{"id": "1/36", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/36/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 36", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "314A–315E", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXXVI. Contra Procuratores Pelagij asserentes, quod etsi merita non sint causa collationis gratiae principalis, sunt tamen causa sine qua non confertur.\n\nLIcet autem Sancti Patres istam Pelagianam haeresin succederunt, ex venenata tamen eius radice in multorum cordibus profundata, quaedam non penitus spuria, sed pestifera vitulamina, quia non saporem sed colorem mutantia, non desinunt pullulare: Dicunt enim aliqui\n\ntalium, quod merita non sunt causa principalis gratiae nobis datae, sed causa sine qua non datur. Sed quis non videat istos et eorum similes haeresin Pelagianam tantum vocaliter declinare, et ipsam realiter praedicare? Mutant vocem propter horrorem nominis haeretici euitandum, vt sic candem prauitatis sententiam sophistice palliatam, et laruatam fallaciter, cautius introducant, sicque corda simplicium cortumpant facilius et seducant. Vox quidem vox Iacobi est, scilicet viri fidelis, Deo que dilecti, sed manus iniquam sententiam inserentes, manus sunt Esaui, viri scilicet infidelis et Deo odibilis. Quis etiam mentis tam inops, vt non percipiat, quam laeto corde tales reconciliarent Pelagium, Coelestinum, Iulianum, et caeteros Pelagianos haereticos, si auderent, ac Paulum, Augustinum, Gregorium, et caeteros catholicos condemnarent? Igitur si merita nostra sunt causa sine qua non gratiae nobis datae, per capitulum decimum sextum potest ostendi, quod merita sunt aliquo modo causa, vt concausa,\n\net causa partialis gratiae nobis datae. Nec Pelagius vnquam desipiebat in tantum quod voluit dicere, merita esse causam totalem gratiae datae a Deo, quia hoc esset ponere et excludere Deum datorem gratiae nobis datae. In quo ergo disentiunt isti a Pelagio? Item tunc gratia esset ex meritis et operibus contra capitulum proximum. Item omnia argumenta ibi probantia, quod gratia datur gratis, non pro praecedentibus meritis, istam falsigraphiam reprobabunt similiter, si debite proferantur. Item si intelligant per causam principalem, causam principalissimam omnium et supremam, sic nec mala merita sunt causa damnationis et poenae, nec aliqua causa inferior est causa alicuius effectus, sicut praecedentia manifestant. Rursumque secundum istud, iniustus similiter mereretur primam gratiam, sicut iustificatus secundam, scilicet gratiae primae augmentum; cum tamen primum negetur ab omnibus, sicut capitulum proximum docuit, secundum vero catholice concedatur. Vnde Parab. 4. Acquire prudentiam, et dabit capiti tuo augmenta gratiarum. Et Augustinus ad Bonifacium Papam,\n\nsicut recitat Lumbardus 2. sentent. dist 26. sic scribit; Non gratiam Dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani, sed ipsa meretur augeri, vt aucta mereatur et perfici; Et in sententijs Prosperi, propositione 95a. Crescit semper charitatis facultas, dum vsu maior, et largitate fit ditior. Itē si merita sint prior causa dationis gratiae quam sit Deus, tunc qui sic meretur, prius venit ad Deum quam e contra, et potius trahit Deum ad eum quam e contra; Quomodo ergo dicit, Nemo venit ad me, etc. Ioan. sexto? Quomodo ergo dicit, Non vos me elegistis, sed ego elegi vos, Ioan. 15? Et sine me nihil potestis facere; et quomodo tunc dicit Apostolus, Quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quod et Philosophice statim probat, quoniam, inquit, Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia. ad Rom. 11. Et quomodo ergo dicit ad Ephes. 2. Gratia saluati estis, et hoc non ex vobis, Dei enim donum est, non ex operibus, cum tamen originaliter sit ex vobis? Item si merita sint concausa, vel causa partialis dationis gratiae, ista datio partim tribuenda est Deo, partim nobis; imo\n\net pars prior est nostra, sicut iam fuit ostensum; posterior vero Dei contra glossam verbi Apostolici allegati dicentem, Gratia praecunte, id est, gratuita Dei voluntate, non ex vobis, id est, ex vi naturae vestrae, quia Dei Donum est pure, non partim ex operibus. Item dicit Augustinus de praedestinatione Sanctorum 3. Nolens Pelagius tam claris testimonijs Apostolicis repugnare et tamen volens a seipso sibi