear nothing? Here, however, many friends of the Pelagians try to respond in manifold ways. Yet they all agree in this one thing: that grace, a created virtue, or charity, does not truly and properly bring about good acts as regards the substance of the acts. Either it brings about nothing at all, or only in some improper and transferred way [n7].\n\nSome, for instance, say that the created virtue, grace or charity, in no way brings about good acts, but only uncreated grace and charity, which is God and the Holy Spirit of God; and so they understand all the authorities that say that grace or charity brings about any act. But even if these men could somehow evade by this means certain of the authorities set out above, they cannot evade the arguments. Indeed any Catholic who looks with sound eyes at some such Authorities on the surface of the letter, and at others a little deeper within, can at once perceive another meaning, namely about created grace and charity. Hence Peter too, in Sentences 2, dist. 27, among other things cited above, says: \"When good merits are said to be from grace and to begin from it, either grace freely giving is understood, that is, God, or rather grace freely given, which comes before the will of man (for it would be no great thing if these merits were said to be from God, from whom are all things); but rather his grace freely given is understood, from which good merits begin. And when they are said to be from grace alone, free choice is not excluded, since there is no merit in an adult man that does not come through free choice; but in meriting good things the position of principal cause is attributed to grace, because the principal cause of good merits is grace itself, by which free choice is aroused, and the will of man is healed and helped to be good.\" Others say that grace is said to bring about a good act because it arouses the will so that the will itself may bring about the good act. But these too are reasonably convicted by the arguments set out above. Likewise, if grace arouses the will, it moves the will in some way, and does some act; and if it does this by coming before the will, which is not yet acting, why can it not, by like reasoning, co-act the meritorious act with the will when the will is acting? Who indeed, unless\n\nungrateful to grace, will give to the grace of God the worse act, or the less good, and to its own natural powers the better? For who does not know that the meritorious act is incomparably better than the bare arousal to it, with which it is consistent to merit nothing—indeed, to sin? But what was alleged in the earlier chapters does not permit this. Moreover, a man or an angel could will and do without such an arouser, since it contributes nothing, either here or there; and therefore could fulfil all God's commands without grace, which is the error of Pelagius, as the preceding chapter recited. Moreover, the human will could likewise be aroused by something that is not grace: by reason, for example, by moral virtue, by a teacher, by natural impulse or inclination, and by various other things; so these other things, without grace, suffice for doing the commands. According to this, too, the created will would be a more principal cause of merit than grace; for the will principally, indeed singly, brings about merit, while grace only arouses to acting. But this is plainly against the Apostle cited above: \"I have laboured more abundantly than all of them, yet not I, but the grace of God with me.\"\n\nFor how else is this to be understood than as \"not I principally and grace instrumentally,\" but the reverse? The saying of Lombard cited above against the immediately preceding response also plainly attests this. Others judge that grace makes good acts not effectively but only formally, as whiteness makes a subject white, and the soul makes a thing animate, and any form its formed thing. But these views can be refuted by the arguments and authorities set out above. Further, grace, which is an infused habit, is not the natural and essential form of the act of willing of the one in grace [n8], just as no habit is the form of its own act. For the act is more actual than the habit; it is neither the natural subject of the habit nor composed of habit and act [n9] as of form and matter, but is simple. Nor is grace the material cause of the good act, namely of due love of God and neighbour, nor the final cause, as no one is ignorant; nor the efficient cause, as these men say. So a man could perform that act, and fulfil the commands, without grace, from his natural powers alone, as Pelagius raved; for no required cause would be lacking. But if anyone says that grace is an improper form, and in a way actual [n10] of the good act, namely because it informs the will performing that act, he falls into the sea of Pelagius spoken of above [n11].\n\nHe must also say, consequently, that every act proceeding from such a will is good and graced, because it is similarly informed by grace. This is not true of the acts of infants, nor of all the acts of adults, since it is not true of indifferent acts nor of venial sins. By the same reasoning every act of a wise man would be wise, or wisely done, an act of a temperate man temperate, or temperately done, and in the same way with all the virtues and vices, which no one doubts to be false. These men also posit grace as \"empty,\" against the Apostle, that is, idle, as the Gloss explains; so they themselves appear empty and void of grace. Still others think that grace is said to do good acts because it binds and restrains resisting concupiscence, and with concupiscence bound the graced will produces graced acts. But the arguments and authorities set out above convict these men too. How, moreover, does grace bind and restrain resisting concupiscence if it does absolutely nothing, as was touched on above? Or if grace does anything toward the repression of concupiscence, why not toward the production of a good act, by like reasoning, as was argued above against the second response?\n\nMoreover, men established in grace sometimes have concupiscence so strong, and at times stronger than men destitute of grace, as the lives of many saints show, and St Paul especially, in 1 Cor. 12, plainly concerning himself [n12]. Therefore such men destitute of grace can do good acts and fulfil God's commands, just as such men established in grace can. Hence these too, like the former, are swallowed up by the whirlpool of the Pelagian sea. The same can be shown in another way. To the degree that concupiscence is bound and quieted by grace, to that degree it could be quieted by moral virtues, by medicine, by natural alteration, and in some by their own natural complexion. Such men could therefore, by the power of nature, without grace of this kind, keep all of God's commands; so these men too slip back into the sea of Pelagius. To the same point: if one in grace, whose concupiscence is only a little repressed by grace, can produce a great act and great merit, then one not in grace, hindered somewhat more by a somewhat greater concupiscence, can also produce a like act, though perhaps proportionally smaller, and perhaps better in proportion as it is more difficult, as the preceding chapter argued. For similar unequal causes produce similar unequal effects. Hence the Philosopher, in On the Heavens 3, 72 [n13], rejecting those who posit that fire burns because of angles, that is, because of the sharpness of the angles, says: \"If fire heats and burns because of angles, all the elements will be heat-producing, but perhaps one more than another; for all have angles: for instance that of eight bases, and that of twelve bases, and the pyramid, and for Democritus the sphere as well, an angle being what burns; they differ, therefore, in that they do so more and less.\" Moreover, on this view the angel and man in the state of innocence before the fall would not at all have needed grace in order to merit; for he did not have resisting concupiscence, the opposite of which the preceding chapter was showing. Hence Augustine too, Enchiridion 87: \"That immortality,\" he says, \"in which human nature was able not to die, it lost through free choice; this one, in which it will not be able to die, it will receive through grace, which, had it not sinned, it was to receive\n\nthrough merit,\" though even then it would not have been without grace, nor could any merit have existed without it [n14]. For even if sin lay in free choice alone, free choice nevertheless was not sufficient for retaining justice, unless divine help were supplied through participation in the unchanging good. Peter too proves and holds the same in Sentences 2, dist. 5, 24 and 29. Others opine that grace is said to make good acts because, by marking the soul with a character for the Lord and clothing it in the Lord's garment, it makes the soul terrible to the adverse power, so that the adversary does not dare to attack it, as he does another soul that lacks these; and thus such a graced soul can freely do graced works. But these, like the last, will be driven into the pit of destruction, into the sea of Pelagius. Others judge that grace is said to bring about good acts because it frees and justifies man from sin, which had hindered him from doing good acts. But these men, together with their father Pelagius, will be refuted by the principal arguments and authorities, and also by those set out against the fourth response. The Pelagians are also specially reprobated on account of this opinion. For they posit, as Augustine recites in On Grace and Free Choice 16, that only that grace by which sins are forgiven us is not given according to our merits, but that which we await at the end, namely eternal life, is given according to our merits; for they understand our merits to exist for us from ourselves, not from the grace of God nor from God. Hence Augustine, after reciting this error of the Pelagians, adds: \"They must be answered thus: if they understood our merits in such a way that they also recognized them to be gifts of God, this opinion would not need to be reproved. But since they so proclaim human merits as to say that man has them from himself, the Apostle most rightly answers: 'For who will distinguish you? And what do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?' Quite rightly it is said to one thinking such things: God crowns his own gifts, not your merits. If your merits are yours from yourself and not from him, they are evils that God crowns; but if they are good, they are God's gifts, namely through his grace freely given.\" In the Council of Milevis too, held against the Pelagians, at which Augustine was present, as is clear from Epistle 134 among his epistles, and which is found in the Canon, De consecratione, distinction 4 [n15], it was concordantly decreed that whoever says that the grace of God by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord avails only for the remission of sins already committed, and not as a help that they may not be committed, is anathema. There are also many other little twisted responses, which by what has been set out here and in the earlier chapters will easily be set straight, with the help of God's grace, or rather with it working as the principal agent.\n\nAfter this, however, an objection is raised against these points. For if grace properly brings about the graced act, the graced man will act more easily and more strongly than the ungraced. For the one has the great help of grace, the other none; and the opposite of this, as it seems, the most ungrateful sinners show by experience. Likewise, let A be one whole meritorious act, done by grace and the human will; let B be the part of A done by grace; and let C be the part of it done by the human will alone. Therefore C is meritorious, or A is so only on account of C, because C alone is done by the free will of man; for in the will all merit consists. Likewise, let a man set before himself a definite degree of love, which he would have without cooperating grace. Then, if he loves with grace cooperating, he will love beyond that degree; he will therefore love at least this intensely, but violently and unwillingly, and hence not meritoriously. So grace, if it is posited as active, removes merit and freedom of choice. Likewise, grace and the human will are either equally powerful or not equally. If equally, each can prevent the other from doing anything, and so grace could violently keep a man from sinning, and from willing this or that; and so everyone having such grace would be finally confirmed. If not equally, then either grace is the more powerful or the will. If grace, the absurdity just mentioned returns; grace can also make the will will unwillingly, and hold it unwilling in the act of willing. If the will is more powerful than grace, the will can be weakened, or grace strengthened, until it is equally powerful or more powerful; and if this is posited, the difficulty is posited again. Likewise, since grace is an irrational agent, and does not act from election, if it acts it necessarily always acts to the utmost of its power, as far as it can; so whatever action of whatever species or degree grace, or the graced man, performs once, he performs always. Nor does it seem in accord with reason that an irrational agent should do a free act, and freely, rather than by necessity of nature. Likewise, it would then not be in man's power to keep the commandments, nor to be saved, since it is not in his power to have such grace, which is necessarily required. Many similar objections could also be raised; but when these are solved, the solution of the rest like them will be clear, God's grace revealing it. These ungrateful objections [n16], however, must be answered with the help of grace. To the first, then: what theologian doubts that charity and grace make the yoke of the Lord sweet and his burden light, when so many Doctors teach this, in so many places? Isaiah, God's secretary, saw this as well, who says: \"He who gives strength to the weary, and multiplies might and strength for those who are not. Boys will faint and labour, and young men will fall in weakness. But those who hope in the Lord will renew their strength, they will take wings like eagles, they will run and not labour, they will walk and not faint,\" Isa. 40. Wherefore\n\nconcerning the wicked, in the person of the wicked, the Wise Man speaks thus: \"We are wearied in the way of iniquity and perdition, and we have walked difficult ways; but the ways of the Lord we have not known\"; and Scripture offers many similar sayings besides. But for a more sufficient and more subtle solution of this objection it must be noted that, according to what was shown in the preceding chapter, the proper operation of charity and grace is to love God dearly and freely above all things, finally for his own sake, and so to do all the rest for God's sake. No one lacking charity and grace can have such love and operation; but as long as he lacks them, he necessarily loves most of all his own advantage and himself, and for the sake of his own advantage and himself does all the rest as final end. The love and operation of charity or grace, then, that is, of one with charity and grace, proceeding from charity and grace, differs in species from the love and operation of one without charity and grace. For just as the objects of loves, the things finally loved, differ in species, so do their proper loves; so it is also in proper and distinct knowledge and vision. Otherwise all willings and loves would be of the same species [n17]\n\nmost specific, and all cognitions and visions likewise; and so for the other powers, and for any proper operations whatsoever. Hence the Philosopher too, in Ethics 8, 3 [n18]: \"Since there are three species of the lovable, namely the useful, the pleasant, and the honorable or virtuous, there must be three species of lovings and of friendships.