{"id": "1/39", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 39", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "325A–364A", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXXIX. Contra quosdam putantes hominem ex se tantum posse mereri primam gratiam de congruo, non de condigno.\n\nPRaeter istos autem sunt alij non contenti gratia gratis data, sed volunt quod vendatur a Deo, et ematur ab eis aliquo precio licet vili, congruo tamen vt asserunt, non condigno. Dicunt enim homines ex solis proprijs viribus gratiam Dei mereri de congruo, non autem de condigno.\n\nEt quia iste error est famosior caeteris his diebus, et nimis multi per ipsum in Pelagianum praecipitium dilabuntur; necessarium videtur ipsum diligentiori examine perscrutari. Porro hic error non multum differt realiter ab alijs superius recitatis, potest cum illis similiter confutari: Nam omnes poene rationes, et autoritates contra illos adductae, contra hunc procedunt similiter recta fronte. Sequitur enim ex ista, quod gratia sit ex operibus et meritis, cum errore Pelagij radicali; sequitur etiam quod gratia sit ex meritis saltem, vt ex causa partiali et concausa cum primo errore sequente; et quod merita illa de congruo sint saltem causa et dispositio praeparatoria gratiae cum secundo, et quod quis possit mereri de congruo per se solum, sicut tertius error ponit, quod homo potest solis proprijs viribus aperire. Praeterea si quis de congruo primam gratiam mereatur, hoc est priusquam habeat gratiam saltem prioritate naturae; sed priusquam habeat gratiam de qua loquor, scilicet gratificantem ad regnum, non habet\n\netiam charitatem. Ipsa enim sola diuidit inter filios perditionis, et regni, vt dicit Augustinus 15. de Trinit. 18. et patet per Apostolum 1. ad Corinth. 13. quare nec diligit Deum omnino, vel saltem non amore gratuito, sed libere et principaliter propter illum. Quapropter nec aliquid meretur ab eo, et maxime nullum bonum gratuitum arram certam boni maximi sempiterni: Nam qua fronte vendicat quis remunerationem a Deo, cui nullum munus donauit? aut quo titulo exigit retributionem ab eo, cui nunquam aliquid tribuit? et quomodo meretur quis quicquam a Deo, qui nihil facit pro eo? Vnde Matth. 6. Attendite, ne iustitiam vestram faciatis coram hominibus, vt videamini ab cis, alioquin mercedem non habebitis apud Patrem vestrum qui in coelis est: vbi Chrysostomus; Quid autem a Deo recipies, qui Deo nihil dedisti? Nam quod propter Deum fit, Deo datur, quod autem propter homines fit, in ventos effunditur. Ad hoc et facit efficaciter Augustinus, 1. contra Pelagium et Caelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali 22. sicut 37um recitauit. Adhuc autem et si quis amet\n\nDeum, et faciat pro eo, non propter se, sed vt prospera sibi concedat, vel aduersa prohibeat, redit idem. Quomodo namque talis plus meretur a Deo, quam venditor ab emptore? et praeter hoc, magis diligit concessionem istorum, et prohibitionem illorum, quam Deum, et cum ista diligat propter seipsum, magis diligit seipsum quam Deum. Semper enim propter quod vnumquod que , illud magis est: vt propter quod amamus, illud magis amicum est, 1. Post. 2. Imo sicut 26. capitulo fucrat declaratum; Qui diligit aliquid propter aliquem certum finem, non diligit hoc, sed finem; ergo nedum sic diligens non meretur, sed peccat; facit enim contra rectum et debitum ordinem diligendi, teste parte 30. corollarij, primi, huius; et contra praeceptum de diligendo Deum ex toto corde, et tota anima, et tota fortitudine atque mente, Deuteron. 6. et Mat. 22. Talis quoque se fruitur, et vtitur ipso Deo; ergo constat eum peccare, vt patet diffuse per Aug. De doctrina Christ. cap. 1. et post: et recitat Lumb. 1. Sent. dist. 1. Patet etiam quod talis non meretur. Nullus enim operando meretur, nisi habeat intentionem\n\nrectam, scilicet recti finis: Nam sicut in naturalibus motus denominatur a fine, sic et in moralibus, sicut et patet ex 34. huius. Talis autem extra charitatem non habet intentionem rectam: Nulla enim est intentio recta, nisi quae finaliter immediate tendit in Deum, vel forsitan mediate, quae forte immediate fertur in creaturam, et per illam finaliter in Deum, et hoc super omnia gratuito propter ipsum, sicut 30. pars corol. 1. docet. Si enim propter aliquid aliud finaliter appetatur, iam illud aliud magis est finis intentus, sicut praehabita manifestant; et cum caetera naturalia in quantum acceperunt a natura, in tantum per inclinationē naturalem hoc faciant; homo qui ad hoc accepit potentiam intellectualem, et libere volutiuam, debet hoc facere scienter et libere secundū potentias ad hoc finaliter sibi datas. Homo ergo quicun que agē do non sic dirigit actualiter nec habitualiter intentionē suā finaliter in Deum, et hoc gratuito propter ipsum, facit contra naturalem ordinem vniuersi; quare et peccat innaturaliter contra\n\nnaturam, et contra Deum, principium, et finem, ac summum autorem totius naturae, et ordinis naturalis, vel saltem non meretur. Hoc etiam patet per Augustinum 1. de doctrina Christiana, vbi prius; Si enim intentio illa sit recta, intendens fruitur Deo, vel per illam vtitur creatura: et si fruitur Deo, patet propositum; Si autem vtitur creatura, cum secundum Augustinum ibidem, vti sit id, quod in vsum venerit, referre ad obtinendum illud quo fruendum est; alias abuti est, non vti; Nam vsus illicitus abusus, vel abusio nominari debet. Adhuc patet, Nam vsus creaturae, si non referatur in Deum, est vsus illicitus; ergo peccatum, vel faltem non est recte factum; ergo illa intentio non est recta; nec alicuius intentio sine charitate et gratia gratuito super omnia fertur in Deum; quoniam sicut nullius intellectus sine fide fideliter fertur in Deum, ita nullius affectus sine gratia grate fertur in Deum, ita quod habeat Deum gratuito super omnia sibi charum: Eadem enim est proportio hic et ibi. Item si homo sine gratia charitatis posset Deum amare gratuito super omnia alia, et posset similiter\n\ncognoscere omnia alia mandata, et seruare ea; quia qui potest maius, potest et minus; sed mandatum de dilectione Dei est primum et maximum, Matt. 22. Imo quicunque sic Deum diligeret, nullo modo scienter eum offenderet, nec aliquod eius mandatum coniemneret. (Hoc enim tantae dilectioni repugnaret expresse) sed ea omnia pro viribus conseruaret. Dicit enim Philosophus 9. Eth. 4. Ponunt amicum volentem et operantem bona vel apparentia illius gratia, puta amati; et 2. Rhetor. suae 5 Sit, inquit, velle, amare alicui quae putat bona, illius gratia, sed non sui, et secundum posse actiuum esse horum: Vnde et Sapientiae sexto; Dilector, custodia, seu custoditio legum illius est: Quare et veritas ipsa dicit, Siquis diligit me, sermonem meum seruabit, Ioan. 14. Super quod Gregorius hom. 30. Probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis. Hinc in epistola sua, isdem Ioannes dicit, Qui dicit, quia diligo Deum, et mandata eius non custodit, mendax est; vere enim diligimus, si mandata eius seruamus; vere diligimus, si a nostris voluptatibus nos coarctamus. Nam qui adhuc per illicita desideria\n\ndefluit, profecto Deum non amat, quia ei in voluntate sua contradicit. Apostolus ad Rom. 13. similiter arguens, sic concludit; Plenitudo ergo legis est dilectio; quare nec sine gratia charitatis, posset quis esse in statu salutis. Nam Luc. 10. dicit Saluator, Haec fac, id est, serua mandata, et viues. Frustra ergo ponuntur hi tres habitus, scilicet fides, spes, et charitas supernaturaliter nobis infusi, cum sine his naturalia nostra nobis sufficiant ad faciendum et seruandum omnia diuina mandata, sicut Pelagius asserebat, vt recitat Augustinus de haeresibus 88. et Petrus 2. sentent. dist. 28. et Isidorus 8. Eth. 14. et Canon. 24. quaest. vlt. Quidam autem. Sed Doctores nostri Catholici dicunt nos istis tribus habitibus, vel alijs proportionalibus indigete, quia cum animae nostrae aspectus et affectus per molem corporis seu peccati, vel per naturalem impotentiam deprimantur, in tantum quod non possunt Deum videre debite, nec amare, vel etiam propter improportionem tam excellentis obiecti, necessario indigent fide vel lumine gloriae, et charitate seu gratia, quae ipsos eleuent ad Deum videndum\n\ndebite et amandum. Vnde et Papa Clemens quintus damnat haeresin Begardorum dicentem, quod anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam eleuante ad Deum viden dum, et eo beate fruendum, Extra de haereticis, Ad nostrum. Et hoc nedum nos in statu praesentis miseriae, sed etiam Angeli et primi parentes in statu primae innocentiae similiter indigebant, quando nullum obicem posuerunt mortalem, nec minimum venialem, vt dicit Lumbardus, et probat per autoritates Augustini 2. sentent dist. 5a. 24a. et 29a. plane. Et si quis dicat, quod virtutes morales satis eleuent affectum ad Deum grate amandum, contradicetur ei faciliter per priora: Incidit enim in errorem Pelagij supra dictum, quod videlicet homo solius liberi arbitrij viribus sine gratia possit omnia Dei mandata efficaciter adimplere, sicut praecedentia monstrauerunt. Adhuc autem quid simile, sic eleuat Angelos ad amandum? Amplius autem virtutes morales ex operibus generantur, vt patet 2. Eth. 1. et 2. nec speciem suam aut terminos suos excedunt, sed ad similes operationes tantum inclinant, ex qualibus generabantur. Vnde\n\ndicit ibi Philosophus cap. 2. Operationes et virtutes in eisdem erunt: Sicut enim ex recedere a voluptatibus efficimur temperati, sic effecti maxime possumus recedere ab ipsis; et sicut assueti contemnere terribilia et sustinere ipsa efficimur fortes, sic effecti maxime poterimus sustinere terribilia. Cum ergo nullus ex puris naturalibus diligat Deum gratuito super omnia propter seipsum, sed propter aliquem alium finem, habitus ex talibus multiplicatis dilectionibus generatus tantummodo inclinabit ad Deum similiter, et non aliter diligendum. Quapropter et idem Philosophus 8. Eth. et 9. ostendit, quod quilibet etiam virtuosus, primo et maxime diliget semetipsum, et quod ab hac dilectione omnis alia dilectio et amicitia derinatur. Octaui namque 2. sic ait, Videtur autem et quod ipsi bonum amare vnusquisque;\n\net infra 7. Sibi ipsi maxime vnusquisque vult bona; et noni libri 4. Amicabilia autem quae ad amicos, et quibus amicitiae determinantur, videntur ex his quae ad seipsum venisse: et infra 8. quaerit, Vtrum oportet amare seipsum maxime, et arguit pro, et contra, et determinat quod oportet; vbi et infra 9. Omnis, inquit, intellectus eligit optimum sibi ipsi; epieikes autem obedit intellectui: verum enim quod de studioso, et amicorum gratia multa agere, et pati, et si oporteat, mori: Proijciet enim et pecunias et honores, et totaliter circumpugnabilia bona, procurans sibi ipsi bonum. Paucum enim tempus valde delectari magis vtique eliget, quam multum quiete; et viuere bene annum, quam multos annos qualitercunque; et vnam actionem bonam, et magnam, quam multas et paruas. Morientibus autem et hoc forte accidit, eligunt vtique magnum sibi ipsis, et pecunias proijciunt vtique, in quo plura recipient amici. Fiunt enim quidem amico pecuniae, ipsi autem bonum, maius autem bonum tribuit sibi ipsi. Ecce secundum doctrinam Philosophi quod virtuosus in operatione\n\nsua maxime virtuosa intendit, et amat finaliter, non Deum gratuito propter Deum, sed proprium bonum suum, proprium commodum et seipsum, et Deum fortassis propter se hominem. Vnde et Sixtus Pictagoras in sententiolis suis ait; Sine Deo non poteris viuere Deo; et infra, Sapientem fatum non facit; gratia enim Dei fato non fubiacet. Quapropter et Anselmus de Concord. vlt. dicit, quod voluntas quae est instrumentum, et naturalis libertas arbitrij sine iustitia otiosa est et ancilla facta est suae affectionis quae ad commodum est, quia remota iustitia nihil potest velle, nisi quod illa vult, affectio scilicet commodi; haec autem iustitia proculdubio est gratia Dei ipsa, ex gratiaue dependet. Iustitia namque tribuit vnicuique quod est suum; quare et Deo amorem gratuitum super omnia propter ipsum, secundum partem 30am Corollarij, primi huius; quod fieri sine gratia nusquam potest, sicut praecedentia suaserunt. Hoc idem Anselmus, et alij Doctores Catholici saepius contestantur: Dicit enim Apostolus, Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius, ad Rom. 3. et iterum, Iustificati gratia ipsius,\n\nhaeredes fimus, ad Titum 3. et iterum, Gratia regnet per iustitiam, ad Rom. 5. et infra 10. de quibusdam opinionis contrariae scribit ita; Ignorantes Dei iustitiam, et suam quae rentes statuere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti; quod tractans Augustinus de verbis Apostoli, serm. 15. Iustitia, inquit, sit, sed ex gratia sit; a Deo tibi sit, tua non sit: qui et exponens illud Psalmi 118. Feci iudicium et iustitiam, scribit ita; Iustitiae nomine hoc loco non ipsa virtus, sed opus eius significatum est. Quis enim facit in homine iustitiam, nisi qui iustificat impium? hoc est per gratiam suam ex impio facit iustum. Vnde Apostolus, Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius: Facit ergo iustitiam, id est, opus iustitiae, qui habet in se iustitiam, quibus et multi Autores similia multa dicunt. Quapropter et euidenter apparet nullam virtutem Philosophicam seu moralem esse veram virtutem, simpliciter rectam, aut iustam, sine charitate et gratia ipsam perficiente, erigente in Deum et ad ipsum finaliter propter ipsum gratuito dirigente. Non enim parum deest virtuti, cui deest vera causa finalis, recta intentio, iustus finis, et praecipue talis\n\nfinis, qualis cognoscitur esse Deus. Vnde nec minus clare perpenditur, nullum opus virtutis huiusmodi per charitatem et gratiam non formatae; et vniuersaliter nullum opus cuiuspiam, veram virtutem charitatis et gratiae non habentis, esse simpliciter virtuosum, rectum, aut iustum; quinimo et quodlibet tale opus, est aliquo modo peccatum. Nam quomodo posset opus esse virtuosum, rectum, et iustum simpliciter, quod non a tali virtute procedit, quae rectam causam finalem simpliciter, rectam intentionem, et iustum finem non habet? imo quomodo posset opus non esse quouismodo obliquitas aut peccatum, quod a recto, debito, et iusto fine simpliciter ad alium distorquetur, et ibi requiescit finaliter vltimate? Quare et Plato atque Platonici Philosophi excellentes veras virtutes non esse dicebant, nisi quae menti quodammodo imprimuntur a forma illius aeternae immutabilisque substantiae, qui est Deus: An et haec est virtus de qua Aristoteles 7. Ethic. 1. dicit, Quandam esse super nos virtutem heroicam et diuinam? Quapropter et Augustinus 4. contra Iulianum 4. recitat opinionem\n\ncontrariam tanquam errorem Pelagianorum, sic alloquens Iulianum; Soletis, negantes Dei dona esse virtutes, quibus recte viuitur, et eas naturae voluntatique humanae non gratiae Dei tribuentes, hoc vti argumento, quod eas nonnunquam habeant infideles. Et infra 5. Acerbissimi, inquit, gratiae inimici, exempla nobis opponitis impiorum, quos dicitis alienos a fide abundare virtutibus, in quibus sine adiutorio gratiae solum est naturae bonum, licet superstitionibus mancipatum, qui solius libertatis ingenitae viribus, et misericordes crebro, et modesti, et casti inueniuntur, et sobrij. Sed horum errorem, ertoneum argumentum redarguit consequenter, ostendens diffuse quod nulla est in infidelibus vera virtus, nec aliquod opus rectum; imo et quod omne opus infidelium est peccatum; quod etiam virtutes infidelium sunt veraciter dona Dei; quare et sexto sic ait, Absit vt sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit iustus vere, nisi viuat ex fide; Iustus enim ex fide\n\nviuit. Quis porro eorum qui se Christianos haberi volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiam forte tu solus, iustum dixerit infidelem, iustum dixerit impium, iustum dixerit Diabolo mancipatum? Porto si veram iustitiam non habent impij; profecto nec alias virtutes comites et socias, si quas habent, veras habent; ac per hoc nec continentia, siue pudicitia, vera virtus est impiorum, quia cum non ad suum referuntur autorem dona Dei, hoc ipso malo, his vtentes efficiuntur iniusti. Et infra 8. Nouetis, inquit, non officijs sed finibus a vitijs discernendas esse virtutes; officium est autem quod faciendum est; cum ita que facit aliquid homo vbi peccare non videtur, si non propter hoc facit, propter quod facere debet, peccare conuincitur; quae tamen non attēdens fines ab officijs separasti, et virtutes veras officia sine finibus appellāda esse dixisti; ex quo te tanta absurditas sequitur, vt veram appellare cogaris iustitiam, etiam cuius Dominam repereris auaritiam. Siquidem manus abstinere ab alieno, si officium cogites, potest videri esse iustitiae; si tamen quaeritur, quare fiat, et respondetur, ne plus pecuniae litibus\n\npereat, quomodo iam hoc factum vere poterit esse iustitiae, cum seruiat auaritiae, quales virtutes Epicurus induxit voluptatis ancillas, quae omnino quicquid facerent, propter illam vel adipiscendam facerent, vel tenendam? Absit autem, vt virtutes verae cuiquam seruiant nisi illi, vel propter illum, cui dicimus, Deus virtutum conuerte nos. Proinde virtutes quae carnalibus delectationibus, vel quibuscunque commodis et emolumentis temporalibus seruiunt, verae prorsus esse non possunt; quae autem nulli rei seruire volunt, nec ipsae verae sunt. Verae quippe virtutes Deo seruiunt in hominibus, a quo donantur hominibus; Deo seruiunt in Angelis, a quo donantur etiam Angelis; quicquid autem bonum fit ab homine, et non propter hoc fit, propter quod fieri debere vera sapientia praecipit, etsi officio videatur bonum, ipso non recto fine peccatum est. Et infra 12. recitat replicationem Iuliani haeretici, et respondet sic dicens; Ecce eadem commemoro quae ipse posuisti. Si gentilis, qui non viuit ex fide, nudum, operuerit, periclitātem liberauerit, aegri vulnera fouerit, diuitias honestae amicitiae\n\nimpenderit, ad testimonium falsum nec tormentis poterit impelli; quaero abs te, vtrum haec opera bona bene faciat an male, si enim quamuis bona, male tamen facit, negare non potes eum peccare, qui male quodlibet facit; sed quia eum non vis peccare cum ista facit, profecto dicturus es, et bona facit, et bene. Fructus ergo bonos facit arbor mala, quod fieri non posse veritas dicit. An dicis hominem infidelem arborem bonam? placet ergo Deo, et vbi erit quod scriptum est, Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo? Vide itaque vtrum infidelē voluntatem audeas dicere bonam voluntatem: Sed forte dicturus es, misericors voluntas bona est; recte istud diceretur, si quemadmodum fides Christi, id est, fides quae per dilectionem operatur semper est bona, ita misericordia semper est bona: si autē et reperitur mesericordia mala, qua persona pauperis accipitur in iudicio; propter quam postremo rex Saul meruit a Domino et vtique misericordiae damnari, quia contra eius praeceptum captiuo regi per humanum peperit affectum; attente cogita, ne forte misericordia bona non sit, nisi quae bonae huius fidei fuerit; imo responde,\n\nvt hoc sine dubitatione prospicias, vtrum bonam misericordiam existimes infidelem? Porro si vitium est male misereri, proculdubio vitiū est misereri infideliter; quod si et ipsa per seipsam naturali compassione opus est bonum, etiam isto bono male vtitur, qui infideliter vtitur; et hoc bonum male facit, qui in fideliter facit; qui autē male facit aliquid profecto peccat, ex quo colligitur etiam ipsa bona opera, quae faciunt infideles, non ipsorum esse, sed illius qui bene vtitur malis; ipsorum autem esse peccata, quibus et bona male faciunt, quia non fideli sed infideli, id est, stulta et noxia hoc faciunt voluntate. Et infra 13. Intellige quod ait Dominus, Si oculus tuus nequam est, totum corpus tuum tenebrosum erit; Si autem oculus tuus est simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit; et hunc oculum agnosce intentionem qua quis que facit quod facit, et per hoc disce eum qui non facit opera bona, intentione fidei bonae, hoc est quae per dilectionem operatur, totum quasi corpus, quod illis, velut membris, operibus constat, tenebrosum\n\nesse, hoc est plenum nigredine peccatorum. Amor enim mundi quo quisque amicus est huius mundi, non est ex Deo; amor fruendi quibuscunque creaturis sine amore creatoris non est a Deo; Amorautem Dei, quo perueniatur ad Deum, non est nisi a Deo patre per Iesum Christum in Spiritu Sancto. Per hunc amorem Creatoris bene quis que vtitur creaturis; sine hoc amore Creatoris nullus quisquam bene vtitur creaturis. Quem imitatus et Beda contra Iulianum 13. Quod, inquit, dicit (scilicet Iulianus) multos Philosophorum patientiam, castitatem, modestiam, aliasque de Naturae bono habuisse virtutes, constat quod quicunque Philosophorum Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam nescierunt, hi nullam vere virtutem, sicut nec veram sapientiam habere nulla ratione potuerunt. Vnde et in sententijs Prosperi propositione 106. Omnis infidelium vita peccatū est; Bonum enim nihil est sine\n\nsummo bono. Vbi enim deest agnitio aeternae et incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus. Quapropter et Apostolus, primo ad Corinthios, decimo tertio, Omnes virtutes in charitate radicari demonstrat. Ex his igitur plane constat, quod nulla virtus Philosophica aut moralis, fine gratia charitatis, est simpliciter vera virtus, recta, aut iusta, nec valet erigere voluntatem creatam ad Deum super omnia propter Deum gratuito diligendum, quin potius ipsam deflectit, deflexamue detinet, ad cuiuslibet commodum proprium, et scipsum. De necessitate ergo requiritur aliqua virtus superior supernaturalis, heroica, et diuina, puta gratia gratis data a Deo, ad erigendum voluntatem creatam insufficientem ex seipsa, ad diligendum Deum super omnia gratuito propter Deum, et finaliter propter eum. Hoc autem videtur et congrue figurari Ezechielis primo, vbi Propheta sic ait; Vidi et cecidi in faciem meam, et audini vocem loquentis, et dixit ad me; Fili hominis, sta super pedes tuos, sicut et omni homini ex peccato, seu conditione naturae cadenti, seu iacenti longe\n\ninferius, imperatur; sed quia per seipsum non sufficit surgere, neque stare, recte subiungitur, et ingressus est in me spiritus postquam locutus est mihi, et statuit me supra pedes meos, etc. Quis enim est hic spiritus, nisi spiritus gratiae, spiritus Dei sanctus? Quare et Gregorius primo super Ezechielem, homilia nona, sic ait; Ecce diuina vox iacenti Prophetae iussit, vt surgeret; sed surgere omnino non posset, nisi in hunc Omnipotentis Dei spiritus intrasset. Huic et concordanter Daniel ita dicit; Iacebam consternatus super faciem meam, vultusque meus haerebat terrae, et ecce manus tetigit me, et erexit me super genua mea, et super articulos manuum mearum, etc. Danielis decimo: Quae enim est haec manus, nisi manus diuinae gratiae adiutricis? Quapropter et Augustinus De spiritu et litera, vndecim. dicit ita; Demonstrare nitimur non in eo nos diuinitus adiuuari ad operandam iustitiam, quod legem Deus dedit plenam bonis sanctisque praeceptis; sed quia ipsa voluntas nostra sine qua operari bonum non possumus, adiuuetur, et erigatur, impertito spiritu gratiae, sine quo adiutorio\n\ndoctrina illa litera est occidens. Petrus quoque secundo Sent. suarum distinct. 24. Est, inquit, in anima rationali voluntas, vel qua naturaliter vult bonum, licet tenuiter et exiliter nisi gratia iuuet, quae adueniens iuuat eam et erigit, vt efficaciter velit bonum. Et infra Distinct. 25. vltim. Voluntas, inquit, hominis quam naturaliter habet, non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum, vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur, et adiuuetur; liberetur quidem vt velit, et adiuuetur vt perficiat, quia vt ait Apostolus; Non est volentis velle, neque currentis currete, id est, operari, sed miserentis Dei, qui operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum, cuius gratiam non aduocat hominis voluntas vel operatio; sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praeuenit praeparando, vt velit bonum, et praeparatam adiuuat, ne frustra velit, id est, vt perficiat. Amplius autem secundum omnes Philosophos, naturales et morales, omnis forma, et omnis habitus moralis vel intellectualis per operationem suam cognoscitur, et per operationes distinctas et varias, formae distinctae et variae demonstrantur. Cur ergo per operationem\n\ncharitatis et gratiae, quae est Deum super omnia chare et gratis diligere, forma seu habitus charitatis et gratiae non probatur? Item omnes Doctores de baptismo, et eius effectu scribentes tenent concorditer, quod cuilibet rite baptizato in suo baptismo, tres virtutes Theologicae, scilicet fides, spes, et charitas infunduntur, vna cum gratia informante. Et vt de caetero, nullus super hoc audeat dubitare, sancta Ecclesia istud certissime definiuit. Nam Iohannes Papa Extra, In constitutionibus Clementis, de summa Trinitate, et fide Catholica, recitata vna opinione dicente per virtutem Baptismi paruulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; et alia assere•, quod culpa ipsis in baptismo remittitur, ac virtutes, et informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum; etsi non pro illo tempore quoad vsum, subiungit; Nos attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis, opinionem secundam, quae dicit tam paruulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam, et virtutes, tanquam probabiliorem, et dictis\n\nSanctorum, ac Doctorum modernorum Theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante consilio duximus eligendam. Item nullus potest exercere operationem propriam alicuius formae nisi praehabita illa forma, sicut nullus potest percutere fortiter, nisi praehabita fortitudine, nec videre acute nisi praehabito visu acuto; et in intellectualibus, et moralibus similiter; Nullus enim potest facere sapienter aut prudenter nisi praehabita sapientia vel prudentia; nec in moralibus potest quis generaliter benefacere, nisi praehabita aliquali virtute in genere, a qua tanquam a forma bona seu bonitate actio bona procedat. Vnde secundo Ethicorum sexto ostendit Philosophus quod virtus habentem perficit, et eius opus bonum reddit; cui et simile ex sexto Ethicorum, 10. recitat trice•imum quartum huius, et idem videtur de qualibet virtute in particulari, et operatione illius. Nullus ergo potest iuste velle, nisi praehabita iustitia, nec diligere Deum chare nisi praehabita\n\ncharitate. Quicunque ergo caret iustitia, charitate, et gratia, non potest ex se iuste vel chare aut grate velle nec facere, nec hanc potest ex se habere sicut praecedentia docuerunt; et potest probari; quia si posset, hoc esset grate merendo, seu volendo, vel non sic faciendo; sed non grate merendo, seu volendo, quia hoc non potest nisi praehabita gratia per proximam rationem; nec non grate aliquid faciendo; Non enim congruit rationi, quod gratia detur in praemium et mercedem ei, qui nihil gratum fuerit operatus. (Nam secundum Apostolum 1. ad Cor. 3. Vnusquisque propriam mercedem accipit secundum suum laborem) nec carens ea potest eam recipere a sola alia creatura. Nullus enim potest gignere aut facere filios Dei, et constituere haeredes regni coelestis, nisi Deus Pater, et Dominus huius regni. Restat igitur vt gratia secundum nomen suum, sine vllis meritis praeuijs gratis detur ingratis, a Deo datore liberalissimo gratiarum. Et propter hanc rationem Anselmus de Concordia, eandem sententiam profitetur; vbi postquam ostendit capitulo octauo; quod recte velle est finis\n\nrationalis creaturae, et quod iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se seruata, quoniam qui solum propter aliud illam seruat, non illam diligit, sed illud propter quod eam seruat, et ideo non est dicendus iustus, nec talis rectitudo nominanda est iustitia, nono capitulo sic adiungit; Dubium non est, quia voluntas non vult recte nisi quia recta est: Sicut namque visus non est acutus, quia videt acute, sed id circo videt acute quia est acutus; Ita voluntas non est recta, quia recte vult, sed recte vult quoniam recta est; Cum autem vult hanc rectitudinem, proculdubio recte vult. Non ergo vult rectitudinem nisi quia recta est; Idem autem est voluntati rectam esse et rectitudinem habere; palam igitur est, quia non vult rectitudinem, nisi quia rectitudinem habet. Idem de veritate 12. Rectitudinis acceptio prius est natura quam habere aut velle illam, quoniam illam habere aut velle, non est causa acceptionis, sed acceptio facit illam velle, et habere. Et sicut patet per eundem De causa Diaboli 17. Desertor Angelus amissa iustitia, non potest ex se habere voluntatem iustitiae; Imo et sicut apparet\n\nsupra eiusdem 12. Angelus dispositus ad volendum, non potuit ex se habere suam primam voluntatem, neque beatitudinis aut iustitiae, sed voluntatem commodi naturalem. Huic et consonat dictum eius De concordia vlt. superius recitatum; qui et supra 9. post superius recitata, ostendit quod nullus potest rectitudinem illam recipere nisi a Deo; Consideremus nunc, inquit, vtrum aliquis hanc rectitudinem non habens, aliquo modo eam a se habere possit; vtique illam a se habere nequit nisi aut volendo, aut non volendo; volendo quidem nullus valet eam per se adipisci, quia nequit eam velle, scilicet recte, nisi eam habeat; quod autem nolendo valeat eam assequi mens nullius accipit: Nullo ergo modo potest eam habere ex se; sed neque ab alia creatura: Sicut namque creatura nequit creaturam saluare, ita non potest illi dare per quod saluetur. Sequitur ergo quod nulla creatura rectitudinem habeat, nisi per Dei gratiam. Deo ergo largiente inuenimus gratiam eius ad saluandum hominem cum libero arbitrio concordare; ita vt gratia sola possit hominem saluare, nihil eius libero arbitrio\n\nagente; sicut fit in infantibus et in intelligentibus, vt ipsa semper adiuuet liberū arbitrium naturale, quod sinc illa nihil valet ad salutem, dando voluntati rectitudinem, quam seruet per liberum arbitrium. Et quamuis non omnibus det, quoniam cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat; Nulli tamen dat pro praecedenti aliquo merito, quoniam, quis prior dedit Deo et retribuctur ei? Si autem voluntas per liberum arbitrium, seruando quod accepit, meretur aut augmentum acceptae iustitiae, aut potestatem pro bona voluntate, aut praemium aliquod, haec omnia fructus sunt primae gratiae; et gratia pro gratia, et deo totum imputandum est gratiae, quia neque volentis est quod vult, neque currentis est quod currit, sed miserentis est Dei. Nonne et hoc est quod dicit Propheta, Scio, inquiens, Domine quod non est homins via eius, nec viri est vt ambulet et dirigat gressus suos. Ierem. 1. Cuius est ergo, nisi illius de quo alius Propheta sic ait, Apud Dominum gressus hominis dirigetur, et viam eius volet, Psalmo trigesimo sexto; Imo sicut alia litera clatior, A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur\n\nprimo, et post directionem iam factam, viam eius scilicet Domini volet homo secundo. Hoc enim Aug. exponens sic ait, Ipse homo vt velit viam Domini, ab ipso Domino eius gressus dirigentur: Nam si Dominus non dirigeret gressus hominis, tam praui erant vt semper per praua irent, et semitas curuas sequendo redire non possent. Ipse est ergo qui direxit gressus nostros, vt viam eius vellemus. Qui et 1. ad Simplicianum 24. ait; Ad frangendam atque deijciendam superbiam hominum ingratorum gratiae Dei, et audientium gloriari de meritis suis, ista commemorantur: Cum enim nondum nati fuissent, neque aliquod egissent bonum aut malum, non ex operibus sed ex vocante dictum est, Quia maior seruiet minori. Vocantis est ergo gratia; percipientis vero gratiam consequenter sunt opera bona, non\n\nquae gratiam pariant, sed quae gratia pariantur. Non enim vt ferueat, calefacit ignis, sed quia feruet; nec ideo bene currit rota, vt rotunda sit, sed quia rotunda est: sic nemo propterea bene operatur vt accipiat gratiam, sed quia accepit. Non enim potest juste viuere, qui non fuerit justificatus, nec omnino viuere, qui non fuerit viuificatus; Iustificat autem gratia, vt justificatus possit juste viuere. Prima est igitur gratia, secunda opera bona. Idem de fide ad Petrum, 18. dicit, quod Deus intellectuali naturae, Angelis scilicet et hominibus cognoscendi ac diligendi se facultatem voluntatem que donauit, vt eam vnusquisque et habere posset et perdere; si quis tamen eam sponte perderet, suo eam deinceps arbitrio resumere non valeret, vt illius esset, illius sanctae cogitationis initia gratuitae dono bonitatis denuo renouandis quibus vellet infundere, cujus fuit in ipso creationis exordio, nullis praecedentibus meritis, spiritus et corpora, locis atque affectionibus, prout ipse sapiens voluit congruis, mirabiliter\n\nordinare. Et infra 21. Bonae inquit voluntatis et cogitationis initium non homini ex scipso nasci, sed diuinitus et praeparari et tribui, in eo Deus euidenter ostendit, quod neque diabolus, neque aliquis Angelorum ejus, ex quo ruinae illius merito in hanc sunt inferiorem detrusi caliginem, bonam potuit aut poterit resumere voluntatem. Quod si possibile esset, vt humana natura, postquam a Deo auersa bonitatem perdidit voluntatis, ex seipsa rursus eam habere potuisset; multo possibilius hoc natura haberet Angelica, quae quanto minus grauatur terreni corporis pondere, tanto magis hac esset praedita facultate: Sed ostendit Deus vnde bona voluntas hominibus detur, quam sic amiserunt Angeli cum haberent, vt amissam deinceps habere non possent. Idem 12. de Ciuit. Dei, 9. probat, quod si boni Angeli fuerunt prius sine bona voluntate, non potuerunt eam habere ex se; quia si eam ipsi, Deo non operante, fecerunt, meliores a seipsis, quam ab illo facti sunt; quod absit: et si non potuerunt seipsos facere meliores, quam cos ille fecerat, quo nemo melius quicquam facit; profecto et bonam voluntatem qua meliores essent, nisi operante adjutorio creatoris habere non possent. Sed\n\nobijcietur fortassis per illud, 2. Eth. 1. et 2. quod virtus moralis generatur ex operibus similibus praecedentibus, vt justitia, temperantia, et fortitudo, ex juste, temperate, et fortiter operari; ergo aliquis potest virtuose operati non habendo virtutem. Item alias fatuum videretur et vanum appetere et desiderare virtutes: Nullus enim hoc potest nisi eas habendo; sed superfluum videtur et fatuum aliquem desiderare, et appetere hoc quod habet. Item hoc videtur in artibus manifestum: Nullus enim habet artem citharizandi, aut aedificandi, nisi prius citharizando, aut aedificando, vt patet per Philosophum, 2. Eth. 1. et 9. Metaphys. 14. Ad haec potest responderi sicut respondet Philosophus 2. Eth. 4. ad similem quaestionem. Quia enim dictum erat prius, quod virtus ex operibus generatur; quaereret aliquis, inquit, qualiter dicimus, quoniam oportet iusta operantes iustos fieri, et temperata temperantes? Si enim operantur iusta et temperata, iam sunt iusti, et temperati. Et respondet quod tales non operantur iuste et temperate, sed iusta et temperata: et dicit quod opera\n\niusta et temperata dicuntur, quando sunt talia, qualia iustus et temperatus operabitur. Aliter tamen nec improbabiliter potest dici, quod quicunque talia operatur, et non omnino casualiter, sicut bosinuenit leporem aut perdicem, hoc facit ex aliqua forma virtutis, et virtute, quam habet, large loquendo. Nam secundum eundem Philosophum, 6. Eth. vlt. duplex est virtus, vna principalis, alia naturalis; vel vna acquisita, alia vero innata; et hoc probat per communem experientiam, ita dicens; Omnibus enim videtur singulos morum existere natura; aliqualiter enim iusti, et temperati, et fortes, et alia habemus confestim a natiuitate. Etenim pueris et bestiis naturales existunt habitus, sed sine intellectu nociui videntur, quemadmodum corpori forti sine visione moto accidit falli fortiter, propter non habere visum, sic et hic. Si autem accipiat intellectum habitus similis existens, tunc erit proprie virtus. Et ratio hoc conuincit: Si enim propter hoc, quod homo post multa tristia opera sentit se fortiter inclinari ad talia faciliter et delectabiliter operandum, concludit se habere virtutem moralem\n\ntaliter inclinantem. Quare si quis naturaliter, similiter, vel vehementius, facilius, et delectabilius inclinetur, non concludit se habere virtutē huiusmodi naturalem? et hanc forsan virtutem contra virtutem acquisitam quam hic vocat principalem, in praedicamentis distinguens, sub nomine dispositionis posuit in prima specie qualitatis. Has etiam virtutes nedum naturales aut morales, sed etiam intellectuales et artificiales, Mathematici videre se reputant in natiuitatibus puerorum; Ideoque antiqui prudentes, inuestigata diligenter et cognita naturali habilitate pueri cuiuscunque secundum illam quemlibet ad quodlibet congrue applicabant. Quare et inter cos tunc temporis omnes artes excellentissime viguerunt. Vnde et 3. Eth. 13. scribitur isto modo, Innasci oportet quemadmodum visum habentem, quo iudicat bene, et quo secundum veritatem bonum desiderabit, et est bene natus, cui hoc innatum est bene: Quod enim maximum et optimum, et quod ab alio non possibile accipete,\n\nneque discere; sed quale innatum est, tale habebit, et quod bene et optime hoc innatum esle perfecta et vera erit vtique bona natiuitas. Quare et Aristoteles 5. Polit. 9. recitat Socratem affirmantem naturam producere prauos et meliores disciplina; et addit, Hoc ipsum dicens forte, non male: Contingit enim esse aliquos, quos disciplmari, et fieri studiosos impossibile est. Quapropter et in secret. secret. 3. part. 10. scribit ita; Est consideranda genesis in quibusdam, quia generatus saepe disponitur juxta vim Planetarum, qui sunt in regione suae genescos, et si forte contingat, quod genitores genitum doceant aliquam artium, na•ura superior attrahet eum multoties ad artem sideris conuenientem. Nam simile huic accidit quibusdam hominibus, qui conuenerunt in quadam villa, et hospitati fuerunt apud quendam textorem, cui natus est in illa nocte filius, cuius genesin hospites acceperunt, et ordinauerunt eius Planetas. Fuit ergo eius genesis in Venere, et in Marte, gradu suo existente Geminis cum Libra; sidera vero contraria et pessima nondum fuerunt orta: Ostendit ergo eis genesis, quod Puer\n\nerat futurus sapiens, curialis, velocis manus, boni consilij, diligendus a Regibus: Occultauerunt ergo hoc, coelantes a Patre. Creuit ergo natus in prosperitate, et crediderunt, ac nisi sunt genitores instruere cum aliquam artem de operibus suis, sed nihil potuit ex his addiscere: Verberantes autem ipsum, et flagellantes grauissime, exposuerunt ipsum voluntati suae. Inclinauit ergo se juuehis ad homines possidentes disciplinas, et acquisiuit scientias, et sciuit cursus et tempora supercoelestia, et mores, ac regimina Regum, et ecce factus est bajulus Regis. Vbi et immediate subjungit; Contrarium huic accidit ex mirabilibus operibus et dispositionibus Planetarum, et naturis eorum, illud quod conuenit, vt duobus natis Regis Indiae, facta comparatione ad genesin, sed occultum fuit Regi, Quando ergo creuit vnus puerorum, credidit Rex eum instruere scientijs; Misit ergo eum per Indiam, et per alias Prouincias honorifice, sicut decet filium tanti Regis; sed nihil profuit diligentia Patris, quia non potuit inclinate animum et naturam, nisi ad fabrile artificium. Propter quod turbatus est Rex valde,\n\nconuocauitque sapientes omnes sui Regni, qui requisiti, omnes conueniunt in hoc quod relinqueretur his ad quae natura pueri reducebat ipsum; factum est ergo ita, et multoties accidit huic simile. Quamobrem et Ouidius 1. de vetula refert ita: Tempus erat cum Philosophos Respublica quondam / Quaerebat magnis in sumtibus, vtilitati / Communi vigilans, et eos tractabat honeste / Vt sibi consulerent summis in rebus agendis. / Tunc vesum sentoribus est, in qualibet vrbe / Vt pueros dociles ex pluribus ingeniosis / Eligerent mittendos ad gymnasia, causa / Discendi, quibus ad victum stipendia grata\n\n/ Prastarent vrbs quaeque suis. Et ibi faciebant / Discerni per iudicium Pysiognomicorum, / Quae quibus ars discenda foret, sic ars sua cuique / Assignabatur, sic nissae quilibet arti / Semper adhaerebat, et in vna quemlibet esse / Perfectum sat erat, nec eum mutare licebat. / Tunc viguere artes, perfecte cognita quaeque / Tunc erat, et poterat perfecte posteritati / Tradi, scribendisque libris per magna vacabat: / Tunc matheses solae doctrinae nomine dignae / Sectores habuere suos, tunc vtilitatis / Quaeque quid afferret clarebat apud studiosos.\n\n/ Potest igitur homo ex virtutibus talibus sibi innatis talia operari, sed non chare, nec grate modo praedicto: Charitas enim et gratia non sunt nobis innatae: Eramus enim natura filij irae ad Ephes. 2. Et per haec patet ad obiecta, et maxime ad primum et vltimum obiectorum; Secundum vero non procedit: Licet enim aliquis habeat virtutem, potest desiderare virtutem dupliciter, scilicet vt sibi plenius augeatur, sicut Apostoli a Domino petierunt, Adauge nobis fidem Luc. 17. vel vt stabiliter conseruetur iuxta illud Psalmi 15. Conserua me, Domine, et 67. Confirma hoc Deus quod operatus es in nobis; et sic respondet Ansel. De concordia vbi prius. Si autem adhuc aliquis instantius vrgeat, supponendo, quod non quilibet\n\nhabet virtutem quamlibet naturalem, vel si habeat, tollat Omnipotens sibi vnam, puta artem citharizandi, et adhuc potest addiscere, citharizare, et non nisi artificialiter operando, quia si inartificialiter, et multiplicet talia opera, ipsa generabunt similem habitum in eo, vt patet 2. Eth. vbi prius; non ergo acquiret artem, sed magis inertiam et errorem. Potest ergo non habens artem, artificialiter operati; quare et carens virtutibus, virtuose. Dicendum quod ad hoc quod talis citharizet exiliter quantumcunque, habet in anima sua ex propria inuentione, aut imaginatione vel exauditione et aliquali doctrina, aliquod idolum, et aliqualem similitudinem citharizationis, quae ipsum aliqualiter dirigit citharizando; aliter enim non magis a proposito tangeret vnam chordam quam aliam, nec magis a proposito citharizaret quam saltaret sed forsan pure casualiter, sicut bos cornibus citharam ventilando, et ex tali tactione chordarum quantum cunque multiplicata, nunquam fieret citharoedus. Dico ergo quod talis ex propria imaginatione vel auditione alterius habet aliquam speciem et formam citharizationis a qua sua citharizatio procedit, et per vsum crescit continue ad perfectum; et haec videtur responsio\n\nPhilos. 9. Met. 14. dicentis; Videtur impossibile esse citharoedum esse, qui non citharizauit: nam ad discens citharizare citharizando addiscit. Vnde sophisticus elenchus factus est, quia non habens quis scientiam, faciet cuius est scientia; addiscens enim non habet scientiam; et respondet; Sed quia, inquit, eius quod fit, factum est aliquid, et totaliter eius quod mouetur, motum est aliquid; palam autem in his quae de motu, hoc et discentem necesse habere aliquid scientiae forsan; vbi textus Auerrois dicit expressius et sine forte, et addit; Non ergo mouetur aliquod ad aliud, nisi de illo ad quod mouetur in se; vbi dicit Auerroes; Omne quod generatur et fit aliquid, impossibile est hoc fieri nisi habeat aliquid, ex eo quod habebit in postremo: verbi gratia, quoniam impossibile est vt citharizet, nisi qui habet aliquid de arte citharizandi; et ideo asinus non addiscit citharizare, neque homo qui non est innatus citharizare. De charitate autem et gratia non possumus habere minimam scintillam a nobis, nec ab aliqua creatura, sicut superius est ostensum; quare nec aliquid grate facere propter Deum; quapropter\n\nnec aliquid mereri ab eo, nisi prius cam dederit nobis gratis. Adhuc autem forsitan quisnam dicet, quod gratia multum facilitat hominem ad implendum Dei mandata, et dicitur necessaria homini hac de causa; sed tunc posset homo sine gratia, licet difficilius haec implere contra priora. Cur etiam non possent Angeli, mole corporis deprimentis nullatenus aggrauati sine gratia facillime haec implere, contra praemissa? Amplius autem et iste est Pelagij filius in hac parte. Ipse enim dixit gratiam ad hoc dari hominibus, vt quae facere per liberum iubentur arbitrium, facilius possent implere per gratiam, sicut de ipso recitat August. de haeres. vbi prius, primi contra Pelagium et Caelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali, 7. et 23. de verbis Apostoli sermone 13. et alijs locis multis. Item haec haeresis fuit damnata solenniter in Concilo Mileuitano, cui interfuit Augustinus, contra Pelagianos, sicut recitatur in Canon. de Consecrat. dist. 4. ca. vlt. in haec verba; Placuit, vt quicun que dixerit ideo nobis gratiam iustificationis\n\ndari, vt quod facere per liberum iubemur arbitrium, facilius possimus implere per gratiam, tanquam et si gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed tamen possimus etiam sine illa implere mandata diuina, anathema sit. Et hoc idem recitat sanctus Prosper in libro suo de praedicatoribus gratiae Dei contra Cassianum 21. vna cum ratione Pontificum, propter quam illud dictum Pelagij tanquam haereticum damnauerunt, at que inquit; In illius damnatae sententiae foueam cadat, qua dicitur a Deo nobis gratiam iustificationis dari, vt quod facere per liberum iubemur arbitrium, facilius possimus implere per gratiā; tanquam etsi gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed tamen possemus etiam sine illa implere diuina mandata; quod et Catholici Pontifices dignum anathemate censuerunt. Vtendum est nobis eo, quo vsi sunt testimonio dicentes; De fructibus enim mandatorum Dominus loquebatur, vbi non ait; Sine me difficilius potestis facere, sed ait; Sine me nihil potestis facere. Adhuc vicarius Pelagij forsitan respondebit, et dicet, ideo gratiam esse necessariā ad implendum diuina mandata, quia per ipsam\n\ndiuina mādata reuelantur hominibus, et boni ac mali discretio demonstratur; qua reuelatione et discretione per gratiā habita, potest homo ea implere viribus propriae voluntatis: Sed istud reuincitur per praemissa. Rursum et secundū istam sententiam; Ante legem datam hominibus vel Angelis, gratia non fuisset eis necessaria ad Deum super omnia gratuito diligendum; vel si nunc legis potētia tolleretur, et homo lege naturali naturalis rationis iudicio traderetur, gratia Dei nullatenus indigeret, quorum opposita superius patuerunt. Adhuc autem et hoc dato, Pelagij error redit. Augustinus namque primo contra Pelagium et Caelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali, secundo, loquens de Pelagio, scribit ita; Gratiam Dei et adiutorium, quo adiuuamur a Domino ad non peccandum, aut in natura et libero ponit arbitrio, aut in lege aut doctrina; vt videlicet cum adiuuat Deus hominem vt declinet a malo, et faciat bonum, reuelanco, et ostendendo quid fieri debeat, adiuuare credatur,\n\nnon etiam cooperando, et dilectionem inspirando, vt illud quod faciendum esse agnouerit, faciat. Et infra 7. recitat verba Pelagij sub hac forma; Adiuuat nos per doctrinam et reuelationem suam, dum cordis nostri oculos aperit, dum nobis, ne praesentibus occupemur, futura demonstrat, dum diaboli pandit insidias, dum nos multiformi et ineffabili dono gratiae coelestis illuminat; qui hoc dicit, gratiam tibi negare videtur, an et liberum hominis arbitrium et Dei gratiam confitetur? Et infra 8. Hoc, in quit, est gratiam Dei ponere in lege aut doctrina. Hic itaque apparet hanc cum gratiam confiteri, qua demonstrat et reuelat Deus, quid agere debeamus, non qua donat atque adiuuat vt agamus, cum ad hoc potius valeat legis agnitio, si gratiae desit opitulatio, vt fiat mandati praeuaricatio. Vbi enim non est lex, ait Apostolus, nec praeuaricatio; et concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret; Non concupisces. Ac per hoc vsque adeo aliud est lex, aliud gratia, vt lex non solum nihil prosit, verum etiam plurimum obsit, nisi adiuuet gratia, et hoc ostendatur legis vtilitas, quoniam\n\nquos facit praeuaticationis reos, cogit confugere ad gratiam liberandos, et vt concupiscentias malas superent adiuuandos: Iubet enim magis, quam iuuat; docet morbum esse, non sanat; Imo ab ea potius, quod non sanatur, augetur; vt attentius et solicitius gratiae medicina quaeratur, quia litera occidit, spiritus autem viuificat. Idem de gratia et libero arbitrio 25. Quid est, inquit, quod vanissimi homines, et peruet sissimi Pelagiani, legem dicunt esse Dei gratiam, qua iuuamur ad non peccandum? Quid est quod miseri dicunt, qui sine vlla dubitatione tanto Apostolo contradicunt? Ille dicit peccatum vires aduersus hominem accepisse per legem, et eum per mandatum, quamuis sanctum, et iustum, et bonum, tamen occidere, et per bonum operati ei mortem, de qua non liberaretur, nisi viuificaret cum spiritus, quem litera occiderat, sicut alio loco dicit, Litera occidit, spiritus autem viuificat; et isti indo ciles contra lucem Dei caeci, et contra vocem Dei surdi, occidentem literam viuificare dicunt, et viuificanti spiritui contradicunt. Et infra 28. Quis ita scit surdus aduersus Apostolicas\n\nvoces? quis ita desipiat, imo insaniat nesciens quid loquatur, vt audeat dicere legem esse gratiam, cum clamet, qui sciebat quid loqueretur, Qui in lege iustificamini a gratia excedistis? Idem adhuc de spiritu et litera 2. sic ait, Illis acerrime ac vehementissime retistendum est qui putant sine a diutorio Dei per seipsam vim voluntatis humanae, vel iustitiam posse perficere, vel ad eam tendendo proficere: et cum vrgeri caeperint, quomodo id praesumant asserere fieri sine ope diuina, reprimunt se, nec hanc vocem audent emittere, quoniam vident quam sit impia et non ferenda; sed aiunt, ideo ista sine ope diuina non fieri, quia et hominem Deus creauit cum libero voluntatis arbitrio, et dando praecepta ipse docet, quomodo homini sit viuendum, et in eo vti que a diuuat, quod docendo ignorantiam aufert, vt sciat homo in operibus suis, quid euitare, et quid appetere debeat, quo per liberum arbitrium naturaliter in situm viam demonstratam ingrediens, continentur, et pie, et iuste viuendo ad beatam candem que aeternam vitam peruenire mereatur. Nos autem dicimus humanam voluntatem\n\nsic diuinitus adiuuari ad faciendam iustitiam, vt praeter quod creatus est homo cum libero voluntatis arbitrio, praeterque doctrinam qua ei praecipitur, quemadmodum viuere debeat, accipiat Spiritum Sanctum, quo fiat in animo delectatio, dilectioque summ: illius, atque incommutabilis boni quod Deus est; etiam nunc cum adhuc per fidem ambulatur, nondum per speciem, vt hac sibi velut arra data gratuiti muneris, inardescat in haerere Creatori, atque inflammetur accedere ad participationem illius veri luminis, vt ex illo ei bene sit, a quo habet vt sit. Nam neque liberum arbitrium quicquam, nisi ad peccandum, valet, si lateat veritatis via; et cum id quod agendum, et quo intendendum est coeperit non latere, nisi etiam delectet, et ametur, non agitur, non suscipitur, non bene viuitur; vt autem diligatur, charitas Dei diffunditur in cordibus nostris, non per liberum arbitrium quod surgit ex nobis, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis. Adhuc autem et Concilium superius allegatum, sicut recitatur in canone vbi prius, cap. penult. ita dicit, Quisquis dixerit eandem gratiam Dei per\n\nIesum Christum Dominum nostrum propter hoc tantum nos adiuuare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsum nobis reuelatur et aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, vt sciamus quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis praestari, vt quod faciendum cognouerimus, etiam facere debeamus, aut valeamus, anathema sit. Si quis autem in insaniam tantam proruperit, vt dicat gratiam Dei necessariam homini ad implenda diuina mandata esse liberum arbitrium a Deo homini gratis datum, a Pelagiani voragine pelagi absorbetur. Constat enim ex autoritatibus Augustini praemissis, hanc esse Pelagianae vesaniae vanitatem; qui et 1. contra Pelagium et Coelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali 2. Cum, inquit, Pelagius tria constituat, atque distinguat, quibus diuina mandata dicit impleri, possibilitatem,\n\nvolūtatem, actionem; possibilitatem scilicet qua potest homo esse iustus; voluntatem qua vult esse iustus; actionem qua iustus est; horum trium primum, id est, possibilitatem datam confitetur a creatore naturae, nec esse in nostra potestate, sed eam nos habere si nolimus; duo vero reliqua, id est, voluntatem et actionem nostram esse asserit, atque ita nobistribuit, vt nobis non esse, nisi a nobis contendat. Ecce patenter quid Pelagius gratiam Dei vocat, possibilitatem videlicet naturalem a creatore naturae, beneficio creationis gratuito nobis datam. Hanc etiam haeresin recitat Augustinus de natura et gratia 53. et de gratia et libero arbitrio 28. et eam redarguit hic et ibi. Iste quoque sic errans incidit in haeresin Pelagij supradictam, quae ponit hominem per liberum suum arbitrium posse implere diuina mandata, qui et potest faciliter corrigi per praemissa. Praeterea dicit Apostolus 1. ad Cor. 15. Abundantius illis omnibus laboraui, non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum: Et quomodo non ipse, sed gratia, si ipse vel liberum eius arbitrium gratia nuncupetur. Adhuc autem Pelagiani quidam moderni\n\nrespondent, dicendo, quod homo ex naturalibus suis puris potest diligere Deum super omnia gratis propter seipsum, secundum substantiam ipsam actus, non tamen meritorie, vel saltem non meritorie de condigno, licet forsan de congruo, sine gratia comitante: Sed istud non congruit rationi, et refellitur per praemissa. Praeterea, secundum istos, habens gratiam diligendo Deum, et seruando eius consilia ac mandata potest mereri etiam de condigno; cur ergo si carens gratia faciat pro Deo similia vel maiora aeque recta intentione vel rectiori, aeque sincero affectu vel sinceriori, aeque grato amore vel etiam gratiori, non similiter vel magis meretur? Nam quantum est ex parte operum vel operantium, opus huius est aeque bonum cum opere illius vel melius; quare et aeque acceptabile pro solutione antiqui debiti pro peccato, et pro redemptione animae suae, et pro mercatione regni coelestis. Si ergo Deus pretium huius accepret, et aeque iustum vel iustius pretium illius repellat, est personarum acceptor, nec iudicat aequitatem. Item secundum omnes Catholicos, imo et secundum inimicos gratiae ipsos\n\nPelagianos haereticos, gratia multum alleuiat cuiuslibet operis grauitatem: Reddit enim ingum Domini suaue, et onus eius leue. Carens ergo gratia, similia operans, cum habente difficilius operatur; plus ergo meretur. Dicit enim Philos. 2. Eth. 3. circa difficile autem semper ars sit et virtus; etenim bene, melius in hoc; id est, quod sine difficultate est bene, in hac est melius; et 3. Eth. 18. probat, quod fortitudo magis consistit circa timores, quam audacias, et quod haec laudabilior est quam illa, et secundū quosdam, quam temperantia, per hoc quod difficilius est tristia sustinere, quam a delectabilibus abstinere; et 5i. libri 2o. Pessimus, inquit, qui ad seipsum et ad amicos vtitur malitia; optimus autem non qui ad seipsum virtute, sed qui ad alterum; hoc enim opus difficile. Venerabilis quoque Beda 2. de Temporibus 1. ad hoc idem allegat Hieronymum super Euangelia ponentem nuptias in 30. fructu, et viduas in 60. hac de causa: Quanto, inquit, maior est difficultas ab expertae quondam voluptatis illecebris abstinere, tanto maius et praemium. Amplius autem tunc carens gratia, posset diligere Deum\n\nex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et ex tota virtute, et mente finaliter propter ipsum: et proximum, sicut seipsum similiter propter Deum, et caetera praecepta atque consilia in omnibus obseruare; quare et esse in statu salutis, finaliter que saluari secundum praemissa et contra praemissa: Sola nam que Dei gratia efficit Dei filios et amicos, sicut priora testantur; dicitque Propheta. Qui coronat te misericordia et miserationibus, Psal. 102. Et Apostolus magis plane, Gratia autem Dei vita aeterna ad Rom. 6. quod et tenet fides Ecclesiae generalis. Alij adhuc fingunt, quod homo sine gratia ex seipso potest perficere diuina mandata secundum substantiam operis, non tamen secundum intentionem mandantis, quae est quod fiant in gratia: sed horum fictio confringetur vt aliae praecedentes. Istud quoque videtur mirabile, quia respiciendo vetus Testamentum et nonum, et omnes Doctores et expositores eorum, non apparet aliud esse de intentione mandantis, nisi gratis haec facere propter Deum; et co ipso videtur eis, quod talis sit in gratia, scilicet arguendo a posteriori ad prius, et ab effectu ad suum efficiens;\n\net eodem modo omnes Doctores, et praedicatores veteres, et moderni, praedicando et docendo populum Dei viam salutis, nihil aliud praedicant, nisi quod gratis propter Deum faciant cius mandata, et consilia; nec dicunt, faciatis haec in gratia; imo dicunt, vt videtur, quod eo ipso, quod haec sic faciant, gratiam Dei habent, illam scilicet de qua loquor, quae gratificat nos ad vitam, velut radicem a qua pullulant isti rami. Et huius contrarium non videtur mihi sine periculo praedicandum, scilicet quod licet quis diligat Deum gratis ex toto corde etc. et exerceat omnia opera pietatis erga proximum propter Deum, et sustineat propter eum omnia poenalia et aduersa perseueranter vs que ad finem, et tunc ardentissimo et purissimo Dei amore, propter defensionem legis Dei, morte durissima consummetur, adhuc tradetur morti secundae, et tormentis infernalibus sine fine. Praedicent hoc qui velint, ego non auderem talia praedicare, ne forte cum alijs praedicarem, ipse reprobus efficerer, dum spem piorum subruerem,\n\net multorum refrigescere facerem Charitatem. Ecce quam expressa sunt ad hoc testimonia veritatis; Ecce testimonium Ioelis 2. Quicun que inuocauerit nomen Domini saluus erit; quod et Apostolus ad Rom. 10. contestatur; Et Luc. 10. quaesiuit quidam a Domino, Magister, quid faciendo vitam aeternam habebo? At ille dixit, In lege quid scriptum est? ille respondit, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo etc. et proximum tuum sicut te; dixitque illi, recte respondisti, haec fac et viues. Si tamen potuisset haec fecisse sine gratia gratificante ad vitam, non fuit vera ista doctrina veritatis; Non enim sequitur, Haec fac, etiam perseueranter vsque ad finem, ergo viues; hoc enim posset facere sine gratia, sine qua vtique nullus viuet; Et si tu dicas, quod Saluator intellexit, quod haec faceret in gratia; cum ergo ille modus faciendi sit magis necessarius quam ipsum factum, nec est homini per se notus, nec ipse docendo, et praecipiendo istum modum expressit, videtur quod talis doctrina sit nimium diminuta, et quod inijciat hominibus laqueum, et eos in damnationis aeternae periculum introducat. Tacet\n\nenim gratiam, sine qua nullus gratificatur, nec intrat ad vitam, et exprimit vnum factum mortuum, innuendo patenter quod hoc facere sufficiens est ad vitam; velut si medicus infirmo simplici, ipsum consulenti quid faciendo vitam temporalem haberet, absolute responderet dicendo, Comede carnes tiri, nec diceret sibi modum quo in tiriaca salubriter praeparantur, faciliter huiusmodi simplici mortis ferculum praepararet, quod quilibet zelans medicus euitabit: sed absit quod medcus corporum, sit zelantior nostro medico animarum. Dominus enim zelotes nomen eius Exod. 34. Ad hoc idem est totus ille longus sermo Dominicus Iohan. 15. Ego sum vitis vera, etc. vbi docet discipulos quomodo fructificare debent, scilicet manendo in ipso, vbi et consequenter exponit, quomodo debent manere in ipso: Manere, inquit, in dilectione mea; et adhuc sicut Magister bonus, docet quomodo debent in dilectione eius manere, Si inquiens, praecepta mea seruaueritis, manebitis in dilectione mea; et post exponit singulariter quomodo seruare debent praecepta sua, de quibus pluraliter dixit eis,\n\ncum dicit, Hoc est praeceptum meum, vt diligatis inuicem sicut dilexi vos. Quam adhuc similitudinem noluit in expositam pertransire, sed dixit, Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, vt animam suam ponat quis pro amicis . Quicun que ergo hanc dilectionem habet, manet in Deo, et fert in gratia fructum multum. Item Cyprianus, Augustinus, et vnanimiter omnes Doctores, et tota sancta Dei Ecclesia indubitanter affirmant, quod quicun que licet non renatus ex aqua, pro confessione Christi fuerit interfectus, baptismo sanguinis proprij baptizatus, statim in Coelo cum Sanctis Martyribus corona gloriae coronatur, et hoc est quod Christus ipse testatur, Matth. 10. ita dicens; Omnis qui confitebitur me coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram Patremeo, qui in Coelis est. Huic quoque similem tenent sententiam, de adulto baptizari volente et morte praeuento, sicut allegat Lumbardus 4. Sent. dist. 4. et alibi saepe claret; quod tamen temerarie nimis affirmare praesumerent, si possent haec fieri sine gratia charitatis, sine qua constat neminem posse saluari. Item gratia ista est quidam\n\nhabitus, et diligere Deum super omnia gratuito propter ipsum proprius actus eius; actus autem est finis, et perfectio habitus, sicut vicessimum primum capitulum ostendebat; Quare et habitus est propter actum non e contra. Ad hoc ergo vult Deus, quod homines habeant gratiam, vt per eam faciant gratuito opera praetaxata. Si ergo possent sine gratia ista sic facere, sufficeret Deo, et illis; Imo nulla ratio, nulla causa, nulla vtilitas Deo nec homi•i videretur, quare haec fieri deberent in gratia, cum possent aequaliter fieri sine ipsa, fed potius videretur quantum ad omnem actionem, superflua penitus et inanis, sicut quantum ad omnem significationem cifra cum fuerit vltima figura: Et siquis dicat quod ad hoc vult Deus, quod opera nostra fiant in gratia, quia sic possunt facilius fieri, incidit in errorem Pelagij supradictum, et etiam tunc qui faceret ea sine gratia, propter difficultatem maiorem amplius mereretur, sicut superius est argutum. Item quilibet habitus moralis vel alius cognoscitur per suum effectum, scilicet per hoc, quod aliquis opera talis virtutis promte\n\net dilectabiliter operatur; Vnde secundo Ethic. tertio. Signum autem oportet facere habituum super venientem voluptatem, vel tristitiam operantibus. Qui enim recedit a voluptatibus corporalibus, et hoc ipso gaudet, temperatus est, et qui sustinet pericula et gaudet, vel non tristatur, fortis; Et secundo Post. vlt. arguit Aristoteles contra Platonem ponentem habitus cognitiuos principiorum inesse nobis a natura, sed latere, sic dicens; Si quidem habemus ipsos, inconueniens est; Contingit enim certissmas babentem cognitiones principiorum demonstrantem latere. Cum ergo charitas et gratia sit habitus perfectissimus, potest per operationes cognosci, et hoc videtur ipsa veritas docuisse, cum dixit, A fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos. Mat. 7. Et infra 12. Ex fructu arbot cognoscitur. Et Ioh. 13. dat pro\n\nhac cognitione habenda regulam generaliter specialem, et specialiter generalem; in hoc, inquit, Cognoscent omnes, quia Discipuli mei estis, si dilectionem habueritis adinuicem, quod et infra 15. prosequitur planius multum et plenius, sicut superius erat allegatum. Et in ista sententia videntur Doctores, et Tractatores Scripturae Canonicae vnanimiter concordare: Quicunque ergo talia operatur, et taliter habet gratiam charitatis. Item si operans in gratia aliquid mereatur, ergo et carens gratia, si similia similiter operetur: Nam actus illius per omnia est aeque bonus, sicut actus alterius gratiosi, maxime cum gratia sua nullo modo informet, nec efficiat aut dirigat actum suum. Si dicatur, quod gratia, eo ipso quod stat ibi, reddit actum meritorium, hoc non videtur, cum in actu facto ex puris naturalibus nihil penitus faciat, sicut in cucumerario formido nihil custodit, sed stat ibi caeca, surda, et muta, ac mortua, nec plus facit ad talem actum gratia illa in anima, quam faceret in calice, in bursa, vel in arca. Item, si actus gratiosus propter hoc reddatur meritorius, quia fit a gratioso, licet non a gratia, sequitur quod actus sui indifferentes, imo et peccata venalia, et\n\nvniuersaliter omnes actus sui sint meritorij regni Dei, et hoc etiam de condigno, cum tamen possit diligere vxorem ex affectione carnali, mentiri iocose, dare eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam venialem, et multa similia ex puris naturalibus, non ex gratia sibi data. Posset quoque talis gratia poni realiter in non grato, imo peccante mortaliter, nec tamen eius opera propter ipsam meritoria redderentur. Vnde manifestum est non esse idem, fieri in gratia, et fieri ex gratia, sed omne quod fit ex gratia fit in gratia, non e contra. Manifestum est quoque non propterea opus esse meritorium, quia fit in gratia, sed quia fit ex gratia; et omne opus factum ex gratia esse meritorium, non autem omne opus factum in gratia: Haec omnia patebunt faciliter ex praemissis. Item ad hoc est totus ille processus Anselmi superius recitatus; dicit enim planissime, quod quicunque vult rectitudinem, recte vult, et ideo prius naturaliter illam habet, sicut causam effectiuam illius effectus; et loquitur ibi de rectitudine gratiae, vt patet De Concordia, nono, et De gratia, sine qua nullus saluatur,\n\nvt patet supra, octauo, sicut et superius tangebatur, et ad idem vadit processus Augustini praetactus. Est adhuc alia similis cauillatio quae dicit; Quod homo ex se potest Deum diligere ex toto corde, etc. et facere omnia alia secundum substantiam operum, nihil tamen omnino merebitur, vel saltem nihil de condigno, quia non facit ea secundum intentionem mandantis, quae est, vt dicunt, quod faciat ea aliquo modo meritorie, vel meritorie de condigno: Haec autem ineptia potest refelli similiter cum priori. Item quid intelligit per meritorie facere? si facere in charitate et gratia propter Deum, tunc non differt a positione priori; si facere si quod merces sibi aliqua debeatur, hoc est omnino irrationabile et contrarium rationi. Si enim opus sit meritorium, propter hoc quod merces sibi debetur, prius est mercedem sibi deberi quam opus esse meritorium, cum tamen sit e contra? Propter hoc enim quod opus est meritorium, merces sibi debetur: aliter etenim nulla foret causa, nec\n\nratio, cur huic operi deberetur merces, et non illi. Prius ergo naturaliter est opus esse meritorium, et dignum mercede, quam mercedem sibi deberi. Item mercedem deberi, vel dependet ab opere, vel ab aliquo alio impertinenti: Si ab opere, quicunque facit congrue tale opus, meretur; et iste secundum hanc positionem sine gratia ita facit: Si ab impertinenti; hoc videtur contra omnem rationem et legem. Item in toto Veteri Testamento, et Nouo, facientibus mandata promittit Deus mercedem: Si tamen intelligat sic; Fac mandata mea meritorie, et eris dignus mercede, et habebis mercedem, ridiculosa esset illa promissio seu doctrina; Non enim docet aliquod dubium aut ignotum nisi forsitan dubitanti, An sit Deus, vel, An sit iustus. Constat enim cuilibet, quod quilibet potens, tenetur reddere mercedem meritorie operanti pro eo, et reddet nisi sit iniustus: Videtur ergo, quod Deus intelligat ad communem modum intelligendi hominum, quos docebat, scilicet, Fac hoc, et habebis mercedem, id est, Fac hoc propter me, et propter amorem meum, et habebis\n\nmercedem, et sic potest non habens gratiam secundum istos praedictos. Item existenti in gratia debetur merces pro opere, et iste extra gratiam secundum istos potest facere simile opus, vel maius pro Deo, amore simili vel maiori; Cur ergo non meretur iste quantum ille, vel maius? Item non est aliquo modo probabile, quod Deus summe liberalis et diues, misericors atque iustus, qui reddet vnicuique secundum opera sua, diligentem eum gratuito propter eum ex omnibus viribus mentis et corporis, et proximum sicut seipsum similiter propter Deum, qui et abhorret omnia mala, amplectitur cuncta bona, sustinet omnia tristia, et tandem mortem amarissimam propter Deum, sine omni mercede abijciet, et contemnet, maxime cum ipsemet hoc testetur planissime, etiam interposito iuramento, Matth. 10. in haec verba; Quicunque potum dederit vni ex minimis istis calicem aquae frigidae tantum in nomine discipuli, Amen dico vobis, non perdet\n\nmercedem suam. Sed obijcient forsan isti, quod si nullus posset diligere Deum ex toto corde, etc. et facere omnia facienda, et dimittere omnia dimittenda gratuito propter Deum, nisi esset in gratia charitatis; tunc posset homo scire quando esset in gratia charitatis, contra illud Eccles. 9. Nescit homo, vtrum amore, an odio dignus sit. Item talia opera magnalia possunt fieri absque gratia charitatis: Potest enim quis absque charitate, vt patet 1. ad Cor. 13. habere omnem fidem, et facere miracula maxima, ita vt montes transferat, distribuere omnes facultates suas in cibos pauperum, et tradere corpus suum ita vt ardeat. Ad primum obiectum patet per dicta vigesimo quinto huius, quod aliquis praedestinatus ad vitam, existens in peccato mortali grauissimo, sicut fuit Dauid, quando propter adulterium, dolosum homicidium committebat, non minus tunc amabatur a Deo, quam amabitur in futuro; et similiter praescitus ad mortem existens in maxima charitate, non minus tunc oditur a Deo, quam vnquam odietur post lapsum profundissimum in peccatum, et poenam, sicut fuit de Iuda\n\nDomini traditore, nisi forsan secundum praesentem iustitiam, et plurimum transmutiue. Ideo que nullus hominum potest scire, vtrum odio vel amore dignus sit, quia qualiscunque sit modo, nescit exitum quem habebit, nec vtrum sit praedestinatus finaliter filius vitae vel mortis. Et hoc est quod eadem Scriptura testatur: Cum enim praemisit, Nescit homo vtrum amore an odio dignus sit, sed omnia in futurum seruantur incerta; Nulli autem dubium, quin homo possit scire se esse dignum odio secundum praesentem iustitiam: Potest enim scire se esse in peccatis grauissimis, et in actuali voluntate grauissima committendi, et in desperatione salutis, sicut fuit de Iuda et Cayn. Simili quoque modo est mihi probabile quod homo verisimiliter potest scire, saltem secundum praesentem iustitiam se esse in gratia et dignum Dei amore, per hoc scilicet quod diligit Deum ex toto corde, etc. ita quod nollet eum in minimo saltē offendere pro omni fugibili euitando, nec pro omni desiderabili consequendo, velletque voluntatem diuinam in omnibus adimplete, etiam etsi nunquam foret poena vel\n\npraemium, sed tantum gratuito propter ipsum, et per alia signa multa. Vt autem expediam me breuius licet non verius, potest dicta Autoritas sic exponi; Nescit homo vtrum amore vel odio dignus sit, id est, finaliter, sicut ipsemet se exponit continuo vt est dictum. Quantum ad aliud, verum est, quod sine gratia charitatis fiunt opera multa magnalia, sed non opus dilectionis Dei ex toto corde, etc. modo dicto, nec illa fiunt amore gratuito propter Deum. Et ideo bene dicit Apost. Si fecero haec et illa, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest; et statim per suos effectus definit quodammodo et notificat charitatem; Charitas, inquit, patiens est, benigna est, etc. quasi velit patenter innuere, qui veraciter haec non habet, charitatem non habet, et qui veraciter ista habet, habet similiter charitatem: Nam secundum eundem ad Rom. 11. Si delibatio sancta est, et massa. Hoc autem totum argumentum a principio eius vs que huc tam longe protensum, tam breui restringitur syllogismo, quicunque meretur de congruo gratiam a Deo, facit ante acceptionem gratiae tempore vel natura, aliquid grate\n\npro eo; Nullus facit sic ante aliquid grate pro eo.\n\nItem si quis carens gratia potest mereri gratiam primam de congruo, et habens gratiam potest mereri augmentum suae gratiae tantum de congruo, non autem de condigno; carens gratia posset similiter primam gratiam promereri, sicut habens gratiam, gratiam suam augeri; cum tamen primum istorum sit Haeresis Pelagij a Patribus reprobata; secundum vero ab omnibus Catholicis est concessum: Non ergo similiter possunt mereri primus primum, et secundus secundum: Quod autem gratia habita mereatur augeri, probat Autoritas Augustini superius allegata, Gratia meretur augeri, vt aucta mereatur et perfici. Vnde et Parab. 4. Posside sapientiam, et dabit capiti tuo augmenta gratiarum. Et quod hoc non sit de condigno, potest ostendi per rationes trigesimi quinti capituli ostendentes quod gratia non ex meritis aut operibus praeuijs, quoniam tunc non esset gratia, sed debitum, cum omne augmentum gratiae sit gratia, et omnis gratia vniuoce dicatur cum alia\n\ngratis data. Item si quis potest mereri augmentum gratiae de condigno, potest mereri altiorem sedem in Coelo et intensiorem beatitudinem, et magnam latitudinem, et portionem illius aeternam similiter de condigno, quod falsum est. In iustitia enim commutatiua de condigno requiritur ad minus aequale pro aequali, vt patet 5. Ethic. 6. et post diffuse, sed operatio momentanea gratiosi non est aeque bona, sicut tanta portio beatitudinis sempiterna; Vnde Apostolus ad Rom. 8. Existimo quod non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam quae reuelabitur in nobis; Glossa, existimo, et scio, quod passiones huius temporis, id est, temporales et momentaneae, non sunt condignae, id est sufficientes, si districte ageretur nobiscum, ad promerendam futuram gloriam: Tribulatio namque ipsa est\n\ncum fine, merces erit sine fine; et multo maior erit ibi gloria quam hic labor. Istam quoque sententiam docet expressius Augustinus super illud Psalmi 36. A Domino gressus hominis dirigetur, et viam eius volet, Noli, inquiens, tantum attendere qua iturus es, sed quo venturus sis; tolerabis dura temporalia, sed ad laeta peruenies sempiterna; si vis sustinere laborem, attende mercedem; miraberis tantum dari pro tanto labore. Nam vtique, fratres, pro aeterna requie labor aeternus subeundus erat, et aeternam felicitatem accepturus, aeternas passiones sustinere deberes; sed si aeternum sustineres laborem, quando peruenires ad aeternam felicitatem? quo fit vt necessario temporalis sit tribulatio tua, qua finita venias ad felicitatem infinitam. Sed tamen, fratres, posset esse tribulatio longa pro aeterna felicitate, verbi gratia, vt cum felicitas nostra finem non habebit, miseria nostra, et labor noster, et tribulationes nostrae diuturnae essent: Nam etsi millia annorum essent, appende mille annos contra aeternitatem; quid appendis cum infinito quantumcunque finitum? decem millia annorum, decies centena millia\n\nsi dicendum est, et millia millium quae finem habent, cum aeternitate comparari non possunt. Dicitur forsitan, quod quia Deus promisit operantibus regnum aeternum, merentur illud de condigno, et alias non mererentur illud de condigno: Sed istud non videtur, quia illam promissionem nullus de condigno potuit promereri, nec sine hac potuit mereri de condigno regnum aeternum; Nullus ergo simpliciter de condigno potuit, aut potest mereri regnum aeternum. Nec operatio alicuius post promissionem est melior, quam fuit similis ante promissionē; sed nulla operatio ante promissionem meruit regnū de condigno: Nec illa promissio facit opus melius, vt patet per substantiā operis, et per omnes eius circumstantias inductiue; imo forsitan minus bonum: Facit enim intentionem minus sinceram; Qui enim prius operabatur pure propter Deum solum, nunc forsitan operatur propter retributionem promissam. Item tunc Deus non ita libero modo confert vitam aeternam, sicut fecit ante promissionem; quia tunc omnino libere contulit, nunc autem ex necessitate promissionis, et de\n\nnecessitate iustitiae conseruandae, quod videtur eius summae libertati, et immutabilitati perfectae plurimum derogare. Tunc etiam meritorie operans cogeret Deum ad resuscitandum ipsum, et aeternaliter praemiandum, vel ad oflensam iustitiae incurrendum; vbi est ergo eius summa libertas, insuperabilis que potestas? Item non minus obligat Deum promissio sua aeterna mentalis interior in verbo, vel spiritu suo sancto aeterno, quam temporlis verbalis exterior, ministerio forsan Angeli alicuius; sed quicquid temporaliter, vocaliter exterius promittebat, aeternaliter, mentaliter interius in verbo, vel spiritu suo sancto aeterno promisit, quod immutabilitas eius omnimoda per 5um et 23um capitula demonstrabit. Item ita Deus promisit, quod quicquid peteremus in nomine suo daret nobis, et Samuel orauit pro Saule, et Ieremias pro populo, et multi pro multis reprobis exorabant. Meruerunt ergo de condigno audiri, et Deus eos non audiuit, sicut vicesimum quintum huius allegat; fecit igitur eis iniuriam manifestam, quod nullus nisi manifeste iniustus audebit vel tacite cogitare. Item principaliter,\n\nsi quis meretur augmentum gratiae de condigno; vel ergo meretur augmentum eius continuum, vel discretum; si discretum tantummodo, et per vices, tunc per vnum magnum meritum, meretur vnum certum augmentum; quare per medietatem meriti, medietatem praemij et augmenti, et ita proportionaliter secundum singulas partes suas. Meretur ergo de condigno gratiam suam continue augmentari. Omnis etiam ratio quae probat aliquem mereri de condigno gratiam suam augeri per vices et discrete; et quod continue similiter comprobabit: Quod si detur, dabitur consequenter quodlibet opus gratiae mereri de condigno remissionem cuiuscunque poenae temporalis hic et in purgatorio, imo et omnium talium poenarum quorumlibet punitorum, si debite offeratur et detur ad illum effectum; quod non videtur, quia tunc superfluum videretur facere multa et magna opera gratiae pro poenis, vel etiam pro peccatis venialibus redimendis, cum de condigno sufficeret breuis salutatio virginis gloriosae, imo et minimus cogitatus. Et idem sequitur de peccatis mortalibus\n\nquantiscunque. Minima enim contritio, vt videtur [non nullis] ex gratia, tollit culpam et commutat poenam aeternam in temporalem. Cum ergo quaelibet contritio forsitan sit intensior, quam necessario requiratur, medietas intensiua illius non necessario requisita aufert totam poenam temporalem relictam; vel saltem si contritio continueretur vlterius per quantumlibet paruum tempus, auferret totam poenam: Quodlibet enim opus gratiae meretur de condigno incomparabiliter maius omni tali remissione temporali, scilicet augmentum gratiae, et proportionaliter augmentum gloriae sempiternum; quodlibet ergo tale meritum de condigno, etiam pro quocunque minori sufficiet de condigno; sicut 5. Ethic. docent commutatiuae iustitiae sanctiones: Dicit que Anselmus 2. Cur Deus homo 20. Quid iustius intelligi valet, quam vt cui datur pretium maius omni debito, si debito datur affectu, dimittat omne debitum? Si autem dicatur, quod commutare tale meritum quo meretur augmentum\n\ngratiae et glorae sempiternae, pro remissione poenae temporalis, temporaliumue poenarum, esset sibi praeiudicium sempiternum; ideoque Deus aequius iudic ans hoc non facit; Adhuc stat ratio prius facta, maxime cum volenti non fiat iniuria, secundum Iuristas, et secundum Philosophum 5. Eth. 17. Nullus patitur iniustum volens. Imo videtur quod quilibet potest dispensare egenis pio affectu illud quod est sibi debite acquisitum, nulli alteri praeiudicium inferendo; vel ponatur quod offerat meritum illud Deo pro aliquo mortuo et damnato ad tantam miseriam vel minorem, et ratio dicta stabit. Etiam secundum responsionem praedictam nullus posset per aliquod opus gratiae mereri plenam remissionem, nec etiam mitigationem poenae leuissimae temporalis, semper eodem praeiudicio prohibente, quod constat esse falsissimum iudicio totius Ecclesiae indulgentias concedentis, et poenitentias in alia pietatis opera permutantis. Item sine omni commutatione, quicunque meretur continue, et condigne incomperabiliter maius, scilicet augmentum gratiae et gloriae sempiternum, citius vel saltem\n\naeque cito metetur condigne incomparabiliter minus, scilicet remissionem quantaecun que poenae temporalis; Quicunque ergo incipit ex gratia meritorie operari, statim in primo instanti, vel immediate post remittitur sibi de debito et condigno quaelibet poena temporalis. Item quod nullus mereatur augmentum continuum gratiae de condigno, videtur, quia tunc cuilibet operi gratiae, certum augmentum gratiae deberetur, maiori maius, minori minus, ac aequali aequale. Sint ergo duo filij gratiae pares in gratia, et in omnibus alijs, hoc excepto, quod vnus pro peccato mortali, vel solummodo veniali, sit debitor poenae temporalis, et agant aequalia opera gra•ae, ita quod debitor poenae per illud meritum penitus absoluatur; vel ergo vltra illam absolutionem a poena, meretur aliquod praemium in vita futura, vel nihil omnino; Non nihil omnino, quia tunc posset contingere quod adultus baptizatus, diligens actualiter Deum summe, et in Sanctis operibus actualiter se exercens magno tempore vitae suae, etiam martyrium sustinens pro Christo, et lege ipsius, aequaliter praemiaretur, in vita futura cum vno parvulo\n\nbaptizato, qui nunquam aliquid boni fecit. Hoc enim consequitur euidenter, si haec omnia iungantur in poenitentiam congruam peccatori, aut si haec omnia aeque sufficiant prosatisfactione peccati seu peccatorum suorum; vbi est ergo quod vtrumque testamentum creberrime repromittit, quod Deus vnicuique secundum opera sua reddet? Secundum istam quoque sententiam videretur, quod magis expediret peccantibus differre satisfactionem sibi iniunctam, vel saltem prouenialibus debitam, vsque ad purgatorium post terminum vitae praesentis, et alijs bonis operibus non satisfactorijs, neque factis animo satisfaciendi pro peccato, sed simpliciter directis in Deum, et meritorijs simpliciter insudare. Sic etenim faciendo, et sic finaliter decedendo, acquireret sibi magnum praemium sempiternum, et sustineret post mortem paruam poenam purgatoriam temporalem. Sed quis hoc praesumserit affirmare? Adhuc autem si sit ita, talis aeternaliter puniretur, saltem poena damni, per subtractionem videlicet portionis gloriae sempiternae, quam fuisset alias habiturus; Sed quis praesumserit facere\n\ncoelum carcerem, seu locum poenalem? Quomodo etiam verum erit, quod Iacobus protestatur de Deo, qui, iuquiens, dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat; si tamen sic faceret, daret opprobrium sempiternum homini poenitenti pro peccato commisso, et dimisso, diminutionem videlicet gloriae sempiternae. Imo et si sic esset, nullus vnquam satisfaceret, aut posset satisfacere in vita praesenti pro aliquo peccato licet paruo et minimo: Si enim saluetur, punietur pro illo peccato poena damnī aeterna in coelo, per subtractionem aliquam gloriae sempiternae, quam pro illo bono opere per quod satisfacit, fuisset alias habiturus; quod quis praesumserit dicere, vel etiam cogitare? Mirum insuper et nimis admirabile videretur; quod qui ex charissima charitate, et charissima gratia, charissime et gratissime Deum diligeret super omnia propter seipsum, et sic opera sua licet satisfactoria pro peccato faceret propter Deum, nihil perpetui praemij mereretur, nec quicquam boni omnino, nisi paruam dimissionem poenae paruulae temporalis. Quomodo namque aequitati congrueret aut iustitiae conueniret, vt\n\npraetium dignissimum maximo premio sempiterno, pro debito minimo, pro poena minima temporali solummodo acceptaret, cum plus valeat infinite? sic enim vsuras exigeret nimis graues. Quapropter fortas•is dicetur, quod talis meretur aliquod praemium sempiternum; vel ergo minus quam alius liber a debito poenae huiusmodi, aequaliterve cum illo: Si minus aut ergo minus aeternaliter, aut temporaliter tantum minus; Non minus aeternaliter propter rationes praemissas. Ponatur enim quod Petrus paruulus baptizatus factus adultus, peccando mortaliter cadat a gratia baptismali, quae sit A, et Paulus adultus in gratia constitutus, per aliquod pium opus mereatur B. gratiam, quae sit aequalis A vel minor, vltra gratiam suam priotem, vel tantum eius augmentum: Petrus vero carens,\n\ngratia, qui secundum hypothesin potest eam inereri de congruo, faciat simile pium opus, merendo de congruo primam gratiam post peccatum, quae sit C; aut ergo C est aequalis A, vel minor, vel maior: si aequalis, redit inconueniens praetaxatum, quod videlicet adultus laudabiliter operans, beatificetur aequaliter cum paruulo solummodo baptizato. Si autem C sit minor A inconuenientia maior erit. Si vero sit maior, cur Petrus minus dispositus ad merendum quam Paulus, per simile pium opus plus meretur quam ipse? Paulus enim meretur B, gratiam aequalem A, tantummodo vel minorem; Imo ponatur, quod Paulus per aliquod bonum opus mereatur B gratiam minorem quantumuis A gratia, et consequens erit, Petrum per simile bonum opus mereri aequalem gratiam vel minorem; imo videtur rationabiliter quod minorem, cum sit minus dispositus ad merendum. Adhuc autem si C sit maior A, hoc est secundum aliquam proportionem finitam; Ponatur ergo quod meritum Petri per quod meretur C gratiam proportionaliter minoretur, vel infra; et redeunt inconuenientia praelibata; praesertim si secundum Pelagianam hypothesin, Deus nullam gratiam gratis det Petro,\n\nsed tantum propter et secundum meritum antecedens. Adhuc autem ponatur Petrum et Paulum in gratia aequali constitui, et Petrum debitorem poenae paruulae pro peccato, Paulum vero nequaquam, et ambos aequalia ope•a meritoria operari, etc. sicut supra contra responsionem priorem. Sequitur enim plane, quod magis expediret Petro satisfactionem illam differre, vsque purgatorium post hanc vitam; quod etiam Petrus saluatus in coelo, aeternaliter punietur; quod Deus dat ei parce, et improperat ei semper; quod nunquam satisfaciet, nec vnquam potest satisfacere pro peccato quocunque; quod insuper Deus immisericorditer, crudeliter, et iniuste agit cum eo, portionem videlicet meriti, cui digne debetur portio gloriae sempiterna pro satisfactione poenae paruulae compensando, cum hoc infinite plus valeat de condigno, et tam inique eius praemium defalcando. Adhuc autem si aliquod bonum opus excedat pro satisfactione huius, et aliquod minus sufficiat secundum praemissa et sicut Pelagiani fatentur, aliquod aequaliter sufficit, etc. sicut supra. Amplius autem\n\nquantum minus aeternaliter meretur Petrus quam Paulus, secundum quid debet quanti•as illius minoritatis attendi, nisi fortassis secundum quantitatem poenae aeternae prius sibi debitae pro peccato mortali; sed illa forsitan fuit intensior gloria quam Paulus meretur: quare et Petrus per illud opus satisfactorium nihil meretur de gloria sempiterna contra hypothesin; imo nec plene se exuit a toto debito poenae antiquae. Neque necesse est, quod peccatum Petri praecedens fuit mortale, aut poena perpetua puniendum. Nonne et si Petrus sit iam in gloria constitutus, liber est a debito poenae aeternae, et debitor forsitan poenae solummodo temporalis? Quomodo ergo Deus iustus exigit nunc ab eo debitum, et satisfactionem pro poena aeterna? Ideo fortassis dicetur in primis quod in casu priori, Petrus meretur aliquod praemium sempiternum, temporaliter tantum minus quam Paulus, tantum videlicet minus et breuius extensiue per aliquod certum tempus finitum, quanta fuit poena temporalis per\n\nmeritum suum dimissa, et ex tunc aequale extensiue et intensiue similiter in aeternum; se• nequaquam talis deformitas, imo plena conformitas reputatur a Patribus ponenda in sanctis, in foelicitate futura, et beatitudine consummata, neque tempus meriti, aut profectus putatur in coelo post finale iudicium a Patribus Orthodoxis; nec etiam locus carceralis aut poenalis in coelo a sanctis Patribus aestimatur. Quis etiam dixerit nullum satisfacere, neque posse satis•acere per pia opera quantacunque, pro quantulocunque peccato in vita praesenti, quin post hanc vitam, si transeat ad futuram, punietur ibi aliqua poena damni? Simili etiam ratione videtur, quod duorum aequaliter meritorum non simul decedentium, sed huius, in principio quasi mundi, et illius in fine, prior expectaret posteriorem, nec vllum beatitudinis gustum perciperet ante eum. Quamobrem et fortassis dicetur, quod in casu praemisso, Petrus et Paulus aequaliter omnino merentur, ergo aequale augmentum gratiae in praesenti, et gloriae in futuro; quare et Petrus simpliciter plus meretur; dimissionem videlicet poenae\n\nsuae, contra hypothesin iam praemissam. Si autem dicatur cum Apostolo ad Romanos, 5. Quod vbi abundauit delictum, superabundauit et gratia, ideo quia Iesus Christus, per quem gratia et veritas magis applicat virtutem suae benedictissimae et immaculatissimae passionis ad meritum illius, qui est debitor poenae temporalis, propter suum delictum, sic •ue e• vltra meritum suum commune cum alio, etiam poena remittitur temporalis. Hoc autem non soluit, quia sicut dicit Apostolus, vbi abundauit delictum superabundauit et gratia; est ergo remissio illa poenae ex gratia, non ex merito de condigno; neque responsio ista iuuat Pelagianos ingratos debitum meritorum in talibus nullam gratuitam gratiam profitentes; nec ratio vlla cogit Christum passum magis sibi assistere, cum sit indignior, vel saltem non dignior, quam sit alter imo cum assistat voluntarie, potest assistere minus vel aequaliter, sicut placet: Assistat ergo aequaliter, et stat argumentum incolume, sicut prius. Tunc\n\netiam secundum istud, quantacunque esset poena temporalis quam deberet, passio Christi quantolibet paruo merito copulata tolleret illam totam. Nulla enim videtur ratio quare tantam tolleret nec maiorem; imo si propter hoc quod in aliquo tantum superabundauit delictum, tanta superabundauit et gratia, eadem ratione in alio, vbi magis superabundauit delictum, maior proportionaliter superabundauit et gratia tollens illud, nec minus aliquid meretur de augmento gratiae et gloriae sempiternae. Dicunt alij quod ille debitor poenae, habebit necessario vnam circumstantiam meriti, quam alius non habebit, scilicet quod opus suum sit poenitentia et Ecclesiasticum Sacramentum, et illa circumstantia tollit poenam temporalem, et meritum principale acquirit augmentum gratiae et gloriae sempiternum. Sed istud non soluit: Ponatur enim, quod reus peccati venialis, et poenae temporalis sine confessione et sacramentali poenitētia pro illis tollendis faciat aliquod pium opus, et alius immunis omnino aequaliter mereatur: Vel ponatur quod ille immunis credat se reum similis peccati, et tantae\n\npoenae debitorem, et pro illis tollendis faciat similiter simile opus omnino: Vel ponatur adhuc quod sic credens conteratur, confiteatur, et faciat ex gratia omnia aequaliter sicut reus, et reuertitur arg•mentum: Vel adhuc ponatur quod talis reus peccati mortalis tempore legis priscae, quae forsitan ad oris confessionem nullatenus obligauit, per gratiam Dei, contritionem, et alia opera sancta satisfecerit pro peccato; aut quod aliquis tempore nouae legis non habens copiam Confessoris, similiter satisfaciat pro peccato suo mortali, sine poenitentiae sacramento, et tollitur responsiuncula iam praemissa. Amplius autem si quis meretur augmentum gratiae de condigno, tunc opera aeque grata aequale merentur augmentum; faciat ergo Ioannes aliquod opus gratiae tantummodo pro seipso, dicendo cum sancto Dauide, Miserere mei Deus; Petrus vero faciat opus gratiae aeque meritorium pro alijs, et ipsorum gratia intendatur, dicendo cum Apostolo, ad Philip. 1. Hoc oro, vt charitas vestra magis ac magis abundet; tunc gratia Ioannis secundum aliquid certum augetur, et gratia Petri tantum; aequaliter\n\nenim meretur; et gratia illorum pro quibus Petrus orat, augetur in aliquo: Quicquid enim petierimus Patrem in nomine Filij dabit nobis; Petrus ergo simpliciter plus meretur, quod contradicit hypothesi manifeste. Videtur etiam quod oratio Petri in gratia esset meri• infiniti: Sint enim multi infideles dispositi ad gratiam fidei Christianae, pro quibus oret Petrus tantum generaliter, vt conuertantur ad fidem, et fiat vnum ouile, et vnus pastor. Cum ergo quicquid petierimus Patrem in nomine Filij, dabit nobis, aliquem vel aliquos illorum conuertet; et cum nulla sit causa maior pro vno quam pro alio, (esto quod aequaliter disponantur) sequitur quod singuli conuertentur; et eadem ratione sic fieret, si essent centum, vel mille, vel in aliquo numero quantocunque. Oratio ergo Petri, quantum est de se, non est meriti limita•, sed potius infiniti. Confirmatur haec ratio, quia si oratio Petri tantum vni valeret, esset certi meriti; si valeat duobus, est maioris, et sic deinceps; et quanto est maioris meriti, tanto dignior est, vt pro pluribus acceptetur: Quanto ergo pro\n\npluribus orat, et auditur, tanto adhuc pro pluribus dignius audietur. Rursum cum nullo modo rationabile videatur, quod meritum orationis Petri plus valeat ex debito, alij, vel alijs, quam ipsi Petro, cum Psalmus trigesimus quartus dicat, Oratio mea in sinu meo conuertetur, videtur quod illa oratio sit etiam ipsi Petro meriti infiniti. Si autem dicatur, quod quanto pluribus meretur gratiam, tanto cuilibet illorum minorem meretur; quare ratio illa non procedit; hoc stare non potest: quia tunc mereretur aliquibus minorem gratiam gratia baptismali, et minorem gloriam sempiternam, quam sit minima gloria paruulorum, aut quae per se possit sentiri. Amplius autem quod opera aeque grata non mereantur condigne gratiam augeri aequaliter, suadetur; quia tunc eadem ratione mererentur aequaliter caetera bona cuncta; cum tamen duorum aequalium prior decedens semper aeque intense, et cum hoc diutius alio glorietur. Item tunc existens in gratia posset per orationes suas mereri de condigno primam gratiam alteri gratiam non habenti; non ergo esset gratia per praedicta; imo et posset\n\nmereri de condigno sibi ipsi gratiam primam dari: Oret enim in gratia; quod si contingat eum cadere ab ea peccando mortaliter, Deus infundat sibi gratiam resurgendi, et sit oratio sua tam efficax, quod hoc impetret de condigno, tunc si peccet mortaliter, Deus tenetur ex merito suo condigno priori, dare sibi gratiam primam qua resurgat. Item tunc adultus in primo instanti, quo sibi infunditur gratia, potest meritorie illa vti, sicut plane docet Anselmus, De veritate, 12 quod et multis rationibus, et autoritatibus alias erat suasum, et. vt aestimo. pe• suasum. Quare et potest mereri condigne, et recipere in eodem instanti augmentum illius. Et cum in qualitate intensa non sit cumulus partium remissarum, sed sit semper tantum vnica qualitas pure simplex, vt hic suppono, quia hoc vt arbitror alibi est\n\nostensum; potest ergo mereri condigne gratiam suam primam, quod est contra positionem istorum, et contra Catholicam veritatem, sicut 35um cap. declarauit. Rursum si in instanti mereatur condigne certum augmentum gratiae sibi dari, sequitur quod si similiter mereatur continue per aliquod totum tempus, merebitur condigne augmentum gratiae infinitum; vel per aliquod totum tempus continuum, merendo similiter, sicut in instanti aequaliter tantum merebitur condigne sicut in instanti, et per aliquod totum tempus continuum adhuc minus. Amplius autem tunc aliquis gratiosus posset mereri condigne cuilibet viatori, etiam reprobo gratiam conuersionis, et gloriam sempiternam cum aliquibus praedestinatis peioribus illis possit; cuius oppositum patuit de Samuele orante pro Saule, et Ieremia orante pro populo Iudaeorum, et per Augustinum 21. de Ciuitate Dei 25. vniuersaliter de omnibus reprobis, sicut 25um capitulum alle gauit. Item aliquis finaliter reprobatus habet aliquoties charitatem,\n\nqui postea respicit, et similiter abit retro, vel saltem hoc est possibile, alioquin omnis habens charitatem et gratiam necessario saluaretur; quod et fuit verum de Saule, et Iuda, sicut Doctores affirmant: Talis autem existens in gratia quantacunque, non potest mereri condigne, quod Deus eum amet ad vitam; Exerceat enim se talis reprobatus in operibus gratiae quantumcunque, etiam decies millies plusquam faciat vnus praedestinatus; nec adhuc Deus amat eum ad vitam, sed tantum odit eum ad mortem, sicut vnquam faciet in futuro; Cum enim talis post omnia merita sit mortuus et sepultus in Inferno, finaliterque damnatus, certum est Deum non amare ipsum ad vitam, sed odire ad mortem; quare nec vnquam cum amauit, nec etiam non odiuit, sicut 23. et 25. docent. Praeterea si talis possit mereri condigne, quod Deus eum amaret, posset mouere voluntatem diuinam de reprobatione ad praedestinationem, de odio ad amorem, vel saltem posset eam a priori et efficienter mouere, contra 20um. et si vnus existens in gratia non potest mereri condigne quod ametur ad vitam aeternam, ergo nullus. Similiter quoque potest ostendi, quod nullus existens in gratia potest mereri de congruo\n\ncausaliter et antecedenter voluntati diuinae, quod ametur a Deo ad vitam aeternam, vel quod magis ametur ab eo. Amplius autem videtur, quod nullus potest mereri de condigno, et de rigori iuris aliquid boni a Deo, nisi forsitan sit tale bonum, quod ad meritum inseparabiliter consequatur, sicut est fortassis esse merentem bonum et iustum simpliciter vel in parte; Alias enim qui mereretur, •ogeret Deum et voluntatem diuinam necessario ad reddendum, vel ad reddere volendum mercedem, vel ad perdendum iustitiam. Si enim iustus Dominus in omnibus vijs suis permaneat, et aliquis mereatur condigne quicquam ab eo, iustum est vt hoc habeat, et omne tale iustum a voluntate Dei est iustum, sicut 21 um docet. Quare necesse est vt velit reddere illud sibi; maxime cum per 22um habeat actum voluntatis circa retributionem mercedis, quapropter et cum non deficiat sibi posse, necesse est vt reddat, sicut decimum ostendebat; sicque creatura cogeret Deum velle, et etiam extrinsecus operari, quod nullo modo permittet prima Suppositio, et eius perfectio infinita, neque 20um poterit consentire.\n\nItem ponatur secundum aduersarios, quod Iohannes heri meruit de condigno A bonum cras sibi reddi a Deo; Heri ergo fuit iustum, et volutum a Deo, quod A cras redderetur Iohanni; ponatur etiam quod hodie demereatur A; Deus ergo hodie non vult reddere A Iohanni; quare et per 23um nec heri volebat; imo hodie vult quod nunquam habebit A, quapropter et per idem 23um volebat heri similiter. Adhuc autem si quis potest quicquam condigne mereri a Deo potest, vt videtur, mereri condigne sibi vel alteri existenti in gratia, vt perseueret finaliter et saluetur; quod si fecerit, talis viator non potest peccare mortaliter nec damnari. Item per 20um huius, nullum meritum est motiuum voluntatis diuinae, quare nec causa, quare Deus vult dare cuiquam hoc vel illud. Et per eadem argumenta potest ostendi, quod nullus causaliter et antecedenter meretur de congruo quicquam boni a Deo, supposito quod nullum congruum sit iniustum, sicut nullum iniustum videtur congruum, et quod omne congruum sit iustum, volutum que a Deo. Item nullus meretur condigne quicquam ab alio, qui nihil prius facit pro eo,\n\naut dat sibi. Nam opus proprium laborantis debet mercedem praecedere tempore vel natura. Si enim omnem operationem a Deo priore recipiat, et in eius virtute continuet, non videtur per hoc mereri condigne quicquam ab eo, sed magis teneri sibi post operationem suam quam ante; quia tunc plus boni benigne recepit ab eo, quam ante, et maxime qui nihil proprium dantis donat, sed tantum bonum illius cui donatur. Nullus autem homo prius facit pro Deo; Ipse enim in qualibet factione et motione est primus factor et motor, sicut ex superioribus clare patet. Quid ergo meretur homo condigne per huiusmodi factionem? Haec autem videtur ratio Apostoli ad Rom. 11. Quis, inquit, prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quoniā ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia. Vnde constat, quod ex gratia sola dat bona, non ex merito praecedenti. Quare et Aug. super illud Psal. 32. Omnia opera eius in fide, innuens distinctionem de debitore et debito ita dicit; Teneamus Deum fidelissim um debitorem, quia\n\ntenemus misericordissimum promissorem: Neque enim aliquid ei mutuum commodauimus, vt debitorem teneamus, cum ab illo habeamus quicquid ei offerimus. Quis enim prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quoniam ab ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia: Ergo non ei aliquid dedimus, et debitorem tenemus. Vnde ergo debitorem? quia fidelissimum promissorem; Cui concordat Anselmus de Concordia 9. dicens, Deus nulli dat pro praecedenti merito. Quando quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Idem que 1. Cur Deus homo 20. Deus nulli quicquam debet, sed omnis creatura illi debet, et ideo non expedit homini, vt agat cum Deo quemadmodum par cum pari. Lumbardus etiam 1. Sentent. dist. 43. sequens Augustinum, dicit Deum non esse debitorem nostrum nisi forsitan ex promisso, non ex commisso. Hoc idem sentit Cypryanus superius allegatus, cum dicit, in nullo nobis gloriandum, quoniam nostrum nihil est. Et Glossa super illud ad Rom. 4. Ei autem qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum, Quod, inquit, bene operamur accepta gratia,\n\nnon nobis sed illi tribuendum est, qui per gratiā nos iustificauit: Nam si debitam ante gratiam mercedem vellet reddere, peccatoribus poenam redderet debitam. Non igitur tibi blandiaris de meritis, cum tibi reddi mercedem secundum debitum operis audis, tanquam non sit in opere gratia retribuentis, sicut in fide est gratia iustificantis. Vix enim mihi suadeo vllum opus dici ex debito, remunerationē Dei deposcere, cum etiam hoc ipsum quod agere aliquid possumus, vel cogitare, vel proloqui, ipsius dono et largitione faciamus. Beatus quoque Bernard, de gratia et lib. arbit. vlt. tractans de corona iustitiae reddenda Apostolo vult hoc idem. Item per primam Suppositionem et tertiam partem Corollarij primi huius, •ihil, quod aliquo modo minuit libertatem tribuendum est Deo; sed debete de condigno, et puro iuris rigore minuit libertatem, et aliquo modo subijcit seruituti; Nam liberior esset Dominus, qui haberet scruos operantes, et nihil teneretur eis ex debito vel rigore, sed tantum ex spontanea libertate, quam qui teneretur seruis suis operantibus ex necessario debito et rigore, et ad reddendum\n\nposset compelli inuitus, qui etiam alias subiaceret iniuriae seruituti. Item per eadem nihil quod minuit libertatem donantis, tribuendum est Deo, sed debitum minuit; Liberalius enim est dare gratis quam debite. Item nullus meretur aliquid ab alio de condigno, qui non facit aliquid, uod sibi aliquo modo sit bonum, sed tantummodo facienti; sed per quintam partem Corollarij primi huius, nullus homo facit aliquod bonum Deo. Quare et Iob 22. Quid prodes Deo, si iustus fueris, aut quid ei confers, si immaculata fuerit vita tua? sed quicquid boni facit homo, proficit sibi ipsi. Vnde et August. 3. de lib. arbit. 25. Deus nulli debet aliquid, quia omnia gratuito praestat, et si quis dicat aliquid ab illo deberi meritis suis, certe vt esset non ei debebatur. Non enim erat cut deberetur, et tamen quod meritum est conuerti ad cum ex quo es, vt ex ipso etiam melior sis, ex quo habes vt sis? quid ergo ei praerogas vt tanquam debitum poscas, quando si nolles ad eum conuerti, nihil ei de esset, tu autem miser esses? omnia ergo illi debent, primo quod sunt, in quantum naturae sunt; deinde quicquid melius possunt\n\nesse si velint quaecunque acceperunt vt velint, et quicquid oportet eas esse. Item nullus carens gratia, potest ex se satisfacere Deo condigne pro peccato originali, aut minimo actuali sicut videtur ex praemissis circa 32am partem, 38am et 39am Corollarij primi huius; quare nec mereri quicquam ab eo de debito et condigno. Quicquid enim boni talis poterit facere, minus est debito pro peccato. Nam alias talis possit ex se mereri condigne gratiam in praesenti, et gloriam in futuro contra priora. Hoc etiam probat Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo 21. et 22. quod et beatus Iob videtur sentire cum dicit, Peccaui, quid faciam tibi o Custos hominū? Iob 7. quasi dicat, Peccaui, quid faciam tibi pro satisfactione condigna? innuendo, quod nihil. Super quod beatus Greg. 8. Moral. 21. dicit; Ecce fatetur malum quod fecit, sed bonum, quod Deo in recompensationem debeat offerre, non inuenit; quia ad abluendam culpam quaelibet humanae actionis virtus infirma est, nisi hanc misericordia parcentis foucat, et non iustitia\n\nrecte iudicantis premat. Itē nullus potest reddere plenarie debitū quod accepit a Deo; quare nec ⟨gap: 1 word⟩ miseri ab eo ex pure debito, et condigno; Filius enim non potest reddere patri carna •quantū debet; quanto minus potest quis reddere quantū debet Patricoelesti. Si enim filius po•t •ddere patti quantū debet; reddat, et est absolutus ab omni obligatione naturali et deb•o erga patrē, •ta quod nullo casu emergente plus tenetur pat•i, quam extranco cuicū que quod •ex •turae, et gratitudinis non permittit. Vnde Philos. 8 Eth. vlt. Reddendum tribuentem quod contingit; Posse enim amicitia requirit non quod secundū dignitatem. Ne que enim i• omnibus est, quemadmodum et in his, quae ad Deos, hominibus, et parentes. Nullus enim secundum d•gnitatem ali quando vtique retribuet: in potentiam autem famulans epicikes esse videtur; debentem enim reddendum; nihil autem faciens dignum corum, quae subfuerunt,\n\noperatus est; quare semper debet. Item quicunque recepit aliquid ab alto, tenetur ad aequale si possit, sicut lex gratitudinis clare probat; vnde dicit Philosophus, 8. Eth. 13. Potenti retribuendum secundum dignitatem eorum quae passus est, et sponte; cui et concordat autoritas proximo allegata. Et 5. Eth. 8. ponitur quaedam species iustitiae commutatiuae retribuere proportionaliter beneficio praeaccepto: Dicitur enim ibi; In contra facere proportionale commanet ciuitas, si autem non, seruitus videtur esse; si enim non, tetributio non fit, retributione autem commanent: propter quod et gratiatum sacramentum prompte faciunt, vt retributio fit, hoc enim proprium gratiae: refamulari enim oportet ei qui gratiam fecit, et rursus ipsum incipere gratiam facientem, quod et septem libri Senecae de beneficijs saepissime cō testantur. Quare et si plus recepit, quam retribuere valeat, tenetur retribuere quantum potest, quod et prima autoritas Philosophi plane dicit. Sed Deus plus fecit pro nobis quam possumus reddere ad condignum, sicut vult prima autoritas Philosophi memorata, et pater, quia\n\nDeus dedit homini totum seipsum, et omnes suas potentias, ac habitus siue actus sicut praecedentia manifestant: Haec ergo omnia debet Deo. Adhuc autem vltra ista, Deus dedit homini, et pro homine misero, et captiuo, flammis perpetuis obligato, seipsum incarnatum, passum, mortuum et sepultum in precisi temporaliter redimendo; promitrit insuper et dat scipsum totum in praemium foeliciter consummando, quod excedit quemlibet purum hominem infinite: Quilibet ergo homo debet Deo infinite plusquam est, et potest, vel ad minimum quantum potest. Confirmatur haec ratio per Anselm. in illa Meditatione sua de redempt. humanae animae, Christiana anima de graui morte resuscitata, dicentem; Certe Domine, quia me fecisti, debeo amori tuo meipsum totum; quia me redemisti, debeo meipsum totum, imo tantum debeo amori tuo plusquam meipsum, quantum tu es maior me pro quo dedisti teipsum, et cui promittis teipsum. Respondetur forte secundum eundem Anselm. 2. Cur Deus homo, 18. dicentem; Cum dicis creaturam debere Deo quod melius scit ac potest, si intelligis ex debito, et non subaudis,\n\nsi Deus iuber, non est semper verum. Siquidem non debet homo virginitatem ex debiro, sed si vult debet vti coniugio: sed istud non soluit; Deus enim non iubendo, non destruit legē gratitudinis, quam sanciuit, et hac lege quilibet benefaciatus renetur benefactori ad aequale vel maius, vel saltem ad id quod potest, vt volunt autoritates priores. Item si Deus exigeret, homo teneretur facere quantum posset; si autem non exigat, sed voluntati propriae liberū derelinquat, plus facit pro eo, cum libertatem maiorem concedat; quare et hoc ipso, homo plus vel saltem tantum obligatur Deo, quam vel quantum esset alias obligatus. Hic aliquis forsitan respondebit, quod Deus potest totam illam obligationem remittere: Dicit enim Philos. 8. Eth. vlt. statim post autoritatem allegatam de retributione dijs et parentibus facienda, quibus autem debetur, potestas dimittere et patri vtique. Sed rursum contra istum reuertitur argumentum: nam tantum debitum, et tantam obligationem remitteret est beneficium vnum non paruum. Pro illo ergo cum alijs amplius obligatur, sicut si creditor omnem pecuniam accommodatam\n\ndebitori libere condonaret, et quantum posset, omnem obligationem remitteret, tanto ipsum sibi arctius obligaret, quanto secundum beneficium primum excederet. Verum ne Anselmo et Arist. videar contraire, dico, quod sicut potest elici ex sententia vtriusque; Debere est dupliciter, scilicet potentialiter scu habitualiter, et actualiter; actualiter debere, intelligo actualiter obligari ad aliquid faciendum sub poena peccati, sicut est de operario conducto ad certam operam faciendum, sic que non tenemur facere quicquid poterimus propter Deum; et haec est forte mens Anselmi, et sic secundum Arist. pater potest dimittere filio, et Deus homini, ne sibi, quantum potuerit, obligetur. Potentialiter vero siue habitualiter debere intelligo quenquam beneficiatum ex beneficio praeaccepto, habere obligationem in potentia et in habitu ad aliquid faciendum, quae cum benefactori placuerit, potest reduci ad actum, scilicet si exigat hoc ab eo; velut si Iohannes traderet Petro, 10. interposita tali conditione; Habeas libere ista 10. nisi contingat me ipsa repetere; quae si repetam, mihi resoluere tenearis; et sic quaelibet\n\nrationalis creatura tenetur Deo per omnia quantum potest, scilicet si velit exigere hoc ab ea. Quapropter nihil boni potest ex stricto, debito, et violento rigore mereri ab eo, sicut nec Petrus pro illis, 10. quicquam emere a Iohanne. Quod enim habeat quodammodo liberum, et proprium hoc vel illud ad merendum, emendum, vel aliquid faciendum non ex se, sed ex Deo, et hoc non ex aliquo debito praecontracto, sed omnino de gratia et permissione libera suae gratui•e voluntatis. Amplius autem quod nullus de congruo primam gratiam mereatur, quia vel hoc esset congruitate antecedente voluntatem diuinam, et mouente eam ad gratiam faciendam; vel consequente illam, et dependente ab ea•: si congruitate antecedente, cum omnis talis congruitas sit quaedam ratio, et iustitia, rationabile est et iustum ratione et iustitia antecedentibus voluntatem diuinam, quod Deus det gratiam suam tali; quare et per 21. hoc est necessario rationabile et iustum; necesse ergo est Deum hoc facere, vel facere contra necessariam\n\nrationem et iustitiā, et peccare; et etiā tunc talis congruitas inferior moueret voluntatē diuinā cōtra 20. et ipsam de se indifferentē determinaret, esset que a diuina prouidentia penitus aliena, contra 27. et alia quae sequuntur. Si congruitate consequente voluntatem diuinam, tunc illa est posterior voluntate diuina; quare et per 20. nullo modo mouet illam ad volendum conferre gratiam, tanquam meritum excitans et inducens. Item, si sit ita, congruum est Deum dare gratiam sic merenti, quia hoc volutum est a Deo; ergo hoc nedum est congruum vt hi dicunt, sed etiam est condignum, quicquid Deus vult fieri, dignum et iustum est fieri, sicut vigesimum primum capitulum demonstrauit, nec aliquis dubitat, qui de diuina iustitia est securus, et scit quod omne iustū est dignum. Dicent fortassis quod bene est dignū, sed non condignū; sed quid est condignum, nisi cum ratione et iustitia dignū? Quare et Hest. 6. scribitur isto modo, Hoc honore condignus est, quemcun que Rex voluerit honorate. Itidem sic ad idem, omne sufficiens est condignum (sic enim exponit Glossa, illud ad Rom. 8. Non sunt condignae passiones,\n\netc. condignae, id est, sufficientes) sed tale opus est sufficiens ad gratiam impetrandam. Nam nihil sibi deest; Impetrat enim illam. Illud etiam est sufficiens, quod Deus vult et discernit sufficere ex parte operantis, et tale est opus huiusmodi secundum positionem istorum: Si autem dicatur, quod non est condignum, id est, aeque bonum, ita nec opus in gratia est aeque bonum cum augmento gratiae temporalis et gloriae sempiternae, sicut superius est argutum. Item si hoc sit congruum congruitate consequente voluntatem diuinam, scilicet quia Deus vult sic fieri, tunc etiam qui nihil boni facit, sed peccat mortaliter et grauissime, sicut fecit Paulus, quando adhuc spirans minarum et caedis in discipulos Domini, nomen Christianum conabatur delere, meretur de congruo gratiam sibi dari; quia Deus vult quod sic fiat: Ipse enim per gratiam suam operantem pratuite praeuenit peccatores sicut superius est ostensum. Et si dicatur, quod Deus dat talibus gratiam, sed non pro talibus malis factis, ideo que per talia non merentur de congtuo gratiam sibi dari; ergo secundum istos, illis qui merentur\n\ngratiam primam de congruo, Deus dat illam propter merita sua priora; ergo gratia iam non est gratia, sicut superius est argutum, et etiam tunc illa merita antecedenter et causaliter a priori mouent voluntatem diuinam, et causant volutionem in ea, cuius contrarium dicebatur, scilicet quod congruum est Deum sic facere congruitate tantummodo consequente voluntatem diuinam: huius quoque contrarium vigesimum capitulum ostendebat. Item Augustinus super illud Psalmi 118i. Retribue seruo tuo, quadruplicem retributionem distinguens, ostendit, quod Deus retribuit bona pro malis: Dicit enim, Quatuor retributiones sunt: Aut mala pro malis retribuuntur, sicut Deus ignem aeternum retributurus est impijs; aut bona pro bonis, sicut regnum aeternum retributurus est iustis; aut bona pro malis, sicut Christus per gratiam iustificat impium; aut mala pro bonis, sicut Iudas per malitiam persecutus est Christū. Harum quatuor retributionum duae priores pertinēt ad iustitiam, tertia ad misericordiā; quartam Deus nescit: Haec autē tertia primitus est necessaria; nisi enim retribueret\n\nbona pro malis, nullo modo essent, quibus retribueret bona pro bonis. Potest autē haec ratio aliter fieri sub hac forma, cum quis Dei gratiam meretur de congruo, vel quia Deus vult sic esse, ideo hoc est congruum; vel quia hoc est congruū, ideo Deus vult sic esse: Si detur primū, ita similiter est cōdignum, et ita est de pessime operante, et etiam tunc, est iustū posterius voluntate diuina; quapropter non est causa illius; Prius enim naturaliter Deus vult sic esse, et sic volendo facit illud esse congruum; non ergo quia hoc est congruum, Deus vult sic esse: Si detur secundū, tunc per vigesimum hoc non est iustum positiuū et contingens aliter se habere, quia omne tale iustum dependet a voluntate diuina; sed est iustum necessarium absolute, vel saltem est iustum mixtim, et sic, supposito quod tale factum sit de necessitate, est iustum, et sic Deus de necessitate seruandae iustitiae daret gratiam sic merenti. Item Deus potest libere non dare gratiam sic operanti: Ponatur ergo quod non faciat, tunc non est congruum; vel si vni sic operanti dat gratiam, et alteri operanti similiter non dat illam, non ergo est hoc per se congruum,\n\net ideo volutum a Deo, sed e contra. Item facilius est cuicunque existenti in gratia mereri de congruo quod Deus eum amet, vel quod plus eum amet ad vitam, quam carenti gratia mereri primam gratiam, et quod ametur a Deo ad vitam aeternam; sed praescitus ad mortem existens in gratia, hoc non potest, sicut superius est argutum. Item cum quis meretur a Deo quicquam de congruo, cum omne congruum sit iustum, quia omne iniustum est incongruum, illud est iustum, et oppositum eius iniustum; quare et impossibile circa Deum, sicut prima Suppositio, et 3. pars corollarij primi probant; dicit que Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo 10. In Deo quantumlibet paruum inconueniens sequitur impossibilitas, et si oppositum eius sit impossibile, hoc est necessarium, et omne iustum necessarium est condignum: Quicunque\n\nergo meretur a Deo quicquam de congruo, meretur etiam de condigno. Dicitur forte quod aliquis meretur a Deo quicquam de congruo, quia si Deus hoc reddat, congruum est, et pro certo ita est si Deus reddat sibi poenam: non magis ergo meretur de congruo gratiam quam poenam; et similiter si peccanti grauissime Deus reddat gratiam, congruum est, ergo meretur cam de congruo; et si duo omnino similiter operentur, et Deus det vni gratiam, alteri non det vllam, vnus meretur eam de congruo, et non alius, cum tamen per omnia similiter operetur; et etiam si Deus sic reddat, sic fieri est condignum; nihil enim in talibus dignum est aut condignum, nisi quia volutum est a Deo, quia nec rationabile, neque iustum, sicut 21. capitulum ostendebat, et Hest. 6. Tali honore condignus est, quemcunque Rex voluerit honorare. Item secundum istos, homo carens gratia, potest mereri aliquid de condigno, sed gratiam tantum de congruo; vel ergo est aliquod maximum, quod potest mereri de condigno, vel minimum quod non potest; Si detur maximum quod potest, sit illud A, vel ergo A est bonum finitum,\n\nvel infinitum: Si finitum, potest adhuc aliquid mereri vlterius, A ergo non est maximum quod potest mereri: Si infinitum, hoc non videtur, quia quilibet actus suus fuit finitus, et omnes simul finiti in merito et valore, et quia adhuc posset plus mereri, nec Deus posset eum praemiari condigne, quia non potest facere infinitum, sicut ex ostensione 40ae partis Corollarij, primi patet; nec potest negari prima diuisio, Si aliquod bonum possit de condigno mereri, aliquod que non possit; Capiatur enim paruum bonum quod potest mereri condigne, quod imaginarie crescat continue, donec sit tantum, quantum condigne mereri non possit. Tunc A in aliquo instanti, quod sit B incipiet esse tantum quantum talis condigne mereri non possit: Vel ergo A incipiet in B, intrinsece esse tantum, scilicet quod tunc primo erit tantum, et tunc est aliquod nimirum quod mereri condigne non potest: Non enim potest condigne mereri, quantum tunc erit A, et quantumlibet minus potest; vel A incipiet extrinsece esse tantum, quantum talis condigne mereri non possit, scilicet quod tunc non erit tantum,\n\nsed immediate post erit, et tunc A erit maximum quod talis potest condigne mereri: Quoniam tantum potest mereri condigne, quantum A erit in B, vt datur. et nihil vlterius maius eo. Item mercantur de congruo Iohannes et Petrus infideles aequaliter, et aeque diu primas gratias sibi dari, et Iohannes post certum tempus in A instanti recipiat gratiam, secundum quod meruit; Petrus vero in A decedat: Ex quo ergo meruit aequaliter cum Iohanne, nec per eum stat, quod decedit, vt pono, Deus ipsum de congruo aequali gratia praemi•bit, finaliterque saluabit, cum nullo baptismo fluminis, flaminis, aut sanguinis fuerit baptizatus, quod videtur contra Euangelium, et omnes Doctores, et fidem Ecclesiae generalem. Vnde Iohan. 3. Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non potest introire in regnum Dei, et. hoc ad literam realiter, vel saltem spiritualiter, et virtualiter, sicut Doctores exponunt, quod fit in adultis, credendo, et baptizari volendo, vel pro Dei amore sanguinem proprium effundendo. Item dicit Augustinus de gratia et libero arbitrio 50. Suspicentur homines quaelibet\n\nmerita bona, quae putant praecedere, vt iustificentur per Dei gratiam, non intelligentes, cum hoc dicunt, nihil aliud quam negare se gratiam: Qui ergo merita de congruo gratiae Dei praeponunt, gratiam Dei negant. Obijciet forsitan aliquis contra dicta: Primo probando quod aliquis potest mereri condigne gloriam sempiternam: Nam Sapient. 3. dicitur sic de Iustis, In paucis vexati, in multis bene disponentur, quoniam Deus temptauit illos, et inuenit illos dignos se: Et Ecclesiastici 26. Omnis ponderatio non est digna continentis animae, ergo anima continens meretur condigne praemium infinitum: et Luc. 10. Dignus est operarius mercede sua; merces autem operariorum in vinea Christi est denarius gloriae infinitae: Et infra eiusdem 20. Illi qui digni habebuntur saeculo illo, et resurrectione ex mortuis etc. Et Apoc. 3. Ambulabunt mecum in albis, quoniam digni sunt, cum suis similibus satis multis. Hoc idem ratio manifestat; omnis enim actus virtuosus melior est incomparabiliter omni bono vtili, vel delectabili distincto contra bonum honestum, virtuosum, et iustum; alias enim bonum vtile\n\nvel delectabile posset tantum augeri, quod esset aeque bonum cum felicitate quae consistit in actibus virtuosis, vt patet 1. Eth. 9. et post, imo et quod esset melius, et sic cum felicitas sit maximum bonum humanum, vt patet ibi et alibi, per omnes vulgares Philosophicos, et Theologicos, ipsa esset in pecunijs aut voluptatibus statuenda, contra omnes sane sapientes, et contra totum processum Philosophi memoratum. Tunc quoque tantum acceptaretur a Deo magnum bonum datum, vel delectabile derelictum, quantum actus maximus virtuosus; et etiam tantum vel magis secundum rectam rationem posset homo eligere diuitias, et voluptates aeternas sine iustitia et virtute, etiam ad quam tenetur sicut actum virtutis, cum tamen eligendo sic peccet, et faciat contrariū rationi. Videtur insuper, quod illud sit melius homini, quod habitum necessario efficit ipsum bonum, quam quod habitū non sic facit, sed ipsum malum et miserum esse sinit; Actus autem virtuosus habitus a quocunque necessario efficit ipsum bonū;\n\nsed omnis pecunia et voluptas potest adesse malo et misero cuicun que sic autem probat Philos. 1. Eth. 12. foelicitatem non in possessione vel habitu, sed in operatione ponendam. Dicit enim, differt autem non parum in possessione vel vsu, optimum existimare, et in habitu vel operatione. Habitum quidem enim contingit nullum bonum perficere existentem, vt puta dormienti et aliter otioso, operationem autem non possibile est; operabitur enim ex necessitate et bene operabitur. Item qui diligit Deum super omnia toto corde, et facit omnia propter cum, non potest remunerari condigne minori quam Deo; Nullus enim amor videtur recompensandus condigne bono minori quam tanto, quanto amans amatum suum praeponit, et quantum citius relinqueret quam amatum; Si enim amor est recompensandus amore, ergo et maior maiore, et aequalis aequali; Nam alias proportio debita claudicaret. Amor autem in potente otiosus esse non potest: Amare enim est velle bonum amato et facere, sicut docent praemissa 39. huius; Deus ergo omnipotens amatus ab homine super omnia toto corde, ipsum\n\nde condigno aequaliter redamans vult sibi bonum, super omnia bona bonum, et hoc potest, hoc ergo sibi retribuit, vel retribuet pro tempore opportuno. Tale autem bonum super omnia alia bona bonum, est tantummodo ipse Deus. Deus ergo seipsum de condigno retribuet sic amanti; sicut et patet ex ostensione 32. et 34. partis Corollarij primi huius. Vnde et Anselmus Monol. 70. Nihil potest esse praemium huius amoris, nisi quod supereminet in omnibus naturis: Quid enim summa bonitas retribuet amanti, et disideranti se nisi seipsam? Nam quicquid aliud retribuat, non retribuit, quia nec compensatur amori, nec consolatur amantem, nec satiat desiderantem. Pro quo et dicit Philosophus 9. Eth. 1. Contendunt autem cum altera fiunt ipsis, et non quae appetunt. Simile enim est, quod est nihil fieri, cum eo quod appetit, non potitur. Hoc iterum confirmatur; Amicitia enim et amor talem proportionalitatem, vt videtur, condigne requirit, quod quantum proportionaliter per vires suas, vel supra, si posset, amans faceret pro amato; tantum proportionaliter secundum vires suas, amatus faciat\n\npro amante; sed homo sicamans Deum, faceret pro eo, et daret sibi si posset bonum, super omnia bona bonum, et melius: Deus ergo cum sit omnipotens, de condigno faciet sibi tantum. Item quod homo potest mereri condigne aliquod bonum, videtur. Nam quodlibet opus bonum essentialiter et inseparabiliter sequitur quaedam bonitas, quaedam rectitudo, quaedam iustitia, pulchritudo, decentia, seu honestas, vel etiam actualiter bonum esse, rectum et iustum; et haec videtur aliqua sua merces, quam de condigno meretur. Amplius autem non decet summam iustitiam, et clementissimam bonitatem, promptius punire peccantes, quam praemiare bene operantes, sicut et videtur ex 31. parte corollarij, primi, huius: sed quemlibet peccantem statim, et inseparabiliter sequitur sua poena, scilicet iniustitia, peccatum, et seruitus peccati, priuatio iustitiae, et libertatis quam prius habebat, saltem respectu illarum iniustitiae, et seruitutis, quas nouiter tunc incurrit; sicut et patet per eandem 31am partem; quare et e contrario, in quolibet bono facto. Licet autem satis constare debeat, quod\n\nquicunque peccans eo ipso necessario et inseparabiliter incurrit peccatum, iniustitiam, et seruitutem peccati, esse peccatorem, iniustum, et seruum peccati, cum priuationibus supra dictis, et multis malis similibus, quae remanent in eo etiam post peccare, sicut inhaeserunt sibi quando actu peccauit, quae omnia sunt digna poena prioris peccati, seu peccare; Potest tamen hoc exabundanti aliquibus testimonijs authenticis confirmari. Autor enim Autorum Iohan. 8. sic dicit; Omnis qui facit peccatum, seruus est peccati. Vnde et Iob. 7. Peccaui: Quid faciam tibi, O custos hominum? quare posuisti me contrarium tibi? videlicet per peccatum, et factus sum mihimet ipsi grauis, scilicet per poenam. Super quod dicit Gregorius 8. Moral. 22. Haec contrarietas culpae facta est homini pondus poenae, vt corruptioni suae malae liber seruiat, qui bene seruus de incorruptionis libertate gaudebat. Hoc idem vult Augustinus 1. de libero arbittio, 20. et 2.1. sed manifestius 3.19. et post ostendit, quod\n\nomne vitium et peccatum est corruptio naturae, et alicuius boni naturalis; et idem patet per eundem, 12. de Ciuit. Dei 6. et Enchirid. 7. Manifestissime vero hoc ostendit 3. de libero arbitrio, 24. dicens, quia nemo superat leges omnipotentis Creatoris; non sinitur anima non reddere debitum: Aut enim reddit bene vtendo quod accepit, aut amittendo, quod vti bene noluit. Itaque si non reddit faciendo iustitiam, reddet patiendo miseriam: Nullo autem interuallo temporis ista diuiduntur, vt quasi alio tempore non faciat quod debet, et alio patiatur quod debet, ne vel puncto temporis vniuersalis pulchritudo turpetur, vt sit in ea peccati dedecus sine decore vindictae. Hoc etiam patet conjunctim in boni factis et malis: Dicit enim Hermes de Deo; Qui nullius malefactoris opus justificat, et nullum benefactorem praemijs priuat: Cui et Arist. cōcordanter in De Mundo vlt. Hunc inquit, semper comitatur vltio,\n\nvel iustitia, puniens, vel cruciatiua, derelinquentium diuinam legem; beatus autem et foelix a principio confestim particeps esset. Gen. etiam 4. dicit; Nonne si bene egeris, recipies, scilicet statim, sin autem male, statim peccatum in foribus adarit? Dicit que Augustinus 8. super Genesin ad literam 31. Diuina prouidentia regens vniuersam creaturam, administrat naturas, vt sint volentes, vt nec infructuosae bonae, nec impunitae malae sint: Nam in seipsis male volentes habent interiorem poenam suam, eandem ipsam iniquitatem suam. Ergo sic bonae habent interiorem mercedem suam, ipsam aequitatem et rectitudinem facti sui. Idem De quantitate animae, vltim. Deus summus et verus incorrupta lege omne quod condidit, regit; animam in nullo actu deserit sine poena vel praemio. Idem super illud Psalmi 118. Iuraui, et statui custodire iudicia iustitiae tuae; Fide custodiuntur iudicia iustitiae Dei, cum sub Deo iusto iudice, nec rectum factum infructuosum, nec peccatum creditur impunitum. Item amari vel odiri a Deo, videtur praemium non paruum, vel poena; Deus autem amat bene facientes, et odit peccantes.\n\nDicit enim Aristoteles, secundo, suae Rhetoricae, 28. Si iusta dixeris, homines te odient; si iniusta, dij; si autem iusta dixeris, dij te amabunt; si iniusta, homines. Idem de bona Fortuna, primo; Deum dignificamus, Dominum existentem talium, vt dignis distribuat et bona, et mala. Idemque decimo Ethicorum, decimo tertio; Secundum intellectum operans, et hunc curans, et dispositus optime, et Dei amantissimus videtur esse: Si enim quaedam cura humanorum a dijs fit, quemadmodum videtur, et erit vtique bene rationabile, et gaudere ipsos de optimo, et cognatissimo, hic autem erit intellectus, et diligentes maxime hoc et honorantes, et rebeneficiare vt amicis ipsis curatis. Vbi Auerroes; Si cura sit Deo de hominibus, vt creditur, et vt debitum est, gaudet de meliori, et dignius est vt benefaciat eis, qui amant eum plus, et honorificet eos, et visitet eos, sicut est dispositio amici cum amico. Dicitque Boetius 4. De consolatione Philosophiae, prosa 1. Ipso, de cuius nunc regno loquimur, autore, cognosces semper quidem potentes esse bonos, malos vero abiectos semperat que\n\nimbecilles; nec sine poena vnquam esse vitia, nec sine praemio virtutes. Idemque specialiter de virtute, et operibus virtuosis, supra eiusdem tertij prosa 4. Inest dignitas propria virtuti, quam protinus in eos, quibus ipsa fuerit adiuncta transfundit; et intelligit, vt videtur, hic et prius per virtutem, nedum solum habitum, sed et actum; cui et concordanter Ouid. de Ponto, sic ait; Non facile inuenies multis in millibus vnum, / Virtutem precium qui putet esse sui: / Ipse decor recte facti, si praemia desint, / Non mouet, et gratis poenitet esse probum. / Vnde et Auerroes super 1. Eth. 12. Actus qui fit secundum exigentiam virtutis, virtus est. Et Augustinus super illud Psalmi 36. Iustus autem miseretur, et commodat; si habet foris facultatem, dat ipsam charitas, si autem non habet dat beneuolentiam; habet semper vnde det, cui plenum pectus est charitatis. Ipsa est charitas, quae dicitur et voluntas bona, et accipit ibi voluntatem\n\npro actu voluntatis, sicut totus processus ostendit; qui et tertio De doctrina Christiana, 10. sicut et recitat Petrus primo Sententiarum, distinct. 17. Charitatem, inquit, voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se, ac proximo propter Deum. Idem, in libro de moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, tractans illud verbum Apostoli; Nec mors nec vita poterit nos separare a charitate Dei; Charitas Dei, inquit, hic dicta est virtus, quae animi nostri rectissima affectio est, quae coniungit nos Deo, qua cum diligimus. Simili quoque modo videtur loqui Propheta, cum dicit; Feci iudicium et iustitiam, id est, actum iustitiae, siue opus, quod ideo Augustinus exponens sic ait; Iustitiae nomine hoc loco non ipsa virtus, sed opus eius significatum est. Dicitur quoque communiter, et tricesima prima pars corollarij primi docet, quod Deus praemiat bona merita vltra condignum; bonum ergo meritum exigit aliquid de condigno. Praetere a quod Deus vult fieri, et promittit recte operantibus, dignum est fieri, et condignum; sed ipse vult et promittit, quod qui perseueranter bene faciunt, habebunt\n\npro mercede gloriam sempiternam; ergo illam condigne merentur. Adhuc autem, Christus meruit sibi, et nobis multa bona, sicut allegat Lumbardus 3. Sentent. dist. 18. 19. et post; et quis audebit asserere, quod haec non meruit de condigno, maxime cum sicut Christus excedit quemlibet purum hominem infinite, sic et meritum Christi, meritum cuiuslibet puri hominis videtur excedere? potuit ergo Christus mereri quantumlibet de condigno. Pro quo dicit Anselmus, secundo, Cur Deus homo, 14. Putasne tantum donum, tam amabile posse sufficere ad soluendum quod debetur pro peccatis totius mundi, et respondet; imo plus potest in infinitum: ergo meruit de condigno omnibus saluandis gloriam sempiternam. Vnde Apocalyps. quinto; Dignus es, Domine, accipere librum et aperire signacula eius, quoniam occisus es, et redemisti nos Deo in sanguine tuo, et fecisti nos Deo nostro regnum. Ecce quid meruit nobis condigne. Et sequitur; Dignus est agnus, qui occisus est,\n\naccipere virtutem, et diuinitatem, et sapientiam, et fortitudinem, et honorem, et gloriam, et benedictionem; Ecce quid condigne meruit sibi ipsi. Amplius autem sicut argutum est prius, quod nullus meretur quicquam boni condigne, similiter omnino poterit argui, quod nullus meretur quicquam mali condigne, quod si quis concesserit, cogetur concedere consequenter Deum esse iniustum, qui punit tam grauiter peccatores, cum nullam poenam meruerint de condigno; Scripturam quoque veritatis mentiri fatebitur: Vnde Iob 11. vtinam Deus loqueretur tecum, et intelligeres, quod multo minora exigaris ab eo, quam meretur iniquitas tua: Super quod dicit Gregorius 10. Moral. 6. Qui multiplicitatem intelligit legis Dei, cuncta quae patitur, quam sint minora perpendit, et Iob 33. Peccaui et vere deliqui, et, vt eram dignus, non recepi; Et Psalmo 84. Mitigasti omnem iram tuam: Et Abacuc 3. Cum iratus fueris, misericordiae recordaberis: quibus et sunt alia multa similia in Scriptura. Dicit quidem Apostolus ad Rom. 6. Stipendia peccati mors, gratia autem Dei,\n\nvita aeterna; Glossa; Mors aeterna est stipendium peccati, id est digna retributio pro peccato; vita autem aeterna sola gratia Dei datur, quam expositionem per multas multorum autoritates confirmat. Praeterea vnum argumentum praemissum volens ostendere, quod quicquid homo meretur de congruo, meretur etiam de condigno, est contra communem scholam, vel saltem contra magnam eius partem, haec ab inuicem distinguentem. Vt autem obiecta facilius dissoluantur, sciendum, quod non eodem modo se habent Deus et homo ad reddendum praemium pro merito qualicunque bono vel malo: Homo namque sicut Rex vel alius publico edicto promulgat, quod qui fecerit tale quid bonum vel malum pro congrua mercede recipiet hoc vel illud, manetque ipse indifferens et indeterminatus in voluntate sua, circa sibi subictos, quis quid habebit; et si vnus faciat tale bonum, alius vero malum, iam per hoc determinatur eius indifferentia voluntatis; per hoc quoque antecedenter, causaliter, et efficienter mouetur ei voluntas ad volendum et ad praemiandum, et puniendum secundum praecedentia\n\nmerita hunc et illum: Non sic autem Deus, ex se solo nihil a posterioribus mendicando, semper aeque determinate vult, et non vult quaecunque, sicut 20um. huius 21um. 23um. 25um. 27um. et sequentia docuerunt. Quod et planissime testatur Apostolus ad Rom. 9. de Iacob et Esau sic dicens, Cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni aut mali, vt secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quia maior seruiet minori, sicut scriptum est, Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui. Et si quis ob•jciat, quod tota sac•a Scriptura, et omnes Doctores, imo et vniuersalis Ecclesia indubitanter affirmant Deum praemiaturum bonos propter merita sua bona, et malos propter mala sua merita puniturum; Quia propter, quia, ideo et similia aliquam causam vt frequenter significant, ostendendum in primis, quod meritum non est aliqua causa aeterni praemij subsequentis: Non enim est causa materialis, quia ipsa necessario simul est cum suo materiato, sed actus meritorius, quo illud praemium meruit, tunc non manet: Nec est causa formalis; Ipsa\n\nenim est simul necessario cum formato: Nec finalis, quia magis videtur e contra, sicut apparet ex 35. huius: Nec efficiens, quae tamen magis apparet, quia nec in actu, nec in potentia: Non in actu; Nam secundum Philosophum 5. Metaph. 3. Agentia singularia simul sunt et non sunt, et ipsa quorum sunt causae, vt hic medicus cum hoc conualescente, et hic aedificator cum hoc aedificato: sed actus meritorius praecedit praemium tempore, nec est simul cum eo: Nec est causa efficiens praemij in potentia, quia tunc aliquando exiret in actum, et actualiter efficeret praemium sempiternum, et tunc vt praemittitur esset simul cum eo: Nec potest quis dicere quod ideo meritum est causa efficiens praemij, quia nunc primum mouet voluntatem Dei prius naturaliter indeterminatam, et determinat eam, efficiendo in ea volutionem actualem et certam ad praemium conferendum, quia 20um. 23um. 25um. et 35um. huius prohibent ita dici. Est igitur vlterius aduertendum quod haec dictio, Propter, est multiplex penes secundum modum aequiuocationis. Nam primo et principaliter significat causam\n\nessendi; secundatio vero et aliqualiter transumtiue significat causam cognoscendi, siue innotescendi; et adhuc aliquando significat ordinem: Quod autem significet causam essendi nullus ignorat; et quod significet etiam causam cognoscendi, patet per Philosophum 1. Post. 12. dicentem, quod si causae et effectus aeque praedicantium, id est, conuertibilium, vt Planetas esse prope, quod est causa, et non scintillare, quod est eius effectus, non causa, id est, effectus sit notior, tunc demonstratio per hanc erit, vt quod prope sunt Planetae, propter id quod non scintillant. Ecce secundum eum, quod propter, non signat ibi causam essendi, sed effectum, qui est causa tantummodo cognoscendi; quare et ordinato syllogismo demonstratiuo per terminos A B C subdit; quare demonstratum est, quod erraticae prope sunt. Hic igitur\n\nsyllogismus non est propter quid, sed propter quia: Non enim ex eo, quod non scintillant, prope sunt; sed propter id quod prope sunt, non scintillant. Ecce quomodo primo concedit, et secundo negat Planetas esse prope, propter id quod non scintillant; et hoc est, quia, propter, primo sibi significat causam tantummodo cognoscendi, secundo vero causam essendi. Hoc etiam concordat cum toto processu illius capituli, et sequentium, vbi demonstratio ab effectu vocatur demonstratio quia; cum tamen haec dictio, quia, significet causam, sicut et propter: Quare ibi significat causam tantummodo cognoscendi, licet Donatus potestati coniunctionis non causali, sed rationali irrationabiliter supponat quia, quapropter, propterea, et multa similia, quae sunt causalia manifeste, sicut et potestati eius causali supponit, si, nisi, et talia, quae potestati conditionali fuissent potius supponenda, quam penitus praetermisit. Hoc etiam satis probat illud frequens exemplum Philosophi, et vulgatum, videlicet propter quid anguli trianguli valent duos rectos? propter id quod angulus extrinsecus valet duos intrinsecos\n\nsibi oppositos, cum tamen quantitas anguli extrinseci nullo modo sit causa, imo nec effectus, quare tres anguli trianguli valent duos rectos: Neutrum enim illorum est causa materialis, efficiens, formalis, nec finalis alterius, cum vtrumque possit sine reliquo semper esse. Angulum tamen extrinsecum valere duos extrinsecos sibi oppositos est causa tantum cognitionis nostrae, quare tres anguli trianguli valent duos rectos: Per hoc enim demonstratiue docetur sic esse, sicut 2a pars 32ae primi elementorum Euclidis ostendit. Ideoque dicit Auerroes super 8. Phys. comment. 58. quod tres sunt demonstrationes, scilicet causae, et esse tantum, et causae et esse. Sed ne in causa Catholica testes tantummodo Ethnicos videar ministrare, ecce quid fidelissimus Paulus dicit, Christus factus est obediens vsque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus exaltauit illum, et donauit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, scilicet quod nominetur Deus. Hoc tamen nomen habuit ante suam passionē; imo et naturaliter ante omne meritum suum habuit illud nomen: Ille enim homo prius naturaliter\n\nfuit, et prius naturaliter Deus fuit, quam fecerit aliquid, aut meruerit quouismodo. Nam omne agens praecedit naturaliter suam quamlibet actionē. Christus ergo non meruit esse Deus, sed hoc fuit datum sibi gratissime, sine quouis merito praecedente, sicut ex 35o huius patet. Lumbard. quo que 3. sent. dist. 6. multas autoritates ad hoc idem adducit; et infra 18. tractans autoritatem Apostoli supradictam, dicit quod homo ille non meruit hic tantum bonum, scilicet nomen Dei; non ergo videtur, quod aliquo modo per obedientiam passionis meruit illud nomen, nisi quantum ad cognitionem et manifestationem non Deo, sed hominibus hoc primo ignorantibus, et per eius passionem, resurrectionem, ascensionem, et similia addiscentibus, et vere scientibus, ipsum esse non tantummodo hominem, sed et Deum ; et hoc est quod dicit ibi Lumbardus; Quomodo ergo hoc, inquit, dicitur, per obedientiam donatum est ei hoc nomen? et respondet secundum tropum illum in Scriptura creberrimum, hoc accipiendum est quo dicitur res fieri, quando innotescit. Post resurrectionem vero, quod ante fuit in\n\nobscuro, in euidenti positum est, vt scirent homines et daemones. Vnde et Saluator ipse Iohan. 13o ita dicit, In hoc cognoscent omnes, quod discipuli mei estis, si dilectionem habueritis ad inuicem. Posset ergo dici, quod cum dicitur, Iste propter tale meritum tale praemium consequetur, haec dictio, Propter, non significat causam essendi, sed cognoscendi. Per meritum enim innotescit hominibus, daemonibus, et forsitan Angelis quale praemium quis habebit. Hoc etiam verbum, propter, significat ordinem aliquando, nec incongrue: Nam secundum praemissa 35o huius, Deus primo vult homini praemium et gloriam tanquam finem, et ideo vult sibi et facit merita congrua, velut quaedam media praeuia ad hunc finem: quare et vt tandem recte finaliter ordinentur, tribuit eis finem; propter quem et ad quem ipse finaliter ordinauit. Potest ergo, propter, aliquoties ordinem designare, vt dictum Apostoli intelligatur hoc modo, Factus est obediens etc. propter quod et Deus exaltauit illū, id est, post quod praecedens ordinatum a Deo, ad istud subsequens, quod non nisi post illud fieri statuebat. Pro\n\nquo Anselmus tractans eandem autoritatem Apostoli 1. Cur Deus homo 9. sic dicit, Quod autem cum di•isset Apostolus, Humiliauit seipsum etc. propter quod Deus etc. non ita dictum est, quasi nullatenus potuisset peruenire ad hanc exaltationem, nisi per hanc mortis obedientiam, et haec exaltatio non nisi in retributionem huius obedientiae collata sit (Prius enim quam pateretur, ipse dixit omnia sibi esse tradita a Patre, et omnia Patris esse sua) sed quoniam ipse cum Patre, sanctoque spiritu disposuerat se non aliter quam per mortem, celsitudinem omnipotentiae suae mundo ostensurum, quippe quod non nisi per illam mortem fieri dispositum est, cum per illam fit, non incongrue dicitur propter illam fieri? Si enim intendimus facere aliquid, sed proponimus nos prius facturos aliud per quod illud fiat, cum iam factum est quod volumus praecedere, si fit quod intendimus, recte dicitur propterea fieri, quoniam factum est, propter quod differebatur, quia non nisi per illud fieri\n\ndispositum erat. Nam si fluuium, quem equo et naui transire possum, propono me non nisi naui transiturum, et idcirco differo transmeare, quia nauis abest; cum iam praesto est nauis, si transeo, recte de me dicitur; Nauis parata fuit, propterea transiuit. Et non solum ita loquimur, quando sequens fit per id quod praecedere volumus, sed etiam quando non fit per illud, sed tantummodo post illud facere aliud aliquid statuimus: Si quis enim differt cibum sumere, quia nondum ea die missae celebrationi affuit, peracto quod prius facere volebat, non incongrue illi dicitur; Iam sume cibum, propterea quia jam fecisti, propter quod sumere differebas; Multo igitur minus inusitata est locutio, cum Christus dicitur exaltatus propterea quia mortem sustinuit, per quam et post quam illam exaltationem facere decreuit. Ponitque aliam expositionem eiusdem dicti Apostolici in haec verba; Potest hoc et eo modo intelligi, quo idem Dominus legitur profecisse sapientia, et gratia apud Deum, non quia ita erat, sed quia ille sic se habebat, ac si ita esset. Nam sic per mortem exaltatus est, quasi propter illam hoc fieret. Si\n\nquis igitur de merito et praemio capitis nostri Christi, et membrorum suorum Christianorum, quantum ad causalitatem propositam velit dicere consequenter, ecce tres modi dicendi praemissi authenticorum Patrum nostrorum, sed quia ista sententia ambigua videtur et dubia, et posset probabiliter contradici, maxime si a capite transferatur ad membra, vellem libenter sine praeiudicio aut reprehensione venerabilium Patrum et Autorum meorum, propter minus sapientes, inter quos plus ego qui non sufficio profunda Dei scrutari, desiderarem etiam vehementer si esset possibile sententiam clariorem, vel ipsam eandem clarius tamen dictam, et magis a contradictione remotam. Vnde et Alexander, vt recitat Auerroes super 2. de coelo, comment. 1. de sententia Aristotelis ita dicit; Nos non sumus sustentati super sententiam huius hominis inter omnes alios, nisi quia videmus ipsam minoris ambiguitatis, et remotiorem a contradictione. Videtur igitur mihi, quod remota omni lege retributionis per voluntatem Dei statutae, non est verum quod propter tale factum bonum vel malum, praemium tale\n\ndebetur, quia tunc esset necessarium absolute, nec Deus posset in contrarium sine offensione iustitiae, sed de necessitate absoluta sic vellet et faceret sic ad extra, sicut superius est argutum: sed quod tale factum, tale praemium mereatur, hoc est, quia Deus sic voluit, et statuit tale in lege, quae voluntas et lex perseuerant continue, non mutatae, sicut 23. capitulum ostendebat. Cum ergo dicitur, iste propter tale meritum, tale praemium consequetur, distinguendum est, eo quod haec dictio, Propter, potest significare causam, quae sit virtus et efficacia meriti talis solius, et sic non est verum, sicut promixo est ostensum: si autem in illo merito, imo supra et ante meritum importet causam quae sit voluntas diuina, et lex eius de retributione cuilibet operi bono vel malo similiter facienda, verum est et catholice concedendum. Propter hoc enim quod iste sic meruit, et legem iam positam tale praemium consequetur, hoc est, quia Deus vult quemlibet secundum sua opera praemiari; et iste sic operatur, ideo tale praemium consequetur. Et cum dicitur, Deus vult istum propter sua merita praemiare, si, Propter, significet\n\ncausam posteriorem in merito mouentem voluntatem diuinam, determinantem ipsam et educentem de potentia ad actum volendi, non est verum, sicut superius est ostensum: Si autem significet voluntatem diuinam vere causam praecedentem omne meritum et praemium, quae ipsum, vt meruit praemiabit, verum est, et certum. Verum est enim quod Deus habet voluntatem, quae est prima causa omnium meritorum et similiter praemiorum. Potest autem et aliter congrue satis dici, quod meritum est causa efficiens praemij, non proprie, sed solummodo transumptiue, quia scilicet efficit formam in merente, qua secundum praesentem justitiam fit idoneus ad praemium vel ad poenam; vel sic breuius, Quia efficit merentem talem, qualicunque et soli est praemium ordinatum. Nam secundum ordinationem praesentis justitiae, nullus adultus praetaxatam gloriam consequetur, vel poenam, nisi prius per merita sua bona adepta quadam formosa, forma, qua formetur idonee ad gloriam consequendam; vel per merita\n\nsua mala, quadam deformi forma, qua idonee deformiter quodammodo formetur ad poenam. Sic ergo propter meritum debetur praemiū, et est meritum causa praemij effectiua, quia inducit formam qua quis fit idoneus ad praemium capiendum, sicut sacerdos et miles propter hoc quod ordines receperunt, hic celebrat, ille militat, et honoribus proptiis honorantur. Et cum dicitur, Deus vult istum propter sua merita praemiare, si, Propter, significet causam posteriorem effectiuam volutionis diuinae, negandum; si autem significet causam in merito effectiuam quodā modo formae cuiusdā, vel etiam ipsam formā, qua iste fit doneus praemio voluto sibi a Deo, secundum praesentem iustitiam, concedendū. Deus ergo vult istum propter sua merita praemiare, hoc est, iste propter merita sua modo dicto talis est, quales Deus vult et statuit praemiare. Pro quo B. Bern. de grat. et lib. arbit. cap. vlt. ita dicit; In eo Deus Paulum coronae\n\nstatuit promeritorē, cum operū, quibus illa erat repromissa corona habere dignatus est coadjutorem; Porro coadiutorē; fecit volentem, hoc est suae voluntati consentientem; ita que voluntas in auxilium reputatur in meritū. Si igitur a Deo voluntas est et meritū, nec dubium quod a Deo sit velle et perficere pro bona voluntate; Deus ergo autor est meriti, qui et voluntatē applicat operi, et opus explicat voluntate: Alioquin, si proprie appellentur ea quae diximus, nostra merita, spei sunt quaedam seminaria, charitatis incentiua, occultae praedestinationis indicia, futurae foelicitatis praesagia, via regni, non causa regnandi. Adhuc autem et 3. non incongrue dici potest; Iste est propter merita praemiandus, id est, propter merita ordinanda, ita quod; Propter, significet ibi causam finalem ordinis vniuersi a Deo decentissime praedestinati: Non enim decet, quod vniuersalis ordo in minimo perturbetur, sicut tractatus de Prouidentia manifestat. Dicitque Augustinus 1. De libero arbitrio, 13. Lex Dei aeterna est, qua iustum est, vt omnia sint ordinatissima; et Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo, 12. Deum non decet aliquid inordinatum\n\nin suo regno dimittere; et secundum eundem supra, eodem; Recte ordinare peccatum sine satisfactione, non est nisi punire, et per hoc ostendit, quod omne peccatum sine satisfactione est necessario puniendum: et Augustinus simili ratione suffultus, 3. De libero arbitrio, 24. ostendit idem; Imo et quod peccatum et poena nullo interuallo temporis diuiduntur, ne vel puncto temporis vniuersalis pulchritudo turpetur. Quare et in recte factis similiter constat esse, sicut praesens capitulum superius ostendebat. Et iste modus dicendi concordat cum secundo modo dicendi recitato superius ab Anselmo. Cum ergo dicitur, iste est propter merita praemiandus, hoc est, iste est praemiandus propter merita finaliter ordinanda, id est, propter finalem ordinem meritorum praetaxatum a Deo. Et cum dicitur, Deus vult istum propter merita praemiare, hoc est, Deus vult istum praemiate propter merita finaliter ordinanda, id est, vult quod talis sit finis talium meritorum, secundum ordinem ab ipso talibus praestitutum, ita quod merita nullo modo antecedenter, causaliter, a priori, mouent, determinant, vel actuant\n\nvoluntatem diuinam ad praemia rependenda. Vnde Auicen. 8. Met. 7. Deus, inquit, diligit ordinem bonitatis vniuersi, sed non patitur ab eo, nec concupiscit. Et si quis adhuc quaerat, si non propter merita, quare ergo eligit, vel reprobat hunc vel illum? cap. 21. et alia hic respondent: quare autem semper quaerit causam, causa autem formalis volutionis illius, est quodammodo ipse Deus, officiens vero causa prior quodammodo est sua voluntas, posterior vero inter res creatas, nulla est omnino. Et hoc est quod dicit Apostolus ad Rom. 9. cum praedixit, quod Deus Iacobum dilexit, et Esauum odio habuit, et hoc non ex operibus, sed ex voluntate, vt secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, inducit quaerentem quaestionem praedictam, cui sic respondet; Voluntati eius quis resistet? O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? quasi diceret; Non est talis causa prohibens aut efficiens voluntatem diuinam, per quam valeat responderi, quare hunc dilexit, et illum odiuit; et hoc statim per locum a simili, seu per locum a minori, sic probat; Nunquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit, quid me fecisti sic? id est,\n\npropter quam rationem praeponderantem, motiuam, et effectiuam volutionis tuae? certe non: imo sine omni ratione priori praeponderante potest libere ex eadem massa facere vnum vas tale, aliud vero tale; et hoc est quod subdit; Annon habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? Et infra, 11. planius dicit idem; O altitudo, inquiens, diuitiarū sapientiae et scientiae Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, et inuestigabiles viae eius? scilicet per aliquam rationem effectiuam priorem, quia nulla est talis omnino. Et hoc est quod statim subiungit; Quis enim cognouit sensum Domini, scilicet rationem aliquam praecedentem, quare sic fecit, quasi diceret, Nullus; quia hoc non est cognoscibile, cum non sit verum: et subdit expressius; Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit, scilicet quae posterior res causata fuit causa prior, et quasi offerens rationem, cui innitebatur diuinum consilium operando; ideo que planissime statim subdit; Aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quasi dicat, nullus, nec aliqua res posterior ipso Deo, quod et statim ostensiue demonstrat,\n\ncum dicit; Quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia, quo modo cap. 20. et alia eandem conclusionem ostendunt. Vnde et Aug. De correp. et gratia 12. ita dicit; Quare sic isti, illi aliter, at que aliter alij innumerabilibus et diuer sis modis vocentur? Absit, vt dicamus iudicium luti esse debere, non figuli. Augustinus autem in hac parte sequitur nedum Apostolum, sed etiam Sapientem, Sap. 15. sic dicentem; Figulus de eodem luto fingit vasa munda, et his contraria; horum autem vasorum quis sit vsus, iudex est figulus. Et iterum De corrept et gratia, 25. Si a me quaeritur; Cur eis Deus perseuerantiam non dedit, quibus eam qua maxime viuerent, dilectionem dedit, me ignorare respondeo; Vnde Apostolus; O homo, tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo; et, O altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei, etc. Idem de bono perseuerantiae, 16. Cur, inquis, in eadem causa, me quam illum potius puniet? aut illum, quam me potius liberabit? hoc non dico, si quaeris quare? quia fateor me non inuenire quid dicam, quia in\n\nhac re, sicut iusta est ita eius, sicut magna est misericordia eius, ita inscrutabilia iudicia eius. Si autem quaeratur, per quare, causa finalis, et hoc de reprobatione malorum, quia hoc plerosque magis sollicitat; dicendum secundum vigesimum primum capitulum, quod causa finalis vltima est Deus: Vniuersa namque propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus, impium quoque ad diem malum, Parabol. 16. Ecce quod impium ad diem malum operatus est Dominus, propter semetipsum finaliter vltimate. Causa autem finalis media est tam multiplex, quam multa bona ex reprobatis proueniunt, quorum aliqua trigesimum primum huius, et 34um. pandunt; quorum et vnum est manifestatio Dominij; et virtutis illius, ipsomet testante Exod. 9. Idcirco posui te, scilicet Pharaonem, mihi contrarium, vt ostendam in te fortitudinem meam, et narretur nomen meum in omni terra. Si enim Pharao nequaquam Domino restitisset, quomodo Deus tot miracula ostendisset? et Psal. 105. Saluauit eos propter nomen luum, vt notam faceret potentiam suam. Per hanc quoque autoritatem similiter respondet\n\nApostolus ad Rom. 9. cum ait, Dicit enim Scriptura, quia in hoc ipsum excitaui te, vt ostendam in te virtutem meam, et vt annuntietur nomen meum in vniuersa terra; Et sequitur, Quod si volens Deus ostendere iram suam, et notam facere potentiam suam; sustinuit in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, etc. sed quia secundum 21um. huius, homo est finis omnium aliorum, et hominum electi sunt finis quodammodo reproborum; ideo reprobati ordinantur finaliter ad vtilitatem electorum: Vnde Apostolus ad Rom. 9. Maior seruiet minori, scilicet reprobatus electo; et infra 11. Inimici propter vos, scilicet electos; et 2. ad Cor. 4. Omnia propter vos; et 2. ad Tim. 2. expressius, Omnia sustineo propter electos, vt et ipsi salutem consequantur: et ad hoc idem est testimonium Dei quod maius est, Exod. 10. Mosi de Pharaone sic dicit, Ego indutaui cor eius, et seruorum illius, vt faciam signa mea haec in eo, et narres in auribus filij tui et nepotum tuorum, quoties contriuerim Aegyptios, et signa mea fecerim in eis, et sciatis quod ego Dominus. Ecce causa finalis, vt sciatis,\n\nscilicet vos electi, quia ego sum Dominus: Quomodo enim mali Deum timerent, bonique amarent in tantum, nisi vidissent, vel audissent tam validam manum Dei, malorum tam potentem vltricem, bonorum vero tam strenuam adiutricem, sicut omnia illa miracula circa Aegyptios et Hebraeos terribiliter et amabiliter manifestant. Est insuper alia causa finalis non parua, sed magna vtilitas electorum, vt videlicet poena vnius sit metus multorum, imo verius, vt poena multorū sit metus paucorum, (Multi enim sunt vocati, pauci vero electi) quatenus scilicet electi scientes culpas et poenas perpetuas reproborum, ad timoris et humilitatis officia prouocentur, et ad iugis orationis instantiam conuertantur. Quapropter Augustinus de bono perseuerantiae 17. Hominibus, inquit, videtur; omnes qui boni apparent fideles perseuerantiam vsque in finem accipere debuisse; Deus autem melius esse iudicauit, miscere quosdam non perseueraturos certo numero sanctorum suorum, vt quibus non expedit in huius vitae temptatione securitas, non possint esse securi: Multos enim a perniciosa elatione\n\nreprimit, quod ait Apostolus; Quapropter qui videtur stare, videat ne cadat. Et infra 37. Ideo quippe non perseueraturi perseueraturis prouidentissima Dei voluntate miscentur, vt esse discamus non alta sapientes, sed humilibus consentientes, et cum timore et tremore nostram ipsorum salutem operemur: Deus est enim qui operatur in nobis et velle, et operari pro bona voluntate. Qui et de sancta virginitate 16. An non propter aliud credendum est permittere Deum vt misceantur numero vestrae professionis, multi et multae casuri et casurae, nisi vt his cadentibus timor vester augeatur, quo superbia comprimatur, quam sic odit Deus, vt contra hanc vnam tantum se humiliaret altissimus. Est adhuc et tertia causa non parua, vt scilicet filij gratiae et electi, videntes se non meritis proprijs, sed gratia Dei gratis a reprobis separari, gratia Dei grata magis appareat, et electi filij gratiae reddātur Autori gratissimo gratiae gratiores. Quare et Augustinus super illud Psalmi 87. Nunquid cognoscentur in tenebris mirabilia tua? etc. Occurrebat, inquit, quaestio, quisnam fit vsus istorum mortuorum,\n\nquid ex his agat Deus ad vtilitatem corporis sui, quod est Ecclesia, vt in eis demonstretur, quae sit Dei gratia in praedestinatis, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt: Vnde ipsum corpus in alio Psalmo dicit, Deus meus, misericordia eius praeueniet me. Isti etiam reprobi nedū in via, verum etiam in patria, vtiles sunt electis, vt scilicet visa illorum miseria, horum gloria gratior habeatur. Opposita namque iuxta se posita magis apparent, sicut 34um. pandit, et horum quam gratuitus liberator, et gratiosissimus praemiator, qui hos aequaliter sicut illos potuit aeternaliter damnauisse, charius diligatur. Vnde Psalmus 57. ita dicit, Laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam; Et Esaiae vlt. Egredientur et videbunt cadauera virorum, qui praeuaricati sunt in me: vermis eorum non morietur, et ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt vs que\n\nad satietatem visionis omni carni; vbi Glossa, super verbum ad satietatem visionis, Quia videbunt eos a se iusto iudicio separatos, amissa potentia qua saeuiebant contra bonos, et vindictā in illos tantam, vt maiorem non exposcant, qui modo dicunt, vsquequo Domine non vindicas sanguinem nostrum? Satiabuntur quo que de beatitudine sua agentes gratias, visa impiorum ineffabili poena. Quare et Gregor. hom. 40. tractans illam historiam Euangelicam de diuite sepulto in inferno, et Lazaro mendico portato in sinu Abrahae, ita scribit; Iusti in tormentis semper intuentur iniustos, vt hinc eorum gaudium crescat, quia malum conspiciunt quod misericorditer euaserunt, tantoque maiores redemptori suo referunt gratias, quanto vident quod in alijs, ipsi perpeti, si essent relicti, potuerunt: nec illam tantae beatitudinis claritatem apud iustorum animum fuscat aspecta poena reproborum, quia vbi iam compassio miseriae non erit, minui proculdubio bonorum laetitia non valebit. Quid autem mirum, si dum iusti\n\niniustorum tormenta conspiciant, hoc eis veniat in obsequio gaudiorum; quando et in pictura niger color substernitur, vt albus vel rubeus clarior videatur. Sic ergo vt dictum est, tanto bonis sua gaudia excrescunt, quanto eorum oculis damnatorum mala subtus iacent quae euaserunt; et quamuis eis sua gaudia ad perfruendum plene sufficiant, mala tamen reproborum absque dubio semper aspiciunt; quia qui Creatoris sui claritatem vident, nihil in creatura agitur, quod videre non possint. Qui et 4. dial. 46. Petro quaerenti, Sed nullus iustus crudelitate pascitur delinquentis: seruus a iusto Domino idcirco caedi praecipitur, vt a nequitia corrigatur; Ad hoc ergo vapulat, vt emendari debeat; Iniqui autem gehennae ignibus traditi, si ad correctionem non perueniunt, quo fine semper ardebunt? Ita respondet; sed omnipotens Deus, qui pius est, miserorum cruciatu non pascitur, quia autem iustus est, ab iniquotum vltione in perpetuum non sedatur; sed iniqui omnes aeterno supplicio deputati, sua quidem iniquitate puniuntur, et tamen ad aliquid ardebunt, scilicet vt iusti omnes et in Deo videant gandia quae percipiunt, et illis respiciant supplicia, quae euaserunt, quatenus tanto\n\nmagis diuinae gratiae in aeternum debitores se esse cognoscant, quanta in aeternum mala puniri conspiciunt, quae eius adiutorio vicerunt. Quapropter et Augustinus de gaudijs Iustorum, et poenis malorum sic ait; Tunc communis reus et hostis diabolus in conspectu omnium electorum Dei damnabitur, cuius damnatio et intolerabilis poena delectabile spectaculum praestabit electis; tunc ardentissimo amore liberatorem suum et omnium bonorum datorem amabunt, et sine fine, et sine fastidio clamore cordis laudabunt. Istam quoque sententiam Petrus 4. sentent. dist. vlt. profitetur. Supposito ergo, quod miseria damnatorum aliquo modo valeat gloriae saluandorum, potest argui, quod Deus hanc ad illam finaliter ordinauit: Alias namque hoc fieret a casu vel fortuna, nec a prouidentia diuina procederet; quare nec saluandi de illa suae gloriae portione; Deo gratias agere tenerentur, contra 27um et alia quae sequuntur. Quare et haec plane videtur sententia Apostoli ad Roman. 9. in solutione eiusdem quaestionis dicentis, Sustinuit Deus in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, vt\n\nostenderet diuitias gloriae suae, in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparauit in gloriam. Vnde Augustinus de praedestinatione Sanctorum 10. Cur Deus non omnes doceat, aperuit Apostolus, quia volens ostendere iram, et demonstrare potentiam suam, attulit in multa patientia vasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem, et vt notas faciat diuitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae quae praeparauit in gloriam. Idemque expressius 5. contra Iulianum 6. Ex numero electorum nemo perit; caeteri autem mortales, qui ex hoc numero non sunt, et ex eadem quidem massa, ex qua et isti, sed vasa irae facti sunt, ad vtilitatem nascuntur istorum: Non enim quenquam eorum Deus temere ac fortuito creat, aut quid de illis boni operetur ignorat, cum et hoc ipso bonum operetur, quod in eis humanam creat naturam, et ex eis ordinem saeculi praesentis exornat. Ecce triplex bonum ex reprobis, vtilitas electorum, bonum naturae saeculique ornatus. Ponatur quoque secundum pium zelum multorum, licet non secundum scientiam, quod totus infernus, cum omnibus suis domesticis reprobatis tolleretur de\n\nmedio, esset que coelum tantummodo cum ciuibus suis sanctis, tunc saeculum esset multum perfectum, et si Deus sic fecisset, multum bene fecisset; Nunc autem tanto perfectius et tanto melius facit Deus, quantum perfectionis et bonitatis continent in se illae nobiles creaturae damnatae, quantum etiam resplendentiae et apparentiae purioris illa comparatio veluti contrarietatis extremae confert Iustis, tanquam scintillae fulgentibus, et vt stellae: Quis enim, vel cuius ratio prohibuisset Dominum ab initio, si fuisset placitum coram eo, creasse coelum plenum electis in gloria, et Infernum plenum reprobis in poena, vt hoc illi comparate apparuisset gloriosius et fuisset? Non decrunt tamen, qui hos humano miseratentur affectu, et pia compassione contenderent sic fieri non debere. Sed cur non miserantur paruulos, nedum non peccantes, sed peccare penitus nescientes, sine Sacramento baptismatis decedentes, aeterni ignis supplicio puniendos, vt dicit August. de Fide ad Petrum 59. et 24. plane? Cur etiam non contendunt\n\ncum Deo, vt iudicium suum retractet, quo talium paruulorū non Fato aut fortuitu, sed ex suae consilio voluntatis, hunc assumit ad baptismum, ad regnum, ad gloriam; illum relinquit, imo et repellit quodammodo a baptismo ad carcerem et ad poenam, sicut plane testatur autoritas Augustini de bono perseu. 35. cum alijs sibi similibus 31. huius praemissis? Cur etiā non miserantur bestias innocentes, tot miserijs et tot mortibus subiacere? Cur hinc Deum non causantur? cur etiam nequaquā figulum criminantur ex eadem massa luti facientem vnum vas in honotē, aliud vero in contumeliā, et contemptum? Annon est Deus ita liber dominus suorum sicut figulus est suorum? Et haec videtur ratio Apostoli ad Rom. 9. in solutione huius, quae in manibus vertitur, quaestionis. Imo audi, et diligenter exaudi; cogita, et vigilanter recogita Augustinum in libello de Praedestinatione et gratia Dei, qui in libro Sermonum suorum praescribitur quintus Sermo 18. ita scribentem; Qua tandem impudentia homo de Deo lutum de figulo iudicabit, non solum dicens, Quid me fecisti sic, sed etiam de alijs dam nabili curiositate\n\npersetutans, et dicens, quare de eadem massa fecisti alium quidem sic, alium vero sic? Si humanum genus quod creatum primitus constat ex nihilo, non cum debito mortis et peccati origine nasceretur, et tamen ex eis Creator omnipotens in aeternum nonnulles damnare vellet in interitum, quis omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare fecisti sic? qui enim, cum non essent, esse donauerat, quo fine essent habuit potestatem, nec dicerent caeteri, cur paribus omnium meritis diuinum discreparet arbittium? quia potestatem habet figulus lu•, ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam. Qui et super titulum Psalmi 70. ita dicit; In omnibus sanctis Scripturis, gratia Dei quae liberat nos, commendat se nobis, vt commendatos habeat nos: Quis enim ei diceret, quid fecisti, si damnaret justum? quanta ergo misericordia eius si iustificet iniustum? Et si adhuc obijcias, quod Deus potuit ordinasse mundum, et gloriam electorum sufficienter bene et congrue per alium modum magis benignum, et sine perditione alicuius tam nobilis creaturae; non ergo decuit tam pium\n\net iustum, aliquem Angelum aut hominem aeternae gratis miseriae praeparare: Fateor indubitanter, quod potuit sic, et potuit aliter reparasse genus humanum, quam per passionem et mortem Christi. Cur ergo ex tota compassione non quaereris tam celsi Regis filium vnicum, tam innocentem, tam delicarum, tam tenerum, imo et Dominum Deum tuum p•o enocente et misero scruo suo, tam contemptibiliter apprehendi, tam crudeliter flagellari vulnerari, lacerari, et tandem morte turpissima consummari? cur non ibidem Dei iudicium reuocas, irritas, et annullas? Et licet Deus voluntatem tuam secutus, benignius et melius ordinasset, cum adhuc semper melius posset, et melius sine fine, semper remaneret eadem querela, cur sic ordinauit, et non melius, cum ita faciliter potuit melius ordinaste. Compescat ergo se ista querulosa temeritas contra Deum, nec irrationabiliter quaeritet rationem superiorem voluntate diuina, cum ipsa in talibus volutis posterioribus sit summitas rationis, non rationis pedissequa vel ancilla, sed e contra; hanc enim ratio equitur, vt Dominam\n\net Magistram, sicut vigesimum primum capitulum demonstrauit. Vnde Ecclesiastis 8. Intellexi quod omnium operum Dei nullam possit homo inuenire rationem eorum quae fiunt sub Sole. Ecce pro volutis posterioribus et quanto plus laborauerit ad quaerendum, tanto minus inueniet, etiamsi dixerit Sapiens se nosse, non poterit reperire. Compescat ergo se omnis humana querimonia contra Deum, et pro ratione in cunctis sibi sufficiat, sic Deum et Dominum voluisse. Vnde et Ecclesiastis 7. Considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ille despexerit; In die bona fruere bonis, et malam diem praecaue: Sicut enim hanc, sic et illam fecit Deus, vt non in ueniat homo contra cum iustas querimonias. Amplius autem ad autoritates canonicas forsitan te conuertes, obijciesque illud Apostoli 1. ad Tim. 2. qui vult omnes homines saluos fieri; et illud Ezech. 18. Nunquid voluntatis meae est morsimpij? dicit Dominus, et non vt conuertatur, et viuat? Et illud Act. 10. Non est personarum acceptor Deus; Et illud Marc. vlt. Praedicate Euangelium omni creaturae etc. Dicitque Gregorius\n\n4. Moral. 24. super illud Iob 3. Nunc dormiens silerem etc. Si parentem primum nulla peccati putredo corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios gehen•ae generaret: sed hi qui nunc per redemptionem saluādi sunt soliab illo electi nascerentur. Ad haec autem dicendum, Autoritates sacrae Scripturae obiectas non posse intelligi secundum superficiem liceralem, sicut decimum et vicessimum tertium huius probant. Harum igitur primam, non ego, sed Patres Catholici multis modis exponunt: Ambrosius enim ibi exponens Apostolum, primo quaerit, Si Deus, qui omnipotens dicitur, omnes homines vult saluos fieri, cur non impletur eius voluntas? secundo respondet, Sed in omni locutione sensus et conditio latet. Vnde dicit Petrus Apostolus, Omnis scriptura indiget interpretatione: Vult enim Deus omnes homines\n\nsaluos fieri, sed si accedant ad eum. Non enim sic vult, vt nolentes saluentur, sed vult ipsos saluari, si et ipsi velint: Nam qui legem omnibus dedit, nullum excepit a salute. Et super illud ad Rom. 9. Miserebor cui misertus ero, Non iniuste iudicat, qui omnes vult saluos esse, manente iustitia. Augustinus quoque Enchirid. 77. mouet eandem quaestionem, et longa disputatione super insuperabilitate voluntatis diuinae praemissa cap. 83. sic respondet; Debemus ita intelligere quod scriptum est, Qui vult omnes homines saluos fieri, tanquam diceretur nullum hominem fieri saluum, nisi quem saluum fieri ipse voluerit; Non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quam saluum fieri velit, quod cap. 84. confirmat per simile, ita dicens; Sic enim intelligimus quod in Euangelio scriptum est, Qui illuminat omnem hominem, non quia nullus est hominum qui non illuminatur, sed quia nullus nisi ab ipso illuminatur. Deinde subiungit aliā quaestionē eiusdem; aut certe, inquit sic dictum est, Qui omnes homines vult saluos fieri, non quod nullus hominum esset, quem fieri saluum nolit, qui virtutes miraculorum noluit facere apud eos, quos dicit acturos poenitentiam, si fecisset; sed vt omnes homines,\n\nomne genus hominum intellgamus per quascunque differentias distributum, Reges, nobiles, et ignobiles, priuatos, sublimes, humiles, doctos et indoctos, integri corporis, debiles, ingeniosos, tardiores, fatuos, diuites, pauperes, mediocres, mares, foeminas, infantes, pueros, adolescentes, iuuenes, senes, in linguis omnibus, in moribus omnibus, in artibus omnibus, in professionibus omnibus, in voluptatum et concupiscentiarum varietate innumerabili constitutos, et si quid aliud differentiarum est in hominibus. Quam expositionem cap. 85. monstrat cum processu Apostoli concordare; Praeceperat, inquit Apostolus, vt oraretur pro omnibus hominibus, et specialiter addiderat, pro regibus et his qui in sublimitate sunt, qui putari poterant fastu potentiori, et superbia saeculari fidei Christianae humilitatem abhorrere. Proinde dicens; Hoc enim bonum est coram Saluatore Domino nostro, id est, vt etiam pro talibus oretur statim vt desperationem tolleret, addidit; Qui omnes homines vult saluos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire; quod confirmat per simile statim dicens; Isto locutionis modo\n\net Dominus vsus est in Euangelio, vbi ait Pharisaeis; Decimatis mentham, et rutam, et cuminum, et omne olus. Neque enim Pharisaei et quaecunque aliena, et omnium per omnes terras alienigenarum omnia olera decimabant. Sicut ergo omne olus, omne olerum genus, ita et illic omnes homines, omne hominum genus intelligere possumus; et hoc est quod logice solet dici, quod potest in talibus distributio fieri pro singulis generum, vel pro generibus singulorum, sicut hic; Omne animal fuit in area Noe. Vnde Gen. 7. Ingressi sunt ipsi, et omne animal secundum genus suum. Et istam eandem expositionem eiusdem dicti ponit de correptione et gratia, 61. quam etiam roborat per illud Euangelicum iam praemissum; Qui decimatis omne olus, et per illud quod dicit Paulus; Omnibus per omnia placeo. Et infra 74. aliter hoc exponit; Vult, inquiens, Deus omnes homines saluos fieri, id est, facit omnes homines velle saluos fieri, quia ipse operatur velle; et similem modum loquendi habet 22. de Ciu. Dei 2. sicut\n\nerat superius allegatum. Idem quoque De praedest. Sanctorum, 10. simile dictum sic exponit; Sicut integre loquimur, cum de aliquo literarum magistro, qui in ciuitate solus est Dominus; Omnes iste hic literas docet, non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab illo discit quicunque ibi literas discit: Ita recte dicimus; Omnes Deus docet venire ad Christum, non quia omnes veniunt, sed quia nemo aliter venit. Idem quoque de natura, et gratia dicit idem, scilicet quod omnes viuificantur per Christū, quia nullus nisi per ipsum, sicut dicimus, quod Magister literarum in ciuitate docet omnes, quia nullus discit nisi quem ipse docuit. Illud autem Ezechielis obiectum soluitur per illam distinctionem de velle quam 34. fecit, et si quis vltimum eius verbum voluerit ponderare, scilicet, et non vt conuertatur et viuat, quasi hoc sit voluntatis diuinae, vt omnis peccator conuertatur et viuat, respondendum est secundumiam dicta. Et illud Act. supradictum; Non est personarum acceptor Deus, si debet exponi ad mentem dicentis, debet intelligi modo dicto, scilicet quod Deus non est acceptor personarum secundum\n\ngenus, non secundum speciem seu numerum: Non est, inquam, Deus acceptor personarum secundum genus, quin ex omni gente et natione vocet et recipiat ad salutem; et ista videtur mens Petri Apostoli, qui hoc dixit. Ipse enim prius credidit, vt videtur, quod soli Iudaei essent accepti a Deo ad fidem Christi et regnum, iuxta illud Mat. 15. Non sum missus nisi ad oues quae perierant domus Israel; et supra 10. In viam gentium ne abieritis, et in ciuitates Samaritanorū ne intraueritis, sed potiusite ad oues quae perierunt domus Israel. Sed postquam aud•uit quanta gratia Dominus etiam illum Gentilem Cornelium visitauit, aperiens os suum, dixit; In veritate comperi, quoniam non est personarū acceptor Deus, sed in omni gente, qui timet Deum, et operatur iustitiam, acceptus est illi. Vult ergo tantum dicere S. Petrus, quod Deus non est personarum acceptor, quae ex circumcisione sunt tantum, exclusis alijs quibuscunque, sed in omni alia gente, natione, vel lingua, qui timet Deum et operatur iustitiam, acceptus\n\nest illi; et eiusdem opinionis cum Petro erant fideles caeteri ex Iudaeis; et etiam Apostoli alij, vt videtur; vnde intra eodem; Obstupuerunt ex circumcisione fideles, qui venerant cum Petro, quia et in nationes gratia Spiritus S. effusa est: et infra 11. Audierunt autem Apostoli et fratres, qui erant in Iudaea, quoniam et gentes receperunt gratiam Dei, et honorificabant Deum. Vnde dicit Aug. De bono perseu. 35. Quid est quod aliquando paruuli infideliū baptizantur, fidelium vero non? vt certe ostendatur, quod personarum apud Deum non est acceptio; alioquin fidelium potius quam infidelium filios liberaret: cui et concordat eius autoritas de correptione et gratia, 27. De gratia et lib. arbit. 50. quas 31. habet. Et quod Deus sit personarū acceptor secundū numerū, patet per eundē, infra eodē, sic dicentē; Hunc Deus suscitauit tertia die, et dedit eū manifestū fieri non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo. Et infra 13. Crediderunt, quotquot praeordinati erant ad vitā aeternā. Vnde et Apost. ad Rom. 4. secundum propositum gratiae Dei, sicut et Dauides dicit beatitudinē hominis, cui Deus accepto\n\nfert iustitiam sine operibus. Et infra 9. Cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni aut mali, vt secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex voluntate dictū est, quia maior seruiet minori. Et infra eodem, Miserebot cui miserebor, etc. Et non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei, cum toto processu capituli ad hoc idem. Quod tractans Augustinus Enchirid. 78. sic dicit; Ambo gemini natura irae filij nascebantur, nullis quidem operibus proprijs, sed originaliter ex Adam vinculo damnationis astricti; sed qui dixit, Miserebor cui misertus ero, Iacob dilexit per misericordiam gratuitam, Esau autē odio habuit per iudicium debitum, quod cum deberetur ambobus, in altero alter agnouit non de suis distantibus meritis sibi esse gloriandū, quod in eadem causa idem supplicium non incurrit, sed de diuinae gratiae largitate, quia, Neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei. Et de bono perseuerantiae 26. Duorum geminorum, quorum vnus assumitur, vnus relinquitur, dispar est exitus, merita communia. Et supra eiusdem 19. Ex duobus parunlis\n\noriginali peccato pariter obstrictis, cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur, et ex duobus aetate iam grandibus impijs, cur iste ita vocetur, vt vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vocetur, Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei; Ex duobus autem pijs, cur huic donetur perseuerantia vsque in finem, illi autem non donetur, Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei. Idemque Enchuid. 75. Tunc non latebit, quod nunc latet, cur de duobus vnus esset assumendus per misericordiam, alius per iudicium relinquendus, in quois qui assumeretur agnosceret, quid sibi per iudicium deberetur, nisi misericordia subueniret, cur ille potius quam iste fuerit assumptus, cum causa vna esset amborum. Dicitque beatus Gregorius 25. Moral. 14. super illud Iob trigesimo quarto, Ipso concedente pacem, quis est qui condemnet, nemo discutiat, cur alius trahatur ex dono, alius repellatur ex merito. Quibus et concors est Anselmus Prosolog. 11. Deo sic dicens, Si vtcunque capi potest, cur malos potes velle saluare; illud certe nulla ratione comprehendi potest, cur de similibus malis, hos magis\n\nsalues quam illos per summam bonitatem, et illos magis damnes quam illos per summam iustitiam. Hoc etiam plane probant Ieremias, Ioannes Baptista, et beata virgo Maria, quae sine omni merito praecedente sanctificabantur in vtero, alijs omnino similibus derelictis. Si quis autem huiusmodi sanctificationis qualiacunque merita sibi fingat, ponatur quod alia virgo similis virgini gloriosae similiter omnino vixisset; et si nullo modo Deus sit acceptor singularium personarum, sequitur quod Deus ex ea fuisset similiter incarnatus, sicque multas matres vnicus Dei Filius habuisset: Ego autem credo firmissime, quod etsi omnes filiae domus Iacob, sicut et domina mea vixissent; nulla tamen earum talis fuisset in acceptatione diuina, et quod ipsi soli prae omnibus virginis et matris donasset gaudium et honorem, ex ipsa singulariter incarnatus; Nullo tamen modo videtur, quod tanta sapientia, quae omnia disponit suaniter, vnicam sibi matrem studiosa prouidentia non singulariter et aeternaliter praeelegit, sed quae foret mater eius, quasi negligenter reliquit meritis et voluntatibus hominum\n\nvarijs, et tanquam casui et fortunae, ac velut casui taxillorum. Verum quia Domino reuelante didiceram, quod opera Dei reuelare, et confiteri honorificum est et gratum; Ecce breuis historia ad hoc idem. Sciui quendam clericum iuuenem, seruitorem deuotum virginis gloriosae, qui vt purissimae virgini non habenti maculam neque rugam mentis aut corporis acceptius descruiret, castitatem perpetuam nedum carnis sed et cogitationis, et voluntatis munditiam ei vouit; et idem votum in deuotionibus suis quotidie renouabat. Cui inuidens callidus ille serpens, qui mille per maeandros fraudesque fluxuosas quieta corda non de sinit agitare, tantum virus temptationis infudit, vt inciperet sollicite cogitare, et dubius quodammodo disputare de valore, merito, et praemio castitatis, qui tandem fallaciter est delusus in\n\ntantum, vt paruipenderet castitatem etiam virginis benedictae, et consequenter totam sanctissimam vitam eius, aestimans quod si alia foemina similem vitam aut sanctiorem duxisset, similis e• in caeteris, beatiorue fuisset. Quapropter et amando, et obsequia solita exhibendo, remissus et tepidus est effectus, qui dum quadam nocte dedisser oculis suis somnum, medentis gratiae radio visitatus, ductus sibi videbatur per quendam in locum vnum amoenum, veluti paradisum, vbi et ostensa fuerat ei arbor incomparabiliter speciosa, et similiter pretiosa, quae radicata in terra, erigebatur in coelum, in cuius summitate, quasi in nidulo puer paruulus quiescebat, eratque arbor secundum longitudinem spaciatim pulcherrimi• nodis distincta; volentique scire quae, et qualis esset haec arbor, responsum est ita: Haec est virginitas sanctae Mariae, statimque vno nodorum arborisad instaroris aperto, facta est vox dicens, Etsi omnes filiae domus Iacob, sicut illa vixissent, nulla tamen talis fuisset. Hoc etiam totum de acceptatione et praepositione vnius personarum aequalium et etiam minus dignae 21o. capitulo\n\nmagis patet. Ad id vltimum de praedicatione obiectum, dicendum, sicut de oratione 23um. et 25um. dicunt; Christus enim qui ipsemet praedicauit hominibus ore proprio benedicto, vel per suos Apostolos, vel alios praedicatores quoscunque, noluit quod omnes audientes compungerentur, et acquiescerent veritati; Imo noluit quod aliquid aliud, aut aliter in minimo fieret vnquam per aliquem suum sermonem, quam plene fiebat, sicut capitulum 10. manifestat. Vnde Esai. 55. Quomodo descendit imber et nix de coelo, et illuc vltra non reuertitur, fed inebriat terram, et infundit eam, et germinare cam facit, et dat semen serenti, et panem comedenti: sic erit verbum meum quod egredietur de ore meo, non reuertetur ad me vacuum, sed faciet quodcunque volui, et prosperabitur in his ad quae misi illud. Et si tu quaeras, quare ergo voluit praedicare omnibus indistincte; Responsio patet per praedicta: Dicendum tamen quod hoc voluit propter eruditionem electorum, et punitionem reproborum. Vnde Mat. 13. et alibi frequenter, Qui habet aures audiendi, audiat: et Matt. 19. Non omnes capiunt verbum\n\nistud, sed quibus dacum est; qui potest capere, capiat. Et Iohan. 9. In iudicium ego in hunc mundum veni, vt qui non vident, videant; et qui vident, caeci siant. Et Matth. 13. Interrogatus a discipulis, quare turbis in parabolis praedicaret, respondit, quia, Vobis datum est nosse mysteria regni coelorum, illis autem non est datum. Ideo in parabolis loquor eis, quia videntes non vident, et audientes non audiunt, neque intelligunt, vt adimpleatur in eis Propheta Esaiae dicentis, Auditu audietis, et non intelligetis, et videntes videbitis, et non videbitis; Incrassatū est cor populi huius, et auribus grauiter audierunt, et oculos suos clauserunt, ne quando oculis videant, et auribus audiant, et corde intelligant, et conuertantur, et sanem cos. Et est Esaiae 6 sub verbis parum distantibus a praedictis. Et Marc. 4. expressius patet idem; vbi postquam Dominus turbae in parabolis praedicauit 12. Apostolis ita dixit, Vobis datum est nosse mysteria regni Dei; Illis autem qui foris sunt, in parabolis omnia fiunt, vt Videntes videant, et non videant, et audientes audiant et non intelligant, ne quando conuertantur, et\n\ndimittantur eis peccata. Sed puri homines, qui nesciunt distinguere inter electos et reprobos, debent omnibus praedicare, optando eis salutem, sicut et orare pro omnibus, sicut 23um et 25um capitula monstrauerunt. Vnde Ecclesiastis 11. Mane semina semen tuum, et vespere ne cesset manus tua, quia nescis quid magis oriarur, hoc aut illud, et si vtrumque simul, melius erit. Ideoque debet praedicatio fieri omnibus indistincte, vt electiae dificentur ad vitam, reprobi vero vt minus noceant, et vt minus mali fiant, minusque damnentur, vel vt per praedicationem huiusmodi, velut per quendam gladium spiritus, seu quandam virgam spiritualem oris Domini feriantur, et vt nobis meritum augeatur: Dicit enim Apostolus ad Eph. 6. Assumite gladium spiritus quod est verbum Dei. Et Esaiae 11. Percutiet terram virga oris sui, et spiritu labiorum suorum interficiet impium. Et 2. ad Corinth. 2. Christi bonus odor sumus Deo in his qui salui fiunt, et in his qui pereunt; alijs quidem odor mortis in mortem, alijs autem odor vitae in vitam. Et Luc 10. In quamcunque domum intraueritis, primum dicite,\n\nPax huic domui, et si ibi fuerit filius pacis, requiescet super illum pax vestra: sin autem, ad vos reuertetur. Vnde August. de correptione et gratia 68. Patiantur se homines corripi, quando peccant, nec de ipsa correptione argumententur contra gratiam, nec de gratia contra correptionem; quia et peccatis iusta poena debetur, ad ipsam pertinet iusta correptio; quae medicinaliter exhibetur, etiam si salus aegrotantis incerta est, vt si is, qui corripitur, ad praedestinatorum numerum pertinet, sit ei correptio salubre medicamentum; si autem non pertinet, fit ei correptio poenale tormentum; sub isto ergo incerto ex charitate adhibenda est. Idem infra 75. Quantum ad nos pertinet, qui praedestinatos a non praedestinatis discernere non valemus, omnibus, ne pereant, vel ne alios perdant, adhibenda nobis medicinaliter seuera correptio; Dei autem est facere cam illis vtilem, quos ipse praesciuit, et praedestinauit conformes fieri imaginis filij sui. Et sequitur 76. Si enim aliquando timore corripimus, ne aliquis inde\n\npereat, cur non timore etiam corripimus, ne aliquis inde plus pereat; et supra 73. tractans Autoritatem Lucae praemissam, Ad nos, inquit, cum nescimus quisnam sit filius pacis secundum praedestinationem Dei, aut non; sic pertinet nullum exceptum facere, nullumque discernere, sed velle omnes saluos fieri, quibus praedicamus hanc pacem. Neque enim metuendum ne perdamus eam, si ille cui praedicamus, non est filius pacis, ignorantibus nobis; Ad nos enim reuertetur; id est, nobis proderit. Dictum autem Gregorij non contradicit praemissis: Si enim primus parens perseueranter stetisset, Deus aliter ordinasset: His igitur praelibatis, iam restat prosequi quae sequuntur. Cum ergo inprimis arguitur, quod quis potest mereri a Deo aliquid de condigno, pro solutionis materia est sciendum, quod mereri est facere aliquid praemiandū, id est, dignum vel debitum praemiari; omne autem debitum, dignum, vel condignum est rationabile atque iustum; Ideoque sicut 21. capitulum de rationabili, et iusto distinxit; sic est de debito, digno, et condigno similiter distinguendum; quod de condigno, quia de ipso arguitur,\n\nsufficiat demonstrare, ipsoque cognito reliqua non latebunt. Est igitur condignum prius naturaliter et antecedenter voluntati diuinae, vel posterius et subsequenter, vel etiam mixtum quodammodo ex ambobus: Vel sub alijs verbis idem; Est condignum per se absolute, et de inflexibili rigore iustitiae: est condignum per accidens et respectu voluntatis diuinae, et de iustitia dependente ab ea; Est condignum mixtum quodammodo ex vtrisque. Pro modo quo que loquendi communi omnium, proprio que Doctorum vlterius est sciendum; quod mereri de condigno diuersimode sumitur in bono et in malo; dicitur enim quod quis peccans meretur condigne poenam aeternam, quia tam malum est illud peccatum, quod ex sola eius malitia poena aeterna sine omni iuris iniuria infligi poterit sic peccanti; Dicitur autē quod nullus meretur condigne vitam aeternā quia nullius opus est tam bonū aut tam meritorium apud Deum, vt ei ex illius solius bonitate aut merito vita aeterna sine omni gratia debeatur, imo nec quicquā boni distincti omnino, sicut superius est argutum. Hi tamen duo modi eius quod est\n\nmereri condigne, possunt reduci ad aliquod vnum commune vniuocum, analogumue ambobus, quod forsan est facere aliquid, cui iuste potest retribui pura merces; ita quod haec dictio, pura, excludat in mercede omne gratis illatum bonum, vel malum, et hoc est condignum potentiale, quia iuste potest retribui sibi merces. Possum ergo a principio altius ordiendo, distinguere aliter de mereri, et demereri condigne, scilicet actualiter et potentialiter: Actualiter mereri, est facere aliquid praemiandum, scilicet cui praemium actualiter debeatur, et sic nullus peccans meretur poenam aliam quam habebit; Non enim est dignum aut debitum, quod aliter puniatur, quam Deus ipsum staruit puniendum; et istud, mereri, potest subdistingui tribus modis praedictis: Mereri autem potentialiter est facere aliquid praemiabile, scilicet cui praemium posset reddi; sic que omnis peccans mortaliter tam damnandus quam saluandus meretur maiorem poenam quam habebit, et forsan poenam aeternam quantamlibet intensiue: Posset enim Deus iuste punire quemlibet sic peccantem maiori poena quam puniet, et forsitan\n\nquantacun que . Istud autem mereri, seu mereri condigne potentialiter est mixtum quodammodo ex mereri condigne antecedenter, et subsequenter voluntati diuinae, sicut 21. huius in suo simili planius exponebat: Quod enim faciat hoc vel illud, dependet a voluntate diuina secundum 9. cap. sed quod facto hoc vel illo posset vel non posset digne sibi retribui pura merces, necessarium est omnino. Loquendo ergo de mereri condigne actualiter primo modo, scilicet antecedenter voluntati diuinae per se et absolute, videtur quod nullus potest quicquam mereri a Deo bonum nec malum sicut ostendebant alia argumenta; secundo autem modo potest, nam omne quod Deus vult et statuit, dignum est et condignum, sicut superius monstrabatur. Tertio modo similiter potest quis mereri condigne actualiter bonum et malum a Deo, scilicet tale bonum vel malum quod supra probatum est se qui inseperabiliter suum opus. Quod enim faciat tale opus pendet ex voluntate diuina, sicut 9. cap. ostendebat: sed quod facto tali opere cum suis circumstantijs vniuersis comitetur tale bonum vel malum non dependet a voluntate\n\ndiuina, sed de necessitate consequitur, sicut ad hunc currere, hunc moueri. Quare et vnum de prioribus argumentis non tenet, illud scilicet quod arguebat, istud praemium necessario consequens necessitate voluntatem diuinam ad ipsum volendum reddere, et reddendum, qui ipsum meretur; quoniam sicut ipsa libere vult et facit tale meritum in quocun que , sic et omnia quae necessario consequuntur. Per hanc etiā distinctionē praemissam multa soluuntur, quae superius sunt arguta. Ad illud autem quod arguit, actū virtuosum mereri condigne omne bonum vtile et delectabile distinctum contra bonum honestum, quia melior est hoc et illo; Dicē dum hoc non sequi, sicut si Joha. saluet vitam Petri, non propterea Petrus tenetur sibi reddere omnia bona sua, cum tamen quantumcun que multa sint, et magna, sint multum minora beneficio\n\npraeaccepto; sicut etiam si Iohannes doceat Petrum scientias; et virtutes licet sint incomparabiliter meliores omnibus bonis Petri, non ideo tenetur Petrus retribuere Iohanni omnia bona sua; imo sufficit retribuere in talibus sicut potest, et solet retribui comperenter. Vnde Phi. 9. Eth. 1. In quibus autem non fit propter confusionem, id est, promissionē ministrationis, id est, certae retributionis, hi quidem propter seipsos, id est, accipientes aut dantes, dictum est, quoniam inaccusabiles sunt: Talis enim secundum virtutem amicitia, et retributio facienda secundum electionem; hoc enim amici et virtutis. Sic autem videtur et Philosophia communicantibus; Non enim ad pecunias dignitas mensuratur, pretium que aeque ponderans non vti que fiet, sed forte quod sufficiens, quemadmodum ad deos et parentes contingens. Et hoc forsan est quia Petrus sine suo magno detrimento non sufficit retribuere aeque ponderanter Iohanni; et licet Deus sufficiat, non tamen tenetur; Nullus enim merendo facit aliquid boni Deo, sed sibi; quare ergo tenetur Deus hoc retribuere de condigno? Et si tu dicas, quod ego sic arguebam superius; Fateor, sed hoc contra ponentes gratum mereri a Deo augmentum gratiae de\n\ncondigno; et sic videtur argumentum procedere quod mereatur condigne remissionem poenae temporalis cuiustibet quae est minor. Aliud vero quod arguit, illum qui super omnia amat Deum, debere ab eo similiter redamari, non bene aduertit analogiam in alijs amicitijs obseruandam: Non enim quantum dignior amatur ab aliquo, tantum readamare tenetur; sufficit enim quod minus redamet secundum excellentiam status sui. Dicit enim Philosophus 8. Eth. 7. Analogum autem in omnibus secundum superabundantiam existentibus amicitijs, id est, vno extremo amicitiae super aliud abundante in bonitate, et amationem fieri oportet, puta mehorem magis amari quam amare, et vtiliorem, et aliorum vnumquem que similiter. Cum enim secundum dignitatem amatio fiat, tunc fit aliqualiter aequalitas, quod vtique amicitiae esse videtur; et cum Deus sit melior et dignior infinite quocunque, videtur proportionalitatē sequendo, quod ipse sub nullo gradu amoris tenetur amantem quempiam redamare; et maxime quia ille libere dat sibi totum illum amorem, tenetur que Deum diligere quantum potest, sicut\n\nsuperius probabatur; et hoc potest breuis ratio suadere. Sint enim Iohannes, et Petrus, cum multis alijs Deum super omnia aequaliter diligentes; tunc si Deus teneretur rediligere super omnia quemcun que illorum, teneretur rediligere Iohānem super Petrum, et e contra, et quemlibet super quemlibet, et super caeteros vniuersos et super B. Mariam, et sicut vnicum verbum suum. Congruit tamen multum et decet Deum puregratuito suos tales amatores ineffabiliter redamare, imo verius praeamare; et hoc est quod testatur ille fidelis amicus Iohannes plurimum dilectus et diligens, primae suae Epist. 4. dicens; In hoc est charitas, non quasi nos dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos. Ad Ansel. et Arist. respondendum quod talis tantum meretur secundum propriam praestitutionem, non secundum rigor•m iustitiae absolutum; confirmatio vero huius rationis infirmabitur per praedicta. Ad caetera vero argumenta sequentia, vs que ad argumentum de merito Christi factum praehabita respondebunt: Et illud\n\npotest solui per distinctionem praemissam de mereri condigne. Nam primo modo, antecedenter videlicet voluntati diuinae, et de absolute necessario et inflexibili rigore iustitiae videtur, quod Christus non meruit sibi, nec nobis resurrectionem a morte et vitam aeternam, nec quicquam huiusmodi: Si enim fecisset, esset necessarium absolute quod Deus haec redderet sibi et nobis, cum non possit esse iniustus; sicque Deus suscitaret, et beatificaret electos de necessitate simpliciter absoluta, et non de beneplacito liberae voluntatis, quod 9. cap. non permittit. Videtur quo que possibile, licet nullus homo peccasset, Filium Dei assumpsisse hominem passibilem, et omnia vel similia, aut maiora vel pluries fecisse, et passum fuisse, sicut nunc fecit, non propter aliquod praemium sibi, vel alijs applicandum, sed sincerissima charitate tantummodo propter Deum, et post haec omnia deposuisse, et annihilasse hominē sic assumptum nunquam postea resumendū, et omnes alios homines, ac quamlibet creaturā, nunquā aliquid creaturus; et idem videtur possibile, supposito lapsu hominisin peccatum, quoniam contradictionē formaliter\n\nnullatenus infert; et si ita fuisset, Christus nec sibi nec alijs meruisset aliquid de condigno primo modo praedicto; quare nec nunc, quia quantum meriti seu boni operis nunc habebat, tunc tantum vel amplius habuislet. Christus insuper non meruit per naturam suam diuinam sed humanam, et hoc non ex naturalibus suis tantum, sed ex gratia gratis data, sicut 35. capitulum allegauit; quod et Lumbar. 3. Sent. dist. 13. et 18. similiter attestatur. Hoc quoque videtur sentire Apostolus ad Rom. 1. dicens de Christo; Qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, secundum spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi Domini nostri. Vbi Glossa; Ipse secundum quod homo est, praedestinatus est, id est, sine meritis sola gratia praeelectus, non solum vt esset caput nostrum, sed vt nec originem traheret, nec voluntate perpetraret peccatum, et vt ex mortali natura clarificaretur immortaliter. Si ergo immortalitatem sibi non meruit de condigno, nec aliquid aliud vt videtur; quare nec nobis. Ipse etiam\n\nDominus Iesus Christus videtur hoc testari realiter et in facto, agendo gratias Deo Patri quoniam audiuit eum, Iohan. 11. Si tamen meruit de condigno, et puro debito audiri a Patre, nullae gratiae fuissent ei reddendae, sicut tricesimum primum capitulum arguebat: Quis enim verus et sapiens illi gratias aget aut retribuet, qui nunquam sibi fecit aliquid gratiosum aut tribuit quicquam gratis, cum proprium sit gratiarum actionis huius, vt sit retributio beneficij gratis facti. Pro quo dicit Philosophus 5. Eth. 8. In contrafacere proportionale commanet ciuitas; retributione autem commanent; propter quod et gratiarum sacramentum prompte faciunt, vt retributio sit; hoc enim proprium gratiae; refamulari enim oportet ei qui gratiam fecit, scilicet reagendo ei gratiam, qui primo aliquid gratis fecit. Cui concordat Tullius 2o. veteris suae Rhetoricae, definiendo gratiam isto modo; Gratia est, in qua, amicitiarum et officiorum, id est, beneficiorum alterius memoria, et alterius voluntas remunerandi continetur: Vnde et Poeta, Gratia pro rebus merito debetur inemptis. Si autem\n\ngratia esset rationabiliter referenda ei qui non facit aliquam gratiam, sed debitum purum tantum, emptor et venditor, locans et conducens, mercenarius seu seruus et dominus deberent mutuo gratias agere sibi ipsis, quod ratio prohibet, quia sine gratiarum actione huic inde est plenarie satisfactum, et in omnibus retributum; quare ergo expectaretur vlterius gratiarum actio, quae est quaedam retributio vt dictum est: Nec consuetudo hoc habet; et absit quod omnes tales sint mutuo ingrati, cum nullus possit esse ingratus nisi gratiae gratis factae; sed secundum Apostolum ad Rom. 4. Ei, qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum; quare non videtur quod a tali operario sit aliqua gratia suo domino referenda: Vnde Luc. 6. Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quae vobis est gratia? Et infra 17. Quis vestrum habens scruum arantem aut pascentem, qui regressus de agro dicit illi statim; Transi, recumbe; et non dicit, Para quod caenem, et praecinge te, et ministra mihi donec manducem, et bibam, et post haec, tu manducabis et bibes; Nunquid gratiam\n\nhabet seruo illi, quia fecit quod imperauerat ei? Non puto. Ex quo ergo Christus gratias egit Patri quia eum audiuit, videtur quod non meruit de condigno, vt permittitur, exaudiri; quare nec quicquam omnino simili ratione. Et cum arguitur quod meritum Christi excedit meritum cuiuslibet puri hominis infinite, quia sic Christus excedit quemlibet hominem; forsitan non oportet; quia sic potest argui de eius intellectione, volutione, locutione, ambulatione, et alia eius operatione quacunque: Meritum tamen Christi potest considerari dupliciter; vno modo quantum ad actum ipsum merendi, qui proprie dicitur meritum, et sic videtur fuisse tantum finitum, sicut anima, potentia, actus, et habitus vnde processit: Nam secundum praemissa 40a. parte corollarij, primi, huius, Nulla creatura est, nec esse poterit infinita: nec valet illa causalis; quia Christus excedit quemlibet hominem infinite, ideo meritum Christi similiter; quia sic Deus excedit quamlibet creaturam, et tamen non quilibet motus factus, vel possibilis fieri immediate a Deo, similiter excedit motum factum a qualibet\n\ncreatura. Et specialiter haec causalis de merito Christi non renet, quia Christus habet duas naturas, diuinam scilicet infinitam, et secundum illam non meruit; et humanam finitam, et secundum illam tantummodo meruit. Aliter potest considerari meritum Christi, scilicet quantum ad pretium, quod per illud obtulit Deo Patri, et sic potest dici congrue infinitum; Per actum enim meritorium propriae voluntatis humanae, se ipsum totum filium Dei perfectum Deum et hominem obtulit Deo Patri in pretium pro hominibus redimendis. Quapropter licet assumpsisset naturalia humana imperfectiora quantumlibet, et sic per actum voluntatis meritorium remissiorem in proportione quacunque seipsum similiter obtulisset; vellicet forsitan in naturalibus iam assumptis per actum voluntatis meritorium remissiorem quantum volueris se obtulisset similiter pro hominibus redimendis, ipsos sufficientissime redemisset, non ratione infinitatis actus, voluntatis, aut meriti proprie, sed ratione infiniti huius pretij infinities infiniti per meritum illud oblati; sicut si duorum volentium emere eandem\n\nrem vaenalem, vnus cum feruentissima voluntate offerat pretium minus iusto, alter cum remississima voluntate offerat pretium iustum, vel maius, hic rem habebit, ille carebit, et hoc non ratione diuersitatis actuum voluntatum, sed praetiorum tantummodo oblatorum. Vnde et 1. Tim. 2. Vnus, inquit, Apostolus Deus, et mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus qui dedit redemptionem semetipsum pro omnibus. Et secundum istam sententiam potest intelligi dictum Anselmi 2. Cur Deus homo 14. superius allegatum, et hoc apparet per eundem infra eodem 20o. sic dicentem; Quid misericordius intelligi valet quam peccatori tormentis aeternis damnato, et vnde se redimat non habenti, Deus Pater dicit, Accipe vnigenitum meum, et da pro te; et ipse Filius, Tolle me, et redime te; Quasi enim\n\nhoc dicunt, quando nos ad Christianam fidem vocant, et trahunt: Quid etiam iustius, quam vt ille cui datur precium maius omni debito, si debito datur affectu, dimittat omne debitum. Sed dato quod meritum Christi fuisset infinitum in specie meriti proprie, adhuc non sequitur quod meruisset aliquid de condigno primo modo, scilicet antecedenter voluntati diuinae; quia adhuc voluntas diuina prius natura fecisset in voluntate Christi humana meritum eius quodcunque, et prius aeternaliter et tempore, et natura voluisset Christum, et quemlibet Christianum habere quicquid per illud meruit sibi vel suis, sicut ex praemissis capitulo isto et alijs poterit apparere. Et si mihi non creditis, saltem credite veritati dicenti, Ego ex meipso non sum locutus, sed qui misit me, Pater ipse mihi mandatum dedit, quid dicam, et quid loquar, Iohan. 12. Et supra 5. Non possum ego a meipso facere quicquam, sed sicut audio, iudico, et iudicium meum verum est, quia non quaero voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me, Patris. Quod tractans Augustinus super Iohan. parte 2a. homilia 45. seu. 99. totius sic\n\ndicit, Propter personam Filij vnam ex duabus substantijs diuina humanaque constantem, aliquando secundum quod Deus est loquitur, vt est illud quod ait, Ego et Pater vnum sumus; aliquando secundum id quod homo est, vt est illud, Quoniam Pater maior me est, secundum quod accepimus ab eo dictum et hoc vnde nunc disputo, Non possum a me ipso facere quicquam, sed sicut audio, iudico. His tamen non obstantibus, quidam conantur astruere, quod Christus meruit de condigno tam sibi quam nobis. Illud enim meretur quis condigne quod si exigat, est necessarium sibi reddi: sed si Christus exigat gloriam sibi et nobis, est necessarium eam reddi. Christus quoque merendo voluit gloriam reddi sibi et suis, et quicquid voluit, necesse erat impleri; Aliter enim voluntas diuina posset frustrari, quod capitulum 10um prohibet manifeste. Quibus breuiter respondendum, quoniam primum assumptum non est verum vniuersaliter intellectum. Si enim Christus secundum quod possibile fuit ei sicut omnipotentia Dei monstrat, et patet per Lumbardum 3. sentent. dist. 18. assumpsisset corpus impassibile\n\net perfecte gloriosum, quale nunc habet, et sine omni merito exegisset gloriam sibi vel nobis, fuisset necessarium illam reddi, non quia illam meruisset condigne, sed quia ita voluisset, et voluntas sua humana necessario fuisset conformis voluntati diuinae sicut ex praemissis apparet, et quia peccare non potest, et voluntas diuina necessario semper est iusta, et efficaciter adimpleta; vel si potuit voluntate humana voluntati diuinae contraire aut difformiter voluisse, non fuisset necessarium tale volutum sibi reddi, quia nec iustum, sicut 21um capitulum ostendebat. Quicquid etiam Pater vel Spiritus Sanctus exigit est necessarium sibi reddi, sicut 10um huius probat, et tamen nihil merentur. Si autem illud primum assumptum intelligatur hoc modo, quod omne illud meretur quis condigne, quod si exigat ratione meriti de condigno primo modo, scilicet antecedenter voluntati diuinae, et de rigore absolutae iustitiae, est similiter necessarium sibi reddi; dicendum vt prius, quod nec Christus, nec alius potest sic mereri\n\nactualiter quicquam a Deo; quare nec Christus potest ratione huius meriti exigere quicquam a Deo, nisi Christus possit errare, et velle contrarie aut difformiter voluntati diuinae: et si exigendo quicquam sic faceret, non esset necessarium sibi reddi, quia nec iustum, sicut 21um capitulum demonstrabat. Alterum quoque argumentum praemissum per iam habita potest solui: Residua vero obiecta superius per praecedentia sunt reiecta, vsque ad vltimum eorum quod fuit de distinctione meriti de congruo, et condigno, pro quo videtur talis distinctio facienda, quod meritum de condigno accipitur tripliciter vt est dictum; meritum vero de congruo est meritum potentiale de quo superius dicebatur, scilicet tale opus bonum vel malum quod de congruitate seu congruentia operis est praemiabile, scilicet possibile et habile praemiari; non quod de congruitate seu congruentia aliqua priori voluntate diuina sit actualiter praemiandum, sicut superius est ostensum.\n\nCOROLLARIVM.\n\nCoroll. contra quosdam alios recentissimos Pelagij defensores, fingentes quod licet homo nullo modo possit primam gratiam promereri, potest tamen ipsam proprijs tantum viribus impetrare.\n\nEX his autem clare conuincitur error quidam recentissimus Pelagianorum fingentium, quod licet homo nullo modo neque de condigno, neque de congruo valeat gratiam promereri; potest tamen ipsam proprijs tantum viribus impetrare. Vnde et nec minus clare potest retundi error quidam Pelagianus ficturus forsitan et dicturus, quod Deus non dat gratiam homini propter aliquod meritum antecedens, sed propter merita sua futura praeuisa ab eo: sicut sator seminat bonum semen in terra quam praeuidet fructus vberes allaturam: Hi autem errores possunt faciliter corrigi per hic et superioribus capitulis praelibata. Multi quoque vt\n\nparuuli baptizati continuo decedentes, effectiue grandes recipiunt gratiam, qui nunquam ex ea proferunt fructum bonum, nunquam fructus dulces afferunt, sed amaros; nunquam vuas faciunt, sed labruscas; aut si quando que faciant opera quaedam grata, reuertentes ad vomitum et gratiam suffocantes, faciunt plura mala, et in ipsis proficiunt et perdurant finaliter obdurati.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXIX.\n\nAgainst certain persons who think that a man can of himself alone merit the first grace congruously, not condignly.\n\nBesides these, there are others who are not content with grace freely given. They want it to be sold by God and bought from him by themselves at some price, however cheap: a congruous price, as they assert, not a condign one. For they say that men, by their own powers alone, merit the grace of God congruously, but not condignly.\n\nThis error is more notorious than the others in these days, and far too many are slipping through it into the Pelagian precipice, so it seems necessary to examine it with closer scrutiny. Yet in reality this error does not differ much from the others recounted above, and can be refuted along with them in the same way. For almost all the arguments and authorities brought against those proceed against this one likewise, head-on. It follows from it that grace comes from works and merits, which is the root error of Pelagius. It follows also that grace comes from merits at least as from a partial cause and co-cause, with the first error that follows. It follows that those congruous merits are at least the cause and preparatory disposition of grace, with the second; and that someone can merit congruously by himself alone, as the third error posits, that a man can open by his own powers alone.[n1] Moreover, if anyone merits the first grace congruously, he does so before he has grace, at least by priority of nature. But before he has the grace of which I speak, namely the grace that makes one pleasing with a view to the kingdom, he does not have charity either. For charity alone divides between the sons of perdition and the sons of the kingdom, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 15, 18, and as is plain from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13. Hence he does not love God at all, or at least not with gratuitous love, that is, freely and principally for God's sake.[n2] For this reason he merits nothing from God, and least of all any gratuitous good, a sure pledge of the greatest everlasting good. With what face does anyone claim a reward from God, to whom he has given no gift? On what title does he demand repayment from one to whom he has never given anything? How does anyone merit anything from God who does nothing for him? Hence Matthew 6: Take care not to do your justice before men, that you may be seen by them; otherwise you will have no reward with your Father who is in heaven. On this Chrysostom says: What will you receive from God, you who have given God nothing? For what is done for God's sake is given to God, but what is done for the sake of men is poured out to the winds. Augustine also speaks effectively to this purpose in Book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, on the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, ch. 22, as the 37th recounted. Furthermore, even if someone loves\n\nGod, and acts for him, not for his own sake but so that God may grant him prosperity or ward off adversity, it comes to the same thing. For how does such a man merit more from God than a seller does from a buyer? Besides, he loves the granting of the former and the warding off of the latter more than he loves God; and since he loves these for his own sake, he loves himself more than God. For that on account of which each thing is, is always more so: thus that on account of which we love is more dear, Posterior Analytics 1, 2.[n3] Indeed, as had been declared in chapter 26, whoever loves something on account of a certain end does not love this thing but the end. So far, then, is such a lover from meriting that he sins; for he acts against the right and due order of loving, as the thirtieth part of the first Corollary of this book attests, and against the precept to love God with the whole heart, and the whole soul, and the whole strength and mind, Deuteronomy 6 and Matthew 22. Such a man also enjoys himself and uses God himself;[n4] so it is clear that he sins, as is shown at length by Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, ch. 1 and following, and as Lombard recites, Sentences 1, dist. 1. It is clear also that such a man does not merit. For no one merits by working unless he has a right intention,\n\nnamely the intention of a right end. For as in natural things motion is named from its end, so also in moral things, as is clear from the 34th of this book. But such a man, outside charity, does not have a right intention. For no intention is right unless it tends finally and immediately toward God, or perhaps mediately: an intention that is perhaps carried immediately to a creature and through it finally to God, and this above all things, gratuitously, for his own sake, as the thirtieth part of Corollary 1 teaches. For if something else is finally desired for the sake of another thing, then that other thing is the end more truly intended, as the foregoing shows. Now other natural things, in so far as they have received from nature, to that extent do this by natural inclination. A man, who has received for this purpose an intellectual power and a freely willing one, ought to do this knowingly and freely, according to the powers finally given him for this. Whoever, then, acting, does not direct his intention finally to God, neither actually nor habitually, and this gratuitously for God's own sake, acts against the natural order of the universe; hence he also sins unnaturally against\n\nnature, and against God, the beginning and end and highest author of all nature and of the natural order; or at least he does not merit. This is also clear from Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1, where cited before. For if that intention is right, the one who intends enjoys God, or uses a creature through it; and if he enjoys God, the proposition is clear. But if he uses a creature, then (since according to Augustine in the same place, to use is to refer what has come into use to the obtaining of that which is to be enjoyed; otherwise it is to abuse, not to use) the same follows;[n5] for an unlawful use ought to be called abuse, or misuse. This is also clear in another way. The use of a creature, if it is not referred to God, is an unlawful use; therefore it is sin, or at least not rightly done; therefore that intention is not right. Nor is the intention of anyone without charity and grace carried gratuitously above all things to God; for just as no one's intellect without faith is carried faithfully to God, so no one's affection without grace is carried acceptably to God, so that he has God dear to him gratuitously above all things. For the proportion is the same here and there. Again, if a man without the grace of charity could love God gratuitously above all other things, he could likewise\n\nknow all the other commandments, and keep them; for he who can do the greater can also do the lesser. But the commandment of the love of God is first and greatest, Matthew 22. Indeed, whoever loved God in this way would in no way knowingly offend him, nor despise any commandment of his. (For this would expressly contradict so great a love.) He would rather keep them all to the best of his powers. For the Philosopher says in Ethics 9, 4: They posit that a friend is one who wills and does good things, or apparent ones, for the sake of him, namely, the beloved; and in his Rhetoric 2, 5: Let it be, he says, to will, to love for someone the things one thinks good, for his sake and not for one's own, and, as far as one can, to be active in bringing these about. Hence also Wisdom 6: Love is the keeping, or guarding, of her laws.[n6] So also the Truth himself says, If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, John 14. On which Gregory, Homily 30: The proof of love is the showing forth of works. Hence in his letter the same John says: He who says, \"I love God\", and does not keep his commandments, is a liar; for we truly love if we keep his commandments; we truly love if we restrain ourselves from our pleasures. For he who still flows away through unlawful desires\n\ncertainly does not love God, since he contradicts him in his own will. The Apostle in Romans 13, arguing in the same way, concludes: Love, therefore, is the fullness of the law; hence neither could anyone be in the state of salvation without the grace of charity. For in Luke 10 the Savior says, Do this, that is, keep the commandments, and you will live. In vain, then, are these three habits posited, namely faith, hope and charity, supernaturally infused in us, if without them our natural resources suffice for doing and keeping all the divine commandments, as Pelagius asserted, as Augustine recounts in On Heresies 88, and Peter in Sentences 2, dist. 28, and Isidore, 8 Eth. 14, and the Canon, 24, last question, Quidam autem.[n7] But our Catholic Doctors say that we need these three habits, or other proportionate ones. The gaze and affection of our souls are weighed down by the mass of the body or of sin, or by natural incapacity, so that they cannot see God as is due, nor love him; or, also on account of the disproportion of so excellent an object, they necessarily need faith or the light of glory, and charity or grace, to raise them to seeing God\n\nas is due, and to loving him. Hence Pope Clement V also condemns the heresy of the Beghards, which says that the soul does not need the light of glory to raise it to see God and to enjoy him blessedly: Extra, De haereticis, Ad nostrum. And this holds not only for us in the state of present misery; the Angels and the first parents in the state of first innocence likewise needed them, when they had set no obstacle, mortal, nor even the least venial, as Lombard says, and proves plainly by authorities of Augustine, Sentences 2, dists. 5, 24 and 29. If anyone says that the moral virtues sufficiently raise the affection to loving God acceptably, he will easily be contradicted by what went before. For he falls into the error of Pelagius spoken of above, namely that a man, by the powers of free choice alone, without grace, can effectively fulfil all the commandments of God, as the preceding chapters have shown. Again, what comparable thing raises the Angels in this way to love? Furthermore, the moral virtues are generated from works, as is clear from Ethics 2, 1 and 2; and they do not exceed their species or their limits, but incline only to like operations, from the like of which they were generated. Hence\n\nthe Philosopher says there, ch. 2: Operations and virtues will be in the same things. For as by withdrawing from pleasures we are made temperate, so, having been made so, we can best withdraw from them; and as, by becoming accustomed to despise terrors and to endure them, we are made brave, so, having been made so, we shall best be able to endure terrors. Since, then, no one on purely natural resources loves God gratuitously above all things for his own sake, but for some other end, the habit generated from such multiplied loves will incline only to loving God in the same way, and not otherwise. Hence the same Philosopher shows, in Ethics 8 and 9, that everyone, even the virtuous man, will love himself first and most, and that from this love all other love and friendship is derived. For in the eighth, 2, he says thus: It seems, moreover, that each person loves the good for himself;\n\nand below, 7: Each one wishes goods most of all for himself; and in the ninth book, 4: The friendly feelings toward friends, by which friendships are defined, seem to come from those that relate to oneself. And below, 8, he asks whether one ought to love oneself most, argues for and against, and determines that one ought; where also below, 9: Every mind, he says, chooses what is best for itself; but the decent man obeys the mind. For it is true of the upright man that he does many things for the sake of his friends, and suffers, and if need be dies.[n8] For he will cast away both money and honors and, wholly, all the goods fought over, procuring good for himself. For he will choose to be delighted exceedingly for a short time rather than much quietly; to live nobly for a year rather than many years anyhow; and one good and great action rather than many small ones. And for those who are dying this too perhaps happens: they choose something great for themselves, and they cast away money, in which their friends will receive more. For money comes to the friend, but the good to the man himself, and he assigns the greater good to himself. Behold what follows from the Philosopher's doctrine: that the virtuous man, in his most virtuous operation,\n\nintends and loves finally not God gratuitously for God's sake, but his own good, his own advantage, and himself, and God perhaps for the sake of himself, the man. Hence also Sextus the Pythagorean says in his little Sentences: Without God you will not be able to live to God; and below, Fate does not make the wise man; for the grace of God is not subject to fate.[n9] Therefore Anselm too, in On Concord, last chapter, says that the will, which is an instrument, and the natural freedom of choice, is idle without justice and has been made the handmaid of its own affection for advantage; for, justice removed, it can will nothing except what that affection wills, namely the affection for advantage. This justice, without doubt, is God's grace itself, or depends on grace. For justice assigns to each what is his own; hence also to God gratuitous love above all things for his own sake, according to the thirtieth part of the first Corollary of this book; and this can nowhere come about without grace, as the preceding arguments urged. Anselm and other Catholic Doctors often bear witness to the same. For the Apostle says, Justified freely by his grace, Romans 3; and again, Justified by his grace,\n\nwe are made heirs, Titus 3; and again, Let grace reign through justice, Romans 5; and below, 10, he writes thus of certain holders of the contrary opinion: Ignorant of the justice of God, and seeking to establish their own, they are not subject to the justice of God. Augustine, treating this in On the Words of the Apostle, sermon 15: Let there be justice, he says, but let it be from grace; let it be from God to you; let it not be your own. The same Augustine, expounding that verse of Psalm 118 [119], I have done judgment and justice, writes thus: By the name of justice in this place is meant not the virtue itself, but its work. For who makes justice in a man, except him who justifies the ungodly? That is, by his grace he makes a just man out of an ungodly one. Hence the Apostle: Justified freely by his grace. He, then, does justice, that is, the work of justice, who has justice in himself; and many authors say many similar things to these. Hence it appears evidently that no philosophical or moral virtue is true virtue, simply upright or just, without charity and grace perfecting it, raising it to God and directing it finally to him, gratuitously, for his own sake. For it lacks no little thing, the virtue that lacks a true final cause, a right intention, a just end, and especially such an end as God is known to be.\n\nHence it is no less clearly weighed that no work of such a virtue, not formed by charity and grace, and universally no work of anyone who lacks the true virtue of charity and grace, is simply virtuous, upright or just; nay, any such work is in some way sin. For how could a work be simply virtuous, upright and just, which proceeds from such a virtue as does not have a right final cause simply, a right intention, and a just end?[n10] Indeed, how could a work fail to be in some way a crookedness or a sin, if it is twisted from the right, due and just end, simply speaking, to another, and there comes to rest finally and ultimately? Hence Plato and the Platonic philosophers too, excellent as they were, said that there are no true virtues except those which are somehow imprinted on the mind from the form of that eternal and immutable substance, who is God. Might this too be the virtue of which Aristotle says, in Ethics 7, 1, that there is a certain heroic and divine virtue above us? Hence Augustine also, Against Julian 4, 4, recites the contrary opinion\n\nas an error of the Pelagians, addressing Julian thus: You are accustomed, denying that the virtues by which one lives rightly are gifts of God, and attributing them to nature and human will, not to the grace of God, to use this argument, that unbelievers sometimes have them. And below, 5: Most bitter enemies of grace, he says, you set against us the examples of the ungodly, whom you say, though strangers to the faith, abound in virtues, in whom, without the help of grace, there is only a good of nature, though enslaved to superstitions, and who, by the powers of innate freedom alone, are found often merciful, and modest, and chaste, and sober. But he goes on to refute the error of these men, their erroneous argument, showing at length that there is no true virtue in unbelievers, nor any right work; indeed, that every work of unbelievers is sin; and also that the virtues of unbelievers are truly gifts of God.[n11] Hence in the sixth he also says: Far be it that there be true virtue in anyone unless he be truly just, unless he live by faith; for the just man lives by faith\n\n(Hab 2:4). Who, then, of those who wish to be counted Christians, except the Pelagians alone, or perhaps among them you alone, will say that an unbeliever is just, will say that an ungodly man is just, will say that one enslaved to the Devil is just? Moreover, if the ungodly do not have true justice, surely neither do they have true the other virtues that are its companions and associates, if they have any; and so neither continence, nor chastity, is true virtue in the ungodly, since, when these gifts of God are not referred to their author, by this very evil those who use them are made unjust. And below, 8: You should know, he says, that virtues are to be distinguished from vices not by duties but by ends. A duty is what is to be done; when, therefore, a man does something in which he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it for the reason for which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning. You, however, not attending to this, have separated ends from duties, and said that true virtues are to be called duties without ends. From this so great an absurdity follows for you that you are compelled to call that true justice of which you find avarice to be the mistress. For indeed, to keep the hand from another's property, if you consider only duty, can seem to belong to justice. If, however, it is asked why it is done, and the answer is, lest more money perish in lawsuits,\n\nhow could this deed now truly belong to justice, when it serves avarice? Such were the virtues that Epicurus introduced as handmaids of pleasure, which, whatever they did at all, would do for the sake of obtaining it or of keeping it. But far be it that true virtues serve anyone except him, or for his sake, to whom we say, God of virtues, turn us.[n12] Therefore virtues that serve carnal delights, or any temporal advantages and emoluments whatever, cannot be true at all; and those which wish to serve nothing are themselves not true either. For true virtues serve God in men, by whom they are given to men; they serve God in Angels, by whom they are also given to Angels. But whatever good is done by a man, and is not done for the reason for which true wisdom commands that it be done, even if it seems good by duty, is sin by the very fact of its end not being right. And below, 12, he recites the reply of Julian the heretic, and answers thus: Behold, I recall the same things that you yourself set down. If a gentile, who does not live by faith, clothes the naked, rescues one in danger, tends the wounds of the sick, spends riches on honorable friendship,\n\nand cannot be driven even by torments to false witness, I ask you whether he does these good works well or badly. For if, though they are good, he nevertheless does them badly, you cannot deny that he sins who does anything badly; but since you do not want him to sin when he does these things, you will surely say that he does good, and does it well. A bad tree, then, bears good fruit, which the Truth says cannot happen. Or do you call the unbelieving man a good tree? Then he pleases God, and where will be what is written, Without faith it is impossible to please God? See, therefore, whether you dare to call an unbelieving will a good will. But perhaps you will say, a merciful will is good. That would rightly be said if, just as the faith of Christ, that is, the faith that works through love, is always good, so mercy were always good. But mercy too is found to be bad, when partiality is shown to the poor man's person in judgment; on account of which King Saul at last deserved to be condemned by the Lord, and condemned indeed for mercy, because, contrary to his command, he spared a captive king out of human feeling.[n13] Think carefully lest perhaps mercy not be good unless it belongs to this good faith; nay, answer,\n\nso that you may foresee this without doubt: do you reckon that an unbelieving mercy is good mercy? Moreover, if it is a vice to show mercy badly, it is without doubt a vice to show mercy unbelievingly. But if even mercy itself, by itself, as a work of natural compassion, is a good work, he who uses it unbelievingly uses even this good badly; and he does this good badly who does it unbelievingly; and he who does anything badly surely sins. From this it is also gathered that the very good works which unbelievers do are not theirs, but his who uses evils well; but theirs are the sins by which they do even good things badly, since they do this not with a faithful will but with an unfaithful one, that is, a foolish and harmful one. And below, 13: Understand what the Lord says, If your eye is evil, your whole body will be dark; but if your eye is single, your whole body will be bright. In this eye recognize the intention with which each person does what he does, and from this learn that he who does not do good works with the intention of good faith, that is, faith that works through love, has his whole body, as it were, which consists of those works as of members, dark,\n\nthat is, full of the blackness of sins. For the love of the world, by which each person is a friend of this world, is not from God; the love of enjoying any creatures without love of the Creator is not from God; but the love of God, by which one comes to God, is only from God the Father through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. Through this love of the Creator everyone uses creatures well; without this love of the Creator no one at all uses creatures well. Imitating him, Bede also says, Against Julian 13: As to what he says (namely Julian), that many of the Philosophers had patience, chastity, modesty, and other virtues from the good of Nature, it is clear that whichever of the Philosophers did not know Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God, these could by no reasoning have any virtue truly, just as neither could they have true wisdom. Hence also in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 106: All the life of unbelievers is sin; for there is no good without the highest good.\n\nFor where the knowledge of eternal and unchangeable truth is lacking, virtue is false, even in the best of morals. Hence the Apostle too, in 1 Corinthians 13, shows that all virtues are rooted in charity. From these things, therefore, it is plainly clear that no philosophical or moral virtue, without the grace of charity, is simply true virtue, upright or just. Nor is it able to raise the created will to loving God above all things for God's sake gratuitously; rather it bends it aside, or holds it bent aside, to the personal advantage of each, and to the self. Of necessity, therefore, some higher virtue is required, supernatural, heroic and divine, namely grace freely given by God, to raise the created will, insufficient of itself, to loving God above all things gratuitously for God's sake, and finally on his account. This seems to be fittingly prefigured in Ezekiel 1, where the Prophet says thus: I saw, and fell on my face, and I heard the voice of one speaking, and he said to me: Son of man, stand upon your feet. So too is it commanded of every man who falls through sin or through the condition of nature, or lies far\n\nbelow. But since he is not sufficient to rise or to stand by himself, it is rightly added, And the spirit entered into me after he spoke to me, and set me upon my feet, etc. For what is this spirit, except the spirit of grace, the Holy Spirit of God? Hence Gregory too, in Book 1 on Ezekiel, Homily 9, says thus: Behold, the divine voice commanded the prostrate Prophet to rise; but he could not at all have risen unless the spirit of Almighty God had entered into him. Daniel says in agreement with this: I lay prostrate on my face, and my countenance clung to the earth, and behold a hand touched me, and raised me up on my knees and on the joints of my hands, etc. (Daniel 10). For what is this hand, if not the hand of divine grace the helper? Hence Augustine also, On the Spirit and the Letter, 11, says thus: We strive to show that we are divinely helped to work justice not in that God gave a law full of good and holy precepts, but in that our very will, without which we cannot work good, is helped and raised up by the bestowal of the spirit of grace, without which help\n\nthat teaching is the letter that kills. Peter also, in the second of his Sentences, dist. 24, says: There is in the rational soul a will, or that by which it naturally wills the good, though thinly and feebly unless grace helps; which grace, coming, helps it and raises it, that it may effectively will the good.[n14] And below, dist. 25, last: The will of man, which it has naturally, is not able to be raised to willing good effectively, or to fulfilling it in work, unless it be freed and helped through grace; freed, indeed, that it may will, and helped that it may accomplish, since, as the Apostle says, It is not of him who wills to will, nor of him who runs to run, that is, to work, but of God who has mercy, who works in us to will and to work the good; whose grace the will or work of man does not summon, but grace itself goes before the will, preparing it that it may will the good, and helps it when prepared, lest it will in vain, that is, that it may accomplish. Furthermore, according to all Philosophers, natural and moral, every form, and every habit, moral or intellectual, is known through its operation, and by distinct and varied operations distinct and varied forms are shown. Why, then, is the form or habit of charity and grace not proved through the operation\n\nof charity and grace, which is to love God above all things charitably and gratuitously? Likewise all the Doctors who write on baptism and its effect hold with one accord that in his baptism, to anyone duly baptized, the three theological virtues, namely faith, hope and charity, are infused, together with informing grace. And lest anyone henceforth dare to doubt this, Holy Church has defined it most certainly. For Pope John, Extra, in the Constitutions of Clement, On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith,[n15] having recounted one opinion which says that by the power of baptism guilt is indeed remitted to infants but grace is not conferred, and another which asserts that guilt is remitted to them in baptism, and that virtues and informing grace are infused as to habit, though not for that time as to use, adds: We, attending to the general efficacy of Christ's death, which is applied through baptism equally to all the baptized, have judged, with the sacred council approving, that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism on infants as well as adults, is to be chosen as the more probable, and more consonant and concordant with the sayings\n\nof the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology. Likewise no one can exercise the proper operation of any form unless he has that form beforehand; as no one can strike strongly unless he has strength beforehand, nor see acutely unless he has sharp sight beforehand; and likewise in intellectual and moral matters. For no one can act wisely or prudently unless he has wisdom or prudence beforehand; nor in moral matters can anyone do good generally unless he has beforehand some virtue in general, from which, as from a form, a good or goodness, a good action may proceed. Hence in Ethics 2, 6 the Philosopher shows that virtue perfects its possessor and renders his work good. The thirty-fourth of this book recites a like statement from Ethics 6, 10; and the same appears to hold of any virtue in particular, and its operation. No one, then, can will justly unless he has justice beforehand, nor love God charitably unless he has charity beforehand.\n\nWhoever, then, lacks justice, charity and grace cannot of himself will or do justly, or charitably, or acceptably, nor can he have this from himself, as the preceding showed. It can also be proved: for if he could, he would do so either by meriting, or willing, acceptably, or by not acting thus. But not by meriting or willing acceptably, since he cannot do this without grace beforehand, by the reasoning just given; nor yet by doing anything unacceptably.[n16] For it is not consistent with reason that grace be given as prize and wage to one who has done nothing acceptable. (For according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 3, Each will receive his own wage according to his own labor.) Nor can one who lacks it receive it from any other creature alone. For no one can beget or make sons of God, and appoint heirs of the heavenly kingdom, except God the Father, and the Lord of this kingdom. It remains, therefore, that grace, according to its name, be given freely, without any previous merits, to the ungracious, by God, the most liberal giver of graces.