esse quod credit, quasi componit homo cum Deo, vt partem fidei sibi vendicet, atque illi partem relinquat; et quod est elatius, primam tollit ipse, sequentem dat illi; et in eo quod dicit esse amborum, priorem se facit, posteriorem Deum. Ecce quomodo sic dicentes, mentē et verba Pelagij amplectuntur. Item tunc bene posset quaeri, quare hunc trahit Deus, et hunc non trahit: Habet enim veram causam, scilicet meritum\n\naliquod antecedens, contra Augustinum superius recitatum. Quomodo etiam saluant isti gratiam operantem, quae in omnibus praeuenit peccatores? Si autem isti obijciant illud Augustini, Qui creauit te sine te, non iustificabit te sinete, et similia: ergo oportet quod aliquid coagas ad hoc, quod gratia tibi detur; dicendum, quod verum est forsitan in adultis; non tamen oportet me aliquid agere antecedenter, sed subsequentet, ita quod infusa mihi gratia bene velim et faciam; sed infusio gratiae est prior naturaliter, me autem bene velle et facere, illam naturaliter consequitur, sicut efficiens suus effectus, et causam suum causatum. Sic autem respondet Lumbardus 2. sent. dist. 26. (cum obijcitur quod gratia non praecedit hominis voluntatem) per illud Augustini super Iohannem, vbi prius, Nemo potest venire ad me, et reliqua: Caetera potest homo nolens, credere autem non nisi volens; et per illud gloslae super illud Gen. 24. Vocemus puellam, et quaeramus ipsius voluntatem, quia fides est voluntatis,\n\nnon necessitatis: Dicit igitur, Ad quod respondentes dicimus, haec omnia dicta esse, quia non est fides, nisi in eo qui vult credere, cuius bonam voluntatem fides praeuenit, non tempore, sed causa, et natura; quam responsionem confirmat per Augustinum Enchirid. 23. dicentem, quod bona voluntas in eis donis est, quae non praecedit, et ipsa iuuat quibus praeuenitur, dum eis consentit, quod et supra capitulis multis expressius continetur. Quaerit enim sic, Cum proculdubio, si homo eius aetatis est, vt ratione vtatur, non possit credere, sperare, diligere, nisi velit, nec peruenire ad palmam vocationis Dei, nisi voluntate cucurrerit: quomodo ergo non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei? nisi quia voluntas, vt scriptum est a Domino praeparatur: alioquin si propterea dictum est, Non volentis etc. sed miserentis, etc. quia ex vtroque fit, id est, ex voluntate hominis et misericordia Dei, vt sic dictum accipiamus, Non volentis etc. quasi diceretur non sufficit sola voluntas hominis, si non sit etiam misericordia Dei; nec sufficit sola misericordia Dei, si non sit etiam voluntas hominis; ac per hoc, si recte dictum sit, Non volentis hominis, sed miserentis est Dei, quia illud\n\nvoluntas hominis sola non implet; cur non e contrario recte dicitur, Non miserentis Dei, sed volentis est hominis, quia id misericordia Dei sola non implet? Porro si hoc dicere nullus Christianus audebit, ne Apostolo apertissime contradicat, restat vt propterea recte dictum intelligatur, Non volentis, sed miserentis est, vt totum detur Deo, qui hominis voluntatem bonam et praeparat adiuuandam, et adiuuat praeparatam: Praecedit enim bona voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia, quae autem non praecedit ipsa, in eis est et ipsa. Item eadem dist. 26. allegat Augustinum dicentem, Cum fides impetrat iustificationem, non gratiam Dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani, sed hoc fit voluntate comitante non ducente, pedissequa, non praeuia. Idem supra, dist. 25. vlt. dicit, quod Dei gratiam non adiuuat voluntas hominis vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praeuenit praeparando vt velit bonum, quod et diffuse ostendit distinct. 26. et 27. consequenter. Augustinus quoque de praedestinatione contra Pelagianos 3. scribit ita; Stulte, Deus est, qui iustificat impium, non praeuentus humana\n\nvoluntate, sed ipse praeueniens hominis voluntatem misericordia sua: Deus enim, inquit, meus, misericordia eius praeueniet me. Audi et alium Prophetam loquentem, Conuerte me, Domine, et conuertar; Sana me, et sanabor: vnde et Apostolus, Iustificati, inquit, gratis per gratiam ipsius. Audi gratis, et tace de meritis: Qui et de natura et gratia 32. loquens de iustificatione nostra, sic ait; Vbi quidem operamur et nos, sed illo operante nos cooperamur, quia misericordia eius praeueniet nos: Et de bono perseuerantiae 48. dicit, quod Deus eorum praeuenit voluntatem, quibus datur gratia, ideo vtique ne non gratis dari videatur, sed secundum praecedentis merita voluntatis, sicut contra veritatem Pelagianus error obloquitur. Idem Hypog. 