\" For he says, \"these differ from one another in species; and so the lovings and friendships are equal in number to the lovable things.\" And below, in 7: \"There is another species of friendship, which is according to superiority: for example, that of a father to a son, and generally of an elder to a younger, of a husband to a wife, and of every ruler to the ruled. These differ from one another; for it is not the same for parents toward children and for rulers toward the ruled, nor even for a father toward a son and a son toward a father, nor for a husband toward a wife and a wife toward a husband. For the virtue and the work of each of them is different, and different too are the reasons for which they love; so the lovings and the friendships are different.\" Anselm also, in On Free Choice, 7 [n19], having distinguished in the will between the natural instrument by which we will and its use or work, adds: \"That which is the work is as manifold as the things we will are many, and as often as we will; just as sight, which is the work and is called vision, is as numerous as the things we see are numerous, and as many times as we see.\"\n\nThe same can also be shown briefly, in theological terms, as follows. If one not in grace [n20] could love and do anything with a love and a doing of the same species as that of one in grace, he could likewise fulfil all the commandments without grace, as the one in grace does; and that is the error of Pelagius, as the preceding chapter makes clear. The love, then, of one in grace proceeding from grace, and that of one not in grace, differ in species. Yet one in grace can sometimes love and act not from grace but from natural friendship, from affection for his own advantage, from desire for what is pleasant and useful to himself, performing an indifferent act or even a venial sin. So the objection [n21] either compares an act of one in grace proceeding from grace with any act whatever of one not in grace, and then they differ in species, and no experience shows that one not in grace can perform so strongly an act of the same species as the act of one in grace proceeding from grace; so it does not stand. Or it compares an act of one in grace not proceeding from grace with a similar act of one not in grace, of the same species; and then they can indeed act equally strongly, because grace neither compels nor helps the one in grace there; so neither does this objection stand.\n\nAs for the second, it must be known that it in no way goes through, because in the same way it could be shown that God does not produce the meritorious act of the will, the opposite of which is clear from the third chapter of this book, and the fourth, and many other chapters touched on before. It also imagines one falsehood. For if A has diverse parts, as he does have, then grace and will alike produce the whole of him and each part of him, not separately but jointly, not successively but simultaneously, as God and the will do; just as two men pull a boat. Hence Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice, the twenty-third [n22]: \"To this end,\" he says, \"grace goes before free choice, that henceforth it may cooperate with it; yet in such a way that what was begun by grace alone is equally completed by both, so that it works in combination, not singly, and together, not in turn, through each individual effect; not partly grace and partly free choice, but each performs the single works as a whole in one undivided act: the whole this one, and the whole that one; but as the whole is in the one, so the whole is from the other.\" The third is dismissed like the second: for in the same way it could be shown that God does not produce the free and meritorious act of the will. This too is resolved over and above, nonetheless, like the first: for a man cannot, without grace, love in any degree with a love of the same species as the love proceeding from grace. But to dig up its root, I say that even if one not in grace could love in the same species as one in grace from grace, the objection would not stand. For grace would not make him will violently and unwillingly, or so intensely; rather, from one willing and resisting, it would make one freely willing [n23] and voluntarily loving; for this is proper to grace, as what has been set out above about grace shows. The conversion of St Paul makes this especially clear, and so does that of the man whom divine grace converted at the prayers of St Stephen, founder of the Grandmontine order. For William of Auvergne reports, in the third part of his Tripartite, 22 [n24], in this manner: for a certain man of this kind, who even forbade that prayer be made for him, and who said that he did not want in any way to obtain the grace of repentance or conversion, though he was unwilling and resisting, Saint Stephen made prayer for him,\n\nthe founder of the Grandmont order, together with his community; and he was heard. For while they were praying for him, that man came to them announcing how he had been visited, and, making confession of his sins with much devotion and tears, did penance. It [n25] also errs gravely in that it ignores the refutation. For how do they conflict, that someone now wills one thing and earlier did not will it, or willed its opposite? What conflict is there? Or why does such a man will unwillingly? For example, suppose that he resolved for himself yesterday that today he would feed a single poor man, and that today, visited with a richer grace, he wants to feed two, and does feed them: what violence is there? What conflict between these things? It also seems very probable that a man can, with grace and from it, will however remissly. So a man can, from grace, love in as great a degree as he resolved for himself, and as he would have had without grace, and even in a lesser degree. The fourth errs like the third and the second: for in this way it could be proved that God does not produce our free acts, and also that the grace of confirmation would do violence to the will\n\nof the one confirmed, as regards not sinning and his beatific act; and yet this can be resolved as the third was. The fifth, if it proved anything, would prove likewise that neither the end, nor its species in the soul, nor the cognition of it moves one who wills, nor in any way brings about the free act of the will; against what was set out in chapters 19 and 21 of this book. And who that has even slightly entered philosophy has not read that chapter of the third book of On the Soul, \"On the Mover\" [n26], where it is sufficiently shown that imagination is one cause moving animals, and the intellect men, in locomotion? How is this to be understood, except that imagination is one efficient cause of appetite in them, and the intellect (that is, the species of the object in the intellect, or the act of understanding, the intellection itself) is likewise one efficient cause of will in these [n27]; by which and through which animals and men are moved in locomotion, as is evidently gathered from the course of the text? Who does not see that course of argument in Metaphysics 12, where the Philosopher shows that the first mover, which is God, moves, as the new translation says [n28], as the desirable and the intelligible move, themselves unmoved, and as the loved; and, as the translation which Averroes expounds says, moves as the desired and the understood\n\nand as the loved? On which Averroes, comment 36, says: \"This mover is a mover because it produces the motion, and because it is the end of the motion; but these differ in us: namely, that which moves us in place, insofar as it is an agent, and that which moves us insofar as it is an end. And it has a twofold being: in the soul, and outside the soul. For that which is in the soul is the agent of the motion, but insofar as it is outside the soul it is a mover as end. For example, since the bath has a twofold form, in the soul and outside the soul, beyond that form which is in the soul we desire another form, which is outside the soul, and on account of that form which is in the soul we desire another form which is outside the soul. The form of the bath, then, insofar as it is in the soul, is the agent of desire and motion; but insofar as it is outside the soul, it is the end of the motion, not the agent.\" Reason shows the same. For cognition is necessarily presupposed to willing; so it is some cause of it, as was shown above; and it is not a material, formal or final cause; so it is\n\nits efficient cause: and this seems to be the reasoning of the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul, where he was cited. Cognition is also naturally and essentially prior to willing; hence it too is some cause of it, as is clear from the thirteenth of this book, etc., as before. From these things it is known that it is not dissonant with reason, as the sixth supposes, that an irrational agent should perform a free act; indeed necessary reason requires this [n29]. If an irrational agent alone did this, it would be so; but that it does this together with a rational agent is in no way dissonant with reason. The last objection is purely Pelagian. For it would prove that grace is not necessarily required for the observance of the commandments, nor for attaining everlasting salvation; and it is no more an obstacle to one who says that grace is active than to one who says it is not active, provided he says that it is necessarily required for salvation, as everyone must say who is unwilling to profess the Pelagian heresy, as the earlier chapters make clear.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Gratia Dei mecum (\"the grace of God with me\") anticipates the Pauline text, 1 Cor 15:10, that Bradwardine cites below at 365D–E: non ego, sed gratia Dei mecum. The author presents himself as a man helped by cooperating grace."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Savile's \"Eth. 1.2 & 3\" with \"2\" is Nicomachean Ethics II, chapters 1–3 (Ethics 2, 1–3). The \"supposition\" and the closing sentence quoted are from the end of II.3 (1105a). Savile's numbering of Aristotle's books and chapters is kept throughout (Conventions §5.4)."}, {"n": 3, "text": "\"Above in the first book, chapter seven\" is Nicomachean Ethics I.7 (1098a), where the human good is defined as activity of the soul according to virtue, in a complete life. Savile's \"1i 7o\" is not expanded further."}, {"n": 4, "text": "The fomes and original sin are treated in Lombard, Sent. II, dist. 30–31. The printed \"40\" is apparently a slip for 30, but it is kept as Savile prints it."}, {"n": 5, "text": "The Hypognosticon (Hypomnesticon) is a work once ascribed to Augustine and now regarded as spurious. The numbers that follow (60; 48; \"36 of this book\"; 24) are Savile's, and the third presumably refers to chapter 36 of Book I. They are given without expansion."}, {"n": 6, "text": "Idem (\"the same\") follows a citation of Augustine, but the reference \"3. sent.\" makes it Peter Lombard. The questions \"what sort of mother?…\" are Bradwardine's own."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Transumpto: transumptio is the scholastic term for metaphorical or transferred use of a word. The Pelagians' friends allow \"efficient cause\" of grace only in a figurative sense."}, {"n": 8, "text": "Grati: Bradwardine's gratus is \"one who has grace\" (pleasing to God, in grace). It is rendered \"graced\" or \"one in grace\", and non gratus \"ungraced\" or \"one not in grace\", so that the gratia family stays visible. Ingratus (the \"ungrateful\") keeps its ordinary sense but plays on the same root."}, {"n": 9, "text": "The variant alio (\"and another\") for actu would give \"composed of the habit and something else, as of form and matter\". The main reading (\"habit and act\") is awkward but construes, as the act is not a composite of habit and a further act. The text is therefore left as printed."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The variant accidentalis, \"an improper and in a way accidental form\", would be easier than the main reading actualis. Both construe, and the main reading is kept."