[n17] And for this reason Anselm, in On Concord, professes the same opinion; where, after he has shown in the eighth chapter that to will rightly is the end …\n\nof the rational creature, and that justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake (since one who preserves it only for the sake of something else does not love it, but loves that for the sake of which he preserves it, and therefore is not to be called just, nor is such rectitude to be called justice), he adds in the ninth chapter as follows: \"There is no doubt that the will does not will rightly except because it is right. For as sight is not sharp because it sees sharply, but sees sharply for this reason, that it is sharp, so the will is not right because it wills rightly, but wills rightly because it is right. And when it wills this rectitude, it undoubtedly wills rightly. It does not, then, will rectitude except because it is right. For the will to be right is the same as for it to have rectitude; it is plain, therefore, that it wills rectitude only because it has rectitude.\" The same author says in On Truth, 12: \"The reception of rectitude is prior by nature to having or willing it, since having or willing it is not the cause of its reception, but its reception makes one will it and have it.\" And as is plain from the same author, On the Fall of the Devil [n18], 17: the angel who deserted, having lost justice, cannot have from himself a will of justice. Indeed, as appears above in 12 of the same work, the angel who was disposed to willing could not have from himself his first will, whether of happiness or of justice, but only a natural will for what is to his advantage. With this his saying in the last chapter of On Concord, recited above, also agrees. He also shows above, at 9, after the passages recited earlier, that no one can receive that rectitude except from God: \"Let us consider now,\" he says, \"whether anyone who does not have this rectitude could in any way have it from himself. He certainly cannot have it from himself except either by willing or by not willing. By willing, indeed, no one can obtain it by himself, because he cannot will it (that is, will it rightly) unless he has it; and that anyone could attain it by not willing, no one's mind accepts. In no way, then, can he have it from himself; but neither from another creature: for as a creature cannot save a creature, so it cannot give it that by which it is saved. It follows, therefore, that no creature has rectitude except through the grace of God.\" By God's bounty, then, we find his grace to be in concord with free choice for the saving of man, so that grace alone can save man, his free choice doing nothing, as happens in infants and in those with understanding, so that grace itself always helps natural free choice [n19], which without it avails nothing for salvation, by giving rectitude to the will, which the will keeps through free choice. And although he does not give it to everyone (for he has mercy on whom he will, and hardens whom he will), he gives it to no one for any preceding merit, since \"who has first given to God, and shall be repaid?\" But if the will through free choice, by keeping what it received, merits either an increase of the justice received, or power in return for good will, or some reward, all these are fruits of the first grace, and grace for grace; and so the whole is to be imputed to grace, because it is not of him who wills what he wills, nor of him who runs what he runs, but of God who has mercy. Is not this also what the Prophet says: \"I know, Lord,\" he says, \"that the way of man is not his, nor is it for man to walk and direct his steps\"? [n20] Whose is it, then, if not his of whom another Prophet says, \"With the Lord a man's steps will be directed, and he will will his way,\" in the thirty-sixth Psalm? Indeed, as another text has it more clearly, \"By the Lord a man's steps will be directed\" first; and after the direction already accomplished, man will will his way, that is, the Lord's, second. For Augustine, expounding this, says: \"So that the man himself may will the way of the Lord, his steps are directed by the Lord himself. For if the Lord did not direct a man's steps, they were so crooked that they would always go by crooked ways, and, following twisting paths, could not return. He it is, then, who directed our steps, so that we might will his way.\" The same, in 1, To Simplicianus, 24, says: \"To break and cast down the pride of men ungrateful to the grace of God, and of those who are heard to boast of their merits, these things are recorded: for 'when they were not yet born, and had done nothing good or evil, it was said, not from works but from him who calls: The elder shall serve the younger.' Grace, then, belongs to the one who calls; but to the one who receives grace there follow, as a consequence, good works, not such as\n\nbring forth grace, but such as are brought forth by grace. For fire does not heat in order to be hot, but because it is hot; nor does a wheel run well in order to be round, but because it is round: so no one acts well in order to receive grace, but because he has received it. For he cannot live justly who has not been justified, nor live at all who has not been made alive; but grace justifies, so that the justified may live justly. Grace, therefore, is first, good works second.\" The same, in On the Faith, to Peter [n21], 18, says that God gave to the intellectual nature, that is, to angels and men, the faculty and the will of knowing and loving him, so that each could both have it and lose it; but if anyone should lose it of his own accord, he could not thereafter take it up again by his own choice, so that it should be his (his to infuse the beginnings of that holy thought, by the gift of gratuitous goodness, into whomever he wished, to be renewed afresh), whose it was, at the very beginning of creation, with no preceding merits, to order wonderfully spirits and bodies, with places and dispositions fitting as he in his wisdom willed. And below, 21, he says: \"That the beginning of good will and thought does not arise in man from himself, but is both prepared and bestowed from above, God clearly shows in this: that neither the devil nor any of his angels, since by the merit of their fall they were thrust down into this lower darkness, could or can take up a good will again. For if it were possible for human nature, after turning away from God and losing goodness of will, to have it again of itself, much more possible would it be for angelic nature to have this, which, the less it is weighed down by the weight of an earthly body, would be the more endowed with this faculty. But God shows whence good will is given to men, which the angels so lost when they had it that, once lost, they could not thereafter have it.\" The same, in City of God 12, 9, proves that if the good angels were first without good will, they could not have had it from themselves; for if they produced it themselves, God not working, they were made better by themselves than by him, which God forbid; and if they could not make themselves better than he had made them (than whom no one makes anything better), then surely they could not have a good will, by which they would be better, except with the aid of the creator at work. But an objection will perhaps be raised from that passage, Ethics 2, 1 and 2 [n22], that moral virtue is generated from similar preceding acts, as justice, temperance and fortitude from acting justly, temperately and bravely; therefore someone can act virtuously without having virtue. Again, it would otherwise seem foolish and vain to seek and desire virtues: for no one can do this except by having them; but it seems superfluous and foolish for anyone to desire and seek what he has. Again, this seems manifest in the arts: for no one has the art of playing the cithara, or of building, unless by first playing or building, as is clear from the Philosopher, Ethics 2, 1, and Metaphysics 9, 14. To this one can reply as the Philosopher replies to a similar question in Ethics 2, 4. For since it had been said earlier that virtue is generated from acts, someone might ask, he says, how we can say that those who do just things must become just, and those who do temperate things temperate? For if they do just and temperate things, they are already just and temperate. And he replies that such persons do not act justly and temperately, but do things just and temperate; and he says that acts are called just and temperate when they are such as a just and temperate person would do. Yet it can also be said, in another way and not improbably, that whoever does such things, and not wholly by chance (as an ox finds a hare or a partridge), does so from some form of virtue, and by a virtue which he has, speaking loosely. For according to the same Philosopher, Ethics 6, last chapter, virtue is twofold, one principal, the other natural; or one acquired, the other innate; and he proves this by common experience, saying: \"For it seems to everyone that each kind of character belongs to us by nature; for in some way we are just, and temperate, and brave, and the rest, straight from birth. For children and beasts have natural states, but without understanding they seem harmful, just as it happens that a strong body moving without sight falls heavily because it lacks sight; so also here. But if the state, being similar, receives understanding, then it will be virtue properly so called.\" And reason proves this: for if a man, because after many painful acts he feels himself strongly inclined to do such things easily and with delight, concludes that he has a moral virtue so inclining him, then if someone is inclined naturally, in a like way, or more strongly, more easily and more delightfully, does he not conclude that he has a natural virtue of this kind? And this virtue, perhaps, as against acquired virtue (which he here calls principal), he placed in the Categories, where he distinguishes them, under the name of disposition, in the first species of quality. These virtues too, not only natural or moral but also intellectual and artistic, the mathematicians [n23] think they can see in the nativities of boys. And so the wise men of old, having diligently investigated and learned the natural aptitude of each boy, would suitably assign each, in accordance with it, to whatever [art] suited. Hence at that time all the arts flourished most excellently among them. So also in Ethics 3, 13, it is written thus: \"One must be born as one having sight, by which he judges well, and by which he will desire the good according to truth; and he is well born to whom this is innate well: for what is greatest and best, and what is not possible to receive from another,\n\nnor to learn; but such as it is innate, such he will have it; and for this to be innate well and in the best way will be, certainly, a perfect and true good birth.\" Hence also Aristotle, Politics 5, 9, reports Socrates as asserting that nature produces the depraved and the better by discipline; and he adds: \"Perhaps in saying this he did not speak badly: for it happens that there are some whom it is impossible to discipline and make studious.\" Hence also in the Secret of Secrets, part 3, 10, he writes thus [n24]: \"In certain cases the horoscope must be considered, because one who is begotten is often disposed according to the power of the planets which are in the region of his horoscope; and if it happens that the parents teach the child some one of the arts, a higher nature will often draw him to the art that suits his star. For something like this happened to certain men who came together in a village and lodged with a weaver, to whom a son was born that night; the guests took his horoscope and set out his planets. His horoscope was, then, in Venus and in Mars, its degree being in Gemini with Libra; the contrary and worst stars had not yet risen. The horoscope showed them, then, that the boy\n\nwas to be wise, courtly, quick of hand, of good counsel, and to be loved by kings; so they concealed this, hiding it from the father. The boy grew up in prosperity, and his parents believed they should, and strove to, instruct him in some art from their own trades, but he could learn nothing from them. So, beating him and scourging him most severely, they abandoned him to his own will. The youth therefore turned to men who possessed the disciplines, and acquired the sciences, and learned the courses and times of the heavenly bodies, and the customs and governments of kings; and behold, he became the king's tutor [n25]. Where he immediately adds: The contrary of this happened, from the wonderful works and dispositions of the planets and their natures, in what befell the two sons of the King of India, when comparison was made with the horoscope, but it was hidden from the King. When one of the boys grew up, therefore, the King believed he should instruct him in the sciences. He sent him, therefore, through India and through other provinces with honor, as befits the son of so great a king; but the father's diligence profited nothing, because he could not incline his mind and nature except to the smith's craft. At this the King was greatly troubled,\n\nand he summoned all the wise men of his kingdom, who, when asked, all agreed that he should be left to those things to which the boy's nature was leading him back; and so it was done, and many times something like this has happened.\" Therefore Ovid also, in On the Old Woman, book 1 [n26], reports as follows:\n\nThere was a time when the commonwealth once sought philosophers\nat great expense, watchful for the common good,\nand treated them honorably, that they might counsel it\nin the highest affairs of state.\nThen it seemed good to the elders, in every city,\nto choose docile boys from among many gifted ones\nand send them to the schools for the sake of\nlearning, to whom each city would furnish for its own\nwelcome stipends for their living. And there they had it\n\ndetermined by the judgment of the physiognomers\nwhich art each should learn; so each was assigned his art,\nso each, intent upon his art [n27],\nalways clung to it, and it was enough for each to be\nperfect in one, nor was it lawful to change him.\nThen the arts flourished, then everything was perfectly known,\nand could be perfectly handed on to posterity,\nand there was great leisure for the writing of books:\nthen the mathematical sciences alone, worthy of the name of learning,\nhad their followers, then what use each would bring\nwas clear among students.\n\nA man can therefore do such things out of such virtues innate in him, but not lovingly, nor graciously [n28], in the manner stated. For charity and grace are not innate in us: for \"we were by nature children of wrath,\" Ephesians 2. And from this the answer to the objections is clear, especially to the first and the last of them. The second does not go through: for although someone has virtue, he can desire virtue in two ways, namely either that it be more fully increased in him, as the Apostles asked of the Lord, \"Increase our faith,\" Luke 17, or that it be steadily preserved, according to that of Psalm 15, \"Preserve me, Lord,\" and 67, \"Confirm, O God, what you have wrought in us.\" And so Anselm replies in On Concord, where above. But if anyone presses still harder, supposing that not everyone\n\nhas every natural virtue, or, if he does, that the Omnipotent takes one away from him, say the art of playing the cithara; and yet he can still learn to play, and only by acting artfully, because if he acts inartfully, and multiplies such acts, they will generate a similar habit in him, as is clear from Ethics 2, where above; so he will not acquire the art, but rather ineptitude and error. One who does not have the art, therefore, can act artfully; and so one lacking the virtues can act virtuously. To this it must be said that, for such a person to play the cithara, however thinly, he has in his soul, from his own invention, or imagination, or hearing and some instruction, some image, and some likeness of cithara-playing, which in some measure guides him as he plays; for otherwise he would not touch one string rather than another on purpose, nor would he play the cithara on purpose rather than dance, but perhaps quite by chance, as an ox tossing a cithara about with its horns; and from such touching of strings, however much multiplied, he would never become a cithara player. I say, then, that such a person, from his own imagination or the hearing of another, has some species and form of cithara-playing from which his playing proceeds, and which through use grows continually to perfection; and this seems to be the answer\n\nof the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 14, who says: \"It seems impossible to be a cithara player, one who has never played; for the learner of playing learns by playing.\" Hence this became a sophistical refutation, namely that one who does not have knowledge will do what belongs to knowledge; for a learner does not have knowledge. And he replies: \"But because,\" he says, \"of what is made, something has been made, and, in general, of what is moved, something has been moved; and it is clear in what is said about motion that the learner too must perhaps have something of knowledge.\" Where the text of Averroes says it more expressly and without \"perhaps,\" and adds: \"Nothing, therefore, is moved toward another unless it has in itself something of that toward which it is moved.\" Where Averroes says: \"Everything that is generated and becomes something, it is impossible for this to come about unless it have something of what it will have in the end: for example, since it is impossible for anyone to play the cithara unless he has something of the art of playing; and therefore an ass does not learn to play the cithara, nor does a man who is not born apt for playing.\" But of charity and grace we cannot have the least spark from ourselves, nor from any creature, as was shown above; so we cannot do anything graciously for God's sake; and therefore\n\nneither can we merit anything from him, unless he first gives it to us freely. But someone will perhaps still say that grace greatly makes it easier for man to fulfil God's commands, and is called necessary to man for this reason; but that man could do these things without grace, though with more difficulty, contrary to what went before. Why, too, could not the angels, in no way weighed down by the mass of a pressing body, fulfil these things most easily without grace, contrary to what has been laid down? Moreover, this man also is a son of Pelagius in this respect. For Pelagius himself said that grace is given to men for this purpose, that what they are commanded to do through free choice they might fulfil more easily through grace, as Augustine reports of him in On Heresies, where above; in book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, 7 and 23; in sermon 13 On the Words of the Apostle; and in many other places. Again, this heresy was solemnly condemned in the Council of Milevis, at which Augustine was present, against the Pelagians, as is reported in the canon De consecratione, distinction 4, last chapter, in these words: \"It was resolved that whoever says that the grace of justification is given to us for this reason\n\nthat what we are commanded to do through free choice we may fulfil more easily through grace, as though, even if grace were not given, we could still fulfil the divine commands even without it, though not indeed easily, let him be anathema.\" The holy Prosper reports the same in his book On the Preachers of the Grace of God, against Cassian [n29], 21, together with the reasoning of the Pontiffs on account of which they condemned that saying of Pelagius as heretical; and he says: \"Let him fall into the pit of that condemned opinion according to which it is said that the grace of justification is given to us by God so that what we are commanded to do through free choice we may fulfil more easily through grace; as though, even if grace were not given, we could still fulfil the divine commands even without it, though not indeed easily; which the Catholic Pontiffs judged worthy of anathema. We must use the testimony which they used, saying: The Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commands, where he does not say, 'Without me you can do it with more difficulty,' but says, 'Without me you can do nothing.'\" Still, Pelagius's deputy will perhaps reply and say that grace is necessary for fulfilling the divine commands for this reason, that through it\n\nthe divine commands are revealed to men, and the discernment of good and evil is shown; and that, this revelation and discernment having been obtained through grace, man can fulfil them by the powers of his own will. But this is refuted by what has been set out. Again, according to that opinion, before the law was given to men or angels, grace would not have been necessary to them for loving God freely above all things; or if the power of the law were now removed, and man were handed over to the natural law, to the judgment of natural reason, he would have no need of the grace of God; the opposites of which were shown above. Moreover, even granting this, the error of Pelagius returns. For Augustine, in book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, chapter 2, speaking of Pelagius, writes thus: \"The grace of God, and the help by which we are helped by the Lord not to sin, he places either in nature and free choice, or in the law or teaching; so that, that is, when God helps man to turn away from evil and do good, he is believed to help by revealing and showing what ought to be done,\n\nand not also by cooperating and inspiring love, so that what he has recognized must be done, he may do.\" And below, 7, he recites the words of Pelagius in this form: \"He helps us by his teaching and his revelation, while he opens the eyes of our heart, while he shows us things to come so that we may not be taken up with the present, while he lays bare the snares of the devil, while he enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace. Does one who says this seem to deny grace to you? Or does he confess both the free choice of man and the grace of God?\" And below, 8: \"This,\" he says, \"is to place the grace of God in law or teaching.\" Here, then, it appears that Pelagius confesses that grace by which God shows and reveals what we ought to do, not that by which he gives and helps so that we do it, since to this end knowledge of the law serves rather (if the aid of grace is lacking) that transgression of the command may result. \"For where there is no law,\" says the Apostle, \"there is no transgression\"; and \"I did not know concupiscence unless the law said: You shall not covet.\" And on this account the law is so far one thing and grace another that the law not only does no good, but does very much harm, unless grace helps; and in this the usefulness of the law is shown, since\n\nthose whom it makes guilty of transgression it forces to take refuge in grace, to be set free, and to be helped to overcome evil desires. For it commands rather than helps; it teaches that there is a sickness, it does not heal it; indeed, by it the sickness is rather increased, in that it is not healed; so that the medicine of grace may be sought more attentively and anxiously, because the letter kills, but the spirit gives life. The same, in On Grace and Free Choice, 25: \"What is it,\" he says, \"that the emptiest of men, and the most perverse Pelagians, say that the law is the grace of God by which we are helped not to sin? What is it that these wretches say, who without any hesitation contradict so great an Apostle? He says that sin took strength against man through the law, and that it kills him through the commandment, though holy and just and good, and that through what is good it works death in him, from which he would not be freed unless the Spirit gave life to him whom the letter had killed, as he says in another place: The letter kills, but the spirit gives life; and these unteachable men, blind to the light of God and deaf to the voice of God, say that the killing letter gives life, and contradict the life-giving Spirit.\" And below, 28: \"Who is so deaf [n30] to the Apostle's words?\n\nWho would be so foolish, or rather so mad, not knowing what he says, as to dare to say that the law is grace, when he cries out who knew what he was saying: 'You who are justified in the law have fallen from grace'?\" The same again, in On the Spirit and the Letter, 2, says: \"Those must be resisted most sharply and vehemently who think that the power of the human will by itself, without God's help, can either bring justice to perfection or advance in it by striving toward it. And when they begin to be pressed how they presume to assert that this happens without divine aid, they check themselves and do not dare to utter this saying, since they see how impious and intolerable it is; but they say that these things do not happen without divine aid for this reason, that God created man with free choice of the will, and by giving precepts himself teaches how man should live, and in this at any rate he helps, that by teaching he takes away ignorance, so that man may know in his works what he should avoid and what he should seek, so that, entering upon the way shown to him through the free choice naturally implanted in him, and living continently, piously and justly, he may deserve to attain the blessed and eternal life. But we say that the human will\n\nis so divinely helped to do justice that, besides the fact that man was created with free choice of will, and besides the teaching by which he is commanded how he ought to live, he receives the Holy Spirit, by whom delight arises in the soul, and love of that highest and unchangeable good which is God, even now, while we still walk by faith and not yet by sight, so that, having this given him as a kind of pledge of a gratuitous gift, he may burn to cling to the Creator, and be inflamed to come to a share in that true light, so that it may be well with him from him from whom he has his being. For free choice avails for nothing except sinning if the way of truth is hidden; and when what is to be done, and what is to be aimed at, has ceased to be hidden, unless it also delights and is loved, it is not done, not undertaken, not lived well; but that it may be loved, the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, not through free choice, which arises from ourselves, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.\" Moreover the Council cited above, as is reported in the canon where above, next-to-last chapter, says thus: \"Whoever says that the same grace of God, through\n\nJesus Christ our Lord, helps us not to sin only for this reason, that through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, so that we may know what we ought to seek and what to avoid, but that it is not through it given to us that what we have recognized must be done we also ought to do, or be able to do [n31], let him be anathema.\" But if anyone should break out into such madness as to say that the grace of God, necessary to man for fulfilling the divine commands, is free choice freely given to man by God, he is swallowed up by the whirlpool of the Pelagian sea [n32]. For it is clear from the authorities of Augustine set out above that this is the vanity of Pelagian folly; and Augustine also, in book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, 2, says: \"Since Pelagius sets out and distinguishes three things by which he says the divine commands are fulfilled, possibility,\n\nwill, action (possibility, that is, by which a man can be just; will, by which he wills to be just; action, by which he is just), the first of these three, that is, possibility, he confesses to be given by the creator of nature, and not to be in our power, but that we have it even if we do not wish; but the remaining two, that is, will and action, he asserts to be ours, and so ascribes them to us that he maintains they are for us only from ourselves. Behold plainly what Pelagius calls the grace of God: natural possibility, namely, from the creator of nature, given us by the benefit of creation, freely.\" Augustine also reports this heresy in On Nature and Grace, 53, and in On Grace and Free Choice, 28, and refutes it here and there. This man too, erring in this way, falls into the aforesaid heresy of Pelagius, which holds that man through his own free choice can fulfil the divine commands, and he too can easily be corrected by what has been set out. Besides, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15: \"I have labored more abundantly than all of them; yet not I, but the grace of God with me.\" And how \"not I, but grace,\" if he himself, or his free choice, is called grace? Moreover, certain modern Pelagians\n\nreply, saying that a man out of his purely natural powers can love God above all things freely, for his own sake, as to the very substance of the act, though not meritoriously, or at least not meritoriously by condign merit, though perhaps by congruous merit, without accompanying grace. But this does not accord with reason, and is refuted by what has been set out. Besides, according to them, one who has grace, by loving God and keeping his counsels and commands, can merit even condignly; why then, if one lacking grace does for God similar or greater things, with an equally right intention or a righter one, an equally sincere affection or a more sincere, an equally gracious love or an even more gracious, does he not merit similarly or more? For as far as concerns the works or those who work, the work of the one lacking grace [n33] is as good as the work of the one who has it, or better; hence also as acceptable for the payment of the ancient debt for sin, and for the redemption of his soul, and for the purchase of the heavenly kingdom. If, then, God accepts the price of the one who has grace and rejects the equally just or more just price of the other, he is a respecter of persons, and does not judge with equity. Again, according to all Catholics, and even according to the enemies of grace, the heretical Pelagians themselves,\n\ngrace greatly lightens the burden of any work: for it makes the yoke of the Lord sweet, and his burden light. One who lacks grace, then, doing similar things, works with more difficulty than one who has it; he therefore merits more. For the Philosopher says, in Ethics 2, 3: art and virtue are always concerned with what is difficult; \"for the good is better in this\"; that is, what is good without difficulty is better in difficulty. And in Ethics 3, 18 he proves that fortitude consists more in fears than in acts of daring, and that this is more praiseworthy than that [n34], and, according to some, than temperance, in that it is harder to endure sorrows than to abstain from pleasures. And in the fifth book, chapter 2: \"The worst,\" he says, \"is he who uses wickedness toward himself and toward his friends; but the best is not he who uses virtue toward himself, but toward another; for this is a difficult work.\" The venerable Bede also, in On Times 2, 1, for this same point cites Jerome on the Gospels, who places marriage at the thirtyfold fruit and widows at the sixtyfold, for this reason: \"The greater the difficulty,\" he says, \"of abstaining from the enticements of a pleasure once experienced, the greater also the reward.\" Moreover, one lacking grace could then love God…\n\n…with his whole heart, and with his whole soul, and with his whole strength, and mind, finally for his sake; and to love the neighbor as himself, likewise for God's sake, and to observe the other precepts and counsels in all things. Therefore he would also be in the state of salvation, and finally be saved, according to the premises and against the premises [n35]. For God's grace alone makes children and friends of God, as the earlier arguments attest; and the Prophet says, \"Who crowns you with mercy and compassion,\" Ps 102 [103]; and the Apostle more plainly, \"But the grace of God is eternal life,\" Rom 6, which the faith of the universal Church also holds. Others still contrive that a man without grace can of himself perfect the divine commands according to the substance of the work, though not according to the intention of the one commanding, which is that they be done in grace; but the fiction of these will be shattered like the earlier ones. This too seems astonishing: looking to the Old Testament and the New, and to all their Doctors and expositors, it does not appear that the intention of the one commanding is anything other than that they do these things freely for God's sake [n36]; and by that very fact it seems to them that such a person is in grace, namely arguing from the posterior to the prior, and from the effect to its efficient cause; and in the same way all Doctors, and preachers ancient and modern, preaching and teaching the people of God the way of salvation, preach nothing else than that they do his commands and counsels freely for God's sake. Nor do they say, \"Do these things in grace\"; rather they say, as it seems, that by the very fact that they do these things in this way, they have God's grace, namely that grace of which I speak, which makes us acceptable unto life, like the root from which these branches sprout. And the contrary of this does not seem to me to be preachable without danger: namely that although someone loves God freely with his whole heart etc., and exercises all the works of piety toward the neighbor for God's sake, and endures for his sake all penalties and adversities, persevering to the end, and then, with the most ardent and purest love of God, for the defense of God's law, is consummated by a most harsh death, yet he will be handed over to the second death, and to infernal torments without end. Let those preach this who wish; I would not dare to preach such things, lest perhaps, preaching with the others, I myself be made a reprobate, while I undermined the hope of the pious,\n\nand made the charity of many grow cold. Behold how plain the testimonies of truth are on this point. Behold the testimony of Joel 2: \"Whoever calls on the name of the Lord will be saved,\" which the Apostle also attests in Rom 10. And in Luke 10 someone asked the Lord, \"Master, what must I do to have eternal life?\" But he said, \"What is written in the law?\" He answered, \"You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart etc., and your neighbor as yourself\"; and he said to him, \"You have answered rightly; do this and you will live.\" But if he could have done these things without the grace that makes acceptable unto life, this was not a true teaching of the truth. For it does not follow, \"Do this, even persevering to the end, therefore you will live,\" since he could do this without grace, without which no one will live. And if you say that the Savior meant that he should do this in grace: since that manner of doing is more necessary than the deed itself, and is not known to man of himself, and the Savior did not express this manner in teaching and commanding, it seems that such a teaching is excessively deficient, and that it throws a snare before men and leads them into the danger of eternal damnation. For it is silent about grace, without which no one is made acceptable or enters into life, and it expresses one dead deed, plainly implying that to do this suffices for life. It is as if a doctor, to a simple sick man who consulted him about what to do in order to have temporal life, answered flatly, \"Eat the flesh of the tyrus\" [n37], and did not tell him the manner in which it is wholesomely prepared in tyriac : he would readily prepare for such a simple man a dish of death, which any zealous doctor would avoid. But far be it that the doctor of bodies should be more zealous than our doctor of souls. For \"the Lord, Zealous is his name,\" Exod 34 [n38]. To the same end is that whole long discourse of the Lord in John 15, \"I am the true vine,\" etc., where he teaches the disciples how they ought to bear fruit, namely by remaining in him, and where he then explains how they ought to remain in him: \"Remain,\" he says, \"in my love\"; and further, like a good Master, he teaches how they ought to remain in his love: \"If you keep my commandments, you will remain in my love\"; and afterwards he explains in the singular how they ought to keep his commandments, of which he spoke to them in the plural, when he says, \"This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.\" This comparison too he did not wish to pass over unexplained [n39], but said, \"Greater love than this no one has, than that one lay down his life for his friends\" . Whoever, therefore, has this love remains in God, and bears much fruit in grace. Likewise Cyprian, Augustine, and unanimously all Doctors, and the whole holy Church of God, affirm without doubt that whoever, though not reborn of water, has been killed for the confession of Christ, baptized with the baptism of his own blood, is straightway crowned in Heaven with the Holy Martyrs with the crown of glory; and this is what Christ himself attests, Matt 10, saying: \"Everyone who will confess me before men, I too will confess him before my Father, who is in Heaven.\" They hold a similar opinion about an adult who wishes to be baptized and is forestalled by death, as the Lombard cites in Sentences 4, dist. 4, and as is often clear elsewhere. Yet they would presume to affirm this far too rashly if these things could happen without the grace of charity, without which it is agreed that no one can be saved. Likewise, this grace is a certain\n\nhabit, and to love God above all things freely for his own sake is its proper act; but the act is the end and perfection of the habit, as the twenty-first chapter showed. Therefore the habit is for the sake of the act, not the reverse. To this end, then, God wills that men have grace: that through it they freely do the aforesaid works. If, therefore, they could do these things in this way without this grace, it would suffice for God and for them. Indeed, no reason, no cause, no usefulness would appear, to God or to man, why these things should be done in grace, since they could be done equally without it; rather it would seem wholly superfluous and empty as regards every action, just as, as regards every signification, a cipher is when it is the last figure [n40]. And if someone says that God wills this, that our works be done in grace, because in this way they can be done more easily, he falls into the error of Pelagius mentioned above; and moreover, in that case one who did them without grace would merit more, because of the greater difficulty, as was argued above. Likewise, any moral habit or other is known by its effect, namely by this, that someone performs the works of such a virtue promptly and with delight. Hence in Ethics II, third [n41]: \"A sign of dispositions must be made of the pleasure or pain that supervenes on those who are acting. For one who withdraws from bodily pleasures, and rejoices in this very thing, is temperate; and one who endures dangers and rejoices, or is not pained, is brave.\" And in Posterior Analytics II, last [n41], Aristotle argues against Plato, who posits that the cognitive habits of the principles are in us from nature but lie hidden, saying thus: \"If indeed we have them, it is absurd; for it happens that one who has the most certain cognitions of the principles, in demonstrating, goes unnoticed\" [n42]. Since, therefore, charity and grace is a most perfect habit, it can be known through its operations, and the Truth himself seems to have taught this when he said, \"By their fruits you will know them,\" Matt 7; and below, 12, \"By its fruit the tree is known.\" And John 13 gives, for\n\nhaving this knowledge, a rule generally special and specially general: \"By this,\" he says, \"all will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another,\" which he also pursues below, in 15, far more plainly and fully, as was cited above. And on this opinion the Doctors and the expositors of canonical Scripture seem to agree unanimously: whoever, therefore, does such works, and in such a way, has the grace of charity. Likewise, if one working in grace merits something, then so does one lacking grace, if he does similar things similarly. For the act of the latter is in every respect equally good as the act of the other, who is graced [n43], especially since the other's grace in no way informs, nor effects, nor directs his act. If it is said that grace, by the very fact that it is present there, renders the act meritorious, this does not seem so, since in an act done from purely natural powers it does nothing at all, just as a scarecrow in a cucumber field [n44] guards nothing, but stands there blind, deaf, and dumb, and dead. Nor does that grace in the soul contribute any more to such an act than it would in a cup , in a purse, or in a chest. Likewise, if a graced act is rendered meritorious for this reason, that it is done by one who has grace, though not by grace, it follows that his indifferent acts, indeed even his venial sins, and universally all his acts, are meritorious of the kingdom of God, and this even de condigno; and yet he can love his wife from carnal affection, lie in jest, give alms out of venial vainglory, and do many similar things from purely natural powers, not from grace given to him. Such grace could also be really posited in one not pleasing to God, indeed sinning mortally , and yet his works would not be rendered meritorious on account of it. Hence it is clear that to be done in grace and to be done from grace are not the same; but whatever is done from grace is done in grace, not the reverse. It is also clear that a work is not meritorious because it is done in grace, but because it is done from grace; and that every work done from grace is meritorious, but not every work done in grace. All these things will be easily evident from the premises. Likewise, to this end is that whole discussion of Anselm recited above. For he says most plainly that whoever wills rectitude wills rightly, and therefore first naturally has it, as the effective cause of that effect; and he is speaking there of the rectitude of grace, as is clear in On Concord, the ninth, and in On Grace, without which no one is saved,\n\nas is clear above, in the eighth, as was also touched on above; and the aforementioned course of Augustine's argument goes to the same end. There is, further, another similar quibble, which says: A man can of himself love God with his whole heart etc., and do all the other things according to the substance of the works, but will nevertheless merit nothing at all, or at least nothing de condigno, because he does not do them according to the intention of the one commanding, which is, as they say, that he do them in some manner meritoriously, or meritoriously de condigno. But this silliness can be refuted in the same way as the former. Likewise, what do they mean by \"to do meritoriously\"? If to do in charity and grace for God's sake, then it does not differ from the former position; if to do in such a way that some reward is owed to him, this is wholly irrational and contrary to reason. For if a work is meritorious for this reason, that a reward is owed to him, then the reward's being owed is prior to the work's being meritorious, whereas it is the other way round. For it is because the work is meritorious that a reward is owed to him: otherwise there would be no cause or reason why a reward should be owed to this work and not to that. Therefore, it is naturally prior that a work be meritorious, and worthy of reward, than that a reward be owed to him. Likewise, a reward's being owed depends either on the work or on something else irrelevant. If on the work, whoever does such a work congruously merits; and he, according to this position, does so without grace. If on something irrelevant, this seems against all reason and law. Likewise, throughout the whole Old Testament and New, God promises a reward to those who do the commandments. But if it is understood thus: \"Do my commandments meritoriously, and you will be worthy of the reward, and will have the reward,\" that promise or teaching would be ridiculous; for it teaches nothing doubtful or unknown, except perhaps to one doubting whether God exists, or whether he is just. For it is agreed by everyone that anyone who has power is bound to pay a reward to one who works meritoriously for him, and will pay it unless he is unjust. It seems therefore that God means it according to the common way of understanding of the men whom he was teaching, namely, \"Do this, and you will have a reward,\" that is, \"Do this for my sake, and for love of me, and you will have\n\na reward.\" And so, according to those aforesaid, one who does not have grace can have it [n45]. Likewise, a reward is owed to one existing in grace for the work, and the one outside grace, according to them, can do a similar work, or a greater, for God, from similar or greater love; why then does he not merit as much as the other, or more? Likewise, it is in no way probable that God, supremely generous and rich, merciful and just, who will render to each according to his works, will cast away and despise without any reward one who loves him freely for his own sake with all the strength of mind and body, and his neighbor as himself likewise for God's sake; who also abhors all evils, embraces all goods, endures all sorrows, and at last bitterest death for God's sake; especially since he himself attests this most plainly, even with an oath interposed, Matt 10, in these words: \"Whoever gives to one of these least ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, Amen I say to you, he will not lose\n\nhis reward.\" But perhaps they will object that if no one could love God with his whole heart etc., and do all that is to be done, and relinquish all that is to be relinquished, freely for God's sake, unless he were in the grace of charity, then a man could know when he was in the grace of charity, against that text of Ecclesiastes 9: \"Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred.\" Likewise, such great works can be done apart from the grace of charity: for someone can, as is clear in 1 Cor 13, have all faith, and work the greatest miracles, so as to move mountains, distribute all his goods as food for the poor, and hand over his body to be burned. To the first objection, it is clear from what was said in the twenty-fifth of this that someone predestined to life, existing in the gravest mortal sin, as David was when he committed adultery and treacherous murder, was no less loved then by God than he will be loved in the future; and similarly one foreknown to death, existing in the greatest charity, is no less hated then by God than he will ever be hated after the deepest fall into sin and punishment, as was the case with Judas the betrayer of the Lord, except perhaps according to present justice, and in a very changeable way [n46]. And therefore no human being can know whether he is worthy of hatred or of love, because however he now is, he does not know the outcome he will have, nor whether he is finally predestined as a son of life or of death. And this is what the same Scripture attests. For when it premised, \"Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred, but all things are kept uncertain for the future,\" to no one is it doubtful that a man can know that he is worthy of hatred according to present justice: for he can know that he is in the gravest sins, and in an actual will to commit the gravest, and in despair of salvation, as was the case with Judas and Cain. In like manner it is probable to me that a man can probably know, at least according to present justice, that he is in grace and worthy of God's love, namely by this, that he loves God with his whole heart etc., so that he would not wish to offend him in the least, even to avoid anything that can be fled, nor to obtain anything desirable, and would wish to fulfil the divine will in all things, even if there were never punishment or\n\nreward, but only freely for his sake; and by many other signs. But to extricate myself more briefly, though not more truly: the cited Authority can be explained thus: \"Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred,\" that is, finally, as it explains itself immediately, as has been said. As to the other point, it is true that many great works are done without the grace of charity, but not the work of loving God with the whole heart etc., in the manner stated, nor are those done from free love for God's sake. And therefore the Apostle says well, \"If I do this and that, but have not charity, it profits me nothing\"; and straightway he defines and makes known charity, in a way, through its effects: \"Charity,\" he says, \"is patient, is kind,\" etc., as if he wished to intimate plainly that whoever truly does not have these does not have charity, and whoever truly has these likewise has charity. For according to the same, Rom 11: \"If the firstfruit is holy, so is the lump.\" This whole argument, from its beginning up to here so far extended, is contracted into so brief a syllogism: Whoever merits grace from God de congruo does, before the reception of grace, in time or in nature, something pleasing for him [n47]; no one before that does anything thus pleasingly for him.\n\nLikewise: if someone lacking grace can merit first grace congruously, and someone having grace can merit an increase of his grace only congruously and not condignly, then someone lacking grace could likewise merit first grace beforehand, just as one who has grace merits that his grace be increased. Yet the first of these is the heresy of Pelagius, condemned by the Fathers, while the second is conceded by all Catholics. Therefore the first man and the second cannot merit in like manner, the first the first thing and the second the second. That grace already possessed merits to be increased is proved by the authority of Augustine cited above: \"Grace merits to be increased, so that, once increased, it may merit also to be perfected.\" Hence also Proverbs 4: \"Possess wisdom, and it will give to your head increases of graces.\" And that this is not by condign merit can be shown by the reasons of the thirty-fifth chapter, which show that grace is not from prior merits or works, since then it would not be grace but a debt. For every increase of grace is grace, and all grace is called grace in the same sense as any other grace freely given.[n48]\n\nLikewise: if someone can merit an increase of grace condignly, he can merit a higher seat in Heaven and a more intense beatitude, and a great breadth, and an eternal portion of it, likewise condignly; which is false. For in commutative justice, condign merit requires at least an equal for an equal, as is plain in Ethics 5, ch. 6, and at length thereafter;[n49] but the momentary operation of one in grace is not as good as so great an everlasting portion of beatitude. Hence the Apostle in Romans 8: \"I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not condign for the future glory which will be revealed in us.\" The Gloss:[n50] \"I reckon, and I know, that the sufferings of this time, that is, temporal and momentary ones, are not condign, that is, sufficient, if strict dealing were employed with us, to merit future glory. For the tribulation itself is with an end, the reward will be without end; and the glory there will be much greater than the labor here.\"\n\nAugustine teaches this same view more explicitly on that verse of Psalm 36, \"The steps of a man will be directed by the Lord, and he will desire his way\":[n51] \"Do not,\" he says, \"look only at where you are going, but at where you are to arrive. You will bear hard temporal things, but you will come to joyful, everlasting ones. If you wish to endure the labor, look to the reward; you will marvel that so much is given for so great a labor. For surely, brothers, for eternal rest an eternal labor would have to be undergone, and, in order to receive eternal happiness, you would have to endure eternal sufferings; but if you endured eternal labor, when would you arrive at eternal happiness? So it comes about that your tribulation must be temporal, so that when it is finished you may come to infinite happiness. And yet, brothers, there could be a long tribulation for the sake of eternal happiness; for example, so that, since our happiness will not have an end, our misery too, and our labor, and our tribulations should be lasting. For even if there were thousands of years, weigh a thousand years against eternity; what are you weighing when you set any finite thing against the infinite? Ten thousand years, a million if we must say so, and thousands of thousands, which have an end, cannot be compared with eternity.\"\n\nPerhaps it will be said that because God promised the eternal kingdom to those who work, they merit it condignly, and otherwise they would not merit it condignly. But this does not seem so, because no one could merit that promise itself condignly, and without it the eternal kingdom could not be merited condignly ; therefore no one, simply speaking, could or can merit the eternal kingdom condignly. Nor is anyone's work after the promise better than a similar one was before the promise; but no work before the promise merited the kingdom condignly. Nor does that promise make the work better, as is plain inductively from the substance of the work and from all its circumstances; indeed perhaps it makes it less good, for it makes the intention less sincere: he who formerly worked purely for God alone now perhaps works for the sake of the promised retribution. Likewise, God then does not confer eternal life in as free a manner as he did before the promise; for then he conferred it altogether freely, but now from the necessity of the promise and of the necessity of preserving justice. This seems to detract very greatly from his supreme freedom and perfect immutability. Then too the one working meritoriously would compel God to raise him up and reward him eternally, or else to incur an offense against justice; where then is his supreme freedom and insuperable power?\n\nLikewise, his eternal promise, mental and interior, in the Word or in his eternal Holy Spirit, binds God no less than his temporal promise, verbal and exterior, perhaps through the ministry of some angel; but whatever he promised temporally, vocally, externally, he promised eternally, mentally, internally, in the Word or in his eternal Holy Spirit, as his complete immutability will demonstrate by the 5th and 23rd chapters. Likewise, God so promised that whatever we ask in his name he would give us; and Samuel prayed for Saul, and Jeremiah for the people, and many were interceding for many reprobates. They therefore merited condignly to be heard, and God did not hear them, as the twenty-fifth of this work alleges. He therefore did them a manifest injury, which no one except a manifestly unjust man will dare even to think silently.\n\nAgain, as a principal argument: if someone merits an increase of grace condignly, then he merits either its continuous increase or a discrete one. If only a discrete one, and by turns, then by one great merit he merits one definite increase; hence by half the merit, half the reward and increase, and so proportionally according to its several parts. Therefore he merits condignly that his grace be continually increased. Moreover, every reason that proves that someone merits condignly that his grace be increased by turns and discretely will likewise prove it for the continuous case. And if this is granted, it will follow that any work of grace merits condignly the remission of any temporal penalty, here and in purgatory, indeed even of all such penalties of all the punished whatsoever, if it is duly offered and given to that effect. This does not seem so, for then it would seem superfluous to do many great works of grace to buy off penalties, or even venial sins, since a brief salutation of the glorious Virgin (the Hail Mary) would suffice condignly, indeed even the least thought. And the same follows for mortal sins, however great.\n\nFor the least contrition, as it seems [to some], by grace removes the guilt and commutes the eternal penalty into a temporal one. Since therefore any contrition is perhaps more intense than is necessarily required, the intensive half of it, not necessarily required, removes the whole temporal penalty that remains; or at least, if the contrition were prolonged further for however short a time, it would remove the whole penalty. For any work of grace merits condignly something incomparably greater than every such temporal remission, namely an increase of grace and, proportionally, an everlasting increase of glory; any such condign merit, therefore, will suffice condignly even for any lesser thing, as the sanctions of commutative justice teach in Ethics 5. And Anselm says in Why God Became Man, book 2, ch. 20: \"What can be understood to be more just than that one to whom a price greater than every debt is given, if it is given with the affection that is due, should remit the whole debt?\" But if it is said that to commute such a merit, by which an increase of everlasting grace and glory is merited, for the remission of a temporal penalty, or of temporal penalties, would be an everlasting prejudice to him, and that God, judging more equitably, therefore does not do this: still the reasoning made before stands, especially since no injury is done to one who is willing, according to the jurists and according to the Philosopher in Ethics 5, 17: \"No one willing suffers injustice.\"[n52] Indeed it seems that anyone can dispense to the needy, out of pious affection, what is duly his own acquisition, inflicting prejudice on no other; or suppose he offers that merit to God for someone dead and damned to so great a misery, or a lesser one, and the said reasoning will stand. Even according to the aforesaid response, no one could merit by any work of grace full remission, nor even mitigation of the lightest temporal penalty, the same prejudice always prohibiting. This is known to be most false in the judgment of the whole Church, which grants indulgences and commutes penances into other works of piety.\n\nLikewise, without any commutation: whoever merits continuously, and condignly, something incomparably greater, namely an increase of everlasting grace and glory, will merit condignly, sooner or at least just as soon, something incomparably less, namely the remission of any temporal penalty whatever. Whoever therefore begins to work meritoriously out of grace has any temporal penalty remitted to him, as a matter of debt and condignity, at once, in the first instant or immediately after. Likewise, that no one merits a continuous increase of grace condignly appears from this: that then to any work of grace a definite increase of grace would be owed, a greater to the greater, a lesser to the lesser, an equal to the equal. Let there then be two sons of grace equal in grace and in everything else, except that one, for a mortal sin, or for a venial one only, is a debtor of temporal penalty; and let them do equal works of grace, so that the debtor of the penalty is wholly absolved by that merit. Then either beyond that absolution from the penalty he merits some reward in the future life, or nothing at all. Not nothing at all, because then it could happen that a baptized adult, actually loving God supremely and actually exercising himself in holy works for a long time of his life, even enduring martyrdom for Christ and his law, would be rewarded equally in the future life with one baptized infant who never did anything good.\n\nFor this follows evidently if all these things are joined into a fitting penance for the sinner, or if all these things suffice equally for the satisfaction of his sin or sins. Where then is what both Testaments most frequently promise again, that God will render to each according to his works? According to this view too it would seem more expedient for sinners to defer the satisfaction enjoined on them, or at least that owed for venial sins, until purgatory after the end of the present life, and to toil at other good works that are not satisfactory, nor done with the intention of satisfying for sin, but simply directed to God and simply meritorious. For by so doing, and so finally departing, he would acquire for himself a great everlasting reward, and would undergo after death a small temporal purgatorial penalty. But who would presume to affirm this? Moreover, if it were so, such a man would be punished eternally, at least with the penalty of loss, namely by the subtraction of a portion of the everlasting glory which he would otherwise have had; but who would presume to make heaven a prison, or a place of punishment?\n\nHow also will it be true what James testifies of God, who, he says, \"gives to all abundantly and does not reproach\"? If he acted thus, he would give everlasting reproach to the penitent man for a sin committed and forgiven, namely a diminution of everlasting glory. Indeed, if it were so, no one would ever satisfy, or be able to satisfy, in the present life for any sin, however small and least. For if he is saved, he will be punished for that sin with an eternal penalty of loss in heaven, through some subtraction of everlasting glory, which he would otherwise have had for that good work by which he satisfies; and who would presume to say this, or even to think it? It would seem, moreover, wonderful and exceedingly amazing that one who from most dear charity and most dear grace should love God most dearly and most gratefully above all things for his own sake,[n53] and so do his works, though satisfactory for sin, for the sake of God, should merit no perpetual reward, nor anything good at all, except a small remission of a small temporal penalty. For how would it accord with equity or agree with justice that he should accept a price most worthy of the greatest everlasting reward only for the least debt, for the least temporal penalty, when it is worth infinitely more? For thus he would be exacting excessively heavy interest. Therefore perhaps it will be said that such a man merits some everlasting reward: either less than another who is free from a debt of penalty of this kind, or equally with him. If less, then either less eternally, or less only temporally. Not less eternally, for the reasons set forth.\n\nFor suppose that Peter, baptized as an infant and having become an adult, falls by mortal sin from baptismal grace, which let be A; and that Paul, an adult established in grace, merits by some pious work a grace B, which let be equal to A or less, beyond his prior grace, or only an increase of it. But Peter, lacking grace, who according to the hypothesis can merit it congruously, does a similar pious work, meriting congruously first grace after sin, which let be C. Then either C is equal to A, or less, or greater. If equal, the inconvenience previously stated returns, namely that an adult working laudably would be beatified equally with an infant merely baptized. But if C is less than A, the inconvenience will be greater. If, however, it is greater, why does Peter, less disposed to merit than Paul, merit more than he by a similar pious work? For Paul merits B, a grace equal to A, only, or less. Indeed, suppose that Paul by some good work merits a grace B less than grace A by however much, and it will follow that Peter by a similar good work merits an equal grace or a lesser one; indeed it seems reasonable that it would be lesser, since he is less disposed to merit. Still further, if C is greater than A, that is, by some finite proportion, suppose then that Peter's merit, by which he merits C, is reduced proportionally, or below that; and the inconveniences just touched on return, especially if, according to the Pelagian hypothesis, God gives no grace freely to Peter, but only on account of and according to antecedent merit.\n\nMoreover, suppose that Peter and Paul are established in equal grace, and Peter is a debtor of a small penalty for sin but Paul by no means, and that both do equal meritorious works, etc., as above against the former response. For it follows plainly that it would be more expedient for Peter to defer that satisfaction until purgatory after this life; that Peter, even saved in heaven, would be punished eternally; that God gives to him sparingly and always reproaches him; that he will never satisfy, nor can ever satisfy, for any sin whatever; and that, besides, God acts mercilessly, cruelly and unjustly with him, namely by compensating a portion of merit, to which a portion of everlasting glory is worthily owed, for the satisfaction of a small penalty, although this is worth infinitely more condignly, and by thus unjustly docking his reward. Moreover, if some good work exceeds for the satisfaction of this, and some lesser one suffices according to what was set forth, and, as the Pelagians admit, some one suffices equally, etc., as above.\n\nFurthermore, as to how much less Peter merits eternally than Paul, by what measure is the quantity of that lesser amount to be reckoned, unless perhaps by the quantity of the eternal penalty previously owed him for mortal sin? But that penalty was perhaps more intense than the glory that Paul merits;[n54] hence Peter too by that satisfactory work merits nothing of everlasting glory, against the hypothesis; indeed he does not even fully divest himself of the whole debt of the old penalty. Nor is it necessary that Peter's preceding sin was mortal, or to be punished with perpetual penalty. Is not Peter, even if he is now established in glory,[n55] free from the debt of eternal penalty, and perhaps a debtor of temporal penalty only? How then does the just God now exact from him a debt, and satisfaction, for an eternal penalty? Therefore perhaps it will be said, first, that in the former case Peter merits some everlasting reward, less than Paul only temporally, that is, less and shorter in extent by some definite finite time, as great as the temporal penalty remitted through his merit was, and from then on equal in extent and in intensity likewise to eternity. But such a deformity is by no means countenanced; rather, full conformity is considered by the Fathers to be posited in the saints, in future happiness and consummated beatitude. Nor is a time of merit or of progress held by the orthodox Fathers to exist in heaven after the final judgment; nor is a place of prison or of punishment in heaven reckoned by the holy Fathers.\n\nWho would even say that no one satisfies, or can satisfy, by pious works however great, for however small a sin in the present life, without being punished there after this life, if he passes to the future one, by some penalty of loss? By a similar reason it seems that, of two equally meritorious men who do not die at the same time, but one at the beginning, as it were, of the world and the other at its end, the earlier would wait for the later and would receive no taste of beatitude before him. Therefore perhaps it will also be said that in the case set forth Peter and Paul merit altogether equally, and so an equal increase of grace in the present and of glory in the future; hence Peter too merits more simply, namely the remission of his penalty, against the hypothesis already set forth.\n\nIf, however, it is said with the Apostle in Romans 5 that where sin abounded, grace also superabounded, for the reason that Jesus Christ, through whom come grace and truth, applies more the power of his most blessed and most immaculate passion to the merit of him who is a debtor of temporal penalty on account of his offense, and so for him, beyond his merit common with another, the temporal penalty also is remitted: this does not resolve the matter. For, as the Apostle says, where sin abounded, grace superabounded; that remission of the penalty is therefore from grace, not from condign merit. Nor does this response help the ungrateful Pelagians, who profess a debt of merits in such matters and no gratuitous grace.[n56] Nor does any reason compel that the suffering Christ assist him more, since he is more unworthy, or at least not more worthy, than another; indeed, since he assists voluntarily, he can assist less or equally, as it pleases. Let him therefore assist equally, and the argument stands unharmed, as before.\n\nThen also, according to this view, however great the temporal penalty he owed, the passion of Christ, joined with merit however small, would take away all of it. For no reason appears why it should take away this much and not more; indeed, if because in one man sin superabounded so much, grace superabounded just as much, then by the same reasoning in another, where sin superabounded more, grace removing it superabounded proportionally greater, and he merits no less of an increase of grace and everlasting glory.\n\nOthers say that that debtor of penalty will necessarily have one circumstance of merit that the other will not have, namely that his work is penance and an ecclesiastical sacrament, and that this circumstance removes the temporal penalty, while the principal merit acquires the increase of everlasting grace and glory. But this does not resolve it. For suppose that one guilty of venial sin and of temporal penalty, without confession and sacramental penance, does some pious work to remove them, and that another, wholly immune, merits equally; or suppose that that immune man believes himself guilty of a similar sin and a debtor of so great a penalty, and does likewise an altogether similar work to remove them; or suppose further that, so believing, he is contrite, confesses, and does everything equally from grace just as the guilty man does, and the argument returns. Or suppose still that such a man, guilty of mortal sin in the time of the old law, which perhaps did not at all bind to oral confession, has satisfied for his sin by God's grace, contrition and other holy works; or that someone in the time of the new law, having no access to a confessor, similarly satisfies for his mortal sin without the sacrament of penance; and the little reply already set forth is removed.\n\nMoreover, if someone merits an increase of grace condignly, then equally pleasing works merit an equal increase. Let John then do some work of grace only for himself, saying with holy David, \"Have mercy on me, O God\"; and let Peter do a work of grace equally meritorious, for others, and let their grace be intensified, saying with the Apostle, in Philippians 1, \"This I pray, that your charity may abound more and more.\" Then John's grace is increased by something definite, and Peter's grace by as much, for he merits equally; and the grace of those for whom Peter prays is increased by something. For whatever we ask the Father in the Son's name he will give us. Peter therefore merits simply more, which manifestly contradicts the hypothesis.\n\nIt seems also that Peter's prayer in grace would be of infinite merit. For suppose there are many unbelievers disposed to the grace of the Christian faith, for whom Peter prays only in general, that they may be converted to the faith, and that there may be one sheepfold and one shepherd. Since then whatever we ask the Father in the Son's name he will give us, he will convert one or some of them; and since there is no greater cause for one than for another (granted that they are equally disposed), it follows that each will be converted. And by the same reasoning it would be so if there were a hundred, or a thousand, or any number however great. Peter's prayer, therefore, so far as it depends on itself, is not of limited merit, but rather of infinite. This reasoning is confirmed: if Peter's prayer availed for only one person, it would be of a definite merit; if it avails for two, it is of greater, and so on; and the greater its merit, the more worthy it is to be accepted for more people. The more people therefore he prays for and is heard, the more worthily will he still be heard for more.\n\nAgain, since it seems in no way reasonable that the merit of Peter's prayer should be worth more, as a matter of debt, to another or to others than to Peter himself, since the thirty-fourth Psalm says, \"My prayer shall return into my bosom,\" it seems that that prayer is of infinite merit also for Peter himself. If, however, it is said that the more people he merits grace for, the less he merits for each of them, so that that reasoning does not proceed: this cannot stand. For then he would merit for some a grace less than baptismal grace, and a lesser everlasting glory than the least glory of infants, or than one that could be sensed in itself.\n\nMoreover, that equally pleasing works do not condignly merit an equal increase of grace is urged by this: that then by the same reasoning they would equally merit all other goods too; whereas of two equals, the one who departs first is always equally intensely, and in addition for longer than the other, glorified. Likewise, then someone existing in grace could by his prayers merit condignly first grace for another who does not have grace; so by what has been said it would not be grace. Indeed he could even merit condignly that first grace be given to himself. For let him pray in grace; and if it should happen that he falls from it by mortal sin, let God infuse in him the grace of rising again, and let his prayer be so efficacious that he obtains this condignly. Then, if he sins mortally, God is bound by his prior condign merit to give him first grace by which he may rise. Likewise, then an adult in the first instant in which grace is infused into him can use it meritoriously, as Anselm plainly teaches in On Truth, 12,[n57] which was elsewhere urged by many reasons and authorities and, as I think, shown persuasively. Hence he can also merit condignly, and receive in the same instant, an increase of it. And since in an intense quality there is no heap of remitted parts,[n58] but it is always only one quality, purely simple, as I suppose here, because, as I judge, this has been shown elsewhere: he can therefore merit condignly his own first grace, which is against the position of those men and against Catholic truth, as the 35th chapter declared.\n\nAgain, if in an instant he merits condignly that a definite increase of grace be given to him, it follows that if he likewise merits continuously through some whole time, he will merit condignly an infinite increase of grace; or, meriting likewise through some whole continuous time, he will merit condignly equally only as much as in an instant, and through some whole continuous time still less.[n59] Moreover, then some man in grace could merit condignly for any wayfarer, even a reprobate, the grace of conversion and everlasting glory, since he can do so for some of the predestined who are worse than they.[n60] The opposite of this was made plain in the case of Samuel praying for Saul, and Jeremiah praying for the people of the Jews, and by Augustine, City of God 21, 25, universally about all the reprobate, as the 25th chapter cited.\n\nLikewise, someone finally reprobate has charity at times, and afterward looks back,[n61] and likewise turns backward; or at least this is possible, otherwise everyone having charity and grace would necessarily be saved. This was true of Saul and Judas, as the Doctors affirm. But such a one, existing in grace however great, cannot merit condignly that God love him to life. For let such a reprobate exercise himself in works of grace however much, even ten thousand times more than a predestined man does; still God does not love him to life, but only hates him to death, as he will ever do in the future. For since such a man, after all his merits, is dead and buried in Hell and finally damned, it is certain that God does not love him to life but hates him to death; hence he never loved him, nor ever failed to hate him, as the 23rd and 25th teach. Moreover, if such a man could merit condignly that God would love him, he could move the divine will from reprobation to predestination, from hate to love, or at least could move it a priori and efficiently, against the 20th. And if one existing in grace cannot merit condignly that he be loved to eternal life, then no one can. Likewise it can also be shown that no one existing in grace can merit congruously, causally and antecedently, to the divine will, that he be loved by God to eternal life, or loved more by him.\n\nMoreover, it seems that no one can merit anything good from God condignly and by strict right, unless perhaps it is such a good as inseparably follows upon the merit, such as perhaps being, for the one who merits, good and just, simply or in part. Otherwise, the one who merited would compel God and the divine will necessarily to render, or to be willing to render, the reward, or to lose justice. For if the Lord remains just in all his ways, and someone merits anything condignly from him, it is just that he have it, and everything just of this kind is just by the will of God, as the 21st teaches. Hence it is necessary that he will to render it to him, especially since by the 22nd he has an act of will concerning the retribution of the reward; wherefore also, since power does not fail him, it is necessary that he render, as the tenth showed. And so the creature would compel God to will, and even to act outwardly, what the first Supposition, with its infinite perfection, in no way permits, nor will the 20th be able to consent.\n\nAgain, suppose, as the adversaries do, that John yesterday merited condignly that a good, A, be returned to him by God tomorrow. Then yesterday it was just, and willed by God, that A be returned to John tomorrow. Suppose also that today he forfeits A by demerit. Then God today does not will to return A to John; hence, by the 23rd, neither did he will it yesterday. Indeed, today he wills that John will never have A, and so, by the same 23rd, he likewise willed this yesterday. Moreover, if anyone can merit anything condignly from God, he can, it seems, merit condignly, for himself or for another who is in grace, that he persevere to the end and be saved. If he does this, such a wayfarer cannot sin mortally or be damned. Again, by the 20th of this, no merit is a motive of the divine will, and therefore not a cause why God wills to give anyone this or that. By the same arguments it can be shown that no one merits from congruity, causally and antecedently, any good from God. This supposes that nothing congruous is unjust, just as nothing unjust seems congruous, and that everything congruous is just and willed by God. Again, no one merits anything condignly from another who has first done nothing for him,\n\nor given him anything. For the laborer's own work must precede the wage, in time or in nature. If he receives every operation from God, who is prior, and continues in his power, he does not seem by this to merit anything condignly from him, but rather to owe him more after his working than before. For then he has benignly received more good from him than before, and above all he gives nothing proper to the giver, only a good of him to whom it is given. No man, however, first does anything for God; for God himself is, in every making and moving, the first maker and mover, as is clearly evident from what precedes. What then does man merit condignly by such making? This seems to be the Apostle's reasoning in Rom 11: Who, he says, has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? for from him, and through him, and in him are all things. Hence it is clear that he gives good things from grace alone, not from preceding merit. Therefore Augustine too, on that verse of Ps 32 [33], All his works are in faith, hinting at the distinction between debtor and debt, speaks thus: Let us hold God as the most faithful debtor, because\n\nwe hold him as a most merciful promiser. For we have lent him nothing, that we might hold him as debtor, since we have from him whatever we offer him. For who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? because from him, and through him, and in him are all things. Therefore we have given him nothing, and yet we hold him as debtor. Whence then do we have him as debtor? Because he is the most faithful promiser. Anselm agrees with this in On Concord 9, saying: God gives to no one for a preceding merit. When has anyone first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? And the same Anselm in Why God Became Man 1, 20: God owes nothing to anyone, but every creature owes to him, and therefore it does not befit man to deal with God as an equal with an equal. Lombard also, Sentences 1, dist. 43, following Augustine, says that God is not our debtor except perhaps by promise, not by anything entrusted [n62]. Cyprian, cited above, thinks the same, when he says that we must glory in nothing, since nothing is ours. And the Gloss on that verse of Rom 4, To him who works, the wage is not reckoned according to grace, but according to what is owed, says: What we do well, once grace is received,\n\nis to be ascribed not to us but to him who has justified us through grace. For if he wished to render the wage owed before grace, he would render to sinners the punishment owed. Do not, then, flatter yourself about merits, when you hear that a wage is returned to you according to the debt of the work, as though in the work there were no grace of the one who rewards, as in faith there is the grace of the one who justifies. For I can hardly persuade myself that any work is said to claim God's remuneration from debt, since even this very thing, that we can do something, or think, or say, we do by his gift and bounty. The blessed Bernard also, in On Grace and Free Choice, last chapter, treating of the crown of justice to be rendered to the Apostle, wills the same. Again, by the first Supposition and the third part of the first Corollary of this, nothing that in any way diminishes freedom is to be ascribed to God. But to owe condignly, and by the pure rigor of law, diminishes freedom and in a certain way subjects it to servitude. For a Lord would be freer who had servants working for him and were bound to them by no debt or rigor but only by spontaneous freedom, than one who were bound to his working servants by necessary debt and rigor, and could be compelled against his will to render payment, and who would in that case be subject to the injury of servitude.\n\nAgain, by the same, nothing that diminishes the freedom of the giver is to be ascribed to God, but debt diminishes it; for it is more liberal to give freely than as due. Again, no one merits anything condignly from another unless he does something that is in some way good for that other, and not only for the doer; but by the fifth part of the first Corollary of this, no man does any good to God. Hence Job 22: What do you profit God, if you are just, or what do you confer on him, if your life is spotless? But whatever good man does, profits himself. And so Augustine, On Free Choice 3, 25: God owes nothing to anyone, because he bestows all things gratuitously; and if anyone says that something is owed by him to his merits, surely, for it to exist, it was not owed to him. For there was no one to whom it could have been owed; and yet what merit is it to be turned to him from whom you are, so that from him you may also be better, from whom you have it that you are? Why then do you claim precedence with him, so as to demand it as a debt, when, if you were unwilling to be turned to him, nothing would be lacking to him, and you would be wretched? All things therefore owe to him: first that they are, insofar as they are natures; then whatever better they can be if they will, whatever they have received that they may will, and whatever it behooves them to be.\n\nAgain, no one lacking grace can of himself satisfy God condignly for original sin, or even the least actual sin, as appears from what was premised around the 32nd part, and the 38th and 39th, of the first Corollary of this. Hence neither can he merit anything from him from debt and condignity. For whatever good such a one can do is less than the debt for sin. Otherwise such a one could of himself merit condignly grace in the present and glory in the future, contrary to what was said earlier. Anselm also proves this in Why God Became Man 1, 21 and 22. The blessed Job seems to hold the same when he says, I have sinned; what shall I do to you, O Guardian of men? (Job 7), as if to say: I have sinned; what shall I do to you for condign satisfaction? hinting that he can do nothing. On this the blessed Gregory says, Moralia 8, 21: Behold, he confesses the evil he has done, but the good which he ought to offer to God in compensation he does not find; because, for washing away guilt, the virtue of any human action is weak, unless the mercy of one who spares fosters it, and the justice of one who judges rightly does not press it down.\n\nAgain, no one can fully repay the debt which he has received from God; hence neither can he merit anything from him from pure debt and condignity. For a son cannot repay his carnal father as much as he owes; how much less can anyone repay as much as he owes to the heavenly Father. For if a son could repay his father as much as he owes, let him repay it, and he is absolved from every natural obligation and debt toward his father, so that in no case that may arise is he bound to his father more than to any stranger whatever. This the law of nature and of gratitude does not permit. Hence the Philosopher, Ethics 8, last [chapter] [n63]: Return should be made to the benefactor of what one can; for friendship requires what is possible, not what accords with worth. For it is not so in all cases, as also in those matters that pertain to the gods, to men, and to parents. For no one will ever make a return according to worth; but one who serves according to his ability seems equitable; for one who owes must make repayment; but one who does nothing worthy of those things that were at hand [n64],\n\nhas labored; therefore he always owes. Again, whoever has received anything from another is bound to return the equal, if he can, as the law of gratitude clearly proves. Hence the Philosopher says, Ethics 8, 13: One who is able must make return according to the worth of what he has received, and willingly. The authority just cited agrees with this. And in Ethics 5, 8 a certain species of commutative justice is posited: to return proportionally for a benefit previously received. For it is said there: By doing in return proportionally the city holds together; but if not, servitude seems to result; for if not, repayment is not made, and by repayment they hold together. For this reason they also promptly perform the sacred rite of the Graces [n65], that repayment may occur; for this is proper to favor: one must serve in return the one who has done a favor, and then himself begin again by doing a favor. The seven books of Seneca On Benefits attest this very often. Hence even if a man has received more than he is able to return, he is bound to return as much as he can, as the first authority of the Philosopher plainly says. But God has done more for us than we can return condignly, as the first-cited authority of the Philosopher wills; and it is clear, because God gave man his whole being, and all his powers, and habits or acts, as the preceding show. All these things, therefore, man owes to God. And beyond these, God gave to man, and for wretched man, a captive bound over to everlasting flames, himself incarnate, suffering, dead and buried, as a price, to redeem him in time. He promises besides, and gives himself whole, as a reward, to bring him to blessed completion; and this exceeds any mere man infinitely. Therefore every man owes God infinitely more than he is and can [render], or at the very least as much as he can. This reasoning is confirmed by Anselm, in that Meditation of his on the redemption of the human soul, which begins \"Christian soul, raised from grave death\" [n66], where he says: Surely, Lord, because you made me, I owe your love my whole self; because you redeemed me, I owe my whole self; indeed, I owe your love as much more than myself as you, for whom you gave yourself, and to whom you promise yourself, are greater than I. Perhaps one will reply, according to the same Anselm, Why God Became Man 2, 18, who says: When you say that a creature owes God what it knows and is able to do best, if you understand this as from debt, and do not supply,\n\n\"if God commands,\" it is not always true. For man does not owe virginity from debt, but if he wishes, he ought to make use of marriage. But this does not resolve the matter; for God, by not commanding, does not destroy the law of gratitude which he has ordained, and by this law everyone who has been benefited is bound to his benefactor for the equal or more, or at least for what he can, as the earlier authorities hold. Again, if God demanded, man would be bound to do as much as he could; but if he does not demand, and leaves the matter free to man's own will, he does more for him, since he grants greater freedom. Hence by this very fact man is more obligated to God, or at least as much, as he would otherwise have been. Here someone will perhaps answer that God can remit that entire obligation; for the Philosopher says, Ethics 8, last, immediately after the authority cited on the repayment to be made to the gods and parents, but those to whom it is owed have the power to release, and a father surely. But the argument turns back once more against him. For to remit so great a debt and so great an obligation is one benefit, and not a small one. For this, therefore, together with the others, man is further obligated. It is as when a creditor freely forgives a debtor all the money lent, and remits every obligation as far as he can: he binds the debtor to himself the more tightly, by as much as the second benefit exceeds the first.\n\nBut lest I seem to contradict Anselm and Aristotle, I say, as can be drawn from the opinion of each, that to owe is twofold, namely potentially or habitually, and actually. By owing actually I understand being actually obligated to do something under penalty of sin, as a hired workman is to perform a definite work; and in this way we are not bound to do for God whatever we can. This is perhaps Anselm's meaning; and so, according to Aristotle, a father can release his son, and God man, so that he not be obligated to him to the full extent he could be. By owing potentially or habitually I understand that anyone who has been benefited by a benefit previously received has an obligation, in potency and in habit, to do something, which, when it pleases the benefactor, can be reduced to act, namely if he demands it of him. It is as if John handed over ten to Peter on this condition: Have these ten freely, unless it happens that I take them back; and if I take them back, you are bound to pay them back to me. And so every\n\nrational creature is bound to God in all things as much as it can, namely if he wishes to demand this of it. Therefore it can merit nothing good from him by strict, owed, and violent rigor, just as Peter with those ten cannot buy anything from John. For the fact that he has, in a certain way, this or that as free and his own for meriting, buying, or doing something, he has not from himself but from God; and this not from any previously contracted debt, but wholly from grace and the free permission of his gratuitous will. Moreover, that no one merits first grace from congruity is clear, because either this would be by a congruity antecedent to the divine will and moving it to bestow grace, or by one consequent upon it and dependent on it. If by an antecedent congruity, then, since every such congruity is a certain reason and justice, it is reasonable and just, by a reason and justice antecedent to the divine will, that God give his grace to such a person. Hence by the 21st this is necessarily reasonable and just; it is therefore necessary that God do this, or act against necessary\n\nreason and justice, and sin. Then, too, such a congruity, being lower, would move the divine will, against the 20th, and would determine that will, which is of itself indifferent; and it would be wholly alien to divine providence, against the 27th and the others that follow. If by a congruity consequent upon the divine will, then that congruity is posterior to the divine will; hence, by the 20th, it in no way moves that will to will to confer grace, as a merit exciting and inducing it. Again, if it is so, it is congruous that God give grace to one so meriting, because this is willed by God; therefore this is not only congruous, as these men say, but also condign. For whatever God wills to be done, it is worthy and just that it be done, as the twenty-first chapter demonstrated, and no one doubts it who is secure about divine justice and knows that everything just is worthy. They will perhaps say that it is indeed worthy, but not condign; but what is condign, except what is worthy with reason and justice? Hence it is also written in Esther 6 in this way: He is condignly worthy of this honor, whomever the king wills to honor [n67]. Likewise, to the same point: everything sufficient is condign (for so the Gloss expounds that verse of Rom 8, The sufferings are not condign, etc.: condign, that is, sufficient),\n\nbut such a work is sufficient for obtaining grace. For nothing is lacking to it; for it obtains it. That also is sufficient which God wills and judges to suffice on the part of the one working, and such, according to the position of these men, is a work of this kind. But if it is said that it is not condign, that is, equally good, then neither is the work done in grace equally good with the increase of temporal grace and eternal glory, as was argued above. Again, if this is congruous by a congruity consequent upon the divine will, namely because God wills it so to be done, then even one who does nothing good but sins mortally and most gravely merits from congruity that grace be given him. So did Paul, when, still breathing threats and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, he sought to destroy the Christian name; for God wills it to be so done. For he himself by his operating grace freely anticipates sinners, as was shown above. And if it is said that God gives grace to such men, but not for such evil deeds, and so through such deeds they do not merit from congruity that grace be given them, then, according to these men, to those who merit first grace from congruity God gives it on account of their prior merits; therefore\n\ngrace is now no longer grace, as was argued above. And moreover those merits then move the divine will antecedently and causally, a priori, and cause volition in it, the contrary of which was said, namely that it is congruous for God to act so by a congruity only consequent upon the divine will. The twentieth chapter also showed the contrary of this. Again, Augustine, on that verse of Psalm 118 [119], Repay your servant [n68], distinguishing a fourfold repayment, shows that God repays good for evil. For he says: There are four repayments: either evil is repaid for evil, as God will repay eternal fire to the wicked; or good for good, as he will repay the eternal kingdom to the just; or good for evil, as Christ by grace justifies the wicked; or evil for good, as Judas by malice persecuted Christ. Of these four repayments, the first two belong to justice, the third to mercy; the fourth God does not know. But this third is first in necessity; for unless he repaid good for evil,\n\nthere would be in no way any to whom he might repay good for good. This reasoning can also be made otherwise, in this form: when someone merits God's grace from congruity, either because God wills it so to be, therefore this is congruous; or because this is congruous, therefore God wills it so to be. If the first is granted, it is likewise condign, and so it is even for one who acts in the worst way, and even then it is just posterior to the divine will; therefore it is not the cause of that will. For God first, naturally, wills it so to be, and by so willing makes it congruous; not therefore because this is congruous does God will it so to be. If the second is granted, then, by the twentieth, this is not a positive just, contingent and able to be otherwise, because every such just depends on the divine will; but it is just necessarily and absolutely, or at least just in a mixed way, and thus, supposing that such a deed is of necessity, it is just, and so God would give grace to one so meriting out of the necessity of preserving justice. Again, God can freely not give grace to one so acting. Suppose then that he does not; then it is not congruous. Or if he gives grace to one who so acts, and to another acting likewise he does not give it, then this is not congruous per se, and therefore willed by God, but the converse.\n\nAgain, it is easier for anyone existing in grace to merit from congruity that God love him, or love him more unto life, than for one lacking grace to merit first grace, and to be loved by God unto eternal life. But one foreknown to death, existing in grace, cannot do this, as was argued above. Again, when someone merits anything from God from congruity, since everything congruous is just, because everything unjust is incongruous, that is just and its opposite unjust; hence its opposite is also impossible with respect to God, as the first Supposition and the 3rd part of the first corollary prove. And Anselm says, Why God Became Man 1, 10: In God any inconvenience, however small, is followed by impossibility; and if its opposite is impossible, this is necessary, and everything necessary just is condign. Whoever\n\ntherefore merits anything from God from congruity also merits it from condignity. Perhaps it is said that someone merits something from God from congruity because, if God gives it back, it is congruous; and for certain so it is if God should render him punishment. Then he no more merits grace from congruity than punishment. Likewise, if God should render grace to one sinning most gravely, it is congruous, therefore he merits it from congruity. And if two act in every respect alike, and God gives grace to one, and gives none to the other, one merits it from congruity and not the other, though they act alike in all things. Also, if God so renders, it is condign that it be so done. For in such matters nothing is worthy or condign except because it is willed by God, since it is neither reasonable nor just otherwise, as chapter 21 showed, and Esther 6: He is condignly worthy of such honor, whomever the king wills to honor. Again, according to these men, a man lacking grace can merit something from condignity, but grace only from congruity. So either there is some greatest thing that he can merit condignly, or a least that he cannot. If the greatest that he can be posited, let it be A; then either A is a finite good,\n\nor infinite. If finite, he can still merit something further, and so A is not the greatest that he can merit. If infinite, this does not seem so, because each of his acts was finite, and all together finite in merit and worth, and because he could still merit more, nor could God reward him condignly, since he cannot make an infinite, as is clear from the showing of the 40th part of the first Corollary. Nor can the first division be denied: that some good can be merited condignly and some cannot. For let a small good be taken which can be merited condignly, and let it be imagined to grow continuously until it is so great that it cannot be merited condignly. Then A, at some instant, which let be B, will begin to be as great as such a one cannot merit condignly. Either, therefore, A will begin intrinsically in B to be so great, namely so that then for the first time it will be so great; and then there is, no doubt, something that cannot be merited condignly, for he cannot merit condignly as much as A will then be, though he can merit any amount less. Or A will begin extrinsically to be as great as such a one cannot merit condignly, namely so that then it will not be so great, but immediately afterward it will be; and then A will be the greatest that such a one can merit condignly, since he can merit condignly as much as A will be in B, as is granted, and nothing further greater than it. Again, let John and Peter, unbelievers, merit from congruity equally, and equally long, that first graces be given them, and let John after a certain time, at instant A, receive grace according to what he merited, but let Peter die at A. Since then he merited equally with John, and it is not due to him that he dies, as I suppose, God will reward him from congruity with equal grace, and will finally save him, though he was baptized with no baptism of water, of the Spirit, or of blood [n69]. This seems contrary to the Gospel, and to all the Doctors, and to the general faith of the Church. Hence John 3: Unless one is born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God, and this literally, in reality, or at least spiritually and virtually, as the Doctors expound, which happens in adults by believing and wishing to be baptized, or by shedding their own blood for the love of God. Again, Augustine says, On Grace and Free Choice 50: Let men suppose whatever\n\ngood merits they think precede, so as to be justified through God's grace, not understanding, when they say this, that they do nothing other than deny grace. Therefore those who put merits from congruity before God's grace deny God's grace. Someone may perhaps object against what has been said, first by proving that someone can merit eternal glory condignly. For Wisdom 3 says thus of the Just: Afflicted in a few things, in many they shall be well ordered, because God tested them and found them worthy of himself. And Ecclesiasticus 26: No weighing is worthy of a continent soul; therefore a continent soul merits condignly an infinite reward. And Luke 10: The laborer is worthy of his wage; but the wage of the laborers in Christ's vineyard is the denarius of infinite glory. And further on in the same [Gospel], 20: Those who shall be counted worthy of that age and of the resurrection from the dead, etc. And Apoc. 3: They shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy, together with a good many similar texts. Reason shows the same. For every virtuous act is incomparably better than every good that is useful or delightful, distinguished from the honorable, virtuous, and just good; otherwise a useful\n\nor delightful good could be increased so much that it would be equally good with the happiness which consists in virtuous acts, as is clear in Ethics 1, 9 and after, indeed that it would be better. And thus, since happiness is the greatest human good, as is clear there and elsewhere from all the standard philosophical and theological writers, it would have to be placed in money or pleasures, against all truly wise men and against the whole course of the Philosopher's argument just mentioned. Then also a great good given, or a pleasure forgone, would be accepted by God as much as the greatest virtuous act. And a man could choose riches and eternal pleasures, without justice and virtue, as much or more according to right reason; yet he is also bound to justice and virtue as to an act of virtue [n70], though by choosing thus he sins and acts contrary to reason. It seems, moreover, that that is better for man which, when possessed, necessarily makes him good, than that which, when possessed, does not so make him, but lets him be evil and wretched. But a virtuous act, when had by anyone, necessarily makes him good;\n\nbut all money and pleasure can be present to any evil and wretched man whatever. Thus the Philosopher proves, Ethics 1, 12, that happiness is to be placed not in possession or habit, but in activity. For he says: It differs not a little to judge the best to lie in possession or use, and in habit or activity. For a habit can exist in a man and accomplish no good, as in one sleeping or otherwise idle; but activity cannot: for he who is active will act of necessity, and will act well. Again, he who loves God above all with his whole heart, and does all things for his sake, cannot be repaid condignly with less than God. For no love seems to be condignly repaid by a good less than as great as that to which the lover prefers his beloved, and as great as whatever he would sooner abandon than his beloved. For if love is to be repaid with love, then greater with greater, and equal with equal; otherwise due proportion would limp. But love cannot be idle in one who is powerful: for to love is to will the good for the beloved and to do it, as the premises, 39 of this, teach. God, therefore, omnipotent, loved by man above all with his whole heart, loving him back equally and condignly, wills for him a good, a good above all goods, and is able to do this; therefore he repays this to him, or will repay it in due time. But such a good, above all other goods, is only God himself. God, therefore, will repay himself condignly to one who so loves, as is also clear from the showing of the 32nd and 34th parts of the first Corollary of this. Hence also Anselm, Monologion 70: Nothing can be the reward of this love except what stands above in all natures. For what will the highest goodness repay to the lover, and to the one who longs for it, except itself? For whatever else it repays, it does not repay, because it neither compensates the love, nor consoles the lover, nor satisfies the one who desires. For this the Philosopher also says, Ethics 9, 1: They quarrel when what comes to them is other, and not what they seek. For it is like nothing's coming about, when one does not obtain what one seeks. This is confirmed again. For friendship and love, as it seems, condignly require such a proportionality: as much as the lover, proportionally to his powers, or beyond them if he could, would do for the beloved, so much, proportionally according to his powers, the beloved should do for the lover. But a man who so loves God would do for him, and would give him, if he could, a good, a good above all goods, and better. God, therefore, being omnipotent, will condignly do as much for him.\n\nAgain, that man can merit some good condignly is apparent. For every good work is followed, essentially and inseparably, by a certain goodness, a certain rectitude, a certain justice, beauty, fittingness, or honorableness, or even by its actually being good, right, and just; and this seems some reward of his, which he merits condignly. Further, it does not befit supreme justice and most clement goodness to punish sinners more promptly than to reward those who act well, as also appears from the 31st part of the first Corollary of this. But anyone who sins is immediately and inseparably followed by his punishment, namely injustice, sin, and the servitude of sin, the privation of the justice and freedom which he had before, at least in respect of that injustice and servitude which he then newly incurs, as is also clear from the same 31st part; hence also, conversely, in any good deed done. Although it ought to be sufficiently clear that\n\nWhoever sins, by that very fact necessarily and inseparably incurs sin, injustice, and slavery to sin, and is a sinner, unjust, and a slave of sin. He incurs also the privations mentioned above and many similar evils, which remain in him even after the sinning, just as they clung to him when he sinned in act. All of these are fitting punishment for the earlier sin, that is, for the sinning. Yet this can be confirmed over and above by some authentic testimonies. For the Author of authors [n71] says in John 8: Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. Hence also Job 7: I have sinned: what shall I do to you, O guardian of men? Why have you set me against you? (that is, through sin) and I have become a burden to myself (that is, through punishment). On this Gregory says, Moralia 8, 22: \"This opposition of guilt has become for man the weight of punishment, so that, free, he serves his own evil corruption, he who as a good servant once rejoiced in the liberty of incorruption.\" Augustine intends the same in On Free Choice 1, 20, and 2, 1, but more clearly in 3, 19, and afterwards he shows that every vice and sin is a corruption of nature and of some natural good; and the same is plain from the same author in City of God 12, 6, and the Enchiridion 7. But he shows it most plainly in On Free Choice 3, 24, saying: \"Because no one overcomes the laws of the almighty Creator, the soul is not permitted to fail to render what is owed. For it renders it either by using well what it received, or by losing what it refused to use well. Thus if it does not render by doing justice, it will render by suffering misery. These two are divided by no interval of time, as though at one time it failed to do what it owes and at another suffered what it owes, lest even for a moment of time the beauty of the universe be disfigured, so that there would be in it the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of vengeance.\" This is also evident jointly in good deeds and bad. For Hermes says of God: [n72] He who justifies the work of no evildoer, and deprives no benefactor of rewards. In agreement with him Aristotle says at the end of On the World [n73]: \"Him, he says, vengeance or justice always attends, punishing or tormenting those who abandon the divine law; but the one who is blessed and happy would at once, from the beginning, be a sharer in it.\"\n\nGenesis 4 also says: If you do well, will you not receive (that is, at once)? But if ill, will not sin immediately be at the door? And Augustine says, On Genesis Literally 8, 31: \"Divine providence, ruling the whole creation, administers natures that will, so that the good ones are not unfruitful nor the evil ones unpunished. For those who will evil have in themselves their own inner punishment, that very iniquity of theirs. So likewise the good have their inner reward, the very equity and rectitude of what they have done.\" The same, On the Greatness of the Soul, last chapter: \"God, supreme and true, rules by an incorrupt law everything he has made; he abandons the soul in no act without punishment or reward.\" The same, on that verse of Psalm 118 [119]: I have sworn and resolved to keep the judgments of your justice: \"The judgments of God's justice are kept in faith, since under God, the just judge, neither is a right deed believed fruitless nor a sin unpunished.\" Again, to be loved or hated by God seems no small reward or punishment; and God loves those who do well and hates those who sin.\n\nFor Aristotle says in the second book of his Rhetoric, 28 [n74]: If you speak what is just, men will hate you; if what is unjust, the gods; but if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men. The same, in On Good Fortune, book 1: \"We dignify God as Lord of such things, so that he distributes both good things and evil to the worthy.\" The same, in Ethics 10, 13 [n75]: \"The one who acts according to intellect, and cares for it, and is disposed in the best way, seems also to be most loving of God. For if there is some care of human affairs on the part of the gods, as there seems to be, it would surely be quite reasonable that they rejoice in what is best and most akin to them (this would be the intellect), and that they repay with benefits those who most love and honour it, as friends of theirs, since they themselves are cared for.\" On this Averroes says: \"If God has care for human beings, as is believed and as is owed, he rejoices in what is better, and it is more fitting that he do good to those who love him more, and honour them, and visit them, as is the disposition of a friend toward a friend.\" And Boethius says, Consolation of Philosophy 4, prose 1: \"By that very Author, of whose kingdom we now speak, you will learn that the powerful are always good, but the wicked always abject and feeble; that vices are never without punishment, nor virtues without reward.\" And the same, specially of virtue and virtuous works, earlier, in the same book 3, prose 4: \"There is a dignity proper to virtue, which it immediately pours over those to whom it is joined.\" By \"virtue\" he understands here, as it seems, and earlier, not only the habit but also the act. In agreement with this Ovid says in the Letters from Pontus [n76]:\n\n> Not easily will you find one in many thousands\n> who thinks virtue to be its own reward:\n> The very beauty of a right deed, if rewards are lacking,\n> does not move him, and he regrets, for nothing, to be upright.\n\nHence also Averroes on Ethics 1, 12: \"The act that is done according to the requirement of virtue is virtue.\" And Augustine on that verse of Psalm 36 [37], The just man has mercy and lends: \"If he has means outside himself, charity gives them [n77]; but if he has none, it gives goodwill; he always has something to give whose heart is full of charity.\"\n\n\"This is charity, which is also called good will\"; and there he takes will for the act of willing, as his whole course of argument shows. The same author says it also in On Christian Doctrine 3, 10, as Peter [Lombard] also recounts in Sentences 1, distinction 17: \"I call charity,\" he says, \"the movement of the soul toward enjoying God for his own sake, and oneself and one's neighbour for the sake of God.\" The same, in the book On the Morals of the Catholic Church, treating that word of the Apostle, Neither death nor life will be able to separate us from the charity of God: \"The charity of God,\" he says, \"is here called the virtue which is the most upright disposition of our soul, which joins us to God, and by which we love him.\" In a similar manner the Prophet seems to speak when he says, I have done judgment and justice, that is, an act of justice, or a work; and Augustine, expounding it, says: \"By the name of justice in this place not the virtue itself but its work is signified.\" It is also commonly said, and the thirty-first part of the first corollary teaches, that God rewards good merits beyond what is condign; a good merit therefore requires something of what is condign. Furthermore, what God wills to be done, and promises to those who act rightly, it is fitting and condign that it be done. But he himself wills and promises that those who do well with perseverance will have everlasting glory as their wage; therefore they merit it condignly.\n\nMoreover, Christ merited for himself and for us many goods, as the Lombard alleges in Sentences 3, distinctions 18 and 19, and after. And who will dare assert that he did not merit these condignly, especially since, as Christ infinitely exceeds any mere man, so the merit of Christ seems to exceed the merit of any mere man? Christ could therefore merit condignly as much as you please. On this Anselm says in Cur Deus homo 2, 14: \"Do you think so great a gift, so lovable, can suffice to pay what is owed for the sins of the whole world?\" and he replies: \"Indeed, it can do infinitely more.\" Therefore he merited condignly everlasting glory for all who are to be saved. Hence Apocalypse 5: You are worthy, Lord, to take the book and open its seals, because you were slain, and redeemed us for God in your blood, and made us a kingdom for our God. Behold what he merited for us condignly. And it continues: Worthy is the Lamb who was slain to receive power, and divinity, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing. Behold what he merited condignly for himself.\n\nFurther, just as it was argued earlier that no one merits anything good condignly, in exactly the same way it can be argued that no one merits anything evil condignly. If anyone concedes this, he will be forced to concede, as a consequence, that God is unjust, who punishes sinners so gravely although they have merited no punishment condignly; and he will also have to confess that the Scripture of truth lies. Hence Job 11: Would that God would speak with you, and you would understand that far less is exacted from you by him than your iniquity deserves. On this Gregory says, Moralia 10, 6: \"He who understands the manifold nature of God's law weighs how much smaller are all the things he suffers.\" And Job 33: I have sinned and truly failed, and, as I deserved, I did not receive. And Psalm 84 [85]: You have mitigated all your anger. And Habakkuk 3: When you are angry, you will remember mercy. There are many other similar texts in Scripture. The Apostle indeed says to the Romans, chapter 6: The wages of sin are death, but the grace of God is eternal life. The Gloss: \"Eternal death is the wage of sin, that is, the worthy requital for sin; but eternal life is given by the grace of God alone.\" This exposition he confirms through many authorities of many writers [n78].