52. In omni opere facto prior est voluntas Dei, posterior liberi arbitrij, id est, operarur Deus, cooperatur homo. Quod si dicas vt dicere consueuisti, quia ego prior volui, Deus voluit, iam meritum facis, vt gratia ex operibus iam non sit gratia, sed merces: hoc loco redarguit te Apostolus, dicens; Si ergo gratia, iam non ex operibus, alio quin\n\ngratia iam non est gratia, gratia mihi donatur, non redditur. Qui et de haeresibus 88. dicit, quod Pelagius non praeposuit gratiam libero arbitrio, sed infideli calliditate supposuit. Isidorus insuper 8. Eth. 5. sent. 14. tractans de diuersis haereticis et eorum haeresibus, dicit, quod Pelagiani liberum arbitrium diuinae gratiae anteponunt, et recitatur in Canone 24. quaest. vlt. Quidam autem; vbi Gratianus sequens Isidorum enumerat multos haereticos, cum haeresibus eorundem.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXVI. Against the Proctors of Pelagius, who assert that although merits are not the principal cause of the conferral of grace, they are nevertheless a cause without which it is not conferred.\n\nAlthough the holy Fathers cut down[n1] that Pelagian heresy, yet from its poisoned root, which has struck deep into the hearts of many, there do not cease to spring up certain shoots, not wholly bastard but pestilential, which change not the flavor but the color. For some such men say that merits are not the principal cause of the grace given to us, but a cause without which it is not given. But who cannot see that these men and their like renounce the Pelagian heresy only in word, and preach it in fact? They change the word to avoid the horror of the heretic's name, so that they may introduce the same perverse opinion, sophistically cloaked and deceitfully masked, more cautiously, and so corrupt and seduce the hearts of the simple more easily. The voice, indeed, is the voice of Jacob, that is, of a faithful man beloved of God; but the hands that bring in the unjust opinion are the hands of Esau, that is, of a faithless man, hateful to God.[n2] And who is so lacking in sense as not to perceive how gladly such men would reconcile Pelagius, Celestius, Julian and the other Pelagian heretics, if they dared, and condemn Paul, Augustine, Gregory and the other Catholics? If, then, our merits are the cause without which the grace given to us is not given, it can be shown by the sixteenth chapter that merits are in some way a cause, as a concause and a partial cause of the grace given to us. Nor was Pelagius ever so foolish as to wish to say that merits are the total cause of the grace given by God, since this would be at once to posit God as the giver of the grace given to us and to exclude him. Wherein, then, do these men differ from Pelagius? Again, grace would then be from merits and works, contrary to the previous chapter. Again, all the arguments there which prove that grace is given freely, not for preceding merits, will equally refute this falsification, if they are duly brought to bear. Again, if by \"principal cause\" they mean the most principal cause of all, the supreme cause, then in that sense neither are evil merits the cause of damnation and punishment, nor is any inferior cause the cause of any effect, as the foregoing makes plain. And further, on that view the unjust man would likewise merit first grace, as the justified man merits second grace, that is, an increase of the first; though the first is denied by all, as the previous chapter taught, while the second is granted by Catholics. Hence Proverbs 4: \"Acquire prudence, and it will give to your head increases of graces.\"[n3]\n\nAnd Augustine, to Pope Boniface, as Lombard recites it in Sentences 2, dist. 26, writes thus: \"No human merit precedes the grace of God, but grace itself merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit to be perfected.\" And in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 95: \"The capacity of charity always grows, becoming greater by use and richer by bestowal.