}, {"n": 11, "text": "Pelagus Pelagij, \"the sea of Pelagius\", is a pun that cannot be kept in English: Greek pelagos, \"sea\", resembles the name Pelagius. Here and below the \"sea\" is Pelagianism, in which the opponents are drowned (also \"the whirlpool of the Pelagian sea\")."}, {"n": 12, "text": "The thorn in the flesh and the angel of Satan are in 2 Cor 12:7, not 1 Cor 12; Savile prints \"1. ad Cor. 12\"."}, {"n": 13, "text": "De caelo III.8 (306b), on Democritus and the shapes of the elements. \"72\" is Savile's number, presumably the number of the text or comment in the medieval Aristotle–Averroes edition. The quotation follows the medieval Latin of the passage."}, {"n": 14, "text": "The sentence adapts Augustine, Enchiridion: quamvis nec tunc sine gratia, \"though not even then without grace\". Savile's \"sine gratia nec fuerat tunc\" is kept as printed and construed in the sense Augustine's text gives."}, {"n": 15, "text": "The Council of Milevis (416) is meant. Gratian's Decretum, De consecratione, D.4, is \"the Canon\". \"Epistle 134\" is Savile's number; in modern numbering the Milevis correspondence is among Augustine's Epp. 175–176."}, {"n": 16, "text": "Ingratas instantias: instantia is the technical term for an objection. Ingratas (\"graceless\", \"ungrateful\") puns on gratia, and the phrase is rendered \"ungrateful objections\"."}, {"n": 17, "text": "The unit ends mid-sentence at 369A; Savile's print continues at 369B with specialissimae (\"the most specific species\"), in the next stretch."}, {"n": 18, "text": "Savile's \"Eth. 8, 3\" and \"infra 7\" are Nicomachean Ethics VIII.3 (1156a) and VIII.7 (1158b), in the medieval division. Per the conventions, Savile's numbers are kept. The second quotation is a close paraphrase of the Latin translation Bradwardine used, not a word-for-word match."}, {"n": 19, "text": "Savile's reference is De libero arbitrio 7. The distinction of the will into instrument, affection and use is found in Anselm's De concordia III (c. 11); I have not verified the exact source of the quotation. I translate the reference as Savile gives it."}, {"n": 20, "text": "Gratus (opposed to non gratus) is the one who has grace, the one \"pleasing\" to God. It is the same word as \"grateful\", and its pairing with charus in the previous unit (\"of one with charity and grace\") makes the sense clear. I render it \"one in grace\" and \"one not in grace\"."}, {"n": 21, "text": "Instantia is a counterexample or objection raised against a thesis. This chapter answers a numbered series of them, the \"first\" to the \"last\". The pun in instantia non instat cannot be kept; I render it \"does not stand\"."}, {"n": 22, "text": "In modern divisions this is Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio 14 (§47); Savile's \"twenty-third\" is an older section number. In the final clause both Bernard's text and the print give in illa … ex illa. With hoc = arbitrium and illa = gratia, the sense is that the whole is \"in\" free choice and \"from\" grace. I give that sense, not the literal \"in it, from it\"."}, {"n": 23, "text": "Gratis volentem: \"freely\", \"gratuitously\", with the sound of gratia behind it. In keeping with the conventions I give the sense \"freely willing\" and note the jingle, which English cannot reproduce."}, {"n": 24, "text": "William of Auvergne (d. 1249), the Tripartite being his Magisterium divinale. \"22\" is left as Savile prints it. The \"Saint Stephen\" is Stephen of Muret (d. 1124), founder of Grandmont, not the protomartyr. The sentence runs over the page turn (369E/370A), so the English breaks after \"Saint Stephen made prayer for him\"."}, {"n": 25, "text": "The subject of peccat is the objection under discussion, here the third (compare \"The fourth errs like the third\"). Ignorat elenchum is the fallacy ignoratio elenchi: the objection misses what is actually at issue."}, {"n": 26, "text": "Savile prints \"3i.\" and the keyed text has the same. I read tertii, \"of the third [book]\". Processiue is \"in locomotion\", i.e. motus processivus, moving from place to place, as in the Aristotelian tradition on animal movement."}, {"n": 27, "text": "The Latin has no verb or noun for \"cause\" in the second member: intellectus vero … voluntatis in istis. The words \"is likewise one efficient cause\" are supplied from the parallel first member."}, {"n": 28, "text": "The noua translatio of Metaphysics XII is the newer Greek-based Latin version, in contrast to the older translation that Averroes comments on. Savile's text does not name either."}, {"n": 29, "text": "The sense of quod tamen solum agens irrationabile hunc faceret, esset is elliptical: esset has no predicate in the print. From the contrast that follows, the missing word is \"dissonant with reason\". I supply \"so\" and do not emend the Latin."}], "errata": [{"address": "365C", "keyed": "mor•ua", "print": "mortua"}, {"address": "365D", "keyed": "ronuit", "print": "renuit"}, {"address": "365E", "keyed": "altas", "print": "alias"}, {"address": "366E", "keyed": "causa principalitas", "print": "causae principalitas"}, {"address": "366E", "keyed": "praemisias", "print": "praemissas"}, {"address": "366E", "keyed": "cut", "print": "cur"}, {"address": "367E", "keyed": "iuerat", "print": "fuerat"}, {"address": "369A", "keyed": "speciel", "print": "speciei"}, {"address": "369C", "keyed": "speciet", "print": "speciei"}, {"address": "370A", "keyed": "orastent", "print": "orassent (print: oraſſent, long-s pair)"}, {"address": "370C", "keyed": "illlam", "print": "illam"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p364A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p364A", "locator_display": "364A", "source_text": "CAP. XL. Quod gratia, quae est habitus gratis datus a Deo vna cum voluntate humana est causa efficiens proprie cuiuslibet boni et meritorij actus sui.", "english": "CHAPTER 40. That grace, which is a habit freely given by God, together with the human will, is properly the efficient cause of every good and meritorious act of its own.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p364B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p364B", "locator_display": "364B–364E", "source_text": "POST haec autem gratia Dei mecum ostendet, vt spero, quod ipsa est causa efficiens proprie cuiuslibet actus boni; gratia scilicet gratis data, quae est habitus animae a Deo gratis infusus, iuxta distinctionem de gratia 25. factam, de qua etiam capitula proxima loquebantur. Si nempe gratia non esset causa efficiens proprie actus boni, posset homo ex naturalibus proprijs sine ipsa implere Dei mandata, et perficere quemlibet actum bonum contra proximo praeostensa: Si enim habens gratiam efficit quemlibet actum suum, gratia nihil penitus coagente, sic posset et ipsa remota; Non enim remoueretur causa efficiens totalis, nec etiam partialis. Item si gratia seu charitas non faciat actum dilectionis humanae quo implet mandatum de dilectione, eadem ratione nec fides et spes, habitus infusi, vt patet per capitulo proximo allegata, faciunt actus credendi, et sperandi. Posset igitur homo ex se et suis naturalibus, et naturaliter acquisitis,\n\ncredere, sperare, diligere, et facere quicquid debet, quod est error Pelagij manifestus, et contra proximo praeostensa. Item virtutes Theologicae et supernaturales non sunt minus efficaces similum actuum, quam virtutes naturales, morales, et intellectuales; sed hae omnes efficiunt proprie actus suos: Quis enim dubitat formas et virtutes naturales efficere suos actus? Et quis nesciat virtutes morales efficere actus morales, et virtutes intellectuales conformiter actus tales? cur aliter, non similiter operarentur carentes istis virtutibus, sicut eas habentes, ex quo eis non deest aliquod principium effectiuum? Quare et Philos. 2. Eth. 1.2. et 3. ostendit virtutes morales ex operibus generari, ipsas que generatas similia opera generare; vbi et cap. 3. post ostensionem huius multiplicem, ita dicit; Supponitur ergo virtus esse talis circa voluptates et tristitias optimorum operatiua, malitia autem contrarium; Et infra finaliter concludendo, sic ait, Quoniam quidem igitur est virtus circa delectationes et tristitias; et quoniam ex quibus fit, ab his et augetur, et corrumpitur non similiter factis; et quoniam ex quibus fit,\n\ncirca haec et operatur, dictum sit. Qui et supra 1i 7o definit Felicem secundum virtutem perfectam operantē, quod et sae pissime innuit alijs locis multis. Itē gratia seu charitas facit intentionem rectā, eleuat et erigit voluntatē, sicut capitulo proximo est ostensum, sicuti et in moralibus facit virtus moralis, teste Philos. ibi, et 34. huius plenius allegato. Item virtus, et maxime summa virtus scilicet gratia seu charitas non est minus efficax quam vitium; vitiū autem efficit actus malos: quare et gratia seu charitas actus bonos. Vt autem taceā de vitijs moraliter acquisitis, quis nesciat, quis non sentiat quales actus efficiat vnum vitium radicale, lex membrorum tyrannus naturae, fomes peccati, concupiscentia seu concupiscibilitas carnis nostrae, quod et plerunque peccatum originale a Doctoribus appellatur? testis est experientia nimis crebra, nimium violenta; Testis est Apostolus, Ego inquiens, carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato; quod enim operor non intelligo: Non enim quod volo, hoc ago, sed quod odi, illud facio; Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Condelector enim\n\nlegi Dei secundum interiorem hominem, video autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captiuantem me in lege peccati, ad Rom. 7. Testes sunt Glossae et expositiones sanctorum hanc literam ex ponentes. Testis est pene tota 40. distinctio secundi sententiarum Lumbardi, vbi et istam sententiam plane tenet, et per Augustinum confirmat; Ait enim, Originale peccatum dicitur fomes peccati, scilicet concupiscentia, vel concupiscibilitas, quae dicitur lex membrorum, seu languor naturae, siue tyrannus qui est in membris nostris, siue lex carnis. Vnde Augustinus in libro De baptismo paruulorum; Est in nobis concupiscentia, quae non est permittenda regnare; sunt et eius desideria, quae sunt actuales concupiscentiae, quae sunt arma Diaboli, quae veniunt ex languore naturae;", "english": "After this, the grace of God with me will show, as I hope, that grace is properly the efficient cause of every good act [n1]. I mean grace freely given, which is a habit of the soul poured into it freely by God, according to the distinction concerning grace made in 25, of which the preceding chapters also spoke. For if grace were not properly the efficient cause of a good act, a man could fulfil God's commands from his own natural powers without it, and complete any good act, contrary to what was just shown. If one who has grace brings about each of his acts with grace contributing nothing whatever, then he could do so equally with grace removed; for neither the total efficient cause nor even a partial one would be removed. Likewise, if grace or charity does not make the act of human love by which he fulfils the commandment of love, then by the same reasoning faith and hope, which are infused habits, do not make the acts of believing and hoping either, as is clear from what was cited in the preceding chapter. A man could therefore, from himself and his natural endowments, and from what he has naturally acquired, believe, hope, love, and do whatever he ought. That is the manifest error of Pelagius, and contrary to what was just shown.\n\nLikewise, the theological and supernatural virtues are no less effective in bringing about their like acts than the natural virtues, moral and intellectual; yet all of these properly bring about their own acts. For who doubts that natural forms and virtues bring about their acts? And who does not know that moral virtues bring about moral acts, and intellectual virtues likewise such acts? Why else would those lacking these virtues not act in the same way as those who have them, since no effective principle is wanting to them? Hence the Philosopher too, in Ethics 2, chapters 1, 2 and 3 [n2], shows that moral virtues are generated from works, and that, once generated, they generate like works. In chapter 3, after a manifold demonstration of this, he speaks thus: \"It is supposed, then, that virtue is of such a kind as to be productive of the best acts concerning pleasures and pains, and vice the contrary.\" And at the end, concluding, he says: \"Since, then, virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains; and since it is increased by the things from which it comes about, and destroyed when they are not done in like manner; and since it operates concerning the things from which it comes about—let this much be said.\" He also defines, above in the first book, chapter seven [n3], the happy man as one operating according to perfect virtue, and he hints at this very often in many other places.\n\nLikewise grace or charity makes the intention right, lifts up and raises the will, as was shown in the preceding chapter, just as in moral matters moral virtue does, as the Philosopher testifies there, and as is cited more fully in 34 of this book. Likewise virtue, and above all the highest virtue, namely grace or charity, is not less effective than vice; but vice brings about evil acts, and therefore grace or charity brings about good acts. To say nothing of vices morally acquired, who does not know, who does not feel, what sort of acts one radical vice brings about: the law of the members, the tyrant of nature, the tinder of sin, the concupiscence or concupiscibility of our flesh, which the Doctors also commonly call original sin? Our all too frequent and all too violent experience bears witness. The Apostle bears witness: \"I am carnal,\" he says, \"sold under sin; for what I do I do not understand. For I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do. But now it is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me. For I delight in the law of God according to the inner man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and making me captive in the law of sin,\" Rom. 7. The Glosses and the expositions of the saints expounding this passage bear witness. Almost the whole of the 40th distinction of the second book of Lombard's Sentences bears witness [n4], where he also plainly holds this opinion and confirms it from Augustine. For he says: \"Original sin is called the tinder of sin, namely concupiscence, or concupiscibility, which is called the law of the members, or the languor of nature, or the tyrant that is in our members, or the law of the flesh.