\n\nFurthermore, one argument advanced above, which seeks to show that whatever a man merits by congruity he also merits by condignity, is against the common school, or at least against a large part of it, which distinguishes the two. But so that the objections may be dissolved more easily, it must be known that God and man do not stand in the same way toward rendering a reward for any merit, good or bad. For a man, like a king or another, promulgates by public edict that whoever does such and such a good or evil thing will receive this or that as a fitting wage; and he himself remains indifferent and undetermined in his will, in regard to his subjects, as to who will have what. And if one does such a good, another an evil, his indifference of will is thereby determined; and thereby also, antecedently, causally, and efficiently, his will is moved to will, to reward and to punish this man and that according to the preceding merits. Not so God, who begs nothing from what is posterior, but from himself alone always equally and determinately wills and does not will whatever he wills or does not will, as the twentieth of this work, and the twenty-first, twenty-third, twenty-fifth, twenty-seventh, and those following, have taught. The Apostle also attests this most plainly in Romans 9, speaking thus of Jacob and Esau: When they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, so that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not from works but from him who calls, it was said that the elder shall serve the younger, as it is written, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.\n\nAnd if anyone should object that all Holy Scripture and all the Doctors, indeed the universal Church too, affirm without doubt that God will reward the good for their good merits and punish the wicked for their evil merits: since propter, quia, ideo and the like, as they frequently do, signify some cause, it must first be shown that merit is not any cause of the eternal reward that follows. For it is not a material cause, since that is necessarily simultaneous with what is made of it, but the meritorious act, by which he merited that reward, does not then remain. Nor is it a formal cause, for that is necessarily simultaneous with what is formed. Nor is it a final cause, because the reverse seems rather to be the case, as appears from the thirty-fifth of this work. Nor is it an efficient cause, though that is the likelier suggestion, because it is so neither in act nor in potency. Not in act; for according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5, 3, particular agents exist and cease to exist together with those whose causes they are, as this physician with this man recovering, and this builder with this thing built; but the meritorious act precedes the reward in time and is not simultaneous with it. Nor is it the efficient cause of the reward in potency, because then at some time it would pass into act and actually effect the everlasting reward, and then, as was said, it would be simultaneous with it. Nor can anyone say that merit is therefore the efficient cause of the reward because it now for the first time moves the will of God, previously by nature undetermined, and determines it, effecting in it an actual and fixed willing to confer the reward; for the twentieth, twenty-third, twenty-fifth and thirty-fifth of this work forbid saying so. It is therefore to be observed further that this word propter is manifold, by a mode of equivocation.\n\nFor first and principally it signifies a cause of being; secondly, and in a certain way by transference, it signifies a cause of knowing, or of making known; and still at times it signifies an order. That it signifies a cause of being no one is ignorant; and that it signifies also a cause of knowing is plain from the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 1, 12 [n79], who says: if, of a cause and an effect that are equally predicated (that is, convertible), such as the planets' being near, which is the cause, and their not twinkling, which is its effect and not the cause, the effect, that is, is the better known, then the demonstration will be through this, namely that the planets are near on account of the fact that they do not twinkle. Behold: according to him, propter there signifies not a cause of being, but an effect, which is a cause only of knowing. Hence, once a demonstrative syllogism has been set in order through terms A B C, he adds: \"Therefore it has been demonstrated that the wandering stars are near.\" This syllogism, then, is not propter quid but propter quia [n80]; for it is not from their not twinkling that they are near, but on account of their being near that they do not twinkle.\n\nBehold how he first concedes, and secondly denies, that the planets are near on account of their not twinkling; and this is because propter signifies for him first a cause only of knowing, and secondly a cause of being. This agrees also with the whole course of that chapter and the following ones, where demonstration from the effect is called demonstration quia, although this word quia signifies a cause, as does propter. There, then, it signifies a cause only of knowing. Donatus [n81], though, unreasonably assigns quia, quapropter, propterea and many like words, which are manifestly causal, to the power of a conjunction not causal but \"rational\"; and, just as unreasonably, he assigns to its causal power si, nisi and such, which should rather have been assigned to a conditional power, which he passed over altogether. This is also sufficiently proved by that frequent and well-known example of the Philosopher: why do the angles of a triangle equal two right angles? Because the exterior angle equals the two interior angles opposite to it. Yet the magnitude of the exterior angle is in no way a cause, nor even an effect, of why the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles; for neither of them is a material, efficient, formal, or final cause of the other, since either can always exist without the other. Yet that the exterior angle equals the two interior [n82] angles opposite to it is the cause only of our knowledge why the three angles of the triangle equal two right angles; for by this it is demonstratively shown to be so, as the second part of the thirty-second proposition of the first book of Euclid's Elements shows. Hence Averroes says, on Physics 8, comment 58, that there are three demonstrations, namely of the cause, of the fact only, and of cause and fact.\n\nBut lest I seem, in the Catholic cause, to furnish only pagan witnesses, see what the most faithful Paul says: Christ became obedient unto death, even death on a cross; on account of which God also exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name, namely that he be called God. Yet he had this name before his passion; indeed he had that name naturally before any merit of his. For that man first naturally was, and first naturally was God, before he did anything or merited in any way. For every agent naturally precedes any action of his.\n\nChrist, then, did not merit to be God; this was given to him most freely [n83], without any preceding merit whatever, as is plain from the thirty-fifth of this work. The Lombard too, Sentences 3, distinction 6, adduces many authorities for this same point; and below, in distinction 18, treating the Apostle's authority cited above, he says that that man did not merit here so great a good, namely the name of God. So it does not seem that in any way he merited that name through the obedience of his passion, except as regards recognition and manifestation: not to God, but to men, who at first did not know it, and who through his passion, resurrection, ascension, and the like learned and truly knew that he is not only man but God [n84]. And this is what the Lombard says there: \"How, then,\" he says, \"is it said that this name was given to him through obedience?\" And he answers, according to that trope so frequent in Scripture, that this is to be taken in the sense in which a thing is said to be made when it becomes known. After the resurrection, indeed, what before was in obscurity was set in evidence, so that men and demons might know. Hence the Saviour himself says in John 13: By this all will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another.\n\nIt could therefore be said that when one says, \"This man will obtain such a reward on account of such merit,\" this word propter does not signify a cause of being but of knowing. For through merit it becomes known to men, to demons, and perhaps to Angels what reward someone will have. This word propter also signifies an order at times, and not unfittingly. For according to the thirty-fifth of this work, God first wills for man reward and glory as an end, and therefore wills for him and makes congruous merits, as certain preceding means to this end. Therefore also, that they may at last be rightly and finally ordered, he assigns them an end, on account of which and toward which he himself has finally ordered them. Propter can therefore sometimes designate an order, so that the saying of the Apostle may be understood in this way: He became obedient, etc., on account of which God also exalted him, that is, after which preceding thing, ordained by God toward this subsequent thing, which he had decreed should be done only after that.\n\nIn support of which Anselm, treating the same authority of the Apostle in Cur Deus homo 1, 9, says thus: \"When the Apostle had said, He humbled himself, etc., on account of which God, etc., this was not said as though he could in no way have reached this exaltation except through this obedience of death, and as though this exaltation were conferred only as a recompense for this obedience (for before he suffered, he himself said that all things had been handed over to him by the Father, and that all things of the Father are his); it was said because he had determined, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, to show the loftiness of his omnipotence to the world in no other way than through death. What was determined to be done only through that death, when it is done through it, is not unfittingly said to be done on account of it [n85]. For if we intend to do something, but propose first to do something else through which it may be done, when what we wished to precede is already done and what we intend then comes about, it is rightly said to be done propterea, 'on that account,' since there has been done that on account of which it was deferred, because it was determined to be done only through that.\"\n\n\"For if there is a river which I can cross by horse and by boat, and I resolve to cross it only by boat, and therefore put off crossing because the boat is away, then when the boat is at hand, if I cross, it is rightly said of me: The boat was ready, therefore he crossed. And we speak thus not only when what follows is brought about through that which we wished to precede, but also when it is not brought about through it, and we merely resolve to do something else after it. For if someone delays taking food because he has not yet attended the celebration of Mass that day, then when what he wished to do first is done, it is not unfittingly said to him: Take food now, because you have now done that on account of which you were delaying eating. Far less unusual, therefore, is the phrase when Christ is said to be exalted propterea quia he endured death, through which and after which he decreed to bring about that exaltation.\" And he sets down another exposition of the same Apostolic saying in these words: \"This can be understood also in the way in which the same Lord is read to have advanced in wisdom and grace before God, not because it was so, but because he comported himself as if it were so. For he was exalted through death in such a way as if this came about on account of it.\"\n\nIf anyone, then, wishes to speak consistently about the merit and reward of Christ our head, and of his members the Christians, as regards the causality proposed, behold the three modes of speaking set out above, from our authentic Fathers. But because that opinion seems ambiguous and doubtful and could be probably contradicted, especially if it is transferred from the head to the members, I would gladly wish, without prejudice or reproach to my venerable Fathers and authorities, and for the sake of the less wise (among whom I most of all am, who am not equal to searching the depths of God), and I would even vehemently desire, if it were possible, a clearer opinion, or the same opinion stated more clearly and further removed from contradiction. Hence also Alexander, as Averroes recounts on On the Heavens 2, comment 1, says thus of the opinion of Aristotle: \"We are not supported in the opinion of this man above all others, except because we see it to be of less ambiguity and more remote from contradiction.\"\n\nIt seems to me, then, that with every law of retribution established by the will of God removed, it is not true that such a reward is owed on account of such a good or evil deed. For then it would be absolutely necessary, and God could not do otherwise without offence to justice, but would will and do thus outwardly by absolute necessity, as was argued above. Rather, that such a deed merits such a reward is so because God has so willed and established it in law, which will and law persist continually, unchanged, as the twenty-third chapter showed. When it is said, therefore, \"This man will obtain such a reward on account of such merit,\" a distinction must be made, because this word propter can signify a cause which is the virtue and efficacy of such merit alone, and so it is not true, as was just shown. But if it imports in that merit (indeed above and before the merit) a cause which is the divine will and his law of retribution to be made alike to any work, good or bad, it is true and to be conceded in a Catholic sense. For because this man has so merited, and because of the law already laid down, he will obtain such a reward: that is, because God wills to reward everyone according to his works, and this man so works, therefore he will obtain such a reward.\n\nAnd when it is said, \"God wills to reward this man on account of his merits\": if propter signifies a posterior cause in the merit moving the divine will, determining it and leading it out from potency to the act of willing, it is not true, as was shown above. But if it signifies the divine will as truly the cause preceding every merit and reward, which will reward him as he has merited, it is true and certain. For it is true that God has a will which is the first cause of all merits and likewise of rewards. It can also be said otherwise, and suitably enough, that merit is the efficient cause of the reward, not properly but only by transference: namely because it produces in the one who merits a form by which, according to present justice, he becomes fit for reward or punishment. Or, more briefly: because it makes the one who merits such [n86] that reward is ordained for one of that kind and for him alone. For according to the ordering of present justice, no adult will obtain the aforesaid glory or punishment unless he has first acquired, through his good merits, a certain beautiful form by which he is fittingly formed for obtaining glory; or, through his evil merits, a certain deformed form by which he is fittingly, in a manner, deformed toward punishment. Thus, therefore, on account of merit reward is owed, and merit is the effective cause of the reward, because it induces the form by which one becomes fit to receive the reward. So a priest and a knight, because they have received their orders, the one celebrates and the other fights, and they are honoured with honours proper to them.\n\nAnd when it is said, \"God wills to reward this man on account of his merits\": if propter signifies a posterior effective cause of the divine willing, it is to be denied; but if it signifies a cause effective in the merit, in some way, of a certain form, or even the form itself, by which this man becomes fit for the reward willed for him by God according to present justice, it is to be conceded. God therefore wills to reward this man on account of his merits means that this man, on account of his merits, in the manner stated, is such as God wills and has established to reward. On this Blessed Bernard says, in On Grace and Free Choice, last chapter: \"In this God established Paul as one meriting the crown, when he deigned to have him as a fellow-worker in the works for which that crown had been promised. Moreover he made the fellow-worker willing, that is, consenting to his will; and so the will is reckoned an aid to merit.\"\n\n\"If, then, the will is from God, and the merit, and there is no doubt that willing and accomplishing according to good will are from God, then God is the author of merit, who both applies the will to the work and unfolds the work by the will. Otherwise, if what we have said were to be properly called our merits, they are certain seed-beds of hope, incentives to charity, signs of hidden predestination, presages of future happiness, the way to the kingdom, not the cause of reigning\" [n87].\n\nFurthermore, thirdly, it may be said, not unfittingly: \"This man is to be rewarded on account of merits,\" that is, on account of merits to be ordered, so that propter signifies there the final cause of the order of the universe, most fittingly predestined by God. For it does not befit that the order of the whole be disturbed in the least, as the treatise on Providence makes plain. And Augustine says, On Free Choice 1, 13: \"The law of God is eternal, by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered\"; and Anselm, Cur Deus homo 1, 12: \"It does not befit God to leave anything disordered in his kingdom\"; and, according to the same, above, in the same place: \"To order sin rightly without satisfaction is nothing but to punish.\" By this he shows that every sin without satisfaction is necessarily to be punished. Augustine, supported by a like reason, shows the same in On Free Choice 3, 24; indeed he shows also that sin and punishment are divided by no interval of time, lest even for a moment of time the beauty of the universe be disfigured. So it is evident that it is similarly with rightly done deeds, as the present chapter showed above. And this mode of speaking agrees with the second mode of speaking recounted above from Anselm. When it is said, therefore, \"This man is to be rewarded on account of merits,\" this means that he is to be rewarded on account of merits to be finally ordered, that is, on account of the final order of merits determined beforehand by God. And when it is said, \"God wills to reward this man on account of merits,\" this means that God wills to reward this man on account of merits finally ordered, that is, he wills that such be the end of such merits, according to the order established for such merits by himself. The merits do not in any way antecedently, causally, a priori, move, determine, or actuate the divine will to render rewards.\n\nHence Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 7: \"God,\" he says, \"loves the order of the goodness of the universe, but is not affected by it, nor does he covet it.\" And if anyone still asks, \"If not on account of merits, why then does he elect or reprobate this man or that?\", chapter 21 and others here answer: but why does one always seek a cause [n88]? The formal cause of that willing is in a way God himself; the efficient cause, as prior, is in a way his will; but a posterior cause among created things there is none at all. And this is what the Apostle says in Romans 9. When he had said beforehand that God loved Jacob and hated Esau, and this not from works but from will, so that the purpose of God according to election might stand, he brings in one who asks the question stated above, and answers him thus: Who resists his will? O man, who are you to answer back to God? As if to say: there is no such cause, hindering or effecting the divine will, by which an answer could be given as to why he loved this man and hated that. And he proves this at once, by a topic from likeness, or from the lesser, thus: Shall the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why have you made me thus? That is: on what preponderant, motive, and effective reason of your willing? Surely none. Rather, without any prior preponderant reason he can freely make from the same lump one vessel of this kind, another of that; and this is what he adds: Does not the potter have power over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honour, another for dishonour? And below, in chapter 11, he says the same more plainly: O the depth, he says, of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments and how unsearchable his ways! That is, through some prior effective reason, because there is none such at all. And this is what he adds at once: For who has known the mind of the Lord? That is, some preceding reason why he so acted; as if to say, \"No one,\" because this is not knowable, since it is not true. And he adds more expressly: Or who has been his counsellor? That is, what posterior caused thing was a prior cause, and as it were offering a reason on which the divine counsel relied in acting. And therefore he adds most plainly at once: Or who has first given to him, and will be repaid? As if to say, no one, nor any thing posterior to God himself; which he also at once demonstrates ostensively,\n\nwhen he says: \"For from Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things,\" in the way that chapter 20 and others prove the same conclusion. Hence Augustine too, in On Rebuke and Grace 12, speaks thus: \"Why are these called thus, those otherwise, and others again otherwise, in countless and diverse ways? Far be it from us to say that the judgment ought to belong to the clay, not to the potter.\" Augustine in this part follows not only the Apostle but also the Wise Man, who says in Wisdom 15: \"The potter fashions from the same clay clean vessels, and their opposites; but what the use of these vessels is, the potter is judge.\" And again in On Rebuke and Grace, 25: \"If I am asked why God did not give perseverance to those to whom He gave the love by which they might live to the utmost, I answer that I do not know; whence the Apostle: 'O man, who are you, who answer back to God?' and 'O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God,' etc.\" The same, in On the Gift of Perseverance 16: \"Why,\" you ask, \"in the same cause will He punish me rather than him? or free him rather than me? I do not say this. If you ask why? it is because I confess that I do not find what to say, since in this matter, as His wrath is just, as His mercy is great, so His judgments are unsearchable.\"\n\nBut if the question is asked by \"through why,\" that is, the final cause (and this about the reprobation of the wicked, because this troubles most people the more), one must say, according to the twenty-first chapter, that the ultimate final cause is God: \"For the Lord has made all things for Himself, even the wicked for the evil day,\" Proverbs 16. Behold, the Lord has made the wicked for the evil day, for His own sake, finally and ultimately. The intermediate final cause, however, is as manifold as the many goods that come forth from the reprobate, some of which the thirty-first of this book and the thirty-fourth disclose; and one of them is the manifestation of the Lord's dominion and of His power, as He Himself testifies in Exodus 9: \"For this reason I have set you up,\" that is, Pharaoh, \"opposed to me, that I may show my strength in you, and that my name may be told in all the earth.\" For if Pharaoh had in no way resisted the Lord, how would God have shown so many miracles? And Psalm 105 [106]: \"He saved them for His name's sake, that He might make His power known.\" By this authority too the Apostle answers likewise in Romans 9, when he says: \"For the Scripture says that for this very thing I have raised you up, that I may show my power in you, and that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth.\" And it follows: \"But what if God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction,\" etc. But because, according to the twenty-first of this book, man is the end of all other things, and the elect among men are in a certain way the end of the reprobate, therefore the reprobate are ordered finally to the benefit of the elect: whence the Apostle in Romans 9: \"The elder shall serve the younger,\" that is, the reprobate the elect; and below, 11: \"Enemies for your sake,\" that is, for the sake of the elect; and 2 Corinthians 4: \"All things are for your sake\"; and 2 Timothy 2 more expressly: \"I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they too may obtain salvation.\" And to this same effect is the testimony of God, which is greater, in Exodus 10: He speaks thus to Moses about Pharaoh: \"I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants, that I may do these signs of mine in him, and that you may tell in the ears of your son and of your grandsons how often I have crushed the Egyptians and done my signs among them, and that you may know that I am the Lord.\" Behold the final cause: that you may know, namely you the elect, that I am the Lord. For how would the wicked fear God, and the good love Him so greatly, had they not seen or heard of so strong a hand of God, so powerful an avenger of the wicked and so vigorous a helper of the good, as all those miracles concerning the Egyptians and the Hebrews make manifest, terribly and lovably? There is, besides, another final cause, not a small one but a great one, the benefit of the elect: namely, that the punishment of one be the fear of many, or rather, that the punishment of many be the fear of few (\"For many are called, but few are chosen\"), so that the elect, knowing the perpetual faults and punishments of the reprobate, may be aroused to the duties of fear and humility, and turn to constancy in unceasing prayer.\n\nTherefore Augustine, in On the Gift of Perseverance 17: \"It seems to men,\" he says, \"that all the faithful who appear good ought to have received perseverance to the end; but God judged it better to mix some who will not persevere with the fixed number of His saints, so that those for whom security in the temptation of this life is not expedient may not be able to be secure; for what the Apostle says restrains many from ruinous pride: 'Therefore let him who seems to stand take heed lest he fall.'\" And below, 37: \"For this very reason, those who will not persevere are mixed with those who will, by the most provident will of God, that we may learn not to be minded to high things but to consent to the lowly, and with fear and trembling to work out our own salvation; for it is God who works in us both to will and to work, for His good pleasure.\" The same, in On Holy Virginity 16: \"Is it to be believed that God permits, for any other reason, that many men and many women who are going to fall should be mixed into the number of your profession, than that by their falling your fear may be increased, and pride thereby be repressed, which God so hates that against this one vice alone the Most High humbled Himself?\" There is yet a third cause, not a small one: namely, that the children of grace and the elect, seeing that they are separated from the reprobate not by their own merits but freely by the grace of God, may find the grace of God the more welcome, and that the elect, children of grace, may be made more grateful to the most gracious Author of grace.[n89]\n\nHence Augustine too, on that verse of Psalm 87 [88], \"Shall your wonders be known in the darkness?\" etc.: \"A question presented itself,\" he says, \"what use these dead are, what God does with them for the benefit of His body, which is the Church, so that in them it may be shown what the grace of God is in the predestined, who are called according to His purpose; whence the body itself says in another Psalm: 'My God, His mercy will go before me.'\" These reprobate also, not only on the way but also in the homeland, are useful to the elect: namely, that, when their misery is seen, the glory of these may be held the more welcome. For opposites placed side by side appear more clearly, as the thirty-fourth discloses; and so the liberator of these, how freely giving, and their most gracious rewarder, who could as equally have damned these eternally as those, is loved the more dearly. Hence Psalm 57 [58] says: \"The just man will rejoice when he sees the vengeance\"; and the last chapter of Isaiah: \"They shall go out and see the corpses of the men who have transgressed against me: their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be until satiety of vision for all flesh\"; where the Gloss on the words \"until satiety of vision\" says: \"Because they will see them separated from themselves by just judgment, the power lost by which they raged against the good, and vengeance upon them so great that they ask no greater: they who now say, 'How long, Lord, do you not avenge our blood?' They will also be satisfied by their beatitude, giving thanks, having seen the ineffable punishment of the impious.\"\n\nHence Gregory too, Homily 40, treating that Gospel story of the rich man buried in hell and the beggar Lazarus carried into Abraham's bosom, writes thus: \"The just in their torments always look upon the unjust, that from this their joy may grow, because they behold the evil which they mercifully escaped, and they render so much the greater thanks to their Redeemer as they see in others what they themselves could have suffered, had they been left; nor does the sight of the punishment of the reprobate darken in the soul of the just the brightness of so great a beatitude, because where there will no longer be compassion for misery, the gladness of the good will undoubtedly not be able to be diminished. What wonder, then, if while the just behold the torments of the unjust, this comes to them in the service of their joys, since in painting too a black colour is laid underneath, that the white or red may appear brighter? So, then, as has been said, the joys of the good swell the more, the more the evils of the damned which they escaped lie beneath their eyes; and although their joys suffice them for full enjoyment, yet they undoubtedly always look upon the evils of the reprobate; for those who see the brightness of their Creator, nothing is done in creation that they cannot see.\" The same man, in Dialogues 4.46,[n90] to Peter asking, \"But no just man feeds on the cruelty of the wrongdoer: a servant is ordered to be beaten by a just master for this reason, that he may be corrected of wickedness; he is beaten, therefore, that he may be amended; but the wicked, handed over to the fires of Gehenna, if they do not come to correction, to what end will they burn forever?\" answers thus: \"But almighty God, who is merciful, is not fed by the torment of the wretched; yet because He is just, He is not appeased forever by the punishment of the wicked; but all the wicked, assigned to eternal torment, are punished for their own wickedness, and yet they will burn for some purpose, namely that all the just may both see in God the joys which they receive, and look back in them upon the torments which they escaped, so that they may know themselves the more indebted forever to divine grace, the greater the evils they see punished forever, which they overcame by His help.\"\n\nHence Augustine too, in On the Joys of the Just and the Punishments of the Wicked, says thus: \"Then the common culprit and enemy, the devil, will be condemned in the sight of all the elect of God, and his condemnation and unbearable punishment will furnish the elect a delightful spectacle; then with most ardent love they will love their Liberator and the Giver of all good things, and endlessly and without weariness will praise Him with the cry of the heart.\" Peter [Lombard] also professes this opinion in Sentences 4, last distinction. Granting, therefore, that the misery of the damned is in some way of service to the glory of those who are to be saved, it can be argued that God ordered this finally to that: for otherwise this would come about by chance or fortune, and would not proceed from divine providence; so that those to be saved would not even be bound to give thanks to God for that portion of their glory, against the twenty-seventh and the others that follow. Hence this too plainly seems the opinion of the Apostle in Romans 9, in the solution of the same question, when he says: \"God endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory in the vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory.\"\n\nHence Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints 10: \"Why God does not teach all, the Apostle has disclosed: that, willing to show wrath and to make His power known, He brought forth in much patience vessels of wrath, which were perfected for perdition, and to make known the riches of His glory in vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory.\" And the same more expressly in 5, Against Julian 6: \"From the number of the elect no one perishes; but the other mortals, who are not of this number, and who are indeed of the same lump from which these also come, but have been made vessels of wrath, are born for the benefit of these: for God does not create any of them rashly or by chance, nor is He ignorant of what good He will work from them, since He works good even by this very fact, that in them He creates human nature and by them adorns the order of the present age.\" Behold a threefold good from the reprobate: the benefit of the elect, the good of nature, and the adornment of the age. Suppose also, according to the pious zeal of many, though not according to knowledge, that the whole of Hell, with all its household of reprobates, were removed from the midst, and there were only heaven with its holy citizens: then the age would be much perfected, and if God had so made it, He would have done very well. But as it is, God acts so much the more perfectly and so much the better, in proportion as those noble damned creatures contain in themselves perfection and goodness, and in proportion as that comparison, as of extreme contrariety, confers on the just a radiance and purer appearance, shining like sparks, and as stars. For who, or whose reason, would have prevented the Lord from the beginning, if it had pleased Him, from creating heaven full of the elect in glory and Hell full of the reprobate in punishment, so that the one, compared with the other, would have appeared, and been, the more glorious? There will not be lacking, however, those who would pity these with human feeling, and with pious compassion would contend that it ought not to be so. But why do they not pity little children, who are not only not sinning but utterly incapable of sinning, and who depart without the sacrament of baptism, to be punished with the torment of eternal fire, as Augustine plainly says in On the Faith to Peter[n91] 59 and 24?\n\nWhy do they not also contend with God to retract His judgment, by which, of such little children, not by Fate or chance but from the counsel of His own will, He takes this one to baptism, to the kingdom, to glory, and leaves that one, indeed even in a way drives him away from baptism to prison and punishment, as the authority of Augustine plainly attests in On the Gift of Perseverance 35, together with others like it set out in the thirty-first of this book? Why do they not also pity innocent beasts for being subject to so many miseries and so many deaths? Why do they not on this account bring a cause against God?[n92] Why, again, do they in no way accuse the potter who makes from the same lump of clay one vessel to honor and another to dishonor and contempt? Is not God as free a lord of His own as the potter is of his? And this seems the Apostle's reason in Romans 9, in the solution of this question which we have in hand. Nay, hear, and listen carefully; think, and think over again with vigilance, of Augustine in his little book on the Predestination and Grace of God, which in the book of his Sermons is headed \"fifth, Sermon 18,\"[n93] writing thus: \"With what shamelessness, then, will man judge of God, clay of the potter, not only saying, 'Why have you made me thus?' but also, with damnable curiosity, searching into others and saying, 'Why from the same lump have you made one thus, another otherwise?' If the human race, which is established as first created out of nothing, were not born with the debt of death and the origin of sin, and yet the omnipotent Creator should wish to damn some of them to destruction forever, who would say to the omnipotent Creator, 'Why have you made it so?' For He who, when they were not, had given them being, had power as to the end for which they should be, nor would the others say, 'Why, with the merits of all equal, does the divine judgment differ?' because the potter has power over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel to honor and another to dishonor.\"\n\nThe same, on the title of Psalm 70 [71], speaks thus: \"In all the Holy Scriptures, the grace of God that frees us commends itself to us, so that it may hold us as commended: for who would say to Him, 'What have you done?' if He were to damn a just man? How great, then, is His mercy, if He justifies the unjust!\" And if you still object that God could have ordered the world and the glory of the elect sufficiently well and fittingly by another, more kindly way, and without the perdition of any so noble creature; that it was therefore not fitting for one so pious and just to prepare any angel or man for eternal misery without cause:[n94] I confess without hesitation that He could have done so, and could have restored the human race otherwise than by the passion and death of Christ. Why then, out of all your compassion, do you not complain that the only Son of so exalted a King, so innocent, so delicate, so tender, indeed even the Lord your God, was, for His guilty and wretched servant,[n95] so contemptibly seized, so cruelly scourged, wounded, torn, and at last put to death by a most shameful death? Why do you not, at that very place, recall, nullify, and annul God's judgment? And granted that God, following your will, had ordained things more kindly and better, since He could still always do better, and better without end, the same complaint would always remain: why did He so ordain, and not better, when He could so easily have ordained better? Let this querulous rashness against God, then, restrain itself, and not irrationally keep seeking a reason higher than the divine will, since in such willed things[n96] that will itself is the summit of reason, not reason's attendant or handmaid, but the reverse; for reason follows it as Lady and Mistress, as the twenty-first chapter has shown.\n\nHence Ecclesiastes 8: \"I understood that of all the works of God man can find no reason for the things that are done under the sun.\" Behold, regarding the posterior willed things: the more he labors in seeking, the less he will find; even if the wise man says he knows, he will not be able to find it. Let all human complaint against God, then, restrain itself, and let it suffice for it, in place of a reason in all things, that God and Lord has so willed. Hence also Ecclesiastes 7: \"Consider the works of God, that no one can correct him whom He has despised. In the good day enjoy good things, and guard against the evil day; for as He made this, so also He made that, so that man may not find just complaints against Him.\" Further, perhaps you will turn to canonical authorities, and object that word of the Apostle in 1 Timothy 2, \"who wills all men to be saved\"; and that of Ezekiel 18: \"Is the death of the wicked my will?\" says the Lord, \"and not that he be converted and live?\" And that of Acts 10: \"God is not an acceptor of persons\";[n97] and that of the last chapter of Mark: \"Preach the Gospel to every creature,\" etc. And Gregory, in Morals 4, 24, on that verse of Job 3, \"Now sleeping I should be silent,\" etc., says: \"If no putrefaction of sin had corrupted the first parent, he would in no way have begotten children of Gehenna from himself; but those who are now to be saved through redemption would alone be born of him, as elect.\" To this it must be said that the authorities of Holy Scripture that are objected cannot be understood according to the literal surface, as the tenth and the twenty-third of this book prove.\n\nOf these, then, the first, not I but the Catholic Fathers expound in many ways: for Ambrose, expounding the Apostle there, first asks: If God, who is called omnipotent, wills all men to be saved, why is His will not fulfilled? Second, he answers: But in every utterance the sense and condition lie hidden. Hence the Apostle Peter says: \"All Scripture needs interpretation.\" For God wills all men to be saved, but if they come to Him. For He does not will it in such a way that the unwilling are saved, but wills them to be saved if they too will: for He who gave the law to all excepted no one from salvation. And on that text of Romans 9, \"I will have mercy on whom I shall have had mercy\": He does not judge unjustly who wills all to be saved, justice remaining. Augustine also, in the Enchiridion 77, raises the same question, and after a long disputation on the insuperability of the divine will, set out in chapter 83, answers thus: \"We must understand what is written, 'Who wills all men to be saved,' as if it were said that no man is saved unless He Himself has willed him to be saved; not that there is no human being whom He does not will to be saved.\"[n98] This in chapter 84 he confirms by a comparison, saying thus: \"For so we understand what is written in the Gospel, 'Who enlightens every man,' not because there is no man who is not enlightened, but because no one is enlightened except by Him.\" Then he adds another question of the same text: \"Or at least,\" he says, \"it was said thus, 'Who wills all men to be saved,' not meaning that there was any man whom He did not will to be saved, He who refused to work miracles of power among those who, He says, would have done penance had He done so; but that by 'all men' we should understand every kind of men, distributed through whatever differences: kings, nobles and commoners, private persons, the exalted, the lowly, the learned and the unlearned, the sound of body, the infirm, the talented, the slower, the foolish, the rich, the poor, those between, men, women, infants, boys, adolescents, young men, old men; established among all languages, all customs, all arts, all professions, in the innumerable variety of pleasures and desires, and whatever other differences there are among men.\" This exposition he shows, in chapter 85, to agree with the course of the Apostle's argument: \"The Apostle,\" he says,[n99] \"had commanded that prayer be made for all men, and had specially added, for kings and for those who are in high station, who could be thought, from a more powerful pride and worldly arrogance, to shrink from the humility of the Christian faith. Hence, saying, 'For this is good in the sight of our Savior God,' that is, that prayer be made even for such, he added straightway, in order to remove despair: 'Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth'; which he at once confirms by a comparison, saying: 'In this manner of speaking the Lord also made use in the Gospel, where He says to the Pharisees: You tithe mint, and rue, and cumin, and every herb.'\"\n\n\"For the Pharisees did not tithe whatever belonged to others, nor all the herbs of all foreigners through all lands. As, then, 'every herb' means every kind of herb, so there also we can understand 'all men' as every kind of men; and this is what is customarily said in logic, that in such cases the distribution can be made for the individuals of the kinds, or for the kinds of individuals, as here: 'Every animal was in Noah's ark.' Whence Genesis 7: 'They went in, and every animal according to its kind.'\" And he sets down this same exposition of the same saying in On Rebuke and Grace, 61, which he also strengthens by that Gospel passage already set out, \"You who tithe every herb,\" and by what Paul says: \"I please all men in all things.\" And below, 74, he expounds this otherwise: \"God wills,\" he says, \"all men to be saved,\" that is, He makes all men will to be saved, because He Himself works the willing; and he has a similar manner of speaking in City of God 22, 2, as was alleged above. The same also, in On the Predestination of the Saints 10, expounds a similar saying thus: \"As we speak rightly of some master of letters who is the only master in the city:[n100] 'This man teaches letters to everyone here,' not because all learn, but because no one who learns letters there learns except from him: so we rightly say, 'God teaches all to come to Christ,' not because all come, but because no one comes otherwise.\" The same man also says the same in On Nature and Grace, namely that all are made alive through Christ, because no one is except through Him, as we say that the master of letters in the city teaches all, because no one learns except him whom he has taught. But that objection from Ezekiel is resolved by that distinction about willing which the thirty-fourth made; and if anyone wishes to weigh its last words, namely \"and not that he be converted and live,\" as if it were of the divine will that every sinner be converted and live, the answer must be given according to what has already been said. And that saying of Acts mentioned above, \"God is not an acceptor of persons,\" if it is to be expounded according to the mind of the speaker, must be understood in the manner stated, namely that God is not an acceptor of persons according to genus,[n101] not according to species or number. God is not, I say, an acceptor of persons according to genus, for He calls and receives to salvation from every people and nation; and this seems to be the mind of the Apostle Peter, who said it.\n\nFor he himself had previously believed, as it seems, that only the Jews were accepted by God to the faith of Christ and the kingdom, according to that text of Matthew 15, \"I was not sent except to the sheep that had perished of the house of Israel\"; and above, 10: \"Do not go into the way of the Gentiles, and do not enter the cities of the Samaritans, but go rather to the sheep that perished of the house of Israel.\" But after he heard with how much grace the Lord had visited even that Gentile Cornelius, opening his mouth he said: \"In truth I have found that God is not an acceptor of persons, but in every nation he who fears God and works justice is accepted by Him.\" Saint Peter, therefore, means only to say that God is not an acceptor of those persons who are of the circumcision alone, with all others whatever excluded, but that in every other nation, people, or tongue, he who fears God and works justice is accepted by Him; and the other faithful from among the Jews were of the same opinion as Peter, and the other Apostles also, as it seems; whence below in the same place: \"The faithful of the circumcision who had come with Peter were astonished, because the grace of the Holy Spirit was poured out on the nations also\"; and below, 11: \"But the Apostles and brothers who were in Judea heard that the Gentiles also had received the grace of God, and they honored God.\"\n\nWhence Augustine says, in On the Gift of Perseverance 35: \"Why is it that sometimes the infants of unbelievers are baptized, and those of believers not? that it may surely be shown that there is no acceptance of persons with God; otherwise He would rather free the children of believers than of unbelievers.\" With which his authority in On Rebuke and Grace 27 and On Grace and Free Choice 50 also agrees, which the thirty-first has. And that God is an acceptor of persons according to number is evident through the same man, below in the same place, speaking thus: \"God raised Him on the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God.\" And below, 13: \"As many as were preordained to eternal life believed.\" Whence also the Apostle in Romans 4, according to the purpose of the grace of God, as David also speaks of the blessedness of the man to whom God credits[n102] righteousness without works. And below, 9: \"When they were not yet born, or had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works but from the will it was said, that the elder shall serve the younger.\" And below in the same: \"I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,\" etc. And: \"It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy,\" with the whole course of the chapter to the same effect.\n\nTreating this, Augustine says in the Enchiridion 78: \"Both twins were born children of wrath by nature, by no works of their own, but originally bound by the chain of damnation from Adam; but He who said, 'I will have mercy on whom I shall have mercy,' loved Jacob through gratuitous mercy, but held Esau in hatred through deserved judgment; which, since it was owed to both, in the one the other recognized that he must not boast of his own differing merits, in that in the same cause he did not incur the same punishment, but of the largesse of divine grace, because 'it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy.'\" And in On the Gift of Perseverance 26: \"Of two twins, one of whom is taken up, one left, the outcome is unequal, the merits common.\" And above, 19, of the same: \"From two infants alike bound by original sin, why this one is taken up, that one left; and from two wicked men already of full age, why this one is so called that he follows the caller, while that one is either not called or not so called, the judgments of God are unsearchable; but from two pious men, why to this one perseverance to the end is given, to that one not given, the judgments of God are unsearchable.\" And the same, Enchiridion 75: \"Then it will not be hidden, what is now hidden, why of two one was to be taken up through mercy, another left through judgment, in which he who was taken up would recognize what would have been owed him by judgment, had mercy not come to his aid, why that one rather than this was taken up, when the cause of both was one.\" And blessed Gregory says, in Morals 25, 14, on that verse of Job 34, \"When He grants peace, who is it that will condemn?\": let no one inquire why one is drawn by gift, another repelled by desert. With these Anselm also agrees, in the Proslogion 11, speaking thus to God: \"If it can somehow be grasped why You can will to save the wicked, this surely can be comprehended by no reason, why, of similarly wicked men, You save these rather than those through supreme goodness, and damn those rather than these[n103] through supreme justice.\"\n\nJeremiah, John the Baptist, and the blessed Virgin Mary also plainly prove this: they were sanctified in the womb without any preceding merit, others entirely similar being left behind. If anyone, however, should imagine for himself any merits whatever of such sanctification, let it be supposed that another virgin, like the glorious Virgin, had lived in an altogether similar way; and if God is in no way an acceptor of individual persons, it follows that God would likewise have been incarnate from her, and thus the only Son of God would have had many mothers. I, however, believe most firmly that even if all the daughters of the house of Jacob had lived as my Lady did, none of them would nevertheless have been such in the divine acceptance, and that He would have granted to her alone, before all, the joy and honor of virgin and mother, being incarnate from her singularly. In no way, however, does it seem that so great a wisdom, which orders all things sweetly, did not, by careful providence, choose beforehand, singularly and eternally, a single mother for itself, but left who should be His mother, as though negligently, to the merits and wills of men[n104]\n\n…various, and, as it were, to chance and fortune, and to the fall of the dice. But since the Lord had revealed to me that to reveal and confess the works of God is honourable and pleasing, here is a short story to the same point. I knew a certain young cleric, a devoted servant of the glorious Virgin. In order to serve more acceptably the most pure Virgin, who has no spot or wrinkle of mind or body, he vowed to her perpetual chastity, not only of flesh but also of thought, and purity of will; and he renewed the same vow every day in his devotions. That cunning serpent, who through a thousand windings and slippery deceits never ceases to disturb quiet hearts, envied him, and poured in so much venom of temptation that he began to think anxiously, and, half in doubt, to dispute about the worth, merit and reward of chastity. At last he was so deceitfully deluded\n\nthat he held cheap the chastity even of the blessed Virgin, and consequently her whole most holy life, reckoning that if some other woman had led a similar life, or a holier one, she would have been like her in all else, or even more blessed. For this reason he became slack and lukewarm in loving her and in rendering his accustomed services. One night, when he had given sleep to his eyes, he was visited by a ray of healing grace, and seemed to be led by someone into a pleasant place, like a paradise. There he was shown a tree of incomparable beauty and equal worth, which, rooted in the earth, rose up into heaven; on its top, as in a little nest, a tiny child was resting, and the tree along its length was marked at intervals with most beautiful knots. When he wished to know what this tree was and of what sort, the answer came: \"This is the virginity of holy Mary.\" At once, one of the knots of the tree opened like a mouth, and a voice said: \"Even if all the daughters of the house of Jacob had lived as she did, none would have been such.\" All this, about the acceptance and preferring of one of equal persons, and even of a less worthy one, is clearer in chapter 21.\n\nAs to that last objection, about preaching, one must reply as chapters 23 and 25 say about prayer. Christ, who preached to men himself with his own blessed mouth, or through his Apostles or any other preachers, did not will that all who heard should be pierced to the heart and yield to the truth. Indeed he willed that nothing else, and nothing otherwise in the least, should ever come to pass through any sermon of his than what fully did come to pass, as chapter 10 shows. Hence Isaiah 55: \"As the rain and snow come down from heaven, and return there no more, but soak the earth, and water it, and make it bring forth, and give seed to the sower and bread to the eater: so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth. It shall not return to me empty, but shall do whatever I willed, and shall prosper in the things for which I sent it.\" And if you ask why, then, he willed to preach to all without distinction, the answer is plain from what has been said. One must add that he willed this for the instruction of the elect and the punishment of the reprobate. Hence Matthew 13 and often elsewhere: \"He who has ears to hear, let him hear\"; and Matthew 19: \"Not all take this word, but those to whom it is given; let him who can take it, take it.\" And John 9: \"For judgment I came into this world, that those who do not see may see, and those who see may become blind.\" And Matthew 13: asked by the disciples why he preached to the crowds in parables, he answered that \"to you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. Therefore I speak to them in parables, because seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear, nor understand, that the prophecy of Isaiah might be fulfilled in them, who says: 'You shall hear with hearing, and shall not understand, and seeing you shall see, and shall not see. The heart of this people has grown fat, and they have heard heavily with their ears, and have closed their eyes, lest ever they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with the heart, and be converted, and I heal them.'\" This is also in Isaiah 6, in words slightly different from these. And Mark 4 shows the same more expressly; there, after the Lord had preached to the crowds in parables, he said thus to the twelve Apostles: \"To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God; but to those who are outside, all things are done in parables, that seeing they may see and not see, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest ever they be converted, and their sins be forgiven them.\"\n\nBut mere men, who do not know how to distinguish between the elect and the reprobate, ought to preach to all, wishing them salvation, as also to pray for all, as chapters 23 and 25 showed. Hence Ecclesiastes 11: \"In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening let not your hand cease, for you do not know which will spring up, this or that; and if both together, it will be better.\" And so preaching ought to be done to all without distinction. Thus the elect may be built up unto life; the reprobate, for their part, may do less harm, become less evil, and be the less damned, or be struck by such preaching as by a sword of the spirit, or a kind of spiritual rod of the Lord's mouth; and merit may be increased for us. For the Apostle says in Ephesians 6: \"Take the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God.\" And Isaiah 11: \"He shall strike the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he shall slay the wicked.\" And 2 Corinthians 2: \"We are the good fragrance of Christ to God among those who are being saved and among those who perish; to some indeed a fragrance of death unto death, to others a fragrance of life unto life.\" And Luke 10: \"Into whatever house you enter, first say, 'Peace to this house'; and if a son of peace is there, your peace shall rest upon him; but if not, it shall return to you.\"\n\nHence Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace 68: \"Let men suffer themselves to be rebuked when they sin, and let them not argue from rebuke itself against grace, nor from grace against rebuke. For just punishment is owed to sins, and just rebuke belongs to that punishment; and it is administered medicinally, even if the salvation of the sick person is uncertain. So if he who is rebuked belongs to the number of the predestined, rebuke is a healing medicine for him; but if he does not belong, rebuke becomes for him a penal torment. Under this uncertainty, therefore, it is to be applied out of charity.\" The same author, below, 75: \"As far as concerns us, who cannot distinguish the predestined from the non-predestined, severe rebuke is to be applied by us medicinally to all, lest they perish or lest they destroy others; but it is God's to make it profitable to those whom he himself foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.\" And 76 follows: \"For if sometimes we rebuke out of fear that someone may perish thereby, why do we not also rebuke out of fear that someone may perish the more thereby\" [n105]\n\n… and above, 73, treating the authority of Luke set out before, he says: \"It concerns us, since we do not know who is a son of peace according to God's predestination, and who is not, to make no exception and to distinguish no one, but to wish all to be saved to whom we preach this peace. For we need not fear that we lose it, if he to whom we preach is not a son of peace, without our knowing; for it will return to us, that is, it will profit us.\" Now Gregory's saying does not contradict what has been said: for if the first parent had stood firm, God would have ordained otherwise.\n\nWith these preliminaries, it now remains to go on to what follows. When it is first argued that someone can merit something from God condignly [de condigno], the answer depends on knowing that to merit is to do something to be rewarded, that is, to be rewarded as worthy or due; and everything due, worthy or condign is reasonable and just. Therefore, as chapter 21 distinguished about the reasonable and the just, so likewise one must distinguish about the due, the worthy and the condign. As to the condign, since it is what is argued about, it suffices to show it, and once it is known the rest will not be hidden.\n\nThe condign, then, is either prior by nature and antecedent to the divine will, or posterior and subsequent to it, or in a way mixed of both. Or, in other words, the same thing: there is a condign per se, absolutely, and from the inflexible rigor of justice; there is a condign per accidens, in respect of the divine will and from justice dependent on it; and there is a condign mixed in a way of both. One must further know, as to the common manner of speaking of all and the proper manner of the Doctors, that to merit condignly is taken differently in good and in evil. For it is said that one who sins merits eternal punishment condignly, because that sin is so evil that eternal punishment could be inflicted on the one so sinning, from its malice alone, without any injury to right. But it is said that no one merits eternal life condignly, because no one's work is so good or so meritorious with God that eternal life is owed him from the goodness or merit of that work alone, without any grace; indeed, nor any good at all of the \"distinct\" kind [n106], as was argued above. Yet these two senses of what it is to merit condignly\n\ncan be reduced to some one common sense, univocal or analogous to both: perhaps it is to do something for which pure reward can justly be paid, so that this word \"pure\" excludes from the reward every good or evil given freely. And this is the potential condign, because reward can justly be paid to him.\n\nSo, beginning higher up from the principle, I can distinguish otherwise about meriting and demeriting condignly, namely actually and potentially. To merit actually is to do something to be rewarded, namely something for which a reward is actually owed; and so no sinner merits any punishment other than the one he will have. For it is not worthy or due that he be punished otherwise than God himself has established he is to be punished; and this \"to merit\" can be subdivided in the three aforesaid ways. But to merit potentially is to do something rewardable, namely something for which a reward could be rendered. So everyone who sins mortally, whether he is to be damned or to be saved, merits a greater punishment than he will have, and perhaps an eternal punishment of whatever intensity. For God could justly punish anyone so sinning with a greater punishment than the one he will inflict, and perhaps with one of any size whatever.\n\nThis meriting, or meriting condignly potentially, is in a way mixed of meriting condignly antecedently and subsequently to the divine will, as chapter 21 explained more plainly in its like. For that he does this or that depends on the divine will, according to chapter 9; but that, this or that having been done, pure reward could or could not worthily be rendered to him, is wholly necessary.\n\nSpeaking, then, of meriting condignly in act in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will, per se and absolutely, it seems that no one can merit anything from God, good or evil, as the other arguments showed. In the second way he can, for everything that God wills and establishes is worthy and condign, as was shown above. In the third way likewise one can merit condignly in act good and evil from God, namely such good or evil as was proved above to follow inseparably upon one's work. For that he does such a work depends on the divine will, as chapter 9 showed; but that, such a work having been done with all its circumstances, such good or evil accompanies it does not depend on the divine will but follows of necessity, as, upon this man's running, this man's being moved [n107].\n\nTherefore one of the earlier arguments does not hold either, namely the one which argued that this reward, following necessarily, makes the divine will necessarily will it and render it to the one who merits it. For as the divine will freely wills and does such a merit in anyone, so too it does all that follows necessarily. By this distinction premised, many things argued above are also resolved. As to the argument that a virtuous act merits condignly every good, useful and delightful, as distinct from the honourable good, because it is better than this and that: one must say that this does not follow. If John saves Peter's life, Peter is not thereby bound to give him back all his goods, since however many and great they are, they are far less than the benefit\n\npreviously received. So too, if John teaches Peter the sciences and virtues, though these are incomparably better than all Peter's goods, Peter is not therefore bound to repay John all his goods; it suffices to repay in such matters as he can, and as is customarily and fittingly repaid. Hence the Philosopher, Ethics 9, 1 [n108]: \"But in cases where [the exchange] is not made on account of confusion, that is, promise of service, that is, of certain repayment, these indeed are for their own sake, that is, the receivers or givers, it is said, because they are unimpeachable. For such is friendship according to virtue, and the repayment is to be made according to choice; for this belongs to friends and to virtue. And so it seems also with those who share philosophy; for worth is not measured by money, and a price of equal weight will not be set, but perhaps what suffices, as is the case toward the gods and parents.\" And perhaps this is because Peter cannot, without great detriment to himself, repay John with equal weight; and although God could suffice, yet he is not bound. For no one by meriting does anything good for God, but for himself; why then is God bound to repay this condignly? And if you say that I argued thus above, I admit it, but that was against those who hold that one in grace merits from God condignly an increase of grace; and so the argument seems to proceed to the point that he merits condignly remission of any temporal punishment which is less.\n\nAnother point it argues, that one who loves God above all must be loved back by him likewise, does not rightly attend to the analogy to be observed in other friendships. For the more worthy one is loved by someone, the other is not bound to love back by that much; it suffices that he love back less, according to the excellence of his station. For the Philosopher says, Ethics 8, 7: \"The analogue in all friendships that exist according to superabundance, that is, where one extreme of the friendship abounds over the other in goodness, requires that the loving also be made so; for example, the better is to be loved more than he loves, and the more useful, and each of the others likewise. For when the loving is made according to worth, then there is in a way equality, which seems to belong to friendship.\" And since God is better and more worthy than anyone infinitely, it seems, following proportionality, that he is bound under no degree of love to love back any lover; and especially since he freely gives God all that love, and is bound to love God as much as he can, as was proved above. A short argument can persuade of this. Let John and Peter, with many others, love God above all equally. Then if God were bound to love back above all any one of them, he would be bound to love John back above Peter, and conversely, and anyone above anyone, and above all the rest, and above the Blessed Mary, and as his only Word [n109].\n\nYet it is very fitting, and becomes God, out of pure gratuity, to love back such lovers ineffably, indeed more truly to love them first. And this is what that faithful friend John, much beloved and loving, testifies in his first Epistle, chapter 4, saying: \"In this is charity, not that we loved God, but that he first loved us.\" To Anselm and Aristotle the reply is that such a one merits only according to his own prior appointment, not according to the absolute rigor of justice; and the confirmation of this argument will be weakened by what has been said. As to the remaining arguments that follow, up to the argument made about Christ's merit, what has been laid out beforehand will answer them. And that one\n\ncan be solved by the distinction premised about meriting condignly. For in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will, and from the absolutely necessary and inflexible rigor of justice, it seems that Christ did not merit for himself or for us resurrection from death and eternal life, or anything of the kind. For if he had, it would be absolutely necessary that God render these to him and to us, since he cannot be unjust; and so God would raise up and beatify the elect by necessity simply absolute, and not by the good pleasure of a free will, which chapter 9 does not allow.\n\nIt also seems possible that, even had no man sinned, the Son of God would have assumed passible human nature, done all these things or similar ones, or greater, or more often, and suffered, as he has now done. He would have done so not for the sake of any reward to be applied to himself or to others, but only out of the purest charity for God's sake. After all this, he would have laid aside and annihilated the man so assumed, never to be taken up again, and all other men, and every creature, never going to create anything [n110]. The same seems possible with man's fall into sin supposed, since it formally implies no contradiction in any way. And had it been so, Christ would have merited nothing, for himself or for others, condignly in the first way mentioned. Therefore neither does he now, since as much merit or good work as he had now, he would then have had as much or more.\n\nMoreover Christ did not merit by his divine nature but by his human, and this not from his natural endowments alone but from grace freely given, as chapter 35 alleged; Lombard attests the same, Sentences 3, dist. 13 and 18. The Apostle also seems to hold this in Romans 1, saying of Christ: \"Who was predestined Son of God in power, according to the spirit of sanctification, by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ our Lord.\" On which the Gloss says: \"He himself, as he is man, was predestined, that is, chosen beforehand without merits by grace alone, not only that he might be our head, but that he might neither draw [the origin of sin] nor commit sin by will, and that from mortal nature he might be glorified immortally.\" If then he did not merit immortality for himself condignly, nor anything else, as it seems, neither did he for us. The Lord Jesus Christ himself\n\nseems to attest this really and in fact, by giving thanks to God the Father because he heard him, John 11. If, however, he merited condignly, and by pure debt, to be heard by the Father, no thanks would have been due to him, as chapter 31 argued. For what true and wise man will give thanks or make a return to one who never did him anything gracious or gave anything freely, since it is proper to this act of thanksgiving to be the return for a benefit freely done? [n111] On which the Philosopher says, Ethics 5, 8: \"By requital in proportion the city is held together; they are held together by return. Wherefore they also make the sacred rite of the Graces prompt, that there may be return; for this is proper to grace. For one must serve in return the one who did a grace, namely by doing him a grace in turn, who first did something freely.\" Tully agrees, in the second book of his Old Rhetoric, defining grace thus: \"Grace is that in which the memory of another's friendships and services, that is, benefits, and the will of repaying, are contained.\" Hence also the Poet: Thanks are rightly owed for things unbought.\n\nBut if thanks were reasonably to be returned to one who does no favour but only a pure debt, buyer and seller, lessor and lessee, hireling or servant and master would owe each other thanks, which reason forbids. For without thanksgiving satisfaction has been made fully on both sides, and return made in all things; why then should thanksgiving still be expected, which is itself a kind of return, as was said? Nor does custom hold this; and far be it that all such persons be mutually ungrateful, since no one can be ungrateful except for a favour freely done. But according to the Apostle, Romans 4: \"To him that works, the wages are not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.\" So it does not seem that any thanks are to be rendered by such a worker to his master. Hence Luke 6: \"If you love those who love you, what thanks do you deserve?\" And below, 17: \"Which of you, having a servant ploughing or tending sheep, says to him at once when he comes back from the field, 'Come over, recline'; and does not say, 'Prepare what I may eat, and gird yourself, and serve me until I eat and drink, and after that you shall eat and drink'? Does he thank that servant because he did what he commanded him? I think not.\"\n\nSince, then, Christ gave thanks to the Father because he heard him, it seems that he did not merit condignly, as is granted, to be heard; and so neither anything else at all, by like reasoning. And when it is argued that Christ's merit infinitely exceeds the merit of any mere man, because Christ so exceeds every man, perhaps this need not hold, since one could argue so about his understanding, willing, speaking, walking, and any other operation of his. Christ's merit, however, can be considered in two ways. In one way, as to the act itself of meriting, which is properly called merit, and so it seems to have been only finite, like the soul, power, act and habit from which it proceeded. For according to what was premised in the fortieth part of the first corollary of this book, no creature is, nor can be, infinite; nor is that causal inference valid, \"because Christ exceeds every man infinitely, therefore Christ's merit does likewise.\" For God exceeds every creature in that way, and yet not every motion made, or possible to be made, immediately by God likewise exceeds a motion made by any\n\ncreature. And in particular this causal inference about Christ's merit does not hold, since Christ has two natures: the divine, which is infinite, and according to that he did not merit; and the human, which is finite, and according to that alone he merited. In another way Christ's merit can be considered, namely as to the price which he offered by it to God the Father, and so it can be called fittingly infinite. For by a meritorious act of his own human will he offered himself whole, the Son of God, perfect God and man, to God the Father as the price for men to be redeemed. Therefore, even if he had assumed human natural endowments however much more imperfect, and so had offered himself in like manner by a meritorious act of will more remiss in any proportion whatever; or even if perhaps, with natural endowments already assumed, he had offered himself likewise for men to be redeemed by a meritorious act of will as remiss as you please [n112], he would have redeemed them most sufficiently. This would be not by reason of the infinity of the act, will or merit properly speaking, but by reason of the infinite of this price, infinitely infinite, offered through that merit. It is as if two men wish to buy the same article for sale, and one with most fervent will offers less than the just price, the other with most remiss will offers the just price or more: the latter will have the thing, the former will lack it, and not by reason of the diversity of the acts of will, but only of the prices offered.\n\nHence also 1 Timothy 2: \"One,\" says the Apostle, \"God, and mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as redemption for all\" [n113]. And according to this view can be understood the saying of Anselm, Why God Became Man 2, 14, alleged above, and this appears from the same author below in the same book, chapter 20, where he says: \"What more merciful can be conceived than that God the Father should say to a sinner damned to eternal torments, with nothing to redeem himself, 'Take my only-begotten, and give him for yourself'; and the Son himself, 'Take me, and redeem yourself'? For they say as it were this, when they call and draw us to the Christian faith. What also is more just than that he to whom a price greater than every debt is given, if it is given with due affection, should remit every debt?\"\n\nBut granted that Christ's merit was infinite in the species of merit properly so called, it still does not follow that he merited anything condignly in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will. For the divine will would still, prior by nature, have made in Christ's human will that merit of his, whatever it was; and prior eternally, in time and by nature, it would have willed Christ, and every Christian, to have whatever he merited by it for himself or his own, as can appear from the premises of this chapter and others. And if you do not believe me, at least believe the Truth saying, \"I have not spoken from myself, but the Father who sent me himself gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak,\" John 12. And above, John 5: \"I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge, and my judgment is true, because I seek not my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father.\" Treating this, Augustine on John, part 2, homily 45, or 99 of the whole [n114], says thus: \"On account of the person of the Son, consisting of two substances, divine and human, he speaks sometimes according to what he is as God, as in what he says, 'I and the Father are one'; sometimes according to what he is as man, as in 'For the Father is greater than I.' According to this we have taken what was said by him, and what I am now discussing, 'I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge.'\"\n\nDespite this, some try to assert that Christ merited condignly as much for himself as for us. For one merits condignly that which, if he demands it, it is necessary be rendered to him; but if Christ demands glory for himself and for us, it is necessary that it be rendered. Also, by meriting Christ willed glory to be rendered to himself and his own, and whatever he willed had to be fulfilled; for otherwise the divine will could be frustrated, which chapter 10 manifestly forbids. To these one must briefly reply that the first assumption is not true understood universally. For if Christ, as was possible for him, as God's omnipotence shows and as is clear from Lombard, Sentences 3, dist. 18, had assumed an impassible body\n\nand one perfectly glorious, such as he now has, and without any merit had demanded glory for himself or for us, it would have been necessary for it to be rendered. This would be not because he had merited it condignly, but because he had so willed; and his human will would necessarily have been conformed to the divine will, as appears from the premises, since it cannot sin, and the divine will is necessarily always just and efficaciously fulfilled. Or if the human will could have willed contrarily or differently from the divine will, it would not have been necessary that such a thing willed be rendered to him, since it would not be just, as chapter 21 showed. Whatever the Father or the Holy Spirit demands is likewise necessary to be rendered to them, as chapter 10 of this book proves, and yet they merit nothing. But if that first assumption is understood in this way, that one merits condignly everything which, if he demands it by reason of merit condignly in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will and from the rigor of absolute justice, is likewise necessary to be rendered to him, then one must say as before that neither Christ nor anyone else can so merit\n\nactually anything from God. Therefore neither can Christ, by reason of this merit, demand anything from God, unless Christ could err, and will contrarily or differently to the divine will; and if by demanding anything he so acted, it would not be necessary that it be rendered to him, because it would not be just, as chapter 21 demonstrated. The other argument premised can also be solved by what has now been had. The remaining objections above have been rejected by what preceded, up to the last of them, which was about the distinction of merit of congruity and of condignity. For this, it seems, such a distinction must be made: that merit of condignity is taken in three ways, as was said; but merit of congruity is the potential merit of which it was said above, namely such a good or evil work which from congruity, or congruence of the work, is rewardable, that is, possible and fit to be rewarded. It does not mean that from some congruity or congruence prior to the divine will it is actually to be rewarded, as was shown above.\n\nCOROLLARY.\n\nCorollary against certain other most recent defenders of Pelagius, who feign that although a man can in no way merit first grace, he can nevertheless obtain it by his own powers alone.\n\nFrom these things a certain most recent error of the Pelagians is clearly refuted, the error of those who feign that although a man cannot merit grace in any way, neither condignly nor congruously, he can nevertheless obtain it by his own powers alone. Hence, no less clearly can be repelled a certain Pelagian error which perhaps will be fabricated and uttered, that God does not give grace to a man on account of any antecedent merit, but on account of his future merits foreseen by him: as a sower sows good seed in earth which he foresees will bring forth abundant fruit. But these errors can easily be corrected by what has been set out beforehand here and in the earlier chapters. Many also, as\n\nbaptized infants who die at once, receive grace effectively, being grown [n115], and never bring forth from it any good fruit; they never bear sweet fruits, but bitter ones; they never make grapes, but wild grapes. Or if ever they do some pleasing works, returning to their vomit and stifling grace, they do more evils, and make progress in them, and in the end persist hardened.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "aperire has no object in Savile. The evident sense is \"open [to grace]\", as in the third error stated in the preceding chapters. The three \"errors\" are cited by number; I have not expanded the cross-reference (ruling 4)."}, {"n": 2, "text": "gratuito and its family (gratia, gratis, grate, ingratis). Here gratuito means \"gratuitously\": for nothing, for God's own sake, with no view to reward. grate I render \"acceptably\", that is, pleasing to God in the manner of gratum faciens; chare I render \"charitably\". The sed in \"non amore gratuito, sed libere et principaliter propter illum\" is awkward after non. The sense is plainly that he does not love God freely and principally for God's sake, which is what \"gratuitous\" love means in the next sentences (\"gratuito super omnia propter ipsum\"). I have translated that evident sense."}, {"n": 3, "text": "Savile's Aristotle references follow the medieval book-and-chapter divisions and are kept as he gives them. 1 Post. 2 = Posterior Analytics I.2 (72a29–32); 9 Eth. 4 = Nicomachean Ethics IX.4 (1166a3–4); 2 Rhetor. 5 = Rhetoric II.4 (1380b35–36); 2 Eth. 1, 2 and 6 = EN II.1, 2, 6; 7 Eth. 1 = EN VII.1 (1145a18–20)."}, {"n": 4, "text": "frui / uti, enjoyment and use, in Augustine's sense (De doctrina christiana I). To enjoy is to cleave to a thing for its own sake; to use is to refer it to another end. The man described loves God for the sake of his own advantage, so he \"uses\" God and \"enjoys\" himself."}, {"n": 5, "text": "The sentence is elliptical: \"Si autem vtitur creatura, cum … vti sit …\" has no stated main clause. The sense is that a right intention uses the creature by referring it to God, and so the man enjoys God after all. I have supplied \"the same follows\" and nothing more."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The print has Dilector, custodia …, \"lover, the guarding …\". Wisdom 6:19 [6:18] (Vulgate) has dilectio, \"love\". I have translated the evident sense."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Petrus is Peter Lombard (called Lumbardus elsewhere in this chapter). \"8 Eth. 14\" is presumably Isidore's Etymologiae (the book on heresies is VIII), not Aristotle's Ethics; I have not verified the chapter. \"Canon\" is the Decretum, C. 24, last question."}, {"n": 8, "text": "epieikes is Aristotle's Greek word for the \"decent\" or equitable man, transliterated in Savile. studiosus (Greek spoudaios) is the earnest, upright man. The passage is EN IX.8 (1168b–1169a). \"Goods fought over\" renders circumpugnabilia (Greek periμachēta)."}, {"n": 9, "text": "\"Sixtus Pictagoras\" is Sextus the Pythagorean, whose Sentences circulated in Rufinus's Latin translation."}, {"n": 10, "text": "As printed: quod non a tali virtute procedit, quae rectam causam finalem … non habet, \"which does not proceed from such a virtue, which does not have …\". The two negatives cannot both stand. The argument requires \"a work proceeding from a virtue that lacks a right end\", so one non is surplus. Either \"which proceeds from such a virtue as does not have\", or \"which does not proceed from a virtue that has\". I have translated the first. The sense is the same either way."}, {"n": 11, "text": "quod etiam virtutes infidelium sunt veraciter dona Dei is read as a third quod-clause after ostendens. Augustine's point is that these natural goods are gifts of God, although they are not true virtues and become sin by misuse. See the following sections (\"not theirs, but his who uses evils well\")."}, {"n": 12, "text": "Deus virtutum (Ps 79:8 [80:8]) is \"God of hosts\" in the Psalm, but Augustine and Bradwardine read virtutes as \"virtues\" and so make the verse fit the argument. I translate \"God of virtues\" to keep the play."}, {"n": 13, "text": "misericordiae damnari: genitive of the charge, \"condemned for mercy\" (1 Sam 15, Saul sparing Agag). accipere personam (\"to show partiality to a person\", Ex 23:3) is rendered \"partiality is shown to the poor man's person\"."}, {"n": 14, "text": "voluntas, vel qua naturaliter vult bonum: Lombard's text probably has no vel (\"a will by which it naturally wills good\"). I have kept the print's vel as \"or\"."}, {"n": 15, "text": "\"Pope John\" is John XXII, who promulgated the Constitutiones Clementinae (Clement V's decrees) in 1317; the passage is Clem. 1.1.1, Fidei catholicae fundamento. The council is that of Vienne."}, {"n": 16, "text": "nec non grate aliquid faciendo: here nec non is not \"and also\" but \"nor [by acting] not acceptably\". It is the second horn of the dilemma opened by \"vel non sic faciendo\"."}, {"n": 17, "text": "gratia … gratis detur ingratis: the jingle cannot be kept in English, which has \"grace … freely … to the ungracious\". The ingrati are \"the ungrateful\", and also those without gratia, not pleasing to God."}, {"n": 18, "text": "Anselm's work is De casu diaboli (\"On the Fall of the Devil\"). Savile's De causa Diaboli is a misprint, and I translate the evident title."}, {"n": 19, "text": "Savile has no stop after intelligentibus. I read the sentence with the sense its later clauses require: grace alone can save infants, who contribute nothing, while in those with understanding grace \"always helps\" natural free choice. The other construal, in which grace alone suffices for both, contradicts what follows."}, {"n": 20, "text": "The text is Jer 10:23. Savile's \"Ierem. 1.\" in text and margin is evidently truncated. The Psalm is Ps 36:23 [37:23]. \"Another text\" is another version of the Psalter. The Vulgate reads Apud Dominum, not A Domino."}, {"n": 21, "text": "Bradwardine cites De fide ad Petrum as Augustine's (\"the same\"). It is the work of Fulgentius of Ruspe (CPL 826)."}, {"n": 22, "text": "Savile's numerals for Aristotle follow the medieval Latin divisions, not Bekker's, and are kept as printed. The passages meant appear to be these. Ethics 2, 1–2 = EN II.1–2 (1103a–b). Ethics 2, 3 (335C) = II.3 (1105a). Ethics 2, 4 = II.4 (1105a). Ethics 6, last = VI.13 (1144b). Ethics 3, 13 = III.5 (1114b). Ethics 3, 18 (335C) = roughly III.7–9 (1115b–1117a). The fifth book, chapter 2 (335C: 5i. libri 2o) = V.1 (1129b–1130a). Metaphysics 9, 14 = Θ 8 (1049b–1050a). I have not identified Politics 5, 9."}, {"n": 23, "text": "Mathematici here are astrologers, who cast nativities."}, {"n": 24, "text": "Genesis is the horoscope or nativity chart. The Secret of Secrets is the pseudo-Aristotelian letter to Alexander, widely read in Latin."}, {"n": 25, "text": "Bajulus can mean tutor, guardian, or attendant. \"Tutor\" is inferred from the context of the story."}, {"n": 26, "text": "De vetula is a thirteenth-century Latin poem falsely ascribed to Ovid. Bradwardine takes it as Ovid's."}, {"n": 27, "text": "Savile prints nisse. The metre and sense call for nixus or nisus (\"intent upon, striving after\"), and I translate that."}, {"n": 28, "text": "Chare and grate are adverbs of caritas and gratia: acting in love, and acting in a way that is pleasing and in grace. \"Graciously\" and \"gracious\" render the grate/gratum family (also at 333B and 335B), and gratis is rendered \"freely.\" English cannot keep the gratia/gratis/gratus play; Bradwardine's argument runs on it (grace is \"given freely,\" gratis, so that it can be \"pleasing,\" grata)."}, {"n": 29, "text": "Prosper of Aquitaine is meant, and the work is probably his Contra collatorem (against Cassian), ch. 21. Savile's title is Bradwardine's own description of the book."}, {"n": 30, "text": "Savile prints scit surdus (\"who so knows deaf\"). The sense requires sit (\"who is so deaf\"), as in Augustine, and I translate that."}, {"n": 31, "text": "The canon (Carthage, 418, cited by Gratian) reads, as far as I know, diligamus atque valeamus (\"we may love and be able to do\"). Savile's debeamus, aut valeamus (\"we ought to do, or be able to do\") is construable, so I translate it as printed."}, {"n": 32, "text": "Pelagiani … pelagi: wordplay on Pelagianus and pelagus (\"sea, deep\"). Bradwardine returns to it elsewhere (I.35, pelluntur in pelagus). The English keeps only the image of the sea."}, {"n": 33, "text": "Savile's huius/illius are inconsistent. In the first sentence huius is the person without grace, and in the next huius is the person with grace. I give the referents plainly."}, {"n": 34, "text": "Haec … illa has no clear antecedent. It probably means fortitude concerned with fears set against fortitude concerned with daring. I translate literally."}, {"n": 35, "text": "secundum praemissa et contra praemissa. The sense appears to be that the opponents' position, on their own premises, would have the man saved, while this contradicts the premises Bradwardine has established earlier. Savile gives nothing more explicit."}, {"n": 36, "text": "gratis … propter Deum, with gratuito, gratificat, gratificatur and grate below, is the gratia family (§5.5). \"Freely\" renders gratis/gratuito: without regard to reward, from love. \"Makes acceptable\" renders gratificare (to make gratus to God) and \"pleasing\" renders grate. The jingle with gratia cannot be kept in English throughout."}, {"n": 37, "text": "tiri … tiriaca: the tyrus is the viper from whose flesh theriac (the antidote) is made. The margin offers the variants viperae and theriaca. The main text construes, so I keep it. \"Tyriac\" is a transliteration of the main-text reading."}, {"n": 38, "text": "Dominus zelotes nomen eius: the Vulgate's rendering of the Hebrew \"jealous\". Bradwardine plays on zelans/zelantior (\"zealous\"), so I render \"Zealous\"."}, {"n": 39, "text": "Both the keyed text and the print have in expositam (two words, or inexpositam run together). I take it as inexpositam, \"unexplained\". The sense requires it."}, {"n": 40, "text": "cifra cum fuerit vltima figura: a zero standing in the last place in the order of reckoning (the leftmost, since numerals were reckoned from the right) signifies nothing. The point is that grace would add nothing to the act."}, {"n": 41, "text": "Savile's \"secundo Ethic. tertio\" is Nicomachean Ethics II.3 (1104b); \"Post. vlt.\" is Posterior Analytics II.19 (99b). Per convention the citations are kept as Savile gives them."}, {"n": 42, "text": "certissmas … habentem cognitiones principiorum demonstrantem latere: the Latin is compressed and demonstrantem is awkward. Aristotle's point is that a person might possess knowledge of the principles more certain than demonstration without being aware of it. I give the evident sense and take demonstrantem as modifying the person who has the cognitions."}, {"n": 43, "text": "gratiosi / gratiosus: one who has grace, \"graced\". Likewise non grato at 337B is \"not pleasing to God\", i.e. lacking grace, which prepares the sentence's point."}, {"n": 44, "text": "formido in a cucumerarium: the scarecrow of Baruch (Letter of Jeremiah) 6 [69–70]: \"like a scarecrow in a cucumber field, which guards nothing\"."}, {"n": 45, "text": "et sic potest non habens gratiam: elliptical in the Latin, and the object is evidently the reward. I supply \"have it\"."}, {"n": 46, "text": "transmutiue: \"in the manner of change\". God's eternal love or hatred of a person does not change, except as regards the person's present justice or state, which does."}, {"n": 47, "text": "grate, \"pleasingly\" (for God). The final clause Nullus facit sic ante aliquid grate pro eo is elliptical: ante has no object. The sense is \"before the reception of grace\" (cf. the major premise)."}, {"n": 48, "text": "Gratia … gratis data. The Latin chain gratia / gratis / gratuitus cannot be fully kept in English. \"Grace freely given\" is the theological term (gratia gratis data). The point of the argument is that any increase of grace is as much \"free\" as first grace, and so cannot be owed as a debt."}, {"n": 49, "text": "Savile's \"5. Ethic. 6\" and, at 340A, \"5. Eth. 17\" cite Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics V in the medieval Latin chapter numbering, which I leave as Savile gives it (Conventions §5.4). Commutative (rectificatory) justice is treated in EN V.4–5 (1131b–1133b). \"No one suffers injustice willingly\" is EN V.9 (1136a–b)."}, {"n": 50, "text": "Savile's margin says only \"Glossa\", presumably the Glossa ordinaria on Rom 8:18. I have not checked its wording. The Latin does not mark where the Gloss ends. I close the quotation at \"the labor here\" because istam sententiam (339A) seems to refer back to it."}, {"n": 51, "text": "Psalms are cited in Vulgate numbering: Ps 36 is Eng. 37:23; below, \"Have mercy on me, O God\" is Ps 50 [51]:1, and \"the thirty-fourth Psalm\" is Ps 34 [35]:13. The long quotation from Augustine on Ps 36 is marked by inquiens, but the Latin does not say where it ends. I close it at \"cannot be compared with eternity\", after which Bradwardine's Dicitur forsitan resumes."}, {"n": 52, "text": "\"Ethics 5, 17\": see note 49. Bradwardine gives the Latin maxim Nullus patitur iniustum volens, which is the jurists' volenti non fit iniuria as the Philosopher states it."}, {"n": 53, "text": "Charissima charitate … charissima gratia, charissime et gratissime: the Latin chains carus with caritas, and gratia with gratus. \"Dear … dearly … gratefully\" keeps part of the play. Gratissime could also be \"most acceptably\", with an echo of gratia."}, {"n": 54, "text": "The Latin is hard: sed illa forsitan fuit intensior gloria quam Paulus meretur. I take illa as the eternal penalty just mentioned, and gloria quam Paulus meretur as an ablative of comparison (\"than the glory that Paul merits\"), with the relative attracted. The point is that the old penalty may have been greater than Paul's glory, so that it gives no usable measure of the \"lesser amount.\""}, {"n": 55, "text": "The print has gloria in the text and the variant gratia in the margin. I translate the main reading, which can be construed. The variant would sit more easily with \"free from the debt of eternal penalty and perhaps a debtor of temporal penalty only\", which better describes a man in grace than a man in glory."}, {"n": 56, "text": "Pelagianos ingratos … gratuitam gratiam: the pun survives in English only in part (\"ungrateful … gratuitous grace\")."}, {"n": 57, "text": "The reference is Bradwardine's. I have not tried to confirm that Anselm, De veritate 12, says this. Quod … suasum … persuasum is loose. I take \"which was elsewhere urged … and shown persuasively\" to refer to the doctrine that the adult can use grace meritoriously in the first instant. The print has suasum, then persuasum."}, {"n": 58, "text": "Cumulus partium remissarum: \"remitted\" parts are parts of lower intensity (lower degrees). The point is that intensification of a quality is not an addition of lesser degrees but a change in a single simple quality. The increase of grace is therefore not a separate \"part\" that could be merited apart from the whole."}, {"n": 59, "text": "The Latin repeats its clauses (sicut in instanti aequaliter tantum … sicut in instanti) and is elliptical. I read it as follows. Either continuous merit would yield an infinite increase, or it would yield no more than one instant yields, or even less. The last two are presented as absurd."}, {"n": 60, "text": "cum … possit is a causal subjunctive: \"since he can [do this] for some predestined who are worse than those [reprobates].\" It is not \"together with\"."}, {"n": 61, "text": "respicit is ambiguous (Luke 9:62 \"looking back\"; or \"turns his regard\"). I take it as parallel with abit retro (\"goes backward\", cf. John 6:67)."}, {"n": 62, "text": "non ex commisso. Commissum can mean something entrusted (a loan or deposit) or something done (a deed, a fault). I take the first sense, because the contrast with promissum and the preceding \"we have lent him nothing\" point to a debt arising from what we have committed to him."}, {"n": 63, "text": "Savile's Aristotle references follow the medieval chapter division of the Ethics (Grosseteste's Latin), and per the conventions they are kept as printed. The cited passages are: \"8, last\" and \"8, 13\" = EN VIII.14, 1163b; \"5, 8\" = EN V.5, 1132b–1133a; \"1, 12\" = EN I.8, 1098b31ff.; \"1, 9\" = the passages on happiness in EN I.7–8; \"9, 1\" = EN IX.1."}, {"n": 64, "text": "quae subfuerunt. The Latin is obscure. Probably subesse renders a Greek verb for \"to be already at hand or given beforehand\". The sense would then be: one who has done nothing worthy of the benefits already conferred has merely worked, and so remains in debt. I translate \"were at hand\" and leave the clause open."}, {"n": 65, "text": "gratiarum sacramentum. Aristotle speaks of a shrine of the Graces (Charites) set up in public so that return of favors may be made. Sacramentum here is a \"sacred rite\". Bradwardine then plays on gratia (\"favor\", \"grace\") in the next clause, \"this is proper to gratia\". English \"favor\" cannot carry the whole jingle with the Graces and with theological grace."}, {"n": 66, "text": "\"Christian soul, raised from grave death\" (Christiana anima de graui morte resuscitata) is the opening of Anselm's Meditation on human redemption. Savile's margin offers Christi for Christiana, which cannot be right grammatically, so I follow the main text and take the phrase as the title or incipit, not as part of Bradwardine's own sentence."}, {"n": 67, "text": "condignus. In Esther 6:9 and Rom 8:18 the Vulgate has condignus (Greek axios), \"worthy\" or \"proportionate\". Bradwardine's argument depends on the compound, cum + dignus (\"worthy together with reason and justice\"). I therefore keep \"condign\" or \"condignly worthy\" so that the argument still reads."}, {"n": 68, "text": "Psalm 118:17 [119:17], Retribue servo tuo. Savile's text has a small superscript after \"118\" (keyed 118i) whose meaning I cannot determine. It does not affect the sense."}, {"n": 69, "text": "baptismo fluminis, flaminis, aut sanguinis: the traditional triad of baptism by water (flumen), by the Spirit (flamen, \"breath\"), and by blood. The paired sounds are lost in English."}, {"n": 70, "text": "\"as to an act of virtue\" (sicut actum virtutis). The clause is awkward, since quam has \"justice and virtue\" as antecedent and actum is a loose accusative of comparison. The marginal variant veritatis (\"of truth\") would not improve it, so I keep the main reading."}, {"n": 71, "text": "Autor Autorum: Christ, who speaks John 8:34. The title plays on the \"authentic testimonies\" (authenticis testimoniis, auctoritates) just invoked. The Author stands behind every authority cited."}, {"n": 72, "text": "\"Hermes\" (presumably Hermes Trismegistus, as often in scholastic florilegia). I have not traced the sentence; Bradwardine gives no title."}, {"n": 73, "text": "De mundo 7 (401b), where the Latin version quotes Plato, Laws 4 (716a). \"Hunc\" (\"him\") is God, who is mentioned just before in the source. Ultio vel iustitia renders Greek Dikē, \"Justice, avenger\"; the two nouns are alternative renderings of the one word, and puniens vel cruciatiua likewise."}, {"n": 74, "text": "Savile's \"second book, 28\" is the Latin chapter number. The text is Aristotle's Rhetoric II.23 (1399b), the dilemma of the priestess who warns her son against public speaking: if he says what is just, men will hate him; if what is unjust, the gods. The printed text gives both horns; Bradwardine uses the second pair (just: loved by the gods)."}, {"n": 75, "text": "Ethics 10, 13 in the Latin chapter division is Nic. Eth. X.8, 1179a22–29."}, {"n": 76, "text": "Gratis here means \"for nothing,\" \"without reward.\" The word is the one the gratia / gratis family turns on elsewhere in the book. Bradwardine, who quotes the line to show that virtue's reward is bound to the act, perhaps has the echo in mind."}, {"n": 77, "text": "dat ipsam charitas: construed with ipsam = facultatem (\"the means\"), and charitas as subject (\"charity gives them\"). Charitas in the nominative cannot be the object of dat, and the next clause (dat beneuolentiam) confirms the construction."}, {"n": 78, "text": "The subject of confirmat is not expressed. It is evidently the author of the arguments just reported, whose last argument ends here; Bradwardine's replies begin at Praeterea."}, {"n": 79, "text": "Posterior Analytics 1, 12 in Savile's Latin chapter division is I.13 (78a30–b4): the planets' nearness is cause of their not twinkling."}, {"n": 80, "text": "Propter quid is demonstration of the reasoned fact, from cause to effect; propter quia (or demonstration quia) is demonstration of the bare fact, from effect to cause. I keep the Latin terms because the whole argument turns on the double sense of propter and quia."}, {"n": 81, "text": "Donatus, Ars maior, on the \"powers\" (potestates) of conjunctions, which include causales and rationales. The English cannot keep the pun rationali irrationabiliter (\"a 'rational' conjunction, irrationally\")."}, {"n": 82, "text": "The print reads extrinsecos (\"exterior\") for intrinsecos (\"interior\"), a misprint: the angles opposite the exterior angle are the two interior ones, as Bradwardine wrote a few lines earlier (duos intrinsecos). The sense is evident and I translate \"interior.\""}, {"n": 83, "text": "gratissime: \"most freely,\" \"most gratuitously.\" The gratia / gratis / gratissime family is at work: Christ's divinity is a gift, not a wage."}, {"n": 84, "text": "Savile's marginal variant hominem is keyed to an asterisk placed after Deum. It would give \"not only man but God, [and] man.\" I translate the main text."}, {"n": 85, "text": "The print ends this sentence with a question mark, though the construction is declarative (non incongrue dicitur). I translate it as a statement."}, {"n": 86, "text": "qualicunque et soli est praemium ordinatum is awkward. I take qualicunque as \"to one of any such kind,\" and soli as \"to him alone\": reward is ordained for one of that kind and for no other."}, {"n": 87, "text": "Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio 14, 46 (Savile: \"last chapter\"). Bernard's alioquin (\"otherwise\") introduces his statement of what \"our merits\" properly are. Bradwardine uses it to show that merit does not effect the reward."}, {"n": 88, "text": "The sentence is elliptical, and I do not emend it: quare autem semper quaerit causam I take as the questioner's persistent question (\"but why does one always seek a cause?\"), which the causa autem formalis… clause then answers. The \"efficient cause\" in the answer is God's will, as prior; no posterior created cause exists."}, {"n": 89, "text": "The jingle gratia Dei grata magis appareat … Autori gratissimo gratiae gratiores runs through one root in Latin: gratis (freely, without merit), grata (welcome, pleasing), gratissimo (most gracious, most pleasing), gratiores (more grateful, more thankful). English cannot keep one word throughout. I use \"freely,\" \"more welcome,\" \"most gracious,\" \"more grateful.\" The wordplay is lost."}, {"n": 90, "text": "Gregory, Dialogues 4.46. The opening sentence (\"But no just man feeds on…to what end will they burn forever?\") is the question of Gregory's interlocutor, Peter (Petro quaerenti). Ita respondet introduces Gregory's reply, which begins at \"But almighty God.\""}, {"n": 91, "text": "De fide ad Petrum, long ascribed to Augustine, is the work of Fulgentius of Ruspe. Savile's numbers \"59 et 24\" are kept as printed and have not been checked."}, {"n": 92, "text": "Causantur (causari): to plead a cause or bring a complaint against someone. I keep \"cause\" for the forensic sense, as the project's title requires, and do not use \"case\" or a plain \"accuse.\" The next clause, criminantur, is the plain \"accuse.\""}, {"n": 93, "text": "Qui in libro Sermonum suorum praescribitur quintus Sermo 18: the reference is obscure. The little book on predestination and grace appears to be entered in a collection of Augustine's Sermons as the \"fifth,\" \"Sermon 18.\" I have translated the words as printed and have not resolved the reference."}, {"n": 94, "text": "Aeternae gratis miseriae: here gratis means \"for nothing, without cause.\" It is the dark twin of gratia gratis data; the objector's complaint is that damnation would be gratuitous in this sense."}, {"n": 95, "text": "The print reads \"pro e no-/cente\" (line break after no); the keyed text has \"p•o enocente.\" I read pro nocente, \"for the guilty\": the argument is that Christ suffered for the sinful servant, and the stray e is a misprint. If innocente were meant, the servant would be called innocent and the argument would invert. Savile's text as printed is not emended."}, {"n": 96, "text": "Volutis posterioribus (also at 356D): Bradwardine's volutum, \"a thing willed\" (the object of a volutio; cf. Conventions §3). \"Posterior\" means that which follows upon, and is caused by, the divine willing. I render \"willed things\" and keep the same rendering in both places."}, {"n": 97, "text": "Personarum acceptor (Acts 10:34, Vulgate) is rendered literally (\"acceptor of persons\") and not by the usual \"respecter of persons.\" Bradwardine's argument turns on the verb accipere: God is not acceptor, and the one who fears Him is acceptus (357E). He then argues that God does \"accept\" by number (individuals) though not by genus (358A ff.)."}, {"n": 98, "text": "Printed: Non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quam saluum fieri velit. As it stands this cannot be construed: quam is feminine, and the clause would merely repeat the preceding one. The parallel at chapter 84 and the second solution that follows (non quod nullus hominum esset, quem fieri saluum nolit) require \"not that there is no human being whom He does not will to be saved.\" I translate that sense and leave the print unemended."}, {"n": 99, "text": "Praeceperat, inquit Apostolus: taken literally, the words would make the Apostle speak of himself in the third person. The sense, an account of 1 Tim 2:1–4, requires Apostolus as the subject of praeceperat, with inquit being Augustine's. I translate accordingly."}, {"n": 100, "text": "Qui in ciuitate solus est Dominus: construed as \"who is the only lord (master) in the city.\" The print supplies no verb of saying before Omnes iste hic literas docet; \"we speak rightly\" in my English governs it."}, {"n": 101, "text": "Secundum genus … non secundum speciem seu numerum: \"genus\" here is a class of persons (the circumcised, the Gentiles), as against a narrower kind (species) or numerically distinct individuals (numerus). Bradwardine explains it at once: God admits persons from every nation, but chooses individuals (358A)."}, {"n": 102, "text": "Accepto fert (Rom 4:6, Vulgate) is \"credits, reckons to the account of.\" The verb also echoes acceptus, acceptor, acceptatio in Bradwardine's argument; see note 97."}, {"n": 103, "text": "The print repeats illos … quam illos (\"those rather than those\"). The evident sense, as in Anselm's own text, is \"those rather than these,\" so I translate it so. I take the repeated illos to be a misprint for istos."}, {"n": 104, "text": "The block ends mid-sentence: the clause continues in the next unit (358E)."}, {"n": 105, "text": "Bradwardine's quotation breaks off here. It is read literally: the second clause seems to mean that fear of someone's perishing more is a reason for rebuking rather than withholding rebuke. Savile's punctuation leaves the sentence elliptical, and I have not supplied what is missing."}, {"n": 106, "text": "boni distincti: \"distinct\" good is the term used below (360E) for the useful and delightful good as distinguished from the honourable good (bonum honestum). Eternal life is thus said not to be condignly merited even as a good of that kind."}, {"n": 107, "text": "sicut ad hunc currere, hunc moueri: the verb is understood (\"as, upon this man's running, his being moved [follows]\"). I have filled in the ellipsis in English and kept Savile's two infinitives."}, {"n": 108, "text": "Aristotle is cited by Savile's book and chapter of the medieval Latin Ethics, not by modern numbering. Eth. 9, 1 = EN IX.1 (1164b); Eth. 8, 7 = EN VIII.7 (1158b); Eth. 5, 8 = EN V.5 (1133a). The quotations follow the old Latin version (Grosseteste's), which Bradwardine glosses inline with id est."}, {"n": 109, "text": "et sicut vnicum verbum suum: the sense seems to be that God would have to love each of them as he loves his only Word (the Son), which is absurd. The syntax is elliptical and I have translated it as it stands."}, {"n": 110, "text": "creaturus is nominative, the Son \"never going to create anything\", and its sense is supplied from context. The construction is loose: omnes alios homines, ac quamlibet creaturam are most naturally taken with deposuisse et annihilasse (\"laid aside and annihilated\"). I have translated so."}, {"n": 111, "text": "The gratia family is worked hard in this passage: gratia is \"grace\", \"favour\" and \"thanks\"; gratis \"freely\"; gratiosum \"gracious\"; gratiarum actio \"thanksgiving\"; ingratus \"ungrateful\". The argument depends on the single word, which English can only partly carry. I have varied \"thanks\", \"favour\" and \"grace\" according to context. Sacramentum gratiarum renders Aristotle's shrine of the Charites (the Graces), as the medieval Latin version has it: here \"the sacred rite of the Graces\"."}, {"n": 112, "text": "vellicet: read as vel licet, \"or even if\", parallel to the preceding licet assumpsisset. Both Savile's print and the keyed text give one word."}, {"n": 113, "text": "Vnus, inquit, Apostolus Deus: Savile's punctuation makes Apostolus the subject of inquit. The text of 1 Tim 2:5 is \"one God, and one mediator…\"; the Vulgate unus Deus is split here by the inserted attribution."}, {"n": 114, "text": "\"Homily 45, or 99 of the whole\": the double number is Savile's. It means the 45th homily of the second part of Augustine's Tractates on John, counted as 99 in the whole series."}, {"n": 115, "text": "vt paruuli baptizati continuo decedentes, effectiue grandes recipiunt gratiam: the construction is awkward. I take vt as \"like\", with effectiue \"in effect, in fact\" and grandes \"grown\", as the sense requires a comparison of adults with baptized infants who die at once. The alternative reading, \"receive great grace\", is possible but less natural with the plural nominative."}], "errata": [{"address": "326B", "keyed": "coniemneret", "print": "contemneret"}, {"address": "326B (margin 326B·2)", "keyed": "S • pien.", "print": "Sapient."}, {"address": "326E", "keyed": "derinatur", "print": "deriuatur"}, {"address": "327E", "keyed": "ertoneum", "print": "erroneum"}, {"address": "328A", "keyed": "Porto", "print": "Porro"}, {"address": "329A", "keyed": "audini", "print": "audiui"}, {"address": "329D", "keyed": "assere•", "print": "asserente"}, {"address": "329E", "keyed": "trice•imum", "print": "tricesimum"}, {"address": "330D", "keyed": "sinc", "print": "sine"}, {"address": "330D", "keyed": "retribuctur", "print": "retribuetur"}, {"address": "330D", "keyed": "deo totum", "print": "ideo totum"}, {"address": "330D", "keyed": "clatior", "print": "clarior"}, {"address": "331B", "keyed": "scipso", "print": "seipso"}, {"address": "331B", "keyed": "quam cos ille fecerat", "print": "quam eos ille fecerat"}, {"address": "331C", "keyed": "virtuose operati", "print": "virtuose operari"}, {"address": "331E", "keyed": "inter cos tunc temporis", "print": "inter eos tunc temporis"}, {"address": "331E", "keyed": "accipete", "print": "accipere"}, {"address": "332A", "keyed": "na•ura superior", "print": "natura superior"}, {"address": "332A", "keyed": "disciplmari", "print": "disciplinari"}, {"address": "332B", "keyed": "juuehis", "print": "iuuenis"}, {"address": "332B", "keyed": "inclinate", "print": "inclinare"}, {"address": "332C", "keyed": "vesum sentoribus", "print": "visum senioribus"}, {"address": "332D", "keyed": "Prastarent", "print": "Praestarent"}, {"address": "332D", "keyed": "nissae", "print": "nisse"}, {"address": "332E", "keyed": "• s. 2. (margin)", "print": "Ephes. 2."}, {"address": "332E", "keyed": "et 6 • (margin)", "print": "& 67."}, {"address": "333A", "keyed": "artificialiter operati", "print": "artificialiter operari"}, {"address": "333B", "keyed": "ad discens", "print": "addiscens"}, {"address": "333E", "keyed": "reuelanco", "print": "reuelando"}, {"address": "334A", "keyed": "hanc cum gratiam", "print": "hanc eum gratiam"}, {"address": "334B", "keyed": "praeuaticationis", "print": "praeuaricationis"}, {"address": "334B", "keyed": "peruet sissimi", "print": "peruersissimi"}, {"address": "334B", "keyed": "operati ei mortem", "print": "operari ei mortem"}, {"address": "334B", "keyed": "viuificaret cum spiritus", "print": "viuificaret eum spiritus"}, {"address": "334C", "keyed": "retistendum", "print": "resistendum"}, {"address": "334C", "keyed": "a diutorio", "print": "adiutorio"}, {"address": "334C", "keyed": "vti que", "print": "vtique"}, {"address": "334D", "keyed": "summ: illius", "print": "summi illius"}, {"address": "335B", "keyed": "accepret", "print": "acceptet"}, {"address": "335C", "keyed": "ingum", "print": "iugum"}, {"address": "335D", "keyed": "co ipso", "print": "eo ipso"}, {"address": "335D", "keyed": "nonum", "print": "nouum"}, {"address": "335E", "keyed": "cius", "print": "eius"}, {"address": "336B", "keyed": "〈◊〉 viperae (margin 336B·1)", "print": "‖ viperae"}, {"address": "336C", "keyed": "Patremeo", "print": "Patre meo"}, {"address": "336D", "keyed": "homi•i", "print": "homini"}, {"address": "336D", "keyed": "fed potius", "print": "sed potius"}, {"address": "337C", "keyed": "si facere si quod", "print": "si facere sic quod"}, {"address": "338B", "keyed": "adimplete", "print": "adimplere"}, {"address": "339C", "keyed": "oflensam", "print": "offensam"}, {"address": "339C", "keyed": "temporlis", "print": "temporalis"}, {"address": "339E", "keyed": "[non nullis]", "print": "[nonnullis]"}, {"address": "340A", "keyed": "glorae", "print": "gloriae"}, {"address": "340A", "keyed": "incomperabiliter", "print": "incomparabiliter"}, {"address": "340A", "keyed": "iudic ans", "print": "iudicans"}, {"address": "340B", "keyed": "metetur", "print": "meretur"}, {"address": "340B", "keyed": "gra•ae", "print": "gratiae"}, {"address": "340D", "keyed": "iuquiens", "print": "inquiens"}, {"address": "340E", "keyed": "fortas•is", "print": "fortassis"}, {"address": "340E", "keyed": "priotem", "print": "priorem"}, {"address": "341A", "keyed": "inereri", "print": "mereri"}, {"address": "341B", "keyed": "ope•a", "print": "opera"}, {"address": "341C", "keyed": "quanti•as", "print": "quantitas"}, {"address": "341D", "keyed": "se•", "print": "sed"}, {"address": "341D", "keyed": "satis•acere", "print": "satisfacere"}, {"address": "341E", "keyed": "sic •ue e•", "print": "sicque ei"}, {"address": "342B", "keyed": "arg•mentum", "print": "argumentum"}, {"address": "342C", "keyed": "meri•", "print": "meriti"}, {"address": "342C", "keyed": "limita•", "print": "limitati"}, {"address": "342E", "keyed": "pe• suasum", "print": "persuasum"}, {"address": "343B", "keyed": "cum amauit", "print": "eum amauit"}, {"address": "343C", "keyed": "•ogeret", "print": "cogeret"}, {"address": "343E", "keyed": "margin 343E·1: variant \"principalis Apostolus. Rom. 11.\"", "print": "variant \"principalis\" only; \"Apostolus. Rom. 11.