\" Again, if merits are a prior cause of the giving of grace than God is, then he who so merits comes to God before God comes to him, and draws God to himself rather than the reverse. How, then, does he say, \"No one comes to me,\" etc. (John 6)? How does he say, \"You did not choose me, but I chose you\" (John 15)? And \"Without me you can do nothing\"? And how then does the Apostle say, \"Who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid him?\", which he at once proves philosophically, since, he says, \"Of him, and through him, and in him are all things\" (Rom 11)? And how does he say in Ephesians 2, \"By grace you are saved, and this not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God, not from works,\" when on their view it would originally be from you? Again, if merits are a concause, or a partial cause, of the giving of grace, that giving must be ascribed partly to God, partly to us; indeed even the prior part is ours, as has already been shown, and the later part God's. This is contrary to the gloss on the cited Apostolic word, which says: \"By grace going before,\" that is, by the gratuitous will of God, \"not from yourselves,\" that is, from the force of your nature, \"because it is purely the gift of God, not partly from works.\" Again, Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints 3: \"Pelagius, unwilling to resist such clear Apostolic testimonies, and yet wishing what he believes to be from himself, as it were makes a bargain with God: he claims a part of faith for himself and leaves a part to him; and, what is more arrogant, he takes the first part himself and gives the following part to God; and in what he says belongs to both, he makes himself first and God second.\" See how those who speak thus embrace the mind and the words of Pelagius.\n\nAgain, it could then properly be asked why God draws this man and does not draw that one; for there would be a true cause, namely some antecedent merit, contrary to the Augustine recited above. How, moreover, do these men uphold operating grace, which goes before sinners in all things? And if they object that saying of Augustine, \"He who created you without you will not justify you without you,\" and the like, and conclude that you must contribute something toward the giving of grace to you, the answer is that this is perhaps true of adults. Yet I need not act anything antecedently, but subsequently, so that when grace has been infused in me I may will and do well; for the infusion of grace is prior by nature, and my willing and doing well follows it by nature, as an efficient cause is followed by its effect, and a cause by its caused. Lombard answers in this way in Sentences 2, dist. 26 (when it is objected that grace does not precede man's will), by that saying of Augustine on John, where first he comments on \"No one can come to me,\" and the rest: \"Man can do other things unwilling, but believe only willing\"; and by the gloss on Genesis 24, \"Let us call the girl and ask her will,\" because faith is a matter of will, not of necessity. He says therefore:[n4] \"In reply to this we say that all these things were said because there is no faith except in him who wills to believe, whose good will faith precedes, not in time, but in cause and nature.\" This answer he confirms by Augustine, Enchiridion 23, who says that good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and itself helps those by which it is preceded, while it consents to them; and this is also set out more expressly above in many chapters. For he asks thus: \"Since beyond doubt, if a man is of an age to use reason, he cannot believe, hope, or love unless he wills, nor reach the prize of God's calling unless he has run with his will, how then is it 'not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy'? Only because the will is prepared by the Lord, as it is written.