\" Hence Augustine, in the book On the Baptism of Infants: \"There is in us concupiscence, which must not be permitted to reign; and there are its desires, which are actual concupiscences, which are the weapons of the Devil, which come from the languor of nature;", "margins": [{"id": "364C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "The Philosopher."}, {"id": "364D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "The Apostle."}, {"id": "364E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Rom. 7."}, {"id": "364E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p365A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p365A", "locator_display": "365A–365E", "source_text": "Languor autem iste est tyrannus qui mouet mala desideria. Et infra; Nomine autem concupiscentiae non actum concupiscendi, sed vitium prauum significauit, cum eam dixit carnis legem. Vnde idem in Tractatu de verbis Apostoli, ait; Semper pugna est in corpore mortis huius, quia ipsa concupiscentia cum qua nati sumus, finiri non potest quamdiu viuimus; quotidie minui potest, finiri autem non potest. Quae est autem concupiscentia cum qua nati sumus? vitium vtique est, quod paruulum habilem concupiscere facit; adultum etiam concupiscentem reddit. Cum ergo cupiditas sit tam pugnax, tam efficax, et tam multipliciter actuosa, quomodo eam reprimit, minuit, et superat charitas, si penitus nihil agat, si nihil penitus moueat, si sit penitus otiosa? Non sic autem, non sic sentit Apost. 1. ad Cor. 13. Charitas, inquiens, patiens est, benigna est, non aemulatur, non agit perperam, non inflatur, non est ambitiosa, non quaerit quae sua sunt, non irritatur, non cogitat malum, non gaudet super iniquitate, quasi diceret euidenter; Non haec sed contraria horum facit; quare et statim subiungit; Congaudet autem veritati, omnia suffert, omnia credit, omnia sperat, omnia sustinet. Quod et\n\nAug. de 4. virtutibus charitatis; Quod omnia tolerat, omnia credit, omnia sperat, omnia sustinet, pulchre monstrat. Vnde inter caetera, in persona Abrahae, cui secundam harum virtutum attribuit, ita dicit; Virtus charitatis in me manens omnia credit, et facit, et dicit. Audio enim eam sine strepitu vocis intus ad cor loquentem, et infra; O charitas quae tantum potes in hac pugna mortalitatis adhuc sollicita, quantum poteris in illa perfecta pace secura? Qui et Enchirid. penult. Minuitur, inquit, cupiditas charitate crescente, donec veniat hic ad tantam magnitudinem qua maior esse non possit; ibi autem quis explicet quanta charitas erit, vbi cupiditas, quam coercendo superet, nulla erit? quando sanitas summa erit, quando contentio mortis nulla erit? Idem ad Anastasium sicut allegat Petrus 2. Sent. dist. 26. Sine spiritu non est voluntas hominis libera. Cum enim cupiditatibus vincatur, non est libera ad bonum, nisi liberata fuerit, non autem liberatur, nisi per Spiritum charitas diffundatur in cordibus. Non est libera voluntas nisi gratia eam liberet per legem fidei, id est, non est libera sine fide operante per\n\ndilectionem, et illa sufficienter et vere bona est: Non enim est fructus bonus, qui de charitatis radice non surgit: Si vero assit fides operans per dilectionem, fit delectatio boni. Qui et de spiritu et litera, 13. Non est, inquit, fructus bonus, qui de charitatis radice non surgit; qui et recitante Petro, 3. Sentent. dist. 31. sic ait; Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas, et radix omnium bonorum est charitas. Sed qualis radix est charitas? viua, an mortua? non mor•ua; constat plane: et quomodo viua si nihil viuidi operis siue fructus germinet, aut producat? Qui etiam super Psalmum 31. Sermon. 1. tractans illud Apostoli ad Rom. 13. Plenitudo legis est dilectio seu charitas, secundum aliam translationem, sic ait; Nunquid charitas permittit aliquid mali te facere ei quem diligis? sed forte tantummodo mali nihil facis, nec aliquid boni. Ergo nec charitas permittit te non praestare quicquid potes ei quem diligis. Nonne illa est charitas quae orat etiam pro inimicis? ergo non deserit amicum, qui bene optat inimico. Itaque\n\nsi fides sine dilectione sit, sine opere erit. Ne autem multa cogites de opere fidei adde illi spem et dilectionem, et noli cogitare quod opereris; nam ipsa dilectio vacare non potest. Cui etiam concordanter Greg. hom. 27. super Euang. exponens illud Iohan. 15. Hoc est praeceptū meum vt diligatis inuicem, ita dicit; Omne mandatum de sola dilectione est, et omnia vnum praeceptum sunt, quia quicquid praecipitur in sola charitate solidatur. Vt enim multi arboris rami ex vna radice prodeunt, sic multae virtutes ex vna charitate generantur, nec habet aliquid viriditatis ramus boni operis, si non manet in radice charitatis. Praecepta ergo dominica et multa sunt, et vnum; multa sunt per diuersitatem operis, vnum in radice dilectionis. Qui et infra hom. 30. Nunquā, inquit, Dei amor est otiosus; operatur enim magna, si est; si vero operari ronuit, amor non est. Dicit que Petrus 2. Sent. dist. 26. Quod ipsa gratia non est otiosa, sed meretur augeri, vt aucta mereatur et perfici. Rursum Apost. ad Gal. 5. dicit; Quod fides per charitatem operatur; et iterum 1. ad Cor. 15. Gratia, inquit, Dei sum id quod sum, et gratia eius in me vacua\n\nnon fuit, sed abundantius illis omnibus laboraui, non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum. Quis ergo dixerit charitatē seu gratiam nihil penitus operari? Si quis sic senserit, legat libros, et expositiones Augustini et aliorum Doctorum super autoritates istas, et plurimas altas similes, et definet sic sentire. Hoc idem testantur autoritates quamplurimae capitulis proximis allegatae; inter quas ille Aug. Hypognost. 60. De bono perseu. 48.36. huius, et 1. ad Simplic. 24. et ille Anselmi De concordia, et de veritate tactae capitulo proximo sunt expressae. Quis etiam vel atrium exterius Theologiae parum ingressus, illam diuisionem communissimam de gratia operante et cooperante ignoret? cum omnes poene Doctores atque discipuli creberrime hanc affirment. Vnde et Petrus, secundo Sententiarum, Distinct. 5.26.27. et 29. ipsam diligenter explanat. Qui et distinct. 25. vlt. loquens de libertate naturae et gratiae. Vtramque inquit, Libertatem notat Apostolus, cum ex persona hominis non redempti, ait, velle adiacet", "english": "but that languor is the tyrant who stirs up evil desires.\" And below: \"By the name of concupiscence he signified not the act of desiring but the depraved vice, when he called it the law of the flesh.\" Hence the same Augustine, in the Treatise on the Words of the Apostle, says: \"There is always a fight in the body of this death, because the concupiscence itself with which we were born cannot be ended as long as we live; it can be diminished daily, but it cannot be ended. And what is the concupiscence with which we were born? It is a vice, to be sure, which makes an infant capable of desiring, and renders an adult desirous.\" Since cupidity is so combative, so effective, and so manifoldly active, how does charity restrain it, diminish it and overcome it, if it does absolutely nothing, if it moves nothing at all, if it is utterly idle? Not so, the Apostle does not so think, in 1 Cor. 13: \"Charity,\" he says, \"is patient, is kind, is not envious, does not act perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, does not seek its own, is not provoked, thinks no evil, does not rejoice over iniquity,\" as though he were plainly saying: it does not do these things but their contraries. So he immediately adds: \"but rejoices together with the truth; it bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.\" Augustine too, in On the Four Virtues of Charity, beautifully shows that it tolerates all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Hence among other things, in the person of Abraham, to whom he assigns the second of these virtues, he says: \"The virtue of charity abiding in me believes all things, and does, and says. For I hear it speaking within, to the heart, without the noise of a voice.\" And below: \"O charity, you who can do so much in this fight of mortality, still anxious, how much will you be able to do in that perfect peace, secure?\" The same Augustine, in the Enchiridion, next to last: \"Cupidity is diminished as charity grows, until it comes here to so great a magnitude that none greater can be; but there, who could set out how great charity will be, where there will be no cupidity for it to overcome by restraining? When health will be supreme, when there will be no struggle of death?\" The same, to Anastasius, as Peter cites in Sentences 2, dist. 26: \"Without the Spirit the will of man is not free. For since it is conquered by desires, it is not free for the good unless it has been set free; and it is not set free unless charity is poured out in hearts through the Spirit. The will is not free unless grace sets it free through the law of faith; that is, it is not free without faith working through love, and that will is sufficiently and truly good. For the fruit that does not spring from the root of charity is not good; but if faith working through love is present, delight in the good comes about.\"\n\nHe also, in On the Spirit and the Letter, 13, says: \"That fruit is not good which does not spring from the root of charity.\" And, as Peter recites in Sentences 3, dist. 31, he speaks thus: \"The root of all evils is cupidity, and the root of all goods is charity. But what sort of root is charity? Living or dead? Not dead; that is plain. And how can it be living, if it sprouts or produces no living work or fruit?\" The same, in the first sermon on Psalm 31, treating that saying of the Apostle in Rom. 13, \"The fullness of the law is love,\" or charity, according to another translation, speaks thus: \"Does charity permit you to do anything evil to him whom you love? But perhaps all you do is no evil, and no good either. Therefore charity does not permit you not to render to him whom you love whatever you can. Is not that charity which prays even for enemies? Therefore he does not desert a friend who wishes his enemy well. And so, if faith is without love, it will be without work. But lest you think much about the work of faith, add to it hope and love, and do not wonder what you will do; for love itself cannot be idle.\" Gregory agrees with this, in Homily 27 on the Gospel, expounding that saying of John 15, \"This is my commandment, that you love one another\": \"Every commandment is of love alone, and all are one commandment, because whatever is commanded is made firm in charity alone. For as the many branches of a tree come forth from one root, so many virtues are generated from one charity, and a branch of good work has nothing of greenness if it does not remain in the root of charity. The Lord's precepts, therefore, are both many and one: many by the diversity of work, one in the root of love.\" He also says below, Homily 30: \"The love of God is never idle; for it works great things, if it is; but if it refuses to work, it is not love.\" And Peter, in Sentences 2, dist. 26, says that grace itself is not idle, but merits to be increased, that once increased it may merit also to be perfected. Again the Apostle, to the Galatians 5, says that faith works through charity; and again in 1 Cor. 15: \"By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been empty, but I have laboured more abundantly than all of them: yet not I, but the grace of God with me.\"\n\nWho, then, would say that charity or grace does absolutely nothing? If anyone thinks so, let him read the books and expositions of Augustine and the other Doctors on these authorities, and on very many other similar ones, and he will cease to think so. The very many authorities cited in the preceding chapters bear the same witness. Among them, those of Augustine in the Hypognosticon 60 [n5], in On the Gift of Perseverance 48, 36 of this book, and in To Simplicianus 1, 24, and that of Anselm's On Concord and On Truth, were touched on and set out in the preceding chapter. And who, having entered even a little way into the outer court of Theology, would be ignorant of that very common division concerning operating and cooperating grace, when nearly all the Doctors and their disciples affirm it most frequently? Hence Peter too, in the second book of the Sentences, Distinctions 5, 26, 27 and 29, carefully expounds it. He also, in distinction 25, last, speaking of the liberty of nature and of grace, says: \"The Apostle notes both liberties when, in the person of a man not redeemed, he says, 'To will is present", "margins": [{"id": "365A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "1 Cor. 13."}, {"id": "365B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}, {"id": "365C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) patrare — \"accomplish\" for \"render\"."}, {"id": "365D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Gregory."}, {"id": "365D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Lombard."}, {"id": "365D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Gal. 5; 1 Cor. 15."