\" is a separate source margin with no marker in the keyed text"}, {"address": "344B", "keyed": "•ihil", "print": "nihil"}, {"address": "344B", "keyed": "debete", "print": "debere"}, {"address": "344B", "keyed": "scruos", "print": "seruos"}, {"address": "344C", "keyed": "uod", "print": "quod"}, {"address": "344C", "keyed": "cut deberetur", "print": "cui deberetur"}, {"address": "344C", "keyed": "ad cum", "print": "ad eum"}, {"address": "344C", "keyed": "nihil ei de esset", "print": "nihil ei deesset"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "nec ⟨gap: 1 word⟩ miseri", "print": "nec quicquam mereri"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "carna •quantū", "print": "carnali quantū"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "po•t •ddere", "print": "possit reddere"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "deb•o / •ta / pat•i / extranco", "print": "debito / ita / patri / extraneo"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "quod •ex •turae", "print": "quod lex naturae"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "i• omnibus / d•gnitatem", "print": "in omnibus / dignitatem"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "margin 344E·1 \"Philosop •\"", "print": "Philosophus"}, {"address": "344E", "keyed": "margin 344E·2 \"• err • endum\"", "print": "retribuendum"}, {"address": "345A", "keyed": "ab alto", "print": "ab alio"}, {"address": "345A", "keyed": "tetributio (twice)", "print": "retributio"}, {"address": "345A", "keyed": "gratiatum", "print": "gratiarum"}, {"address": "345B", "keyed": "promitrit", "print": "promittit"}, {"address": "345B", "keyed": "precisi", "print": "preciū (pretium)"}, {"address": "345B", "keyed": "scipsum", "print": "seipsum"}, {"address": "345B", "keyed": "margin 345B·2 \"Chris •\"", "print": "Christi"}, {"address": "345C", "keyed": "iuber", "print": "iubet"}, {"address": "345C", "keyed": "debiro", "print": "debito"}, {"address": "345C", "keyed": "renetur", "print": "tenetur"}, {"address": "345C", "keyed": "remitteret est", "print": "remittere est"}, {"address": "345D", "keyed": "scu", "print": "seu"}, {"address": "345E", "keyed": "gratui•e", "print": "gratuitae"}, {"address": "345E", "keyed": "ea•:", "print": "ea:"}, {"address": "346B", "keyed": "pratuite", "print": "gratuite"}, {"address": "346B", "keyed": "congtuo", "print": "congruo"}, {"address": "347C", "keyed": "mercantur", "print": "mereantur"}, {"address": "347C", "keyed": "praemi•bit", "print": "praemiabit"}, {"address": "347E", "keyed": "margin 347E·1 \"veritati •\"", "print": "veritatis"}, {"address": "347E", "keyed": "margin id 348E·1", "print": "the margin \"Philosophus\" is printed at the head of p. 348, beside \"Actus autem… bonū\", so the id ought to read 348A·1; I kept the marker as given"}, {"address": "348C", "keyed": "sicamans", "print": "sic amans"}, {"address": "348D", "keyed": "arbittio", "print": "arbitrio"}, {"address": "348E", "keyed": "boni factis", "print": "bonis factis"}, {"address": "349A", "keyed": "adarit", "print": "adarit [print misprint for aderit, Vulgate Gen 4:7; keyed text and print agree; sense unaffected]"}, {"address": "349D", "keyed": "qua cum diligimus", "print": "qua eum diligimus"}, {"address": "350A", "keyed": "(margin 350A·2) P • al. 84. A • c • c. 3.", "print": "Psal. 84. Abacuc. 3."}, {"address": "350C", "keyed": "ob•jciat; sac•a", "print": "obijciat; sacra"}, {"address": "350E", "keyed": "secundatio", "print": "secundario"}, {"address": "351E", "keyed": "di•isset", "print": "dixisset"}, {"address": "352A", "keyed": "(margin 352A·1) Euangeli•", "print": "Euangelici"}, {"address": "352C", "keyed": "promixo", "print": "proximo"}, {"address": "352E", "keyed": "proptiis; doneus", "print": "propriis; idoneus"}, {"address": "353B", "keyed": "praemiate", "print": "praemiare (the reading the sense requires; the letter is not certain in the facsimile)"}, {"address": "353B", "keyed": "(margin 353B·1) praedestinatum. Auicenna.", "print": "two entries: variant praedestinatum. at 353B; source Auicenna. at 353C, beside Vnde Auicen."}, {"address": "353C", "keyed": "officiens", "print": "efficiens"}, {"address": "354A", "keyed": "iusta est ita eius", "print": "iusta est ira eius"}, {"address": "354A", "keyed": "nomen luum", "print": "nomen suum"}, {"address": "354B", "keyed": "indutaui", "print": "induraui"}, {"address": "355B", "keyed": "iniquotum", "print": "iniquorum"}, {"address": "355B", "keyed": "gandia", "print": "gaudia"}, {"address": "355B", "keyed": "et illis respiciant", "print": "et in illis respiciant"}, {"address": "355E", "keyed": "decrunt", "print": "deerunt"}, {"address": "355E", "keyed": "miseratentur", "print": "miserarentur"}, {"address": "356A", "keyed": "honotē", "print": "honorē"}, {"address": "356B", "keyed": "persetutans", "print": "perscrutans"}, {"address": "356B", "keyed": "nonnulles", "print": "nonnullos"}, {"address": "356B", "keyed": "arbittium", "print": "arbitrium"}, {"address": "356B", "keyed": "lu•", "print": "luti"}, {"address": "356C", "keyed": "delicarum", "print": "delicatum"}, {"address": "356C", "keyed": "p•o enocente", "print": "pro e no|cente"}, {"address": "356C", "keyed": "ordinaste", "print": "ordinasse"}, {"address": "356C", "keyed": "equitur", "print": "sequitur"}, {"address": "356E", "keyed": "gehen•ae", "print": "gehennae"}, {"address": "356E", "keyed": "liceralem", "print": "literalem"}, {"address": "357B", "keyed": "intellgamus", "print": "intelligamus"}, {"address": "357C", "keyed": "area Noe", "print": "arca Noe"}, {"address": "357E", "keyed": "aud•uit", "print": "audiuit"}, {"address": "358A", "keyed": "intra eodem", "print": "infra eodem"}, {"address": "358B", "keyed": "miserebot", "print": "miserebor"}, {"address": "358B", "keyed": "parunlis", "print": "paruulis"}, {"address": "358C", "keyed": "Enchuid.", "print": "Enchirid."}, {"address": "358E", "keyed": "non de sinit", "print": "non desinit (printed definit, long s; keyed with a stray space)"}, {"address": "359A", "keyed": "similis e•", "print": "similis ei"}, {"address": "359A", "keyed": "pulcherrimi•", "print": "pulcherrimis"}, {"address": "359A", "keyed": "dedisser", "print": "dedisset"}, {"address": "359A", "keyed": "arborisad instaroris aperto", "print": "arboris ad instar oris aperto"}, {"address": "359B", "keyed": "fed inebriat", "print": "sed inebriat"}, {"address": "359B", "keyed": "germinare cam facit", "print": "germinare eam facit"}, {"address": "359C", "keyed": "dacum est", "print": "datum est"}, {"address": "359C", "keyed": "caeci siant", "print": "caeci fiant"}, {"address": "359C", "keyed": "sanem cos", "print": "sanem eos"}, {"address": "359D", "keyed": "oriarur", "print": "oriatur"}, {"address": "359D", "keyed": "electiae dificentur", "print": "electi aedificentur"}, {"address": "359E", "keyed": "cam illis vtilem", "print": "eam illis vtilem"}, {"address": "360C", "keyed": "staruit", "print": "statuit"}, {"address": "360D", "keyed": "se qui inseperabiliter", "print": "sequi inseperabiliter"}, {"address": "361A", "keyed": "comperenter", "print": "competenter"}, {"address": "361B", "keyed": "mehorem", "print": "meliorem"}, {"address": "361C", "keyed": "rigor•m", "print": "rigorem"}, {"address": "361D", "keyed": "hominisin", "print": "hominis in"}, {"address": "361E", "keyed": "habuislet", "print": "habuisset"}, {"address": "362B", "keyed": "scruum", "print": "seruum"}, {"address": "362D", "keyed": "non renet", "print": "non tenet"}, {"address": "363C", "keyed": "contraire", "print": "contrarie"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p325A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p325A", "locator_display": "325A", "source_text": "CAP. XXXIX. Contra quosdam putantes hominem ex se tantum posse mereri primam gratiam de congruo, non de condigno.\n\nPRaeter istos autem sunt alij non contenti gratia gratis data, sed volunt quod vendatur a Deo, et ematur ab eis aliquo precio licet vili, congruo tamen vt asserunt, non condigno. Dicunt enim homines ex solis proprijs viribus gratiam Dei mereri de congruo, non autem de condigno.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXIX.\n\nAgainst certain persons who think that a man can of himself alone merit the first grace congruously, not condignly.\n\nBesides these, there are others who are not content with grace freely given. They want it to be sold by God and bought from him by themselves at some price, however cheap: a congruous price, as they assert, not a condign one. For they say that men, by their own powers alone, merit the grace of God congruously, but not condignly.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p325B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p325B", "locator_display": "325B–325C", "source_text": "Et quia iste error est famosior caeteris his diebus, et nimis multi per ipsum in Pelagianum praecipitium dilabuntur; necessarium videtur ipsum diligentiori examine perscrutari. Porro hic error non multum differt realiter ab alijs superius recitatis, potest cum illis similiter confutari: Nam omnes poene rationes, et autoritates contra illos adductae, contra hunc procedunt similiter recta fronte. Sequitur enim ex ista, quod gratia sit ex operibus et meritis, cum errore Pelagij radicali; sequitur etiam quod gratia sit ex meritis saltem, vt ex causa partiali et concausa cum primo errore sequente; et quod merita illa de congruo sint saltem causa et dispositio praeparatoria gratiae cum secundo, et quod quis possit mereri de congruo per se solum, sicut tertius error ponit, quod homo potest solis proprijs viribus aperire. Praeterea si quis de congruo primam gratiam mereatur, hoc est priusquam habeat gratiam saltem prioritate naturae; sed priusquam habeat gratiam de qua loquor, scilicet gratificantem ad regnum, non habet\n\netiam charitatem. Ipsa enim sola diuidit inter filios perditionis, et regni, vt dicit Augustinus 15. de Trinit. 18. et patet per Apostolum 1. ad Corinth. 13. quare nec diligit Deum omnino, vel saltem non amore gratuito, sed libere et principaliter propter illum. Quapropter nec aliquid meretur ab eo, et maxime nullum bonum gratuitum arram certam boni maximi sempiterni: Nam qua fronte vendicat quis remunerationem a Deo, cui nullum munus donauit? aut quo titulo exigit retributionem ab eo, cui nunquam aliquid tribuit? et quomodo meretur quis quicquam a Deo, qui nihil facit pro eo? Vnde Matth. 6. Attendite, ne iustitiam vestram faciatis coram hominibus, vt videamini ab cis, alioquin mercedem non habebitis apud Patrem vestrum qui in coelis est: vbi Chrysostomus; Quid autem a Deo recipies, qui Deo nihil dedisti? Nam quod propter Deum fit, Deo datur, quod autem propter homines fit, in ventos effunditur. Ad hoc et facit efficaciter Augustinus, 1. contra Pelagium et Caelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali 22. sicut 37um recitauit. Adhuc autem et si quis amet", "english": "This error is more notorious than the others in these days, and far too many are slipping through it into the Pelagian precipice, so it seems necessary to examine it with closer scrutiny. Yet in reality this error does not differ much from the others recounted above, and can be refuted along with them in the same way. For almost all the arguments and authorities brought against those proceed against this one likewise, head-on. It follows from it that grace comes from works and merits, which is the root error of Pelagius. It follows also that grace comes from merits at least as from a partial cause and co-cause, with the first error that follows. It follows that those congruous merits are at least the cause and preparatory disposition of grace, with the second; and that someone can merit congruously by himself alone, as the third error posits, that a man can open by his own powers alone.[n1] Moreover, if anyone merits the first grace congruously, he does so before he has grace, at least by priority of nature. But before he has the grace of which I speak, namely the grace that makes one pleasing with a view to the kingdom, he does not have charity either. For charity alone divides between the sons of perdition and the sons of the kingdom, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 15, 18, and as is plain from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13. Hence he does not love God at all, or at least not with gratuitous love, that is, freely and principally for God's sake.[n2] For this reason he merits nothing from God, and least of all any gratuitous good, a sure pledge of the greatest everlasting good. With what face does anyone claim a reward from God, to whom he has given no gift? On what title does he demand repayment from one to whom he has never given anything? How does anyone merit anything from God who does nothing for him? Hence Matthew 6: Take care not to do your justice before men, that you may be seen by them; otherwise you will have no reward with your Father who is in heaven. On this Chrysostom says: What will you receive from God, you who have given God nothing? For what is done for God's sake is given to God, but what is done for the sake of men is poured out to the winds. Augustine also speaks effectively to this purpose in Book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, on the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, ch. 22, as the 37th recounted. Furthermore, even if someone loves", "margins": [{"id": "325C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Mt 6."}, {"id": "325C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Chrysostom."}, {"id": "325C·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p325D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p325D", "locator_display": "325D–325E", "source_text": "Deum, et faciat pro eo, non propter se, sed vt prospera sibi concedat, vel aduersa prohibeat, redit idem. Quomodo namque talis plus meretur a Deo, quam venditor ab emptore? et praeter hoc, magis diligit concessionem istorum, et prohibitionem illorum, quam Deum, et cum ista diligat propter seipsum, magis diligit seipsum quam Deum. Semper enim propter quod vnumquod que , illud magis est: vt propter quod amamus, illud magis amicum est, 1. Post. 2. Imo sicut 26. capitulo fucrat declaratum; Qui diligit aliquid propter aliquem certum finem, non diligit hoc, sed finem; ergo nedum sic diligens non meretur, sed peccat; facit enim contra rectum et debitum ordinem diligendi, teste parte 30. corollarij, primi, huius; et contra praeceptum de diligendo Deum ex toto corde, et tota anima, et tota fortitudine atque mente, Deuteron. 6. et Mat. 22. Talis quoque se fruitur, et vtitur ipso Deo; ergo constat eum peccare, vt patet diffuse per Aug. De doctrina Christ. cap. 1. et post: et recitat Lumb. 1. Sent. dist. 1. Patet etiam quod talis non meretur. Nullus enim operando meretur, nisi habeat intentionem\n\nrectam, scilicet recti finis: Nam sicut in naturalibus motus denominatur a fine, sic et in moralibus, sicut et patet ex 34. huius. Talis autem extra charitatem non habet intentionem rectam: Nulla enim est intentio recta, nisi quae finaliter immediate tendit in Deum, vel forsitan mediate, quae forte immediate fertur in creaturam, et per illam finaliter in Deum, et hoc super omnia gratuito propter ipsum, sicut 30. pars corol. 1. docet. Si enim propter aliquid aliud finaliter appetatur, iam illud aliud magis est finis intentus, sicut praehabita manifestant; et cum caetera naturalia in quantum acceperunt a natura, in tantum per inclinationē naturalem hoc faciant; homo qui ad hoc accepit potentiam intellectualem, et libere volutiuam, debet hoc facere scienter et libere secundū potentias ad hoc finaliter sibi datas. Homo ergo quicun que agē do non sic dirigit actualiter nec habitualiter intentionē suā finaliter in Deum, et hoc gratuito propter ipsum, facit contra naturalem ordinem vniuersi; quare et peccat innaturaliter contra", "english": "God, and acts for him, not for his own sake but so that God may grant him prosperity or ward off adversity, it comes to the same thing. For how does such a man merit more from God than a seller does from a buyer? Besides, he loves the granting of the former and the warding off of the latter more than he loves God; and since he loves these for his own sake, he loves himself more than God. For that on account of which each thing is, is always more so: thus that on account of which we love is more dear, Posterior Analytics 1, 2.[n3] Indeed, as had been declared in chapter 26, whoever loves something on account of a certain end does not love this thing but the end. So far, then, is such a lover from meriting that he sins; for he acts against the right and due order of loving, as the thirtieth part of the first Corollary of this book attests, and against the precept to love God with the whole heart, and the whole soul, and the whole strength and mind, Deuteronomy 6 and Matthew 22. Such a man also enjoys himself and uses God himself;[n4] so it is clear that he sins, as is shown at length by Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, ch. 1 and following, and as Lombard recites, Sentences 1, dist. 1. It is clear also that such a man does not merit. For no one merits by working unless he has a right intention,\n\nnamely the intention of a right end. For as in natural things motion is named from its end, so also in moral things, as is clear from the 34th of this book. But such a man, outside charity, does not have a right intention. For no intention is right unless it tends finally and immediately toward God, or perhaps mediately: an intention that is perhaps carried immediately to a creature and through it finally to God, and this above all things, gratuitously, for his own sake, as the thirtieth part of Corollary 1 teaches. For if something else is finally desired for the sake of another thing, then that other thing is the end more truly intended, as the foregoing shows. Now other natural things, in so far as they have received from nature, to that extent do this by natural inclination. A man, who has received for this purpose an intellectual power and a freely willing one, ought to do this knowingly and freely, according to the powers finally given him for this. Whoever, then, acting, does not direct his intention finally to God, neither actually nor habitually, and this gratuitously for God's own sake, acts against the natural order of the universe; hence he also sins unnaturally against", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p326A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p326A", "locator_display": "326A–326B", "source_text": "naturam, et contra Deum, principium, et finem, ac summum autorem totius naturae, et ordinis naturalis, vel saltem non meretur. Hoc etiam patet per Augustinum 1. de doctrina Christiana, vbi prius; Si enim intentio illa sit recta, intendens fruitur Deo, vel per illam vtitur creatura: et si fruitur Deo, patet propositum; Si autem vtitur creatura, cum secundum Augustinum ibidem, vti sit id, quod in vsum venerit, referre ad obtinendum illud quo fruendum est; alias abuti est, non vti; Nam vsus illicitus abusus, vel abusio nominari debet. Adhuc patet, Nam vsus creaturae, si non referatur in Deum, est vsus illicitus; ergo peccatum, vel faltem non est recte factum; ergo illa intentio non est recta; nec alicuius intentio sine charitate et gratia gratuito super omnia fertur in Deum; quoniam sicut nullius intellectus sine fide fideliter fertur in Deum, ita nullius affectus sine gratia grate fertur in Deum, ita quod habeat Deum gratuito super omnia sibi charum: Eadem enim est proportio hic et ibi. Item si homo sine gratia charitatis posset Deum amare gratuito super omnia alia, et posset similiter\n\ncognoscere omnia alia mandata, et seruare ea; quia qui potest maius, potest et minus; sed mandatum de dilectione Dei est primum et maximum, Matt. 22. Imo quicunque sic Deum diligeret, nullo modo scienter eum offenderet, nec aliquod eius mandatum coniemneret. (Hoc enim tantae dilectioni repugnaret expresse) sed ea omnia pro viribus conseruaret. Dicit enim Philosophus 9. Eth. 4. Ponunt amicum volentem et operantem bona vel apparentia illius gratia, puta amati; et 2. Rhetor. suae 5 Sit, inquit, velle, amare alicui quae putat bona, illius gratia, sed non sui, et secundum posse actiuum esse horum: Vnde et Sapientiae sexto; Dilector, custodia, seu custoditio legum illius est: Quare et veritas ipsa dicit, Siquis diligit me, sermonem meum seruabit, Ioan. 14. Super quod Gregorius hom. 30. Probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis. Hinc in epistola sua, isdem Ioannes dicit, Qui dicit, quia diligo Deum, et mandata eius non custodit, mendax est; vere enim diligimus, si mandata eius seruamus; vere diligimus, si a nostris voluptatibus nos coarctamus. Nam qui adhuc per illicita desideria", "english": "nature, and against God, the beginning and end and highest author of all nature and of the natural order; or at least he does not merit. This is also clear from Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1, where cited before. For if that intention is right, the one who intends enjoys God, or uses a creature through it; and if he enjoys God, the proposition is clear. But if he uses a creature, then (since according to Augustine in the same place, to use is to refer what has come into use to the obtaining of that which is to be enjoyed; otherwise it is to abuse, not to use) the same follows;[n5] for an unlawful use ought to be called abuse, or misuse. This is also clear in another way. The use of a creature, if it is not referred to God, is an unlawful use; therefore it is sin, or at least not rightly done; therefore that intention is not right. Nor is the intention of anyone without charity and grace carried gratuitously above all things to God; for just as no one's intellect without faith is carried faithfully to God, so no one's affection without grace is carried acceptably to God, so that he has God dear to him gratuitously above all things. For the proportion is the same here and there. Again, if a man without the grace of charity could love God gratuitously above all other things, he could likewise\n\nknow all the other commandments, and keep them; for he who can do the greater can also do the lesser. But the commandment of the love of God is first and greatest, Matthew 22. Indeed, whoever loved God in this way would in no way knowingly offend him, nor despise any commandment of his. (For this would expressly contradict so great a love.) He would rather keep them all to the best of his powers. For the Philosopher says in Ethics 9, 4: They posit that a friend is one who wills and does good things, or apparent ones, for the sake of him, namely, the beloved; and in his Rhetoric 2, 5: Let it be, he says, to will, to love for someone the things one thinks good, for his sake and not for one's own, and, as far as one can, to be active in bringing these about. Hence also Wisdom 6: Love is the keeping, or guarding, of her laws.[n6] So also the Truth himself says, If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, John 14. On which Gregory, Homily 30: The proof of love is the showing forth of works. Hence in his letter the same John says: He who says, \"I love God\", and does not keep his commandments, is a liar; for we truly love if we keep his commandments; we truly love if we restrain ourselves from our pleasures. For he who still flows away through unlawful desires", "margins": [{"id": "326B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Philosopher."}, {"id": "326B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Wis."}, {"id": "326B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Jn 14; Gregory."}]}, {"anchor": "p326C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p326C", "locator_display": "326C–326D", "source_text": "defluit, profecto Deum non amat, quia ei in voluntate sua contradicit. Apostolus ad Rom. 13. similiter arguens, sic concludit; Plenitudo ergo legis est dilectio; quare nec sine gratia charitatis, posset quis esse in statu salutis. Nam Luc. 10. dicit Saluator, Haec fac, id est, serua mandata, et viues. Frustra ergo ponuntur hi tres habitus, scilicet fides, spes, et charitas supernaturaliter nobis infusi, cum sine his naturalia nostra nobis sufficiant ad faciendum et seruandum omnia diuina mandata, sicut Pelagius asserebat, vt recitat Augustinus de haeresibus 88. et Petrus 2. sentent. dist. 28. et Isidorus 8. Eth. 14. et Canon. 24. quaest. vlt. Quidam autem. Sed Doctores nostri Catholici dicunt nos istis tribus habitibus, vel alijs proportionalibus indigete, quia cum animae nostrae aspectus et affectus per molem corporis seu peccati, vel per naturalem impotentiam deprimantur, in tantum quod non possunt Deum videre debite, nec amare, vel etiam propter improportionem tam excellentis obiecti, necessario indigent fide vel lumine gloriae, et charitate seu gratia, quae ipsos eleuent ad Deum videndum\n\ndebite et amandum. Vnde et Papa Clemens quintus damnat haeresin Begardorum dicentem, quod anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam eleuante ad Deum viden dum, et eo beate fruendum, Extra de haereticis, Ad nostrum. Et hoc nedum nos in statu praesentis miseriae, sed etiam Angeli et primi parentes in statu primae innocentiae similiter indigebant, quando nullum obicem posuerunt mortalem, nec minimum venialem, vt dicit Lumbardus, et probat per autoritates Augustini 2. sentent dist. 5a. 24a. et 29a. plane. Et si quis dicat, quod virtutes morales satis eleuent affectum ad Deum grate amandum, contradicetur ei faciliter per priora: Incidit enim in errorem Pelagij supra dictum, quod videlicet homo solius liberi arbitrij viribus sine gratia possit omnia Dei mandata efficaciter adimplere, sicut praecedentia monstrauerunt. Adhuc autem quid simile, sic eleuat Angelos ad amandum? Amplius autem virtutes morales ex operibus generantur, vt patet 2. Eth. 1. et 2. nec speciem suam aut terminos suos excedunt, sed ad similes operationes tantum inclinant, ex qualibus generabantur. Vnde", "english": "certainly does not love God, since he contradicts him in his own will. The Apostle in Romans 13, arguing in the same way, concludes: Love, therefore, is the fullness of the law; hence neither could anyone be in the state of salvation without the grace of charity. For in Luke 10 the Savior says, Do this, that is, keep the commandments, and you will live. In vain, then, are these three habits posited, namely faith, hope and charity, supernaturally infused in us, if without them our natural resources suffice for doing and keeping all the divine commandments, as Pelagius asserted, as Augustine recounts in On Heresies 88, and Peter in Sentences 2, dist. 28, and Isidore, 8 Eth. 14, and the Canon, 24, last question, Quidam autem.[n7] But our Catholic Doctors say that we need these three habits, or other proportionate ones. The gaze and affection of our souls are weighed down by the mass of the body or of sin, or by natural incapacity, so that they cannot see God as is due, nor love him; or, also on account of the disproportion of so excellent an object, they necessarily need faith or the light of glory, and charity or grace, to raise them to seeing God\n\nas is due, and to loving him. Hence Pope Clement V also condemns the heresy of the Beghards, which says that the soul does not need the light of glory to raise it to see God and to enjoy him blessedly: Extra, De haereticis, Ad nostrum. And this holds not only for us in the state of present misery; the Angels and the first parents in the state of first innocence likewise needed them, when they had set no obstacle, mortal, nor even the least venial, as Lombard says, and proves plainly by authorities of Augustine, Sentences 2, dists. 5, 24 and 29. If anyone says that the moral virtues sufficiently raise the affection to loving God acceptably, he will easily be contradicted by what went before. For he falls into the error of Pelagius spoken of above, namely that a man, by the powers of free choice alone, without grace, can effectively fulfil all the commandments of God, as the preceding chapters have shown. Again, what comparable thing raises the Angels in this way to love? Furthermore, the moral virtues are generated from works, as is clear from Ethics 2, 1 and 2; and they do not exceed their species or their limits, but incline only to like operations, from the like of which they were generated. Hence", "margins": [{"id": "326C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Apostle."}]}, {"anchor": "p326E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p326E", "locator_display": "326E", "source_text": "dicit ibi Philosophus cap. 2. Operationes et virtutes in eisdem erunt: Sicut enim ex recedere a voluptatibus efficimur temperati, sic effecti maxime possumus recedere ab ipsis; et sicut assueti contemnere terribilia et sustinere ipsa efficimur fortes, sic effecti maxime poterimus sustinere terribilia. Cum ergo nullus ex puris naturalibus diligat Deum gratuito super omnia propter seipsum, sed propter aliquem alium finem, habitus ex talibus multiplicatis dilectionibus generatus tantummodo inclinabit ad Deum similiter, et non aliter diligendum. Quapropter et idem Philosophus 8. Eth. et 9. ostendit, quod quilibet etiam virtuosus, primo et maxime diliget semetipsum, et quod ab hac dilectione omnis alia dilectio et amicitia derinatur. Octaui namque 2. sic ait, Videtur autem et quod ipsi bonum amare vnusquisque;", "english": "the Philosopher says there, ch. 2: Operations and virtues will be in the same things. For as by withdrawing from pleasures we are made temperate, so, having been made so, we can best withdraw from them; and as, by becoming accustomed to despise terrors and to endure them, we are made brave, so, having been made so, we shall best be able to endure terrors. Since, then, no one on purely natural resources loves God gratuitously above all things for his own sake, but for some other end, the habit generated from such multiplied loves will incline only to loving God in the same way, and not otherwise. Hence the same Philosopher shows, in Ethics 8 and 9, that everyone, even the virtuous man, will love himself first and most, and that from this love all other love and friendship is derived. For in the eighth, 2, he says thus: It seems, moreover, that each person loves the good for himself;", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p327A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p327A", "locator_display": "327A", "source_text": "et infra 7. Sibi ipsi maxime vnusquisque vult bona; et noni libri 4. Amicabilia autem quae ad amicos, et quibus amicitiae determinantur, videntur ex his quae ad seipsum venisse: et infra 8. quaerit, Vtrum oportet amare seipsum maxime, et arguit pro, et contra, et determinat quod oportet; vbi et infra 9. Omnis, inquit, intellectus eligit optimum sibi ipsi; epieikes autem obedit intellectui: verum enim quod de studioso, et amicorum gratia multa agere, et pati, et si oporteat, mori: Proijciet enim et pecunias et honores, et totaliter circumpugnabilia bona, procurans sibi ipsi bonum. Paucum enim tempus valde delectari magis vtique eliget, quam multum quiete; et viuere bene annum, quam multos annos qualitercunque; et vnam actionem bonam, et magnam, quam multas et paruas. Morientibus autem et hoc forte accidit, eligunt vtique magnum sibi ipsis, et pecunias proijciunt vtique, in quo plura recipient amici. Fiunt enim quidem amico pecuniae, ipsi autem bonum, maius autem bonum tribuit sibi ipsi. Ecce secundum doctrinam Philosophi quod virtuosus in operatione", "english": "and below, 7: Each one wishes goods most of all for himself; and in the ninth book, 4: The friendly feelings toward friends, by which friendships are defined, seem to come from those that relate to oneself. And below, 8, he asks whether one ought to love oneself most, argues for and against, and determines that one ought; where also below, 9: Every mind, he says, chooses what is best for itself; but the decent man obeys the mind. For it is true of the upright man that he does many things for the sake of his friends, and suffers, and if need be dies.[n8] For he will cast away both money and honors and, wholly, all the goods fought over, procuring good for himself. For he will choose to be delighted exceedingly for a short time rather than much quietly; to live nobly for a year rather than many years anyhow; and one good and great action rather than many small ones. And for those who are dying this too perhaps happens: they choose something great for themselves, and they cast away money, in which their friends will receive more. For money comes to the friend, but the good to the man himself, and he assigns the greater good to himself. Behold what follows from the Philosopher's doctrine: that the virtuous man, in his most virtuous operation,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p327B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p327B", "locator_display": "327B–327C", "source_text": "sua maxime virtuosa intendit, et amat finaliter, non Deum gratuito propter Deum, sed proprium bonum suum, proprium commodum et seipsum, et Deum fortassis propter se hominem. Vnde et Sixtus Pictagoras in sententiolis suis ait; Sine Deo non poteris viuere Deo; et infra, Sapientem fatum non facit; gratia enim Dei fato non fubiacet. Quapropter et Anselmus de Concord. vlt. dicit, quod voluntas quae est instrumentum, et naturalis libertas arbitrij sine iustitia otiosa est et ancilla facta est suae affectionis quae ad commodum est, quia remota iustitia nihil potest velle, nisi quod illa vult, affectio scilicet commodi; haec autem iustitia proculdubio est gratia Dei ipsa, ex gratiaue dependet. Iustitia namque tribuit vnicuique quod est suum; quare et Deo amorem gratuitum super omnia propter ipsum, secundum partem 30am Corollarij, primi huius; quod fieri sine gratia nusquam potest, sicut praecedentia suaserunt. Hoc idem Anselmus, et alij Doctores Catholici saepius contestantur: Dicit enim Apostolus, Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius, ad Rom. 3. et iterum, Iustificati gratia ipsius,\n\nhaeredes fimus, ad Titum 3. et iterum, Gratia regnet per iustitiam, ad Rom. 5. et infra 10. de quibusdam opinionis contrariae scribit ita; Ignorantes Dei iustitiam, et suam quae rentes statuere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti; quod tractans Augustinus de verbis Apostoli, serm. 15. Iustitia, inquit, sit, sed ex gratia sit; a Deo tibi sit, tua non sit: qui et exponens illud Psalmi 118. Feci iudicium et iustitiam, scribit ita; Iustitiae nomine hoc loco non ipsa virtus, sed opus eius significatum est. Quis enim facit in homine iustitiam, nisi qui iustificat impium? hoc est per gratiam suam ex impio facit iustum. Vnde Apostolus, Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius: Facit ergo iustitiam, id est, opus iustitiae, qui habet in se iustitiam, quibus et multi Autores similia multa dicunt. Quapropter et euidenter apparet nullam virtutem Philosophicam seu moralem esse veram virtutem, simpliciter rectam, aut iustam, sine charitate et gratia ipsam perficiente, erigente in Deum et ad ipsum finaliter propter ipsum gratuito dirigente. Non enim parum deest virtuti, cui deest vera causa finalis, recta intentio, iustus finis, et praecipue talis", "english": "intends and loves finally not God gratuitously for God's sake, but his own good, his own advantage, and himself, and God perhaps for the sake of himself, the man. Hence also Sextus the Pythagorean says in his little Sentences: Without God you will not be able to live to God; and below, Fate does not make the wise man; for the grace of God is not subject to fate.[n9] Therefore Anselm too, in On Concord, last chapter, says that the will, which is an instrument, and the natural freedom of choice, is idle without justice and has been made the handmaid of its own affection for advantage; for, justice removed, it can will nothing except what that affection wills, namely the affection for advantage. This justice, without doubt, is God's grace itself, or depends on grace. For justice assigns to each what is his own; hence also to God gratuitous love above all things for his own sake, according to the thirtieth part of the first Corollary of this book; and this can nowhere come about without grace, as the preceding arguments urged. Anselm and other Catholic Doctors often bear witness to the same. For the Apostle says, Justified freely by his grace, Romans 3; and again, Justified by his grace,\n\nwe are made heirs, Titus 3; and again, Let grace reign through justice, Romans 5; and below, 10, he writes thus of certain holders of the contrary opinion: Ignorant of the justice of God, and seeking to establish their own, they are not subject to the justice of God. Augustine, treating this in On the Words of the Apostle, sermon 15: Let there be justice, he says, but let it be from grace; let it be from God to you; let it not be your own. The same Augustine, expounding that verse of Psalm 118 [119], I have done judgment and justice, writes thus: By the name of justice in this place is meant not the virtue itself, but its work. For who makes justice in a man, except him who justifies the ungodly? That is, by his grace he makes a just man out of an ungodly one. Hence the Apostle: Justified freely by his grace. He, then, does justice, that is, the work of justice, who has justice in himself; and many authors say many similar things to these. Hence it appears evidently that no philosophical or moral virtue is true virtue, simply upright or just, without charity and grace perfecting it, raising it to God and directing it finally to him, gratuitously, for his own sake. For it lacks no little thing, the virtue that lacks a true final cause, a right intention, a just end, and especially such an end as God is known to be.", "margins": [{"id": "327B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm. The Apostle. Rom 3. Tit 3. Rom 5 and 10. Augustine."}, {"id": "327C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Apostle."}]}, {"anchor": "p327D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p327D", "locator_display": "327D–327E", "source_text": "finis, qualis cognoscitur esse Deus. Vnde nec minus clare perpenditur, nullum opus virtutis huiusmodi per charitatem et gratiam non formatae; et vniuersaliter nullum opus cuiuspiam, veram virtutem charitatis et gratiae non habentis, esse simpliciter virtuosum, rectum, aut iustum; quinimo et quodlibet tale opus, est aliquo modo peccatum. Nam quomodo posset opus esse virtuosum, rectum, et iustum simpliciter, quod non a tali virtute procedit, quae rectam causam finalem simpliciter, rectam intentionem, et iustum finem non habet? imo quomodo posset opus non esse quouismodo obliquitas aut peccatum, quod a recto, debito, et iusto fine simpliciter ad alium distorquetur, et ibi requiescit finaliter vltimate? Quare et Plato atque Platonici Philosophi excellentes veras virtutes non esse dicebant, nisi quae menti quodammodo imprimuntur a forma illius aeternae immutabilisque substantiae, qui est Deus: An et haec est virtus de qua Aristoteles 7. Ethic. 1. dicit, Quandam esse super nos virtutem heroicam et diuinam? Quapropter et Augustinus 4. contra Iulianum 4. recitat opinionem\n\ncontrariam tanquam errorem Pelagianorum, sic alloquens Iulianum; Soletis, negantes Dei dona esse virtutes, quibus recte viuitur, et eas naturae voluntatique humanae non gratiae Dei tribuentes, hoc vti argumento, quod eas nonnunquam habeant infideles. Et infra 5. Acerbissimi, inquit, gratiae inimici, exempla nobis opponitis impiorum, quos dicitis alienos a fide abundare virtutibus, in quibus sine adiutorio gratiae solum est naturae bonum, licet superstitionibus mancipatum, qui solius libertatis ingenitae viribus, et misericordes crebro, et modesti, et casti inueniuntur, et sobrij. Sed horum errorem, ertoneum argumentum redarguit consequenter, ostendens diffuse quod nulla est in infidelibus vera virtus, nec aliquod opus rectum; imo et quod omne opus infidelium est peccatum; quod etiam virtutes infidelium sunt veraciter dona Dei; quare et sexto sic ait, Absit vt sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit iustus vere, nisi viuat ex fide; Iustus enim ex fide", "english": "Hence it is no less clearly weighed that no work of such a virtue, not formed by charity and grace, and universally no work of anyone who lacks the true virtue of charity and grace, is simply virtuous, upright or just; nay, any such work is in some way sin. For how could a work be simply virtuous, upright and just, which proceeds from such a virtue as does not have a right final cause simply, a right intention, and a just end?[n10] Indeed, how could a work fail to be in some way a crookedness or a sin, if it is twisted from the right, due and just end, simply speaking, to another, and there comes to rest finally and ultimately? Hence Plato and the Platonic philosophers too, excellent as they were, said that there are no true virtues except those which are somehow imprinted on the mind from the form of that eternal and immutable substance, who is God. Might this too be the virtue of which Aristotle says, in Ethics 7, 1, that there is a certain heroic and divine virtue above us? Hence Augustine also, Against Julian 4, 4, recites the contrary opinion\n\nas an error of the Pelagians, addressing Julian thus: You are accustomed, denying that the virtues by which one lives rightly are gifts of God, and attributing them to nature and human will, not to the grace of God, to use this argument, that unbelievers sometimes have them. And below, 5: Most bitter enemies of grace, he says, you set against us the examples of the ungodly, whom you say, though strangers to the faith, abound in virtues, in whom, without the help of grace, there is only a good of nature, though enslaved to superstitions, and who, by the powers of innate freedom alone, are found often merciful, and modest, and chaste, and sober. But he goes on to refute the error of these men, their erroneous argument, showing at length that there is no true virtue in unbelievers, nor any right work; indeed, that every work of unbelievers is sin; and also that the virtues of unbelievers are truly gifts of God.[n11] Hence in the sixth he also says: Far be it that there be true virtue in anyone unless he be truly just, unless he live by faith; for the just man lives by faith", "margins": [{"id": "327D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Plato."}, {"id": "327D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Aristotle."}, {"id": "327E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p328A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p328A", "locator_display": "328A–328B", "source_text": "viuit. Quis porro eorum qui se Christianos haberi volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiam forte tu solus, iustum dixerit infidelem, iustum dixerit impium, iustum dixerit Diabolo mancipatum? Porto si veram iustitiam non habent impij; profecto nec alias virtutes comites et socias, si quas habent, veras habent; ac per hoc nec continentia, siue pudicitia, vera virtus est impiorum, quia cum non ad suum referuntur autorem dona Dei, hoc ipso malo, his vtentes efficiuntur iniusti. Et infra 8. Nouetis, inquit, non officijs sed finibus a vitijs discernendas esse virtutes; officium est autem quod faciendum est; cum ita que facit aliquid homo vbi peccare non videtur, si non propter hoc facit, propter quod facere debet, peccare conuincitur; quae tamen non attēdens fines ab officijs separasti, et virtutes veras officia sine finibus appellāda esse dixisti; ex quo te tanta absurditas sequitur, vt veram appellare cogaris iustitiam, etiam cuius Dominam repereris auaritiam. Siquidem manus abstinere ab alieno, si officium cogites, potest videri esse iustitiae; si tamen quaeritur, quare fiat, et respondetur, ne plus pecuniae litibus\n\npereat, quomodo iam hoc factum vere poterit esse iustitiae, cum seruiat auaritiae, quales virtutes Epicurus induxit voluptatis ancillas, quae omnino quicquid facerent, propter illam vel adipiscendam facerent, vel tenendam? Absit autem, vt virtutes verae cuiquam seruiant nisi illi, vel propter illum, cui dicimus, Deus virtutum conuerte nos. Proinde virtutes quae carnalibus delectationibus, vel quibuscunque commodis et emolumentis temporalibus seruiunt, verae prorsus esse non possunt; quae autem nulli rei seruire volunt, nec ipsae verae sunt. Verae quippe virtutes Deo seruiunt in hominibus, a quo donantur hominibus; Deo seruiunt in Angelis, a quo donantur etiam Angelis; quicquid autem bonum fit ab homine, et non propter hoc fit, propter quod fieri debere vera sapientia praecipit, etsi officio videatur bonum, ipso non recto fine peccatum est. Et infra 12. recitat replicationem Iuliani haeretici, et respondet sic dicens; Ecce eadem commemoro quae ipse posuisti. Si gentilis, qui non viuit ex fide, nudum, operuerit, periclitātem liberauerit, aegri vulnera fouerit, diuitias honestae amicitiae", "english": "(Hab 2:4). Who, then, of those who wish to be counted Christians, except the Pelagians alone, or perhaps among them you alone, will say that an unbeliever is just, will say that an ungodly man is just, will say that one enslaved to the Devil is just? Moreover, if the ungodly do not have true justice, surely neither do they have true the other virtues that are its companions and associates, if they have any; and so neither continence, nor chastity, is true virtue in the ungodly, since, when these gifts of God are not referred to their author, by this very evil those who use them are made unjust. And below, 8: You should know, he says, that virtues are to be distinguished from vices not by duties but by ends. A duty is what is to be done; when, therefore, a man does something in which he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it for the reason for which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning. You, however, not attending to this, have separated ends from duties, and said that true virtues are to be called duties without ends. From this so great an absurdity follows for you that you are compelled to call that true justice of which you find avarice to be the mistress. For indeed, to keep the hand from another's property, if you consider only duty, can seem to belong to justice. If, however, it is asked why it is done, and the answer is, lest more money perish in lawsuits,\n\nhow could this deed now truly belong to justice, when it serves avarice? Such were the virtues that Epicurus introduced as handmaids of pleasure, which, whatever they did at all, would do for the sake of obtaining it or of keeping it. But far be it that true virtues serve anyone except him, or for his sake, to whom we say, God of virtues, turn us.[n12] Therefore virtues that serve carnal delights, or any temporal advantages and emoluments whatever, cannot be true at all; and those which wish to serve nothing are themselves not true either. For true virtues serve God in men, by whom they are given to men; they serve God in Angels, by whom they are also given to Angels. But whatever good is done by a man, and is not done for the reason for which true wisdom commands that it be done, even if it seems good by duty, is sin by the very fact of its end not being right. And below, 12, he recites the reply of Julian the heretic, and answers thus: Behold, I recall the same things that you yourself set down. If a gentile, who does not live by faith, clothes the naked, rescues one in danger, tends the wounds of the sick, spends riches on honorable friendship,", "margins": [{"id": "328A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) duxisti."}]}, {"anchor": "p328C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p328C", "locator_display": "328C–328D", "source_text": "impenderit, ad testimonium falsum nec tormentis poterit impelli; quaero abs te, vtrum haec opera bona bene faciat an male, si enim quamuis bona, male tamen facit, negare non potes eum peccare, qui male quodlibet facit; sed quia eum non vis peccare cum ista facit, profecto dicturus es, et bona facit, et bene. Fructus ergo bonos facit arbor mala, quod fieri non posse veritas dicit. An dicis hominem infidelem arborem bonam? placet ergo Deo, et vbi erit quod scriptum est, Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo? Vide itaque vtrum infidelē voluntatem audeas dicere bonam voluntatem: Sed forte dicturus es, misericors voluntas bona est; recte istud diceretur, si quemadmodum fides Christi, id est, fides quae per dilectionem operatur semper est bona, ita misericordia semper est bona: si autē et reperitur mesericordia mala, qua persona pauperis accipitur in iudicio; propter quam postremo rex Saul meruit a Domino et vtique misericordiae damnari, quia contra eius praeceptum captiuo regi per humanum peperit affectum; attente cogita, ne forte misericordia bona non sit, nisi quae bonae huius fidei fuerit; imo responde,\n\nvt hoc sine dubitatione prospicias, vtrum bonam misericordiam existimes infidelem? Porro si vitium est male misereri, proculdubio vitiū est misereri infideliter; quod si et ipsa per seipsam naturali compassione opus est bonum, etiam isto bono male vtitur, qui infideliter vtitur; et hoc bonum male facit, qui in fideliter facit; qui autē male facit aliquid profecto peccat, ex quo colligitur etiam ipsa bona opera, quae faciunt infideles, non ipsorum esse, sed illius qui bene vtitur malis; ipsorum autem esse peccata, quibus et bona male faciunt, quia non fideli sed infideli, id est, stulta et noxia hoc faciunt voluntate. Et infra 13. Intellige quod ait Dominus, Si oculus tuus nequam est, totum corpus tuum tenebrosum erit; Si autem oculus tuus est simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit; et hunc oculum agnosce intentionem qua quis que facit quod facit, et per hoc disce eum qui non facit opera bona, intentione fidei bonae, hoc est quae per dilectionem operatur, totum quasi corpus, quod illis, velut membris, operibus constat, tenebrosum", "english": "and cannot be driven even by torments to false witness, I ask you whether he does these good works well or badly. For if, though they are good, he nevertheless does them badly, you cannot deny that he sins who does anything badly; but since you do not want him to sin when he does these things, you will surely say that he does good, and does it well. A bad tree, then, bears good fruit, which the Truth says cannot happen. Or do you call the unbelieving man a good tree? Then he pleases God, and where will be what is written, Without faith it is impossible to please God? See, therefore, whether you dare to call an unbelieving will a good will. But perhaps you will say, a merciful will is good. That would rightly be said if, just as the faith of Christ, that is, the faith that works through love, is always good, so mercy were always good. But mercy too is found to be bad, when partiality is shown to the poor man's person in judgment; on account of which King Saul at last deserved to be condemned by the Lord, and condemned indeed for mercy, because, contrary to his command, he spared a captive king out of human feeling.[n13] Think carefully lest perhaps mercy not be good unless it belongs to this good faith; nay, answer,\n\nso that you may foresee this without doubt: do you reckon that an unbelieving mercy is good mercy? Moreover, if it is a vice to show mercy badly, it is without doubt a vice to show mercy unbelievingly. But if even mercy itself, by itself, as a work of natural compassion, is a good work, he who uses it unbelievingly uses even this good badly; and he does this good badly who does it unbelievingly; and he who does anything badly surely sins. From this it is also gathered that the very good works which unbelievers do are not theirs, but his who uses evils well; but theirs are the sins by which they do even good things badly, since they do this not with a faithful will but with an unfaithful one, that is, a foolish and harmful one. And below, 13: Understand what the Lord says, If your eye is evil, your whole body will be dark; but if your eye is single, your whole body will be bright. In this eye recognize the intention with which each person does what he does, and from this learn that he who does not do good works with the intention of good faith, that is, faith that works through love, has his whole body, as it were, which consists of those works as of members, dark,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p328E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p328E", "locator_display": "328E", "source_text": "esse, hoc est plenum nigredine peccatorum. Amor enim mundi quo quisque amicus est huius mundi, non est ex Deo; amor fruendi quibuscunque creaturis sine amore creatoris non est a Deo; Amorautem Dei, quo perueniatur ad Deum, non est nisi a Deo patre per Iesum Christum in Spiritu Sancto. Per hunc amorem Creatoris bene quis que vtitur creaturis; sine hoc amore Creatoris nullus quisquam bene vtitur creaturis. Quem imitatus et Beda contra Iulianum 13. Quod, inquit, dicit (scilicet Iulianus) multos Philosophorum patientiam, castitatem, modestiam, aliasque de Naturae bono habuisse virtutes, constat quod quicunque Philosophorum Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam nescierunt, hi nullam vere virtutem, sicut nec veram sapientiam habere nulla ratione potuerunt. Vnde et in sententijs Prosperi propositione 106. Omnis infidelium vita peccatū est; Bonum enim nihil est sine", "english": "that is, full of the blackness of sins. For the love of the world, by which each person is a friend of this world, is not from God; the love of enjoying any creatures without love of the Creator is not from God; but the love of God, by which one comes to God, is only from God the Father through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. Through this love of the Creator everyone uses creatures well; without this love of the Creator no one at all uses creatures well. Imitating him, Bede also says, Against Julian 13: As to what he says (namely Julian), that many of the Philosophers had patience, chastity, modesty, and other virtues from the good of Nature, it is clear that whichever of the Philosophers did not know Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God, these could by no reasoning have any virtue truly, just as neither could they have true wisdom. Hence also in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 106: All the life of unbelievers is sin; for there is no good without the highest good.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p329A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p329A", "locator_display": "329A", "source_text": "summo bono. Vbi enim deest agnitio aeternae et incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus. Quapropter et Apostolus, primo ad Corinthios, decimo tertio, Omnes virtutes in charitate radicari demonstrat. Ex his igitur plane constat, quod nulla virtus Philosophica aut moralis, fine gratia charitatis, est simpliciter vera virtus, recta, aut iusta, nec valet erigere voluntatem creatam ad Deum super omnia propter Deum gratuito diligendum, quin potius ipsam deflectit, deflexamue detinet, ad cuiuslibet commodum proprium, et scipsum. De necessitate ergo requiritur aliqua virtus superior supernaturalis, heroica, et diuina, puta gratia gratis data a Deo, ad erigendum voluntatem creatam insufficientem ex seipsa, ad diligendum Deum super omnia gratuito propter Deum, et finaliter propter eum. Hoc autem videtur et congrue figurari Ezechielis primo, vbi Propheta sic ait; Vidi et cecidi in faciem meam, et audini vocem loquentis, et dixit ad me; Fili hominis, sta super pedes tuos, sicut et omni homini ex peccato, seu conditione naturae cadenti, seu iacenti longe", "english": "For where the knowledge of eternal and unchangeable truth is lacking, virtue is false, even in the best of morals. Hence the Apostle too, in 1 Corinthians 13, shows that all virtues are rooted in charity. From these things, therefore, it is plainly clear that no philosophical or moral virtue, without the grace of charity, is simply true virtue, upright or just. Nor is it able to raise the created will to loving God above all things for God's sake gratuitously; rather it bends it aside, or holds it bent aside, to the personal advantage of each, and to the self. Of necessity, therefore, some higher virtue is required, supernatural, heroic and divine, namely grace freely given by God, to raise the created will, insufficient of itself, to loving God above all things gratuitously for God's sake, and finally on his account. This seems to be fittingly prefigured in Ezekiel 1, where the Prophet says thus: I saw, and fell on my face, and I heard the voice of one speaking, and he said to me: Son of man, stand upon your feet. So too is it commanded of every man who falls through sin or through the condition of nature, or lies far", "margins": [{"id": "329A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Ezekiel."}]}, {"anchor": "p329B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p329B", "locator_display": "329B–329C", "source_text": "inferius, imperatur; sed quia per seipsum non sufficit surgere, neque stare, recte subiungitur, et ingressus est in me spiritus postquam locutus est mihi, et statuit me supra pedes meos, etc. Quis enim est hic spiritus, nisi spiritus gratiae, spiritus Dei sanctus? Quare et Gregorius primo super Ezechielem, homilia nona, sic ait; Ecce diuina vox iacenti Prophetae iussit, vt surgeret; sed surgere omnino non posset, nisi in hunc Omnipotentis Dei spiritus intrasset. Huic et concordanter Daniel ita dicit; Iacebam consternatus super faciem meam, vultusque meus haerebat terrae, et ecce manus tetigit me, et erexit me super genua mea, et super articulos manuum mearum, etc. Danielis decimo: Quae enim est haec manus, nisi manus diuinae gratiae adiutricis? Quapropter et Augustinus De spiritu et litera, vndecim. dicit ita; Demonstrare nitimur non in eo nos diuinitus adiuuari ad operandam iustitiam, quod legem Deus dedit plenam bonis sanctisque praeceptis; sed quia ipsa voluntas nostra sine qua operari bonum non possumus, adiuuetur, et erigatur, impertito spiritu gratiae, sine quo adiutorio\n\ndoctrina illa litera est occidens. Petrus quoque secundo Sent. suarum distinct. 24. Est, inquit, in anima rationali voluntas, vel qua naturaliter vult bonum, licet tenuiter et exiliter nisi gratia iuuet, quae adueniens iuuat eam et erigit, vt efficaciter velit bonum. Et infra Distinct. 25. vltim. Voluntas, inquit, hominis quam naturaliter habet, non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum, vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur, et adiuuetur; liberetur quidem vt velit, et adiuuetur vt perficiat, quia vt ait Apostolus; Non est volentis velle, neque currentis currete, id est, operari, sed miserentis Dei, qui operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum, cuius gratiam non aduocat hominis voluntas vel operatio; sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praeuenit praeparando, vt velit bonum, et praeparatam adiuuat, ne frustra velit, id est, vt perficiat. Amplius autem secundum omnes Philosophos, naturales et morales, omnis forma, et omnis habitus moralis vel intellectualis per operationem suam cognoscitur, et per operationes distinctas et varias, formae distinctae et variae demonstrantur. Cur ergo per operationem", "english": "below. But since he is not sufficient to rise or to stand by himself, it is rightly added, And the spirit entered into me after he spoke to me, and set me upon my feet, etc. For what is this spirit, except the spirit of grace, the Holy Spirit of God? Hence Gregory too, in Book 1 on Ezekiel, Homily 9, says thus: Behold, the divine voice commanded the prostrate Prophet to rise; but he could not at all have risen unless the spirit of Almighty God had entered into him. Daniel says in agreement with this: I lay prostrate on my face, and my countenance clung to the earth, and behold a hand touched me, and raised me up on my knees and on the joints of my hands, etc. (Daniel 10). For what is this hand, if not the hand of divine grace the helper? Hence Augustine also, On the Spirit and the Letter, 11, says thus: We strive to show that we are divinely helped to work justice not in that God gave a law full of good and holy precepts, but in that our very will, without which we cannot work good, is helped and raised up by the bestowal of the spirit of grace, without which help\n\nthat teaching is the letter that kills. Peter also, in the second of his Sentences, dist. 24, says: There is in the rational soul a will, or that by which it naturally wills the good, though thinly and feebly unless grace helps; which grace, coming, helps it and raises it, that it may effectively will the good.[n14] And below, dist. 25, last: The will of man, which it has naturally, is not able to be raised to willing good effectively, or to fulfilling it in work, unless it be freed and helped through grace; freed, indeed, that it may will, and helped that it may accomplish, since, as the Apostle says, It is not of him who wills to will, nor of him who runs to run, that is, to work, but of God who has mercy, who works in us to will and to work the good; whose grace the will or work of man does not summon, but grace itself goes before the will, preparing it that it may will the good, and helps it when prepared, lest it will in vain, that is, that it may accomplish. Furthermore, according to all Philosophers, natural and moral, every form, and every habit, moral or intellectual, is known through its operation, and by distinct and varied operations distinct and varied forms are shown. Why, then, is the form or habit of charity and grace not proved through the operation", "margins": [{"id": "329B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Daniel."}, {"id": "329B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "329C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Lombard."}]}, {"anchor": "p329D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p329D", "locator_display": "329D", "source_text": "charitatis et gratiae, quae est Deum super omnia chare et gratis diligere, forma seu habitus charitatis et gratiae non probatur? Item omnes Doctores de baptismo, et eius effectu scribentes tenent concorditer, quod cuilibet rite baptizato in suo baptismo, tres virtutes Theologicae, scilicet fides, spes, et charitas infunduntur, vna cum gratia informante. Et vt de caetero, nullus super hoc audeat dubitare, sancta Ecclesia istud certissime definiuit. Nam Iohannes Papa Extra, In constitutionibus Clementis, de summa Trinitate, et fide Catholica, recitata vna opinione dicente per virtutem Baptismi paruulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; et alia assere•, quod culpa ipsis in baptismo remittitur, ac virtutes, et informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum; etsi non pro illo tempore quoad vsum, subiungit; Nos attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis, opinionem secundam, quae dicit tam paruulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam, et virtutes, tanquam probabiliorem, et dictis", "english": "of charity and grace, which is to love God above all things charitably and gratuitously? Likewise all the Doctors who write on baptism and its effect hold with one accord that in his baptism, to anyone duly baptized, the three theological virtues, namely faith, hope and charity, are infused, together with informing grace. And lest anyone henceforth dare to doubt this, Holy Church has defined it most certainly. For Pope John, Extra, in the Constitutions of Clement, On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith,[n15] having recounted one opinion which says that by the power of baptism guilt is indeed remitted to infants but grace is not conferred, and another which asserts that guilt is remitted to them in baptism, and that virtues and informing grace are infused as to habit, though not for that time as to use, adds: We, attending to the general efficacy of Christ's death, which is applied through baptism equally to all the baptized, have judged, with the sacred council approving, that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism on infants as well as adults, is to be chosen as the more probable, and more consonant and concordant with the sayings", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p329E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p329E", "locator_display": "329E", "source_text": "Sanctorum, ac Doctorum modernorum Theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante consilio duximus eligendam. Item nullus potest exercere operationem propriam alicuius formae nisi praehabita illa forma, sicut nullus potest percutere fortiter, nisi praehabita fortitudine, nec videre acute nisi praehabito visu acuto; et in intellectualibus, et moralibus similiter; Nullus enim potest facere sapienter aut prudenter nisi praehabita sapientia vel prudentia; nec in moralibus potest quis generaliter benefacere, nisi praehabita aliquali virtute in genere, a qua tanquam a forma bona seu bonitate actio bona procedat. Vnde secundo Ethicorum sexto ostendit Philosophus quod virtus habentem perficit, et eius opus bonum reddit; cui et simile ex sexto Ethicorum, 10. recitat trice•imum quartum huius, et idem videtur de qualibet virtute in particulari, et operatione illius. Nullus ergo potest iuste velle, nisi praehabita iustitia, nec diligere Deum chare nisi praehabita", "english": "of the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology. Likewise no one can exercise the proper operation of any form unless he has that form beforehand; as no one can strike strongly unless he has strength beforehand, nor see acutely unless he has sharp sight beforehand; and likewise in intellectual and moral matters. For no one can act wisely or prudently unless he has wisdom or prudence beforehand; nor in moral matters can anyone do good generally unless he has beforehand some virtue in general, from which, as from a form, a good or goodness, a good action may proceed. Hence in Ethics 2, 6 the Philosopher shows that virtue perfects its possessor and renders his work good. The thirty-fourth of this book recites a like statement from Ethics 6, 10; and the same appears to hold of any virtue in particular, and its operation. No one, then, can will justly unless he has justice beforehand, nor love God charitably unless he has charity beforehand.", "margins": [{"id": "329E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p330A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p330A", "locator_display": "330A", "source_text": "charitate. Quicunque ergo caret iustitia, charitate, et gratia, non potest ex se iuste vel chare aut grate velle nec facere, nec hanc potest ex se habere sicut praecedentia docuerunt; et potest probari; quia si posset, hoc esset grate merendo, seu volendo, vel non sic faciendo; sed non grate merendo, seu volendo, quia hoc non potest nisi praehabita gratia per proximam rationem; nec non grate aliquid faciendo; Non enim congruit rationi, quod gratia detur in praemium et mercedem ei, qui nihil gratum fuerit operatus. (Nam secundum Apostolum 1. ad Cor. 3. Vnusquisque propriam mercedem accipit secundum suum laborem) nec carens ea potest eam recipere a sola alia creatura. Nullus enim potest gignere aut facere filios Dei, et constituere haeredes regni coelestis, nisi Deus Pater, et Dominus huius regni. Restat igitur vt gratia secundum nomen suum, sine vllis meritis praeuijs gratis detur ingratis, a Deo datore liberalissimo gratiarum. Et propter hanc rationem Anselmus de Concordia, eandem sententiam profitetur; vbi postquam ostendit capitulo octauo; quod recte velle est finis", "english": "Whoever, then, lacks justice, charity and grace cannot of himself will or do justly, or charitably, or acceptably, nor can he have this from himself, as the preceding showed. It can also be proved: for if he could, he would do so either by meriting, or willing, acceptably, or by not acting thus. But not by meriting or willing acceptably, since he cannot do this without grace beforehand, by the reasoning just given; nor yet by doing anything unacceptably.[n16] For it is not consistent with reason that grace be given as prize and wage to one who has done nothing acceptable. (For according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 3, Each will receive his own wage according to his own labor.) Nor can one who lacks it receive it from any other creature alone. For no one can beget or make sons of God, and appoint heirs of the heavenly kingdom, except God the Father, and the Lord of this kingdom. It remains, therefore, that grace, according to its name, be given freely, without any previous merits, to the ungracious, by God, the most liberal giver of graces.[n17] And for this reason Anselm, in On Concord, professes the same opinion; where, after he has shown in the eighth chapter that to will rightly is the end …", "margins": [{"id": "330A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Apostle, 1 Cor 3."}, {"id": "330A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}]}, {"anchor": "p330B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p330B", "locator_display": "330B–330E", "source_text": "rationalis creaturae, et quod iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se seruata, quoniam qui solum propter aliud illam seruat, non illam diligit, sed illud propter quod eam seruat, et ideo non est dicendus iustus, nec talis rectitudo nominanda est iustitia, nono capitulo sic adiungit; Dubium non est, quia voluntas non vult recte nisi quia recta est: Sicut namque visus non est acutus, quia videt acute, sed id circo videt acute quia est acutus; Ita voluntas non est recta, quia recte vult, sed recte vult quoniam recta est; Cum autem vult hanc rectitudinem, proculdubio recte vult. Non ergo vult rectitudinem nisi quia recta est; Idem autem est voluntati rectam esse et rectitudinem habere; palam igitur est, quia non vult rectitudinem, nisi quia rectitudinem habet. Idem de veritate 12. Rectitudinis acceptio prius est natura quam habere aut velle illam, quoniam illam habere aut velle, non est causa acceptionis, sed acceptio facit illam velle, et habere. Et sicut patet per eundem De causa Diaboli 17. Desertor Angelus amissa iustitia, non potest ex se habere voluntatem iustitiae; Imo et sicut apparet\n\nsupra eiusdem 12. Angelus dispositus ad volendum, non potuit ex se habere suam primam voluntatem, neque beatitudinis aut iustitiae, sed voluntatem commodi naturalem. Huic et consonat dictum eius De concordia vlt. superius recitatum; qui et supra 9. post superius recitata, ostendit quod nullus potest rectitudinem illam recipere nisi a Deo; Consideremus nunc, inquit, vtrum aliquis hanc rectitudinem non habens, aliquo modo eam a se habere possit; vtique illam a se habere nequit nisi aut volendo, aut non volendo; volendo quidem nullus valet eam per se adipisci, quia nequit eam velle, scilicet recte, nisi eam habeat; quod autem nolendo valeat eam assequi mens nullius accipit: Nullo ergo modo potest eam habere ex se; sed neque ab alia creatura: Sicut namque creatura nequit creaturam saluare, ita non potest illi dare per quod saluetur. Sequitur ergo quod nulla creatura rectitudinem habeat, nisi per Dei gratiam. Deo ergo largiente inuenimus gratiam eius ad saluandum hominem cum libero arbitrio concordare; ita vt gratia sola possit hominem saluare, nihil eius libero arbitrio\n\nagente; sicut fit in infantibus et in intelligentibus, vt ipsa semper adiuuet liberū arbitrium naturale, quod sinc illa nihil valet ad salutem, dando voluntati rectitudinem, quam seruet per liberum arbitrium. Et quamuis non omnibus det, quoniam cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat; Nulli tamen dat pro praecedenti aliquo merito, quoniam, quis prior dedit Deo et retribuctur ei? Si autem voluntas per liberum arbitrium, seruando quod accepit, meretur aut augmentum acceptae iustitiae, aut potestatem pro bona voluntate, aut praemium aliquod, haec omnia fructus sunt primae gratiae; et gratia pro gratia, et deo totum imputandum est gratiae, quia neque volentis est quod vult, neque currentis est quod currit, sed miserentis est Dei. Nonne et hoc est quod dicit Propheta, Scio, inquiens, Domine quod non est homins via eius, nec viri est vt ambulet et dirigat gressus suos. Ierem. 1. Cuius est ergo, nisi illius de quo alius Propheta sic ait, Apud Dominum gressus hominis dirigetur, et viam eius volet, Psalmo trigesimo sexto; Imo sicut alia litera clatior, A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur\n\nprimo, et post directionem iam factam, viam eius scilicet Domini volet homo secundo. Hoc enim Aug. exponens sic ait, Ipse homo vt velit viam Domini, ab ipso Domino eius gressus dirigentur: Nam si Dominus non dirigeret gressus hominis, tam praui erant vt semper per praua irent, et semitas curuas sequendo redire non possent. Ipse est ergo qui direxit gressus nostros, vt viam eius vellemus. Qui et 1. ad Simplicianum 24. ait; Ad frangendam atque deijciendam superbiam hominum ingratorum gratiae Dei, et audientium gloriari de meritis suis, ista commemorantur: Cum enim nondum nati fuissent, neque aliquod egissent bonum aut malum, non ex operibus sed ex vocante dictum est, Quia maior seruiet minori. Vocantis est ergo gratia; percipientis vero gratiam consequenter sunt opera bona, non", "english": "of the rational creature, and that justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake (since one who preserves it only for the sake of something else does not love it, but loves that for the sake of which he preserves it, and therefore is not to be called just, nor is such rectitude to be called justice), he adds in the ninth chapter as follows: \"There is no doubt that the will does not will rightly except because it is right. For as sight is not sharp because it sees sharply, but sees sharply for this reason, that it is sharp, so the will is not right because it wills rightly, but wills rightly because it is right. And when it wills this rectitude, it undoubtedly wills rightly. It does not, then, will rectitude except because it is right. For the will to be right is the same as for it to have rectitude; it is plain, therefore, that it wills rectitude only because it has rectitude.\" The same author says in On Truth, 12: \"The reception of rectitude is prior by nature to having or willing it, since having or willing it is not the cause of its reception, but its reception makes one will it and have it.\" And as is plain from the same author, On the Fall of the Devil [n18], 17: the angel who deserted, having lost justice, cannot have from himself a will of justice. Indeed, as appears above in 12 of the same work, the angel who was disposed to willing could not have from himself his first will, whether of happiness or of justice, but only a natural will for what is to his advantage. With this his saying in the last chapter of On Concord, recited above, also agrees. He also shows above, at 9, after the passages recited earlier, that no one can receive that rectitude except from God: \"Let us consider now,\" he says, \"whether anyone who does not have this rectitude could in any way have it from himself. He certainly cannot have it from himself except either by willing or by not willing. By willing, indeed, no one can obtain it by himself, because he cannot will it (that is, will it rightly) unless he has it; and that anyone could attain it by not willing, no one's mind accepts. In no way, then, can he have it from himself; but neither from another creature: for as a creature cannot save a creature, so it cannot give it that by which it is saved. It follows, therefore, that no creature has rectitude except through the grace of God.\" By God's bounty, then, we find his grace to be in concord with free choice for the saving of man, so that grace alone can save man, his free choice doing nothing, as happens in infants and in those with understanding, so that grace itself always helps natural free choice [n19], which without it avails nothing for salvation, by giving rectitude to the will, which the will keeps through free choice. And although he does not give it to everyone (for he has mercy on whom he will, and hardens whom he will), he gives it to no one for any preceding merit, since \"who has first given to God, and shall be repaid?\" But if the will through free choice, by keeping what it received, merits either an increase of the justice received, or power in return for good will, or some reward, all these are fruits of the first grace, and grace for grace; and so the whole is to be imputed to grace, because it is not of him who wills what he wills, nor of him who runs what he runs, but of God who has mercy. Is not this also what the Prophet says: \"I know, Lord,\" he says, \"that the way of man is not his, nor is it for man to walk and direct his steps\"? [n20] Whose is it, then, if not his of whom another Prophet says, \"With the Lord a man's steps will be directed, and he will will his way,\" in the thirty-sixth Psalm? Indeed, as another text has it more clearly, \"By the Lord a man's steps will be directed\" first; and after the direction already accomplished, man will will his way, that is, the Lord's, second. For Augustine, expounding this, says: \"So that the man himself may will the way of the Lord, his steps are directed by the Lord himself. For if the Lord did not direct a man's steps, they were so crooked that they would always go by crooked ways, and, following twisting paths, could not return. He it is, then, who directed our steps, so that we might will his way.\" The same, in 1, To Simplicianus, 24, says: \"To break and cast down the pride of men ungrateful to the grace of God, and of those who are heard to boast of their merits, these things are recorded: for 'when they were not yet born, and had done nothing good or evil, it was said, not from works but from him who calls: The elder shall serve the younger.' Grace, then, belongs to the one who calls; but to the one who receives grace there follow, as a consequence, good works, not such as", "margins": [{"id": "330D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Jer. 1"}, {"id": "330D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Ps 36 [37]"}, {"id": "330E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p331A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p331A", "locator_display": "331A–331E", "source_text": "quae gratiam pariant, sed quae gratia pariantur. Non enim vt ferueat, calefacit ignis, sed quia feruet; nec ideo bene currit rota, vt rotunda sit, sed quia rotunda est: sic nemo propterea bene operatur vt accipiat gratiam, sed quia accepit. Non enim potest juste viuere, qui non fuerit justificatus, nec omnino viuere, qui non fuerit viuificatus; Iustificat autem gratia, vt justificatus possit juste viuere. Prima est igitur gratia, secunda opera bona. Idem de fide ad Petrum, 18. dicit, quod Deus intellectuali naturae, Angelis scilicet et hominibus cognoscendi ac diligendi se facultatem voluntatem que donauit, vt eam vnusquisque et habere posset et perdere; si quis tamen eam sponte perderet, suo eam deinceps arbitrio resumere non valeret, vt illius esset, illius sanctae cogitationis initia gratuitae dono bonitatis denuo renouandis quibus vellet infundere, cujus fuit in ipso creationis exordio, nullis praecedentibus meritis, spiritus et corpora, locis atque affectionibus, prout ipse sapiens voluit congruis, mirabiliter\n\nordinare. Et infra 21. Bonae inquit voluntatis et cogitationis initium non homini ex scipso nasci, sed diuinitus et praeparari et tribui, in eo Deus euidenter ostendit, quod neque diabolus, neque aliquis Angelorum ejus, ex quo ruinae illius merito in hanc sunt inferiorem detrusi caliginem, bonam potuit aut poterit resumere voluntatem. Quod si possibile esset, vt humana natura, postquam a Deo auersa bonitatem perdidit voluntatis, ex seipsa rursus eam habere potuisset; multo possibilius hoc natura haberet Angelica, quae quanto minus grauatur terreni corporis pondere, tanto magis hac esset praedita facultate: Sed ostendit Deus vnde bona voluntas hominibus detur, quam sic amiserunt Angeli cum haberent, vt amissam deinceps habere non possent. Idem 12. de Ciuit. Dei, 9. probat, quod si boni Angeli fuerunt prius sine bona voluntate, non potuerunt eam habere ex se; quia si eam ipsi, Deo non operante, fecerunt, meliores a seipsis, quam ab illo facti sunt; quod absit: et si non potuerunt seipsos facere meliores, quam cos ille fecerat, quo nemo melius quicquam facit; profecto et bonam voluntatem qua meliores essent, nisi operante adjutorio creatoris habere non possent. Sed\n\nobijcietur fortassis per illud, 2. Eth. 1. et 2. quod virtus moralis generatur ex operibus similibus praecedentibus, vt justitia, temperantia, et fortitudo, ex juste, temperate, et fortiter operari; ergo aliquis potest virtuose operati non habendo virtutem. Item alias fatuum videretur et vanum appetere et desiderare virtutes: Nullus enim hoc potest nisi eas habendo; sed superfluum videtur et fatuum aliquem desiderare, et appetere hoc quod habet. Item hoc videtur in artibus manifestum: Nullus enim habet artem citharizandi, aut aedificandi, nisi prius citharizando, aut aedificando, vt patet per Philosophum, 2. Eth. 1. et 9. Metaphys. 14. Ad haec potest responderi sicut respondet Philosophus 2. Eth. 4. ad similem quaestionem. Quia enim dictum erat prius, quod virtus ex operibus generatur; quaereret aliquis, inquit, qualiter dicimus, quoniam oportet iusta operantes iustos fieri, et temperata temperantes? Si enim operantur iusta et temperata, iam sunt iusti, et temperati. Et respondet quod tales non operantur iuste et temperate, sed iusta et temperata: et dicit quod opera\n\niusta et temperata dicuntur, quando sunt talia, qualia iustus et temperatus operabitur. Aliter tamen nec improbabiliter potest dici, quod quicunque talia operatur, et non omnino casualiter, sicut bosinuenit leporem aut perdicem, hoc facit ex aliqua forma virtutis, et virtute, quam habet, large loquendo. Nam secundum eundem Philosophum, 6. Eth. vlt. duplex est virtus, vna principalis, alia naturalis; vel vna acquisita, alia vero innata; et hoc probat per communem experientiam, ita dicens; Omnibus enim videtur singulos morum existere natura; aliqualiter enim iusti, et temperati, et fortes, et alia habemus confestim a natiuitate. Etenim pueris et bestiis naturales existunt habitus, sed sine intellectu nociui videntur, quemadmodum corpori forti sine visione moto accidit falli fortiter, propter non habere visum, sic et hic. Si autem accipiat intellectum habitus similis existens, tunc erit proprie virtus. Et ratio hoc conuincit: Si enim propter hoc, quod homo post multa tristia opera sentit se fortiter inclinari ad talia faciliter et delectabiliter operandum, concludit se habere virtutem moralem\n\ntaliter inclinantem. Quare si quis naturaliter, similiter, vel vehementius, facilius, et delectabilius inclinetur, non concludit se habere virtutē huiusmodi naturalem? et hanc forsan virtutem contra virtutem acquisitam quam hic vocat principalem, in praedicamentis distinguens, sub nomine dispositionis posuit in prima specie qualitatis. Has etiam virtutes nedum naturales aut morales, sed etiam intellectuales et artificiales, Mathematici videre se reputant in natiuitatibus puerorum; Ideoque antiqui prudentes, inuestigata diligenter et cognita naturali habilitate pueri cuiuscunque secundum illam quemlibet ad quodlibet congrue applicabant. Quare et inter cos tunc temporis omnes artes excellentissime viguerunt. Vnde et 3. Eth. 13. scribitur isto modo, Innasci oportet quemadmodum visum habentem, quo iudicat bene, et quo secundum veritatem bonum desiderabit, et est bene natus, cui hoc innatum est bene: Quod enim maximum et optimum, et quod ab alio non possibile accipete,", "english": "bring forth grace, but such as are brought forth by grace. For fire does not heat in order to be hot, but because it is hot; nor does a wheel run well in order to be round, but because it is round: so no one acts well in order to receive grace, but because he has received it. For he cannot live justly who has not been justified, nor live at all who has not been made alive; but grace justifies, so that the justified may live justly. Grace, therefore, is first, good works second.\" The same, in On the Faith, to Peter [n21], 18, says that God gave to the intellectual nature, that is, to angels and men, the faculty and the will of knowing and loving him, so that each could both have it and lose it; but if anyone should lose it of his own accord, he could not thereafter take it up again by his own choice, so that it should be his (his to infuse the beginnings of that holy thought, by the gift of gratuitous goodness, into whomever he wished, to be renewed afresh), whose it was, at the very beginning of creation, with no preceding merits, to order wonderfully spirits and bodies, with places and dispositions fitting as he in his wisdom willed. And below, 21, he says: \"That the beginning of good will and thought does not arise in man from himself, but is both prepared and bestowed from above, God clearly shows in this: that neither the devil nor any of his angels, since by the merit of their fall they were thrust down into this lower darkness, could or can take up a good will again. For if it were possible for human nature, after turning away from God and losing goodness of will, to have it again of itself, much more possible would it be for angelic nature to have this, which, the less it is weighed down by the weight of an earthly body, would be the more endowed with this faculty. But God shows whence good will is given to men, which the angels so lost when they had it that, once lost, they could not thereafter have it.\" The same, in City of God 12, 9, proves that if the good angels were first without good will, they could not have had it from themselves; for if they produced it themselves, God not working, they were made better by themselves than by him, which God forbid; and if they could not make themselves better than he had made them (than whom no one makes anything better), then surely they could not have a good will, by which they would be better, except with the aid of the creator at work. But an objection will perhaps be raised from that passage, Ethics 2, 1 and 2 [n22], that moral virtue is generated from similar preceding acts, as justice, temperance and fortitude from acting justly, temperately and bravely; therefore someone can act virtuously without having virtue. Again, it would otherwise seem foolish and vain to seek and desire virtues: for no one can do this except by having them; but it seems superfluous and foolish for anyone to desire and seek what he has. Again, this seems manifest in the arts: for no one has the art of playing the cithara, or of building, unless by first playing or building, as is clear from the Philosopher, Ethics 2, 1, and Metaphysics 9, 14. To this one can reply as the Philosopher replies to a similar question in Ethics 2, 4. For since it had been said earlier that virtue is generated from acts, someone might ask, he says, how we can say that those who do just things must become just, and those who do temperate things temperate? For if they do just and temperate things, they are already just and temperate. And he replies that such persons do not act justly and temperately, but do things just and temperate; and he says that acts are called just and temperate when they are such as a just and temperate person would do. Yet it can also be said, in another way and not improbably, that whoever does such things, and not wholly by chance (as an ox finds a hare or a partridge), does so from some form of virtue, and by a virtue which he has, speaking loosely. For according to the same Philosopher, Ethics 6, last chapter, virtue is twofold, one principal, the other natural; or one acquired, the other innate; and he proves this by common experience, saying: \"For it seems to everyone that each kind of character belongs to us by nature; for in some way we are just, and temperate, and brave, and the rest, straight from birth. For children and beasts have natural states, but without understanding they seem harmful, just as it happens that a strong body moving without sight falls heavily because it lacks sight; so also here. But if the state, being similar, receives understanding, then it will be virtue properly so called.\" And reason proves this: for if a man, because after many painful acts he feels himself strongly inclined to do such things easily and with delight, concludes that he has a moral virtue so inclining him, then if someone is inclined naturally, in a like way, or more strongly, more easily and more delightfully, does he not conclude that he has a natural virtue of this kind? And this virtue, perhaps, as against acquired virtue (which he here calls principal), he placed in the Categories, where he distinguishes them, under the name of disposition, in the first species of quality. These virtues too, not only natural or moral but also intellectual and artistic, the mathematicians [n23] think they can see in the nativities of boys. And so the wise men of old, having diligently investigated and learned the natural aptitude of each boy, would suitably assign each, in accordance with it, to whatever [art] suited. Hence at that time all the arts flourished most excellently among them. So also in Ethics 3, 13, it is written thus: \"One must be born as one having sight, by which he judges well, and by which he will desire the good according to truth; and he is well born to whom this is innate well: for what is greatest and best, and what is not possible to receive from another,", "margins": [{"id": "331E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) probat."}]}, {"anchor": "p332A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p332A", "locator_display": "332A–332E", "source_text": "neque discere; sed quale innatum est, tale habebit, et quod bene et optime hoc innatum esle perfecta et vera erit vtique bona natiuitas. Quare et Aristoteles 5. Polit. 9. recitat Socratem affirmantem naturam producere prauos et meliores disciplina; et addit, Hoc ipsum dicens forte, non male: Contingit enim esse aliquos, quos disciplmari, et fieri studiosos impossibile est. Quapropter et in secret. secret. 3. part. 10. scribit ita; Est consideranda genesis in quibusdam, quia generatus saepe disponitur juxta vim Planetarum, qui sunt in regione suae genescos, et si forte contingat, quod genitores genitum doceant aliquam artium, na•ura superior attrahet eum multoties ad artem sideris conuenientem. Nam simile huic accidit quibusdam hominibus, qui conuenerunt in quadam villa, et hospitati fuerunt apud quendam textorem, cui natus est in illa nocte filius, cuius genesin hospites acceperunt, et ordinauerunt eius Planetas. Fuit ergo eius genesis in Venere, et in Marte, gradu suo existente Geminis cum Libra; sidera vero contraria et pessima nondum fuerunt orta: Ostendit ergo eis genesis, quod Puer\n\nerat futurus sapiens, curialis, velocis manus, boni consilij, diligendus a Regibus: Occultauerunt ergo hoc, coelantes a Patre. Creuit ergo natus in prosperitate, et crediderunt, ac nisi sunt genitores instruere cum aliquam artem de operibus suis, sed nihil potuit ex his addiscere: Verberantes autem ipsum, et flagellantes grauissime, exposuerunt ipsum voluntati suae. Inclinauit ergo se juuehis ad homines possidentes disciplinas, et acquisiuit scientias, et sciuit cursus et tempora supercoelestia, et mores, ac regimina Regum, et ecce factus est bajulus Regis. Vbi et immediate subjungit; Contrarium huic accidit ex mirabilibus operibus et dispositionibus Planetarum, et naturis eorum, illud quod conuenit, vt duobus natis Regis Indiae, facta comparatione ad genesin, sed occultum fuit Regi, Quando ergo creuit vnus puerorum, credidit Rex eum instruere scientijs; Misit ergo eum per Indiam, et per alias Prouincias honorifice, sicut decet filium tanti Regis; sed nihil profuit diligentia Patris, quia non potuit inclinate animum et naturam, nisi ad fabrile artificium. Propter quod turbatus est Rex valde,\n\nconuocauitque sapientes omnes sui Regni, qui requisiti, omnes conueniunt in hoc quod relinqueretur his ad quae natura pueri reducebat ipsum; factum est ergo ita, et multoties accidit huic simile. Quamobrem et Ouidius 1. de vetula refert ita: Tempus erat cum Philosophos Respublica quondam / Quaerebat magnis in sumtibus, vtilitati / Communi vigilans, et eos tractabat honeste / Vt sibi consulerent summis in rebus agendis. / Tunc vesum sentoribus est, in qualibet vrbe / Vt pueros dociles ex pluribus ingeniosis / Eligerent mittendos ad gymnasia, causa / Discendi, quibus ad victum stipendia grata\n\n/ Prastarent vrbs quaeque suis. Et ibi faciebant / Discerni per iudicium Pysiognomicorum, / Quae quibus ars discenda foret, sic ars sua cuique / Assignabatur, sic nissae quilibet arti / Semper adhaerebat, et in vna quemlibet esse / Perfectum sat erat, nec eum mutare licebat. / Tunc viguere artes, perfecte cognita quaeque / Tunc erat, et poterat perfecte posteritati / Tradi, scribendisque libris per magna vacabat: / Tunc matheses solae doctrinae nomine dignae / Sectores habuere suos, tunc vtilitatis / Quaeque quid afferret clarebat apud studiosos.\n\n/ Potest igitur homo ex virtutibus talibus sibi innatis talia operari, sed non chare, nec grate modo praedicto: Charitas enim et gratia non sunt nobis innatae: Eramus enim natura filij irae ad Ephes. 2. Et per haec patet ad obiecta, et maxime ad primum et vltimum obiectorum; Secundum vero non procedit: Licet enim aliquis habeat virtutem, potest desiderare virtutem dupliciter, scilicet vt sibi plenius augeatur, sicut Apostoli a Domino petierunt, Adauge nobis fidem Luc. 17. vel vt stabiliter conseruetur iuxta illud Psalmi 15. Conserua me, Domine, et 67. Confirma hoc Deus quod operatus es in nobis; et sic respondet Ansel. De concordia vbi prius. Si autem adhuc aliquis instantius vrgeat, supponendo, quod non quilibet", "english": "nor to learn; but such as it is innate, such he will have it; and for this to be innate well and in the best way will be, certainly, a perfect and true good birth.\" Hence also Aristotle, Politics 5, 9, reports Socrates as asserting that nature produces the depraved and the better by discipline; and he adds: \"Perhaps in saying this he did not speak badly: for it happens that there are some whom it is impossible to discipline and make studious.\" Hence also in the Secret of Secrets, part 3, 10, he writes thus [n24]: \"In certain cases the horoscope must be considered, because one who is begotten is often disposed according to the power of the planets which are in the region of his horoscope; and if it happens that the parents teach the child some one of the arts, a higher nature will often draw him to the art that suits his star. For something like this happened to certain men who came together in a village and lodged with a weaver, to whom a son was born that night; the guests took his horoscope and set out his planets. His horoscope was, then, in Venus and in Mars, its degree being in Gemini with Libra; the contrary and worst stars had not yet risen. The horoscope showed them, then, that the boy\n\nwas to be wise, courtly, quick of hand, of good counsel, and to be loved by kings; so they concealed this, hiding it from the father. The boy grew up in prosperity, and his parents believed they should, and strove to, instruct him in some art from their own trades, but he could learn nothing from them. So, beating him and scourging him most severely, they abandoned him to his own will. The youth therefore turned to men who possessed the disciplines, and acquired the sciences, and learned the courses and times of the heavenly bodies, and the customs and governments of kings; and behold, he became the king's tutor [n25]. Where he immediately adds: The contrary of this happened, from the wonderful works and dispositions of the planets and their natures, in what befell the two sons of the King of India, when comparison was made with the horoscope, but it was hidden from the King. When one of the boys grew up, therefore, the King believed he should instruct him in the sciences. He sent him, therefore, through India and through other provinces with honor, as befits the son of so great a king; but the father's diligence profited nothing, because he could not incline his mind and nature except to the smith's craft. At this the King was greatly troubled,\n\nand he summoned all the wise men of his kingdom, who, when asked, all agreed that he should be left to those things to which the boy's nature was leading him back; and so it was done, and many times something like this has happened.\" Therefore Ovid also, in On the Old Woman, book 1 [n26], reports as follows:\n\nThere was a time when the commonwealth once sought philosophers\nat great expense, watchful for the common good,\nand treated them honorably, that they might counsel it\nin the highest affairs of state.\nThen it seemed good to the elders, in every city,\nto choose docile boys from among many gifted ones\nand send them to the schools for the sake of\nlearning, to whom each city would furnish for its own\nwelcome stipends for their living. And there they had it\n\ndetermined by the judgment of the physiognomers\nwhich art each should learn; so each was assigned his art,\nso each, intent upon his art [n27],\nalways clung to it, and it was enough for each to be\nperfect in one, nor was it lawful to change him.\nThen the arts flourished, then everything was perfectly known,\nand could be perfectly handed on to posterity,\nand there was great leisure for the writing of books:\nthen the mathematical sciences alone, worthy of the name of learning,\nhad their followers, then what use each would bring\nwas clear among students.\n\nA man can therefore do such things out of such virtues innate in him, but not lovingly, nor graciously [n28], in the manner stated. For charity and grace are not innate in us: for \"we were by nature children of wrath,\" Ephesians 2. And from this the answer to the objections is clear, especially to the first and the last of them. The second does not go through: for although someone has virtue, he can desire virtue in two ways, namely either that it be more fully increased in him, as the Apostles asked of the Lord, \"Increase our faith,\" Luke 17, or that it be steadily preserved, according to that of Psalm 15, \"Preserve me, Lord,\" and 67, \"Confirm, O God, what you have wrought in us.\" And so Anselm replies in On Concord, where above. But if anyone presses still harder, supposing that not everyone", "margins": [{"id": "332E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Eph 2"}, {"id": "332E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Lk 17; Ps 15 [16]; Ps 67 [68]."}]}, {"anchor": "p333A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p333A", "locator_display": "333A–333E", "source_text": "habet virtutem quamlibet naturalem, vel si habeat, tollat Omnipotens sibi vnam, puta artem citharizandi, et adhuc potest addiscere, citharizare, et non nisi artificialiter operando, quia si inartificialiter, et multiplicet talia opera, ipsa generabunt similem habitum in eo, vt patet 2. Eth. vbi prius; non ergo acquiret artem, sed magis inertiam et errorem. Potest ergo non habens artem, artificialiter operati; quare et carens virtutibus, virtuose. Dicendum quod ad hoc quod talis citharizet exiliter quantumcunque, habet in anima sua ex propria inuentione, aut imaginatione vel exauditione et aliquali doctrina, aliquod idolum, et aliqualem similitudinem citharizationis, quae ipsum aliqualiter dirigit citharizando; aliter enim non magis a proposito tangeret vnam chordam quam aliam, nec magis a proposito citharizaret quam saltaret sed forsan pure casualiter, sicut bos cornibus citharam ventilando, et ex tali tactione chordarum quantum cunque multiplicata, nunquam fieret citharoedus. Dico ergo quod talis ex propria imaginatione vel auditione alterius habet aliquam speciem et formam citharizationis a qua sua citharizatio procedit, et per vsum crescit continue ad perfectum; et haec videtur responsio\n\nPhilos. 9. Met. 14. dicentis; Videtur impossibile esse citharoedum esse, qui non citharizauit: nam ad discens citharizare citharizando addiscit. Vnde sophisticus elenchus factus est, quia non habens quis scientiam, faciet cuius est scientia; addiscens enim non habet scientiam; et respondet; Sed quia, inquit, eius quod fit, factum est aliquid, et totaliter eius quod mouetur, motum est aliquid; palam autem in his quae de motu, hoc et discentem necesse habere aliquid scientiae forsan; vbi textus Auerrois dicit expressius et sine forte, et addit; Non ergo mouetur aliquod ad aliud, nisi de illo ad quod mouetur in se; vbi dicit Auerroes; Omne quod generatur et fit aliquid, impossibile est hoc fieri nisi habeat aliquid, ex eo quod habebit in postremo: verbi gratia, quoniam impossibile est vt citharizet, nisi qui habet aliquid de arte citharizandi; et ideo asinus non addiscit citharizare, neque homo qui non est innatus citharizare. De charitate autem et gratia non possumus habere minimam scintillam a nobis, nec ab aliqua creatura, sicut superius est ostensum; quare nec aliquid grate facere propter Deum; quapropter\n\nnec aliquid mereri ab eo, nisi prius cam dederit nobis gratis. Adhuc autem forsitan quisnam dicet, quod gratia multum facilitat hominem ad implendum Dei mandata, et dicitur necessaria homini hac de causa; sed tunc posset homo sine gratia, licet difficilius haec implere contra priora. Cur etiam non possent Angeli, mole corporis deprimentis nullatenus aggrauati sine gratia facillime haec implere, contra praemissa? Amplius autem et iste est Pelagij filius in hac parte. Ipse enim dixit gratiam ad hoc dari hominibus, vt quae facere per liberum iubentur arbitrium, facilius possent implere per gratiam, sicut de ipso recitat August. de haeres. vbi prius, primi contra Pelagium et Caelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali, 7. et 23. de verbis Apostoli sermone 13. et alijs locis multis. Item haec haeresis fuit damnata solenniter in Concilo Mileuitano, cui interfuit Augustinus, contra Pelagianos, sicut recitatur in Canon. de Consecrat. dist. 4. ca. vlt. in haec verba; Placuit, vt quicun que dixerit ideo nobis gratiam iustificationis\n\ndari, vt quod facere per liberum iubemur arbitrium, facilius possimus implere per gratiam, tanquam et si gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed tamen possimus etiam sine illa implere mandata diuina, anathema sit. Et hoc idem recitat sanctus Prosper in libro suo de praedicatoribus gratiae Dei contra Cassianum 21. vna cum ratione Pontificum, propter quam illud dictum Pelagij tanquam haereticum damnauerunt, at que inquit; In illius damnatae sententiae foueam cadat, qua dicitur a Deo nobis gratiam iustificationis dari, vt quod facere per liberum iubemur arbitrium, facilius possimus implere per gratiā; tanquam etsi gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed tamen possemus etiam sine illa implere diuina mandata; quod et Catholici Pontifices dignum anathemate censuerunt. Vtendum est nobis eo, quo vsi sunt testimonio dicentes; De fructibus enim mandatorum Dominus loquebatur, vbi non ait; Sine me difficilius potestis facere, sed ait; Sine me nihil potestis facere. Adhuc vicarius Pelagij forsitan respondebit, et dicet, ideo gratiam esse necessariā ad implendum diuina mandata, quia per ipsam\n\ndiuina mādata reuelantur hominibus, et boni ac mali discretio demonstratur; qua reuelatione et discretione per gratiā habita, potest homo ea implere viribus propriae voluntatis: Sed istud reuincitur per praemissa. Rursum et secundū istam sententiam; Ante legem datam hominibus vel Angelis, gratia non fuisset eis necessaria ad Deum super omnia gratuito diligendum; vel si nunc legis potētia tolleretur, et homo lege naturali naturalis rationis iudicio traderetur, gratia Dei nullatenus indigeret, quorum opposita superius patuerunt. Adhuc autem et hoc dato, Pelagij error redit. Augustinus namque primo contra Pelagium et Caelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali, secundo, loquens de Pelagio, scribit ita; Gratiam Dei et adiutorium, quo adiuuamur a Domino ad non peccandum, aut in natura et libero ponit arbitrio, aut in lege aut doctrina; vt videlicet cum adiuuat Deus hominem vt declinet a malo, et faciat bonum, reuelanco, et ostendendo quid fieri debeat, adiuuare credatur,", "english": "has every natural virtue, or, if he does, that the Omnipotent takes one away from him, say the art of playing the cithara; and yet he can still learn to play, and only by acting artfully, because if he acts inartfully, and multiplies such acts, they will generate a similar habit in him, as is clear from Ethics 2, where above; so he will not acquire the art, but rather ineptitude and error. One who does not have the art, therefore, can act artfully; and so one lacking the virtues can act virtuously. To this it must be said that, for such a person to play the cithara, however thinly, he has in his soul, from his own invention, or imagination, or hearing and some instruction, some image, and some likeness of cithara-playing, which in some measure guides him as he plays; for otherwise he would not touch one string rather than another on purpose, nor would he play the cithara on purpose rather than dance, but perhaps quite by chance, as an ox tossing a cithara about with its horns; and from such touching of strings, however much multiplied, he would never become a cithara player. I say, then, that such a person, from his own imagination or the hearing of another, has some species and form of cithara-playing from which his playing proceeds, and which through use grows continually to perfection; and this seems to be the answer\n\nof the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9, 14, who says: \"It seems impossible to be a cithara player, one who has never played; for the learner of playing learns by playing.\" Hence this became a sophistical refutation, namely that one who does not have knowledge will do what belongs to knowledge; for a learner does not have knowledge. And he replies: \"But because,\" he says, \"of what is made, something has been made, and, in general, of what is moved, something has been moved; and it is clear in what is said about motion that the learner too must perhaps have something of knowledge.\" Where the text of Averroes says it more expressly and without \"perhaps,\" and adds: \"Nothing, therefore, is moved toward another unless it has in itself something of that toward which it is moved.\" Where Averroes says: \"Everything that is generated and becomes something, it is impossible for this to come about unless it have something of what it will have in the end: for example, since it is impossible for anyone to play the cithara unless he has something of the art of playing; and therefore an ass does not learn to play the cithara, nor does a man who is not born apt for playing.\" But of charity and grace we cannot have the least spark from ourselves, nor from any creature, as was shown above; so we cannot do anything graciously for God's sake; and therefore\n\nneither can we merit anything from him, unless he first gives it to us freely. But someone will perhaps still say that grace greatly makes it easier for man to fulfil God's commands, and is called necessary to man for this reason; but that man could do these things without grace, though with more difficulty, contrary to what went before. Why, too, could not the angels, in no way weighed down by the mass of a pressing body, fulfil these things most easily without grace, contrary to what has been laid down? Moreover, this man also is a son of Pelagius in this respect. For Pelagius himself said that grace is given to men for this purpose, that what they are commanded to do through free choice they might fulfil more easily through grace, as Augustine reports of him in On Heresies, where above; in book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, 7 and 23; in sermon 13 On the Words of the Apostle; and in many other places. Again, this heresy was solemnly condemned in the Council of Milevis, at which Augustine was present, against the Pelagians, as is reported in the canon De consecratione, distinction 4, last chapter, in these words: \"It was resolved that whoever says that the grace of justification is given to us for this reason\n\nthat what we are commanded to do through free choice we may fulfil more easily through grace, as though, even if grace were not given, we could still fulfil the divine commands even without it, though not indeed easily, let him be anathema.\" The holy Prosper reports the same in his book On the Preachers of the Grace of God, against Cassian [n29], 21, together with the reasoning of the Pontiffs on account of which they condemned that saying of Pelagius as heretical; and he says: \"Let him fall into the pit of that condemned opinion according to which it is said that the grace of justification is given to us by God so that what we are commanded to do through free choice we may fulfil more easily through grace; as though, even if grace were not given, we could still fulfil the divine commands even without it, though not indeed easily; which the Catholic Pontiffs judged worthy of anathema. We must use the testimony which they used, saying: The Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commands, where he does not say, 'Without me you can do it with more difficulty,' but says, 'Without me you can do nothing.'\" Still, Pelagius's deputy will perhaps reply and say that grace is necessary for fulfilling the divine commands for this reason, that through it\n\nthe divine commands are revealed to men, and the discernment of good and evil is shown; and that, this revelation and discernment having been obtained through grace, man can fulfil them by the powers of his own will. But this is refuted by what has been set out. Again, according to that opinion, before the law was given to men or angels, grace would not have been necessary to them for loving God freely above all things; or if the power of the law were now removed, and man were handed over to the natural law, to the judgment of natural reason, he would have no need of the grace of God; the opposites of which were shown above. Moreover, even granting this, the error of Pelagius returns. For Augustine, in book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, chapter 2, speaking of Pelagius, writes thus: \"The grace of God, and the help by which we are helped by the Lord not to sin, he places either in nature and free choice, or in the law or teaching; so that, that is, when God helps man to turn away from evil and do good, he is believed to help by revealing and showing what ought to be done,", "margins": [{"id": "333A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) adhuc"}, {"id": "333B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosopher"}, {"id": "333B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Averroes"}, {"id": "333C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine"}, {"id": "333D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Prosper"}, {"id": "333D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) Ad haec."}]}, {"anchor": "p334A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p334A", "locator_display": "334A–334E", "source_text": "non etiam cooperando, et dilectionem inspirando, vt illud quod faciendum esse agnouerit, faciat. Et infra 7. recitat verba Pelagij sub hac forma; Adiuuat nos per doctrinam et reuelationem suam, dum cordis nostri oculos aperit, dum nobis, ne praesentibus occupemur, futura demonstrat, dum diaboli pandit insidias, dum nos multiformi et ineffabili dono gratiae coelestis illuminat; qui hoc dicit, gratiam tibi negare videtur, an et liberum hominis arbitrium et Dei gratiam confitetur? Et infra 8. Hoc, in quit, est gratiam Dei ponere in lege aut doctrina. Hic itaque apparet hanc cum gratiam confiteri, qua demonstrat et reuelat Deus, quid agere debeamus, non qua donat atque adiuuat vt agamus, cum ad hoc potius valeat legis agnitio, si gratiae desit opitulatio, vt fiat mandati praeuaricatio. Vbi enim non est lex, ait Apostolus, nec praeuaricatio; et concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret; Non concupisces. Ac per hoc vsque adeo aliud est lex, aliud gratia, vt lex non solum nihil prosit, verum etiam plurimum obsit, nisi adiuuet gratia, et hoc ostendatur legis vtilitas, quoniam\n\nquos facit praeuaticationis reos, cogit confugere ad gratiam liberandos, et vt concupiscentias malas superent adiuuandos: Iubet enim magis, quam iuuat; docet morbum esse, non sanat; Imo ab ea potius, quod non sanatur, augetur; vt attentius et solicitius gratiae medicina quaeratur, quia litera occidit, spiritus autem viuificat. Idem de gratia et libero arbitrio 25. Quid est, inquit, quod vanissimi homines, et peruet sissimi Pelagiani, legem dicunt esse Dei gratiam, qua iuuamur ad non peccandum? Quid est quod miseri dicunt, qui sine vlla dubitatione tanto Apostolo contradicunt? Ille dicit peccatum vires aduersus hominem accepisse per legem, et eum per mandatum, quamuis sanctum, et iustum, et bonum, tamen occidere, et per bonum operati ei mortem, de qua non liberaretur, nisi viuificaret cum spiritus, quem litera occiderat, sicut alio loco dicit, Litera occidit, spiritus autem viuificat; et isti indo ciles contra lucem Dei caeci, et contra vocem Dei surdi, occidentem literam viuificare dicunt, et viuificanti spiritui contradicunt. Et infra 28. Quis ita scit surdus aduersus Apostolicas\n\nvoces? quis ita desipiat, imo insaniat nesciens quid loquatur, vt audeat dicere legem esse gratiam, cum clamet, qui sciebat quid loqueretur, Qui in lege iustificamini a gratia excedistis? Idem adhuc de spiritu et litera 2. sic ait, Illis acerrime ac vehementissime retistendum est qui putant sine a diutorio Dei per seipsam vim voluntatis humanae, vel iustitiam posse perficere, vel ad eam tendendo proficere: et cum vrgeri caeperint, quomodo id praesumant asserere fieri sine ope diuina, reprimunt se, nec hanc vocem audent emittere, quoniam vident quam sit impia et non ferenda; sed aiunt, ideo ista sine ope diuina non fieri, quia et hominem Deus creauit cum libero voluntatis arbitrio, et dando praecepta ipse docet, quomodo homini sit viuendum, et in eo vti que a diuuat, quod docendo ignorantiam aufert, vt sciat homo in operibus suis, quid euitare, et quid appetere debeat, quo per liberum arbitrium naturaliter in situm viam demonstratam ingrediens, continentur, et pie, et iuste viuendo ad beatam candem que aeternam vitam peruenire mereatur. Nos autem dicimus humanam voluntatem\n\nsic diuinitus adiuuari ad faciendam iustitiam, vt praeter quod creatus est homo cum libero voluntatis arbitrio, praeterque doctrinam qua ei praecipitur, quemadmodum viuere debeat, accipiat Spiritum Sanctum, quo fiat in animo delectatio, dilectioque summ: illius, atque incommutabilis boni quod Deus est; etiam nunc cum adhuc per fidem ambulatur, nondum per speciem, vt hac sibi velut arra data gratuiti muneris, inardescat in haerere Creatori, atque inflammetur accedere ad participationem illius veri luminis, vt ex illo ei bene sit, a quo habet vt sit. Nam neque liberum arbitrium quicquam, nisi ad peccandum, valet, si lateat veritatis via; et cum id quod agendum, et quo intendendum est coeperit non latere, nisi etiam delectet, et ametur, non agitur, non suscipitur, non bene viuitur; vt autem diligatur, charitas Dei diffunditur in cordibus nostris, non per liberum arbitrium quod surgit ex nobis, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis. Adhuc autem et Concilium superius allegatum, sicut recitatur in canone vbi prius, cap. penult. ita dicit, Quisquis dixerit eandem gratiam Dei per\n\nIesum Christum Dominum nostrum propter hoc tantum nos adiuuare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsum nobis reuelatur et aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, vt sciamus quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis praestari, vt quod faciendum cognouerimus, etiam facere debeamus, aut valeamus, anathema sit. Si quis autem in insaniam tantam proruperit, vt dicat gratiam Dei necessariam homini ad implenda diuina mandata esse liberum arbitrium a Deo homini gratis datum, a Pelagiani voragine pelagi absorbetur. Constat enim ex autoritatibus Augustini praemissis, hanc esse Pelagianae vesaniae vanitatem; qui et 1. contra Pelagium et Coelestium de gratia Christi, et de peccato originali 2. Cum, inquit, Pelagius tria constituat, atque distinguat, quibus diuina mandata dicit impleri, possibilitatem,", "english": "and not also by cooperating and inspiring love, so that what he has recognized must be done, he may do.\" And below, 7, he recites the words of Pelagius in this form: \"He helps us by his teaching and his revelation, while he opens the eyes of our heart, while he shows us things to come so that we may not be taken up with the present, while he lays bare the snares of the devil, while he enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace. Does one who says this seem to deny grace to you? Or does he confess both the free choice of man and the grace of God?\" And below, 8: \"This,\" he says, \"is to place the grace of God in law or teaching.\" Here, then, it appears that Pelagius confesses that grace by which God shows and reveals what we ought to do, not that by which he gives and helps so that we do it, since to this end knowledge of the law serves rather (if the aid of grace is lacking) that transgression of the command may result. \"For where there is no law,\" says the Apostle, \"there is no transgression\"; and \"I did not know concupiscence unless the law said: You shall not covet.