[n5] Otherwise, if 'Not of him that wills,' etc., 'but of him that shows mercy,' etc., was said for this reason, that it comes about from both, that is, from man's will and God's mercy, so that we should take 'Not of him that wills,' etc., as if it were said, 'Man's will alone is not enough, if God's mercy is not there also; nor is God's mercy alone enough, if man's will is not there also'; then, if it is rightly said, 'It is not of man who wills, but of God who shows mercy,' because man's will alone does not fulfil that, why is it not equally rightly said on the contrary, 'It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills,' because God's mercy alone does not fulfil that? But if no Christian will dare to say this, lest he contradict the Apostle most openly, it remains that 'Not of him that wills, but of him that shows mercy' is rightly understood as said so that the whole may be given to God, who both prepares man's good will to be helped, and helps it when prepared. For man's good will precedes many gifts of God, but not all; and among those which it does not precede, it is itself also included.\"\n\nAgain, in the same dist. 26 he cites Augustine, who says: \"When faith obtains justification, no human merit precedes the grace of God; but this happens with the will accompanying, not leading, following as an attendant, not going before as a guide.\" Earlier, in dist. 25, the last chapter, he says that man's will or work does not help the grace of God, but grace itself goes before the will, preparing it to will the good; and he shows this at length in dist. 26 and 27 following. Augustine also writes thus in On Predestination, against the Pelagians 3:[n6] \"Fool, it is God who justifies the ungodly, not preceded by human will, but himself preceding man's will by his mercy; for 'my God,' he says, 'his mercy will go before me.' Hear another Prophet also speaking, 'Convert me, Lord, and I shall be converted; heal me, and I shall be healed.' Hence also the Apostle says, 'Justified freely by his grace.' Hear 'freely,'[n7] and be silent about merits.\" The same Augustine, speaking of our justification in On Nature and Grace 32, says thus: \"Where indeed we also work, but we cooperate with him who works, because his mercy will go before us.\" And in On the Gift of Perseverance 48 he says that God goes before the will of those to whom grace is given, precisely so that it may not seem to be given not freely but according to the merits of a preceding will, as the Pelagian error speaks against the truth. The same, in the Hypognosticon 52:[n8] \"In every work done the will of God is prior, that of free choice posterior; that is, God works, man cooperates. But if you say, as you are accustomed to say, 'I willed first, then God willed,' you are already making a merit, so that grace from works is no longer grace but wages. At this place the Apostle refutes you, saying: 'If then by grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.' Grace is given to me; it is not repaid.\" The same Augustine says in On Heresies 88 that Pelagius did not put grace before free choice, but with faithless cunning put it beneath it. Isidore, moreover, in Etymologies 8, 5, sentence 14, treating of various heretics and their heresies, says that the Pelagians put free choice before divine grace; and this is recited in the canon in Cause 24, last question, Quidam autem, where Gratian, following Isidore, lists many heretics with their heresies.[n9]", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Print: succederunt (as keyed). The verb is intransitive in normal Latin and cannot take haeresin as its object in the sense wanted. Because the next clause speaks of the heresy's root and shoots, I translate the evident sense \"cut down,\" as if succiderunt. \"Followed after\" or \"dealt with in succession\" is the only alternative, and it is much weaker."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Gen 27:22: \"The voice indeed is the voice of Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau.\" Bradwardine allegorizes: the Pelagians' words are orthodox, but what they put forward is Pelagian."}, {"n": 3, "text": "A conflation of Prov 4:7–9 rather than a verbatim verse. Vulgate Prov 4:9 reads \"ut det capiti tuo augmentum gratiarum\" (\"that it may give your head an increase of graces\")."}, {"n": 4, "text": "The \"he\" is Lombard. What follows to the end of this long quotation is Lombard's own reply (Sent. II, d. 26), in which Augustine is in turn cited."}, {"n": 5, "text": "The quotation \"voluntas a Domino praeparatur\" is Prov 8:35 in the Septuagint form, not the Vulgate. The Rom 9:16 and Phil 3:14 echoes in the preceding sentence are Augustine's."