}]}, {"anchor": "p366A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p366A", "locator_display": "366A–366E", "source_text": "mihi, perficere autem non inuenio, ac si diceret; Habeo libertatem naturae, sed non habeo libertatem gratiae, ideo non est apud me perfectio boni. Nam voluntas hominis quam naturaliter habet, non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum, vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur, et adiuuetur, vt perficiat, quia, vt ait Apostolus, Non est volentis velle, neque currentis currere, id est operari, sed miserentis Dei, qui operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum, cuius gratiam non aduocat hominis voluntas, vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praeuenit praeparando vt velit bonum, et praeparatam adiuuat ne frustra velit, id est vt perficiat; et dist. 26. immediate subiungit, Haec est gratia operans et cooperans; Operans enim gratia praeparat hominis voluntatem vt velit bonum, gratia cooperans adiuuat ne frustra velit: Vnde Augustinus in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio, Cooperando Deus in nobis perficit, quod operando incipit, quia ipse vt velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens: Vt ergo velimus operatur; cum ergo volumus, et sic\n\nvolumus, vt perficiamus, nobis cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante vt velimus, vel cooperante cum volumus, bona pietatis opera, nihil valemus. Et subdit Petrus, Ex his verbis satis aperitur, quae sit operans gratia, et quae cooperans; Operans enim est quae praeuenit voluntatem (Ea enim liberatur et praeparatur hominis voluntas vt sit bona, bonum que efficaciter velit) Cooperans vero gratia voluntatem iam bonam sequitur adiuuando; vbi et infra allegat Augustinum de praedestinatione Sanctorum dicentem, quod gratia non datur secundum alia merita, sed efficit omnia bona merita. Distinctione quoque vigesima septima ita scribit, Quidam non inerudite tradunt, virtutem esse mentis bonam qualitatem siue formam, quae animam informat, et ipsa non est motus, vel affectus animi, sed ea liberum arbitrium iuuatur, vt ad bonum moueatur, et erigatur; et ita ex virtute et libero arbitrio nascitur bonus motus vel affectus animi; vbi et statim dicit sic esse de gratia et voluntate humana. Et infra, In bonis merendis causae principalitas gratiae attribuitur, quia principalis causa bonorum\n\nmeritorum est ipsa gratia, qua excitatur liberum arbitrium, et sanatur at que iuuatur voluntas hominis vt sit bona, quae ipsa etiam donum Dei est, et hominis meritum, imo gratiae, quia ex gratia principaliter est, et gratia est: Vnde Augustinus ad Sixtum Presbyterum, Quid est meritum hominis ante gratiam, cum omne bonum meritum nostrum non in nobis facit nisi gratia? Ex gratia enim, vt dictum est, quae praeuenit et sanat arbitrium hominis, et ex ipso arbitrio procuratur in anima bonus affectus, siue bonus motus mentis, et hoc est primum hominis bonum meritum; sicut verbi gratia ex fide, virtute, et hominis arbitrio generatur in mente bonus quidam motus, et remunerabilis, scilicet ipsum credere, ita ex charitate et libero arbitrio alius quidam motus prouenit valde bonus, scilicet diligere: sic de caeteris virtutibus intelligendum est. Idem 3. sentent. dist. 36. dicit, quod charitas est mater omnium virtutum, sed qualis mater? sterilis, an foecunda? et quomodo sterilis cum sit mater? si autem sit foecunda, quomodo nihil parit? Hic autem multi Pelagianorū amici conantur multipliciter respondere,\n\nqui tamen omnes in hoc vno concordant, quod gratia virtus creata seu charitas non vere et proprie efficit actus bonos secundū substantiam actuū, sed vel omnino non efficit, vel tantum efficit aliquo modo improprio et transūpto. Aliqui nam que dicunt quod gratia seu charitas virtus creata nullo modo efficit actus bonos, sed gratia et charitas increata quae est Deus et Spiritus Sanctus Dei, et sic intelligunt omnes autoritates dicentes gratiam seu charitatem efficere quenquam actum. Sed isti etsi possent vtcunque subterfugere isto modo quasdam autoritates praemissas, rationes tamen non possunt. Quisquis etiam catholicus Authoritates huiusmodi quasdam in superficie literae, quasdam vero parum interius sanis oculis intuetur, statim potest percipere alium intellectum, de gratia scilicet et charitate creata. Vnde et Petrus 2i. sent. dist. 27 inter caetera superius allegata, Cum, inquit, ex gratia dicuntur esse bona merita et incipere, aut intelligitur gratia gratis dans, id est, Deus, vel potius gratia gratis data, quae voluntatem hominis praeuenit, (Non enim esset magnum, si haec a Deo dicerentur esse, a quo sunt\n\nomnia) sed potius eius gratia gratis data intelligitur, ex qua incipiunt bona merita, quae cum ex gratia sola esse dicantur, non excluditur liberum arbitrium, quia nullum meritū est in homine adulto quod non sit per liberum arbitrium, sed in bonis merendis causa principalitas gratiae attribuitur, quia principalis causa bonorum meritorum est ipsa gratia qua excitatur liberum arbitriū, et sanatur at que iuuatur voluntas hominis, vt sit bona. Alij vero dicunt, quod ideo dicitur gratia efficere bonū actum, quia excitat voluntatem vt ipsa efficiat bonū actum. Sed hi etiā per rationes praemisias rationabiliter conuincuntur. Itē si gratia excitet voluntatē, mouet aliqualiter voluntatē, et aliquem actum agit, et si hoc faciat praeueniendo voluntatē nondum agentē, cut non potest simili ratione coagere actū meritorium cum ipsa agente? quis etiam nisi", "english": "with me, but to accomplish I do not find,' as if he were saying: I have the liberty of nature, but I do not have the liberty of grace; therefore the perfection of the good is not in me. For the will of man, which he has by nature, cannot be raised to effectively willing the good, or to fulfilling it in deed, unless it is freed and helped through grace so that it may complete it. For, as the Apostle says, 'It is not of the one who wills to will, nor of the one who runs to run'—that is, to act—'but of God who has mercy,' who works in us both to will and to work the good. The will or work of man does not summon his grace; rather grace itself comes before the will, preparing it to will the good, and helps the prepared will lest it will in vain, that is, so that it may complete.\" And in dist. 26 he adds immediately: \"This is operating and cooperating grace. For operating grace prepares the will of man to will the good; cooperating grace helps lest it will in vain.\" Hence Augustine, in the book On Grace and Free Choice: \"By cooperating, God completes in us what he began by operating, because he himself works, beginning, that we may will; and he cooperates, completing, with those who will. That we may will, then, he works; when we will, and so will that we complete, he cooperates with us; yet without him, whether working that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we can do nothing in the good works of piety.\"\n\nAnd Peter adds: \"From these words it is sufficiently clear which grace is operating and which cooperating. For operating grace is that which comes before the will (for by it the will of man is freed and prepared, so that it may be good and will the good effectively); but cooperating grace follows the already good will, helping it.\" Further on he also cites Augustine, in On the Predestination of the Saints, saying that grace is not given according to other merits, but brings about all good merits. In the twenty-seventh distinction too he writes thus: \"Some, not unlearnedly, teach that virtue is a good quality or form of the mind, which informs the soul, and is not itself a motion or affection of the mind; but by it free choice is helped to be moved and raised toward the good; and thus from virtue and free choice a good motion or affection of the mind is born.\" Straightaway he says that it is likewise with grace and the human will. And below: \"In meriting good things the position of principal cause is attributed to grace, because the principal cause of good merits is grace itself, by which free choice is aroused, and the will of man is healed and helped to be good. That will is itself also a gift of God, and a merit of man—indeed of grace, because it is principally from grace, and is grace.\" Hence Augustine, to Sixtus the priest: \"What is the merit of man before grace, when it is grace alone that makes in us every good merit of ours?\" For from grace, as has been said, which comes before and heals the choice of man, and from that choice itself, a good affection, or good motion of the mind, is procured in the soul, and this is man's first good merit. For example, from faith, virtue, and man's choice there is generated in the mind a certain good and remunerable motion, namely believing itself; so too from charity and free choice there arises another motion, very good, namely loving. So is it to be understood of the other virtues. The same Peter says [n6], in Sentences 3, dist. 36, that charity is the mother of all virtues. But what sort of mother? Barren or fruitful? And how barren, when she is a mother? But if she is fruitful, how does she bear nothing? Here, however, many friends of the Pelagians try to respond in manifold ways. Yet they all agree in this one thing: that grace, a created virtue, or charity, does not truly and properly bring about good acts as regards the substance of the acts. Either it brings about nothing at all, or only in some improper and transferred way [n7].\n\nSome, for instance, say that the created virtue, grace or charity, in no way brings about good acts, but only uncreated grace and charity, which is God and the Holy Spirit of God; and so they understand all the authorities that say that grace or charity brings about any act. But even if these men could somehow evade by this means certain of the authorities set out above, they cannot evade the arguments. Indeed any Catholic who looks with sound eyes at some such Authorities on the surface of the letter, and at others a little deeper within, can at once perceive another meaning, namely about created grace and charity. Hence Peter too, in Sentences 2, dist. 27, among other things cited above, says: \"When good merits are said to be from grace and to begin from it, either grace freely giving is understood, that is, God, or rather grace freely given, which comes before the will of man (for it would be no great thing if these merits were said to be from God, from whom are all things); but rather his grace freely given is understood, from which good merits begin. And when they are said to be from grace alone, free choice is not excluded, since there is no merit in an adult man that does not come through free choice; but in meriting good things the position of principal cause is attributed to grace, because the principal cause of good merits is grace itself, by which free choice is aroused, and the will of man is healed and helped to be good.\" Others say that grace is said to bring about a good act because it arouses the will so that the will itself may bring about the good act. But these too are reasonably convicted by the arguments set out above. Likewise, if grace arouses the will, it moves the will in some way, and does some act; and if it does this by coming before the will, which is not yet acting, why can it not, by like reasoning, co-act the meritorious act with the will when the will is acting? Who indeed, unless", "margins": [{"id": "366A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}, {"id": "366B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) ostendit — \"shows\" for \"says\"."}, {"id": "366E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) esse — \"to be\"."}]}, {"anchor": "p367A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p367A", "locator_display": "367A–367E", "source_text": "ingratus gratiae, dabit gratiae Dei actum peiorem seu minus bonum, et proprijs naturalib, magis bonum? quis enim ignorat actum meritorium esse incomparabiliter meliorem, quam nudam excitationem ad illum, cum qua stat nihil mereri, imo peccare; hoc autem non sinunt superioribus capitulis allegata. Posset quoque homo vel Angelus velle, et facere sine huiusmodi excitante, cum nihil coagat hic nec ibi; quare et sine gratia implere omnia Dei mandata, quod est error Pelagij, sicut capitulum proximum recitauit. Posset insuper voluntas humana similiter a non gratia excitari, puta a ratione, a virtute morali, a Doctore, ab instinctu seu inclinatione naturali, ab alijsque diuersis; haec igitur alia sine gratia sufficiunt ad faciendum mandata. Secundum hoc etiam voluntas creata esset principalior causa meriti, quam gratia; haec enim principaliter imo singulariter efficit meritum, illa vero tantummodo excitat ad agendum: hoc autem est plane contra Apostolum superius allegatum, Abundantius illis omnibus\n\nlaboraui, non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum. Quomodo namque debet istud intelligi, nisi quod non ego principaliter et gratia instrumentaliter, sed e contra, quod et plane testatur dictum Lumbardi contra responsionem proximam allegatum. Alij aestimant quod gratia facit actus bonos, non effectiue, sed tantum formaliter, sicut albedo facit subiectum album, et anima animatum, et quaelibet forma suum formatum: Sed ista possunt refelli per rationes et autoritates praemissas. Item gratia quae est habitus infusus, non est forma naturalis et essentialis actus volendi ipsius grati, sicut nec aliquis habitus sui actus; est enim actus actualior habitu, nec subiectum habitus naturale, nec compositus ex habitu et actu sicut ex forma et materia, sed est simplex; nec gratia est causa materialis actus boni, puta debitae dilectionis Dei et proximi, nec causa finalis sicut nullus ignorat; nec causa efficiens vt hi dicunt; posset ergo homo facere illum actum, et implere mandata sine gratia, ex naturalibus suis tantum sicut Pelagius delirabat; nulla enim causa deficeret requisita. Siquis autem dixerit, quod gratia est forma improprie, et actualis quodammodo actus boni, quia videlicet informat voluntatem\n\nillum agentem, incidit in pelagus Pelagij supra dictum. Habet etiam dicere consequenter quod omnis actus a tali voluntate procedens est bonus et gratus, quia gratia similiter informatus, quod non est verum de actibus paruulorum, nec de actibus omnibus adultorum, quia non de actibus indifferentibus venialibus que peccatis. Eadē etiam ratione omnis actus sapientis esset sapiens, sapienterue factus, temperati temperatus, temperateue factus, et eodem modo de virtutibus et vitijs vniuersis, quodnullus dubitat esse falsum. Isti quoque contra Apostolum ponunt gratiam vacuam, id est otiosam, sicut glossa exponit; quare