\" And on this account the law is so far one thing and grace another that the law not only does no good, but does very much harm, unless grace helps; and in this the usefulness of the law is shown, since\n\nthose whom it makes guilty of transgression it forces to take refuge in grace, to be set free, and to be helped to overcome evil desires. For it commands rather than helps; it teaches that there is a sickness, it does not heal it; indeed, by it the sickness is rather increased, in that it is not healed; so that the medicine of grace may be sought more attentively and anxiously, because the letter kills, but the spirit gives life. The same, in On Grace and Free Choice, 25: \"What is it,\" he says, \"that the emptiest of men, and the most perverse Pelagians, say that the law is the grace of God by which we are helped not to sin? What is it that these wretches say, who without any hesitation contradict so great an Apostle? He says that sin took strength against man through the law, and that it kills him through the commandment, though holy and just and good, and that through what is good it works death in him, from which he would not be freed unless the Spirit gave life to him whom the letter had killed, as he says in another place: The letter kills, but the spirit gives life; and these unteachable men, blind to the light of God and deaf to the voice of God, say that the killing letter gives life, and contradict the life-giving Spirit.\" And below, 28: \"Who is so deaf [n30] to the Apostle's words?\n\nWho would be so foolish, or rather so mad, not knowing what he says, as to dare to say that the law is grace, when he cries out who knew what he was saying: 'You who are justified in the law have fallen from grace'?\" The same again, in On the Spirit and the Letter, 2, says: \"Those must be resisted most sharply and vehemently who think that the power of the human will by itself, without God's help, can either bring justice to perfection or advance in it by striving toward it. And when they begin to be pressed how they presume to assert that this happens without divine aid, they check themselves and do not dare to utter this saying, since they see how impious and intolerable it is; but they say that these things do not happen without divine aid for this reason, that God created man with free choice of the will, and by giving precepts himself teaches how man should live, and in this at any rate he helps, that by teaching he takes away ignorance, so that man may know in his works what he should avoid and what he should seek, so that, entering upon the way shown to him through the free choice naturally implanted in him, and living continently, piously and justly, he may deserve to attain the blessed and eternal life. But we say that the human will\n\nis so divinely helped to do justice that, besides the fact that man was created with free choice of will, and besides the teaching by which he is commanded how he ought to live, he receives the Holy Spirit, by whom delight arises in the soul, and love of that highest and unchangeable good which is God, even now, while we still walk by faith and not yet by sight, so that, having this given him as a kind of pledge of a gratuitous gift, he may burn to cling to the Creator, and be inflamed to come to a share in that true light, so that it may be well with him from him from whom he has his being. For free choice avails for nothing except sinning if the way of truth is hidden; and when what is to be done, and what is to be aimed at, has ceased to be hidden, unless it also delights and is loved, it is not done, not undertaken, not lived well; but that it may be loved, the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, not through free choice, which arises from ourselves, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.\" Moreover the Council cited above, as is reported in the canon where above, next-to-last chapter, says thus: \"Whoever says that the same grace of God, through\n\nJesus Christ our Lord, helps us not to sin only for this reason, that through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, so that we may know what we ought to seek and what to avoid, but that it is not through it given to us that what we have recognized must be done we also ought to do, or be able to do [n31], let him be anathema.\" But if anyone should break out into such madness as to say that the grace of God, necessary to man for fulfilling the divine commands, is free choice freely given to man by God, he is swallowed up by the whirlpool of the Pelagian sea [n32]. For it is clear from the authorities of Augustine set out above that this is the vanity of Pelagian folly; and Augustine also, in book 1 of Against Pelagius and Caelestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, 2, says: \"Since Pelagius sets out and distinguishes three things by which he says the divine commands are fulfilled, possibility,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p335A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p335A", "locator_display": "335A–335C", "source_text": "volūtatem, actionem; possibilitatem scilicet qua potest homo esse iustus; voluntatem qua vult esse iustus; actionem qua iustus est; horum trium primum, id est, possibilitatem datam confitetur a creatore naturae, nec esse in nostra potestate, sed eam nos habere si nolimus; duo vero reliqua, id est, voluntatem et actionem nostram esse asserit, atque ita nobistribuit, vt nobis non esse, nisi a nobis contendat. Ecce patenter quid Pelagius gratiam Dei vocat, possibilitatem videlicet naturalem a creatore naturae, beneficio creationis gratuito nobis datam. Hanc etiam haeresin recitat Augustinus de natura et gratia 53. et de gratia et libero arbitrio 28. et eam redarguit hic et ibi. Iste quoque sic errans incidit in haeresin Pelagij supradictam, quae ponit hominem per liberum suum arbitrium posse implere diuina mandata, qui et potest faciliter corrigi per praemissa. Praeterea dicit Apostolus 1. ad Cor. 15. Abundantius illis omnibus laboraui, non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum: Et quomodo non ipse, sed gratia, si ipse vel liberum eius arbitrium gratia nuncupetur. Adhuc autem Pelagiani quidam moderni\n\nrespondent, dicendo, quod homo ex naturalibus suis puris potest diligere Deum super omnia gratis propter seipsum, secundum substantiam ipsam actus, non tamen meritorie, vel saltem non meritorie de condigno, licet forsan de congruo, sine gratia comitante: Sed istud non congruit rationi, et refellitur per praemissa. Praeterea, secundum istos, habens gratiam diligendo Deum, et seruando eius consilia ac mandata potest mereri etiam de condigno; cur ergo si carens gratia faciat pro Deo similia vel maiora aeque recta intentione vel rectiori, aeque sincero affectu vel sinceriori, aeque grato amore vel etiam gratiori, non similiter vel magis meretur? Nam quantum est ex parte operum vel operantium, opus huius est aeque bonum cum opere illius vel melius; quare et aeque acceptabile pro solutione antiqui debiti pro peccato, et pro redemptione animae suae, et pro mercatione regni coelestis. Si ergo Deus pretium huius accepret, et aeque iustum vel iustius pretium illius repellat, est personarum acceptor, nec iudicat aequitatem. Item secundum omnes Catholicos, imo et secundum inimicos gratiae ipsos\n\nPelagianos haereticos, gratia multum alleuiat cuiuslibet operis grauitatem: Reddit enim ingum Domini suaue, et onus eius leue. Carens ergo gratia, similia operans, cum habente difficilius operatur; plus ergo meretur. Dicit enim Philos. 2. Eth. 3. circa difficile autem semper ars sit et virtus; etenim bene, melius in hoc; id est, quod sine difficultate est bene, in hac est melius; et 3. Eth. 18. probat, quod fortitudo magis consistit circa timores, quam audacias, et quod haec laudabilior est quam illa, et secundū quosdam, quam temperantia, per hoc quod difficilius est tristia sustinere, quam a delectabilibus abstinere; et 5i. libri 2o. Pessimus, inquit, qui ad seipsum et ad amicos vtitur malitia; optimus autem non qui ad seipsum virtute, sed qui ad alterum; hoc enim opus difficile. Venerabilis quoque Beda 2. de Temporibus 1. ad hoc idem allegat Hieronymum super Euangelia ponentem nuptias in 30. fructu, et viduas in 60. hac de causa: Quanto, inquit, maior est difficultas ab expertae quondam voluptatis illecebris abstinere, tanto maius et praemium. Amplius autem tunc carens gratia, posset diligere Deum", "english": "will, action (possibility, that is, by which a man can be just; will, by which he wills to be just; action, by which he is just), the first of these three, that is, possibility, he confesses to be given by the creator of nature, and not to be in our power, but that we have it even if we do not wish; but the remaining two, that is, will and action, he asserts to be ours, and so ascribes them to us that he maintains they are for us only from ourselves. Behold plainly what Pelagius calls the grace of God: natural possibility, namely, from the creator of nature, given us by the benefit of creation, freely.\" Augustine also reports this heresy in On Nature and Grace, 53, and in On Grace and Free Choice, 28, and refutes it here and there. This man too, erring in this way, falls into the aforesaid heresy of Pelagius, which holds that man through his own free choice can fulfil the divine commands, and he too can easily be corrected by what has been set out. Besides, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15: \"I have labored more abundantly than all of them; yet not I, but the grace of God with me.\" And how \"not I, but grace,\" if he himself, or his free choice, is called grace? Moreover, certain modern Pelagians\n\nreply, saying that a man out of his purely natural powers can love God above all things freely, for his own sake, as to the very substance of the act, though not meritoriously, or at least not meritoriously by condign merit, though perhaps by congruous merit, without accompanying grace. But this does not accord with reason, and is refuted by what has been set out. Besides, according to them, one who has grace, by loving God and keeping his counsels and commands, can merit even condignly; why then, if one lacking grace does for God similar or greater things, with an equally right intention or a righter one, an equally sincere affection or a more sincere, an equally gracious love or an even more gracious, does he not merit similarly or more? For as far as concerns the works or those who work, the work of the one lacking grace [n33] is as good as the work of the one who has it, or better; hence also as acceptable for the payment of the ancient debt for sin, and for the redemption of his soul, and for the purchase of the heavenly kingdom. If, then, God accepts the price of the one who has grace and rejects the equally just or more just price of the other, he is a respecter of persons, and does not judge with equity. Again, according to all Catholics, and even according to the enemies of grace, the heretical Pelagians themselves,\n\ngrace greatly lightens the burden of any work: for it makes the yoke of the Lord sweet, and his burden light. One who lacks grace, then, doing similar things, works with more difficulty than one who has it; he therefore merits more. For the Philosopher says, in Ethics 2, 3: art and virtue are always concerned with what is difficult; \"for the good is better in this\"; that is, what is good without difficulty is better in difficulty. And in Ethics 3, 18 he proves that fortitude consists more in fears than in acts of daring, and that this is more praiseworthy than that [n34], and, according to some, than temperance, in that it is harder to endure sorrows than to abstain from pleasures. And in the fifth book, chapter 2: \"The worst,\" he says, \"is he who uses wickedness toward himself and toward his friends; but the best is not he who uses virtue toward himself, but toward another; for this is a difficult work.\" The venerable Bede also, in On Times 2, 1, for this same point cites Jerome on the Gospels, who places marriage at the thirtyfold fruit and widows at the sixtyfold, for this reason: \"The greater the difficulty,\" he says, \"of abstaining from the enticements of a pleasure once experienced, the greater also the reward.\" Moreover, one lacking grace could then love God…", "margins": [{"id": "335A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) gratis"}, {"id": "335C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosopher"}, {"id": "335C·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) delectationibus."}]}, {"anchor": "p335D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p335D", "locator_display": "335D–335E", "source_text": "ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et ex tota virtute, et mente finaliter propter ipsum: et proximum, sicut seipsum similiter propter Deum, et caetera praecepta atque consilia in omnibus obseruare; quare et esse in statu salutis, finaliter que saluari secundum praemissa et contra praemissa: Sola nam que Dei gratia efficit Dei filios et amicos, sicut priora testantur; dicitque Propheta. Qui coronat te misericordia et miserationibus, Psal. 102. Et Apostolus magis plane, Gratia autem Dei vita aeterna ad Rom. 6. quod et tenet fides Ecclesiae generalis. Alij adhuc fingunt, quod homo sine gratia ex seipso potest perficere diuina mandata secundum substantiam operis, non tamen secundum intentionem mandantis, quae est quod fiant in gratia: sed horum fictio confringetur vt aliae praecedentes. Istud quoque videtur mirabile, quia respiciendo vetus Testamentum et nonum, et omnes Doctores et expositores eorum, non apparet aliud esse de intentione mandantis, nisi gratis haec facere propter Deum; et co ipso videtur eis, quod talis sit in gratia, scilicet arguendo a posteriori ad prius, et ab effectu ad suum efficiens;\n\net eodem modo omnes Doctores, et praedicatores veteres, et moderni, praedicando et docendo populum Dei viam salutis, nihil aliud praedicant, nisi quod gratis propter Deum faciant cius mandata, et consilia; nec dicunt, faciatis haec in gratia; imo dicunt, vt videtur, quod eo ipso, quod haec sic faciant, gratiam Dei habent, illam scilicet de qua loquor, quae gratificat nos ad vitam, velut radicem a qua pullulant isti rami. Et huius contrarium non videtur mihi sine periculo praedicandum, scilicet quod licet quis diligat Deum gratis ex toto corde etc. et exerceat omnia opera pietatis erga proximum propter Deum, et sustineat propter eum omnia poenalia et aduersa perseueranter vs que ad finem, et tunc ardentissimo et purissimo Dei amore, propter defensionem legis Dei, morte durissima consummetur, adhuc tradetur morti secundae, et tormentis infernalibus sine fine. Praedicent hoc qui velint, ego non auderem talia praedicare, ne forte cum alijs praedicarem, ipse reprobus efficerer, dum spem piorum subruerem,", "english": "…with his whole heart, and with his whole soul, and with his whole strength, and mind, finally for his sake; and to love the neighbor as himself, likewise for God's sake, and to observe the other precepts and counsels in all things. Therefore he would also be in the state of salvation, and finally be saved, according to the premises and against the premises [n35]. For God's grace alone makes children and friends of God, as the earlier arguments attest; and the Prophet says, \"Who crowns you with mercy and compassion,\" Ps 102 [103]; and the Apostle more plainly, \"But the grace of God is eternal life,\" Rom 6, which the faith of the universal Church also holds. Others still contrive that a man without grace can of himself perfect the divine commands according to the substance of the work, though not according to the intention of the one commanding, which is that they be done in grace; but the fiction of these will be shattered like the earlier ones. This too seems astonishing: looking to the Old Testament and the New, and to all their Doctors and expositors, it does not appear that the intention of the one commanding is anything other than that they do these things freely for God's sake [n36]; and by that very fact it seems to them that such a person is in grace, namely arguing from the posterior to the prior, and from the effect to its efficient cause; and in the same way all Doctors, and preachers ancient and modern, preaching and teaching the people of God the way of salvation, preach nothing else than that they do his commands and counsels freely for God's sake. Nor do they say, \"Do these things in grace\"; rather they say, as it seems, that by the very fact that they do these things in this way, they have God's grace, namely that grace of which I speak, which makes us acceptable unto life, like the root from which these branches sprout. And the contrary of this does not seem to me to be preachable without danger: namely that although someone loves God freely with his whole heart etc., and exercises all the works of piety toward the neighbor for God's sake, and endures for his sake all penalties and adversities, persevering to the end, and then, with the most ardent and purest love of God, for the defense of God's law, is consummated by a most harsh death, yet he will be handed over to the second death, and to infernal torments without end. Let those preach this who wish; I would not dare to preach such things, lest perhaps, preaching with the others, I myself be made a reprobate, while I undermined the hope of the pious,", "margins": [{"id": "335D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Prophet. Apostle."}]}, {"anchor": "p336A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p336A", "locator_display": "336A–336C", "source_text": "et multorum refrigescere facerem Charitatem. Ecce quam expressa sunt ad hoc testimonia veritatis; Ecce testimonium Ioelis 2. Quicun que inuocauerit nomen Domini saluus erit; quod et Apostolus ad Rom. 10. contestatur; Et Luc. 10. quaesiuit quidam a Domino, Magister, quid faciendo vitam aeternam habebo? At ille dixit, In lege quid scriptum est? ille respondit, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo etc. et proximum tuum sicut te; dixitque illi, recte respondisti, haec fac et viues. Si tamen potuisset haec fecisse sine gratia gratificante ad vitam, non fuit vera ista doctrina veritatis; Non enim sequitur, Haec fac, etiam perseueranter vsque ad finem, ergo viues; hoc enim posset facere sine gratia, sine qua vtique nullus viuet; Et si tu dicas, quod Saluator intellexit, quod haec faceret in gratia; cum ergo ille modus faciendi sit magis necessarius quam ipsum factum, nec est homini per se notus, nec ipse docendo, et praecipiendo istum modum expressit, videtur quod talis doctrina sit nimium diminuta, et quod inijciat hominibus laqueum, et eos in damnationis aeternae periculum introducat. Tacet\n\nenim gratiam, sine qua nullus gratificatur, nec intrat ad vitam, et exprimit vnum factum mortuum, innuendo patenter quod hoc facere sufficiens est ad vitam; velut si medicus infirmo simplici, ipsum consulenti quid faciendo vitam temporalem haberet, absolute responderet dicendo, Comede carnes tiri, nec diceret sibi modum quo in tiriaca salubriter praeparantur, faciliter huiusmodi simplici mortis ferculum praepararet, quod quilibet zelans medicus euitabit: sed absit quod medcus corporum, sit zelantior nostro medico animarum. Dominus enim zelotes nomen eius Exod. 34. Ad hoc idem est totus ille longus sermo Dominicus Iohan. 15. Ego sum vitis vera, etc. vbi docet discipulos quomodo fructificare debent, scilicet manendo in ipso, vbi et consequenter exponit, quomodo debent manere in ipso: Manere, inquit, in dilectione mea; et adhuc sicut Magister bonus, docet quomodo debent in dilectione eius manere, Si inquiens, praecepta mea seruaueritis, manebitis in dilectione mea; et post exponit singulariter quomodo seruare debent praecepta sua, de quibus pluraliter dixit eis,\n\ncum dicit, Hoc est praeceptum meum, vt diligatis inuicem sicut dilexi vos. Quam adhuc similitudinem noluit in expositam pertransire, sed dixit, Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, vt animam suam ponat quis pro amicis . Quicun que ergo hanc dilectionem habet, manet in Deo, et fert in gratia fructum multum. Item Cyprianus, Augustinus, et vnanimiter omnes Doctores, et tota sancta Dei Ecclesia indubitanter affirmant, quod quicun que licet non renatus ex aqua, pro confessione Christi fuerit interfectus, baptismo sanguinis proprij baptizatus, statim in Coelo cum Sanctis Martyribus corona gloriae coronatur, et hoc est quod Christus ipse testatur, Matth. 10. ita dicens; Omnis qui confitebitur me coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram Patremeo, qui in Coelis est. Huic quoque similem tenent sententiam, de adulto baptizari volente et morte praeuento, sicut allegat Lumbardus 4. Sent. dist. 4. et alibi saepe claret; quod tamen temerarie nimis affirmare praesumerent, si possent haec fieri sine gratia charitatis, sine qua constat neminem posse saluari. Item gratia ista est quidam", "english": "and made the charity of many grow cold. Behold how plain the testimonies of truth are on this point. Behold the testimony of Joel 2: \"Whoever calls on the name of the Lord will be saved,\" which the Apostle also attests in Rom 10. And in Luke 10 someone asked the Lord, \"Master, what must I do to have eternal life?\" But he said, \"What is written in the law?\" He answered, \"You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart etc., and your neighbor as yourself\"; and he said to him, \"You have answered rightly; do this and you will live.\" But if he could have done these things without the grace that makes acceptable unto life, this was not a true teaching of the truth. For it does not follow, \"Do this, even persevering to the end, therefore you will live,\" since he could do this without grace, without which no one will live. And if you say that the Savior meant that he should do this in grace: since that manner of doing is more necessary than the deed itself, and is not known to man of himself, and the Savior did not express this manner in teaching and commanding, it seems that such a teaching is excessively deficient, and that it throws a snare before men and leads them into the danger of eternal damnation. For it is silent about grace, without which no one is made acceptable or enters into life, and it expresses one dead deed, plainly implying that to do this suffices for life. It is as if a doctor, to a simple sick man who consulted him about what to do in order to have temporal life, answered flatly, \"Eat the flesh of the tyrus\" [n37], and did not tell him the manner in which it is wholesomely prepared in tyriac : he would readily prepare for such a simple man a dish of death, which any zealous doctor would avoid. But far be it that the doctor of bodies should be more zealous than our doctor of souls. For \"the Lord, Zealous is his name,\" Exod 34 [n38]. To the same end is that whole long discourse of the Lord in John 15, \"I am the true vine,\" etc., where he teaches the disciples how they ought to bear fruit, namely by remaining in him, and where he then explains how they ought to remain in him: \"Remain,\" he says, \"in my love\"; and further, like a good Master, he teaches how they ought to remain in his love: \"If you keep my commandments, you will remain in my love\"; and afterwards he explains in the singular how they ought to keep his commandments, of which he spoke to them in the plural, when he says, \"This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.\" This comparison too he did not wish to pass over unexplained [n39], but said, \"Greater love than this no one has, than that one lay down his life for his friends\" . Whoever, therefore, has this love remains in God, and bears much fruit in grace. Likewise Cyprian, Augustine, and unanimously all Doctors, and the whole holy Church of God, affirm without doubt that whoever, though not reborn of water, has been killed for the confession of Christ, baptized with the baptism of his own blood, is straightway crowned in Heaven with the Holy Martyrs with the crown of glory; and this is what Christ himself attests, Matt 10, saying: \"Everyone who will confess me before men, I too will confess him before my Father, who is in Heaven.\" They hold a similar opinion about an adult who wishes to be baptized and is forestalled by death, as the Lombard cites in Sentences 4, dist. 4, and as is often clear elsewhere. Yet they would presume to affirm this far too rashly if these things could happen without the grace of charity, without which it is agreed that no one can be saved. Likewise, this grace is a certain", "margins": [{"id": "336B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: viperae."}, {"id": "336B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: theriaca."}, {"id": "336C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: suis."}]}, {"anchor": "p336D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p336D", "locator_display": "336D–336E", "source_text": "habitus, et diligere Deum super omnia gratuito propter ipsum proprius actus eius; actus autem est finis, et perfectio habitus, sicut vicessimum primum capitulum ostendebat; Quare et habitus est propter actum non e contra. Ad hoc ergo vult Deus, quod homines habeant gratiam, vt per eam faciant gratuito opera praetaxata. Si ergo possent sine gratia ista sic facere, sufficeret Deo, et illis; Imo nulla ratio, nulla causa, nulla vtilitas Deo nec homi•i videretur, quare haec fieri deberent in gratia, cum possent aequaliter fieri sine ipsa, fed potius videretur quantum ad omnem actionem, superflua penitus et inanis, sicut quantum ad omnem significationem cifra cum fuerit vltima figura: Et siquis dicat quod ad hoc vult Deus, quod opera nostra fiant in gratia, quia sic possunt facilius fieri, incidit in errorem Pelagij supradictum, et etiam tunc qui faceret ea sine gratia, propter difficultatem maiorem amplius mereretur, sicut superius est argutum. Item quilibet habitus moralis vel alius cognoscitur per suum effectum, scilicet per hoc, quod aliquis opera talis virtutis promte\n\net dilectabiliter operatur; Vnde secundo Ethic. tertio. Signum autem oportet facere habituum super venientem voluptatem, vel tristitiam operantibus. Qui enim recedit a voluptatibus corporalibus, et hoc ipso gaudet, temperatus est, et qui sustinet pericula et gaudet, vel non tristatur, fortis; Et secundo Post. vlt. arguit Aristoteles contra Platonem ponentem habitus cognitiuos principiorum inesse nobis a natura, sed latere, sic dicens; Si quidem habemus ipsos, inconueniens est; Contingit enim certissmas babentem cognitiones principiorum demonstrantem latere. Cum ergo charitas et gratia sit habitus perfectissimus, potest per operationes cognosci, et hoc videtur ipsa veritas docuisse, cum dixit, A fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos. Mat. 7. Et infra 12. Ex fructu arbot cognoscitur. Et Ioh. 13. dat pro", "english": "habit, and to love God above all things freely for his own sake is its proper act; but the act is the end and perfection of the habit, as the twenty-first chapter showed. Therefore the habit is for the sake of the act, not the reverse. To this end, then, God wills that men have grace: that through it they freely do the aforesaid works. If, therefore, they could do these things in this way without this grace, it would suffice for God and for them. Indeed, no reason, no cause, no usefulness would appear, to God or to man, why these things should be done in grace, since they could be done equally without it; rather it would seem wholly superfluous and empty as regards every action, just as, as regards every signification, a cipher is when it is the last figure [n40]. And if someone says that God wills this, that our works be done in grace, because in this way they can be done more easily, he falls into the error of Pelagius mentioned above; and moreover, in that case one who did them without grace would merit more, because of the greater difficulty, as was argued above. Likewise, any moral habit or other is known by its effect, namely by this, that someone performs the works of such a virtue promptly and with delight. Hence in Ethics II, third [n41]: \"A sign of dispositions must be made of the pleasure or pain that supervenes on those who are acting. For one who withdraws from bodily pleasures, and rejoices in this very thing, is temperate; and one who endures dangers and rejoices, or is not pained, is brave.\" And in Posterior Analytics II, last [n41], Aristotle argues against Plato, who posits that the cognitive habits of the principles are in us from nature but lie hidden, saying thus: \"If indeed we have them, it is absurd; for it happens that one who has the most certain cognitions of the principles, in demonstrating, goes unnoticed\" [n42]. Since, therefore, charity and grace is a most perfect habit, it can be known through its operations, and the Truth himself seems to have taught this when he said, \"By their fruits you will know them,\" Matt 7; and below, 12, \"By its fruit the tree is known.\" And John 13 gives, for", "margins": [{"id": "336E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: cognitionis."}]}, {"anchor": "p337A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p337A", "locator_display": "337A–337B", "source_text": "hac cognitione habenda regulam generaliter specialem, et specialiter generalem; in hoc, inquit, Cognoscent omnes, quia Discipuli mei estis, si dilectionem habueritis adinuicem, quod et infra 15. prosequitur planius multum et plenius, sicut superius erat allegatum. Et in ista sententia videntur Doctores, et Tractatores Scripturae Canonicae vnanimiter concordare: Quicunque ergo talia operatur, et taliter habet gratiam charitatis. Item si operans in gratia aliquid mereatur, ergo et carens gratia, si similia similiter operetur: Nam actus illius per omnia est aeque bonus, sicut actus alterius gratiosi, maxime cum gratia sua nullo modo informet, nec efficiat aut dirigat actum suum. Si dicatur, quod gratia, eo ipso quod stat ibi, reddit actum meritorium, hoc non videtur, cum in actu facto ex puris naturalibus nihil penitus faciat, sicut in cucumerario formido nihil custodit, sed stat ibi caeca, surda, et muta, ac mortua, nec plus facit ad talem actum gratia illa in anima, quam faceret in calice, in bursa, vel in arca. Item, si actus gratiosus propter hoc reddatur meritorius, quia fit a gratioso, licet non a gratia, sequitur quod actus sui indifferentes, imo et peccata venalia, et\n\nvniuersaliter omnes actus sui sint meritorij regni Dei, et hoc etiam de condigno, cum tamen possit diligere vxorem ex affectione carnali, mentiri iocose, dare eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam venialem, et multa similia ex puris naturalibus, non ex gratia sibi data. Posset quoque talis gratia poni realiter in non grato, imo peccante mortaliter, nec tamen eius opera propter ipsam meritoria redderentur. Vnde manifestum est non esse idem, fieri in gratia, et fieri ex gratia, sed omne quod fit ex gratia fit in gratia, non e contra. Manifestum est quoque non propterea opus esse meritorium, quia fit in gratia, sed quia fit ex gratia; et omne opus factum ex gratia esse meritorium, non autem omne opus factum in gratia: Haec omnia patebunt faciliter ex praemissis. Item ad hoc est totus ille processus Anselmi superius recitatus; dicit enim planissime, quod quicunque vult rectitudinem, recte vult, et ideo prius naturaliter illam habet, sicut causam effectiuam illius effectus; et loquitur ibi de rectitudine gratiae, vt patet De Concordia, nono, et De gratia, sine qua nullus saluatur,", "english": "having this knowledge, a rule generally special and specially general: \"By this,\" he says, \"all will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another,\" which he also pursues below, in 15, far more plainly and fully, as was cited above. And on this opinion the Doctors and the expositors of canonical Scripture seem to agree unanimously: whoever, therefore, does such works, and in such a way, has the grace of charity. Likewise, if one working in grace merits something, then so does one lacking grace, if he does similar things similarly. For the act of the latter is in every respect equally good as the act of the other, who is graced [n43], especially since the other's grace in no way informs, nor effects, nor directs his act. If it is said that grace, by the very fact that it is present there, renders the act meritorious, this does not seem so, since in an act done from purely natural powers it does nothing at all, just as a scarecrow in a cucumber field [n44] guards nothing, but stands there blind, deaf, and dumb, and dead. Nor does that grace in the soul contribute any more to such an act than it would in a cup , in a purse, or in a chest. Likewise, if a graced act is rendered meritorious for this reason, that it is done by one who has grace, though not by grace, it follows that his indifferent acts, indeed even his venial sins, and universally all his acts, are meritorious of the kingdom of God, and this even de condigno; and yet he can love his wife from carnal affection, lie in jest, give alms out of venial vainglory, and do many similar things from purely natural powers, not from grace given to him. Such grace could also be really posited in one not pleasing to God, indeed sinning mortally , and yet his works would not be rendered meritorious on account of it. Hence it is clear that to be done in grace and to be done from grace are not the same; but whatever is done from grace is done in grace, not the reverse. It is also clear that a work is not meritorious because it is done in grace, but because it is done from grace; and that every work done from grace is meritorious, but not every work done in grace. All these things will be easily evident from the premises. Likewise, to this end is that whole discussion of Anselm recited above. For he says most plainly that whoever wills rectitude wills rightly, and therefore first naturally has it, as the effective cause of that effect; and he is speaking there of the rectitude of grace, as is clear in On Concord, the ninth, and in On Grace, without which no one is saved,", "margins": [{"id": "337A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: calce."}, {"id": "337B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: realiter."}]}, {"anchor": "p337C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p337C", "locator_display": "337C–337D", "source_text": "vt patet supra, octauo, sicut et superius tangebatur, et ad idem vadit processus Augustini praetactus. Est adhuc alia similis cauillatio quae dicit; Quod homo ex se potest Deum diligere ex toto corde, etc. et facere omnia alia secundum substantiam operum, nihil tamen omnino merebitur, vel saltem nihil de condigno, quia non facit ea secundum intentionem mandantis, quae est, vt dicunt, quod faciat ea aliquo modo meritorie, vel meritorie de condigno: Haec autem ineptia potest refelli similiter cum priori. Item quid intelligit per meritorie facere? si facere in charitate et gratia propter Deum, tunc non differt a positione priori; si facere si quod merces sibi aliqua debeatur, hoc est omnino irrationabile et contrarium rationi. Si enim opus sit meritorium, propter hoc quod merces sibi debetur, prius est mercedem sibi deberi quam opus esse meritorium, cum tamen sit e contra? Propter hoc enim quod opus est meritorium, merces sibi debetur: aliter etenim nulla foret causa, nec\n\nratio, cur huic operi deberetur merces, et non illi. Prius ergo naturaliter est opus esse meritorium, et dignum mercede, quam mercedem sibi deberi. Item mercedem deberi, vel dependet ab opere, vel ab aliquo alio impertinenti: Si ab opere, quicunque facit congrue tale opus, meretur; et iste secundum hanc positionem sine gratia ita facit: Si ab impertinenti; hoc videtur contra omnem rationem et legem. Item in toto Veteri Testamento, et Nouo, facientibus mandata promittit Deus mercedem: Si tamen intelligat sic; Fac mandata mea meritorie, et eris dignus mercede, et habebis mercedem, ridiculosa esset illa promissio seu doctrina; Non enim docet aliquod dubium aut ignotum nisi forsitan dubitanti, An sit Deus, vel, An sit iustus. Constat enim cuilibet, quod quilibet potens, tenetur reddere mercedem meritorie operanti pro eo, et reddet nisi sit iniustus: Videtur ergo, quod Deus intelligat ad communem modum intelligendi hominum, quos docebat, scilicet, Fac hoc, et habebis mercedem, id est, Fac hoc propter me, et propter amorem meum, et habebis", "english": "as is clear above, in the eighth, as was also touched on above; and the aforementioned course of Augustine's argument goes to the same end. There is, further, another similar quibble, which says: A man can of himself love God with his whole heart etc., and do all the other things according to the substance of the works, but will nevertheless merit nothing at all, or at least nothing de condigno, because he does not do them according to the intention of the one commanding, which is, as they say, that he do them in some manner meritoriously, or meritoriously de condigno. But this silliness can be refuted in the same way as the former. Likewise, what do they mean by \"to do meritoriously\"? If to do in charity and grace for God's sake, then it does not differ from the former position; if to do in such a way that some reward is owed to him, this is wholly irrational and contrary to reason. For if a work is meritorious for this reason, that a reward is owed to him, then the reward's being owed is prior to the work's being meritorious, whereas it is the other way round. For it is because the work is meritorious that a reward is owed to him: otherwise there would be no cause or reason why a reward should be owed to this work and not to that. Therefore, it is naturally prior that a work be meritorious, and worthy of reward, than that a reward be owed to him. Likewise, a reward's being owed depends either on the work or on something else irrelevant. If on the work, whoever does such a work congruously merits; and he, according to this position, does so without grace. If on something irrelevant, this seems against all reason and law. Likewise, throughout the whole Old Testament and New, God promises a reward to those who do the commandments. But if it is understood thus: \"Do my commandments meritoriously, and you will be worthy of the reward, and will have the reward,\" that promise or teaching would be ridiculous; for it teaches nothing doubtful or unknown, except perhaps to one doubting whether God exists, or whether he is just. For it is agreed by everyone that anyone who has power is bound to pay a reward to one who works meritoriously for him, and will pay it unless he is unjust. It seems therefore that God means it according to the common way of understanding of the men whom he was teaching, namely, \"Do this, and you will have a reward,\" that is, \"Do this for my sake, and for love of me, and you will have", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p337E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p337E", "locator_display": "337E", "source_text": "mercedem, et sic potest non habens gratiam secundum istos praedictos. Item existenti in gratia debetur merces pro opere, et iste extra gratiam secundum istos potest facere simile opus, vel maius pro Deo, amore simili vel maiori; Cur ergo non meretur iste quantum ille, vel maius? Item non est aliquo modo probabile, quod Deus summe liberalis et diues, misericors atque iustus, qui reddet vnicuique secundum opera sua, diligentem eum gratuito propter eum ex omnibus viribus mentis et corporis, et proximum sicut seipsum similiter propter Deum, qui et abhorret omnia mala, amplectitur cuncta bona, sustinet omnia tristia, et tandem mortem amarissimam propter Deum, sine omni mercede abijciet, et contemnet, maxime cum ipsemet hoc testetur planissime, etiam interposito iuramento, Matth. 10. in haec verba; Quicunque potum dederit vni ex minimis istis calicem aquae frigidae tantum in nomine discipuli, Amen dico vobis, non perdet", "english": "a reward.\" And so, according to those aforesaid, one who does not have grace can have it [n45]. Likewise, a reward is owed to one existing in grace for the work, and the one outside grace, according to them, can do a similar work, or a greater, for God, from similar or greater love; why then does he not merit as much as the other, or more? Likewise, it is in no way probable that God, supremely generous and rich, merciful and just, who will render to each according to his works, will cast away and despise without any reward one who loves him freely for his own sake with all the strength of mind and body, and his neighbor as himself likewise for God's sake; who also abhors all evils, embraces all goods, endures all sorrows, and at last bitterest death for God's sake; especially since he himself attests this most plainly, even with an oath interposed, Matt 10, in these words: \"Whoever gives to one of these least ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, Amen I say to you, he will not lose", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p338A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p338A", "locator_display": "338A–338B", "source_text": "mercedem suam. Sed obijcient forsan isti, quod si nullus posset diligere Deum ex toto corde, etc. et facere omnia facienda, et dimittere omnia dimittenda gratuito propter Deum, nisi esset in gratia charitatis; tunc posset homo scire quando esset in gratia charitatis, contra illud Eccles. 9. Nescit homo, vtrum amore, an odio dignus sit. Item talia opera magnalia possunt fieri absque gratia charitatis: Potest enim quis absque charitate, vt patet 1. ad Cor. 13. habere omnem fidem, et facere miracula maxima, ita vt montes transferat, distribuere omnes facultates suas in cibos pauperum, et tradere corpus suum ita vt ardeat. Ad primum obiectum patet per dicta vigesimo quinto huius, quod aliquis praedestinatus ad vitam, existens in peccato mortali grauissimo, sicut fuit Dauid, quando propter adulterium, dolosum homicidium committebat, non minus tunc amabatur a Deo, quam amabitur in futuro; et similiter praescitus ad mortem existens in maxima charitate, non minus tunc oditur a Deo, quam vnquam odietur post lapsum profundissimum in peccatum, et poenam, sicut fuit de Iuda\n\nDomini traditore, nisi forsan secundum praesentem iustitiam, et plurimum transmutiue. Ideo que nullus hominum potest scire, vtrum odio vel amore dignus sit, quia qualiscunque sit modo, nescit exitum quem habebit, nec vtrum sit praedestinatus finaliter filius vitae vel mortis. Et hoc est quod eadem Scriptura testatur: Cum enim praemisit, Nescit homo vtrum amore an odio dignus sit, sed omnia in futurum seruantur incerta; Nulli autem dubium, quin homo possit scire se esse dignum odio secundum praesentem iustitiam: Potest enim scire se esse in peccatis grauissimis, et in actuali voluntate grauissima committendi, et in desperatione salutis, sicut fuit de Iuda et Cayn. Simili quoque modo est mihi probabile quod homo verisimiliter potest scire, saltem secundum praesentem iustitiam se esse in gratia et dignum Dei amore, per hoc scilicet quod diligit Deum ex toto corde, etc. ita quod nollet eum in minimo saltē offendere pro omni fugibili euitando, nec pro omni desiderabili consequendo, velletque voluntatem diuinam in omnibus adimplete, etiam etsi nunquam foret poena vel", "english": "his reward.\" But perhaps they will object that if no one could love God with his whole heart etc., and do all that is to be done, and relinquish all that is to be relinquished, freely for God's sake, unless he were in the grace of charity, then a man could know when he was in the grace of charity, against that text of Ecclesiastes 9: \"Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred.\" Likewise, such great works can be done apart from the grace of charity: for someone can, as is clear in 1 Cor 13, have all faith, and work the greatest miracles, so as to move mountains, distribute all his goods as food for the poor, and hand over his body to be burned. To the first objection, it is clear from what was said in the twenty-fifth of this that someone predestined to life, existing in the gravest mortal sin, as David was when he committed adultery and treacherous murder, was no less loved then by God than he will be loved in the future; and similarly one foreknown to death, existing in the greatest charity, is no less hated then by God than he will ever be hated after the deepest fall into sin and punishment, as was the case with Judas the betrayer of the Lord, except perhaps according to present justice, and in a very changeable way [n46]. And therefore no human being can know whether he is worthy of hatred or of love, because however he now is, he does not know the outcome he will have, nor whether he is finally predestined as a son of life or of death. And this is what the same Scripture attests. For when it premised, \"Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred, but all things are kept uncertain for the future,\" to no one is it doubtful that a man can know that he is worthy of hatred according to present justice: for he can know that he is in the gravest sins, and in an actual will to commit the gravest, and in despair of salvation, as was the case with Judas and Cain. In like manner it is probable to me that a man can probably know, at least according to present justice, that he is in grace and worthy of God's love, namely by this, that he loves God with his whole heart etc., so that he would not wish to offend him in the least, even to avoid anything that can be fled, nor to obtain anything desirable, and would wish to fulfil the divine will in all things, even if there were never punishment or", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p338C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p338C", "locator_display": "338C–338D", "source_text": "praemium, sed tantum gratuito propter ipsum, et per alia signa multa. Vt autem expediam me breuius licet non verius, potest dicta Autoritas sic exponi; Nescit homo vtrum amore vel odio dignus sit, id est, finaliter, sicut ipsemet se exponit continuo vt est dictum. Quantum ad aliud, verum est, quod sine gratia charitatis fiunt opera multa magnalia, sed non opus dilectionis Dei ex toto corde, etc. modo dicto, nec illa fiunt amore gratuito propter Deum. Et ideo bene dicit Apost. Si fecero haec et illa, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest; et statim per suos effectus definit quodammodo et notificat charitatem; Charitas, inquit, patiens est, benigna est, etc. quasi velit patenter innuere, qui veraciter haec non habet, charitatem non habet, et qui veraciter ista habet, habet similiter charitatem: Nam secundum eundem ad Rom. 11. Si delibatio sancta est, et massa. Hoc autem totum argumentum a principio eius vs que huc tam longe protensum, tam breui restringitur syllogismo, quicunque meretur de congruo gratiam a Deo, facit ante acceptionem gratiae tempore vel natura, aliquid grate\n\npro eo; Nullus facit sic ante aliquid grate pro eo.", "english": "reward, but only freely for his sake; and by many other signs. But to extricate myself more briefly, though not more truly: the cited Authority can be explained thus: \"Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred,\" that is, finally, as it explains itself immediately, as has been said. As to the other point, it is true that many great works are done without the grace of charity, but not the work of loving God with the whole heart etc., in the manner stated, nor are those done from free love for God's sake. And therefore the Apostle says well, \"If I do this and that, but have not charity, it profits me nothing\"; and straightway he defines and makes known charity, in a way, through its effects: \"Charity,\" he says, \"is patient, is kind,\" etc., as if he wished to intimate plainly that whoever truly does not have these does not have charity, and whoever truly has these likewise has charity. For according to the same, Rom 11: \"If the firstfruit is holy, so is the lump.\" This whole argument, from its beginning up to here so far extended, is contracted into so brief a syllogism: Whoever merits grace from God de congruo does, before the reception of grace, in time or in nature, something pleasing for him [n47]; no one before that does anything thus pleasingly for him.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p338D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p338D", "locator_display": "338D–339A", "source_text": "Item si quis carens gratia potest mereri gratiam primam de congruo, et habens gratiam potest mereri augmentum suae gratiae tantum de congruo, non autem de condigno; carens gratia posset similiter primam gratiam promereri, sicut habens gratiam, gratiam suam augeri; cum tamen primum istorum sit Haeresis Pelagij a Patribus reprobata; secundum vero ab omnibus Catholicis est concessum: Non ergo similiter possunt mereri primus primum, et secundus secundum: Quod autem gratia habita mereatur augeri, probat Autoritas Augustini superius allegata, Gratia meretur augeri, vt aucta mereatur et perfici. Vnde et Parab. 4. Posside sapientiam, et dabit capiti tuo augmenta gratiarum. Et quod hoc non sit de condigno, potest ostendi per rationes trigesimi quinti capituli ostendentes quod gratia non ex meritis aut operibus praeuijs, quoniam tunc non esset gratia, sed debitum, cum omne augmentum gratiae sit gratia, et omnis gratia vniuoce dicatur cum alia\n\ngratis data. Item si quis potest mereri augmentum gratiae de condigno, potest mereri altiorem sedem in Coelo et intensiorem beatitudinem, et magnam latitudinem, et portionem illius aeternam similiter de condigno, quod falsum est. In iustitia enim commutatiua de condigno requiritur ad minus aequale pro aequali, vt patet 5. Ethic. 6. et post diffuse, sed operatio momentanea gratiosi non est aeque bona, sicut tanta portio beatitudinis sempiterna; Vnde Apostolus ad Rom. 8. Existimo quod non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam quae reuelabitur in nobis; Glossa, existimo, et scio, quod passiones huius temporis, id est, temporales et momentaneae, non sunt condignae, id est sufficientes, si districte ageretur nobiscum, ad promerendam futuram gloriam: Tribulatio namque ipsa est\n\ncum fine, merces erit sine fine; et multo maior erit ibi gloria quam hic labor. Istam quoque sententiam docet expressius Augustinus super illud Psalmi 36. A Domino gressus hominis dirigetur, et viam eius volet, Noli, inquiens, tantum attendere qua iturus es, sed quo venturus sis; tolerabis dura temporalia, sed ad laeta peruenies sempiterna; si vis sustinere laborem, attende mercedem; miraberis tantum dari pro tanto labore. Nam vtique, fratres, pro aeterna requie labor aeternus subeundus erat, et aeternam felicitatem accepturus, aeternas passiones sustinere deberes; sed si aeternum sustineres laborem, quando peruenires ad aeternam felicitatem? quo fit vt necessario temporalis sit tribulatio tua, qua finita venias ad felicitatem infinitam. Sed tamen, fratres, posset esse tribulatio longa pro aeterna felicitate, verbi gratia, vt cum felicitas nostra finem non habebit, miseria nostra, et labor noster, et tribulationes nostrae diuturnae essent: Nam etsi millia annorum essent, appende mille annos contra aeternitatem; quid appendis cum infinito quantumcunque finitum? decem millia annorum, decies centena millia", "english": "Likewise: if someone lacking grace can merit first grace congruously, and someone having grace can merit an increase of his grace only congruously and not condignly, then someone lacking grace could likewise merit first grace beforehand, just as one who has grace merits that his grace be increased. Yet the first of these is the heresy of Pelagius, condemned by the Fathers, while the second is conceded by all Catholics. Therefore the first man and the second cannot merit in like manner, the first the first thing and the second the second. That grace already possessed merits to be increased is proved by the authority of Augustine cited above: \"Grace merits to be increased, so that, once increased, it may merit also to be perfected.\" Hence also Proverbs 4: \"Possess wisdom, and it will give to your head increases of graces.\" And that this is not by condign merit can be shown by the reasons of the thirty-fifth chapter, which show that grace is not from prior merits or works, since then it would not be grace but a debt. For every increase of grace is grace, and all grace is called grace in the same sense as any other grace freely given.[n48]\n\nLikewise: if someone can merit an increase of grace condignly, he can merit a higher seat in Heaven and a more intense beatitude, and a great breadth, and an eternal portion of it, likewise condignly; which is false. For in commutative justice, condign merit requires at least an equal for an equal, as is plain in Ethics 5, ch. 6, and at length thereafter;[n49] but the momentary operation of one in grace is not as good as so great an everlasting portion of beatitude. Hence the Apostle in Romans 8: \"I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not condign for the future glory which will be revealed in us.\" The Gloss:[n50] \"I reckon, and I know, that the sufferings of this time, that is, temporal and momentary ones, are not condign, that is, sufficient, if strict dealing were employed with us, to merit future glory. For the tribulation itself is with an end, the reward will be without end; and the glory there will be much greater than the labor here.\"", "margins": [{"id": "338E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Apostle, Rom 8; Gloss."}, {"id": "339A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "suscipere"}]}, {"anchor": "p339A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p339A", "locator_display": "339A–339C", "source_text": "si dicendum est, et millia millium quae finem habent, cum aeternitate comparari non possunt. Dicitur forsitan, quod quia Deus promisit operantibus regnum aeternum, merentur illud de condigno, et alias non mererentur illud de condigno: Sed istud non videtur, quia illam promissionem nullus de condigno potuit promereri, nec sine hac potuit mereri de condigno regnum aeternum; Nullus ergo simpliciter de condigno potuit, aut potest mereri regnum aeternum. Nec operatio alicuius post promissionem est melior, quam fuit similis ante promissionē; sed nulla operatio ante promissionem meruit regnū de condigno: Nec illa promissio facit opus melius, vt patet per substantiā operis, et per omnes eius circumstantias inductiue; imo forsitan minus bonum: Facit enim intentionem minus sinceram; Qui enim prius operabatur pure propter Deum solum, nunc forsitan operatur propter retributionem promissam. Item tunc Deus non ita libero modo confert vitam aeternam, sicut fecit ante promissionem; quia tunc omnino libere contulit, nunc autem ex necessitate promissionis, et de\n\nnecessitate iustitiae conseruandae, quod videtur eius summae libertati, et immutabilitati perfectae plurimum derogare. Tunc etiam meritorie operans cogeret Deum ad resuscitandum ipsum, et aeternaliter praemiandum, vel ad oflensam iustitiae incurrendum; vbi est ergo eius summa libertas, insuperabilis que potestas? Item non minus obligat Deum promissio sua aeterna mentalis interior in verbo, vel spiritu suo sancto aeterno, quam temporlis verbalis exterior, ministerio forsan Angeli alicuius; sed quicquid temporaliter, vocaliter exterius promittebat, aeternaliter, mentaliter interius in verbo, vel spiritu suo sancto aeterno promisit, quod immutabilitas eius omnimoda per 5um et 23um capitula demonstrabit. Item ita Deus promisit, quod quicquid peteremus in nomine suo daret nobis, et Samuel orauit pro Saule, et Ieremias pro populo, et multi pro multis reprobis exorabant. Meruerunt ergo de condigno audiri, et Deus eos non audiuit, sicut vicesimum quintum huius allegat; fecit igitur eis iniuriam manifestam, quod nullus nisi manifeste iniustus audebit vel tacite cogitare. Item principaliter,", "english": "Augustine teaches this same view more explicitly on that verse of Psalm 36, \"The steps of a man will be directed by the Lord, and he will desire his way\":[n51] \"Do not,\" he says, \"look only at where you are going, but at where you are to arrive. You will bear hard temporal things, but you will come to joyful, everlasting ones. If you wish to endure the labor, look to the reward; you will marvel that so much is given for so great a labor. For surely, brothers, for eternal rest an eternal labor would have to be undergone, and, in order to receive eternal happiness, you would have to endure eternal sufferings; but if you endured eternal labor, when would you arrive at eternal happiness? So it comes about that your tribulation must be temporal, so that when it is finished you may come to infinite happiness. And yet, brothers, there could be a long tribulation for the sake of eternal happiness; for example, so that, since our happiness will not have an end, our misery too, and our labor, and our tribulations should be lasting. For even if there were thousands of years, weigh a thousand years against eternity; what are you weighing when you set any finite thing against the infinite? Ten thousand years, a million if we must say so, and thousands of thousands, which have an end, cannot be compared with eternity.\"\n\nPerhaps it will be said that because God promised the eternal kingdom to those who work, they merit it condignly, and otherwise they would not merit it condignly. But this does not seem so, because no one could merit that promise itself condignly, and without it the eternal kingdom could not be merited condignly ; therefore no one, simply speaking, could or can merit the eternal kingdom condignly. Nor is anyone's work after the promise better than a similar one was before the promise; but no work before the promise merited the kingdom condignly. Nor does that promise make the work better, as is plain inductively from the substance of the work and from all its circumstances; indeed perhaps it makes it less good, for it makes the intention less sincere: he who formerly worked purely for God alone now perhaps works for the sake of the promised retribution. Likewise, God then does not confer eternal life in as free a manner as he did before the promise; for then he conferred it altogether freely, but now from the necessity of the promise and of the necessity of preserving justice. This seems to detract very greatly from his supreme freedom and perfect immutability. Then too the one working meritoriously would compel God to raise him up and reward him eternally, or else to incur an offense against justice; where then is his supreme freedom and insuperable power?\n\nLikewise, his eternal promise, mental and interior, in the Word or in his eternal Holy Spirit, binds God no less than his temporal promise, verbal and exterior, perhaps through the ministry of some angel; but whatever he promised temporally, vocally, externally, he promised eternally, mentally, internally, in the Word or in his eternal Holy Spirit, as his complete immutability will demonstrate by the 5th and 23rd chapters. Likewise, God so promised that whatever we ask in his name he would give us; and Samuel prayed for Saul, and Jeremiah for the people, and many were interceding for many reprobates. They therefore merited condignly to be heard, and God did not hear them, as the twenty-fifth of this work alleges. He therefore did them a manifest injury, which no one except a manifestly unjust man will dare even to think silently.", "margins": [{"id": "339A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) suscipere (\"take on\");"}, {"id": "339B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) possunt (\"they can\")."}]}, {"anchor": "p339D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p339D", "locator_display": "339D–340A", "source_text": "si quis meretur augmentum gratiae de condigno; vel ergo meretur augmentum eius continuum, vel discretum; si discretum tantummodo, et per vices, tunc per vnum magnum meritum, meretur vnum certum augmentum; quare per medietatem meriti, medietatem praemij et augmenti, et ita proportionaliter secundum singulas partes suas. Meretur ergo de condigno gratiam suam continue augmentari. Omnis etiam ratio quae probat aliquem mereri de condigno gratiam suam augeri per vices et discrete; et quod continue similiter comprobabit: Quod si detur, dabitur consequenter quodlibet opus gratiae mereri de condigno remissionem cuiuscunque poenae temporalis hic et in purgatorio, imo et omnium talium poenarum quorumlibet punitorum, si debite offeratur et detur ad illum effectum; quod non videtur, quia tunc superfluum videretur facere multa et magna opera gratiae pro poenis, vel etiam pro peccatis venialibus redimendis, cum de condigno sufficeret breuis salutatio virginis gloriosae, imo et minimus cogitatus. Et idem sequitur de peccatis mortalibus\n\nquantiscunque. Minima enim contritio, vt videtur [non nullis] ex gratia, tollit culpam et commutat poenam aeternam in temporalem. Cum ergo quaelibet contritio forsitan sit intensior, quam necessario requiratur, medietas intensiua illius non necessario requisita aufert totam poenam temporalem relictam; vel saltem si contritio continueretur vlterius per quantumlibet paruum tempus, auferret totam poenam: Quodlibet enim opus gratiae meretur de condigno incomparabiliter maius omni tali remissione temporali, scilicet augmentum gratiae, et proportionaliter augmentum gloriae sempiternum; quodlibet ergo tale meritum de condigno, etiam pro quocunque minori sufficiet de condigno; sicut 5. Ethic. docent commutatiuae iustitiae sanctiones: Dicit que Anselmus 2. Cur Deus homo 20. Quid iustius intelligi valet, quam vt cui datur pretium maius omni debito, si debito datur affectu, dimittat omne debitum? Si autem dicatur, quod commutare tale meritum quo meretur augmentum\n\ngratiae et glorae sempiternae, pro remissione poenae temporalis, temporaliumue poenarum, esset sibi praeiudicium sempiternum; ideoque Deus aequius iudic ans hoc non facit; Adhuc stat ratio prius facta, maxime cum volenti non fiat iniuria, secundum Iuristas, et secundum Philosophum 5. Eth. 17. Nullus patitur iniustum volens. Imo videtur quod quilibet potest dispensare egenis pio affectu illud quod est sibi debite acquisitum, nulli alteri praeiudicium inferendo; vel ponatur quod offerat meritum illud Deo pro aliquo mortuo et damnato ad tantam miseriam vel minorem, et ratio dicta stabit. Etiam secundum responsionem praedictam nullus posset per aliquod opus gratiae mereri plenam remissionem, nec etiam mitigationem poenae leuissimae temporalis, semper eodem praeiudicio prohibente, quod constat esse falsissimum iudicio totius Ecclesiae indulgentias concedentis, et poenitentias in alia pietatis opera permutantis. Item sine omni commutatione, quicunque meretur continue, et condigne incomperabiliter maius, scilicet augmentum gratiae et gloriae sempiternum, citius vel saltem", "english": "Again, as a principal argument: if someone merits an increase of grace condignly, then he merits either its continuous increase or a discrete one. If only a discrete one, and by turns, then by one great merit he merits one definite increase; hence by half the merit, half the reward and increase, and so proportionally according to its several parts. Therefore he merits condignly that his grace be continually increased. Moreover, every reason that proves that someone merits condignly that his grace be increased by turns and discretely will likewise prove it for the continuous case. And if this is granted, it will follow that any work of grace merits condignly the remission of any temporal penalty, here and in purgatory, indeed even of all such penalties of all the punished whatsoever, if it is duly offered and given to that effect. This does not seem so, for then it would seem superfluous to do many great works of grace to buy off penalties, or even venial sins, since a brief salutation of the glorious Virgin (the Hail Mary) would suffice condignly, indeed even the least thought. And the same follows for mortal sins, however great.\n\nFor the least contrition, as it seems [to some], by grace removes the guilt and commutes the eternal penalty into a temporal one. Since therefore any contrition is perhaps more intense than is necessarily required, the intensive half of it, not necessarily required, removes the whole temporal penalty that remains; or at least, if the contrition were prolonged further for however short a time, it would remove the whole penalty. For any work of grace merits condignly something incomparably greater than every such temporal remission, namely an increase of grace and, proportionally, an everlasting increase of glory; any such condign merit, therefore, will suffice condignly even for any lesser thing, as the sanctions of commutative justice teach in Ethics 5. And Anselm says in Why God Became Man, book 2, ch. 20: \"What can be understood to be more just than that one to whom a price greater than every debt is given, if it is given with the affection that is due, should remit the whole debt?\" But if it is said that to commute such a merit, by which an increase of everlasting grace and glory is merited, for the remission of a temporal penalty, or of temporal penalties, would be an everlasting prejudice to him, and that God, judging more equitably, therefore does not do this: still the reasoning made before stands, especially since no injury is done to one who is willing, according to the jurists and according to the Philosopher in Ethics 5, 17: \"No one willing suffers injustice.\"[n52] Indeed it seems that anyone can dispense to the needy, out of pious affection, what is duly his own acquisition, inflicting prejudice on no other; or suppose he offers that merit to God for someone dead and damned to so great a misery, or a lesser one, and the said reasoning will stand. Even according to the aforesaid response, no one could merit by any work of grace full remission, nor even mitigation of the lightest temporal penalty, the same prejudice always prohibiting. This is known to be most false in the judgment of the whole Church, which grants indulgences and commutes penances into other works of piety.", "margins": [{"id": "339E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) facta (\"done\")."}]}, {"anchor": "p340A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p340A", "locator_display": "340A–340C", "source_text": "aeque cito metetur condigne incomparabiliter minus, scilicet remissionem quantaecun que poenae temporalis; Quicunque ergo incipit ex gratia meritorie operari, statim in primo instanti, vel immediate post remittitur sibi de debito et condigno quaelibet poena temporalis. Item quod nullus mereatur augmentum continuum gratiae de condigno, videtur, quia tunc cuilibet operi gratiae, certum augmentum gratiae deberetur, maiori maius, minori minus, ac aequali aequale. Sint ergo duo filij gratiae pares in gratia, et in omnibus alijs, hoc excepto, quod vnus pro peccato mortali, vel solummodo veniali, sit debitor poenae temporalis, et agant aequalia opera gra•ae, ita quod debitor poenae per illud meritum penitus absoluatur; vel ergo vltra illam absolutionem a poena, meretur aliquod praemium in vita futura, vel nihil omnino; Non nihil omnino, quia tunc posset contingere quod adultus baptizatus, diligens actualiter Deum summe, et in Sanctis operibus actualiter se exercens magno tempore vitae suae, etiam martyrium sustinens pro Christo, et lege ipsius, aequaliter praemiaretur, in vita futura cum vno parvulo\n\nbaptizato, qui nunquam aliquid boni fecit. Hoc enim consequitur euidenter, si haec omnia iungantur in poenitentiam congruam peccatori, aut si haec omnia aeque sufficiant prosatisfactione peccati seu peccatorum suorum; vbi est ergo quod vtrumque testamentum creberrime repromittit, quod Deus vnicuique secundum opera sua reddet? Secundum istam quoque sententiam videretur, quod magis expediret peccantibus differre satisfactionem sibi iniunctam, vel saltem prouenialibus debitam, vsque ad purgatorium post terminum vitae praesentis, et alijs bonis operibus non satisfactorijs, neque factis animo satisfaciendi pro peccato, sed simpliciter directis in Deum, et meritorijs simpliciter insudare. Sic etenim faciendo, et sic finaliter decedendo, acquireret sibi magnum praemium sempiternum, et sustineret post mortem paruam poenam purgatoriam temporalem. Sed quis hoc praesumserit affirmare? Adhuc autem si sit ita, talis aeternaliter puniretur, saltem poena damni, per subtractionem videlicet portionis gloriae sempiternae, quam fuisset alias habiturus; Sed quis praesumserit facere", "english": "Likewise, without any commutation: whoever merits continuously, and condignly, something incomparably greater, namely an increase of everlasting grace and glory, will merit condignly, sooner or at least just as soon, something incomparably less, namely the remission of any temporal penalty whatever. Whoever therefore begins to work meritoriously out of grace has any temporal penalty remitted to him, as a matter of debt and condignity, at once, in the first instant or immediately after. Likewise, that no one merits a continuous increase of grace condignly appears from this: that then to any work of grace a definite increase of grace would be owed, a greater to the greater, a lesser to the lesser, an equal to the equal. Let there then be two sons of grace equal in grace and in everything else, except that one, for a mortal sin, or for a venial one only, is a debtor of temporal penalty; and let them do equal works of grace, so that the debtor of the penalty is wholly absolved by that merit. Then either beyond that absolution from the penalty he merits some reward in the future life, or nothing at all. Not nothing at all, because then it could happen that a baptized adult, actually loving God supremely and actually exercising himself in holy works for a long time of his life, even enduring martyrdom for Christ and his law, would be rewarded equally in the future life with one baptized infant who never did anything good.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p340C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p340C", "locator_display": "340C–340E", "source_text": "coelum carcerem, seu locum poenalem? Quomodo etiam verum erit, quod Iacobus protestatur de Deo, qui, iuquiens, dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat; si tamen sic faceret, daret opprobrium sempiternum homini poenitenti pro peccato commisso, et dimisso, diminutionem videlicet gloriae sempiternae. Imo et si sic esset, nullus vnquam satisfaceret, aut posset satisfacere in vita praesenti pro aliquo peccato licet paruo et minimo: Si enim saluetur, punietur pro illo peccato poena damnī aeterna in coelo, per subtractionem aliquam gloriae sempiternae, quam pro illo bono opere per quod satisfacit, fuisset alias habiturus; quod quis praesumserit dicere, vel etiam cogitare? Mirum insuper et nimis admirabile videretur; quod qui ex charissima charitate, et charissima gratia, charissime et gratissime Deum diligeret super omnia propter seipsum, et sic opera sua licet satisfactoria pro peccato faceret propter Deum, nihil perpetui praemij mereretur, nec quicquam boni omnino, nisi paruam dimissionem poenae paruulae temporalis. Quomodo namque aequitati congrueret aut iustitiae conueniret, vt\n\npraetium dignissimum maximo premio sempiterno, pro debito minimo, pro poena minima temporali solummodo acceptaret, cum plus valeat infinite? sic enim vsuras exigeret nimis graues. Quapropter fortas•is dicetur, quod talis meretur aliquod praemium sempiternum; vel ergo minus quam alius liber a debito poenae huiusmodi, aequaliterve cum illo: Si minus aut ergo minus aeternaliter, aut temporaliter tantum minus; Non minus aeternaliter propter rationes praemissas. Ponatur enim quod Petrus paruulus baptizatus factus adultus, peccando mortaliter cadat a gratia baptismali, quae sit A, et Paulus adultus in gratia constitutus, per aliquod pium opus mereatur B. gratiam, quae sit aequalis A vel minor, vltra gratiam suam priotem, vel tantum eius augmentum: Petrus vero carens,", "english": "For this follows evidently if all these things are joined into a fitting penance for the sinner, or if all these things suffice equally for the satisfaction of his sin or sins. Where then is what both Testaments most frequently promise again, that God will render to each according to his works? According to this view too it would seem more expedient for sinners to defer the satisfaction enjoined on them, or at least that owed for venial sins, until purgatory after the end of the present life, and to toil at other good works that are not satisfactory, nor done with the intention of satisfying for sin, but simply directed to God and simply meritorious. For by so doing, and so finally departing, he would acquire for himself a great everlasting reward, and would undergo after death a small temporal purgatorial penalty. But who would presume to affirm this? Moreover, if it were so, such a man would be punished eternally, at least with the penalty of loss, namely by the subtraction of a portion of the everlasting glory which he would otherwise have had; but who would presume to make heaven a prison, or a place of punishment?\n\nHow also will it be true what James testifies of God, who, he says, \"gives to all abundantly and does not reproach\"? If he acted thus, he would give everlasting reproach to the penitent man for a sin committed and forgiven, namely a diminution of everlasting glory. Indeed, if it were so, no one would ever satisfy, or be able to satisfy, in the present life for any sin, however small and least. For if he is saved, he will be punished for that sin with an eternal penalty of loss in heaven, through some subtraction of everlasting glory, which he would otherwise have had for that good work by which he satisfies; and who would presume to say this, or even to think it? It would seem, moreover, wonderful and exceedingly amazing that one who from most dear charity and most dear grace should love God most dearly and most gratefully above all things for his own sake,[n53] and so do his works, though satisfactory for sin, for the sake of God, should merit no perpetual reward, nor anything good at all, except a small remission of a small temporal penalty. For how would it accord with equity or agree with justice that he should accept a price most worthy of the greatest everlasting reward only for the least debt, for the least temporal penalty, when it is worth infinitely more? For thus he would be exacting excessively heavy interest. Therefore perhaps it will be said that such a man merits some everlasting reward: either less than another who is free from a debt of penalty of this kind, or equally with him. If less, then either less eternally, or less only temporally. Not less eternally, for the reasons set forth.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p340E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p340E", "locator_display": "340E–341B", "source_text": "gratia, qui secundum hypothesin potest eam inereri de congruo, faciat simile pium opus, merendo de congruo primam gratiam post peccatum, quae sit C; aut ergo C est aequalis A, vel minor, vel maior: si aequalis, redit inconueniens praetaxatum, quod videlicet adultus laudabiliter operans, beatificetur aequaliter cum paruulo solummodo baptizato. Si autem C sit minor A inconuenientia maior erit. Si vero sit maior, cur Petrus minus dispositus ad merendum quam Paulus, per simile pium opus plus meretur quam ipse? Paulus enim meretur B, gratiam aequalem A, tantummodo vel minorem; Imo ponatur, quod Paulus per aliquod bonum opus mereatur B gratiam minorem quantumuis A gratia, et consequens erit, Petrum per simile bonum opus mereri aequalem gratiam vel minorem; imo videtur rationabiliter quod minorem, cum sit minus dispositus ad merendum. Adhuc autem si C sit maior A, hoc est secundum aliquam proportionem finitam; Ponatur ergo quod meritum Petri per quod meretur C gratiam proportionaliter minoretur, vel infra; et redeunt inconuenientia praelibata; praesertim si secundum Pelagianam hypothesin, Deus nullam gratiam gratis det Petro,\n\nsed tantum propter et secundum meritum antecedens. Adhuc autem ponatur Petrum et Paulum in gratia aequali constitui, et Petrum debitorem poenae paruulae pro peccato, Paulum vero nequaquam, et ambos aequalia ope•a meritoria operari, etc. sicut supra contra responsionem priorem. Sequitur enim plane, quod magis expediret Petro satisfactionem illam differre, vsque purgatorium post hanc vitam; quod etiam Petrus saluatus in coelo, aeternaliter punietur; quod Deus dat ei parce, et improperat ei semper; quod nunquam satisfaciet, nec vnquam potest satisfacere pro peccato quocunque; quod insuper Deus immisericorditer, crudeliter, et iniuste agit cum eo, portionem videlicet meriti, cui digne debetur portio gloriae sempiterna pro satisfactione poenae paruulae compensando, cum hoc infinite plus valeat de condigno, et tam inique eius praemium defalcando. Adhuc autem si aliquod bonum opus excedat pro satisfactione huius, et aliquod minus sufficiat secundum praemissa et sicut Pelagiani fatentur, aliquod aequaliter sufficit, etc. sicut supra. Amplius autem", "english": "For suppose that Peter, baptized as an infant and having become an adult, falls by mortal sin from baptismal grace, which let be A; and that Paul, an adult established in grace, merits by some pious work a grace B, which let be equal to A or less, beyond his prior grace, or only an increase of it. But Peter, lacking grace, who according to the hypothesis can merit it congruously, does a similar pious work, meriting congruously first grace after sin, which let be C. Then either C is equal to A, or less, or greater. If equal, the inconvenience previously stated returns, namely that an adult working laudably would be beatified equally with an infant merely baptized. But if C is less than A, the inconvenience will be greater. If, however, it is greater, why does Peter, less disposed to merit than Paul, merit more than he by a similar pious work? For Paul merits B, a grace equal to A, only, or less. Indeed, suppose that Paul by some good work merits a grace B less than grace A by however much, and it will follow that Peter by a similar good work merits an equal grace or a lesser one; indeed it seems reasonable that it would be lesser, since he is less disposed to merit. Still further, if C is greater than A, that is, by some finite proportion, suppose then that Peter's merit, by which he merits C, is reduced proportionally, or below that; and the inconveniences just touched on return, especially if, according to the Pelagian hypothesis, God gives no grace freely to Peter, but only on account of and according to antecedent merit.\n\nMoreover, suppose that Peter and Paul are established in equal grace, and Peter is a debtor of a small penalty for sin but Paul by no means, and that both do equal meritorious works, etc., as above against the former response. For it follows plainly that it would be more expedient for Peter to defer that satisfaction until purgatory after this life; that Peter, even saved in heaven, would be punished eternally; that God gives to him sparingly and always reproaches him; that he will never satisfy, nor can ever satisfy, for any sin whatever; and that, besides, God acts mercilessly, cruelly and unjustly with him, namely by compensating a portion of merit, to which a portion of everlasting glory is worthily owed, for the satisfaction of a small penalty, although this is worth infinitely more condignly, and by thus unjustly docking his reward. Moreover, if some good work exceeds for the satisfaction of this, and some lesser one suffices according to what was set forth, and, as the Pelagians admit, some one suffices equally, etc., as above.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p341B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p341B", "locator_display": "341B–341E", "source_text": "quantum minus aeternaliter meretur Petrus quam Paulus, secundum quid debet quanti•as illius minoritatis attendi, nisi fortassis secundum quantitatem poenae aeternae prius sibi debitae pro peccato mortali; sed illa forsitan fuit intensior gloria quam Paulus meretur: quare et Petrus per illud opus satisfactorium nihil meretur de gloria sempiterna contra hypothesin; imo nec plene se exuit a toto debito poenae antiquae. Neque necesse est, quod peccatum Petri praecedens fuit mortale, aut poena perpetua puniendum. Nonne et si Petrus sit iam in gloria constitutus, liber est a debito poenae aeternae, et debitor forsitan poenae solummodo temporalis? Quomodo ergo Deus iustus exigit nunc ab eo debitum, et satisfactionem pro poena aeterna? Ideo fortassis dicetur in primis quod in casu priori, Petrus meretur aliquod praemium sempiternum, temporaliter tantum minus quam Paulus, tantum videlicet minus et breuius extensiue per aliquod certum tempus finitum, quanta fuit poena temporalis per\n\nmeritum suum dimissa, et ex tunc aequale extensiue et intensiue similiter in aeternum; se• nequaquam talis deformitas, imo plena conformitas reputatur a Patribus ponenda in sanctis, in foelicitate futura, et beatitudine consummata, neque tempus meriti, aut profectus putatur in coelo post finale iudicium a Patribus Orthodoxis; nec etiam locus carceralis aut poenalis in coelo a sanctis Patribus aestimatur. Quis etiam dixerit nullum satisfacere, neque posse satis•acere per pia opera quantacunque, pro quantulocunque peccato in vita praesenti, quin post hanc vitam, si transeat ad futuram, punietur ibi aliqua poena damni? Simili etiam ratione videtur, quod duorum aequaliter meritorum non simul decedentium, sed huius, in principio quasi mundi, et illius in fine, prior expectaret posteriorem, nec vllum beatitudinis gustum perciperet ante eum. Quamobrem et fortassis dicetur, quod in casu praemisso, Petrus et Paulus aequaliter omnino merentur, ergo aequale augmentum gratiae in praesenti, et gloriae in futuro; quare et Petrus simpliciter plus meretur; dimissionem videlicet poenae\n\nsuae, contra hypothesin iam praemissam. Si autem dicatur cum Apostolo ad Romanos, 5. Quod vbi abundauit delictum, superabundauit et gratia, ideo quia Iesus Christus, per quem gratia et veritas magis applicat virtutem suae benedictissimae et immaculatissimae passionis ad meritum illius, qui est debitor poenae temporalis, propter suum delictum, sic •ue e• vltra meritum suum commune cum alio, etiam poena remittitur temporalis. Hoc autem non soluit, quia sicut dicit Apostolus, vbi abundauit delictum superabundauit et gratia; est ergo remissio illa poenae ex gratia, non ex merito de condigno; neque responsio ista iuuat Pelagianos ingratos debitum meritorum in talibus nullam gratuitam gratiam profitentes; nec ratio vlla cogit Christum passum magis sibi assistere, cum sit indignior, vel saltem non dignior, quam sit alter imo cum assistat voluntarie, potest assistere minus vel aequaliter, sicut placet: Assistat ergo aequaliter, et stat argumentum incolume, sicut prius. Tunc", "english": "Furthermore, as to how much less Peter merits eternally than Paul, by what measure is the quantity of that lesser amount to be reckoned, unless perhaps by the quantity of the eternal penalty previously owed him for mortal sin? But that penalty was perhaps more intense than the glory that Paul merits;[n54] hence Peter too by that satisfactory work merits nothing of everlasting glory, against the hypothesis; indeed he does not even fully divest himself of the whole debt of the old penalty. Nor is it necessary that Peter's preceding sin was mortal, or to be punished with perpetual penalty. Is not Peter, even if he is now established in glory,[n55] free from the debt of eternal penalty, and perhaps a debtor of temporal penalty only? How then does the just God now exact from him a debt, and satisfaction, for an eternal penalty? Therefore perhaps it will be said, first, that in the former case Peter merits some everlasting reward, less than Paul only temporally, that is, less and shorter in extent by some definite finite time, as great as the temporal penalty remitted through his merit was, and from then on equal in extent and in intensity likewise to eternity. But such a deformity is by no means countenanced; rather, full conformity is considered by the Fathers to be posited in the saints, in future happiness and consummated beatitude. Nor is a time of merit or of progress held by the orthodox Fathers to exist in heaven after the final judgment; nor is a place of prison or of punishment in heaven reckoned by the holy Fathers.\n\nWho would even say that no one satisfies, or can satisfy, by pious works however great, for however small a sin in the present life, without being punished there after this life, if he passes to the future one, by some penalty of loss? By a similar reason it seems that, of two equally meritorious men who do not die at the same time, but one at the beginning, as it were, of the world and the other at its end, the earlier would wait for the later and would receive no taste of beatitude before him. Therefore perhaps it will also be said that in the case set forth Peter and Paul merit altogether equally, and so an equal increase of grace in the present and of glory in the future; hence Peter too merits more simply, namely the remission of his penalty, against the hypothesis already set forth.", "margins": [{"id": "341C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) gratia (\"grace\")."}]}, {"anchor": "p341E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p341E", "locator_display": "341E–342B", "source_text": "etiam secundum istud, quantacunque esset poena temporalis quam deberet, passio Christi quantolibet paruo merito copulata tolleret illam totam. Nulla enim videtur ratio quare tantam tolleret nec maiorem; imo si propter hoc quod in aliquo tantum superabundauit delictum, tanta superabundauit et gratia, eadem ratione in alio, vbi magis superabundauit delictum, maior proportionaliter superabundauit et gratia tollens illud, nec minus aliquid meretur de augmento gratiae et gloriae sempiternae. Dicunt alij quod ille debitor poenae, habebit necessario vnam circumstantiam meriti, quam alius non habebit, scilicet quod opus suum sit poenitentia et Ecclesiasticum Sacramentum, et illa circumstantia tollit poenam temporalem, et meritum principale acquirit augmentum gratiae et gloriae sempiternum. Sed istud non soluit: Ponatur enim, quod reus peccati venialis, et poenae temporalis sine confessione et sacramentali poenitētia pro illis tollendis faciat aliquod pium opus, et alius immunis omnino aequaliter mereatur: Vel ponatur quod ille immunis credat se reum similis peccati, et tantae\n\npoenae debitorem, et pro illis tollendis faciat similiter simile opus omnino: Vel ponatur adhuc quod sic credens conteratur, confiteatur, et faciat ex gratia omnia aequaliter sicut reus, et reuertitur arg•mentum: Vel adhuc ponatur quod talis reus peccati mortalis tempore legis priscae, quae forsitan ad oris confessionem nullatenus obligauit, per gratiam Dei, contritionem, et alia opera sancta satisfecerit pro peccato; aut quod aliquis tempore nouae legis non habens copiam Confessoris, similiter satisfaciat pro peccato suo mortali, sine poenitentiae sacramento, et tollitur responsiuncula iam praemissa. Amplius autem si quis meretur augmentum gratiae de condigno, tunc opera aeque grata aequale merentur augmentum; faciat ergo Ioannes aliquod opus gratiae tantummodo pro seipso, dicendo cum sancto Dauide, Miserere mei Deus; Petrus vero faciat opus gratiae aeque meritorium pro alijs, et ipsorum gratia intendatur, dicendo cum Apostolo, ad Philip. 1. Hoc oro, vt charitas vestra magis ac magis abundet; tunc gratia Ioannis secundum aliquid certum augetur, et gratia Petri tantum; aequaliter", "english": "If, however, it is said with the Apostle in Romans 5 that where sin abounded, grace also superabounded, for the reason that Jesus Christ, through whom come grace and truth, applies more the power of his most blessed and most immaculate passion to the merit of him who is a debtor of temporal penalty on account of his offense, and so for him, beyond his merit common with another, the temporal penalty also is remitted: this does not resolve the matter. For, as the Apostle says, where sin abounded, grace superabounded; that remission of the penalty is therefore from grace, not from condign merit. Nor does this response help the ungrateful Pelagians, who profess a debt of merits in such matters and no gratuitous grace.[n56] Nor does any reason compel that the suffering Christ assist him more, since he is more unworthy, or at least not more worthy, than another; indeed, since he assists voluntarily, he can assist less or equally, as it pleases. Let him therefore assist equally, and the argument stands unharmed, as before.\n\nThen also, according to this view, however great the temporal penalty he owed, the passion of Christ, joined with merit however small, would take away all of it. For no reason appears why it should take away this much and not more; indeed, if because in one man sin superabounded so much, grace superabounded just as much, then by the same reasoning in another, where sin superabounded more, grace removing it superabounded proportionally greater, and he merits no less of an increase of grace and everlasting glory.\n\nOthers say that that debtor of penalty will necessarily have one circumstance of merit that the other will not have, namely that his work is penance and an ecclesiastical sacrament, and that this circumstance removes the temporal penalty, while the principal merit acquires the increase of everlasting grace and glory. But this does not resolve it. For suppose that one guilty of venial sin and of temporal penalty, without confession and sacramental penance, does some pious work to remove them, and that another, wholly immune, merits equally; or suppose that that immune man believes himself guilty of a similar sin and a debtor of so great a penalty, and does likewise an altogether similar work to remove them; or suppose further that, so believing, he is contrite, confesses, and does everything equally from grace just as the guilty man does, and the argument returns. Or suppose still that such a man, guilty of mortal sin in the time of the old law, which perhaps did not at all bind to oral confession, has satisfied for his sin by God's grace, contrition and other holy works; or that someone in the time of the new law, having no access to a confessor, similarly satisfies for his mortal sin without the sacrament of penance; and the little reply already set forth is removed.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p342B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p342B", "locator_display": "342B–342D", "source_text": "enim meretur; et gratia illorum pro quibus Petrus orat, augetur in aliquo: Quicquid enim petierimus Patrem in nomine Filij dabit nobis; Petrus ergo simpliciter plus meretur, quod contradicit hypothesi manifeste. Videtur etiam quod oratio Petri in gratia esset meri• infiniti: Sint enim multi infideles dispositi ad gratiam fidei Christianae, pro quibus oret Petrus tantum generaliter, vt conuertantur ad fidem, et fiat vnum ouile, et vnus pastor. Cum ergo quicquid petierimus Patrem in nomine Filij, dabit nobis, aliquem vel aliquos illorum conuertet; et cum nulla sit causa maior pro vno quam pro alio, (esto quod aequaliter disponantur) sequitur quod singuli conuertentur; et eadem ratione sic fieret, si essent centum, vel mille, vel in aliquo numero quantocunque. Oratio ergo Petri, quantum est de se, non est meriti limita•, sed potius infiniti. Confirmatur haec ratio, quia si oratio Petri tantum vni valeret, esset certi meriti; si valeat duobus, est maioris, et sic deinceps; et quanto est maioris meriti, tanto dignior est, vt pro pluribus acceptetur: Quanto ergo pro\n\npluribus orat, et auditur, tanto adhuc pro pluribus dignius audietur. Rursum cum nullo modo rationabile videatur, quod meritum orationis Petri plus valeat ex debito, alij, vel alijs, quam ipsi Petro, cum Psalmus trigesimus quartus dicat, Oratio mea in sinu meo conuertetur, videtur quod illa oratio sit etiam ipsi Petro meriti infiniti. Si autem dicatur, quod quanto pluribus meretur gratiam, tanto cuilibet illorum minorem meretur; quare ratio illa non procedit; hoc stare non potest: quia tunc mereretur aliquibus minorem gratiam gratia baptismali, et minorem gloriam sempiternam, quam sit minima gloria paruulorum, aut quae per se possit sentiri. Amplius autem quod opera aeque grata non mereantur condigne gratiam augeri aequaliter, suadetur; quia tunc eadem ratione mererentur aequaliter caetera bona cuncta; cum tamen duorum aequalium prior decedens semper aeque intense, et cum hoc diutius alio glorietur. Item tunc existens in gratia posset per orationes suas mereri de condigno primam gratiam alteri gratiam non habenti; non ergo esset gratia per praedicta; imo et posset", "english": "Moreover, if someone merits an increase of grace condignly, then equally pleasing works merit an equal increase. Let John then do some work of grace only for himself, saying with holy David, \"Have mercy on me, O God\"; and let Peter do a work of grace equally meritorious, for others, and let their grace be intensified, saying with the Apostle, in Philippians 1, \"This I pray, that your charity may abound more and more.\" Then John's grace is increased by something definite, and Peter's grace by as much, for he merits equally; and the grace of those for whom Peter prays is increased by something. For whatever we ask the Father in the Son's name he will give us. Peter therefore merits simply more, which manifestly contradicts the hypothesis.\n\nIt seems also that Peter's prayer in grace would be of infinite merit. For suppose there are many unbelievers disposed to the grace of the Christian faith, for whom Peter prays only in general, that they may be converted to the faith, and that there may be one sheepfold and one shepherd. Since then whatever we ask the Father in the Son's name he will give us, he will convert one or some of them; and since there is no greater cause for one than for another (granted that they are equally disposed), it follows that each will be converted. And by the same reasoning it would be so if there were a hundred, or a thousand, or any number however great. Peter's prayer, therefore, so far as it depends on itself, is not of limited merit, but rather of infinite. This reasoning is confirmed: if Peter's prayer availed for only one person, it would be of a definite merit; if it avails for two, it is of greater, and so on; and the greater its merit, the more worthy it is to be accepted for more people. The more people therefore he prays for and is heard, the more worthily will he still be heard for more.\n\nAgain, since it seems in no way reasonable that the merit of Peter's prayer should be worth more, as a matter of debt, to another or to others than to Peter himself, since the thirty-fourth Psalm says, \"My prayer shall return into my bosom,\" it seems that that prayer is of infinite merit also for Peter himself. If, however, it is said that the more people he merits grace for, the less he merits for each of them, so that that reasoning does not proceed: this cannot stand. For then he would merit for some a grace less than baptismal grace, and a lesser everlasting glory than the least glory of infants, or than one that could be sensed in itself.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p342D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p342D", "locator_display": "342D–343A", "source_text": "mereri de condigno sibi ipsi gratiam primam dari: Oret enim in gratia; quod si contingat eum cadere ab ea peccando mortaliter, Deus infundat sibi gratiam resurgendi, et sit oratio sua tam efficax, quod hoc impetret de condigno, tunc si peccet mortaliter, Deus tenetur ex merito suo condigno priori, dare sibi gratiam primam qua resurgat. Item tunc adultus in primo instanti, quo sibi infunditur gratia, potest meritorie illa vti, sicut plane docet Anselmus, De veritate, 12 quod et multis rationibus, et autoritatibus alias erat suasum, et. vt aestimo. pe• suasum. Quare et potest mereri condigne, et recipere in eodem instanti augmentum illius. Et cum in qualitate intensa non sit cumulus partium remissarum, sed sit semper tantum vnica qualitas pure simplex, vt hic suppono, quia hoc vt arbitror alibi est\n\nostensum; potest ergo mereri condigne gratiam suam primam, quod est contra positionem istorum, et contra Catholicam veritatem, sicut 35um cap. declarauit. Rursum si in instanti mereatur condigne certum augmentum gratiae sibi dari, sequitur quod si similiter mereatur continue per aliquod totum tempus, merebitur condigne augmentum gratiae infinitum; vel per aliquod totum tempus continuum, merendo similiter, sicut in instanti aequaliter tantum merebitur condigne sicut in instanti, et per aliquod totum tempus continuum adhuc minus. Amplius autem tunc aliquis gratiosus posset mereri condigne cuilibet viatori, etiam reprobo gratiam conuersionis, et gloriam sempiternam cum aliquibus praedestinatis peioribus illis possit; cuius oppositum patuit de Samuele orante pro Saule, et Ieremia orante pro populo Iudaeorum, et per Augustinum 21. de Ciuitate Dei 25. vniuersaliter de omnibus reprobis, sicut 25um capitulum alle gauit. Item aliquis finaliter reprobatus habet aliquoties charitatem,", "english": "Moreover, that equally pleasing works do not condignly merit an equal increase of grace is urged by this: that then by the same reasoning they would equally merit all other goods too; whereas of two equals, the one who departs first is always equally intensely, and in addition for longer than the other, glorified. Likewise, then someone existing in grace could by his prayers merit condignly first grace for another who does not have grace; so by what has been said it would not be grace. Indeed he could even merit condignly that first grace be given to himself. For let him pray in grace; and if it should happen that he falls from it by mortal sin, let God infuse in him the grace of rising again, and let his prayer be so efficacious that he obtains this condignly. Then, if he sins mortally, God is bound by his prior condign merit to give him first grace by which he may rise. Likewise, then an adult in the first instant in which grace is infused into him can use it meritoriously, as Anselm plainly teaches in On Truth, 12,[n57] which was elsewhere urged by many reasons and authorities and, as I think, shown persuasively. Hence he can also merit condignly, and receive in the same instant, an increase of it. And since in an intense quality there is no heap of remitted parts,[n58] but it is always only one quality, purely simple, as I suppose here, because, as I judge, this has been shown elsewhere: he can therefore merit condignly his own first grace, which is against the position of those men and against Catholic truth, as the 35th chapter declared.", "margins": [{"id": "342E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) vniuoca (\"univocal\")."}]}, {"anchor": "p343A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p343A", "locator_display": "343A–343C", "source_text": "qui postea respicit, et similiter abit retro, vel saltem hoc est possibile, alioquin omnis habens charitatem et gratiam necessario saluaretur; quod et fuit verum de Saule, et Iuda, sicut Doctores affirmant: Talis autem existens in gratia quantacunque, non potest mereri condigne, quod Deus eum amet ad vitam; Exerceat enim se talis reprobatus in operibus gratiae quantumcunque, etiam decies millies plusquam faciat vnus praedestinatus; nec adhuc Deus amat eum ad vitam, sed tantum odit eum ad mortem, sicut vnquam faciet in futuro; Cum enim talis post omnia merita sit mortuus et sepultus in Inferno, finaliterque damnatus, certum est Deum non amare ipsum ad vitam, sed odire ad mortem; quare nec vnquam cum amauit, nec etiam non odiuit, sicut 23. et 25. docent. Praeterea si talis possit mereri condigne, quod Deus eum amaret, posset mouere voluntatem diuinam de reprobatione ad praedestinationem, de odio ad amorem, vel saltem posset eam a priori et efficienter mouere, contra 20um. et si vnus existens in gratia non potest mereri condigne quod ametur ad vitam aeternam, ergo nullus. Similiter quoque potest ostendi, quod nullus existens in gratia potest mereri de congruo\n\ncausaliter et antecedenter voluntati diuinae, quod ametur a Deo ad vitam aeternam, vel quod magis ametur ab eo. Amplius autem videtur, quod nullus potest mereri de condigno, et de rigori iuris aliquid boni a Deo, nisi forsitan sit tale bonum, quod ad meritum inseparabiliter consequatur, sicut est fortassis esse merentem bonum et iustum simpliciter vel in parte; Alias enim qui mereretur, •ogeret Deum et voluntatem diuinam necessario ad reddendum, vel ad reddere volendum mercedem, vel ad perdendum iustitiam. Si enim iustus Dominus in omnibus vijs suis permaneat, et aliquis mereatur condigne quicquam ab eo, iustum est vt hoc habeat, et omne tale iustum a voluntate Dei est iustum, sicut 21 um docet. Quare necesse est vt velit reddere illud sibi; maxime cum per 22um habeat actum voluntatis circa retributionem mercedis, quapropter et cum non deficiat sibi posse, necesse est vt reddat, sicut decimum ostendebat; sicque creatura cogeret Deum velle, et etiam extrinsecus operari, quod nullo modo permittet prima Suppositio, et eius perfectio infinita, neque 20um poterit consentire.", "english": "Again, if in an instant he merits condignly that a definite increase of grace be given to him, it follows that if he likewise merits continuously through some whole time, he will merit condignly an infinite increase of grace; or, meriting likewise through some whole continuous time, he will merit condignly equally only as much as in an instant, and through some whole continuous time still less.[n59] Moreover, then some man in grace could merit condignly for any wayfarer, even a reprobate, the grace of conversion and everlasting glory, since he can do so for some of the predestined who are worse than they.[n60] The opposite of this was made plain in the case of Samuel praying for Saul, and Jeremiah praying for the people of the Jews, and by Augustine, City of God 21, 25, universally about all the reprobate, as the 25th chapter cited.\n\nLikewise, someone finally reprobate has charity at times, and afterward looks back,[n61] and likewise turns backward; or at least this is possible, otherwise everyone having charity and grace would necessarily be saved. This was true of Saul and Judas, as the Doctors affirm. But such a one, existing in grace however great, cannot merit condignly that God love him to life. For let such a reprobate exercise himself in works of grace however much, even ten thousand times more than a predestined man does; still God does not love him to life, but only hates him to death, as he will ever do in the future. For since such a man, after all his merits, is dead and buried in Hell and finally damned, it is certain that God does not love him to life but hates him to death; hence he never loved him, nor ever failed to hate him, as the 23rd and 25th teach. Moreover, if such a man could merit condignly that God would love him, he could move the divine will from reprobation to predestination, from hate to love, or at least could move it a priori and efficiently, against the 20th. And if one existing in grace cannot merit condignly that he be loved to eternal life, then no one can. Likewise it can also be shown that no one existing in grace can merit congruously, causally and antecedently, to the divine will, that he be loved by God to eternal life, or loved more by him.\n\nMoreover, it seems that no one can merit anything good from God condignly and by strict right, unless perhaps it is such a good as inseparably follows upon the merit, such as perhaps being, for the one who merits, good and just, simply or in part. Otherwise, the one who merited would compel God and the divine will necessarily to render, or to be willing to render, the reward, or to lose justice. For if the Lord remains just in all his ways, and someone merits anything condignly from him, it is just that he have it, and everything just of this kind is just by the will of God, as the 21st teaches. Hence it is necessary that he will to render it to him, especially since by the 22nd he has an act of will concerning the retribution of the reward; wherefore also, since power does not fail him, it is necessary that he render, as the tenth showed. And so the creature would compel God to will, and even to act outwardly, what the first Supposition, with its infinite perfection, in no way permits, nor will the 20th be able to consent.", "margins": [{"id": "343B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) efficaciter (\"effectively\");"}, {"id": "343B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) perpetuam (\"perpetual\")."}]}, {"anchor": "p343D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p343D", "locator_display": "343D", "source_text": "Item ponatur secundum aduersarios, quod Iohannes heri meruit de condigno A bonum cras sibi reddi a Deo; Heri ergo fuit iustum, et volutum a Deo, quod A cras redderetur Iohanni; ponatur etiam quod hodie demereatur A; Deus ergo hodie non vult reddere A Iohanni; quare et per 23um nec heri volebat; imo hodie vult quod nunquam habebit A, quapropter et per idem 23um volebat heri similiter. Adhuc autem si quis potest quicquam condigne mereri a Deo potest, vt videtur, mereri condigne sibi vel alteri existenti in gratia, vt perseueret finaliter et saluetur; quod si fecerit, talis viator non potest peccare mortaliter nec damnari. Item per 20um huius, nullum meritum est motiuum voluntatis diuinae, quare nec causa, quare Deus vult dare cuiquam hoc vel illud. Et per eadem argumenta potest ostendi, quod nullus causaliter et antecedenter meretur de congruo quicquam boni a Deo, supposito quod nullum congruum sit iniustum, sicut nullum iniustum videtur congruum, et quod omne congruum sit iustum, volutum que a Deo. Item nullus meretur condigne quicquam ab alio, qui nihil prius facit pro eo,", "english": "Again, suppose, as the adversaries do, that John yesterday merited condignly that a good, A, be returned to him by God tomorrow. Then yesterday it was just, and willed by God, that A be returned to John tomorrow. Suppose also that today he forfeits A by demerit. Then God today does not will to return A to John; hence, by the 23rd, neither did he will it yesterday. Indeed, today he wills that John will never have A, and so, by the same 23rd, he likewise willed this yesterday. Moreover, if anyone can merit anything condignly from God, he can, it seems, merit condignly, for himself or for another who is in grace, that he persevere to the end and be saved. If he does this, such a wayfarer cannot sin mortally or be damned. Again, by the 20th of this, no merit is a motive of the divine will, and therefore not a cause why God wills to give anyone this or that. By the same arguments it can be shown that no one merits from congruity, causally and antecedently, any good from God. This supposes that nothing congruous is unjust, just as nothing unjust seems congruous, and that everything congruous is just and willed by God. Again, no one merits anything condignly from another who has first done nothing for him,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p343E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p343E", "locator_display": "343E", "source_text": "aut dat sibi. Nam opus proprium laborantis debet mercedem praecedere tempore vel natura. Si enim omnem operationem a Deo priore recipiat, et in eius virtute continuet, non videtur per hoc mereri condigne quicquam ab eo, sed magis teneri sibi post operationem suam quam ante; quia tunc plus boni benigne recepit ab eo, quam ante, et maxime qui nihil proprium dantis donat, sed tantum bonum illius cui donatur. Nullus autem homo prius facit pro Deo; Ipse enim in qualibet factione et motione est primus factor et motor, sicut ex superioribus clare patet. Quid ergo meretur homo condigne per huiusmodi factionem? Haec autem videtur ratio Apostoli ad Rom. 11. Quis, inquit, prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quoniā ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia. Vnde constat, quod ex gratia sola dat bona, non ex merito praecedenti. Quare et Aug. super illud Psal. 32. Omnia opera eius in fide, innuens distinctionem de debitore et debito ita dicit; Teneamus Deum fidelissim um debitorem, quia", "english": "or given him anything. For the laborer's own work must precede the wage, in time or in nature. If he receives every operation from God, who is prior, and continues in his power, he does not seem by this to merit anything condignly from him, but rather to owe him more after his working than before. For then he has benignly received more good from him than before, and above all he gives nothing proper to the giver, only a good of him to whom it is given. No man, however, first does anything for God; for God himself is, in every making and moving, the first maker and mover, as is clearly evident from what precedes. What then does man merit condignly by such making? This seems to be the Apostle's reasoning in Rom 11: Who, he says, has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? for from him, and through him, and in him are all things. Hence it is clear that he gives good things from grace alone, not from preceding merit. Therefore Augustine too, on that verse of Ps 32 [33], All his works are in faith, hinting at the distinction between debtor and debt, speaks thus: Let us hold God as the most faithful debtor, because", "margins": [{"id": "343E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) principalis (\"chief\") for primus. Printed in the margin beside the same lines, but without a marker in the keyed text: (source) the Apostle, Rom 11 [11:35–36]."}, {"id": "343E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p344A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p344A", "locator_display": "344A–344B", "source_text": "tenemus misericordissimum promissorem: Neque enim aliquid ei mutuum commodauimus, vt debitorem teneamus, cum ab illo habeamus quicquid ei offerimus. Quis enim prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quoniam ab ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia: Ergo non ei aliquid dedimus, et debitorem tenemus. Vnde ergo debitorem? quia fidelissimum promissorem; Cui concordat Anselmus de Concordia 9. dicens, Deus nulli dat pro praecedenti merito. Quando quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Idem que 1. Cur Deus homo 20. Deus nulli quicquam debet, sed omnis creatura illi debet, et ideo non expedit homini, vt agat cum Deo quemadmodum par cum pari. Lumbardus etiam 1. Sentent. dist. 43. sequens Augustinum, dicit Deum non esse debitorem nostrum nisi forsitan ex promisso, non ex commisso. Hoc idem sentit Cypryanus superius allegatus, cum dicit, in nullo nobis gloriandum, quoniam nostrum nihil est. Et Glossa super illud ad Rom. 4. Ei autem qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum, Quod, inquit, bene operamur accepta gratia,\n\nnon nobis sed illi tribuendum est, qui per gratiā nos iustificauit: Nam si debitam ante gratiam mercedem vellet reddere, peccatoribus poenam redderet debitam. Non igitur tibi blandiaris de meritis, cum tibi reddi mercedem secundum debitum operis audis, tanquam non sit in opere gratia retribuentis, sicut in fide est gratia iustificantis. Vix enim mihi suadeo vllum opus dici ex debito, remunerationē Dei deposcere, cum etiam hoc ipsum quod agere aliquid possumus, vel cogitare, vel proloqui, ipsius dono et largitione faciamus. Beatus quoque Bernard, de gratia et lib. arbit. vlt. tractans de corona iustitiae reddenda Apostolo vult hoc idem. Item per primam Suppositionem et tertiam partem Corollarij primi huius, •ihil, quod aliquo modo minuit libertatem tribuendum est Deo; sed debete de condigno, et puro iuris rigore minuit libertatem, et aliquo modo subijcit seruituti; Nam liberior esset Dominus, qui haberet scruos operantes, et nihil teneretur eis ex debito vel rigore, sed tantum ex spontanea libertate, quam qui teneretur seruis suis operantibus ex necessario debito et rigore, et ad reddendum", "english": "we hold him as a most merciful promiser. For we have lent him nothing, that we might hold him as debtor, since we have from him whatever we offer him. For who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? because from him, and through him, and in him are all things. Therefore we have given him nothing, and yet we hold him as debtor. Whence then do we have him as debtor? Because he is the most faithful promiser. Anselm agrees with this in On Concord 9, saying: God gives to no one for a preceding merit. When has anyone first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? And the same Anselm in Why God Became Man 1, 20: God owes nothing to anyone, but every creature owes to him, and therefore it does not befit man to deal with God as an equal with an equal. Lombard also, Sentences 1, dist. 43, following Augustine, says that God is not our debtor except perhaps by promise, not by anything entrusted [n62]. Cyprian, cited above, thinks the same, when he says that we must glory in nothing, since nothing is ours. And the Gloss on that verse of Rom 4, To him who works, the wage is not reckoned according to grace, but according to what is owed, says: What we do well, once grace is received,\n\nis to be ascribed not to us but to him who has justified us through grace. For if he wished to render the wage owed before grace, he would render to sinners the punishment owed. Do not, then, flatter yourself about merits, when you hear that a wage is returned to you according to the debt of the work, as though in the work there were no grace of the one who rewards, as in faith there is the grace of the one who justifies. For I can hardly persuade myself that any work is said to claim God's remuneration from debt, since even this very thing, that we can do something, or think, or say, we do by his gift and bounty. The blessed Bernard also, in On Grace and Free Choice, last chapter, treating of the crown of justice to be rendered to the Apostle, wills the same. Again, by the first Supposition and the third part of the first Corollary of this, nothing that in any way diminishes freedom is to be ascribed to God. But to owe condignly, and by the pure rigor of law, diminishes freedom and in a certain way subjects it to servitude. For a Lord would be freer who had servants working for him and were bound to them by no debt or rigor but only by spontaneous freedom, than one who were bound to his working servants by necessary debt and rigor, and could be compelled against his will to render payment, and who would in that case be subject to the injury of servitude.", "margins": [{"id": "344A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "344A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Cyprian; the Gloss."}, {"id": "344B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) confidas (\"you should trust\") for blandiaris."}]}, {"anchor": "p344C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p344C", "locator_display": "344C–344D", "source_text": "posset compelli inuitus, qui etiam alias subiaceret iniuriae seruituti. Item per eadem nihil quod minuit libertatem donantis, tribuendum est Deo, sed debitum minuit; Liberalius enim est dare gratis quam debite. Item nullus meretur aliquid ab alio de condigno, qui non facit aliquid, uod sibi aliquo modo sit bonum, sed tantummodo facienti; sed per quintam partem Corollarij primi huius, nullus homo facit aliquod bonum Deo. Quare et Iob 22. Quid prodes Deo, si iustus fueris, aut quid ei confers, si immaculata fuerit vita tua? sed quicquid boni facit homo, proficit sibi ipsi. Vnde et August. 3. de lib. arbit. 25. Deus nulli debet aliquid, quia omnia gratuito praestat, et si quis dicat aliquid ab illo deberi meritis suis, certe vt esset non ei debebatur. Non enim erat cut deberetur, et tamen quod meritum est conuerti ad cum ex quo es, vt ex ipso etiam melior sis, ex quo habes vt sis? quid ergo ei praerogas vt tanquam debitum poscas, quando si nolles ad eum conuerti, nihil ei de esset, tu autem miser esses? omnia ergo illi debent, primo quod sunt, in quantum naturae sunt; deinde quicquid melius possunt\n\nesse si velint quaecunque acceperunt vt velint, et quicquid oportet eas esse. Item nullus carens gratia, potest ex se satisfacere Deo condigne pro peccato originali, aut minimo actuali sicut videtur ex praemissis circa 32am partem, 38am et 39am Corollarij primi huius; quare nec mereri quicquam ab eo de debito et condigno. Quicquid enim boni talis poterit facere, minus est debito pro peccato. Nam alias talis possit ex se mereri condigne gratiam in praesenti, et gloriam in futuro contra priora. Hoc etiam probat Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo 21. et 22. quod et beatus Iob videtur sentire cum dicit, Peccaui, quid faciam tibi o Custos hominū? Iob 7. quasi dicat, Peccaui, quid faciam tibi pro satisfactione condigna? innuendo, quod nihil. Super quod beatus Greg. 8. Moral. 