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The words \"Stulte, Deus est…\" are in fact from the Hypognosticon (the Hypomnesticon, a work against the Pelagians), which the Middle Ages ascribed to Augustine. This explains the later \"Idem Hypog. 52.\" Savile's citation \"de praedestinatione contra Pelagianos 3\" is kept as he gives it."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Gratis (\"freely\") and gratiam (\"grace\") form one word-family in the Latin. In English, \"freely\" and \"by grace\" cannot echo each other as the Latin does, so the jingle (gratis per gratiam) is lost."}, {"n": 8, "text": "Hypog. = the Hypognosticon. See note 6."}, {"n": 9, "text": "\"Eth.\" in Savile is the abbreviation of Etymologiae. The canon Quidam autem is in Gratian's Decretum, Causa 24, q. 3 (Savile: \"quaest. vlt.\"). At 315E Savile's margin gives the variant proposuit for praeposuit. The main reading construes (grace set \"before\" free choice, but in fact \"beneath\" it), so I have kept it."}], "errata": [{"address": "314B", "keyed": "candem", "print": "eandem"}, {"address": "314B", "keyed": "cortumpant", "print": "corrumpant"}, {"address": "314C", "keyed": "disentiunt", "print": "dissentiunt"}, {"address": "315A", "keyed": "sinete", "print": "sine te"}, {"address": "315A", "keyed": "subsequentet", "print": "subsequenter"}, {"address": "315A", "keyed": "gloslae", "print": "glossae"}, {"address": "315D", "keyed": "operarur", "print": "operatur"}, {"address": "314D (margin 314D·2)", "keyed": "Io • . 15.", "print": "Ioan. 15."}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p314A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/36/#p314A", "locator_display": "314A", "source_text": "CAP. XXXVI. Contra Procuratores Pelagij asserentes, quod etsi merita non sint causa collationis gratiae principalis, sunt tamen causa sine qua non confertur.", "english": "CHAPTER XXXVI. Against the Proctors of Pelagius, who assert that although merits are not the principal cause of the conferral of grace, they are nevertheless a cause without which it is not conferred.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p314A-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/36/#p314A-2", "locator_display": "314A–314C", "source_text": "LIcet autem Sancti Patres istam Pelagianam haeresin succederunt, ex venenata tamen eius radice in multorum cordibus profundata, quaedam non penitus spuria, sed pestifera vitulamina, quia non saporem sed colorem mutantia, non desinunt pullulare: Dicunt enim aliqui\n\ntalium, quod merita non sunt causa principalis gratiae nobis datae, sed causa sine qua non datur. Sed quis non videat istos et eorum similes haeresin Pelagianam tantum vocaliter declinare, et ipsam realiter praedicare? Mutant vocem propter horrorem nominis haeretici euitandum, vt sic candem prauitatis sententiam sophistice palliatam, et laruatam fallaciter, cautius introducant, sicque corda simplicium cortumpant facilius et seducant. Vox quidem vox Iacobi est, scilicet viri fidelis, Deo que dilecti, sed manus iniquam sententiam inserentes, manus sunt Esaui, viri scilicet infidelis et Deo odibilis. Quis etiam mentis tam inops, vt non percipiat, quam laeto corde tales reconciliarent Pelagium, Coelestinum, Iulianum, et caeteros Pelagianos haereticos, si auderent, ac Paulum, Augustinum, Gregorium, et caeteros catholicos condemnarent? Igitur si merita nostra sunt causa sine qua non gratiae nobis datae, per capitulum decimum sextum potest ostendi, quod merita sunt aliquo modo causa, vt concausa,\n\net causa partialis gratiae nobis datae. Nec Pelagius vnquam desipiebat in tantum quod voluit dicere, merita esse causam totalem gratiae datae a Deo, quia hoc esset ponere et excludere Deum datorem gratiae nobis datae. In quo ergo disentiunt isti a Pelagio? Item tunc gratia esset ex meritis et operibus contra capitulum proximum. Item omnia argumenta ibi probantia, quod gratia datur gratis, non pro praecedentibus meritis, istam falsigraphiam reprobabunt similiter, si debite proferantur. Item si intelligant per causam principalem, causam principalissimam omnium et supremam, sic nec mala merita sunt causa damnationis et poenae, nec aliqua causa inferior est causa alicuius effectus, sicut praecedentia manifestant. Rursumque secundum istud, iniustus similiter mereretur primam gratiam, sicut iustificatus secundam, scilicet gratiae primae augmentum; cum tamen primum negetur ab omnibus, sicut capitulum proximum docuit, secundum vero catholice concedatur. Vnde Parab. 