videntur gratia vacui et inanes. Alij adhuc putant, quod ideo gratia dicitur agere bonos actus, quia ligat et reprimit concupiscentiā repugnantem, qua ligata grata voluntas efficit gratos actus. Sed istos rationes et autoritates praemissae conuincunt. Quomodo etiam gratia ligat et reprimit concupiscentiam repugnantē, si penitus nihil agat, sicut superius tangebatur? aut si gratia ad repressionem concupiscentiae quicquam agat, cur non ad productionem actus boni simili ratione, sicut\n\ncontra 2am responsionē superius est argutum? Item homines in gratia constituti habent quando que concupiscentiam ita fortem, et aliquoties fortiorem quam homines gratia destituti, sicut vita multorum sanctorum, et specialiter S. Paulus 1. ad Cor. 12. de scipso euidenter ostendunt. Possunt ergo tales homines gratia destituti facere actus bonos, et implere Dei mandata, sicut et tales in gratia constituti. Quare et isti sicut priores pelagi Pelagiani voragine absorbentur. Hoc idem potest et aliter sic ostendi; quia quantum concupiscentia ligatur, et sedatur per gratiam, tantum posset sedari per virtutes morales, per medicinam, per alterationem naturalem, et in quibusdam per complexionem propriam naturalem. Possent ergo tales virtute naturae, sine huiusmodi gratia seruare omnia Dei mandata; quare et isti in pelagus Pelagij relabuntur. Ad idem, si gratus, concupiscentia per gratiam parum repressa, potest producere magnum actum, magnumque meritum, potest et non gratus per concupiscentiam in modico ampliorem modicum amplius impeditus, similem actum producere, licet proportionaliter forte\n\nminorem, et forte tanto meliorem quanto difficiliorem, sicut capitulum proximum arguebat: causae namque similes inaequales producunt effectus similes inaequales. Vnde Philosophus 3. de Coelo 72. reprobans ponentes ignem ardere propter angulos, propter acutiem scilicet angulorum; Si, inquit, calefacit et ardet ignis propter angulos, omnia erunt elementa calefactiua; magis autem forte alterum altero; Omnia enim habent angulos, puta et quod octo basium, et quod duodecim basium, et pyramis, Democrito autem et sphaera, angulus quidem ens ardet; quare differunt eo quod magis et minus. Item tunc Angelus et homo in statu innocentiae ante lapsum, nequaquam indiguit gratia ad merendum; non enim habebat concupiscentiam reluctantē, cuius oppositum cap. proximum ostendebat. Vnde et August. Enchir. 87. Illam, inquit, immortalitatem in qua posset non mori natura humana perdidit per liberum arbitrium; hanc in qua non possit mori, est acceptura per gratiam, quam iuerat, si non peccasset,", "english": "ungrateful to grace, will give to the grace of God the worse act, or the less good, and to its own natural powers the better? For who does not know that the meritorious act is incomparably better than the bare arousal to it, with which it is consistent to merit nothing—indeed, to sin? But what was alleged in the earlier chapters does not permit this. Moreover, a man or an angel could will and do without such an arouser, since it contributes nothing, either here or there; and therefore could fulfil all God's commands without grace, which is the error of Pelagius, as the preceding chapter recited. Moreover, the human will could likewise be aroused by something that is not grace: by reason, for example, by moral virtue, by a teacher, by natural impulse or inclination, and by various other things; so these other things, without grace, suffice for doing the commands. According to this, too, the created will would be a more principal cause of merit than grace; for the will principally, indeed singly, brings about merit, while grace only arouses to acting. But this is plainly against the Apostle cited above: \"I have laboured more abundantly than all of them, yet not I, but the grace of God with me.\"\n\nFor how else is this to be understood than as \"not I principally and grace instrumentally,\" but the reverse? The saying of Lombard cited above against the immediately preceding response also plainly attests this. Others judge that grace makes good acts not effectively but only formally, as whiteness makes a subject white, and the soul makes a thing animate, and any form its formed thing. But these views can be refuted by the arguments and authorities set out above. Further, grace, which is an infused habit, is not the natural and essential form of the act of willing of the one in grace [n8], just as no habit is the form of its own act. For the act is more actual than the habit; it is neither the natural subject of the habit nor composed of habit and act [n9] as of form and matter, but is simple. Nor is grace the material cause of the good act, namely of due love of God and neighbour, nor the final cause, as no one is ignorant; nor the efficient cause, as these men say. So a man could perform that act, and fulfil the commands, without grace, from his natural powers alone, as Pelagius raved; for no required cause would be lacking. But if anyone says that grace is an improper form, and in a way actual [n10] of the good act, namely because it informs the will performing that act, he falls into the sea of Pelagius spoken of above [n11].\n\nHe must also say, consequently, that every act proceeding from such a will is good and graced, because it is similarly informed by grace. This is not true of the acts of infants, nor of all the acts of adults, since it is not true of indifferent acts nor of venial sins. By the same reasoning every act of a wise man would be wise, or wisely done, an act of a temperate man temperate, or temperately done, and in the same way with all the virtues and vices, which no one doubts to be false. These men also posit grace as \"empty,\" against the Apostle, that is, idle, as the Gloss explains; so they themselves appear empty and void of grace. Still others think that grace is said to do good acts because it binds and restrains resisting concupiscence, and with concupiscence bound the graced will produces graced acts. But the arguments and authorities set out above convict these men too. How, moreover, does grace bind and restrain resisting concupiscence if it does absolutely nothing, as was touched on above? Or if grace does anything toward the repression of concupiscence, why not toward the production of a good act, by like reasoning, as was argued above against the second response?\n\nMoreover, men established in grace sometimes have concupiscence so strong, and at times stronger than men destitute of grace, as the lives of many saints show, and St Paul especially, in 1 Cor. 12, plainly concerning himself [n12]. Therefore such men destitute of grace can do good acts and fulfil God's commands, just as such men established in grace can. Hence these too, like the former, are swallowed up by the whirlpool of the Pelagian sea. The same can be shown in another way. To the degree that concupiscence is bound and quieted by grace, to that degree it could be quieted by moral virtues, by medicine, by natural alteration, and in some by their own natural complexion. Such men could therefore, by the power of nature, without grace of this kind, keep all of God's commands; so these men too slip back into the sea of Pelagius. To the same point: if one in grace, whose concupiscence is only a little repressed by grace, can produce a great act and great merit, then one not in grace, hindered somewhat more by a somewhat greater concupiscence, can also produce a like act, though perhaps proportionally smaller, and perhaps better in proportion as it is more difficult, as the preceding chapter argued. For similar unequal causes produce similar unequal effects. Hence the Philosopher, in On the Heavens 3, 72 [n13], rejecting those who posit that fire burns because of angles, that is, because of the sharpness of the angles, says: \"If fire heats and burns because of angles, all the elements will be heat-producing, but perhaps one more than another; for all have angles: for instance that of eight bases, and that of twelve bases, and the pyramid, and for Democritus the sphere as well, an angle being what burns; they differ, therefore, in that they do so more and less.\" Moreover, on this view the angel and man in the state of innocence before the fall would not at all have needed grace in order to merit; for he did not have resisting concupiscence, the opposite of which the preceding chapter was showing. Hence Augustine too, Enchiridion 87: \"That immortality,\" he says, \"in which human nature was able not to die, it lost through free choice; this one, in which it will not be able to die, it will receive through grace, which, had it not sinned, it was to receive", "margins": [{"id": "367B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) alio — \"another\" for \"act\"."}, {"id": "367B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) accidentalis — \"accidental\" for \"actual\"."}, {"id": "367E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p368A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p368A", "locator_display": "368A–368E", "source_text": "acceptura per meritum, quamuis sine gratia nec fuerat tunc, nec vllum meritum esse potuisset. Quia etsi peccatum in solo erat libero arbitrio constitutum, non tamen iustitiae retinendae sufficiebat liberum arbitrium, nisi participatione immutabilis boni diuinum adiutorium praeberetur. Hoc idem et Petrus 2. Sentent. dist. 5.24. et 29. probat, et tenet. Alij opinantur quod ideo gratia dicitur facere actus bonos, quia characterizando animam Domino, et veste Domini induendo, reddit eam terribilem aduersariae potestati, vt eam non audeat aggredi, sicut aliam, quae his caret; sic que potest anima talis grata, grata opera libere operari. Sed hi vt proximi in puteum interitus, in Pelagij pelagus propellentur. Alij arbitrantur, quod ideo gratia dicitur efficere actus bonos, quia liberat et iustificat hominem a peccato, quod impediuit eum ne faceret actus bonos. Sed isti per rationes et autoritates principales; et etiam contra 4tam responsionem praemissas, cum Patre eorum Pelagio refellentur. Pelagiani etiam propter istam sententiam specialiter reprobantur: Ponunt enim, vt recitat Augustinus de gratia et lib.\n\narbitrio 16. quod illa gratia sola non secundum merita nostra datur, qua nobis dimittuntur peccata; illam vero quam expectamus in fine, scilicet vitam aeternam secundum merita nostra dari, intelligentes merita nostra existere nobis a nobis, non a gratia Dei neque a Deo. Vnde Augustinus recitato isto Pelagianorum errore, subiungit, respondendum est eis, Si merita nostra sic intelligerent, vt etiam ipsa dona Dei esse cognoscerent, non esset reprobanda ista sententia quoniam vero merita humana sic praedicant, vt ea ex semetipso habere hominem dicant, prorsus rectissime respondet Apostolus, Quis enim te discernet? quid autem habes quod non accepisti? si autem acceperis, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Prorsus talia cogitanti verissime dicitur, dona sua coronat Deus, non merita tua. Si tibi a te ipso non ab illo sunt merita tua, mala sunt quae coronat Deus; si autem bona sunt, Dei dona sunt, per eius scilicet gratiā gratis datam. In Mileuitano quo que concilio contra Pelagianos celebrato, cui interfuit Augustinus vt patet Epistola 134. inter eius Epistolas, et habetur in Canone de Consecrat.\n\ndistinct. 4. concorditer est sancitum, vt quicunque dixerit gratiam Dei qua iustificamur per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum ad solam remissionem peccatorum valere, quae iam commissa sunt, non adiutorium vt non committantur, anathema sit. Sunt autem et multae aliae responsiunculae tortuosae, quae per praemissa hic et prioribus capitulis iuuante Dei gratia, imo principaliter operante, faciliter dirigentur. Post haec autem obijcitur contra ista; Nam si gratia proprie efficiat actum gratum, gratus facilius et fortius operabitur quam non gratus. Iste nam que habet magnum adiutorium gratiae, ille nullum; cuius oppositum, vt videtur, per experimentum ostendunt ingratissimi peccatores. Item sit A totus vnus actus meritorius factus a gratia et voluntate humana; Et B. pars A facta a gratia; C vero pars eius facta a voluntate humana tantum; ergo C est meritorium, seu A pro C tantum, quia C tantum fit ab hominis libera voluntate; In ipsa namque meritum omne consistit. Item praestituat sibi homo certum\n\ngradum dilectionis, quem haberet sine gratia coagente; tunc si diligat gratia coagente, diliget vltra illum gradum; diliget ergo saltem tam intense, violente et inuite; quare non meritorie. Gratia ergo si ponatur actiua, tollit meritum et arbitrij libertatem. Item gratia et voluntas humana vel sunt aeque potentes, vel non aeque, si aeque, vtra que potest impedire reliquam nequid agat, sicque gratia posset violenter prohibere hominem ne peccaret, et ne vellet hoc vel illud: sic que omnis habens huiusmodi gratiam, esset finaliter confirmatus: si non aeque, aut ergo gratia est potentior vel voluntas; si gratia, redit absurditas proxima; potest quoque gratia facere voluntatem velle inuite, inuitamque detinere in actu volendi: Si voluntas sit potentior gratia, potest debilitari voluntas, vel fortificari gratia, donec sit aeque potens vel potentior, quod si ponatur reponitur difficultas. Item cum gratia sit agens irrationale, et non ex electione, si sit agens, necessario semper agit secundum vltimum suae potentiae quantum potest; quamcunque ergo actionem cuiuscun que speciei vel gradus agit semel gratia siue gratus, et semper. Nec etiam\n\nvidetur consonum rationi, quod agens irrationale agat actum liberum, et libere, sed necessitate naturae. Item tunc non esset in potestate hominis seruare mandata, ne que saluari; cum non sit in potestate sua habere huiusmodi gratiam necessario requisitam. Multa quo que similia possent opponi, sed istis solutis patebit solutio aliorum similium Dei gratia reuelante. Ad has autem ingratas instantias iuuante gratia respondendum. Pro prima igitur quis Theologus dubitat charitatem et gratiam facere iugum Domini suaue, et onus eius leue, cum tot Doctores doceant hoc, tot locis? Quod et videns ille Dei secretarius Esaias, Qui, inquit, dat