21. dicit; Ecce fatetur malum quod fecit, sed bonum, quod Deo in recompensationem debeat offerre, non inuenit; quia ad abluendam culpam quaelibet humanae actionis virtus infirma est, nisi hanc misericordia parcentis foucat, et non iustitia", "english": "Again, by the same, nothing that diminishes the freedom of the giver is to be ascribed to God, but debt diminishes it; for it is more liberal to give freely than as due. Again, no one merits anything condignly from another unless he does something that is in some way good for that other, and not only for the doer; but by the fifth part of the first Corollary of this, no man does any good to God. Hence Job 22: What do you profit God, if you are just, or what do you confer on him, if your life is spotless? But whatever good man does, profits himself. And so Augustine, On Free Choice 3, 25: God owes nothing to anyone, because he bestows all things gratuitously; and if anyone says that something is owed by him to his merits, surely, for it to exist, it was not owed to him. For there was no one to whom it could have been owed; and yet what merit is it to be turned to him from whom you are, so that from him you may also be better, from whom you have it that you are? Why then do you claim precedence with him, so as to demand it as a debt, when, if you were unwilling to be turned to him, nothing would be lacking to him, and you would be wretched? All things therefore owe to him: first that they are, insofar as they are natures; then whatever better they can be if they will, whatever they have received that they may will, and whatever it behooves them to be.\n\nAgain, no one lacking grace can of himself satisfy God condignly for original sin, or even the least actual sin, as appears from what was premised around the 32nd part, and the 38th and 39th, of the first Corollary of this. Hence neither can he merit anything from him from debt and condignity. For whatever good such a one can do is less than the debt for sin. Otherwise such a one could of himself merit condignly grace in the present and glory in the future, contrary to what was said earlier. Anselm also proves this in Why God Became Man 1, 21 and 22. The blessed Job seems to hold the same when he says, I have sinned; what shall I do to you, O Guardian of men? (Job 7), as if to say: I have sinned; what shall I do to you for condign satisfaction? hinting that he can do nothing. On this the blessed Gregory says, Moralia 8, 21: Behold, he confesses the evil he has done, but the good which he ought to offer to God in compensation he does not find; because, for washing away guilt, the virtue of any human action is weak, unless the mercy of one who spares fosters it, and the justice of one who judges rightly does not press it down.", "margins": [{"id": "344C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Job 22 [22:2–3]."}, {"id": "344C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "344D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "344D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gregory."}]}, {"anchor": "p344E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p344E", "locator_display": "344E", "source_text": "recte iudicantis premat. Itē nullus potest reddere plenarie debitū quod accepit a Deo; quare nec ⟨gap: 1 word⟩ miseri ab eo ex pure debito, et condigno; Filius enim non potest reddere patri carna •quantū debet; quanto minus potest quis reddere quantū debet Patricoelesti. Si enim filius po•t •ddere patti quantū debet; reddat, et est absolutus ab omni obligatione naturali et deb•o erga patrē, •ta quod nullo casu emergente plus tenetur pat•i, quam extranco cuicū que quod •ex •turae, et gratitudinis non permittit. Vnde Philos. 8 Eth. vlt. Reddendum tribuentem quod contingit; Posse enim amicitia requirit non quod secundū dignitatem. Ne que enim i• omnibus est, quemadmodum et in his, quae ad Deos, hominibus, et parentes. Nullus enim secundum d•gnitatem ali quando vtique retribuet: in potentiam autem famulans epicikes esse videtur; debentem enim reddendum; nihil autem faciens dignum corum, quae subfuerunt,", "english": "Again, no one can fully repay the debt which he has received from God; hence neither can he merit anything from him from pure debt and condignity. For a son cannot repay his carnal father as much as he owes; how much less can anyone repay as much as he owes to the heavenly Father. For if a son could repay his father as much as he owes, let him repay it, and he is absolved from every natural obligation and debt toward his father, so that in no case that may arise is he bound to his father more than to any stranger whatever. This the law of nature and of gratitude does not permit. Hence the Philosopher, Ethics 8, last [chapter] [n63]: Return should be made to the benefactor of what one can; for friendship requires what is possible, not what accords with worth. For it is not so in all cases, as also in those matters that pertain to the gods, to men, and to parents. For no one will ever make a return according to worth; but one who serves according to his ability seems equitable; for one who owes must make repayment; but one who does nothing worthy of those things that were at hand [n64],", "margins": [{"id": "344E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) the Philosopher."}, {"id": "344E·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) retribuendum (\"to be repaid\")."}]}, {"anchor": "p345A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p345A", "locator_display": "345A–345B", "source_text": "operatus est; quare semper debet. Item quicunque recepit aliquid ab alto, tenetur ad aequale si possit, sicut lex gratitudinis clare probat; vnde dicit Philosophus, 8. Eth. 13. Potenti retribuendum secundum dignitatem eorum quae passus est, et sponte; cui et concordat autoritas proximo allegata. Et 5. Eth. 8. ponitur quaedam species iustitiae commutatiuae retribuere proportionaliter beneficio praeaccepto: Dicitur enim ibi; In contra facere proportionale commanet ciuitas, si autem non, seruitus videtur esse; si enim non, tetributio non fit, retributione autem commanent: propter quod et gratiatum sacramentum prompte faciunt, vt retributio fit, hoc enim proprium gratiae: refamulari enim oportet ei qui gratiam fecit, et rursus ipsum incipere gratiam facientem, quod et septem libri Senecae de beneficijs saepissime cō testantur. Quare et si plus recepit, quam retribuere valeat, tenetur retribuere quantum potest, quod et prima autoritas Philosophi plane dicit. Sed Deus plus fecit pro nobis quam possumus reddere ad condignum, sicut vult prima autoritas Philosophi memorata, et pater, quia\n\nDeus dedit homini totum seipsum, et omnes suas potentias, ac habitus siue actus sicut praecedentia manifestant: Haec ergo omnia debet Deo. Adhuc autem vltra ista, Deus dedit homini, et pro homine misero, et captiuo, flammis perpetuis obligato, seipsum incarnatum, passum, mortuum et sepultum in precisi temporaliter redimendo; promitrit insuper et dat scipsum totum in praemium foeliciter consummando, quod excedit quemlibet purum hominem infinite: Quilibet ergo homo debet Deo infinite plusquam est, et potest, vel ad minimum quantum potest. Confirmatur haec ratio per Anselm. in illa Meditatione sua de redempt. humanae animae, Christiana anima de graui morte resuscitata, dicentem; Certe Domine, quia me fecisti, debeo amori tuo meipsum totum; quia me redemisti, debeo meipsum totum, imo tantum debeo amori tuo plusquam meipsum, quantum tu es maior me pro quo dedisti teipsum, et cui promittis teipsum. Respondetur forte secundum eundem Anselm. 2. Cur Deus homo, 18. dicentem; Cum dicis creaturam debere Deo quod melius scit ac potest, si intelligis ex debito, et non subaudis,", "english": "has labored; therefore he always owes. Again, whoever has received anything from another is bound to return the equal, if he can, as the law of gratitude clearly proves. Hence the Philosopher says, Ethics 8, 13: One who is able must make return according to the worth of what he has received, and willingly. The authority just cited agrees with this. And in Ethics 5, 8 a certain species of commutative justice is posited: to return proportionally for a benefit previously received. For it is said there: By doing in return proportionally the city holds together; but if not, servitude seems to result; for if not, repayment is not made, and by repayment they hold together. For this reason they also promptly perform the sacred rite of the Graces [n65], that repayment may occur; for this is proper to favor: one must serve in return the one who has done a favor, and then himself begin again by doing a favor. The seven books of Seneca On Benefits attest this very often. Hence even if a man has received more than he is able to return, he is bound to return as much as he can, as the first authority of the Philosopher plainly says. But God has done more for us than we can return condignly, as the first-cited authority of the Philosopher wills; and it is clear, because God gave man his whole being, and all his powers, and habits or acts, as the preceding show. All these things, therefore, man owes to God. And beyond these, God gave to man, and for wretched man, a captive bound over to everlasting flames, himself incarnate, suffering, dead and buried, as a price, to redeem him in time. He promises besides, and gives himself whole, as a reward, to bring him to blessed completion; and this exceeds any mere man infinitely. Therefore every man owes God infinitely more than he is and can [render], or at the very least as much as he can. This reasoning is confirmed by Anselm, in that Meditation of his on the redemption of the human soul, which begins \"Christian soul, raised from grave death\" [n66], where he says: Surely, Lord, because you made me, I owe your love my whole self; because you redeemed me, I owe my whole self; indeed, I owe your love as much more than myself as you, for whom you gave yourself, and to whom you promise yourself, are greater than I. Perhaps one will reply, according to the same Anselm, Why God Became Man 2, 18, who says: When you say that a creature owes God what it knows and is able to do best, if you understand this as from debt, and do not supply,", "margins": [{"id": "345B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "345B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) Christi for Christiana (see note 66)."}]}, {"anchor": "p345C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p345C", "locator_display": "345C–345D", "source_text": "si Deus iuber, non est semper verum. Siquidem non debet homo virginitatem ex debiro, sed si vult debet vti coniugio: sed istud non soluit; Deus enim non iubendo, non destruit legē gratitudinis, quam sanciuit, et hac lege quilibet benefaciatus renetur benefactori ad aequale vel maius, vel saltem ad id quod potest, vt volunt autoritates priores. Item si Deus exigeret, homo teneretur facere quantum posset; si autem non exigat, sed voluntati propriae liberū derelinquat, plus facit pro eo, cum libertatem maiorem concedat; quare et hoc ipso, homo plus vel saltem tantum obligatur Deo, quam vel quantum esset alias obligatus. Hic aliquis forsitan respondebit, quod Deus potest totam illam obligationem remittere: Dicit enim Philos. 8. Eth. vlt. statim post autoritatem allegatam de retributione dijs et parentibus facienda, quibus autem debetur, potestas dimittere et patri vtique. Sed rursum contra istum reuertitur argumentum: nam tantum debitum, et tantam obligationem remitteret est beneficium vnum non paruum. Pro illo ergo cum alijs amplius obligatur, sicut si creditor omnem pecuniam accommodatam\n\ndebitori libere condonaret, et quantum posset, omnem obligationem remitteret, tanto ipsum sibi arctius obligaret, quanto secundum beneficium primum excederet. Verum ne Anselmo et Arist. videar contraire, dico, quod sicut potest elici ex sententia vtriusque; Debere est dupliciter, scilicet potentialiter scu habitualiter, et actualiter; actualiter debere, intelligo actualiter obligari ad aliquid faciendum sub poena peccati, sicut est de operario conducto ad certam operam faciendum, sic que non tenemur facere quicquid poterimus propter Deum; et haec est forte mens Anselmi, et sic secundum Arist. pater potest dimittere filio, et Deus homini, ne sibi, quantum potuerit, obligetur. Potentialiter vero siue habitualiter debere intelligo quenquam beneficiatum ex beneficio praeaccepto, habere obligationem in potentia et in habitu ad aliquid faciendum, quae cum benefactori placuerit, potest reduci ad actum, scilicet si exigat hoc ab eo; velut si Iohannes traderet Petro, 10. interposita tali conditione; Habeas libere ista 10. nisi contingat me ipsa repetere; quae si repetam, mihi resoluere tenearis; et sic quaelibet", "english": "\"if God commands,\" it is not always true. For man does not owe virginity from debt, but if he wishes, he ought to make use of marriage. But this does not resolve the matter; for God, by not commanding, does not destroy the law of gratitude which he has ordained, and by this law everyone who has been benefited is bound to his benefactor for the equal or more, or at least for what he can, as the earlier authorities hold. Again, if God demanded, man would be bound to do as much as he could; but if he does not demand, and leaves the matter free to man's own will, he does more for him, since he grants greater freedom. Hence by this very fact man is more obligated to God, or at least as much, as he would otherwise have been. Here someone will perhaps answer that God can remit that entire obligation; for the Philosopher says, Ethics 8, last, immediately after the authority cited on the repayment to be made to the gods and parents, but those to whom it is owed have the power to release, and a father surely. But the argument turns back once more against him. For to remit so great a debt and so great an obligation is one benefit, and not a small one. For this, therefore, together with the others, man is further obligated. It is as when a creditor freely forgives a debtor all the money lent, and remits every obligation as far as he can: he binds the debtor to himself the more tightly, by as much as the second benefit exceeds the first.\n\nBut lest I seem to contradict Anselm and Aristotle, I say, as can be drawn from the opinion of each, that to owe is twofold, namely potentially or habitually, and actually. By owing actually I understand being actually obligated to do something under penalty of sin, as a hired workman is to perform a definite work; and in this way we are not bound to do for God whatever we can. This is perhaps Anselm's meaning; and so, according to Aristotle, a father can release his son, and God man, so that he not be obligated to him to the full extent he could be. By owing potentially or habitually I understand that anyone who has been benefited by a benefit previously received has an obligation, in potency and in habit, to do something, which, when it pleases the benefactor, can be reduced to act, namely if he demands it of him. It is as if John handed over ten to Peter on this condition: Have these ten freely, unless it happens that I take them back; and if I take them back, you are bound to pay them back to me. And so every", "margins": [{"id": "345C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) the Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p345E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p345E", "locator_display": "345E", "source_text": "rationalis creatura tenetur Deo per omnia quantum potest, scilicet si velit exigere hoc ab ea. Quapropter nihil boni potest ex stricto, debito, et violento rigore mereri ab eo, sicut nec Petrus pro illis, 10. quicquam emere a Iohanne. Quod enim habeat quodammodo liberum, et proprium hoc vel illud ad merendum, emendum, vel aliquid faciendum non ex se, sed ex Deo, et hoc non ex aliquo debito praecontracto, sed omnino de gratia et permissione libera suae gratui•e voluntatis. Amplius autem quod nullus de congruo primam gratiam mereatur, quia vel hoc esset congruitate antecedente voluntatem diuinam, et mouente eam ad gratiam faciendam; vel consequente illam, et dependente ab ea•: si congruitate antecedente, cum omnis talis congruitas sit quaedam ratio, et iustitia, rationabile est et iustum ratione et iustitia antecedentibus voluntatem diuinam, quod Deus det gratiam suam tali; quare et per 21. hoc est necessario rationabile et iustum; necesse ergo est Deum hoc facere, vel facere contra necessariam", "english": "rational creature is bound to God in all things as much as it can, namely if he wishes to demand this of it. Therefore it can merit nothing good from him by strict, owed, and violent rigor, just as Peter with those ten cannot buy anything from John. For the fact that he has, in a certain way, this or that as free and his own for meriting, buying, or doing something, he has not from himself but from God; and this not from any previously contracted debt, but wholly from grace and the free permission of his gratuitous will. Moreover, that no one merits first grace from congruity is clear, because either this would be by a congruity antecedent to the divine will and moving it to bestow grace, or by one consequent upon it and dependent on it. If by an antecedent congruity, then, since every such congruity is a certain reason and justice, it is reasonable and just, by a reason and justice antecedent to the divine will, that God give his grace to such a person. Hence by the 21st this is necessarily reasonable and just; it is therefore necessary that God do this, or act against necessary", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p346A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p346A", "locator_display": "346A–346B", "source_text": "rationem et iustitiā, et peccare; et etiā tunc talis congruitas inferior moueret voluntatē diuinā cōtra 20. et ipsam de se indifferentē determinaret, esset que a diuina prouidentia penitus aliena, contra 27. et alia quae sequuntur. Si congruitate consequente voluntatem diuinam, tunc illa est posterior voluntate diuina; quare et per 20. nullo modo mouet illam ad volendum conferre gratiam, tanquam meritum excitans et inducens. Item, si sit ita, congruum est Deum dare gratiam sic merenti, quia hoc volutum est a Deo; ergo hoc nedum est congruum vt hi dicunt, sed etiam est condignum, quicquid Deus vult fieri, dignum et iustum est fieri, sicut vigesimum primum capitulum demonstrauit, nec aliquis dubitat, qui de diuina iustitia est securus, et scit quod omne iustū est dignum. Dicent fortassis quod bene est dignū, sed non condignū; sed quid est condignum, nisi cum ratione et iustitia dignū? Quare et Hest. 6. scribitur isto modo, Hoc honore condignus est, quemcun que Rex voluerit honorate. Itidem sic ad idem, omne sufficiens est condignum (sic enim exponit Glossa, illud ad Rom. 8. Non sunt condignae passiones,\n\netc. condignae, id est, sufficientes) sed tale opus est sufficiens ad gratiam impetrandam. Nam nihil sibi deest; Impetrat enim illam. Illud etiam est sufficiens, quod Deus vult et discernit sufficere ex parte operantis, et tale est opus huiusmodi secundum positionem istorum: Si autem dicatur, quod non est condignum, id est, aeque bonum, ita nec opus in gratia est aeque bonum cum augmento gratiae temporalis et gloriae sempiternae, sicut superius est argutum. Item si hoc sit congruum congruitate consequente voluntatem diuinam, scilicet quia Deus vult sic fieri, tunc etiam qui nihil boni facit, sed peccat mortaliter et grauissime, sicut fecit Paulus, quando adhuc spirans minarum et caedis in discipulos Domini, nomen Christianum conabatur delere, meretur de congruo gratiam sibi dari; quia Deus vult quod sic fiat: Ipse enim per gratiam suam operantem pratuite praeuenit peccatores sicut superius est ostensum. Et si dicatur, quod Deus dat talibus gratiam, sed non pro talibus malis factis, ideo que per talia non merentur de congtuo gratiam sibi dari; ergo secundum istos, illis qui merentur", "english": "reason and justice, and sin. Then, too, such a congruity, being lower, would move the divine will, against the 20th, and would determine that will, which is of itself indifferent; and it would be wholly alien to divine providence, against the 27th and the others that follow. If by a congruity consequent upon the divine will, then that congruity is posterior to the divine will; hence, by the 20th, it in no way moves that will to will to confer grace, as a merit exciting and inducing it. Again, if it is so, it is congruous that God give grace to one so meriting, because this is willed by God; therefore this is not only congruous, as these men say, but also condign. For whatever God wills to be done, it is worthy and just that it be done, as the twenty-first chapter demonstrated, and no one doubts it who is secure about divine justice and knows that everything just is worthy. They will perhaps say that it is indeed worthy, but not condign; but what is condign, except what is worthy with reason and justice? Hence it is also written in Esther 6 in this way: He is condignly worthy of this honor, whomever the king wills to honor [n67]. Likewise, to the same point: everything sufficient is condign (for so the Gloss expounds that verse of Rom 8, The sufferings are not condign, etc.: condign, that is, sufficient),\n\nbut such a work is sufficient for obtaining grace. For nothing is lacking to it; for it obtains it. That also is sufficient which God wills and judges to suffice on the part of the one working, and such, according to the position of these men, is a work of this kind. But if it is said that it is not condign, that is, equally good, then neither is the work done in grace equally good with the increase of temporal grace and eternal glory, as was argued above. Again, if this is congruous by a congruity consequent upon the divine will, namely because God wills it so to be done, then even one who does nothing good but sins mortally and most gravely merits from congruity that grace be given him. So did Paul, when, still breathing threats and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, he sought to destroy the Christian name; for God wills it to be so done. For he himself by his operating grace freely anticipates sinners, as was shown above. And if it is said that God gives grace to such men, but not for such evil deeds, and so through such deeds they do not merit from congruity that grace be given them, then, according to these men, to those who merit first grace from congruity God gives it on account of their prior merits; therefore", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p346C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p346C", "locator_display": "346C–346D", "source_text": "gratiam primam de congruo, Deus dat illam propter merita sua priora; ergo gratia iam non est gratia, sicut superius est argutum, et etiam tunc illa merita antecedenter et causaliter a priori mouent voluntatem diuinam, et causant volutionem in ea, cuius contrarium dicebatur, scilicet quod congruum est Deum sic facere congruitate tantummodo consequente voluntatem diuinam: huius quoque contrarium vigesimum capitulum ostendebat. Item Augustinus super illud Psalmi 118i. Retribue seruo tuo, quadruplicem retributionem distinguens, ostendit, quod Deus retribuit bona pro malis: Dicit enim, Quatuor retributiones sunt: Aut mala pro malis retribuuntur, sicut Deus ignem aeternum retributurus est impijs; aut bona pro bonis, sicut regnum aeternum retributurus est iustis; aut bona pro malis, sicut Christus per gratiam iustificat impium; aut mala pro bonis, sicut Iudas per malitiam persecutus est Christū. Harum quatuor retributionum duae priores pertinēt ad iustitiam, tertia ad misericordiā; quartam Deus nescit: Haec autē tertia primitus est necessaria; nisi enim retribueret\n\nbona pro malis, nullo modo essent, quibus retribueret bona pro bonis. Potest autē haec ratio aliter fieri sub hac forma, cum quis Dei gratiam meretur de congruo, vel quia Deus vult sic esse, ideo hoc est congruum; vel quia hoc est congruū, ideo Deus vult sic esse: Si detur primū, ita similiter est cōdignum, et ita est de pessime operante, et etiam tunc, est iustū posterius voluntate diuina; quapropter non est causa illius; Prius enim naturaliter Deus vult sic esse, et sic volendo facit illud esse congruum; non ergo quia hoc est congruum, Deus vult sic esse: Si detur secundū, tunc per vigesimum hoc non est iustum positiuū et contingens aliter se habere, quia omne tale iustum dependet a voluntate diuina; sed est iustum necessarium absolute, vel saltem est iustum mixtim, et sic, supposito quod tale factum sit de necessitate, est iustum, et sic Deus de necessitate seruandae iustitiae daret gratiam sic merenti. Item Deus potest libere non dare gratiam sic operanti: Ponatur ergo quod non faciat, tunc non est congruum; vel si vni sic operanti dat gratiam, et alteri operanti similiter non dat illam, non ergo est hoc per se congruum,", "english": "grace is now no longer grace, as was argued above. And moreover those merits then move the divine will antecedently and causally, a priori, and cause volition in it, the contrary of which was said, namely that it is congruous for God to act so by a congruity only consequent upon the divine will. The twentieth chapter also showed the contrary of this. Again, Augustine, on that verse of Psalm 118 [119], Repay your servant [n68], distinguishing a fourfold repayment, shows that God repays good for evil. For he says: There are four repayments: either evil is repaid for evil, as God will repay eternal fire to the wicked; or good for good, as he will repay the eternal kingdom to the just; or good for evil, as Christ by grace justifies the wicked; or evil for good, as Judas by malice persecuted Christ. Of these four repayments, the first two belong to justice, the third to mercy; the fourth God does not know. But this third is first in necessity; for unless he repaid good for evil,\n\nthere would be in no way any to whom he might repay good for good. This reasoning can also be made otherwise, in this form: when someone merits God's grace from congruity, either because God wills it so to be, therefore this is congruous; or because this is congruous, therefore God wills it so to be. If the first is granted, it is likewise condign, and so it is even for one who acts in the worst way, and even then it is just posterior to the divine will; therefore it is not the cause of that will. For God first, naturally, wills it so to be, and by so willing makes it congruous; not therefore because this is congruous does God will it so to be. If the second is granted, then, by the twentieth, this is not a positive just, contingent and able to be otherwise, because every such just depends on the divine will; but it is just necessarily and absolutely, or at least just in a mixed way, and thus, supposing that such a deed is of necessity, it is just, and so God would give grace to one so meriting out of the necessity of preserving justice. Again, God can freely not give grace to one so acting. Suppose then that he does not; then it is not congruous. Or if he gives grace to one who so acts, and to another acting likewise he does not give it, then this is not congruous per se, and therefore willed by God, but the converse.", "margins": [{"id": "346C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p346E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p346E", "locator_display": "346E", "source_text": "et ideo volutum a Deo, sed e contra. Item facilius est cuicunque existenti in gratia mereri de congruo quod Deus eum amet, vel quod plus eum amet ad vitam, quam carenti gratia mereri primam gratiam, et quod ametur a Deo ad vitam aeternam; sed praescitus ad mortem existens in gratia, hoc non potest, sicut superius est argutum. Item cum quis meretur a Deo quicquam de congruo, cum omne congruum sit iustum, quia omne iniustum est incongruum, illud est iustum, et oppositum eius iniustum; quare et impossibile circa Deum, sicut prima Suppositio, et 3. pars corollarij primi probant; dicit que Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo 10. In Deo quantumlibet paruum inconueniens sequitur impossibilitas, et si oppositum eius sit impossibile, hoc est necessarium, et omne iustum necessarium est condignum: Quicunque", "english": "Again, it is easier for anyone existing in grace to merit from congruity that God love him, or love him more unto life, than for one lacking grace to merit first grace, and to be loved by God unto eternal life. But one foreknown to death, existing in grace, cannot do this, as was argued above. Again, when someone merits anything from God from congruity, since everything congruous is just, because everything unjust is incongruous, that is just and its opposite unjust; hence its opposite is also impossible with respect to God, as the first Supposition and the 3rd part of the first corollary prove. And Anselm says, Why God Became Man 1, 10: In God any inconvenience, however small, is followed by impossibility; and if its opposite is impossible, this is necessary, and everything necessary just is condign. Whoever", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p347A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p347A", "locator_display": "347A", "source_text": "ergo meretur a Deo quicquam de congruo, meretur etiam de condigno. Dicitur forte quod aliquis meretur a Deo quicquam de congruo, quia si Deus hoc reddat, congruum est, et pro certo ita est si Deus reddat sibi poenam: non magis ergo meretur de congruo gratiam quam poenam; et similiter si peccanti grauissime Deus reddat gratiam, congruum est, ergo meretur cam de congruo; et si duo omnino similiter operentur, et Deus det vni gratiam, alteri non det vllam, vnus meretur eam de congruo, et non alius, cum tamen per omnia similiter operetur; et etiam si Deus sic reddat, sic fieri est condignum; nihil enim in talibus dignum est aut condignum, nisi quia volutum est a Deo, quia nec rationabile, neque iustum, sicut 21. capitulum ostendebat, et Hest. 6. Tali honore condignus est, quemcunque Rex voluerit honorare. Item secundum istos, homo carens gratia, potest mereri aliquid de condigno, sed gratiam tantum de congruo; vel ergo est aliquod maximum, quod potest mereri de condigno, vel minimum quod non potest; Si detur maximum quod potest, sit illud A, vel ergo A est bonum finitum,", "english": "therefore merits anything from God from congruity also merits it from condignity. Perhaps it is said that someone merits something from God from congruity because, if God gives it back, it is congruous; and for certain so it is if God should render him punishment. Then he no more merits grace from congruity than punishment. Likewise, if God should render grace to one sinning most gravely, it is congruous, therefore he merits it from congruity. And if two act in every respect alike, and God gives grace to one, and gives none to the other, one merits it from congruity and not the other, though they act alike in all things. Also, if God so renders, it is condign that it be so done. For in such matters nothing is worthy or condign except because it is willed by God, since it is neither reasonable nor just otherwise, as chapter 21 showed, and Esther 6: He is condignly worthy of such honor, whomever the king wills to honor. Again, according to these men, a man lacking grace can merit something from condignity, but grace only from congruity. So either there is some greatest thing that he can merit condignly, or a least that he cannot. If the greatest that he can be posited, let it be A; then either A is a finite good,", "margins": [{"id": "347A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) illam (\"that grace\") for vllam."}, {"id": "347A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Esther 6."}]}, {"anchor": "p347B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p347B", "locator_display": "347B–347C", "source_text": "vel infinitum: Si finitum, potest adhuc aliquid mereri vlterius, A ergo non est maximum quod potest mereri: Si infinitum, hoc non videtur, quia quilibet actus suus fuit finitus, et omnes simul finiti in merito et valore, et quia adhuc posset plus mereri, nec Deus posset eum praemiari condigne, quia non potest facere infinitum, sicut ex ostensione 40ae partis Corollarij, primi patet; nec potest negari prima diuisio, Si aliquod bonum possit de condigno mereri, aliquod que non possit; Capiatur enim paruum bonum quod potest mereri condigne, quod imaginarie crescat continue, donec sit tantum, quantum condigne mereri non possit. Tunc A in aliquo instanti, quod sit B incipiet esse tantum quantum talis condigne mereri non possit: Vel ergo A incipiet in B, intrinsece esse tantum, scilicet quod tunc primo erit tantum, et tunc est aliquod nimirum quod mereri condigne non potest: Non enim potest condigne mereri, quantum tunc erit A, et quantumlibet minus potest; vel A incipiet extrinsece esse tantum, quantum talis condigne mereri non possit, scilicet quod tunc non erit tantum,\n\nsed immediate post erit, et tunc A erit maximum quod talis potest condigne mereri: Quoniam tantum potest mereri condigne, quantum A erit in B, vt datur. et nihil vlterius maius eo. Item mercantur de congruo Iohannes et Petrus infideles aequaliter, et aeque diu primas gratias sibi dari, et Iohannes post certum tempus in A instanti recipiat gratiam, secundum quod meruit; Petrus vero in A decedat: Ex quo ergo meruit aequaliter cum Iohanne, nec per eum stat, quod decedit, vt pono, Deus ipsum de congruo aequali gratia praemi•bit, finaliterque saluabit, cum nullo baptismo fluminis, flaminis, aut sanguinis fuerit baptizatus, quod videtur contra Euangelium, et omnes Doctores, et fidem Ecclesiae generalem. Vnde Iohan. 3. Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non potest introire in regnum Dei, et. hoc ad literam realiter, vel saltem spiritualiter, et virtualiter, sicut Doctores exponunt, quod fit in adultis, credendo, et baptizari volendo, vel pro Dei amore sanguinem proprium effundendo. Item dicit Augustinus de gratia et libero arbitrio 50. Suspicentur homines quaelibet", "english": "or infinite. If finite, he can still merit something further, and so A is not the greatest that he can merit. If infinite, this does not seem so, because each of his acts was finite, and all together finite in merit and worth, and because he could still merit more, nor could God reward him condignly, since he cannot make an infinite, as is clear from the showing of the 40th part of the first Corollary. Nor can the first division be denied: that some good can be merited condignly and some cannot. For let a small good be taken which can be merited condignly, and let it be imagined to grow continuously until it is so great that it cannot be merited condignly. Then A, at some instant, which let be B, will begin to be as great as such a one cannot merit condignly. Either, therefore, A will begin intrinsically in B to be so great, namely so that then for the first time it will be so great; and then there is, no doubt, something that cannot be merited condignly, for he cannot merit condignly as much as A will then be, though he can merit any amount less. Or A will begin extrinsically to be as great as such a one cannot merit condignly, namely so that then it will not be so great, but immediately afterward it will be; and then A will be the greatest that such a one can merit condignly, since he can merit condignly as much as A will be in B, as is granted, and nothing further greater than it. Again, let John and Peter, unbelievers, merit from congruity equally, and equally long, that first graces be given them, and let John after a certain time, at instant A, receive grace according to what he merited, but let Peter die at A. Since then he merited equally with John, and it is not due to him that he dies, as I suppose, God will reward him from congruity with equal grace, and will finally save him, though he was baptized with no baptism of water, of the Spirit, or of blood [n69]. This seems contrary to the Gospel, and to all the Doctors, and to the general faith of the Church. Hence John 3: Unless one is born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God, and this literally, in reality, or at least spiritually and virtually, as the Doctors expound, which happens in adults by believing and wishing to be baptized, or by shedding their own blood for the love of God. Again, Augustine says, On Grace and Free Choice 50: Let men suppose whatever", "margins": [{"id": "347C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) condigno (\"condignity\") for congruo."}, {"id": "347C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) John 3 [:5]."}]}, {"anchor": "p347D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p347D", "locator_display": "347D", "source_text": "merita bona, quae putant praecedere, vt iustificentur per Dei gratiam, non intelligentes, cum hoc dicunt, nihil aliud quam negare se gratiam: Qui ergo merita de congruo gratiae Dei praeponunt, gratiam Dei negant. Obijciet forsitan aliquis contra dicta: Primo probando quod aliquis potest mereri condigne gloriam sempiternam: Nam Sapient. 3. dicitur sic de Iustis, In paucis vexati, in multis bene disponentur, quoniam Deus temptauit illos, et inuenit illos dignos se: Et Ecclesiastici 26. Omnis ponderatio non est digna continentis animae, ergo anima continens meretur condigne praemium infinitum: et Luc. 10. Dignus est operarius mercede sua; merces autem operariorum in vinea Christi est denarius gloriae infinitae: Et infra eiusdem 20. Illi qui digni habebuntur saeculo illo, et resurrectione ex mortuis etc. Et Apoc. 3. Ambulabunt mecum in albis, quoniam digni sunt, cum suis similibus satis multis. Hoc idem ratio manifestat; omnis enim actus virtuosus melior est incomparabiliter omni bono vtili, vel delectabili distincto contra bonum honestum, virtuosum, et iustum; alias enim bonum vtile", "english": "good merits they think precede, so as to be justified through God's grace, not understanding, when they say this, that they do nothing other than deny grace. Therefore those who put merits from congruity before God's grace deny God's grace. Someone may perhaps object against what has been said, first by proving that someone can merit eternal glory condignly. For Wisdom 3 says thus of the Just: Afflicted in a few things, in many they shall be well ordered, because God tested them and found them worthy of himself. And Ecclesiasticus 26: No weighing is worthy of a continent soul; therefore a continent soul merits condignly an infinite reward. And Luke 10: The laborer is worthy of his wage; but the wage of the laborers in Christ's vineyard is the denarius of infinite glory. And further on in the same [Gospel], 20: Those who shall be counted worthy of that age and of the resurrection from the dead, etc. And Apoc. 3: They shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy, together with a good many similar texts. Reason shows the same. For every virtuous act is incomparably better than every good that is useful or delightful, distinguished from the honorable, virtuous, and just good; otherwise a useful", "margins": [{"id": "347D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "347D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Wisdom 3 [:5]."}, {"id": "347D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Ecclesiasticus [Sirach] 26 [:20 Vulg.]; Luke 10 [:7]."}]}, {"anchor": "p347E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p347E", "locator_display": "347E", "source_text": "vel delectabile posset tantum augeri, quod esset aeque bonum cum felicitate quae consistit in actibus virtuosis, vt patet 1. Eth. 9. et post, imo et quod esset melius, et sic cum felicitas sit maximum bonum humanum, vt patet ibi et alibi, per omnes vulgares Philosophicos, et Theologicos, ipsa esset in pecunijs aut voluptatibus statuenda, contra omnes sane sapientes, et contra totum processum Philosophi memoratum. Tunc quoque tantum acceptaretur a Deo magnum bonum datum, vel delectabile derelictum, quantum actus maximus virtuosus; et etiam tantum vel magis secundum rectam rationem posset homo eligere diuitias, et voluptates aeternas sine iustitia et virtute, etiam ad quam tenetur sicut actum virtutis, cum tamen eligendo sic peccet, et faciat contrariū rationi. Videtur insuper, quod illud sit melius homini, quod habitum necessario efficit ipsum bonum, quam quod habitū non sic facit, sed ipsum malum et miserum esse sinit; Actus autem virtuosus habitus a quocunque necessario efficit ipsum bonū;", "english": "or delightful good could be increased so much that it would be equally good with the happiness which consists in virtuous acts, as is clear in Ethics 1, 9 and after, indeed that it would be better. And thus, since happiness is the greatest human good, as is clear there and elsewhere from all the standard philosophical and theological writers, it would have to be placed in money or pleasures, against all truly wise men and against the whole course of the Philosopher's argument just mentioned. Then also a great good given, or a pleasure forgone, would be accepted by God as much as the greatest virtuous act. And a man could choose riches and eternal pleasures, without justice and virtue, as much or more according to right reason; yet he is also bound to justice and virtue as to an act of virtue [n70], though by choosing thus he sins and acts contrary to reason. It seems, moreover, that that is better for man which, when possessed, necessarily makes him good, than that which, when possessed, does not so make him, but lets him be evil and wretched. But a virtuous act, when had by anyone, necessarily makes him good;", "margins": [{"id": "347E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) veritatis (\"of truth\") for virtutis."}, {"id": "348E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) the Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p348A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p348A", "locator_display": "348A–348B", "source_text": "sed omnis pecunia et voluptas potest adesse malo et misero cuicun que sic autem probat Philos. 1. Eth. 12. foelicitatem non in possessione vel habitu, sed in operatione ponendam. Dicit enim, differt autem non parum in possessione vel vsu, optimum existimare, et in habitu vel operatione. Habitum quidem enim contingit nullum bonum perficere existentem, vt puta dormienti et aliter otioso, operationem autem non possibile est; operabitur enim ex necessitate et bene operabitur. Item qui diligit Deum super omnia toto corde, et facit omnia propter cum, non potest remunerari condigne minori quam Deo; Nullus enim amor videtur recompensandus condigne bono minori quam tanto, quanto amans amatum suum praeponit, et quantum citius relinqueret quam amatum; Si enim amor est recompensandus amore, ergo et maior maiore, et aequalis aequali; Nam alias proportio debita claudicaret. Amor autem in potente otiosus esse non potest: Amare enim est velle bonum amato et facere, sicut docent praemissa 39. huius; Deus ergo omnipotens amatus ab homine super omnia toto corde, ipsum\n\nde condigno aequaliter redamans vult sibi bonum, super omnia bona bonum, et hoc potest, hoc ergo sibi retribuit, vel retribuet pro tempore opportuno. Tale autem bonum super omnia alia bona bonum, est tantummodo ipse Deus. Deus ergo seipsum de condigno retribuet sic amanti; sicut et patet ex ostensione 32. et 34. partis Corollarij primi huius. Vnde et Anselmus Monol. 70. Nihil potest esse praemium huius amoris, nisi quod supereminet in omnibus naturis: Quid enim summa bonitas retribuet amanti, et disideranti se nisi seipsam? Nam quicquid aliud retribuat, non retribuit, quia nec compensatur amori, nec consolatur amantem, nec satiat desiderantem. Pro quo et dicit Philosophus 9. Eth. 1. Contendunt autem cum altera fiunt ipsis, et non quae appetunt. Simile enim est, quod est nihil fieri, cum eo quod appetit, non potitur. Hoc iterum confirmatur; Amicitia enim et amor talem proportionalitatem, vt videtur, condigne requirit, quod quantum proportionaliter per vires suas, vel supra, si posset, amans faceret pro amato; tantum proportionaliter secundum vires suas, amatus faciat", "english": "but all money and pleasure can be present to any evil and wretched man whatever. Thus the Philosopher proves, Ethics 1, 12, that happiness is to be placed not in possession or habit, but in activity. For he says: It differs not a little to judge the best to lie in possession or use, and in habit or activity. For a habit can exist in a man and accomplish no good, as in one sleeping or otherwise idle; but activity cannot: for he who is active will act of necessity, and will act well. Again, he who loves God above all with his whole heart, and does all things for his sake, cannot be repaid condignly with less than God. For no love seems to be condignly repaid by a good less than as great as that to which the lover prefers his beloved, and as great as whatever he would sooner abandon than his beloved. For if love is to be repaid with love, then greater with greater, and equal with equal; otherwise due proportion would limp. But love cannot be idle in one who is powerful: for to love is to will the good for the beloved and to do it, as the premises, 39 of this, teach. God, therefore, omnipotent, loved by man above all with his whole heart, loving him back equally and condignly, wills for him a good, a good above all goods, and is able to do this; therefore he repays this to him, or will repay it in due time. But such a good, above all other goods, is only God himself. God, therefore, will repay himself condignly to one who so loves, as is also clear from the showing of the 32nd and 34th parts of the first Corollary of this. Hence also Anselm, Monologion 70: Nothing can be the reward of this love except what stands above in all natures. For what will the highest goodness repay to the lover, and to the one who longs for it, except itself? For whatever else it repays, it does not repay, because it neither compensates the love, nor consoles the lover, nor satisfies the one who desires. For this the Philosopher also says, Ethics 9, 1: They quarrel when what comes to them is other, and not what they seek. For it is like nothing's coming about, when one does not obtain what one seeks. This is confirmed again. For friendship and love, as it seems, condignly require such a proportionality: as much as the lover, proportionally to his powers, or beyond them if he could, would do for the beloved, so much, proportionally according to his powers, the beloved should do for the lover. But a man who so loves God would do for him, and would give him, if he could, a good, a good above all goods, and better. God, therefore, being omnipotent, will condignly do as much for him.", "margins": [{"id": "348B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "348B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) the Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p348C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p348C", "locator_display": "348C", "source_text": "pro amante; sed homo sicamans Deum, faceret pro eo, et daret sibi si posset bonum, super omnia bona bonum, et melius: Deus ergo cum sit omnipotens, de condigno faciet sibi tantum. Item quod homo potest mereri condigne aliquod bonum, videtur. Nam quodlibet opus bonum essentialiter et inseparabiliter sequitur quaedam bonitas, quaedam rectitudo, quaedam iustitia, pulchritudo, decentia, seu honestas, vel etiam actualiter bonum esse, rectum et iustum; et haec videtur aliqua sua merces, quam de condigno meretur. Amplius autem non decet summam iustitiam, et clementissimam bonitatem, promptius punire peccantes, quam praemiare bene operantes, sicut et videtur ex 31. parte corollarij, primi, huius: sed quemlibet peccantem statim, et inseparabiliter sequitur sua poena, scilicet iniustitia, peccatum, et seruitus peccati, priuatio iustitiae, et libertatis quam prius habebat, saltem respectu illarum iniustitiae, et seruitutis, quas nouiter tunc incurrit; sicut et patet per eandem 31am partem; quare et e contrario, in quolibet bono facto. Licet autem satis constare debeat, quod", "english": "Again, that man can merit some good condignly is apparent. For every good work is followed, essentially and inseparably, by a certain goodness, a certain rectitude, a certain justice, beauty, fittingness, or honorableness, or even by its actually being good, right, and just; and this seems some reward of his, which he merits condignly. Further, it does not befit supreme justice and most clement goodness to punish sinners more promptly than to reward those who act well, as also appears from the 31st part of the first Corollary of this. But anyone who sins is immediately and inseparably followed by his punishment, namely injustice, sin, and the servitude of sin, the privation of the justice and freedom which he had before, at least in respect of that injustice and servitude which he then newly incurs, as is also clear from the same 31st part; hence also, conversely, in any good deed done. Although it ought to be sufficiently clear that", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p348D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p348D", "locator_display": "348D–349A", "source_text": "quicunque peccans eo ipso necessario et inseparabiliter incurrit peccatum, iniustitiam, et seruitutem peccati, esse peccatorem, iniustum, et seruum peccati, cum priuationibus supra dictis, et multis malis similibus, quae remanent in eo etiam post peccare, sicut inhaeserunt sibi quando actu peccauit, quae omnia sunt digna poena prioris peccati, seu peccare; Potest tamen hoc exabundanti aliquibus testimonijs authenticis confirmari. Autor enim Autorum Iohan. 8. sic dicit; Omnis qui facit peccatum, seruus est peccati. Vnde et Iob. 7. Peccaui: Quid faciam tibi, O custos hominum? quare posuisti me contrarium tibi? videlicet per peccatum, et factus sum mihimet ipsi grauis, scilicet per poenam. Super quod dicit Gregorius 8. Moral. 22. Haec contrarietas culpae facta est homini pondus poenae, vt corruptioni suae malae liber seruiat, qui bene seruus de incorruptionis libertate gaudebat. Hoc idem vult Augustinus 1. de libero arbittio, 20. et 2.1. sed manifestius 3.19. et post ostendit, quod\n\nomne vitium et peccatum est corruptio naturae, et alicuius boni naturalis; et idem patet per eundem, 12. de Ciuit. Dei 6. et Enchirid. 7. Manifestissime vero hoc ostendit 3. de libero arbitrio, 24. dicens, quia nemo superat leges omnipotentis Creatoris; non sinitur anima non reddere debitum: Aut enim reddit bene vtendo quod accepit, aut amittendo, quod vti bene noluit. Itaque si non reddit faciendo iustitiam, reddet patiendo miseriam: Nullo autem interuallo temporis ista diuiduntur, vt quasi alio tempore non faciat quod debet, et alio patiatur quod debet, ne vel puncto temporis vniuersalis pulchritudo turpetur, vt sit in ea peccati dedecus sine decore vindictae. Hoc etiam patet conjunctim in boni factis et malis: Dicit enim Hermes de Deo; Qui nullius malefactoris opus justificat, et nullum benefactorem praemijs priuat: Cui et Arist. cōcordanter in De Mundo vlt. Hunc inquit, semper comitatur vltio,\n\nvel iustitia, puniens, vel cruciatiua, derelinquentium diuinam legem; beatus autem et foelix a principio confestim particeps esset. Gen. etiam 4. dicit; Nonne si bene egeris, recipies, scilicet statim, sin autem male, statim peccatum in foribus adarit? Dicit que Augustinus 8. super Genesin ad literam 31. Diuina prouidentia regens vniuersam creaturam, administrat naturas, vt sint volentes, vt nec infructuosae bonae, nec impunitae malae sint: Nam in seipsis male volentes habent interiorem poenam suam, eandem ipsam iniquitatem suam. Ergo sic bonae habent interiorem mercedem suam, ipsam aequitatem et rectitudinem facti sui. Idem De quantitate animae, vltim. Deus summus et verus incorrupta lege omne quod condidit, regit; animam in nullo actu deserit sine poena vel praemio. Idem super illud Psalmi 118. Iuraui, et statui custodire iudicia iustitiae tuae; Fide custodiuntur iudicia iustitiae Dei, cum sub Deo iusto iudice, nec rectum factum infructuosum, nec peccatum creditur impunitum. Item amari vel odiri a Deo, videtur praemium non paruum, vel poena; Deus autem amat bene facientes, et odit peccantes.", "english": "Whoever sins, by that very fact necessarily and inseparably incurs sin, injustice, and slavery to sin, and is a sinner, unjust, and a slave of sin. He incurs also the privations mentioned above and many similar evils, which remain in him even after the sinning, just as they clung to him when he sinned in act. All of these are fitting punishment for the earlier sin, that is, for the sinning. Yet this can be confirmed over and above by some authentic testimonies. For the Author of authors [n71] says in John 8: Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. Hence also Job 7: I have sinned: what shall I do to you, O guardian of men? Why have you set me against you? (that is, through sin) and I have become a burden to myself (that is, through punishment). On this Gregory says, Moralia 8, 22: \"This opposition of guilt has become for man the weight of punishment, so that, free, he serves his own evil corruption, he who as a good servant once rejoiced in the liberty of incorruption.\" Augustine intends the same in On Free Choice 1, 20, and 2, 1, but more clearly in 3, 19, and afterwards he shows that every vice and sin is a corruption of nature and of some natural good; and the same is plain from the same author in City of God 12, 6, and the Enchiridion 7. But he shows it most plainly in On Free Choice 3, 24, saying: \"Because no one overcomes the laws of the almighty Creator, the soul is not permitted to fail to render what is owed. For it renders it either by using well what it received, or by losing what it refused to use well. Thus if it does not render by doing justice, it will render by suffering misery. These two are divided by no interval of time, as though at one time it failed to do what it owes and at another suffered what it owes, lest even for a moment of time the beauty of the universe be disfigured, so that there would be in it the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of vengeance.\" This is also evident jointly in good deeds and bad. For Hermes says of God: [n72] He who justifies the work of no evildoer, and deprives no benefactor of rewards. In agreement with him Aristotle says at the end of On the World [n73]: \"Him, he says, vengeance or justice always attends, punishing or tormenting those who abandon the divine law; but the one who is blessed and happy would at once, from the beginning, be a sharer in it.\"", "margins": [{"id": "348D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Job 7 [the marginal citation stands beside Peccaui]."}, {"id": "348E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Hermes."}, {"id": "348E·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Aristotle."}, {"id": "349A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Gen. 4. Augustinus."}]}, {"anchor": "p349A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p349A", "locator_display": "349A–349C", "source_text": "Dicit enim Aristoteles, secundo, suae Rhetoricae, 28. Si iusta dixeris, homines te odient; si iniusta, dij; si autem iusta dixeris, dij te amabunt; si iniusta, homines. Idem de bona Fortuna, primo; Deum dignificamus, Dominum existentem talium, vt dignis distribuat et bona, et mala. Idemque decimo Ethicorum, decimo tertio; Secundum intellectum operans, et hunc curans, et dispositus optime, et Dei amantissimus videtur esse: Si enim quaedam cura humanorum a dijs fit, quemadmodum videtur, et erit vtique bene rationabile, et gaudere ipsos de optimo, et cognatissimo, hic autem erit intellectus, et diligentes maxime hoc et honorantes, et rebeneficiare vt amicis ipsis curatis. Vbi Auerroes; Si cura sit Deo de hominibus, vt creditur, et vt debitum est, gaudet de meliori, et dignius est vt benefaciat eis, qui amant eum plus, et honorificet eos, et visitet eos, sicut est dispositio amici cum amico. Dicitque Boetius 4. De consolatione Philosophiae, prosa 1. Ipso, de cuius nunc regno loquimur, autore, cognosces semper quidem potentes esse bonos, malos vero abiectos semperat que\n\nimbecilles; nec sine poena vnquam esse vitia, nec sine praemio virtutes. Idemque specialiter de virtute, et operibus virtuosis, supra eiusdem tertij prosa 4. Inest dignitas propria virtuti, quam protinus in eos, quibus ipsa fuerit adiuncta transfundit; et intelligit, vt videtur, hic et prius per virtutem, nedum solum habitum, sed et actum; cui et concordanter Ouid. de Ponto, sic ait; Non facile inuenies multis in millibus vnum, / Virtutem precium qui putet esse sui: / Ipse decor recte facti, si praemia desint, / Non mouet, et gratis poenitet esse probum. / Vnde et Auerroes super 1. Eth. 12. Actus qui fit secundum exigentiam virtutis, virtus est. Et Augustinus super illud Psalmi 36. Iustus autem miseretur, et commodat; si habet foris facultatem, dat ipsam charitas, si autem non habet dat beneuolentiam; habet semper vnde det, cui plenum pectus est charitatis. Ipsa est charitas, quae dicitur et voluntas bona, et accipit ibi voluntatem", "english": "Genesis 4 also says: If you do well, will you not receive (that is, at once)? But if ill, will not sin immediately be at the door? And Augustine says, On Genesis Literally 8, 31: \"Divine providence, ruling the whole creation, administers natures that will, so that the good ones are not unfruitful nor the evil ones unpunished. For those who will evil have in themselves their own inner punishment, that very iniquity of theirs. So likewise the good have their inner reward, the very equity and rectitude of what they have done.\" The same, On the Greatness of the Soul, last chapter: \"God, supreme and true, rules by an incorrupt law everything he has made; he abandons the soul in no act without punishment or reward.\" The same, on that verse of Psalm 118 [119]: I have sworn and resolved to keep the judgments of your justice: \"The judgments of God's justice are kept in faith, since under God, the just judge, neither is a right deed believed fruitless nor a sin unpunished.\" Again, to be loved or hated by God seems no small reward or punishment; and God loves those who do well and hates those who sin.\n\nFor Aristotle says in the second book of his Rhetoric, 28 [n74]: If you speak what is just, men will hate you; if what is unjust, the gods; but if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men. The same, in On Good Fortune, book 1: \"We dignify God as Lord of such things, so that he distributes both good things and evil to the worthy.\" The same, in Ethics 10, 13 [n75]: \"The one who acts according to intellect, and cares for it, and is disposed in the best way, seems also to be most loving of God. For if there is some care of human affairs on the part of the gods, as there seems to be, it would surely be quite reasonable that they rejoice in what is best and most akin to them (this would be the intellect), and that they repay with benefits those who most love and honour it, as friends of theirs, since they themselves are cared for.\" On this Averroes says: \"If God has care for human beings, as is believed and as is owed, he rejoices in what is better, and it is more fitting that he do good to those who love him more, and honour them, and visit them, as is the disposition of a friend toward a friend.\" And Boethius says, Consolation of Philosophy 4, prose 1: \"By that very Author, of whose kingdom we now speak, you will learn that the powerful are always good, but the wicked always abject and feeble; that vices are never without punishment, nor virtues without reward.\" And the same, specially of virtue and virtuous works, earlier, in the same book 3, prose 4: \"There is a dignity proper to virtue, which it immediately pours over those to whom it is joined.\" By \"virtue\" he understands here, as it seems, and earlier, not only the habit but also the act. In agreement with this Ovid says in the Letters from Pontus [n76]:\n\n> Not easily will you find one in many thousands\n> who thinks virtue to be its own reward:\n> The very beauty of a right deed, if rewards are lacking,\n> does not move him, and he regrets, for nothing, to be upright.\n\nHence also Averroes on Ethics 1, 12: \"The act that is done according to the requirement of virtue is virtue.\" And Augustine on that verse of Psalm 36 [37], The just man has mercy and lends: \"If he has means outside himself, charity gives them [n77]; but if he has none, it gives goodwill; he always has something to give whose heart is full of charity.\"", "margins": [{"id": "349A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gen 4; Augustine."}, {"id": "349B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Aristotle."}, {"id": "349B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes."}, {"id": "349B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Boethius."}, {"id": "349C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes; Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p349C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p349C", "locator_display": "349C–350A", "source_text": "pro actu voluntatis, sicut totus processus ostendit; qui et tertio De doctrina Christiana, 10. sicut et recitat Petrus primo Sententiarum, distinct. 17. Charitatem, inquit, voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se, ac proximo propter Deum. Idem, in libro de moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, tractans illud verbum Apostoli; Nec mors nec vita poterit nos separare a charitate Dei; Charitas Dei, inquit, hic dicta est virtus, quae animi nostri rectissima affectio est, quae coniungit nos Deo, qua cum diligimus. Simili quoque modo videtur loqui Propheta, cum dicit; Feci iudicium et iustitiam, id est, actum iustitiae, siue opus, quod ideo Augustinus exponens sic ait; Iustitiae nomine hoc loco non ipsa virtus, sed opus eius significatum est. Dicitur quoque communiter, et tricesima prima pars corollarij primi docet, quod Deus praemiat bona merita vltra condignum; bonum ergo meritum exigit aliquid de condigno. Praetere a quod Deus vult fieri, et promittit recte operantibus, dignum est fieri, et condignum; sed ipse vult et promittit, quod qui perseueranter bene faciunt, habebunt\n\npro mercede gloriam sempiternam; ergo illam condigne merentur. Adhuc autem, Christus meruit sibi, et nobis multa bona, sicut allegat Lumbardus 3. Sentent. dist. 18. 19. et post; et quis audebit asserere, quod haec non meruit de condigno, maxime cum sicut Christus excedit quemlibet purum hominem infinite, sic et meritum Christi, meritum cuiuslibet puri hominis videtur excedere? potuit ergo Christus mereri quantumlibet de condigno. Pro quo dicit Anselmus, secundo, Cur Deus homo, 14. Putasne tantum donum, tam amabile posse sufficere ad soluendum quod debetur pro peccatis totius mundi, et respondet; imo plus potest in infinitum: ergo meruit de condigno omnibus saluandis gloriam sempiternam. Vnde Apocalyps. quinto; Dignus es, Domine, accipere librum et aperire signacula eius, quoniam occisus es, et redemisti nos Deo in sanguine tuo, et fecisti nos Deo nostro regnum. Ecce quid meruit nobis condigne. Et sequitur; Dignus est agnus, qui occisus est,\n\naccipere virtutem, et diuinitatem, et sapientiam, et fortitudinem, et honorem, et gloriam, et benedictionem; Ecce quid condigne meruit sibi ipsi. Amplius autem sicut argutum est prius, quod nullus meretur quicquam boni condigne, similiter omnino poterit argui, quod nullus meretur quicquam mali condigne, quod si quis concesserit, cogetur concedere consequenter Deum esse iniustum, qui punit tam grauiter peccatores, cum nullam poenam meruerint de condigno; Scripturam quoque veritatis mentiri fatebitur: Vnde Iob 11. vtinam Deus loqueretur tecum, et intelligeres, quod multo minora exigaris ab eo, quam meretur iniquitas tua: Super quod dicit Gregorius 10. Moral. 6. Qui multiplicitatem intelligit legis Dei, cuncta quae patitur, quam sint minora perpendit, et Iob 33. Peccaui et vere deliqui, et, vt eram dignus, non recepi; Et Psalmo 84. Mitigasti omnem iram tuam: Et Abacuc 3. Cum iratus fueris, misericordiae recordaberis: quibus et sunt alia multa similia in Scriptura. Dicit quidem Apostolus ad Rom. 6. Stipendia peccati mors, gratia autem Dei,", "english": "\"This is charity, which is also called good will\"; and there he takes will for the act of willing, as his whole course of argument shows. The same author says it also in On Christian Doctrine 3, 10, as Peter [Lombard] also recounts in Sentences 1, distinction 17: \"I call charity,\" he says, \"the movement of the soul toward enjoying God for his own sake, and oneself and one's neighbour for the sake of God.\" The same, in the book On the Morals of the Catholic Church, treating that word of the Apostle, Neither death nor life will be able to separate us from the charity of God: \"The charity of God,\" he says, \"is here called the virtue which is the most upright disposition of our soul, which joins us to God, and by which we love him.\" In a similar manner the Prophet seems to speak when he says, I have done judgment and justice, that is, an act of justice, or a work; and Augustine, expounding it, says: \"By the name of justice in this place not the virtue itself but its work is signified.\" It is also commonly said, and the thirty-first part of the first corollary teaches, that God rewards good merits beyond what is condign; a good merit therefore requires something of what is condign. Furthermore, what God wills to be done, and promises to those who act rightly, it is fitting and condign that it be done. But he himself wills and promises that those who do well with perseverance will have everlasting glory as their wage; therefore they merit it condignly.\n\nMoreover, Christ merited for himself and for us many goods, as the Lombard alleges in Sentences 3, distinctions 18 and 19, and after. And who will dare assert that he did not merit these condignly, especially since, as Christ infinitely exceeds any mere man, so the merit of Christ seems to exceed the merit of any mere man? Christ could therefore merit condignly as much as you please. On this Anselm says in Cur Deus homo 2, 14: \"Do you think so great a gift, so lovable, can suffice to pay what is owed for the sins of the whole world?\" and he replies: \"Indeed, it can do infinitely more.\" Therefore he merited condignly everlasting glory for all who are to be saved. Hence Apocalypse 5: You are worthy, Lord, to take the book and open its seals, because you were slain, and redeemed us for God in your blood, and made us a kingdom for our God. Behold what he merited for us condignly. And it continues: Worthy is the Lamb who was slain to receive power, and divinity, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing. Behold what he merited condignly for himself.", "margins": [{"id": "349C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Auerroes. Augustinus."}, {"id": "349E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) asseret (\"will assert\") [for audebit asserere]."}, {"id": "349E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "349E·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Apoc 5."}, {"id": "350A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Iob 11."}, {"id": "350A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Gregorius. Iob. 33. P • al. 84. A • c • c. 3."}, {"id": "350A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Rom. 6."}]}, {"anchor": "p350A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p350A", "locator_display": "350A–350B", "source_text": "vita aeterna; Glossa; Mors aeterna est stipendium peccati, id est digna retributio pro peccato; vita autem aeterna sola gratia Dei datur, quam expositionem per multas multorum autoritates confirmat. Praeterea vnum argumentum praemissum volens ostendere, quod quicquid homo meretur de congruo, meretur etiam de condigno, est contra communem scholam, vel saltem contra magnam eius partem, haec ab inuicem distinguentem. Vt autem obiecta facilius dissoluantur, sciendum, quod non eodem modo se habent Deus et homo ad reddendum praemium pro merito qualicunque bono vel malo: Homo namque sicut Rex vel alius publico edicto promulgat, quod qui fecerit tale quid bonum vel malum pro congrua mercede recipiet hoc vel illud, manetque ipse indifferens et indeterminatus in voluntate sua, circa sibi subictos, quis quid habebit; et si vnus faciat tale bonum, alius vero malum, iam per hoc determinatur eius indifferentia voluntatis; per hoc quoque antecedenter, causaliter, et efficienter mouetur ei voluntas ad volendum et ad praemiandum, et puniendum secundum praecedentia", "english": "Further, just as it was argued earlier that no one merits anything good condignly, in exactly the same way it can be argued that no one merits anything evil condignly. If anyone concedes this, he will be forced to concede, as a consequence, that God is unjust, who punishes sinners so gravely although they have merited no punishment condignly; and he will also have to confess that the Scripture of truth lies. Hence Job 11: Would that God would speak with you, and you would understand that far less is exacted from you by him than your iniquity deserves. On this Gregory says, Moralia 10, 6: \"He who understands the manifold nature of God's law weighs how much smaller are all the things he suffers.\" And Job 33: I have sinned and truly failed, and, as I deserved, I did not receive. And Psalm 84 [85]: You have mitigated all your anger. And Habakkuk 3: When you are angry, you will remember mercy. There are many other similar texts in Scripture. The Apostle indeed says to the Romans, chapter 6: The wages of sin are death, but the grace of God is eternal life. The Gloss: \"Eternal death is the wage of sin, that is, the worthy requital for sin; but eternal life is given by the grace of God alone.\" This exposition he confirms through many authorities of many writers [n78].", "margins": [{"id": "350A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Job 11."}, {"id": "350A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gregory; Job 33; Ps 84 [85]; Abacuc 3 [Hab 3]."}, {"id": "350A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Rom 6."}]}, {"anchor": "p350B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p350B", "locator_display": "350B–350D", "source_text": "merita hunc et illum: Non sic autem Deus, ex se solo nihil a posterioribus mendicando, semper aeque determinate vult, et non vult quaecunque, sicut 20um. huius 21um. 23um. 25um. 27um. et sequentia docuerunt. Quod et planissime testatur Apostolus ad Rom. 9. de Iacob et Esau sic dicens, Cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni aut mali, vt secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quia maior seruiet minori, sicut scriptum est, Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui. Et si quis ob•jciat, quod tota sac•a Scriptura, et omnes Doctores, imo et vniuersalis Ecclesia indubitanter affirmant Deum praemiaturum bonos propter merita sua bona, et malos propter mala sua merita puniturum; Quia propter, quia, ideo et similia aliquam causam vt frequenter significant, ostendendum in primis, quod meritum non est aliqua causa aeterni praemij subsequentis: Non enim est causa materialis, quia ipsa necessario simul est cum suo materiato, sed actus meritorius, quo illud praemium meruit, tunc non manet: Nec est causa formalis; Ipsa\n\nenim est simul necessario cum formato: Nec finalis, quia magis videtur e contra, sicut apparet ex 35. huius: Nec efficiens, quae tamen magis apparet, quia nec in actu, nec in potentia: Non in actu; Nam secundum Philosophum 5. Metaph. 3. Agentia singularia simul sunt et non sunt, et ipsa quorum sunt causae, vt hic medicus cum hoc conualescente, et hic aedificator cum hoc aedificato: sed actus meritorius praecedit praemium tempore, nec est simul cum eo: Nec est causa efficiens praemij in potentia, quia tunc aliquando exiret in actum, et actualiter efficeret praemium sempiternum, et tunc vt praemittitur esset simul cum eo: Nec potest quis dicere quod ideo meritum est causa efficiens praemij, quia nunc primum mouet voluntatem Dei prius naturaliter indeterminatam, et determinat eam, efficiendo in ea volutionem actualem et certam ad praemium conferendum, quia 20um. 23um. 25um. et 35um. huius prohibent ita dici. Est igitur vlterius aduertendum quod haec dictio, Propter, est multiplex penes secundum modum aequiuocationis. Nam primo et principaliter significat causam", "english": "Furthermore, one argument advanced above, which seeks to show that whatever a man merits by congruity he also merits by condignity, is against the common school, or at least against a large part of it, which distinguishes the two. But so that the objections may be dissolved more easily, it must be known that God and man do not stand in the same way toward rendering a reward for any merit, good or bad. For a man, like a king or another, promulgates by public edict that whoever does such and such a good or evil thing will receive this or that as a fitting wage; and he himself remains indifferent and undetermined in his will, in regard to his subjects, as to who will have what. And if one does such a good, another an evil, his indifference of will is thereby determined; and thereby also, antecedently, causally, and efficiently, his will is moved to will, to reward and to punish this man and that according to the preceding merits. Not so God, who begs nothing from what is posterior, but from himself alone always equally and determinately wills and does not will whatever he wills or does not will, as the twentieth of this work, and the twenty-first, twenty-third, twenty-fifth, twenty-seventh, and those following, have taught. The Apostle also attests this most plainly in Romans 9, speaking thus of Jacob and Esau: When they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, so that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not from works but from him who calls, it was said that the elder shall serve the younger, as it is written, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.\n\nAnd if anyone should object that all Holy Scripture and all the Doctors, indeed the universal Church too, affirm without doubt that God will reward the good for their good merits and punish the wicked for their evil merits: since propter, quia, ideo and the like, as they frequently do, signify some cause, it must first be shown that merit is not any cause of the eternal reward that follows. For it is not a material cause, since that is necessarily simultaneous with what is made of it, but the meritorious act, by which he merited that reward, does not then remain. Nor is it a formal cause, for that is necessarily simultaneous with what is formed. Nor is it a final cause, because the reverse seems rather to be the case, as appears from the thirty-fifth of this work. Nor is it an efficient cause, though that is the likelier suggestion, because it is so neither in act nor in potency. Not in act; for according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5, 3, particular agents exist and cease to exist together with those whose causes they are, as this physician with this man recovering, and this builder with this thing built; but the meritorious act precedes the reward in time and is not simultaneous with it. Nor is it the efficient cause of the reward in potency, because then at some time it would pass into act and actually effect the everlasting reward, and then, as was said, it would be simultaneous with it. Nor can anyone say that merit is therefore the efficient cause of the reward because it now for the first time moves the will of God, previously by nature undetermined, and determines it, effecting in it an actual and fixed willing to confer the reward; for the twentieth, twenty-third, twenty-fifth and thirty-fifth of this work forbid saying so. It is therefore to be observed further that this word propter is manifold, by a mode of equivocation.", "margins": [{"id": "350C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Rom 9."}]}, {"anchor": "p350D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p350D", "locator_display": "350D–351A", "source_text": "essendi; secundatio vero et aliqualiter transumtiue significat causam cognoscendi, siue innotescendi; et adhuc aliquando significat ordinem: Quod autem significet causam essendi nullus ignorat; et quod significet etiam causam cognoscendi, patet per Philosophum 1. Post. 12. dicentem, quod si causae et effectus aeque praedicantium, id est, conuertibilium, vt Planetas esse prope, quod est causa, et non scintillare, quod est eius effectus, non causa, id est, effectus sit notior, tunc demonstratio per hanc erit, vt quod prope sunt Planetae, propter id quod non scintillant. Ecce secundum eum, quod propter, non signat ibi causam essendi, sed effectum, qui est causa tantummodo cognoscendi; quare et ordinato syllogismo demonstratiuo per terminos A B C subdit; quare demonstratum est, quod erraticae prope sunt. Hic igitur\n\nsyllogismus non est propter quid, sed propter quia: Non enim ex eo, quod non scintillant, prope sunt; sed propter id quod prope sunt, non scintillant. Ecce quomodo primo concedit, et secundo negat Planetas esse prope, propter id quod non scintillant; et hoc est, quia, propter, primo sibi significat causam tantummodo cognoscendi, secundo vero causam essendi. Hoc etiam concordat cum toto processu illius capituli, et sequentium, vbi demonstratio ab effectu vocatur demonstratio quia; cum tamen haec dictio, quia, significet causam, sicut et propter: Quare ibi significat causam tantummodo cognoscendi, licet Donatus potestati coniunctionis non causali, sed rationali irrationabiliter supponat quia, quapropter, propterea, et multa similia, quae sunt causalia manifeste, sicut et potestati eius causali supponit, si, nisi, et talia, quae potestati conditionali fuissent potius supponenda, quam penitus praetermisit. Hoc etiam satis probat illud frequens exemplum Philosophi, et vulgatum, videlicet propter quid anguli trianguli valent duos rectos? propter id quod angulus extrinsecus valet duos intrinsecos", "english": "For first and principally it signifies a cause of being; secondly, and in a certain way by transference, it signifies a cause of knowing, or of making known; and still at times it signifies an order. That it signifies a cause of being no one is ignorant; and that it signifies also a cause of knowing is plain from the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 1, 12 [n79], who says: if, of a cause and an effect that are equally predicated (that is, convertible), such as the planets' being near, which is the cause, and their not twinkling, which is its effect and not the cause, the effect, that is, is the better known, then the demonstration will be through this, namely that the planets are near on account of the fact that they do not twinkle. Behold: according to him, propter there signifies not a cause of being, but an effect, which is a cause only of knowing. Hence, once a demonstrative syllogism has been set in order through terms A B C, he adds: \"Therefore it has been demonstrated that the wandering stars are near.\" This syllogism, then, is not propter quid but propter quia [n80]; for it is not from their not twinkling that they are near, but on account of their being near that they do not twinkle.", "margins": [{"id": "350E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) significat (\"signifies\") [for signat]."}]}, {"anchor": "p351A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p351A", "locator_display": "351A–351C", "source_text": "sibi oppositos, cum tamen quantitas anguli extrinseci nullo modo sit causa, imo nec effectus, quare tres anguli trianguli valent duos rectos: Neutrum enim illorum est causa materialis, efficiens, formalis, nec finalis alterius, cum vtrumque possit sine reliquo semper esse. Angulum tamen extrinsecum valere duos extrinsecos sibi oppositos est causa tantum cognitionis nostrae, quare tres anguli trianguli valent duos rectos: Per hoc enim demonstratiue docetur sic esse, sicut 2a pars 32ae primi elementorum Euclidis ostendit. Ideoque dicit Auerroes super 8. Phys. comment. 58. quod tres sunt demonstrationes, scilicet causae, et esse tantum, et causae et esse. Sed ne in causa Catholica testes tantummodo Ethnicos videar ministrare, ecce quid fidelissimus Paulus dicit, Christus factus est obediens vsque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus exaltauit illum, et donauit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, scilicet quod nominetur Deus. Hoc tamen nomen habuit ante suam passionē; imo et naturaliter ante omne meritum suum habuit illud nomen: Ille enim homo prius naturaliter\n\nfuit, et prius naturaliter Deus fuit, quam fecerit aliquid, aut meruerit quouismodo. Nam omne agens praecedit naturaliter suam quamlibet actionē. Christus ergo non meruit esse Deus, sed hoc fuit datum sibi gratissime, sine quouis merito praecedente, sicut ex 35o huius patet. Lumbard. quo que 3. sent. dist. 6. multas autoritates ad hoc idem adducit; et infra 18. tractans autoritatem Apostoli supradictam, dicit quod homo ille non meruit hic tantum bonum, scilicet nomen Dei; non ergo videtur, quod aliquo modo per obedientiam passionis meruit illud nomen, nisi quantum ad cognitionem et manifestationem non Deo, sed hominibus hoc primo ignorantibus, et per eius passionem, resurrectionem, ascensionem, et similia addiscentibus, et vere scientibus, ipsum esse non tantummodo hominem, sed et Deum ; et hoc est quod dicit ibi Lumbardus; Quomodo ergo hoc, inquit, dicitur, per obedientiam donatum est ei hoc nomen? et respondet secundum tropum illum in Scriptura creberrimum, hoc accipiendum est quo dicitur res fieri, quando innotescit. Post resurrectionem vero, quod ante fuit in", "english": "Behold how he first concedes, and secondly denies, that the planets are near on account of their not twinkling; and this is because propter signifies for him first a cause only of knowing, and secondly a cause of being. This agrees also with the whole course of that chapter and the following ones, where demonstration from the effect is called demonstration quia, although this word quia signifies a cause, as does propter. There, then, it signifies a cause only of knowing. Donatus [n81], though, unreasonably assigns quia, quapropter, propterea and many like words, which are manifestly causal, to the power of a conjunction not causal but \"rational\"; and, just as unreasonably, he assigns to its causal power si, nisi and such, which should rather have been assigned to a conditional power, which he passed over altogether. This is also sufficiently proved by that frequent and well-known example of the Philosopher: why do the angles of a triangle equal two right angles? Because the exterior angle equals the two interior angles opposite to it. Yet the magnitude of the exterior angle is in no way a cause, nor even an effect, of why the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles; for neither of them is a material, efficient, formal, or final cause of the other, since either can always exist without the other. Yet that the exterior angle equals the two interior [n82] angles opposite to it is the cause only of our knowledge why the three angles of the triangle equal two right angles; for by this it is demonstratively shown to be so, as the second part of the thirty-second proposition of the first book of Euclid's Elements shows. Hence Averroes says, on Physics 8, comment 58, that there are three demonstrations, namely of the cause, of the fact only, and of cause and fact.\n\nBut lest I seem, in the Catholic cause, to furnish only pagan witnesses, see what the most faithful Paul says: Christ became obedient unto death, even death on a cross; on account of which God also exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name, namely that he be called God. Yet he had this name before his passion; indeed he had that name naturally before any merit of his. For that man first naturally was, and first naturally was God, before he did anything or merited in any way. For every agent naturally precedes any action of his.", "margins": [{"id": "351C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "hominem,"}]}, {"anchor": "p351C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p351C", "locator_display": "351C–352A", "source_text": "obscuro, in euidenti positum est, vt scirent homines et daemones. Vnde et Saluator ipse Iohan. 13o ita dicit, In hoc cognoscent omnes, quod discipuli mei estis, si dilectionem habueritis ad inuicem. Posset ergo dici, quod cum dicitur, Iste propter tale meritum tale praemium consequetur, haec dictio, Propter, non significat causam essendi, sed cognoscendi. Per meritum enim innotescit hominibus, daemonibus, et forsitan Angelis quale praemium quis habebit. Hoc etiam verbum, propter, significat ordinem aliquando, nec incongrue: Nam secundum praemissa 35o huius, Deus primo vult homini praemium et gloriam tanquam finem, et ideo vult sibi et facit merita congrua, velut quaedam media praeuia ad hunc finem: quare et vt tandem recte finaliter ordinentur, tribuit eis finem; propter quem et ad quem ipse finaliter ordinauit. Potest ergo, propter, aliquoties ordinem designare, vt dictum Apostoli intelligatur hoc modo, Factus est obediens etc. propter quod et Deus exaltauit illū, id est, post quod praecedens ordinatum a Deo, ad istud subsequens, quod non nisi post illud fieri statuebat. Pro\n\nquo Anselmus tractans eandem autoritatem Apostoli 1. Cur Deus homo 9. sic dicit, Quod autem cum di•isset Apostolus, Humiliauit seipsum etc. propter quod Deus etc. non ita dictum est, quasi nullatenus potuisset peruenire ad hanc exaltationem, nisi per hanc mortis obedientiam, et haec exaltatio non nisi in retributionem huius obedientiae collata sit (Prius enim quam pateretur, ipse dixit omnia sibi esse tradita a Patre, et omnia Patris esse sua) sed quoniam ipse cum Patre, sanctoque spiritu disposuerat se non aliter quam per mortem, celsitudinem omnipotentiae suae mundo ostensurum, quippe quod non nisi per illam mortem fieri dispositum est, cum per illam fit, non incongrue dicitur propter illam fieri? Si enim intendimus facere aliquid, sed proponimus nos prius facturos aliud per quod illud fiat, cum iam factum est quod volumus praecedere, si fit quod intendimus, recte dicitur propterea fieri, quoniam factum est, propter quod differebatur, quia non nisi per illud fieri\n\ndispositum erat. Nam si fluuium, quem equo et naui transire possum, propono me non nisi naui transiturum, et idcirco differo transmeare, quia nauis abest; cum iam praesto est nauis, si transeo, recte de me dicitur; Nauis parata fuit, propterea transiuit. Et non solum ita loquimur, quando sequens fit per id quod praecedere volumus, sed etiam quando non fit per illud, sed tantummodo post illud facere aliud aliquid statuimus: Si quis enim differt cibum sumere, quia nondum ea die missae celebrationi affuit, peracto quod prius facere volebat, non incongrue illi dicitur; Iam sume cibum, propterea quia jam fecisti, propter quod sumere differebas; Multo igitur minus inusitata est locutio, cum Christus dicitur exaltatus propterea quia mortem sustinuit, per quam et post quam illam exaltationem facere decreuit. Ponitque aliam expositionem eiusdem dicti Apostolici in haec verba; Potest hoc et eo modo intelligi, quo idem Dominus legitur profecisse sapientia, et gratia apud Deum, non quia ita erat, sed quia ille sic se habebat, ac si ita esset. Nam sic per mortem exaltatus est, quasi propter illam hoc fieret. Si", "english": "Christ, then, did not merit to be God; this was given to him most freely [n83], without any preceding merit whatever, as is plain from the thirty-fifth of this work. The Lombard too, Sentences 3, distinction 6, adduces many authorities for this same point; and below, in distinction 18, treating the Apostle's authority cited above, he says that that man did not merit here so great a good, namely the name of God. So it does not seem that in any way he merited that name through the obedience of his passion, except as regards recognition and manifestation: not to God, but to men, who at first did not know it, and who through his passion, resurrection, ascension, and the like learned and truly knew that he is not only man but God [n84]. And this is what the Lombard says there: \"How, then,\" he says, \"is it said that this name was given to him through obedience?\" And he answers, according to that trope so frequent in Scripture, that this is to be taken in the sense in which a thing is said to be made when it becomes known. After the resurrection, indeed, what before was in obscurity was set in evidence, so that men and demons might know. Hence the Saviour himself says in John 13: By this all will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another.\n\nIt could therefore be said that when one says, \"This man will obtain such a reward on account of such merit,\" this word propter does not signify a cause of being but of knowing. For through merit it becomes known to men, to demons, and perhaps to Angels what reward someone will have. This word propter also signifies an order at times, and not unfittingly. For according to the thirty-fifth of this work, God first wills for man reward and glory as an end, and therefore wills for him and makes congruous merits, as certain preceding means to this end. Therefore also, that they may at last be rightly and finally ordered, he assigns them an end, on account of which and toward which he himself has finally ordered them. Propter can therefore sometimes designate an order, so that the saying of the Apostle may be understood in this way: He became obedient, etc., on account of which God also exalted him, that is, after which preceding thing, ordained by God toward this subsequent thing, which he had decreed should be done only after that.\n\nIn support of which Anselm, treating the same authority of the Apostle in Cur Deus homo 1, 9, says thus: \"When the Apostle had said, He humbled himself, etc., on account of which God, etc., this was not said as though he could in no way have reached this exaltation except through this obedience of death, and as though this exaltation were conferred only as a recompense for this obedience (for before he suffered, he himself said that all things had been handed over to him by the Father, and that all things of the Father are his); it was said because he had determined, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, to show the loftiness of his omnipotence to the world in no other way than through death. What was determined to be done only through that death, when it is done through it, is not unfittingly said to be done on account of it [n85]. For if we intend to do something, but propose first to do something else through which it may be done, when what we wished to precede is already done and what we intend then comes about, it is rightly said to be done propterea, 'on that account,' since there has been done that on account of which it was deferred, because it was determined to be done only through that.\"", "margins": [{"id": "351C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) hominem (\"man\")."}, {"id": "351D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) John 13."}, {"id": "351E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "352A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "illius dicti Euangeli •"}]}, {"anchor": "p352A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p352A", "locator_display": "352A–352C", "source_text": "quis igitur de merito et praemio capitis nostri Christi, et membrorum suorum Christianorum, quantum ad causalitatem propositam velit dicere consequenter, ecce tres modi dicendi praemissi authenticorum Patrum nostrorum, sed quia ista sententia ambigua videtur et dubia, et posset probabiliter contradici, maxime si a capite transferatur ad membra, vellem libenter sine praeiudicio aut reprehensione venerabilium Patrum et Autorum meorum, propter minus sapientes, inter quos plus ego qui non sufficio profunda Dei scrutari, desiderarem etiam vehementer si esset possibile sententiam clariorem, vel ipsam eandem clarius tamen dictam, et magis a contradictione remotam. Vnde et Alexander, vt recitat Auerroes super 2. de coelo, comment. 1. de sententia Aristotelis ita dicit; Nos non sumus sustentati super sententiam huius hominis inter omnes alios, nisi quia videmus ipsam minoris ambiguitatis, et remotiorem a contradictione. Videtur igitur mihi, quod remota omni lege retributionis per voluntatem Dei statutae, non est verum quod propter tale factum bonum vel malum, praemium tale\n\ndebetur, quia tunc esset necessarium absolute, nec Deus posset in contrarium sine offensione iustitiae, sed de necessitate absoluta sic vellet et faceret sic ad extra, sicut superius est argutum: sed quod tale factum, tale praemium mereatur, hoc est, quia Deus sic voluit, et statuit tale in lege, quae voluntas et lex perseuerant continue, non mutatae, sicut 23. capitulum ostendebat. Cum ergo dicitur, iste propter tale meritum, tale praemium consequetur, distinguendum est, eo quod haec dictio, Propter, potest significare causam, quae sit virtus et efficacia meriti talis solius, et sic non est verum, sicut promixo est ostensum: si autem in illo merito, imo supra et ante meritum importet causam quae sit voluntas diuina, et lex eius de retributione cuilibet operi bono vel malo similiter facienda, verum est et catholice concedendum. Propter hoc enim quod iste sic meruit, et legem iam positam tale praemium consequetur, hoc est, quia Deus vult quemlibet secundum sua opera praemiari; et iste sic operatur, ideo tale praemium consequetur. Et cum dicitur, Deus vult istum propter sua merita praemiare, si, Propter, significet", "english": "\"For if there is a river which I can cross by horse and by boat, and I resolve to cross it only by boat, and therefore put off crossing because the boat is away, then when the boat is at hand, if I cross, it is rightly said of me: The boat was ready, therefore he crossed. And we speak thus not only when what follows is brought about through that which we wished to precede, but also when it is not brought about through it, and we merely resolve to do something else after it. For if someone delays taking food because he has not yet attended the celebration of Mass that day, then when what he wished to do first is done, it is not unfittingly said to him: Take food now, because you have now done that on account of which you were delaying eating. Far less unusual, therefore, is the phrase when Christ is said to be exalted propterea quia he endured death, through which and after which he decreed to bring about that exaltation.\" And he sets down another exposition of the same Apostolic saying in these words: \"This can be understood also in the way in which the same Lord is read to have advanced in wisdom and grace before God, not because it was so, but because he comported himself as if it were so. For he was exalted through death in such a way as if this came about on account of it.\"\n\nIf anyone, then, wishes to speak consistently about the merit and reward of Christ our head, and of his members the Christians, as regards the causality proposed, behold the three modes of speaking set out above, from our authentic Fathers. But because that opinion seems ambiguous and doubtful and could be probably contradicted, especially if it is transferred from the head to the members, I would gladly wish, without prejudice or reproach to my venerable Fathers and authorities, and for the sake of the less wise (among whom I most of all am, who am not equal to searching the depths of God), and I would even vehemently desire, if it were possible, a clearer opinion, or the same opinion stated more clearly and further removed from contradiction. Hence also Alexander, as Averroes recounts on On the Heavens 2, comment 1, says thus of the opinion of Aristotle: \"We are not supported in the opinion of this man above all others, except because we see it to be of less ambiguity and more remote from contradiction.\"\n\nIt seems to me, then, that with every law of retribution established by the will of God removed, it is not true that such a reward is owed on account of such a good or evil deed. For then it would be absolutely necessary, and God could not do otherwise without offence to justice, but would will and do thus outwardly by absolute necessity, as was argued above. Rather, that such a deed merits such a reward is so because God has so willed and established it in law, which will and law persist continually, unchanged, as the twenty-third chapter showed. When it is said, therefore, \"This man will obtain such a reward on account of such merit,\" a distinction must be made, because this word propter can signify a cause which is the virtue and efficacy of such merit alone, and so it is not true, as was just shown. But if it imports in that merit (indeed above and before the merit) a cause which is the divine will and his law of retribution to be made alike to any work, good or bad, it is true and to be conceded in a Catholic sense. For because this man has so merited, and because of the law already laid down, he will obtain such a reward: that is, because God wills to reward everyone according to his works, and this man so works, therefore he will obtain such a reward.", "margins": [{"id": "352A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) illius dicti Euangelici (\"of that Gospel saying\") [for eiusdem dicti Apostolici]."}, {"id": "352B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) absque [for sine]."}]}, {"anchor": "p352C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p352C", "locator_display": "352C–353A", "source_text": "causam posteriorem in merito mouentem voluntatem diuinam, determinantem ipsam et educentem de potentia ad actum volendi, non est verum, sicut superius est ostensum: Si autem significet voluntatem diuinam vere causam praecedentem omne meritum et praemium, quae ipsum, vt meruit praemiabit, verum est, et certum. Verum est enim quod Deus habet voluntatem, quae est prima causa omnium meritorum et similiter praemiorum. Potest autem et aliter congrue satis dici, quod meritum est causa efficiens praemij, non proprie, sed solummodo transumptiue, quia scilicet efficit formam in merente, qua secundum praesentem justitiam fit idoneus ad praemium vel ad poenam; vel sic breuius, Quia efficit merentem talem, qualicunque et soli est praemium ordinatum. Nam secundum ordinationem praesentis justitiae, nullus adultus praetaxatam gloriam consequetur, vel poenam, nisi prius per merita sua bona adepta quadam formosa, forma, qua formetur idonee ad gloriam consequendam; vel per merita\n\nsua mala, quadam deformi forma, qua idonee deformiter quodammodo formetur ad poenam. Sic ergo propter meritum debetur praemiū, et est meritum causa praemij effectiua, quia inducit formam qua quis fit idoneus ad praemium capiendum, sicut sacerdos et miles propter hoc quod ordines receperunt, hic celebrat, ille militat, et honoribus proptiis honorantur. Et cum dicitur, Deus vult istum propter sua merita praemiare, si, Propter, significet causam posteriorem effectiuam volutionis diuinae, negandum; si autem significet causam in merito effectiuam quodā modo formae cuiusdā, vel etiam ipsam formā, qua iste fit doneus praemio voluto sibi a Deo, secundum praesentem iustitiam, concedendū. Deus ergo vult istum propter sua merita praemiare, hoc est, iste propter merita sua modo dicto talis est, quales Deus vult et statuit praemiare. Pro quo B. Bern. de grat. et lib. arbit. cap. vlt. ita dicit; In eo Deus Paulum coronae\n\nstatuit promeritorē, cum operū, quibus illa erat repromissa corona habere dignatus est coadjutorem; Porro coadiutorē; fecit volentem, hoc est suae voluntati consentientem; ita que voluntas in auxilium reputatur in meritū. Si igitur a Deo voluntas est et meritū, nec dubium quod a Deo sit velle et perficere pro bona voluntate; Deus ergo autor est meriti, qui et voluntatē applicat operi, et opus explicat voluntate: Alioquin, si proprie appellentur ea quae diximus, nostra merita, spei sunt quaedam seminaria, charitatis incentiua, occultae praedestinationis indicia, futurae foelicitatis praesagia, via regni, non causa regnandi. Adhuc autem et 3. non incongrue dici potest; Iste est propter merita praemiandus, id est, propter merita ordinanda, ita quod; Propter, significet ibi causam finalem ordinis vniuersi a Deo decentissime praedestinati: Non enim decet, quod vniuersalis ordo in minimo perturbetur, sicut tractatus de Prouidentia manifestat. Dicitque Augustinus 1. De libero arbitrio, 13. Lex Dei aeterna est, qua iustum est, vt omnia sint ordinatissima; et Anselmus 1. Cur Deus homo, 12. Deum non decet aliquid inordinatum", "english": "And when it is said, \"God wills to reward this man on account of his merits\": if propter signifies a posterior cause in the merit moving the divine will, determining it and leading it out from potency to the act of willing, it is not true, as was shown above. But if it signifies the divine will as truly the cause preceding every merit and reward, which will reward him as he has merited, it is true and certain. For it is true that God has a will which is the first cause of all merits and likewise of rewards. It can also be said otherwise, and suitably enough, that merit is the efficient cause of the reward, not properly but only by transference: namely because it produces in the one who merits a form by which, according to present justice, he becomes fit for reward or punishment. Or, more briefly: because it makes the one who merits such [n86] that reward is ordained for one of that kind and for him alone. For according to the ordering of present justice, no adult will obtain the aforesaid glory or punishment unless he has first acquired, through his good merits, a certain beautiful form by which he is fittingly formed for obtaining glory; or, through his evil merits, a certain deformed form by which he is fittingly, in a manner, deformed toward punishment. Thus, therefore, on account of merit reward is owed, and merit is the effective cause of the reward, because it induces the form by which one becomes fit to receive the reward. So a priest and a knight, because they have received their orders, the one celebrates and the other fights, and they are honoured with honours proper to them.\n\nAnd when it is said, \"God wills to reward this man on account of his merits\": if propter signifies a posterior effective cause of the divine willing, it is to be denied; but if it signifies a cause effective in the merit, in some way, of a certain form, or even the form itself, by which this man becomes fit for the reward willed for him by God according to present justice, it is to be conceded. God therefore wills to reward this man on account of his merits means that this man, on account of his merits, in the manner stated, is such as God wills and has established to reward. On this Blessed Bernard says, in On Grace and Free Choice, last chapter: \"In this God established Paul as one meriting the crown, when he deigned to have him as a fellow-worker in the works for which that crown had been promised. Moreover he made the fellow-worker willing, that is, consenting to his will; and so the will is reckoned an aid to merit.\"", "margins": [{"id": "353A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus. Anselmus."}]}, {"anchor": "p353A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p353A", "locator_display": "353A–353C", "source_text": "in suo regno dimittere; et secundum eundem supra, eodem; Recte ordinare peccatum sine satisfactione, non est nisi punire, et per hoc ostendit, quod omne peccatum sine satisfactione est necessario puniendum: et Augustinus simili ratione suffultus, 3. De libero arbitrio, 24. ostendit idem; Imo et quod peccatum et poena nullo interuallo temporis diuiduntur, ne vel puncto temporis vniuersalis pulchritudo turpetur. Quare et in recte factis similiter constat esse, sicut praesens capitulum superius ostendebat. Et iste modus dicendi concordat cum secundo modo dicendi recitato superius ab Anselmo. Cum ergo dicitur, iste est propter merita praemiandus, hoc est, iste est praemiandus propter merita finaliter ordinanda, id est, propter finalem ordinem meritorum praetaxatum a Deo. Et cum dicitur, Deus vult istum propter merita praemiare, hoc est, Deus vult istum praemiate propter merita finaliter ordinanda, id est, vult quod talis sit finis talium meritorum, secundum ordinem ab ipso talibus praestitutum, ita quod merita nullo modo antecedenter, causaliter, a priori, mouent, determinant, vel actuant\n\nvoluntatem diuinam ad praemia rependenda. Vnde Auicen. 8. Met. 7. Deus, inquit, diligit ordinem bonitatis vniuersi, sed non patitur ab eo, nec concupiscit. Et si quis adhuc quaerat, si non propter merita, quare ergo eligit, vel reprobat hunc vel illum? cap. 21. et alia hic respondent: quare autem semper quaerit causam, causa autem formalis volutionis illius, est quodammodo ipse Deus, officiens vero causa prior quodammodo est sua voluntas, posterior vero inter res creatas, nulla est omnino. Et hoc est quod dicit Apostolus ad Rom. 9. cum praedixit, quod Deus Iacobum dilexit, et Esauum odio habuit, et hoc non ex operibus, sed ex voluntate, vt secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, inducit quaerentem quaestionem praedictam, cui sic respondet; Voluntati eius quis resistet? O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? quasi diceret; Non est talis causa prohibens aut efficiens voluntatem diuinam, per quam valeat responderi, quare hunc dilexit, et illum odiuit; et hoc statim per locum a simili, seu per locum a minori, sic probat; Nunquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit, quid me fecisti sic? id est,", "english": "\"If, then, the will is from God, and the merit, and there is no doubt that willing and accomplishing according to good will are from God, then God is the author of merit, who both applies the will to the work and unfolds the work by the will. Otherwise, if what we have said were to be properly called our merits, they are certain seed-beds of hope, incentives to charity, signs of hidden predestination, presages of future happiness, the way to the kingdom, not the cause of reigning\" [n87].\n\nFurthermore, thirdly, it may be said, not unfittingly: \"This man is to be rewarded on account of merits,\" that is, on account of merits to be ordered, so that propter signifies there the final cause of the order of the universe, most fittingly predestined by God. For it does not befit that the order of the whole be disturbed in the least, as the treatise on Providence makes plain. And Augustine says, On Free Choice 1, 13: \"The law of God is eternal, by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered\"; and Anselm, Cur Deus homo 1, 12: \"It does not befit God to leave anything disordered in his kingdom\"; and, according to the same, above, in the same place: \"To order sin rightly without satisfaction is nothing but to punish.\" By this he shows that every sin without satisfaction is necessarily to be punished. Augustine, supported by a like reason, shows the same in On Free Choice 3, 24; indeed he shows also that sin and punishment are divided by no interval of time, lest even for a moment of time the beauty of the universe be disfigured. So it is evident that it is similarly with rightly done deeds, as the present chapter showed above. And this mode of speaking agrees with the second mode of speaking recounted above from Anselm. When it is said, therefore, \"This man is to be rewarded on account of merits,\" this means that he is to be rewarded on account of merits to be finally ordered, that is, on account of the final order of merits determined beforehand by God. And when it is said, \"God wills to reward this man on account of merits,\" this means that God wills to reward this man on account of merits finally ordered, that is, he wills that such be the end of such merits, according to the order established for such merits by himself. The merits do not in any way antecedently, causally, a priori, move, determine, or actuate the divine will to render rewards.", "margins": [{"id": "353A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine; Anselm."}, {"id": "353B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) praedestinatum (\"predestined\") [for praestitutum]. (The keyed text adds \"Auicenna.\" here; in the print it is a separate source margin at 353C, beside Vnde Auicen.: Avicenna.)"}]}, {"anchor": "p353C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p353C", "locator_display": "353C–353D", "source_text": "propter quam rationem praeponderantem, motiuam, et effectiuam volutionis tuae? certe non: imo sine omni ratione priori praeponderante potest libere ex eadem massa facere vnum vas tale, aliud vero tale; et hoc est quod subdit; Annon habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? Et infra, 11. planius dicit idem; O altitudo, inquiens, diuitiarū sapientiae et scientiae Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, et inuestigabiles viae eius? scilicet per aliquam rationem effectiuam priorem, quia nulla est talis omnino. Et hoc est quod statim subiungit; Quis enim cognouit sensum Domini, scilicet rationem aliquam praecedentem, quare sic fecit, quasi diceret, Nullus; quia hoc non est cognoscibile, cum non sit verum: et subdit expressius; Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit, scilicet quae posterior res causata fuit causa prior, et quasi offerens rationem, cui innitebatur diuinum consilium operando; ideo que planissime statim subdit; Aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quasi dicat, nullus, nec aliqua res posterior ipso Deo, quod et statim ostensiue demonstrat,", "english": "Hence Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 7: \"God,\" he says, \"loves the order of the goodness of the universe, but is not affected by it, nor does he covet it.\" And if anyone still asks, \"If not on account of merits, why then does he elect or reprobate this man or that?\", chapter 21 and others here answer: but why does one always seek a cause [n88]? The formal cause of that willing is in a way God himself; the efficient cause, as prior, is in a way his will; but a posterior cause among created things there is none at all. And this is what the Apostle says in Romans 9. When he had said beforehand that God loved Jacob and hated Esau, and this not from works but from will, so that the purpose of God according to election might stand, he brings in one who asks the question stated above, and answers him thus: Who resists his will? O man, who are you to answer back to God? As if to say: there is no such cause, hindering or effecting the divine will, by which an answer could be given as to why he loved this man and hated that. And he proves this at once, by a topic from likeness, or from the lesser, thus: Shall the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why have you made me thus? That is: on what preponderant, motive, and effective reason of your willing? Surely none. Rather, without any prior preponderant reason he can freely make from the same lump one vessel of this kind, another of that; and this is what he adds: Does not the potter have power over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honour, another for dishonour? And below, in chapter 11, he says the same more plainly: O the depth, he says, of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments and how unsearchable his ways! That is, through some prior effective reason, because there is none such at all. And this is what he adds at once: For who has known the mind of the Lord? That is, some preceding reason why he so acted; as if to say, \"No one,\" because this is not knowable, since it is not true. And he adds more expressly: Or who has been his counsellor? That is, what posterior caused thing was a prior cause, and as it were offering a reason on which the divine counsel relied in acting. And therefore he adds most plainly at once: Or who has first given to him, and will be repaid? As if to say, no one, nor any thing posterior to God himself; which he also at once demonstrates ostensively,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p353E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p353E", "locator_display": "353E–354A", "source_text": "cum dicit; Quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia, quo modo cap. 20. et alia eandem conclusionem ostendunt. Vnde et Aug. De correp. et gratia 12. ita dicit; Quare sic isti, illi aliter, at que aliter alij innumerabilibus et diuer sis modis vocentur? Absit, vt dicamus iudicium luti esse debere, non figuli. Augustinus autem in hac parte sequitur nedum Apostolum, sed etiam Sapientem, Sap. 15. sic dicentem; Figulus de eodem luto fingit vasa munda, et his contraria; horum autem vasorum quis sit vsus, iudex est figulus. Et iterum De corrept et gratia, 25. Si a me quaeritur; Cur eis Deus perseuerantiam non dedit, quibus eam qua maxime viuerent, dilectionem dedit, me ignorare respondeo; Vnde Apostolus; O homo, tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo; et, O altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei, etc. Idem de bono perseuerantiae, 16. Cur, inquis, in eadem causa, me quam illum potius puniet? aut illum, quam me potius liberabit? hoc non dico, si quaeris quare? quia fateor me non inuenire quid dicam, quia in\n\nhac re, sicut iusta est ita eius, sicut magna est misericordia eius, ita inscrutabilia iudicia eius. Si autem quaeratur, per quare, causa finalis, et hoc de reprobatione malorum, quia hoc plerosque magis sollicitat; dicendum secundum vigesimum primum capitulum, quod causa finalis vltima est Deus: Vniuersa namque propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus, impium quoque ad diem malum, Parabol. 16. Ecce quod impium ad diem malum operatus est Dominus, propter semetipsum finaliter vltimate. Causa autem finalis media est tam multiplex, quam multa bona ex reprobatis proueniunt, quorum aliqua trigesimum primum huius, et 34um. pandunt; quorum et vnum est manifestatio Dominij; et virtutis illius, ipsomet testante Exod. 9. Idcirco posui te, scilicet Pharaonem, mihi contrarium, vt ostendam in te fortitudinem meam, et narretur nomen meum in omni terra. Si enim Pharao nequaquam Domino restitisset, quomodo Deus tot miracula ostendisset? et Psal. 105. Saluauit eos propter nomen luum, vt notam faceret potentiam suam. Per hanc quoque autoritatem similiter respondet", "english": "when he says: \"For from Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things,\" in the way that chapter 20 and others prove the same conclusion. Hence Augustine too, in On Rebuke and Grace 12, speaks thus: \"Why are these called thus, those otherwise, and others again otherwise, in countless and diverse ways? Far be it from us to say that the judgment ought to belong to the clay, not to the potter.\" Augustine in this part follows not only the Apostle but also the Wise Man, who says in Wisdom 15: \"The potter fashions from the same clay clean vessels, and their opposites; but what the use of these vessels is, the potter is judge.\" And again in On Rebuke and Grace, 25: \"If I am asked why God did not give perseverance to those to whom He gave the love by which they might live to the utmost, I answer that I do not know; whence the Apostle: 'O man, who are you, who answer back to God?' and 'O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God,' etc.\" The same, in On the Gift of Perseverance 16: \"Why,\" you ask, \"in the same cause will He punish me rather than him? or free him rather than me? I do not say this. If you ask why? it is because I confess that I do not find what to say, since in this matter, as His wrath is just, as His mercy is great, so His judgments are unsearchable.\"", "margins": [{"id": "353E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "353E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Wis 15."}, {"id": "354A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Rom. 9."}]}, {"anchor": "p354A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p354A", "locator_display": "354A–354C", "source_text": "Apostolus ad Rom. 9. cum ait, Dicit enim Scriptura, quia in hoc ipsum excitaui te, vt ostendam in te virtutem meam, et vt annuntietur nomen meum in vniuersa terra; Et sequitur, Quod si volens Deus ostendere iram suam, et notam facere potentiam suam; sustinuit in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, etc. sed quia secundum 21um. huius, homo est finis omnium aliorum, et hominum electi sunt finis quodammodo reproborum; ideo reprobati ordinantur finaliter ad vtilitatem electorum: Vnde Apostolus ad Rom. 9. Maior seruiet minori, scilicet reprobatus electo; et infra 11. Inimici propter vos, scilicet electos; et 2. ad Cor. 4. Omnia propter vos; et 2. ad Tim. 2. expressius, Omnia sustineo propter electos, vt et ipsi salutem consequantur: et ad hoc idem est testimonium Dei quod maius est, Exod. 10. Mosi de Pharaone sic dicit, Ego indutaui cor eius, et seruorum illius, vt faciam signa mea haec in eo, et narres in auribus filij tui et nepotum tuorum, quoties contriuerim Aegyptios, et signa mea fecerim in eis, et sciatis quod ego Dominus. Ecce causa finalis, vt sciatis,\n\nscilicet vos electi, quia ego sum Dominus: Quomodo enim mali Deum timerent, bonique amarent in tantum, nisi vidissent, vel audissent tam validam manum Dei, malorum tam potentem vltricem, bonorum vero tam strenuam adiutricem, sicut omnia illa miracula circa Aegyptios et Hebraeos terribiliter et amabiliter manifestant. Est insuper alia causa finalis non parua, sed magna vtilitas electorum, vt videlicet poena vnius sit metus multorum, imo verius, vt poena multorū sit metus paucorum, (Multi enim sunt vocati, pauci vero electi) quatenus scilicet electi scientes culpas et poenas perpetuas reproborum, ad timoris et humilitatis officia prouocentur, et ad iugis orationis instantiam conuertantur. Quapropter Augustinus de bono perseuerantiae 17. Hominibus, inquit, videtur; omnes qui boni apparent fideles perseuerantiam vsque in finem accipere debuisse; Deus autem melius esse iudicauit, miscere quosdam non perseueraturos certo numero sanctorum suorum, vt quibus non expedit in huius vitae temptatione securitas, non possint esse securi: Multos enim a perniciosa elatione", "english": "But if the question is asked by \"through why,\" that is, the final cause (and this about the reprobation of the wicked, because this troubles most people the more), one must say, according to the twenty-first chapter, that the ultimate final cause is God: \"For the Lord has made all things for Himself, even the wicked for the evil day,\" Proverbs 16. Behold, the Lord has made the wicked for the evil day, for His own sake, finally and ultimately. The intermediate final cause, however, is as manifold as the many goods that come forth from the reprobate, some of which the thirty-first of this book and the thirty-fourth disclose; and one of them is the manifestation of the Lord's dominion and of His power, as He Himself testifies in Exodus 9: \"For this reason I have set you up,\" that is, Pharaoh, \"opposed to me, that I may show my strength in you, and that my name may be told in all the earth.