4. Acquire prudentiam, et dabit capiti tuo augmenta gratiarum. Et Augustinus ad Bonifacium Papam,", "english": "Although the holy Fathers cut down[n1] that Pelagian heresy, yet from its poisoned root, which has struck deep into the hearts of many, there do not cease to spring up certain shoots, not wholly bastard but pestilential, which change not the flavor but the color. For some such men say that merits are not the principal cause of the grace given to us, but a cause without which it is not given. But who cannot see that these men and their like renounce the Pelagian heresy only in word, and preach it in fact? They change the word to avoid the horror of the heretic's name, so that they may introduce the same perverse opinion, sophistically cloaked and deceitfully masked, more cautiously, and so corrupt and seduce the hearts of the simple more easily. The voice, indeed, is the voice of Jacob, that is, of a faithful man beloved of God; but the hands that bring in the unjust opinion are the hands of Esau, that is, of a faithless man, hateful to God.[n2] And who is so lacking in sense as not to perceive how gladly such men would reconcile Pelagius, Celestius, Julian and the other Pelagian heretics, if they dared, and condemn Paul, Augustine, Gregory and the other Catholics? If, then, our merits are the cause without which the grace given to us is not given, it can be shown by the sixteenth chapter that merits are in some way a cause, as a concause and a partial cause of the grace given to us. Nor was Pelagius ever so foolish as to wish to say that merits are the total cause of the grace given by God, since this would be at once to posit God as the giver of the grace given to us and to exclude him. Wherein, then, do these men differ from Pelagius? Again, grace would then be from merits and works, contrary to the previous chapter. Again, all the arguments there which prove that grace is given freely, not for preceding merits, will equally refute this falsification, if they are duly brought to bear. Again, if by \"principal cause\" they mean the most principal cause of all, the supreme cause, then in that sense neither are evil merits the cause of damnation and punishment, nor is any inferior cause the cause of any effect, as the foregoing makes plain. And further, on that view the unjust man would likewise merit first grace, as the justified man merits second grace, that is, an increase of the first; though the first is denied by all, as the previous chapter taught, while the second is granted by Catholics. Hence Proverbs 4: \"Acquire prudence, and it will give to your head increases of graces.\"[n3]", "margins": [{"id": "314C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Prov 4. Augustine. Lombard."}]}, {"anchor": "p314C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/36/#p314C", "locator_display": "314C–314E", "source_text": "sicut recitat Lumbardus 2. sentent. dist 26. sic scribit; Non gratiam Dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani, sed ipsa meretur augeri, vt aucta mereatur et perfici; Et in sententijs Prosperi, propositione 95a. Crescit semper charitatis facultas, dum vsu maior, et largitate fit ditior. Itē si merita sint prior causa dationis gratiae quam sit Deus, tunc qui sic meretur, prius venit ad Deum quam e contra, et potius trahit Deum ad eum quam e contra; Quomodo ergo dicit, Nemo venit ad me, etc. Ioan. sexto? Quomodo ergo dicit, Non vos me elegistis, sed ego elegi vos, Ioan. 15? Et sine me nihil potestis facere; et quomodo tunc dicit Apostolus, Quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quod et Philosophice statim probat, quoniam, inquit, Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia. ad Rom. 11. Et quomodo ergo dicit ad Ephes. 