lasso virtutem, et his, qui non sunt, fortitudinem et robur multiplicat. Deficient pueri, et laborabunt, et iuuenes in infirmitate cadent. Qui autem sperant in Domino mutabunt fortitudinē, assument pennas sicut Aquilae, currēt et non laborabunt; ambulabunt et non deficient, Esa. 40. Quocirca", "english": "through merit,\" though even then it would not have been without grace, nor could any merit have existed without it [n14]. For even if sin lay in free choice alone, free choice nevertheless was not sufficient for retaining justice, unless divine help were supplied through participation in the unchanging good. Peter too proves and holds the same in Sentences 2, dist. 5, 24 and 29. Others opine that grace is said to make good acts because, by marking the soul with a character for the Lord and clothing it in the Lord's garment, it makes the soul terrible to the adverse power, so that the adversary does not dare to attack it, as he does another soul that lacks these; and thus such a graced soul can freely do graced works. But these, like the last, will be driven into the pit of destruction, into the sea of Pelagius. Others judge that grace is said to bring about good acts because it frees and justifies man from sin, which had hindered him from doing good acts. But these men, together with their father Pelagius, will be refuted by the principal arguments and authorities, and also by those set out against the fourth response. The Pelagians are also specially reprobated on account of this opinion. For they posit, as Augustine recites in On Grace and Free Choice 16, that only that grace by which sins are forgiven us is not given according to our merits, but that which we await at the end, namely eternal life, is given according to our merits; for they understand our merits to exist for us from ourselves, not from the grace of God nor from God. Hence Augustine, after reciting this error of the Pelagians, adds: \"They must be answered thus: if they understood our merits in such a way that they also recognized them to be gifts of God, this opinion would not need to be reproved. But since they so proclaim human merits as to say that man has them from himself, the Apostle most rightly answers: 'For who will distinguish you? And what do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?' Quite rightly it is said to one thinking such things: God crowns his own gifts, not your merits. If your merits are yours from yourself and not from him, they are evils that God crowns; but if they are good, they are God's gifts, namely through his grace freely given.\" In the Council of Milevis too, held against the Pelagians, at which Augustine was present, as is clear from Epistle 134 among his epistles, and which is found in the Canon, De consecratione, distinction 4 [n15], it was concordantly decreed that whoever says that the grace of God by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord avails only for the remission of sins already committed, and not as a help that they may not be committed, is anathema. There are also many other little twisted responses, which by what has been set out here and in the earlier chapters will easily be set straight, with the help of God's grace, or rather with it working as the principal agent.\n\nAfter this, however, an objection is raised against these points. For if grace properly brings about the graced act, the graced man will act more easily and more strongly than the ungraced. For the one has the great help of grace, the other none; and the opposite of this, as it seems, the most ungrateful sinners show by experience. Likewise, let A be one whole meritorious act, done by grace and the human will; let B be the part of A done by grace; and let C be the part of it done by the human will alone. Therefore C is meritorious, or A is so only on account of C, because C alone is done by the free will of man; for in the will all merit consists. Likewise, let a man set before himself a definite degree of love, which he would have without cooperating grace. Then, if he loves with grace cooperating, he will love beyond that degree; he will therefore love at least this intensely, but violently and unwillingly, and hence not meritoriously. So grace, if it is posited as active, removes merit and freedom of choice. Likewise, grace and the human will are either equally powerful or not equally. If equally, each can prevent the other from doing anything, and so grace could violently keep a man from sinning, and from willing this or that; and so everyone having such grace would be finally confirmed. If not equally, then either grace is the more powerful or the will. If grace, the absurdity just mentioned returns; grace can also make the will will unwillingly, and hold it unwilling in the act of willing. If the will is more powerful than grace, the will can be weakened, or grace strengthened, until it is equally powerful or more powerful; and if this is posited, the difficulty is posited again. Likewise, since grace is an irrational agent, and does not act from election, if it acts it necessarily always acts to the utmost of its power, as far as it can; so whatever action of whatever species or degree grace, or the graced man, performs once, he performs always. Nor does it seem in accord with reason that an irrational agent should do a free act, and freely, rather than by necessity of nature. Likewise, it would then not be in man's power to keep the commandments, nor to be saved, since it is not in his power to have such grace, which is necessarily required. Many similar objections could also be raised; but when these are solved, the solution of the rest like them will be clear, God's grace revealing it. These ungrateful objections [n16], however, must be answered with the help of grace. To the first, then: what theologian doubts that charity and grace make the yoke of the Lord sweet and his burden light, when so many Doctors teach this, in so many places? Isaiah, God's secretary, saw this as well, who says: \"He who gives strength to the weary, and multiplies might and strength for those who are not. Boys will faint and labour, and young men will fall in weakness. But those who hope in the Lord will renew their strength, they will take wings like eagles, they will run and not labour, they will walk and not faint,\" Isa. 40. Wherefore", "margins": [{"id": "368C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) et delectabilius — \"and more delightfully\" added after \"more strongly\"."}, {"id": "368D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) irrationabile — for \"irrationale\"."}, {"id": "368E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Isaiah."}]}, {"anchor": "p369A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p369A", "locator_display": "369A", "source_text": "de malis in persona malorū Sapiens ita dicit, Lassati sumus in via iniquitatis et perditionis, et ambulauimus vias difficiles; vias autem Domini ignorauimus; quibus et multa similia profert Scriptura. Verum pro sufficientiori et subtiliori solutione huius instantiae aduertendum, quod secundum capitulo proximo praeostensa, operatio propria charitatis et gratiae est diligere Deum chare et gratuite super omnia finaliter propter ipsum, et sic facere reliqua propter Deum; huiusmodi autem dilectionem et operationem nullus carens charitate et gratia potest habere; sed quamdiu his caret, necessario diligit maxime proprium commodum et seipsum, et propter commodum proprium et seipsum finaliter reliqua operatur. Dilectio ergo et operatio charitatis seu gratiae, siue chari et grati, procedens a charitate et gratia differt specifice a dilectione et operatione non chari et non grati. Sicut enim obiecta dilectionum et dilecta finaliter differunt specie, sic et propriae dilectiones eorum: sic enim est in cognitione et visione propria et distincta; alias etiam omnes volutiones et dilectiones essent eiusdem speciel", "english": "concerning the wicked, in the person of the wicked, the Wise Man speaks thus: \"We are wearied in the way of iniquity and perdition, and we have walked difficult ways; but the ways of the Lord we have not known\"; and Scripture offers many similar sayings besides. But for a more sufficient and more subtle solution of this objection it must be noted that, according to what was shown in the preceding chapter, the proper operation of charity and grace is to love God dearly and freely above all things, finally for his own sake, and so to do all the rest for God's sake. No one lacking charity and grace can have such love and operation; but as long as he lacks them, he necessarily loves most of all his own advantage and himself, and for the sake of his own advantage and himself does all the rest as final end. The love and operation of charity or grace, then, that is, of one with charity and grace, proceeding from charity and grace, differs in species from the love and operation of one without charity and grace. For just as the objects of loves, the things finally loved, differ in species, so do their proper loves; so it is also in proper and distinct knowledge and vision. Otherwise all willings and loves would be of the same species [n17]", "margins": [{"id": "369A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "The Wise Man."}]}, {"anchor": "p369B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p369B", "locator_display": "369B–369E", "source_text": "specialissimae, et omnes cognitiones et visiones similiter; et ita de potentijs alijs, et operationibus proprijs quibuscun que . Vnde et Philosophus, 8. Eth. 3. Ex hoc quod sunt tres species amabilium, scilicet vtile, et delectabile, honestum seu virtus, oportet tres esse species amationum et amicitiarum: Dicit enim, differunt autem haec adinuicem specie; et amationes ergo et amicitiae aequales numero amabilibus. Et infra 7. Altera autē est amicitiae species, quae secundū superabundantiam, puta patri ad filium, et totaliter seniori ad iuniorem, viroque ad vxorem, et omni imperanti ad imperatum: Differunt autem hae adinuicem; non enim eadē parentibus ad filios, et imperantibus ad imperatos, sed neque patri ad filium, et filio ad patrem; neque viro ad vxorem, et vxori ad virum; Altera enim vnicuique eorum virtus et opus, altera autem et propter quae amant, alterae igitur et amationes et amicitiae. Anselmus quoque De libero arbitrio, 7. facta distinctione de voluntate, in instrumentum naturale, quo volumus, et in vsum seu opus illius, subiungit; Illa quae opus est tam multiplex est quam multa, et quam\n\nsaepe volumus, sicut et visus qui est opus, et visio nominatur tam numerosus est quam numerosa, et quam numerose videmus. Hoc idem potest et breuiter Theologice sic ostendi; Si non gratus posset diligere et facere quodlibet dilectione et factione eiusdem speciet cum grato, posset sine gratia similiter implere omnia mandata, sicut gratus, quod est error Pelagij, sicut capitulum proximum manifestat. Dilectio ergo grati ex gratia et non grati sunt specie differentes. Potest tamen gratus quandoque diligere et operari, non ex gratia sed ex amicitia naturali, ex affectione commodi, ex appetitu delectabilis et vtilis sibi ipsi faciendo actum indifferentem, vel etiam veniale peccatum. Vel ergo instantia comparat actum grati ex gratia procedentem ad actum quemcunque non grati, et tunc illi differunt specie, nec aliquod experimentum ostendit, quod non gratus potest ita fortiter agere actum eiusdem speciei cum actu grati ex gratia procedente; quare non instat; vel comparat actum grati non ex gratia procedentem ad actum non grati similem specie, et sic bene possunt aeque fortiter agere, quia\n\ngratia non coagit, nec adiuuat ibi gratum; quare nec instantia ista instat. Pro secunda, sciendum quod illa nullo modo procedit, quia similiter posset ostendi, quod Deus non agit actum meritorium voluntatis, cuius oppositum patet ex tertio huius, et quarto, et multis capitulis alijs praelibatis. Imaginatur etiam vnum falsum: Si enim A habeat, et sicut habet, partes diuersas, tam gratia quam voluntas efficit ipsum totum, et quamlibet eius partem non diuisim sed coniunctim, non successiue sed simul, sicut Deus et voluntas; sicut etiam duo homines trahunt nauem. Vnde Bernardus De gratia, et libero arbitrio, vicesimo tertio; Ad hoc, inquit, gratia praeuenit liberum arbitrium, vt iam sibi deinceps cooperetur, ita tamen quod a sola gratia caeptum est pariter ab vtroque perficitur, vt mixtim non singillatim, simul non vicissim per singulos effectus operetur, non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opere indiuiduo peragunt, totum quidem hoc, et totum illa, sed vt totum in illa, sic totum ex illa. Tertia tollitur, sicut secunda: Similiter namque posset ostendi, quod Deus non\n\nagit actum liberum et meritorium voluntatis. Quae et ex abundanti nihilominus soluitur, sicut prima: Non enim potest homo sine gratia diligere sub aliquo gradu dilectione illius speciei, cum dilectione a gratia procedente. Vt tamen radicem eius effodiam, dico quod licet non gratus posset diligere similiter specie, sicut gratus ex gratia, instantia non instaret: Non enim ipsum faceret violente et inuite velle aut tam intense velle; sed de volente et reluctante faceret gratis volentem, et voluntarie diligentem; Hoc enim est propriū gratiae, sicut praemissa hic de gratia manifestant. Quod et specialiter manifestat conuersio S. Pauli, et ille quem ad preces Sancti Stephani fundatoris Grandimontensis ordinis, diuina gratia conuertebat. Refert siquidem Williamus de Aluernia partis tertiae sui tripartiti 22 hoc modo, pro quodam tali, qui etiam prohibebat, ne pro eo oraretur, et qui dicebat se nolle vllo modo obtinere gratiam poenitentiae vel conuersionis, eo inuito et renitente orationem fecit pro eo sanctus Stephanus", "english": "most specific, and all cognitions and visions likewise; and so for the other powers, and for any proper operations whatsoever. Hence the Philosopher too, in Ethics 8, 3 [n18]: \"Since there are three species of the lovable, namely the useful, the pleasant, and the honorable or virtuous, there must be three species of lovings and of friendships.