\" For if Pharaoh had in no way resisted the Lord, how would God have shown so many miracles? And Psalm 105 [106]: \"He saved them for His name's sake, that He might make His power known.\" By this authority too the Apostle answers likewise in Romans 9, when he says: \"For the Scripture says that for this very thing I have raised you up, that I may show my power in you, and that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth.\" And it follows: \"But what if God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction,\" etc. But because, according to the twenty-first of this book, man is the end of all other things, and the elect among men are in a certain way the end of the reprobate, therefore the reprobate are ordered finally to the benefit of the elect: whence the Apostle in Romans 9: \"The elder shall serve the younger,\" that is, the reprobate the elect; and below, 11: \"Enemies for your sake,\" that is, for the sake of the elect; and 2 Corinthians 4: \"All things are for your sake\"; and 2 Timothy 2 more expressly: \"I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they too may obtain salvation.\" And to this same effect is the testimony of God, which is greater, in Exodus 10: He speaks thus to Moses about Pharaoh: \"I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants, that I may do these signs of mine in him, and that you may tell in the ears of your son and of your grandsons how often I have crushed the Egyptians and done my signs among them, and that you may know that I am the Lord.\" Behold the final cause: that you may know, namely you the elect, that I am the Lord. For how would the wicked fear God, and the good love Him so greatly, had they not seen or heard of so strong a hand of God, so powerful an avenger of the wicked and so vigorous a helper of the good, as all those miracles concerning the Egyptians and the Hebrews make manifest, terribly and lovably? There is, besides, another final cause, not a small one but a great one, the benefit of the elect: namely, that the punishment of one be the fear of many, or rather, that the punishment of many be the fear of few (\"For many are called, but few are chosen\"), so that the elect, knowing the perpetual faults and punishments of the reprobate, may be aroused to the duties of fear and humility, and turn to constancy in unceasing prayer.", "margins": [{"id": "354A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Rom 9."}, {"id": "354B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Rom 11."}, {"id": "354B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) 2 Cor 4."}, {"id": "354B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Exod 10."}]}, {"anchor": "p354C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p354C", "locator_display": "354C–354D", "source_text": "reprimit, quod ait Apostolus; Quapropter qui videtur stare, videat ne cadat. Et infra 37. Ideo quippe non perseueraturi perseueraturis prouidentissima Dei voluntate miscentur, vt esse discamus non alta sapientes, sed humilibus consentientes, et cum timore et tremore nostram ipsorum salutem operemur: Deus est enim qui operatur in nobis et velle, et operari pro bona voluntate. Qui et de sancta virginitate 16. An non propter aliud credendum est permittere Deum vt misceantur numero vestrae professionis, multi et multae casuri et casurae, nisi vt his cadentibus timor vester augeatur, quo superbia comprimatur, quam sic odit Deus, vt contra hanc vnam tantum se humiliaret altissimus. Est adhuc et tertia causa non parua, vt scilicet filij gratiae et electi, videntes se non meritis proprijs, sed gratia Dei gratis a reprobis separari, gratia Dei grata magis appareat, et electi filij gratiae reddātur Autori gratissimo gratiae gratiores. Quare et Augustinus super illud Psalmi 87. Nunquid cognoscentur in tenebris mirabilia tua? etc. Occurrebat, inquit, quaestio, quisnam fit vsus istorum mortuorum,", "english": "Therefore Augustine, in On the Gift of Perseverance 17: \"It seems to men,\" he says, \"that all the faithful who appear good ought to have received perseverance to the end; but God judged it better to mix some who will not persevere with the fixed number of His saints, so that those for whom security in the temptation of this life is not expedient may not be able to be secure; for what the Apostle says restrains many from ruinous pride: 'Therefore let him who seems to stand take heed lest he fall.'\" And below, 37: \"For this very reason, those who will not persevere are mixed with those who will, by the most provident will of God, that we may learn not to be minded to high things but to consent to the lowly, and with fear and trembling to work out our own salvation; for it is God who works in us both to will and to work, for His good pleasure.\" The same, in On Holy Virginity 16: \"Is it to be believed that God permits, for any other reason, that many men and many women who are going to fall should be mixed into the number of your profession, than that by their falling your fear may be increased, and pride thereby be repressed, which God so hates that against this one vice alone the Most High humbled Himself?\" There is yet a third cause, not a small one: namely, that the children of grace and the elect, seeing that they are separated from the reprobate not by their own merits but freely by the grace of God, may find the grace of God the more welcome, and that the elect, children of grace, may be made more grateful to the most gracious Author of grace.[n89]", "margins": [{"id": "354D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus."}]}, {"anchor": "p354D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p354D", "locator_display": "354D–355A", "source_text": "quid ex his agat Deus ad vtilitatem corporis sui, quod est Ecclesia, vt in eis demonstretur, quae sit Dei gratia in praedestinatis, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt: Vnde ipsum corpus in alio Psalmo dicit, Deus meus, misericordia eius praeueniet me. Isti etiam reprobi nedū in via, verum etiam in patria, vtiles sunt electis, vt scilicet visa illorum miseria, horum gloria gratior habeatur. Opposita namque iuxta se posita magis apparent, sicut 34um. pandit, et horum quam gratuitus liberator, et gratiosissimus praemiator, qui hos aequaliter sicut illos potuit aeternaliter damnauisse, charius diligatur. Vnde Psalmus 57. ita dicit, Laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam; Et Esaiae vlt. Egredientur et videbunt cadauera virorum, qui praeuaricati sunt in me: vermis eorum non morietur, et ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt vs que\n\nad satietatem visionis omni carni; vbi Glossa, super verbum ad satietatem visionis, Quia videbunt eos a se iusto iudicio separatos, amissa potentia qua saeuiebant contra bonos, et vindictā in illos tantam, vt maiorem non exposcant, qui modo dicunt, vsquequo Domine non vindicas sanguinem nostrum? Satiabuntur quo que de beatitudine sua agentes gratias, visa impiorum ineffabili poena. Quare et Gregor. hom. 40. tractans illam historiam Euangelicam de diuite sepulto in inferno, et Lazaro mendico portato in sinu Abrahae, ita scribit; Iusti in tormentis semper intuentur iniustos, vt hinc eorum gaudium crescat, quia malum conspiciunt quod misericorditer euaserunt, tantoque maiores redemptori suo referunt gratias, quanto vident quod in alijs, ipsi perpeti, si essent relicti, potuerunt: nec illam tantae beatitudinis claritatem apud iustorum animum fuscat aspecta poena reproborum, quia vbi iam compassio miseriae non erit, minui proculdubio bonorum laetitia non valebit. Quid autem mirum, si dum iusti", "english": "Hence Augustine too, on that verse of Psalm 87 [88], \"Shall your wonders be known in the darkness?\" etc.: \"A question presented itself,\" he says, \"what use these dead are, what God does with them for the benefit of His body, which is the Church, so that in them it may be shown what the grace of God is in the predestined, who are called according to His purpose; whence the body itself says in another Psalm: 'My God, His mercy will go before me.'\" These reprobate also, not only on the way but also in the homeland, are useful to the elect: namely, that, when their misery is seen, the glory of these may be held the more welcome. For opposites placed side by side appear more clearly, as the thirty-fourth discloses; and so the liberator of these, how freely giving, and their most gracious rewarder, who could as equally have damned these eternally as those, is loved the more dearly. Hence Psalm 57 [58] says: \"The just man will rejoice when he sees the vengeance\"; and the last chapter of Isaiah: \"They shall go out and see the corpses of the men who have transgressed against me: their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be until satiety of vision for all flesh\"; where the Gloss on the words \"until satiety of vision\" says: \"Because they will see them separated from themselves by just judgment, the power lost by which they raged against the good, and vengeance upon them so great that they ask no greater: they who now say, 'How long, Lord, do you not avenge our blood?' They will also be satisfied by their beatitude, giving thanks, having seen the ineffable punishment of the impious.\"", "margins": [{"id": "354D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "354E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"gloriosissimus\" for \"gratiosissimus\"; (source) Ps 57 [58]; Isa 66 (Savile: \"Esaia vlt.\")"}, {"id": "355A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gloss."}, {"id": "355A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Gregorius."}]}, {"anchor": "p355A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p355A", "locator_display": "355A–355C", "source_text": "iniustorum tormenta conspiciant, hoc eis veniat in obsequio gaudiorum; quando et in pictura niger color substernitur, vt albus vel rubeus clarior videatur. Sic ergo vt dictum est, tanto bonis sua gaudia excrescunt, quanto eorum oculis damnatorum mala subtus iacent quae euaserunt; et quamuis eis sua gaudia ad perfruendum plene sufficiant, mala tamen reproborum absque dubio semper aspiciunt; quia qui Creatoris sui claritatem vident, nihil in creatura agitur, quod videre non possint. Qui et 4. dial. 46. Petro quaerenti, Sed nullus iustus crudelitate pascitur delinquentis: seruus a iusto Domino idcirco caedi praecipitur, vt a nequitia corrigatur; Ad hoc ergo vapulat, vt emendari debeat; Iniqui autem gehennae ignibus traditi, si ad correctionem non perueniunt, quo fine semper ardebunt? Ita respondet; sed omnipotens Deus, qui pius est, miserorum cruciatu non pascitur, quia autem iustus est, ab iniquotum vltione in perpetuum non sedatur; sed iniqui omnes aeterno supplicio deputati, sua quidem iniquitate puniuntur, et tamen ad aliquid ardebunt, scilicet vt iusti omnes et in Deo videant gandia quae percipiunt, et illis respiciant supplicia, quae euaserunt, quatenus tanto\n\nmagis diuinae gratiae in aeternum debitores se esse cognoscant, quanta in aeternum mala puniri conspiciunt, quae eius adiutorio vicerunt. Quapropter et Augustinus de gaudijs Iustorum, et poenis malorum sic ait; Tunc communis reus et hostis diabolus in conspectu omnium electorum Dei damnabitur, cuius damnatio et intolerabilis poena delectabile spectaculum praestabit electis; tunc ardentissimo amore liberatorem suum et omnium bonorum datorem amabunt, et sine fine, et sine fastidio clamore cordis laudabunt. Istam quoque sententiam Petrus 4. sentent. dist. vlt. profitetur. Supposito ergo, quod miseria damnatorum aliquo modo valeat gloriae saluandorum, potest argui, quod Deus hanc ad illam finaliter ordinauit: Alias namque hoc fieret a casu vel fortuna, nec a prouidentia diuina procederet; quare nec saluandi de illa suae gloriae portione; Deo gratias agere tenerentur, contra 27um et alia quae sequuntur. Quare et haec plane videtur sententia Apostoli ad Roman. 9. in solutione eiusdem quaestionis dicentis, Sustinuit Deus in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, vt", "english": "Hence Gregory too, Homily 40, treating that Gospel story of the rich man buried in hell and the beggar Lazarus carried into Abraham's bosom, writes thus: \"The just in their torments always look upon the unjust, that from this their joy may grow, because they behold the evil which they mercifully escaped, and they render so much the greater thanks to their Redeemer as they see in others what they themselves could have suffered, had they been left; nor does the sight of the punishment of the reprobate darken in the soul of the just the brightness of so great a beatitude, because where there will no longer be compassion for misery, the gladness of the good will undoubtedly not be able to be diminished. What wonder, then, if while the just behold the torments of the unjust, this comes to them in the service of their joys, since in painting too a black colour is laid underneath, that the white or red may appear brighter? So, then, as has been said, the joys of the good swell the more, the more the evils of the damned which they escaped lie beneath their eyes; and although their joys suffice them for full enjoyment, yet they undoubtedly always look upon the evils of the reprobate; for those who see the brightness of their Creator, nothing is done in creation that they cannot see.\" The same man, in Dialogues 4.46,[n90] to Peter asking, \"But no just man feeds on the cruelty of the wrongdoer: a servant is ordered to be beaten by a just master for this reason, that he may be corrected of wickedness; he is beaten, therefore, that he may be amended; but the wicked, handed over to the fires of Gehenna, if they do not come to correction, to what end will they burn forever?\" answers thus: \"But almighty God, who is merciful, is not fed by the torment of the wretched; yet because He is just, He is not appeased forever by the punishment of the wicked; but all the wicked, assigned to eternal torment, are punished for their own wickedness, and yet they will burn for some purpose, namely that all the just may both see in God the joys which they receive, and look back in them upon the torments which they escaped, so that they may know themselves the more indebted forever to divine grace, the greater the evils they see punished forever, which they overcame by His help.\"", "margins": [{"id": "355A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Glossa."}, {"id": "355A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gregory."}, {"id": "355C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus."}, {"id": "355C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Lumbardus."}]}, {"anchor": "p355C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p355C", "locator_display": "355C–355D", "source_text": "ostenderet diuitias gloriae suae, in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparauit in gloriam. Vnde Augustinus de praedestinatione Sanctorum 10. Cur Deus non omnes doceat, aperuit Apostolus, quia volens ostendere iram, et demonstrare potentiam suam, attulit in multa patientia vasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem, et vt notas faciat diuitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae quae praeparauit in gloriam. Idemque expressius 5. contra Iulianum 6. Ex numero electorum nemo perit; caeteri autem mortales, qui ex hoc numero non sunt, et ex eadem quidem massa, ex qua et isti, sed vasa irae facti sunt, ad vtilitatem nascuntur istorum: Non enim quenquam eorum Deus temere ac fortuito creat, aut quid de illis boni operetur ignorat, cum et hoc ipso bonum operetur, quod in eis humanam creat naturam, et ex eis ordinem saeculi praesentis exornat. Ecce triplex bonum ex reprobis, vtilitas electorum, bonum naturae saeculique ornatus. Ponatur quoque secundum pium zelum multorum, licet non secundum scientiam, quod totus infernus, cum omnibus suis domesticis reprobatis tolleretur de", "english": "Hence Augustine too, in On the Joys of the Just and the Punishments of the Wicked, says thus: \"Then the common culprit and enemy, the devil, will be condemned in the sight of all the elect of God, and his condemnation and unbearable punishment will furnish the elect a delightful spectacle; then with most ardent love they will love their Liberator and the Giver of all good things, and endlessly and without weariness will praise Him with the cry of the heart.\" Peter [Lombard] also professes this opinion in Sentences 4, last distinction. Granting, therefore, that the misery of the damned is in some way of service to the glory of those who are to be saved, it can be argued that God ordered this finally to that: for otherwise this would come about by chance or fortune, and would not proceed from divine providence; so that those to be saved would not even be bound to give thanks to God for that portion of their glory, against the twenty-seventh and the others that follow. Hence this too plainly seems the opinion of the Apostle in Romans 9, in the solution of the same question, when he says: \"God endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory in the vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory.\"", "margins": [{"id": "355C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "355C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Lombard."}, {"id": "355D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus."}]}, {"anchor": "p355D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p355D", "locator_display": "355D–355E", "source_text": "medio, esset que coelum tantummodo cum ciuibus suis sanctis, tunc saeculum esset multum perfectum, et si Deus sic fecisset, multum bene fecisset; Nunc autem tanto perfectius et tanto melius facit Deus, quantum perfectionis et bonitatis continent in se illae nobiles creaturae damnatae, quantum etiam resplendentiae et apparentiae purioris illa comparatio veluti contrarietatis extremae confert Iustis, tanquam scintillae fulgentibus, et vt stellae: Quis enim, vel cuius ratio prohibuisset Dominum ab initio, si fuisset placitum coram eo, creasse coelum plenum electis in gloria, et Infernum plenum reprobis in poena, vt hoc illi comparate apparuisset gloriosius et fuisset? Non decrunt tamen, qui hos humano miseratentur affectu, et pia compassione contenderent sic fieri non debere. Sed cur non miserantur paruulos, nedum non peccantes, sed peccare penitus nescientes, sine Sacramento baptismatis decedentes, aeterni ignis supplicio puniendos, vt dicit August. de Fide ad Petrum 59. et 24. plane? Cur etiam non contendunt", "english": "Hence Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints 10: \"Why God does not teach all, the Apostle has disclosed: that, willing to show wrath and to make His power known, He brought forth in much patience vessels of wrath, which were perfected for perdition, and to make known the riches of His glory in vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory.\" And the same more expressly in 5, Against Julian 6: \"From the number of the elect no one perishes; but the other mortals, who are not of this number, and who are indeed of the same lump from which these also come, but have been made vessels of wrath, are born for the benefit of these: for God does not create any of them rashly or by chance, nor is He ignorant of what good He will work from them, since He works good even by this very fact, that in them He creates human nature and by them adorns the order of the present age.\" Behold a threefold good from the reprobate: the benefit of the elect, the good of nature, and the adornment of the age. Suppose also, according to the pious zeal of many, though not according to knowledge, that the whole of Hell, with all its household of reprobates, were removed from the midst, and there were only heaven with its holy citizens: then the age would be much perfected, and if God had so made it, He would have done very well. But as it is, God acts so much the more perfectly and so much the better, in proportion as those noble damned creatures contain in themselves perfection and goodness, and in proportion as that comparison, as of extreme contrariety, confers on the just a radiance and purer appearance, shining like sparks, and as stars. For who, or whose reason, would have prevented the Lord from the beginning, if it had pleased Him, from creating heaven full of the elect in glory and Hell full of the reprobate in punishment, so that the one, compared with the other, would have appeared, and been, the more glorious? There will not be lacking, however, those who would pity these with human feeling, and with pious compassion would contend that it ought not to be so. But why do they not pity little children, who are not only not sinning but utterly incapable of sinning, and who depart without the sacrament of baptism, to be punished with the torment of eternal fire, as Augustine plainly says in On the Faith to Peter[n91] 59 and 24?", "margins": [{"id": "355D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "355E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"illorum operatio\" for \"illa comparatio\"."}]}, {"anchor": "p355E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p355E", "locator_display": "355E–356B", "source_text": "cum Deo, vt iudicium suum retractet, quo talium paruulorū non Fato aut fortuitu, sed ex suae consilio voluntatis, hunc assumit ad baptismum, ad regnum, ad gloriam; illum relinquit, imo et repellit quodammodo a baptismo ad carcerem et ad poenam, sicut plane testatur autoritas Augustini de bono perseu. 35. cum alijs sibi similibus 31. huius praemissis? Cur etiā non miserantur bestias innocentes, tot miserijs et tot mortibus subiacere? Cur hinc Deum non causantur? cur etiam nequaquā figulum criminantur ex eadem massa luti facientem vnum vas in honotē, aliud vero in contumeliā, et contemptum? Annon est Deus ita liber dominus suorum sicut figulus est suorum? Et haec videtur ratio Apostoli ad Rom. 9. in solutione huius, quae in manibus vertitur, quaestionis. Imo audi, et diligenter exaudi; cogita, et vigilanter recogita Augustinum in libello de Praedestinatione et gratia Dei, qui in libro Sermonum suorum praescribitur quintus Sermo 18. ita scribentem; Qua tandem impudentia homo de Deo lutum de figulo iudicabit, non solum dicens, Quid me fecisti sic, sed etiam de alijs dam nabili curiositate\n\npersetutans, et dicens, quare de eadem massa fecisti alium quidem sic, alium vero sic? Si humanum genus quod creatum primitus constat ex nihilo, non cum debito mortis et peccati origine nasceretur, et tamen ex eis Creator omnipotens in aeternum nonnulles damnare vellet in interitum, quis omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare fecisti sic? qui enim, cum non essent, esse donauerat, quo fine essent habuit potestatem, nec dicerent caeteri, cur paribus omnium meritis diuinum discreparet arbittium? quia potestatem habet figulus lu•, ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam. Qui et super titulum Psalmi 70. ita dicit; In omnibus sanctis Scripturis, gratia Dei quae liberat nos, commendat se nobis, vt commendatos habeat nos: Quis enim ei diceret, quid fecisti, si damnaret justum? quanta ergo misericordia eius si iustificet iniustum? Et si adhuc obijcias, quod Deus potuit ordinasse mundum, et gloriam electorum sufficienter bene et congrue per alium modum magis benignum, et sine perditione alicuius tam nobilis creaturae; non ergo decuit tam pium", "english": "Why do they not also contend with God to retract His judgment, by which, of such little children, not by Fate or chance but from the counsel of His own will, He takes this one to baptism, to the kingdom, to glory, and leaves that one, indeed even in a way drives him away from baptism to prison and punishment, as the authority of Augustine plainly attests in On the Gift of Perseverance 35, together with others like it set out in the thirty-first of this book? Why do they not also pity innocent beasts for being subject to so many miseries and so many deaths? Why do they not on this account bring a cause against God?[n92] Why, again, do they in no way accuse the potter who makes from the same lump of clay one vessel to honor and another to dishonor and contempt? Is not God as free a lord of His own as the potter is of his? And this seems the Apostle's reason in Romans 9, in the solution of this question which we have in hand. Nay, hear, and listen carefully; think, and think over again with vigilance, of Augustine in his little book on the Predestination and Grace of God, which in the book of his Sermons is headed \"fifth, Sermon 18,\"[n93] writing thus: \"With what shamelessness, then, will man judge of God, clay of the potter, not only saying, 'Why have you made me thus?' but also, with damnable curiosity, searching into others and saying, 'Why from the same lump have you made one thus, another otherwise?' If the human race, which is established as first created out of nothing, were not born with the debt of death and the origin of sin, and yet the omnipotent Creator should wish to damn some of them to destruction forever, who would say to the omnipotent Creator, 'Why have you made it so?' For He who, when they were not, had given them being, had power as to the end for which they should be, nor would the others say, 'Why, with the merits of all equal, does the divine judgment differ?' because the potter has power over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel to honor and another to dishonor.\"", "margins": [{"id": "355E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "illorum operatio"}, {"id": "356A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "356B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "vt."}]}, {"anchor": "p356B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p356B", "locator_display": "356B–356D", "source_text": "et iustum, aliquem Angelum aut hominem aeternae gratis miseriae praeparare: Fateor indubitanter, quod potuit sic, et potuit aliter reparasse genus humanum, quam per passionem et mortem Christi. Cur ergo ex tota compassione non quaereris tam celsi Regis filium vnicum, tam innocentem, tam delicarum, tam tenerum, imo et Dominum Deum tuum p•o enocente et misero scruo suo, tam contemptibiliter apprehendi, tam crudeliter flagellari vulnerari, lacerari, et tandem morte turpissima consummari? cur non ibidem Dei iudicium reuocas, irritas, et annullas? Et licet Deus voluntatem tuam secutus, benignius et melius ordinasset, cum adhuc semper melius posset, et melius sine fine, semper remaneret eadem querela, cur sic ordinauit, et non melius, cum ita faciliter potuit melius ordinaste. Compescat ergo se ista querulosa temeritas contra Deum, nec irrationabiliter quaeritet rationem superiorem voluntate diuina, cum ipsa in talibus volutis posterioribus sit summitas rationis, non rationis pedissequa vel ancilla, sed e contra; hanc enim ratio equitur, vt Dominam\n\net Magistram, sicut vigesimum primum capitulum demonstrauit. Vnde Ecclesiastis 8. Intellexi quod omnium operum Dei nullam possit homo inuenire rationem eorum quae fiunt sub Sole. Ecce pro volutis posterioribus et quanto plus laborauerit ad quaerendum, tanto minus inueniet, etiamsi dixerit Sapiens se nosse, non poterit reperire. Compescat ergo se omnis humana querimonia contra Deum, et pro ratione in cunctis sibi sufficiat, sic Deum et Dominum voluisse. Vnde et Ecclesiastis 7. Considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ille despexerit; In die bona fruere bonis, et malam diem praecaue: Sicut enim hanc, sic et illam fecit Deus, vt non in ueniat homo contra cum iustas querimonias. Amplius autem ad autoritates canonicas forsitan te conuertes, obijciesque illud Apostoli 1. ad Tim. 2. qui vult omnes homines saluos fieri; et illud Ezech. 18. Nunquid voluntatis meae est morsimpij? dicit Dominus, et non vt conuertatur, et viuat? Et illud Act. 10. Non est personarum acceptor Deus; Et illud Marc. vlt. Praedicate Euangelium omni creaturae etc. Dicitque Gregorius", "english": "The same, on the title of Psalm 70 [71], speaks thus: \"In all the Holy Scriptures, the grace of God that frees us commends itself to us, so that it may hold us as commended: for who would say to Him, 'What have you done?' if He were to damn a just man? How great, then, is His mercy, if He justifies the unjust!\" And if you still object that God could have ordered the world and the glory of the elect sufficiently well and fittingly by another, more kindly way, and without the perdition of any so noble creature; that it was therefore not fitting for one so pious and just to prepare any angel or man for eternal misery without cause:[n94] I confess without hesitation that He could have done so, and could have restored the human race otherwise than by the passion and death of Christ. Why then, out of all your compassion, do you not complain that the only Son of so exalted a King, so innocent, so delicate, so tender, indeed even the Lord your God, was, for His guilty and wretched servant,[n95] so contemptibly seized, so cruelly scourged, wounded, torn, and at last put to death by a most shameful death? Why do you not, at that very place, recall, nullify, and annul God's judgment? And granted that God, following your will, had ordained things more kindly and better, since He could still always do better, and better without end, the same complaint would always remain: why did He so ordain, and not better, when He could so easily have ordained better? Let this querulous rashness against God, then, restrain itself, and not irrationally keep seeking a reason higher than the divine will, since in such willed things[n96] that will itself is the summit of reason, not reason's attendant or handmaid, but the reverse; for reason follows it as Lady and Mistress, as the twenty-first chapter has shown.", "margins": [{"id": "356B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"ut\" for \"si\"."}, {"id": "356C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"istud\" for \"ibidem\"."}, {"id": "356D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Eccl 8."}, {"id": "356D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Ecclesiast. 7."}, {"id": "356D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "1. Tim. 2. Ezech. 18. Act. 10. Gregorius."}]}, {"anchor": "p356D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p356D", "locator_display": "356D–356E", "source_text": "4. Moral. 24. super illud Iob 3. Nunc dormiens silerem etc. Si parentem primum nulla peccati putredo corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios gehen•ae generaret: sed hi qui nunc per redemptionem saluādi sunt soliab illo electi nascerentur. Ad haec autem dicendum, Autoritates sacrae Scripturae obiectas non posse intelligi secundum superficiem liceralem, sicut decimum et vicessimum tertium huius probant. Harum igitur primam, non ego, sed Patres Catholici multis modis exponunt: Ambrosius enim ibi exponens Apostolum, primo quaerit, Si Deus, qui omnipotens dicitur, omnes homines vult saluos fieri, cur non impletur eius voluntas? secundo respondet, Sed in omni locutione sensus et conditio latet. Vnde dicit Petrus Apostolus, Omnis scriptura indiget interpretatione: Vult enim Deus omnes homines", "english": "Hence Ecclesiastes 8: \"I understood that of all the works of God man can find no reason for the things that are done under the sun.\" Behold, regarding the posterior willed things: the more he labors in seeking, the less he will find; even if the wise man says he knows, he will not be able to find it. Let all human complaint against God, then, restrain itself, and let it suffice for it, in place of a reason in all things, that God and Lord has so willed. Hence also Ecclesiastes 7: \"Consider the works of God, that no one can correct him whom He has despised. In the good day enjoy good things, and guard against the evil day; for as He made this, so also He made that, so that man may not find just complaints against Him.\" Further, perhaps you will turn to canonical authorities, and object that word of the Apostle in 1 Timothy 2, \"who wills all men to be saved\"; and that of Ezekiel 18: \"Is the death of the wicked my will?\" says the Lord, \"and not that he be converted and live?\" And that of Acts 10: \"God is not an acceptor of persons\";[n97] and that of the last chapter of Mark: \"Preach the Gospel to every creature,\" etc. And Gregory, in Morals 4, 24, on that verse of Job 3, \"Now sleeping I should be silent,\" etc., says: \"If no putrefaction of sin had corrupted the first parent, he would in no way have begotten children of Gehenna from himself; but those who are now to be saved through redemption would alone be born of him, as elect.\" To this it must be said that the authorities of Holy Scripture that are objected cannot be understood according to the literal surface, as the tenth and the twenty-third of this book prove.", "margins": [{"id": "356D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Ecclesiast. 8."}, {"id": "356D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Eccl 7."}, {"id": "356D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) 1 Tim 2; Ezek 18; Acts 10; Gregory."}]}, {"anchor": "p356E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p356E", "locator_display": "356E–357C", "source_text": "saluos fieri, sed si accedant ad eum. Non enim sic vult, vt nolentes saluentur, sed vult ipsos saluari, si et ipsi velint: Nam qui legem omnibus dedit, nullum excepit a salute. Et super illud ad Rom. 9. Miserebor cui misertus ero, Non iniuste iudicat, qui omnes vult saluos esse, manente iustitia. Augustinus quoque Enchirid. 77. mouet eandem quaestionem, et longa disputatione super insuperabilitate voluntatis diuinae praemissa cap. 83. sic respondet; Debemus ita intelligere quod scriptum est, Qui vult omnes homines saluos fieri, tanquam diceretur nullum hominem fieri saluum, nisi quem saluum fieri ipse voluerit; Non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quam saluum fieri velit, quod cap. 84. confirmat per simile, ita dicens; Sic enim intelligimus quod in Euangelio scriptum est, Qui illuminat omnem hominem, non quia nullus est hominum qui non illuminatur, sed quia nullus nisi ab ipso illuminatur. Deinde subiungit aliā quaestionē eiusdem; aut certe, inquit sic dictum est, Qui omnes homines vult saluos fieri, non quod nullus hominum esset, quem fieri saluum nolit, qui virtutes miraculorum noluit facere apud eos, quos dicit acturos poenitentiam, si fecisset; sed vt omnes homines,\n\nomne genus hominum intellgamus per quascunque differentias distributum, Reges, nobiles, et ignobiles, priuatos, sublimes, humiles, doctos et indoctos, integri corporis, debiles, ingeniosos, tardiores, fatuos, diuites, pauperes, mediocres, mares, foeminas, infantes, pueros, adolescentes, iuuenes, senes, in linguis omnibus, in moribus omnibus, in artibus omnibus, in professionibus omnibus, in voluptatum et concupiscentiarum varietate innumerabili constitutos, et si quid aliud differentiarum est in hominibus. Quam expositionem cap. 85. monstrat cum processu Apostoli concordare; Praeceperat, inquit Apostolus, vt oraretur pro omnibus hominibus, et specialiter addiderat, pro regibus et his qui in sublimitate sunt, qui putari poterant fastu potentiori, et superbia saeculari fidei Christianae humilitatem abhorrere. Proinde dicens; Hoc enim bonum est coram Saluatore Domino nostro, id est, vt etiam pro talibus oretur statim vt desperationem tolleret, addidit; Qui omnes homines vult saluos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire; quod confirmat per simile statim dicens; Isto locutionis modo\n\net Dominus vsus est in Euangelio, vbi ait Pharisaeis; Decimatis mentham, et rutam, et cuminum, et omne olus. Neque enim Pharisaei et quaecunque aliena, et omnium per omnes terras alienigenarum omnia olera decimabant. Sicut ergo omne olus, omne olerum genus, ita et illic omnes homines, omne hominum genus intelligere possumus; et hoc est quod logice solet dici, quod potest in talibus distributio fieri pro singulis generum, vel pro generibus singulorum, sicut hic; Omne animal fuit in area Noe. Vnde Gen. 7. Ingressi sunt ipsi, et omne animal secundum genus suum. Et istam eandem expositionem eiusdem dicti ponit de correptione et gratia, 61. quam etiam roborat per illud Euangelicum iam praemissum; Qui decimatis omne olus, et per illud quod dicit Paulus; Omnibus per omnia placeo. Et infra 74. aliter hoc exponit; Vult, inquiens, Deus omnes homines saluos fieri, id est, facit omnes homines velle saluos fieri, quia ipse operatur velle; et similem modum loquendi habet 22. de Ciu. Dei 2. sicut", "english": "Of these, then, the first, not I but the Catholic Fathers expound in many ways: for Ambrose, expounding the Apostle there, first asks: If God, who is called omnipotent, wills all men to be saved, why is His will not fulfilled? Second, he answers: But in every utterance the sense and condition lie hidden. Hence the Apostle Peter says: \"All Scripture needs interpretation.\" For God wills all men to be saved, but if they come to Him. For He does not will it in such a way that the unwilling are saved, but wills them to be saved if they too will: for He who gave the law to all excepted no one from salvation. And on that text of Romans 9, \"I will have mercy on whom I shall have had mercy\": He does not judge unjustly who wills all to be saved, justice remaining. Augustine also, in the Enchiridion 77, raises the same question, and after a long disputation on the insuperability of the divine will, set out in chapter 83, answers thus: \"We must understand what is written, 'Who wills all men to be saved,' as if it were said that no man is saved unless He Himself has willed him to be saved; not that there is no human being whom He does not will to be saved.\"[n98] This in chapter 84 he confirms by a comparison, saying thus: \"For so we understand what is written in the Gospel, 'Who enlightens every man,' not because there is no man who is not enlightened, but because no one is enlightened except by Him.\" Then he adds another question of the same text: \"Or at least,\" he says, \"it was said thus, 'Who wills all men to be saved,' not meaning that there was any man whom He did not will to be saved, He who refused to work miracles of power among those who, He says, would have done penance had He done so; but that by 'all men' we should understand every kind of men, distributed through whatever differences: kings, nobles and commoners, private persons, the exalted, the lowly, the learned and the unlearned, the sound of body, the infirm, the talented, the slower, the foolish, the rich, the poor, those between, men, women, infants, boys, adolescents, young men, old men; established among all languages, all customs, all arts, all professions, in the innumerable variety of pleasures and desires, and whatever other differences there are among men.\" This exposition he shows, in chapter 85, to agree with the course of the Apostle's argument: \"The Apostle,\" he says,[n99] \"had commanded that prayer be made for all men, and had specially added, for kings and for those who are in high station, who could be thought, from a more powerful pride and worldly arrogance, to shrink from the humility of the Christian faith. Hence, saying, 'For this is good in the sight of our Savior God,' that is, that prayer be made even for such, he added straightway, in order to remove despair: 'Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth'; which he at once confirms by a comparison, saying: 'In this manner of speaking the Lord also made use in the Gospel, where He says to the Pharisees: You tithe mint, and rue, and cumin, and every herb.'\"", "margins": [{"id": "357A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p357C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p357C", "locator_display": "357C–357E", "source_text": "erat superius allegatum. Idem quoque De praedest. Sanctorum, 10. simile dictum sic exponit; Sicut integre loquimur, cum de aliquo literarum magistro, qui in ciuitate solus est Dominus; Omnes iste hic literas docet, non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab illo discit quicunque ibi literas discit: Ita recte dicimus; Omnes Deus docet venire ad Christum, non quia omnes veniunt, sed quia nemo aliter venit. Idem quoque de natura, et gratia dicit idem, scilicet quod omnes viuificantur per Christū, quia nullus nisi per ipsum, sicut dicimus, quod Magister literarum in ciuitate docet omnes, quia nullus discit nisi quem ipse docuit. Illud autem Ezechielis obiectum soluitur per illam distinctionem de velle quam 34. fecit, et si quis vltimum eius verbum voluerit ponderare, scilicet, et non vt conuertatur et viuat, quasi hoc sit voluntatis diuinae, vt omnis peccator conuertatur et viuat, respondendum est secundumiam dicta. Et illud Act. supradictum; Non est personarum acceptor Deus, si debet exponi ad mentem dicentis, debet intelligi modo dicto, scilicet quod Deus non est acceptor personarum secundum\n\ngenus, non secundum speciem seu numerum: Non est, inquam, Deus acceptor personarum secundum genus, quin ex omni gente et natione vocet et recipiat ad salutem; et ista videtur mens Petri Apostoli, qui hoc dixit. Ipse enim prius credidit, vt videtur, quod soli Iudaei essent accepti a Deo ad fidem Christi et regnum, iuxta illud Mat. 15. Non sum missus nisi ad oues quae perierant domus Israel; et supra 10. In viam gentium ne abieritis, et in ciuitates Samaritanorū ne intraueritis, sed potiusite ad oues quae perierunt domus Israel. Sed postquam aud•uit quanta gratia Dominus etiam illum Gentilem Cornelium visitauit, aperiens os suum, dixit; In veritate comperi, quoniam non est personarū acceptor Deus, sed in omni gente, qui timet Deum, et operatur iustitiam, acceptus est illi. Vult ergo tantum dicere S. Petrus, quod Deus non est personarum acceptor, quae ex circumcisione sunt tantum, exclusis alijs quibuscunque, sed in omni alia gente, natione, vel lingua, qui timet Deum et operatur iustitiam, acceptus", "english": "\"For the Pharisees did not tithe whatever belonged to others, nor all the herbs of all foreigners through all lands. As, then, 'every herb' means every kind of herb, so there also we can understand 'all men' as every kind of men; and this is what is customarily said in logic, that in such cases the distribution can be made for the individuals of the kinds, or for the kinds of individuals, as here: 'Every animal was in Noah's ark.' Whence Genesis 7: 'They went in, and every animal according to its kind.'\" And he sets down this same exposition of the same saying in On Rebuke and Grace, 61, which he also strengthens by that Gospel passage already set out, \"You who tithe every herb,\" and by what Paul says: \"I please all men in all things.\" And below, 74, he expounds this otherwise: \"God wills,\" he says, \"all men to be saved,\" that is, He makes all men will to be saved, because He Himself works the willing; and he has a similar manner of speaking in City of God 22, 2, as was alleged above. The same also, in On the Predestination of the Saints 10, expounds a similar saying thus: \"As we speak rightly of some master of letters who is the only master in the city:[n100] 'This man teaches letters to everyone here,' not because all learn, but because no one who learns letters there learns except from him: so we rightly say, 'God teaches all to come to Christ,' not because all come, but because no one comes otherwise.\" The same man also says the same in On Nature and Grace, namely that all are made alive through Christ, because no one is except through Him, as we say that the master of letters in the city teaches all, because no one learns except him whom he has taught. But that objection from Ezekiel is resolved by that distinction about willing which the thirty-fourth made; and if anyone wishes to weigh its last words, namely \"and not that he be converted and live,\" as if it were of the divine will that every sinner be converted and live, the answer must be given according to what has already been said. And that saying of Acts mentioned above, \"God is not an acceptor of persons,\" if it is to be expounded according to the mind of the speaker, must be understood in the manner stated, namely that God is not an acceptor of persons according to genus,[n101] not according to species or number. God is not, I say, an acceptor of persons according to genus, for He calls and receives to salvation from every people and nation; and this seems to be the mind of the Apostle Peter, who said it.", "margins": [{"id": "357E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Mat. 15. Mat. 10."}]}, {"anchor": "p357E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p357E", "locator_display": "357E–358A", "source_text": "est illi; et eiusdem opinionis cum Petro erant fideles caeteri ex Iudaeis; et etiam Apostoli alij, vt videtur; vnde intra eodem; Obstupuerunt ex circumcisione fideles, qui venerant cum Petro, quia et in nationes gratia Spiritus S. effusa est: et infra 11. Audierunt autem Apostoli et fratres, qui erant in Iudaea, quoniam et gentes receperunt gratiam Dei, et honorificabant Deum. Vnde dicit Aug. De bono perseu. 35. Quid est quod aliquando paruuli infideliū baptizantur, fidelium vero non? vt certe ostendatur, quod personarum apud Deum non est acceptio; alioquin fidelium potius quam infidelium filios liberaret: cui et concordat eius autoritas de correptione et gratia, 27. De gratia et lib. arbit. 50. quas 31. habet. Et quod Deus sit personarū acceptor secundū numerū, patet per eundē, infra eodē, sic dicentē; Hunc Deus suscitauit tertia die, et dedit eū manifestū fieri non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo. Et infra 13. Crediderunt, quotquot praeordinati erant ad vitā aeternā. Vnde et Apost. ad Rom. 4. secundum propositum gratiae Dei, sicut et Dauides dicit beatitudinē hominis, cui Deus accepto", "english": "For he himself had previously believed, as it seems, that only the Jews were accepted by God to the faith of Christ and the kingdom, according to that text of Matthew 15, \"I was not sent except to the sheep that had perished of the house of Israel\"; and above, 10: \"Do not go into the way of the Gentiles, and do not enter the cities of the Samaritans, but go rather to the sheep that perished of the house of Israel.\" But after he heard with how much grace the Lord had visited even that Gentile Cornelius, opening his mouth he said: \"In truth I have found that God is not an acceptor of persons, but in every nation he who fears God and works justice is accepted by Him.\" Saint Peter, therefore, means only to say that God is not an acceptor of those persons who are of the circumcision alone, with all others whatever excluded, but that in every other nation, people, or tongue, he who fears God and works justice is accepted by Him; and the other faithful from among the Jews were of the same opinion as Peter, and the other Apostles also, as it seems; whence below in the same place: \"The faithful of the circumcision who had come with Peter were astonished, because the grace of the Holy Spirit was poured out on the nations also\"; and below, 11: \"But the Apostles and brothers who were in Judea heard that the Gentiles also had received the grace of God, and they honored God.\"", "margins": [{"id": "357E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Matt 15; Matt 10."}]}, {"anchor": "p358A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p358A", "locator_display": "358A–358B", "source_text": "fert iustitiam sine operibus. Et infra 9. Cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni aut mali, vt secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex voluntate dictū est, quia maior seruiet minori. Et infra eodem, Miserebot cui miserebor, etc. Et non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei, cum toto processu capituli ad hoc idem. Quod tractans Augustinus Enchirid. 78. sic dicit; Ambo gemini natura irae filij nascebantur, nullis quidem operibus proprijs, sed originaliter ex Adam vinculo damnationis astricti; sed qui dixit, Miserebor cui misertus ero, Iacob dilexit per misericordiam gratuitam, Esau autē odio habuit per iudicium debitum, quod cum deberetur ambobus, in altero alter agnouit non de suis distantibus meritis sibi esse gloriandū, quod in eadem causa idem supplicium non incurrit, sed de diuinae gratiae largitate, quia, Neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei. Et de bono perseuerantiae 26. Duorum geminorum, quorum vnus assumitur, vnus relinquitur, dispar est exitus, merita communia. Et supra eiusdem 19. Ex duobus parunlis", "english": "Whence Augustine says, in On the Gift of Perseverance 35: \"Why is it that sometimes the infants of unbelievers are baptized, and those of believers not? that it may surely be shown that there is no acceptance of persons with God; otherwise He would rather free the children of believers than of unbelievers.\" With which his authority in On Rebuke and Grace 27 and On Grace and Free Choice 50 also agrees, which the thirty-first has. And that God is an acceptor of persons according to number is evident through the same man, below in the same place, speaking thus: \"God raised Him on the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God.\" And below, 13: \"As many as were preordained to eternal life believed.\" Whence also the Apostle in Romans 4, according to the purpose of the grace of God, as David also speaks of the blessedness of the man to whom God credits[n102] righteousness without works. And below, 9: \"When they were not yet born, or had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works but from the will it was said, that the elder shall serve the younger.\" And below in the same: \"I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,\" etc. And: \"It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy,\" with the whole course of the chapter to the same effect.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p358B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p358B", "locator_display": "358B–358D", "source_text": "originali peccato pariter obstrictis, cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur, et ex duobus aetate iam grandibus impijs, cur iste ita vocetur, vt vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vocetur, Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei; Ex duobus autem pijs, cur huic donetur perseuerantia vsque in finem, illi autem non donetur, Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei. Idemque Enchuid. 75. Tunc non latebit, quod nunc latet, cur de duobus vnus esset assumendus per misericordiam, alius per iudicium relinquendus, in quois qui assumeretur agnosceret, quid sibi per iudicium deberetur, nisi misericordia subueniret, cur ille potius quam iste fuerit assumptus, cum causa vna esset amborum. Dicitque beatus Gregorius 25. Moral. 14. super illud Iob trigesimo quarto, Ipso concedente pacem, quis est qui condemnet, nemo discutiat, cur alius trahatur ex dono, alius repellatur ex merito. Quibus et concors est Anselmus Prosolog. 11. Deo sic dicens, Si vtcunque capi potest, cur malos potes velle saluare; illud certe nulla ratione comprehendi potest, cur de similibus malis, hos magis\n\nsalues quam illos per summam bonitatem, et illos magis damnes quam illos per summam iustitiam. Hoc etiam plane probant Ieremias, Ioannes Baptista, et beata virgo Maria, quae sine omni merito praecedente sanctificabantur in vtero, alijs omnino similibus derelictis. Si quis autem huiusmodi sanctificationis qualiacunque merita sibi fingat, ponatur quod alia virgo similis virgini gloriosae similiter omnino vixisset; et si nullo modo Deus sit acceptor singularium personarum, sequitur quod Deus ex ea fuisset similiter incarnatus, sicque multas matres vnicus Dei Filius habuisset: Ego autem credo firmissime, quod etsi omnes filiae domus Iacob, sicut et domina mea vixissent; nulla tamen earum talis fuisset in acceptatione diuina, et quod ipsi soli prae omnibus virginis et matris donasset gaudium et honorem, ex ipsa singulariter incarnatus; Nullo tamen modo videtur, quod tanta sapientia, quae omnia disponit suaniter, vnicam sibi matrem studiosa prouidentia non singulariter et aeternaliter praeelegit, sed quae foret mater eius, quasi negligenter reliquit meritis et voluntatibus hominum", "english": "Treating this, Augustine says in the Enchiridion 78: \"Both twins were born children of wrath by nature, by no works of their own, but originally bound by the chain of damnation from Adam; but He who said, 'I will have mercy on whom I shall have mercy,' loved Jacob through gratuitous mercy, but held Esau in hatred through deserved judgment; which, since it was owed to both, in the one the other recognized that he must not boast of his own differing merits, in that in the same cause he did not incur the same punishment, but of the largesse of divine grace, because 'it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy.'\" And in On the Gift of Perseverance 26: \"Of two twins, one of whom is taken up, one left, the outcome is unequal, the merits common.\" And above, 19, of the same: \"From two infants alike bound by original sin, why this one is taken up, that one left; and from two wicked men already of full age, why this one is so called that he follows the caller, while that one is either not called or not so called, the judgments of God are unsearchable; but from two pious men, why to this one perseverance to the end is given, to that one not given, the judgments of God are unsearchable.\" And the same, Enchiridion 75: \"Then it will not be hidden, what is now hidden, why of two one was to be taken up through mercy, another left through judgment, in which he who was taken up would recognize what would have been owed him by judgment, had mercy not come to his aid, why that one rather than this was taken up, when the cause of both was one.\" And blessed Gregory says, in Morals 25, 14, on that verse of Job 34, \"When He grants peace, who is it that will condemn?\": let no one inquire why one is drawn by gift, another repelled by desert. With these Anselm also agrees, in the Proslogion 11, speaking thus to God: \"If it can somehow be grasped why You can will to save the wicked, this surely can be comprehended by no reason, why, of similarly wicked men, You save these rather than those through supreme goodness, and damn those rather than these[n103] through supreme justice.\"", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p358D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p358D", "locator_display": "358D", "source_text": "", "english": "Jeremiah, John the Baptist, and the blessed Virgin Mary also plainly prove this: they were sanctified in the womb without any preceding merit, others entirely similar being left behind. If anyone, however, should imagine for himself any merits whatever of such sanctification, let it be supposed that another virgin, like the glorious Virgin, had lived in an altogether similar way; and if God is in no way an acceptor of individual persons, it follows that God would likewise have been incarnate from her, and thus the only Son of God would have had many mothers. I, however, believe most firmly that even if all the daughters of the house of Jacob had lived as my Lady did, none of them would nevertheless have been such in the divine acceptance, and that He would have granted to her alone, before all, the joy and honor of virgin and mother, being incarnate from her singularly. In no way, however, does it seem that so great a wisdom, which orders all things sweetly, did not, by careful providence, choose beforehand, singularly and eternally, a single mother for itself, but left who should be His mother, as though negligently, to the merits and wills of men[n104]", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p358E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p358E", "locator_display": "358E", "source_text": "varijs, et tanquam casui et fortunae, ac velut casui taxillorum. Verum quia Domino reuelante didiceram, quod opera Dei reuelare, et confiteri honorificum est et gratum; Ecce breuis historia ad hoc idem. Sciui quendam clericum iuuenem, seruitorem deuotum virginis gloriosae, qui vt purissimae virgini non habenti maculam neque rugam mentis aut corporis acceptius descruiret, castitatem perpetuam nedum carnis sed et cogitationis, et voluntatis munditiam ei vouit; et idem votum in deuotionibus suis quotidie renouabat. Cui inuidens callidus ille serpens, qui mille per maeandros fraudesque fluxuosas quieta corda non de sinit agitare, tantum virus temptationis infudit, vt inciperet sollicite cogitare, et dubius quodammodo disputare de valore, merito, et praemio castitatis, qui tandem fallaciter est delusus in", "english": "…various, and, as it were, to chance and fortune, and to the fall of the dice. But since the Lord had revealed to me that to reveal and confess the works of God is honourable and pleasing, here is a short story to the same point. I knew a certain young cleric, a devoted servant of the glorious Virgin. In order to serve more acceptably the most pure Virgin, who has no spot or wrinkle of mind or body, he vowed to her perpetual chastity, not only of flesh but also of thought, and purity of will; and he renewed the same vow every day in his devotions. That cunning serpent, who through a thousand windings and slippery deceits never ceases to disturb quiet hearts, envied him, and poured in so much venom of temptation that he began to think anxiously, and, half in doubt, to dispute about the worth, merit and reward of chastity. At last he was so deceitfully deluded", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p359A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p359A", "locator_display": "359A", "source_text": "tantum, vt paruipenderet castitatem etiam virginis benedictae, et consequenter totam sanctissimam vitam eius, aestimans quod si alia foemina similem vitam aut sanctiorem duxisset, similis e• in caeteris, beatiorue fuisset. Quapropter et amando, et obsequia solita exhibendo, remissus et tepidus est effectus, qui dum quadam nocte dedisser oculis suis somnum, medentis gratiae radio visitatus, ductus sibi videbatur per quendam in locum vnum amoenum, veluti paradisum, vbi et ostensa fuerat ei arbor incomparabiliter speciosa, et similiter pretiosa, quae radicata in terra, erigebatur in coelum, in cuius summitate, quasi in nidulo puer paruulus quiescebat, eratque arbor secundum longitudinem spaciatim pulcherrimi• nodis distincta; volentique scire quae, et qualis esset haec arbor, responsum est ita: Haec est virginitas sanctae Mariae, statimque vno nodorum arborisad instaroris aperto, facta est vox dicens, Etsi omnes filiae domus Iacob, sicut illa vixissent, nulla tamen talis fuisset. Hoc etiam totum de acceptatione et praepositione vnius personarum aequalium et etiam minus dignae 21o. capitulo", "english": "that he held cheap the chastity even of the blessed Virgin, and consequently her whole most holy life, reckoning that if some other woman had led a similar life, or a holier one, she would have been like her in all else, or even more blessed. For this reason he became slack and lukewarm in loving her and in rendering his accustomed services. One night, when he had given sleep to his eyes, he was visited by a ray of healing grace, and seemed to be led by someone into a pleasant place, like a paradise. There he was shown a tree of incomparable beauty and equal worth, which, rooted in the earth, rose up into heaven; on its top, as in a little nest, a tiny child was resting, and the tree along its length was marked at intervals with most beautiful knots. When he wished to know what this tree was and of what sort, the answer came: \"This is the virginity of holy Mary.\" At once, one of the knots of the tree opened like a mouth, and a voice said: \"Even if all the daughters of the house of Jacob had lived as she did, none would have been such.\" All this, about the acceptance and preferring of one of equal persons, and even of a less worthy one, is clearer in chapter 21.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p359B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p359B", "locator_display": "359B–359E", "source_text": "magis patet. Ad id vltimum de praedicatione obiectum, dicendum, sicut de oratione 23um. et 25um. dicunt; Christus enim qui ipsemet praedicauit hominibus ore proprio benedicto, vel per suos Apostolos, vel alios praedicatores quoscunque, noluit quod omnes audientes compungerentur, et acquiescerent veritati; Imo noluit quod aliquid aliud, aut aliter in minimo fieret vnquam per aliquem suum sermonem, quam plene fiebat, sicut capitulum 10. manifestat. Vnde Esai. 55. Quomodo descendit imber et nix de coelo, et illuc vltra non reuertitur, fed inebriat terram, et infundit eam, et germinare cam facit, et dat semen serenti, et panem comedenti: sic erit verbum meum quod egredietur de ore meo, non reuertetur ad me vacuum, sed faciet quodcunque volui, et prosperabitur in his ad quae misi illud. Et si tu quaeras, quare ergo voluit praedicare omnibus indistincte; Responsio patet per praedicta: Dicendum tamen quod hoc voluit propter eruditionem electorum, et punitionem reproborum. Vnde Mat. 13. et alibi frequenter, Qui habet aures audiendi, audiat: et Matt. 19. Non omnes capiunt verbum\n\nistud, sed quibus dacum est; qui potest capere, capiat. Et Iohan. 9. In iudicium ego in hunc mundum veni, vt qui non vident, videant; et qui vident, caeci siant. Et Matth. 13. Interrogatus a discipulis, quare turbis in parabolis praedicaret, respondit, quia, Vobis datum est nosse mysteria regni coelorum, illis autem non est datum. Ideo in parabolis loquor eis, quia videntes non vident, et audientes non audiunt, neque intelligunt, vt adimpleatur in eis Propheta Esaiae dicentis, Auditu audietis, et non intelligetis, et videntes videbitis, et non videbitis; Incrassatū est cor populi huius, et auribus grauiter audierunt, et oculos suos clauserunt, ne quando oculis videant, et auribus audiant, et corde intelligant, et conuertantur, et sanem cos. Et est Esaiae 6 sub verbis parum distantibus a praedictis. Et Marc. 4. expressius patet idem; vbi postquam Dominus turbae in parabolis praedicauit 12. Apostolis ita dixit, Vobis datum est nosse mysteria regni Dei; Illis autem qui foris sunt, in parabolis omnia fiunt, vt Videntes videant, et non videant, et audientes audiant et non intelligant, ne quando conuertantur, et\n\ndimittantur eis peccata. Sed puri homines, qui nesciunt distinguere inter electos et reprobos, debent omnibus praedicare, optando eis salutem, sicut et orare pro omnibus, sicut 23um et 25um capitula monstrauerunt. Vnde Ecclesiastis 11. Mane semina semen tuum, et vespere ne cesset manus tua, quia nescis quid magis oriarur, hoc aut illud, et si vtrumque simul, melius erit. Ideoque debet praedicatio fieri omnibus indistincte, vt electiae dificentur ad vitam, reprobi vero vt minus noceant, et vt minus mali fiant, minusque damnentur, vel vt per praedicationem huiusmodi, velut per quendam gladium spiritus, seu quandam virgam spiritualem oris Domini feriantur, et vt nobis meritum augeatur: Dicit enim Apostolus ad Eph. 6. Assumite gladium spiritus quod est verbum Dei. Et Esaiae 11. Percutiet terram virga oris sui, et spiritu labiorum suorum interficiet impium. Et 2. ad Corinth. 2. Christi bonus odor sumus Deo in his qui salui fiunt, et in his qui pereunt; alijs quidem odor mortis in mortem, alijs autem odor vitae in vitam. Et Luc 10. In quamcunque domum intraueritis, primum dicite,\n\nPax huic domui, et si ibi fuerit filius pacis, requiescet super illum pax vestra: sin autem, ad vos reuertetur. Vnde August. de correptione et gratia 68. Patiantur se homines corripi, quando peccant, nec de ipsa correptione argumententur contra gratiam, nec de gratia contra correptionem; quia et peccatis iusta poena debetur, ad ipsam pertinet iusta correptio; quae medicinaliter exhibetur, etiam si salus aegrotantis incerta est, vt si is, qui corripitur, ad praedestinatorum numerum pertinet, sit ei correptio salubre medicamentum; si autem non pertinet, fit ei correptio poenale tormentum; sub isto ergo incerto ex charitate adhibenda est. Idem infra 75. Quantum ad nos pertinet, qui praedestinatos a non praedestinatis discernere non valemus, omnibus, ne pereant, vel ne alios perdant, adhibenda nobis medicinaliter seuera correptio; Dei autem est facere cam illis vtilem, quos ipse praesciuit, et praedestinauit conformes fieri imaginis filij sui. Et sequitur 76. Si enim aliquando timore corripimus, ne aliquis inde", "english": "As to that last objection, about preaching, one must reply as chapters 23 and 25 say about prayer. Christ, who preached to men himself with his own blessed mouth, or through his Apostles or any other preachers, did not will that all who heard should be pierced to the heart and yield to the truth. Indeed he willed that nothing else, and nothing otherwise in the least, should ever come to pass through any sermon of his than what fully did come to pass, as chapter 10 shows. Hence Isaiah 55: \"As the rain and snow come down from heaven, and return there no more, but soak the earth, and water it, and make it bring forth, and give seed to the sower and bread to the eater: so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth. It shall not return to me empty, but shall do whatever I willed, and shall prosper in the things for which I sent it.\" And if you ask why, then, he willed to preach to all without distinction, the answer is plain from what has been said. One must add that he willed this for the instruction of the elect and the punishment of the reprobate. Hence Matthew 13 and often elsewhere: \"He who has ears to hear, let him hear\"; and Matthew 19: \"Not all take this word, but those to whom it is given; let him who can take it, take it.\" And John 9: \"For judgment I came into this world, that those who do not see may see, and those who see may become blind.\" And Matthew 13: asked by the disciples why he preached to the crowds in parables, he answered that \"to you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. Therefore I speak to them in parables, because seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear, nor understand, that the prophecy of Isaiah might be fulfilled in them, who says: 'You shall hear with hearing, and shall not understand, and seeing you shall see, and shall not see. The heart of this people has grown fat, and they have heard heavily with their ears, and have closed their eyes, lest ever they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with the heart, and be converted, and I heal them.'\" This is also in Isaiah 6, in words slightly different from these. And Mark 4 shows the same more expressly; there, after the Lord had preached to the crowds in parables, he said thus to the twelve Apostles: \"To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God; but to those who are outside, all things are done in parables, that seeing they may see and not see, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest ever they be converted, and their sins be forgiven them.\"\n\nBut mere men, who do not know how to distinguish between the elect and the reprobate, ought to preach to all, wishing them salvation, as also to pray for all, as chapters 23 and 25 showed. Hence Ecclesiastes 11: \"In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening let not your hand cease, for you do not know which will spring up, this or that; and if both together, it will be better.\" And so preaching ought to be done to all without distinction. Thus the elect may be built up unto life; the reprobate, for their part, may do less harm, become less evil, and be the less damned, or be struck by such preaching as by a sword of the spirit, or a kind of spiritual rod of the Lord's mouth; and merit may be increased for us. For the Apostle says in Ephesians 6: \"Take the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God.\" And Isaiah 11: \"He shall strike the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he shall slay the wicked.\" And 2 Corinthians 2: \"We are the good fragrance of Christ to God among those who are being saved and among those who perish; to some indeed a fragrance of death unto death, to others a fragrance of life unto life.\" And Luke 10: \"Into whatever house you enter, first say, 'Peace to this house'; and if a son of peace is there, your peace shall rest upon him; but if not, it shall return to you.\"\n\nHence Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace 68: \"Let men suffer themselves to be rebuked when they sin, and let them not argue from rebuke itself against grace, nor from grace against rebuke. For just punishment is owed to sins, and just rebuke belongs to that punishment; and it is administered medicinally, even if the salvation of the sick person is uncertain. So if he who is rebuked belongs to the number of the predestined, rebuke is a healing medicine for him; but if he does not belong, rebuke becomes for him a penal torment. Under this uncertainty, therefore, it is to be applied out of charity.\" The same author, below, 75: \"As far as concerns us, who cannot distinguish the predestined from the non-predestined, severe rebuke is to be applied by us medicinally to all, lest they perish or lest they destroy others; but it is God's to make it profitable to those whom he himself foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.\" And 76 follows: \"For if sometimes we rebuke out of fear that someone may perish thereby, why do we not also rebuke out of fear that someone may perish the more thereby\" [n105]", "margins": [{"id": "359B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Isa 55"}, {"id": "359B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Matt 13"}, {"id": "359C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) John 9"}, {"id": "359C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Isa 6; Mark 4"}, {"id": "359D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) 2 Cor 2"}, {"id": "359E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine"}]}, {"anchor": "p360A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p360A", "locator_display": "360A–360B", "source_text": "pereat, cur non timore etiam corripimus, ne aliquis inde plus pereat; et supra 73. tractans Autoritatem Lucae praemissam, Ad nos, inquit, cum nescimus quisnam sit filius pacis secundum praedestinationem Dei, aut non; sic pertinet nullum exceptum facere, nullumque discernere, sed velle omnes saluos fieri, quibus praedicamus hanc pacem. Neque enim metuendum ne perdamus eam, si ille cui praedicamus, non est filius pacis, ignorantibus nobis; Ad nos enim reuertetur; id est, nobis proderit. Dictum autem Gregorij non contradicit praemissis: Si enim primus parens perseueranter stetisset, Deus aliter ordinasset: His igitur praelibatis, iam restat prosequi quae sequuntur. Cum ergo inprimis arguitur, quod quis potest mereri a Deo aliquid de condigno, pro solutionis materia est sciendum, quod mereri est facere aliquid praemiandū, id est, dignum vel debitum praemiari; omne autem debitum, dignum, vel condignum est rationabile atque iustum; Ideoque sicut 21. capitulum de rationabili, et iusto distinxit; sic est de debito, digno, et condigno similiter distinguendum; quod de condigno, quia de ipso arguitur,\n\nsufficiat demonstrare, ipsoque cognito reliqua non latebunt. Est igitur condignum prius naturaliter et antecedenter voluntati diuinae, vel posterius et subsequenter, vel etiam mixtum quodammodo ex ambobus: Vel sub alijs verbis idem; Est condignum per se absolute, et de inflexibili rigore iustitiae: est condignum per accidens et respectu voluntatis diuinae, et de iustitia dependente ab ea; Est condignum mixtum quodammodo ex vtrisque. Pro modo quo que loquendi communi omnium, proprio que Doctorum vlterius est sciendum; quod mereri de condigno diuersimode sumitur in bono et in malo; dicitur enim quod quis peccans meretur condigne poenam aeternam, quia tam malum est illud peccatum, quod ex sola eius malitia poena aeterna sine omni iuris iniuria infligi poterit sic peccanti; Dicitur autē quod nullus meretur condigne vitam aeternā quia nullius opus est tam bonū aut tam meritorium apud Deum, vt ei ex illius solius bonitate aut merito vita aeterna sine omni gratia debeatur, imo nec quicquā boni distincti omnino, sicut superius est argutum. Hi tamen duo modi eius quod est", "english": "… and above, 73, treating the authority of Luke set out before, he says: \"It concerns us, since we do not know who is a son of peace according to God's predestination, and who is not, to make no exception and to distinguish no one, but to wish all to be saved to whom we preach this peace. For we need not fear that we lose it, if he to whom we preach is not a son of peace, without our knowing; for it will return to us, that is, it will profit us.\" Now Gregory's saying does not contradict what has been said: for if the first parent had stood firm, God would have ordained otherwise.\n\nWith these preliminaries, it now remains to go on to what follows. When it is first argued that someone can merit something from God condignly [de condigno], the answer depends on knowing that to merit is to do something to be rewarded, that is, to be rewarded as worthy or due; and everything due, worthy or condign is reasonable and just. Therefore, as chapter 21 distinguished about the reasonable and the just, so likewise one must distinguish about the due, the worthy and the condign. As to the condign, since it is what is argued about, it suffices to show it, and once it is known the rest will not be hidden.\n\nThe condign, then, is either prior by nature and antecedent to the divine will, or posterior and subsequent to it, or in a way mixed of both. Or, in other words, the same thing: there is a condign per se, absolutely, and from the inflexible rigor of justice; there is a condign per accidens, in respect of the divine will and from justice dependent on it; and there is a condign mixed in a way of both. One must further know, as to the common manner of speaking of all and the proper manner of the Doctors, that to merit condignly is taken differently in good and in evil. For it is said that one who sins merits eternal punishment condignly, because that sin is so evil that eternal punishment could be inflicted on the one so sinning, from its malice alone, without any injury to right. But it is said that no one merits eternal life condignly, because no one's work is so good or so meritorious with God that eternal life is owed him from the goodness or merit of that work alone, without any grace; indeed, nor any good at all of the \"distinct\" kind [n106], as was argued above. Yet these two senses of what it is to merit condignly", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p360C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p360C", "locator_display": "360C–360E", "source_text": "mereri condigne, possunt reduci ad aliquod vnum commune vniuocum, analogumue ambobus, quod forsan est facere aliquid, cui iuste potest retribui pura merces; ita quod haec dictio, pura, excludat in mercede omne gratis illatum bonum, vel malum, et hoc est condignum potentiale, quia iuste potest retribui sibi merces. Possum ergo a principio altius ordiendo, distinguere aliter de mereri, et demereri condigne, scilicet actualiter et potentialiter: Actualiter mereri, est facere aliquid praemiandum, scilicet cui praemium actualiter debeatur, et sic nullus peccans meretur poenam aliam quam habebit; Non enim est dignum aut debitum, quod aliter puniatur, quam Deus ipsum staruit puniendum; et istud, mereri, potest subdistingui tribus modis praedictis: Mereri autem potentialiter est facere aliquid praemiabile, scilicet cui praemium posset reddi; sic que omnis peccans mortaliter tam damnandus quam saluandus meretur maiorem poenam quam habebit, et forsan poenam aeternam quantamlibet intensiue: Posset enim Deus iuste punire quemlibet sic peccantem maiori poena quam puniet, et forsitan\n\nquantacun que . Istud autem mereri, seu mereri condigne potentialiter est mixtum quodammodo ex mereri condigne antecedenter, et subsequenter voluntati diuinae, sicut 21. huius in suo simili planius exponebat: Quod enim faciat hoc vel illud, dependet a voluntate diuina secundum 9. cap. sed quod facto hoc vel illo posset vel non posset digne sibi retribui pura merces, necessarium est omnino. Loquendo ergo de mereri condigne actualiter primo modo, scilicet antecedenter voluntati diuinae per se et absolute, videtur quod nullus potest quicquam mereri a Deo bonum nec malum sicut ostendebant alia argumenta; secundo autem modo potest, nam omne quod Deus vult et statuit, dignum est et condignum, sicut superius monstrabatur. Tertio modo similiter potest quis mereri condigne actualiter bonum et malum a Deo, scilicet tale bonum vel malum quod supra probatum est se qui inseperabiliter suum opus. Quod enim faciat tale opus pendet ex voluntate diuina, sicut 9. cap. ostendebat: sed quod facto tali opere cum suis circumstantijs vniuersis comitetur tale bonum vel malum non dependet a voluntate\n\ndiuina, sed de necessitate consequitur, sicut ad hunc currere, hunc moueri. Quare et vnum de prioribus argumentis non tenet, illud scilicet quod arguebat, istud praemium necessario consequens necessitate voluntatem diuinam ad ipsum volendum reddere, et reddendum, qui ipsum meretur; quoniam sicut ipsa libere vult et facit tale meritum in quocun que , sic et omnia quae necessario consequuntur. Per hanc etiā distinctionē praemissam multa soluuntur, quae superius sunt arguta. Ad illud autem quod arguit, actū virtuosum mereri condigne omne bonum vtile et delectabile distinctum contra bonum honestum, quia melior est hoc et illo; Dicē dum hoc non sequi, sicut si Joha. saluet vitam Petri, non propterea Petrus tenetur sibi reddere omnia bona sua, cum tamen quantumcun que multa sint, et magna, sint multum minora beneficio", "english": "can be reduced to some one common sense, univocal or analogous to both: perhaps it is to do something for which pure reward can justly be paid, so that this word \"pure\" excludes from the reward every good or evil given freely. And this is the potential condign, because reward can justly be paid to him.\n\nSo, beginning higher up from the principle, I can distinguish otherwise about meriting and demeriting condignly, namely actually and potentially. To merit actually is to do something to be rewarded, namely something for which a reward is actually owed; and so no sinner merits any punishment other than the one he will have. For it is not worthy or due that he be punished otherwise than God himself has established he is to be punished; and this \"to merit\" can be subdivided in the three aforesaid ways. But to merit potentially is to do something rewardable, namely something for which a reward could be rendered. So everyone who sins mortally, whether he is to be damned or to be saved, merits a greater punishment than he will have, and perhaps an eternal punishment of whatever intensity. For God could justly punish anyone so sinning with a greater punishment than the one he will inflict, and perhaps with one of any size whatever.\n\nThis meriting, or meriting condignly potentially, is in a way mixed of meriting condignly antecedently and subsequently to the divine will, as chapter 21 explained more plainly in its like. For that he does this or that depends on the divine will, according to chapter 9; but that, this or that having been done, pure reward could or could not worthily be rendered to him, is wholly necessary.\n\nSpeaking, then, of meriting condignly in act in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will, per se and absolutely, it seems that no one can merit anything from God, good or evil, as the other arguments showed. In the second way he can, for everything that God wills and establishes is worthy and condign, as was shown above. In the third way likewise one can merit condignly in act good and evil from God, namely such good or evil as was proved above to follow inseparably upon one's work. For that he does such a work depends on the divine will, as chapter 9 showed; but that, such a work having been done with all its circumstances, such good or evil accompanies it does not depend on the divine will but follows of necessity, as, upon this man's running, this man's being moved [n107].\n\nTherefore one of the earlier arguments does not hold either, namely the one which argued that this reward, following necessarily, makes the divine will necessarily will it and render it to the one who merits it. For as the divine will freely wills and does such a merit in anyone, so too it does all that follows necessarily. By this distinction premised, many things argued above are also resolved. As to the argument that a virtuous act merits condignly every good, useful and delightful, as distinct from the honourable good, because it is better than this and that: one must say that this does not follow. If John saves Peter's life, Peter is not thereby bound to give him back all his goods, since however many and great they are, they are far less than the benefit", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p361A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p361A", "locator_display": "361A–361C", "source_text": "praeaccepto; sicut etiam si Iohannes doceat Petrum scientias; et virtutes licet sint incomparabiliter meliores omnibus bonis Petri, non ideo tenetur Petrus retribuere Iohanni omnia bona sua; imo sufficit retribuere in talibus sicut potest, et solet retribui comperenter. Vnde Phi. 9. Eth. 1. In quibus autem non fit propter confusionem, id est, promissionē ministrationis, id est, certae retributionis, hi quidem propter seipsos, id est, accipientes aut dantes, dictum est, quoniam inaccusabiles sunt: Talis enim secundum virtutem amicitia, et retributio facienda secundum electionem; hoc enim amici et virtutis. Sic autem videtur et Philosophia communicantibus; Non enim ad pecunias dignitas mensuratur, pretium que aeque ponderans non vti que fiet, sed forte quod sufficiens, quemadmodum ad deos et parentes contingens. Et hoc forsan est quia Petrus sine suo magno detrimento non sufficit retribuere aeque ponderanter Iohanni; et licet Deus sufficiat, non tamen tenetur; Nullus enim merendo facit aliquid boni Deo, sed sibi; quare ergo tenetur Deus hoc retribuere de condigno? Et si tu dicas, quod ego sic arguebam superius; Fateor, sed hoc contra ponentes gratum mereri a Deo augmentum gratiae de\n\ncondigno; et sic videtur argumentum procedere quod mereatur condigne remissionem poenae temporalis cuiustibet quae est minor. Aliud vero quod arguit, illum qui super omnia amat Deum, debere ab eo similiter redamari, non bene aduertit analogiam in alijs amicitijs obseruandam: Non enim quantum dignior amatur ab aliquo, tantum readamare tenetur; sufficit enim quod minus redamet secundum excellentiam status sui. Dicit enim Philosophus 8. Eth. 7. Analogum autem in omnibus secundum superabundantiam existentibus amicitijs, id est, vno extremo amicitiae super aliud abundante in bonitate, et amationem fieri oportet, puta mehorem magis amari quam amare, et vtiliorem, et aliorum vnumquem que similiter. Cum enim secundum dignitatem amatio fiat, tunc fit aliqualiter aequalitas, quod vtique amicitiae esse videtur; et cum Deus sit melior et dignior infinite quocunque, videtur proportionalitatē sequendo, quod ipse sub nullo gradu amoris tenetur amantem quempiam redamare; et maxime quia ille libere dat sibi totum illum amorem, tenetur que Deum diligere quantum potest, sicut\n\nsuperius probabatur; et hoc potest breuis ratio suadere. Sint enim Iohannes, et Petrus, cum multis alijs Deum super omnia aequaliter diligentes; tunc si Deus teneretur rediligere super omnia quemcun que illorum, teneretur rediligere Iohānem super Petrum, et e contra, et quemlibet super quemlibet, et super caeteros vniuersos et super B. Mariam, et sicut vnicum verbum suum. Congruit tamen multum et decet Deum puregratuito suos tales amatores ineffabiliter redamare, imo verius praeamare; et hoc est quod testatur ille fidelis amicus Iohannes plurimum dilectus et diligens, primae suae Epist. 4. dicens; In hoc est charitas, non quasi nos dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos. Ad Ansel. et Arist. respondendum quod talis tantum meretur secundum propriam praestitutionem, non secundum rigor•m iustitiae absolutum; confirmatio vero huius rationis infirmabitur per praedicta. Ad caetera vero argumenta sequentia, vs que ad argumentum de merito Christi factum praehabita respondebunt: Et illud", "english": "previously received. So too, if John teaches Peter the sciences and virtues, though these are incomparably better than all Peter's goods, Peter is not therefore bound to repay John all his goods; it suffices to repay in such matters as he can, and as is customarily and fittingly repaid. Hence the Philosopher, Ethics 9, 1 [n108]: \"But in cases where [the exchange] is not made on account of confusion, that is, promise of service, that is, of certain repayment, these indeed are for their own sake, that is, the receivers or givers, it is said, because they are unimpeachable. For such is friendship according to virtue, and the repayment is to be made according to choice; for this belongs to friends and to virtue. And so it seems also with those who share philosophy; for worth is not measured by money, and a price of equal weight will not be set, but perhaps what suffices, as is the case toward the gods and parents.\" And perhaps this is because Peter cannot, without great detriment to himself, repay John with equal weight; and although God could suffice, yet he is not bound. For no one by meriting does anything good for God, but for himself; why then is God bound to repay this condignly? And if you say that I argued thus above, I admit it, but that was against those who hold that one in grace merits from God condignly an increase of grace; and so the argument seems to proceed to the point that he merits condignly remission of any temporal punishment which is less.\n\nAnother point it argues, that one who loves God above all must be loved back by him likewise, does not rightly attend to the analogy to be observed in other friendships. For the more worthy one is loved by someone, the other is not bound to love back by that much; it suffices that he love back less, according to the excellence of his station. For the Philosopher says, Ethics 8, 7: \"The analogue in all friendships that exist according to superabundance, that is, where one extreme of the friendship abounds over the other in goodness, requires that the loving also be made so; for example, the better is to be loved more than he loves, and the more useful, and each of the others likewise. For when the loving is made according to worth, then there is in a way equality, which seems to belong to friendship.\" And since God is better and more worthy than anyone infinitely, it seems, following proportionality, that he is bound under no degree of love to love back any lover; and especially since he freely gives God all that love, and is bound to love God as much as he can, as was proved above. A short argument can persuade of this. Let John and Peter, with many others, love God above all equally. Then if God were bound to love back above all any one of them, he would be bound to love John back above Peter, and conversely, and anyone above anyone, and above all the rest, and above the Blessed Mary, and as his only Word [n109].\n\nYet it is very fitting, and becomes God, out of pure gratuity, to love back such lovers ineffably, indeed more truly to love them first. And this is what that faithful friend John, much beloved and loving, testifies in his first Epistle, chapter 4, saying: \"In this is charity, not that we loved God, but that he first loved us.\" To Anselm and Aristotle the reply is that such a one merits only according to his own prior appointment, not according to the absolute rigor of justice; and the confirmation of this argument will be weakened by what has been said. As to the remaining arguments that follow, up to the argument made about Christ's merit, what has been laid out beforehand will answer them. And that one", "margins": [{"id": "361A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Philosopher"}, {"id": "361B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Philosopher"}, {"id": "361B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) ipse [for ille]"}]}, {"anchor": "p361D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p361D", "locator_display": "361D–361E", "source_text": "potest solui per distinctionem praemissam de mereri condigne. Nam primo modo, antecedenter videlicet voluntati diuinae, et de absolute necessario et inflexibili rigore iustitiae videtur, quod Christus non meruit sibi, nec nobis resurrectionem a morte et vitam aeternam, nec quicquam huiusmodi: Si enim fecisset, esset necessarium absolute quod Deus haec redderet sibi et nobis, cum non possit esse iniustus; sicque Deus suscitaret, et beatificaret electos de necessitate simpliciter absoluta, et non de beneplacito liberae voluntatis, quod 9. cap. non permittit. Videtur quo que possibile, licet nullus homo peccasset, Filium Dei assumpsisse hominem passibilem, et omnia vel similia, aut maiora vel pluries fecisse, et passum fuisse, sicut nunc fecit, non propter aliquod praemium sibi, vel alijs applicandum, sed sincerissima charitate tantummodo propter Deum, et post haec omnia deposuisse, et annihilasse hominē sic assumptum nunquam postea resumendū, et omnes alios homines, ac quamlibet creaturā, nunquā aliquid creaturus; et idem videtur possibile, supposito lapsu hominisin peccatum, quoniam contradictionē formaliter\n\nnullatenus infert; et si ita fuisset, Christus nec sibi nec alijs meruisset aliquid de condigno primo modo praedicto; quare nec nunc, quia quantum meriti seu boni operis nunc habebat, tunc tantum vel amplius habuislet. Christus insuper non meruit per naturam suam diuinam sed humanam, et hoc non ex naturalibus suis tantum, sed ex gratia gratis data, sicut 35. capitulum allegauit; quod et Lumbar. 3. Sent. dist. 13. et 18. similiter attestatur. Hoc quoque videtur sentire Apostolus ad Rom. 1. dicens de Christo; Qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, secundum spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi Domini nostri. Vbi Glossa; Ipse secundum quod homo est, praedestinatus est, id est, sine meritis sola gratia praeelectus, non solum vt esset caput nostrum, sed vt nec originem traheret, nec voluntate perpetraret peccatum, et vt ex mortali natura clarificaretur immortaliter. Si ergo immortalitatem sibi non meruit de condigno, nec aliquid aliud vt videtur; quare nec nobis. Ipse etiam", "english": "can be solved by the distinction premised about meriting condignly. For in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will, and from the absolutely necessary and inflexible rigor of justice, it seems that Christ did not merit for himself or for us resurrection from death and eternal life, or anything of the kind. For if he had, it would be absolutely necessary that God render these to him and to us, since he cannot be unjust; and so God would raise up and beatify the elect by necessity simply absolute, and not by the good pleasure of a free will, which chapter 9 does not allow.\n\nIt also seems possible that, even had no man sinned, the Son of God would have assumed passible human nature, done all these things or similar ones, or greater, or more often, and suffered, as he has now done. He would have done so not for the sake of any reward to be applied to himself or to others, but only out of the purest charity for God's sake. After all this, he would have laid aside and annihilated the man so assumed, never to be taken up again, and all other men, and every creature, never going to create anything [n110]. The same seems possible with man's fall into sin supposed, since it formally implies no contradiction in any way. And had it been so, Christ would have merited nothing, for himself or for others, condignly in the first way mentioned. Therefore neither does he now, since as much merit or good work as he had now, he would then have had as much or more.\n\nMoreover Christ did not merit by his divine nature but by his human, and this not from his natural endowments alone but from grace freely given, as chapter 35 alleged; Lombard attests the same, Sentences 3, dist. 13 and 18. The Apostle also seems to hold this in Romans 1, saying of Christ: \"Who was predestined Son of God in power, according to the spirit of sanctification, by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ our Lord.\" On which the Gloss says: \"He himself, as he is man, was predestined, that is, chosen beforehand without merits by grace alone, not only that he might be our head, but that he might neither draw [the origin of sin] nor commit sin by will, and that from mortal nature he might be glorified immortally.\" If then he did not merit immortality for himself condignly, nor anything else, as it seems, neither did he for us. The Lord Jesus Christ himself", "margins": [{"id": "361E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Apostle, Rom 1"}]}, {"anchor": "p362A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p362A", "locator_display": "362A–362C", "source_text": "Dominus Iesus Christus videtur hoc testari realiter et in facto, agendo gratias Deo Patri quoniam audiuit eum, Iohan. 11. Si tamen meruit de condigno, et puro debito audiri a Patre, nullae gratiae fuissent ei reddendae, sicut tricesimum primum capitulum arguebat: Quis enim verus et sapiens illi gratias aget aut retribuet, qui nunquam sibi fecit aliquid gratiosum aut tribuit quicquam gratis, cum proprium sit gratiarum actionis huius, vt sit retributio beneficij gratis facti. Pro quo dicit Philosophus 5. Eth. 8. In contrafacere proportionale commanet ciuitas; retributione autem commanent; propter quod et gratiarum sacramentum prompte faciunt, vt retributio sit; hoc enim proprium gratiae; refamulari enim oportet ei qui gratiam fecit, scilicet reagendo ei gratiam, qui primo aliquid gratis fecit. Cui concordat Tullius 2o. veteris suae Rhetoricae, definiendo gratiam isto modo; Gratia est, in qua, amicitiarum et officiorum, id est, beneficiorum alterius memoria, et alterius voluntas remunerandi continetur: Vnde et Poeta, Gratia pro rebus merito debetur inemptis. Si autem\n\ngratia esset rationabiliter referenda ei qui non facit aliquam gratiam, sed debitum purum tantum, emptor et venditor, locans et conducens, mercenarius seu seruus et dominus deberent mutuo gratias agere sibi ipsis, quod ratio prohibet, quia sine gratiarum actione huic inde est plenarie satisfactum, et in omnibus retributum; quare ergo expectaretur vlterius gratiarum actio, quae est quaedam retributio vt dictum est: Nec consuetudo hoc habet; et absit quod omnes tales sint mutuo ingrati, cum nullus possit esse ingratus nisi gratiae gratis factae; sed secundum Apostolum ad Rom. 4. Ei, qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum; quare non videtur quod a tali operario sit aliqua gratia suo domino referenda: Vnde Luc. 6. Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quae vobis est gratia? Et infra 17. Quis vestrum habens scruum arantem aut pascentem, qui regressus de agro dicit illi statim; Transi, recumbe; et non dicit, Para quod caenem, et praecinge te, et ministra mihi donec manducem, et bibam, et post haec, tu manducabis et bibes; Nunquid gratiam\n\nhabet seruo illi, quia fecit quod imperauerat ei? Non puto. Ex quo ergo Christus gratias egit Patri quia eum audiuit, videtur quod non meruit de condigno, vt permittitur, exaudiri; quare nec quicquam omnino simili ratione. Et cum arguitur quod meritum Christi excedit meritum cuiuslibet puri hominis infinite, quia sic Christus excedit quemlibet hominem; forsitan non oportet; quia sic potest argui de eius intellectione, volutione, locutione, ambulatione, et alia eius operatione quacunque: Meritum tamen Christi potest considerari dupliciter; vno modo quantum ad actum ipsum merendi, qui proprie dicitur meritum, et sic videtur fuisse tantum finitum, sicut anima, potentia, actus, et habitus vnde processit: Nam secundum praemissa 40a. parte corollarij, primi, huius, Nulla creatura est, nec esse poterit infinita: nec valet illa causalis; quia Christus excedit quemlibet hominem infinite, ideo meritum Christi similiter; quia sic Deus excedit quamlibet creaturam, et tamen non quilibet motus factus, vel possibilis fieri immediate a Deo, similiter excedit motum factum a qualibet", "english": "seems to attest this really and in fact, by giving thanks to God the Father because he heard him, John 11. If, however, he merited condignly, and by pure debt, to be heard by the Father, no thanks would have been due to him, as chapter 31 argued. For what true and wise man will give thanks or make a return to one who never did him anything gracious or gave anything freely, since it is proper to this act of thanksgiving to be the return for a benefit freely done? [n111] On which the Philosopher says, Ethics 5, 8: \"By requital in proportion the city is held together; they are held together by return. Wherefore they also make the sacred rite of the Graces prompt, that there may be return; for this is proper to grace. For one must serve in return the one who did a grace, namely by doing him a grace in turn, who first did something freely.\" Tully agrees, in the second book of his Old Rhetoric, defining grace thus: \"Grace is that in which the memory of another's friendships and services, that is, benefits, and the will of repaying, are contained.\" Hence also the Poet: Thanks are rightly owed for things unbought.\n\nBut if thanks were reasonably to be returned to one who does no favour but only a pure debt, buyer and seller, lessor and lessee, hireling or servant and master would owe each other thanks, which reason forbids. For without thanksgiving satisfaction has been made fully on both sides, and return made in all things; why then should thanksgiving still be expected, which is itself a kind of return, as was said? Nor does custom hold this; and far be it that all such persons be mutually ungrateful, since no one can be ungrateful except for a favour freely done. But according to the Apostle, Romans 4: \"To him that works, the wages are not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.\" So it does not seem that any thanks are to be rendered by such a worker to his master. Hence Luke 6: \"If you love those who love you, what thanks do you deserve?\" And below, 17: \"Which of you, having a servant ploughing or tending sheep, says to him at once when he comes back from the field, 'Come over, recline'; and does not say, 'Prepare what I may eat, and gird yourself, and serve me until I eat and drink, and after that you shall eat and drink'? Does he thank that servant because he did what he commanded him? I think not.\"\n\nSince, then, Christ gave thanks to the Father because he heard him, it seems that he did not merit condignly, as is granted, to be heard; and so neither anything else at all, by like reasoning. And when it is argued that Christ's merit infinitely exceeds the merit of any mere man, because Christ so exceeds every man, perhaps this need not hold, since one could argue so about his understanding, willing, speaking, walking, and any other operation of his. Christ's merit, however, can be considered in two ways. In one way, as to the act itself of meriting, which is properly called merit, and so it seems to have been only finite, like the soul, power, act and habit from which it proceeded. For according to what was premised in the fortieth part of the first corollary of this book, no creature is, nor can be, infinite; nor is that causal inference valid, \"because Christ exceeds every man infinitely, therefore Christ's merit does likewise.\" For God exceeds every creature in that way, and yet not every motion made, or possible to be made, immediately by God likewise exceeds a motion made by any", "margins": [{"id": "362B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Rom 4"}, {"id": "362B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Luke 6; Luke 17"}]}, {"anchor": "p362D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p362D", "locator_display": "362D–362E", "source_text": "creatura. Et specialiter haec causalis de merito Christi non renet, quia Christus habet duas naturas, diuinam scilicet infinitam, et secundum illam non meruit; et humanam finitam, et secundum illam tantummodo meruit. Aliter potest considerari meritum Christi, scilicet quantum ad pretium, quod per illud obtulit Deo Patri, et sic potest dici congrue infinitum; Per actum enim meritorium propriae voluntatis humanae, se ipsum totum filium Dei perfectum Deum et hominem obtulit Deo Patri in pretium pro hominibus redimendis. Quapropter licet assumpsisset naturalia humana imperfectiora quantumlibet, et sic per actum voluntatis meritorium remissiorem in proportione quacunque seipsum similiter obtulisset; vellicet forsitan in naturalibus iam assumptis per actum voluntatis meritorium remissiorem quantum volueris se obtulisset similiter pro hominibus redimendis, ipsos sufficientissime redemisset, non ratione infinitatis actus, voluntatis, aut meriti proprie, sed ratione infiniti huius pretij infinities infiniti per meritum illud oblati; sicut si duorum volentium emere eandem\n\nrem vaenalem, vnus cum feruentissima voluntate offerat pretium minus iusto, alter cum remississima voluntate offerat pretium iustum, vel maius, hic rem habebit, ille carebit, et hoc non ratione diuersitatis actuum voluntatum, sed praetiorum tantummodo oblatorum. Vnde et 1. Tim. 2. Vnus, inquit, Apostolus Deus, et mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus qui dedit redemptionem semetipsum pro omnibus. Et secundum istam sententiam potest intelligi dictum Anselmi 2. Cur Deus homo 14. superius allegatum, et hoc apparet per eundem infra eodem 20o. sic dicentem; Quid misericordius intelligi valet quam peccatori tormentis aeternis damnato, et vnde se redimat non habenti, Deus Pater dicit, Accipe vnigenitum meum, et da pro te; et ipse Filius, Tolle me, et redime te; Quasi enim", "english": "creature. And in particular this causal inference about Christ's merit does not hold, since Christ has two natures: the divine, which is infinite, and according to that he did not merit; and the human, which is finite, and according to that alone he merited. In another way Christ's merit can be considered, namely as to the price which he offered by it to God the Father, and so it can be called fittingly infinite. For by a meritorious act of his own human will he offered himself whole, the Son of God, perfect God and man, to God the Father as the price for men to be redeemed. Therefore, even if he had assumed human natural endowments however much more imperfect, and so had offered himself in like manner by a meritorious act of will more remiss in any proportion whatever; or even if perhaps, with natural endowments already assumed, he had offered himself likewise for men to be redeemed by a meritorious act of will as remiss as you please [n112], he would have redeemed them most sufficiently. This would be not by reason of the infinity of the act, will or merit properly speaking, but by reason of the infinite of this price, infinitely infinite, offered through that merit. It is as if two men wish to buy the same article for sale, and one with most fervent will offers less than the just price, the other with most remiss will offers the just price or more: the latter will have the thing, the former will lack it, and not by reason of the diversity of the acts of will, but only of the prices offered.\n\nHence also 1 Timothy 2: \"One,\" says the Apostle, \"God, and mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as redemption for all\" [n113]. And according to this view can be understood the saying of Anselm, Why God Became Man 2, 14, alleged above, and this appears from the same author below in the same book, chapter 20, where he says: \"What more merciful can be conceived than that God the Father should say to a sinner damned to eternal torments, with nothing to redeem himself, 'Take my only-begotten, and give him for yourself'; and the Son himself, 'Take me, and redeem yourself'? For they say as it were this, when they call and draw us to the Christian faith. What also is more just than that he to whom a price greater than every debt is given, if it is given with due affection, should remit every debt?\"", "margins": [{"id": "362E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm"}]}, {"anchor": "p363A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p363A", "locator_display": "363A–363B", "source_text": "hoc dicunt, quando nos ad Christianam fidem vocant, et trahunt: Quid etiam iustius, quam vt ille cui datur precium maius omni debito, si debito datur affectu, dimittat omne debitum. Sed dato quod meritum Christi fuisset infinitum in specie meriti proprie, adhuc non sequitur quod meruisset aliquid de condigno primo modo, scilicet antecedenter voluntati diuinae; quia adhuc voluntas diuina prius natura fecisset in voluntate Christi humana meritum eius quodcunque, et prius aeternaliter et tempore, et natura voluisset Christum, et quemlibet Christianum habere quicquid per illud meruit sibi vel suis, sicut ex praemissis capitulo isto et alijs poterit apparere. Et si mihi non creditis, saltem credite veritati dicenti, Ego ex meipso non sum locutus, sed qui misit me, Pater ipse mihi mandatum dedit, quid dicam, et quid loquar, Iohan. 12. Et supra 5. Non possum ego a meipso facere quicquam, sed sicut audio, iudico, et iudicium meum verum est, quia non quaero voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me, Patris. Quod tractans Augustinus super Iohan. parte 2a. homilia 45. seu. 99. totius sic\n\ndicit, Propter personam Filij vnam ex duabus substantijs diuina humanaque constantem, aliquando secundum quod Deus est loquitur, vt est illud quod ait, Ego et Pater vnum sumus; aliquando secundum id quod homo est, vt est illud, Quoniam Pater maior me est, secundum quod accepimus ab eo dictum et hoc vnde nunc disputo, Non possum a me ipso facere quicquam, sed sicut audio, iudico. His tamen non obstantibus, quidam conantur astruere, quod Christus meruit de condigno tam sibi quam nobis. Illud enim meretur quis condigne quod si exigat, est necessarium sibi reddi: sed si Christus exigat gloriam sibi et nobis, est necessarium eam reddi. Christus quoque merendo voluit gloriam reddi sibi et suis, et quicquid voluit, necesse erat impleri; Aliter enim voluntas diuina posset frustrari, quod capitulum 10um prohibet manifeste. Quibus breuiter respondendum, quoniam primum assumptum non est verum vniuersaliter intellectum. Si enim Christus secundum quod possibile fuit ei sicut omnipotentia Dei monstrat, et patet per Lumbardum 3. sentent. dist. 18. assumpsisset corpus impassibile", "english": "But granted that Christ's merit was infinite in the species of merit properly so called, it still does not follow that he merited anything condignly in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will. For the divine will would still, prior by nature, have made in Christ's human will that merit of his, whatever it was; and prior eternally, in time and by nature, it would have willed Christ, and every Christian, to have whatever he merited by it for himself or his own, as can appear from the premises of this chapter and others. And if you do not believe me, at least believe the Truth saying, \"I have not spoken from myself, but the Father who sent me himself gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak,\" John 12. And above, John 5: \"I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge, and my judgment is true, because I seek not my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father.\" Treating this, Augustine on John, part 2, homily 45, or 99 of the whole [n114], says thus: \"On account of the person of the Son, consisting of two substances, divine and human, he speaks sometimes according to what he is as God, as in what he says, 'I and the Father are one'; sometimes according to what he is as man, as in 'For the Father is greater than I.' According to this we have taken what was said by him, and what I am now discussing, 'I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear, I judge.'\"\n\nDespite this, some try to assert that Christ merited condignly as much for himself as for us. For one merits condignly that which, if he demands it, it is necessary be rendered to him; but if Christ demands glory for himself and for us, it is necessary that it be rendered. Also, by meriting Christ willed glory to be rendered to himself and his own, and whatever he willed had to be fulfilled; for otherwise the divine will could be frustrated, which chapter 10 manifestly forbids. To these one must briefly reply that the first assumption is not true understood universally. For if Christ, as was possible for him, as God's omnipotence shows and as is clear from Lombard, Sentences 3, dist. 18, had assumed an impassible body", "margins": [{"id": "363A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) John 12"}, {"id": "363A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) John 5"}, {"id": "363A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine"}]}, {"anchor": "p363C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p363C", "locator_display": "363C–363D", "source_text": "et perfecte gloriosum, quale nunc habet, et sine omni merito exegisset gloriam sibi vel nobis, fuisset necessarium illam reddi, non quia illam meruisset condigne, sed quia ita voluisset, et voluntas sua humana necessario fuisset conformis voluntati diuinae sicut ex praemissis apparet, et quia peccare non potest, et voluntas diuina necessario semper est iusta, et efficaciter adimpleta; vel si potuit voluntate humana voluntati diuinae contraire aut difformiter voluisse, non fuisset necessarium tale volutum sibi reddi, quia nec iustum, sicut 21um capitulum ostendebat. Quicquid etiam Pater vel Spiritus Sanctus exigit est necessarium sibi reddi, sicut 10um huius probat, et tamen nihil merentur. Si autem illud primum assumptum intelligatur hoc modo, quod omne illud meretur quis condigne, quod si exigat ratione meriti de condigno primo modo, scilicet antecedenter voluntati diuinae, et de rigore absolutae iustitiae, est similiter necessarium sibi reddi; dicendum vt prius, quod nec Christus, nec alius potest sic mereri\n\nactualiter quicquam a Deo; quare nec Christus potest ratione huius meriti exigere quicquam a Deo, nisi Christus possit errare, et velle contrarie aut difformiter voluntati diuinae: et si exigendo quicquam sic faceret, non esset necessarium sibi reddi, quia nec iustum, sicut 21um capitulum demonstrabat. Alterum quoque argumentum praemissum per iam habita potest solui: Residua vero obiecta superius per praecedentia sunt reiecta, vsque ad vltimum eorum quod fuit de distinctione meriti de congruo, et condigno, pro quo videtur talis distinctio facienda, quod meritum de condigno accipitur tripliciter vt est dictum; meritum vero de congruo est meritum potentiale de quo superius dicebatur, scilicet tale opus bonum vel malum quod de congruitate seu congruentia operis est praemiabile, scilicet possibile et habile praemiari; non quod de congruitate seu congruentia aliqua priori voluntate diuina sit actualiter praemiandum, sicut superius est ostensum.", "english": "and one perfectly glorious, such as he now has, and without any merit had demanded glory for himself or for us, it would have been necessary for it to be rendered. This would be not because he had merited it condignly, but because he had so willed; and his human will would necessarily have been conformed to the divine will, as appears from the premises, since it cannot sin, and the divine will is necessarily always just and efficaciously fulfilled. Or if the human will could have willed contrarily or differently from the divine will, it would not have been necessary that such a thing willed be rendered to him, since it would not be just, as chapter 21 showed. Whatever the Father or the Holy Spirit demands is likewise necessary to be rendered to them, as chapter 10 of this book proves, and yet they merit nothing. But if that first assumption is understood in this way, that one merits condignly everything which, if he demands it by reason of merit condignly in the first way, namely antecedently to the divine will and from the rigor of absolute justice, is likewise necessary to be rendered to him, then one must say as before that neither Christ nor anyone else can so merit\n\nactually anything from God. Therefore neither can Christ, by reason of this merit, demand anything from God, unless Christ could err, and will contrarily or differently to the divine will; and if by demanding anything he so acted, it would not be necessary that it be rendered to him, because it would not be just, as chapter 21 demonstrated. The other argument premised can also be solved by what has now been had. The remaining objections above have been rejected by what preceded, up to the last of them, which was about the distinction of merit of congruity and of condignity. For this, it seems, such a distinction must be made: that merit of condignity is taken in three ways, as was said; but merit of congruity is the potential merit of which it was said above, namely such a good or evil work which from congruity, or congruence of the work, is rewardable, that is, possible and fit to be rewarded. It does not mean that from some congruity or congruence prior to the divine will it is actually to be rewarded, as was shown above.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p363D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p363D", "locator_display": "363D–363E", "source_text": "COROLLARIVM.\n\nCoroll. contra quosdam alios recentissimos Pelagij defensores, fingentes quod licet homo nullo modo possit primam gratiam promereri, potest tamen ipsam proprijs tantum viribus impetrare.\n\nEX his autem clare conuincitur error quidam recentissimus Pelagianorum fingentium, quod licet homo nullo modo neque de condigno, neque de congruo valeat gratiam promereri; potest tamen ipsam proprijs tantum viribus impetrare. Vnde et nec minus clare potest retundi error quidam Pelagianus ficturus forsitan et dicturus, quod Deus non dat gratiam homini propter aliquod meritum antecedens, sed propter merita sua futura praeuisa ab eo: sicut sator seminat bonum semen in terra quam praeuidet fructus vberes allaturam: Hi autem errores possunt faciliter corrigi per hic et superioribus capitulis praelibata. Multi quoque vt", "english": "COROLLARY.\n\nCorollary against certain other most recent defenders of Pelagius, who feign that although a man can in no way merit first grace, he can nevertheless obtain it by his own powers alone.\n\nFrom these things a certain most recent error of the Pelagians is clearly refuted, the error of those who feign that although a man cannot merit grace in any way, neither condignly nor congruously, he can nevertheless obtain it by his own powers alone. Hence, no less clearly can be repelled a certain Pelagian error which perhaps will be fabricated and uttered, that God does not give grace to a man on account of any antecedent merit, but on account of his future merits foreseen by him: as a sower sows good seed in earth which he foresees will bring forth abundant fruit. But these errors can easily be corrected by what has been set out beforehand here and in the earlier chapters. Many also, as", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p364A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/39/#p364A", "locator_display": "364A", "source_text": "paruuli baptizati continuo decedentes, effectiue grandes recipiunt gratiam, qui nunquam ex ea proferunt fructum bonum, nunquam fructus dulces afferunt, sed amaros; nunquam vuas faciunt, sed labruscas; aut si quando que faciant opera quaedam grata, reuertentes ad vomitum et gratiam suffocantes, faciunt plura mala, et in ipsis proficiunt et perdurant finaliter obdurati.", "english": "baptized infants who die at once, receive grace effectively, being grown [n115], and never bring forth from it any good fruit; they never bear sweet fruits, but bitter ones; they never make grapes, but wild grapes. Or if ever they do some pleasing works, returning to their vomit and stifling grace, they do more evils, and make progress in them, and in the end persist hardened.", "margins": [{"id": "364A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) obstinati [for obdurati]"}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}