\" For he says, \"these differ from one another in species; and so the lovings and friendships are equal in number to the lovable things.\" And below, in 7: \"There is another species of friendship, which is according to superiority: for example, that of a father to a son, and generally of an elder to a younger, of a husband to a wife, and of every ruler to the ruled. These differ from one another; for it is not the same for parents toward children and for rulers toward the ruled, nor even for a father toward a son and a son toward a father, nor for a husband toward a wife and a wife toward a husband. For the virtue and the work of each of them is different, and different too are the reasons for which they love; so the lovings and the friendships are different.\" Anselm also, in On Free Choice, 7 [n19], having distinguished in the will between the natural instrument by which we will and its use or work, adds: \"That which is the work is as manifold as the things we will are many, and as often as we will; just as sight, which is the work and is called vision, is as numerous as the things we see are numerous, and as many times as we see.\"\n\nThe same can also be shown briefly, in theological terms, as follows. If one not in grace [n20] could love and do anything with a love and a doing of the same species as that of one in grace, he could likewise fulfil all the commandments without grace, as the one in grace does; and that is the error of Pelagius, as the preceding chapter makes clear. The love, then, of one in grace proceeding from grace, and that of one not in grace, differ in species. Yet one in grace can sometimes love and act not from grace but from natural friendship, from affection for his own advantage, from desire for what is pleasant and useful to himself, performing an indifferent act or even a venial sin. So the objection [n21] either compares an act of one in grace proceeding from grace with any act whatever of one not in grace, and then they differ in species, and no experience shows that one not in grace can perform so strongly an act of the same species as the act of one in grace proceeding from grace; so it does not stand. Or it compares an act of one in grace not proceeding from grace with a similar act of one not in grace, of the same species; and then they can indeed act equally strongly, because grace neither compels nor helps the one in grace there; so neither does this objection stand.\n\nAs for the second, it must be known that it in no way goes through, because in the same way it could be shown that God does not produce the meritorious act of the will, the opposite of which is clear from the third chapter of this book, and the fourth, and many other chapters touched on before. It also imagines one falsehood. For if A has diverse parts, as he does have, then grace and will alike produce the whole of him and each part of him, not separately but jointly, not successively but simultaneously, as God and the will do; just as two men pull a boat. Hence Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice, the twenty-third [n22]: \"To this end,\" he says, \"grace goes before free choice, that henceforth it may cooperate with it; yet in such a way that what was begun by grace alone is equally completed by both, so that it works in combination, not singly, and together, not in turn, through each individual effect; not partly grace and partly free choice, but each performs the single works as a whole in one undivided act: the whole this one, and the whole that one; but as the whole is in the one, so the whole is from the other.\" The third is dismissed like the second: for in the same way it could be shown that God does not produce the free and meritorious act of the will. This too is resolved over and above, nonetheless, like the first: for a man cannot, without grace, love in any degree with a love of the same species as the love proceeding from grace. But to dig up its root, I say that even if one not in grace could love in the same species as one in grace from grace, the objection would not stand. For grace would not make him will violently and unwillingly, or so intensely; rather, from one willing and resisting, it would make one freely willing [n23] and voluntarily loving; for this is proper to grace, as what has been set out above about grace shows. The conversion of St Paul makes this especially clear, and so does that of the man whom divine grace converted at the prayers of St Stephen, founder of the Grandmontine order. For William of Auvergne reports, in the third part of his Tripartite, 22 [n24], in this manner: for a certain man of this kind, who even forbade that prayer be made for him, and who said that he did not want in any way to obtain the grace of repentance or conversion, though he was unwilling and resisting, Saint Stephen made prayer for him,", "margins": [{"id": "369B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "The Philosopher."}, {"id": "369B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Anselm."}]}, {"anchor": "p370A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/40/#p370A", "locator_display": "370A–370D", "source_text": "institutor Grandimon. ordinis cum conuentu suo, et exauditus fuit. Cum enim pro illo orastent, venit ad eos homo ille annuntians eis, qualiter visitatus esset, et faciens confessionem de peccatis cum multa deuotione et lacrymis poenitentiam egit: Peccat etiam grauiter eo quod ignorat elenchum. Quomodo namque repugnant, quod aliquis nunc vult vnum, et prius noluit illud, aut voluit eius oppositum? quae repugnantia? aut quare vult talis inuite? Exempli siquidem causa, ponatur quod iste praestituit sibi heri, quod hodie pasceret vnicum pauperem; et quod hodie vberiori gratia visitatus velit pascere duos, et pascat, quae violentia? quae repugnantia inter ista? Videtur quoque multum probabile quod homo potest cum gratia et ex ipsa velle quantumcunque remisse: Potest ergo homo ex gratia diligere sub tanto gradu, quantum sibi praestituit, et quantum fuisset sine gratia habiturus, et etiam sub minori. Quarta peccat vt tertia, et secunda: sic enim posset probari quod Deus non agit liberos actus nostros, et etiam quod gratia confirmationis violentaret voluntatem\n\nconfirmati ad non peccandum, et ad beatificum actum suum, quae tamen vt tertia potest solui. Quinta si quid probaret, probaret similiter quod nec finis, nec species eius in anima, nec eius cognitio mouerent volentem, nec aliquo modo efficerent actum liberum voluntatis contra praemissa 19. et 21 o. huius. Quis etiam Philosophiam parum ingressus, non legit illud capitulum 3i. de Anima, De mouente; vbi satis ostenditur quod phantasia est vna causa mouens animalia, et intellectus homines processiue; quod quomodo debet intelligi, nisi quod phantasia est vna causa efficiens appetitus in illis; intellectus vero, scilicet species obiecti in intellectu, seu actus intelligendi, ipsa scilicet intellectio, voluntatis in istis, quo et qua mouentur animalia et homines processiue, sicut euidenter colligitur ex processu? Quis non videt illum processum 12. Metaphys. vbi ostendit Philosophus quod primum mouens quod est Deus, mouet, vt dicit noua translatio, sicut appetibile et intelligibile mouent non mota, et sicut amatum; et sicut dicit translatio quam Auerroes exponit, mouet sicut desideratum et intellectum,\n\net sicut amatum. Super quod Auerroes comment. 36. Hoc, inquit, mouens est mouens quia agit motum, et quia est finis motus; haec autem differunt in nobis, scilicet id quod mouet nos in loco, secundum quod est agens, et quod mouet nos secundum quod est finis; et habet duplex esse; in anima, et extra animam: Quod enim est in anima, est agens motum, secundum vero quod est extra animam est mouens secundum finem; verbi gratia, quoniam balneum duplicem habet formam, in anima, et extra animam; et extra illlam formam quae est in anima desideramus aliam formam, quae est extra animam, et propter illam formam quae est in anima desideramus aliam formam quae est extra animam; Forma igitur balnei in quantum est in anima, est agens desiderium et motum; secundum autem quod est extra animam, est finis motus non agens. Hoc idem et ratio manifestat; Agnitio namque est necessario praesupposita volutioni; est ergo aliqua causa eius sicut in superioribus est ostensum; et non causa materialis, formalis, neque finalis; est ergo\n\nefficiens causa eius: et haec videtur ratio Philosophi tertio de Anima, vbi fuerat allegatus. Est etiam cognitio naturaliter et essentialiter prior volutione, quare et aliqua causa eius, sicut decimo tertio huius patet, etc. sicut prius. Ex his autem cognoscitur quod non est dissonum rationi sicut sexta supponit, quod agens irrationabile liberum actum agat, imo necessaria ratio hoc requirit; quod tamen solum agens irrationabile hunc faceret, esset, sed quod cum rationabili hunc faciat, nullo modo dissonat rationi. Vltima vero instantia est pure Pelagiana. Probaret enim gratiam non esse necessario requisitam ad obseruantiam mandatorum, nec ad salutem perpetuam consequendam, nec magis obuiat dicenti gratiam esse actiuam, quam non actiuam, dum tamen dicat ipsam requiri necessario ad salutem, sicut necesse est quemlibet dicere, qui Pelagianam haeresin noluerit profiteri, sicut priora capitula manifestant.", "english": "the founder of the Grandmont order, together with his community; and he was heard. For while they were praying for him, that man came to them announcing how he had been visited, and, making confession of his sins with much devotion and tears, did penance. It [n25] also errs gravely in that it ignores the refutation. For how do they conflict, that someone now wills one thing and earlier did not will it, or willed its opposite? What conflict is there? Or why does such a man will unwillingly? For example, suppose that he resolved for himself yesterday that today he would feed a single poor man, and that today, visited with a richer grace, he wants to feed two, and does feed them: what violence is there? What conflict between these things? It also seems very probable that a man can, with grace and from it, will however remissly. So a man can, from grace, love in as great a degree as he resolved for himself, and as he would have had without grace, and even in a lesser degree. The fourth errs like the third and the second: for in this way it could be proved that God does not produce our free acts, and also that the grace of confirmation would do violence to the will\n\nof the one confirmed, as regards not sinning and his beatific act; and yet this can be resolved as the third was. The fifth, if it proved anything, would prove likewise that neither the end, nor its species in the soul, nor the cognition of it moves one who wills, nor in any way brings about the free act of the will; against what was set out in chapters 19 and 21 of this book. And who that has even slightly entered philosophy has not read that chapter of the third book of On the Soul, \"On the Mover\" [n26], where it is sufficiently shown that imagination is one cause moving animals, and the intellect men, in locomotion? How is this to be understood, except that imagination is one efficient cause of appetite in them, and the intellect (that is, the species of the object in the intellect, or the act of understanding, the intellection itself) is likewise one efficient cause of will in these [n27]; by which and through which animals and men are moved in locomotion, as is evidently gathered from the course of the text? Who does not see that course of argument in Metaphysics 12, where the Philosopher shows that the first mover, which is God, moves, as the new translation says [n28], as the desirable and the intelligible move, themselves unmoved, and as the loved; and, as the translation which Averroes expounds says, moves as the desired and the understood\n\nand as the loved? On which Averroes, comment 36, says: \"This mover is a mover because it produces the motion, and because it is the end of the motion; but these differ in us: namely, that which moves us in place, insofar as it is an agent, and that which moves us insofar as it is an end. And it has a twofold being: in the soul, and outside the soul. For that which is in the soul is the agent of the motion, but insofar as it is outside the soul it is a mover as end. For example, since the bath has a twofold form, in the soul and outside the soul, beyond that form which is in the soul we desire another form, which is outside the soul, and on account of that form which is in the soul we desire another form which is outside the soul. The form of the bath, then, insofar as it is in the soul, is the agent of desire and motion; but insofar as it is outside the soul, it is the end of the motion, not the agent.\" Reason shows the same. For cognition is necessarily presupposed to willing; so it is some cause of it, as was shown above; and it is not a material, formal or final cause; so it is\n\nits efficient cause: and this seems to be the reasoning of the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul, where he was cited. Cognition is also naturally and essentially prior to willing; hence it too is some cause of it, as is clear from the thirteenth of this book, etc., as before. From these things it is known that it is not dissonant with reason, as the sixth supposes, that an irrational agent should perform a free act; indeed necessary reason requires this [n29]. If an irrational agent alone did this, it would be so; but that it does this together with a rational agent is in no way dissonant with reason. The last objection is purely Pelagian. For it would prove that grace is not necessarily required for the observance of the commandments, nor for attaining everlasting salvation; and it is no more an obstacle to one who says that grace is active than to one who says it is not active, provided he says that it is necessarily required for salvation, as everyone must say who is unwilling to profess the Pelagian heresy, as the earlier chapters make clear.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}