2. Gratia saluati estis, et hoc non ex vobis, Dei enim donum est, non ex operibus, cum tamen originaliter sit ex vobis? Item si merita sint concausa, vel causa partialis dationis gratiae, ista datio partim tribuenda est Deo, partim nobis; imo\n\net pars prior est nostra, sicut iam fuit ostensum; posterior vero Dei contra glossam verbi Apostolici allegati dicentem, Gratia praecunte, id est, gratuita Dei voluntate, non ex vobis, id est, ex vi naturae vestrae, quia Dei Donum est pure, non partim ex operibus. Item dicit Augustinus de praedestinatione Sanctorum 3. Nolens Pelagius tam claris testimonijs Apostolicis repugnare et tamen volens a seipso sibi esse quod credit, quasi componit homo cum Deo, vt partem fidei sibi vendicet, atque illi partem relinquat; et quod est elatius, primam tollit ipse, sequentem dat illi; et in eo quod dicit esse amborum, priorem se facit, posteriorem Deum. Ecce quomodo sic dicentes, mentē et verba Pelagij amplectuntur. Item tunc bene posset quaeri, quare hunc trahit Deus, et hunc non trahit: Habet enim veram causam, scilicet meritum", "english": "And Augustine, to Pope Boniface, as Lombard recites it in Sentences 2, dist. 26, writes thus: \"No human merit precedes the grace of God, but grace itself merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit to be perfected.\" And in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 95: \"The capacity of charity always grows, becoming greater by use and richer by bestowal.\" Again, if merits are a prior cause of the giving of grace than God is, then he who so merits comes to God before God comes to him, and draws God to himself rather than the reverse. How, then, does he say, \"No one comes to me,\" etc. (John 6)? How does he say, \"You did not choose me, but I chose you\" (John 15)? And \"Without me you can do nothing\"? And how then does the Apostle say, \"Who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid him?\", which he at once proves philosophically, since, he says, \"Of him, and through him, and in him are all things\" (Rom 11)? And how does he say in Ephesians 2, \"By grace you are saved, and this not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God, not from works,\" when on their view it would originally be from you? Again, if merits are a concause, or a partial cause, of the giving of grace, that giving must be ascribed partly to God, partly to us; indeed even the prior part is ours, as has already been shown, and the later part God's. This is contrary to the gloss on the cited Apostolic word, which says: \"By grace going before,\" that is, by the gratuitous will of God, \"not from yourselves,\" that is, from the force of your nature, \"because it is purely the gift of God, not partly from works.\" Again, Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints 3: \"Pelagius, unwilling to resist such clear Apostolic testimonies, and yet wishing what he believes to be from himself, as it were makes a bargain with God: he claims a part of faith for himself and leaves a part to him; and, what is more arrogant, he takes the first part himself and gives the following part to God; and in what he says belongs to both, he makes himself first and God second.\" See how those who speak thus embrace the mind and the words of Pelagius.", "margins": [{"id": "314C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Parabol. 4 Augustinus. Lumbardus."}, {"id": "314D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Prosper."}, {"id": "314D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Jn 6. Jn 15. Apostle."}]}, {"anchor": "p314E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/36/#p314E", "locator_display": "314E–315C", "source_text": "aliquod antecedens, contra Augustinum superius recitatum. Quomodo etiam saluant isti gratiam operantem, quae in omnibus praeuenit peccatores? Si autem isti obijciant illud Augustini, Qui creauit te sine te, non iustificabit te sinete, et similia: ergo oportet quod aliquid coagas ad hoc, quod gratia tibi detur; dicendum, quod verum est forsitan in adultis; non tamen oportet me aliquid agere antecedenter, sed subsequentet, ita quod infusa mihi gratia bene velim et faciam; sed infusio gratiae est prior naturaliter, me autem bene velle et facere, illam naturaliter consequitur, sicut efficiens suus effectus, et causam suum causatum. Sic autem respondet Lumbardus 2. sent. dist. 26. (cum obijcitur quod gratia non praecedit hominis voluntatem) per illud Augustini super Iohannem, vbi prius, Nemo potest venire ad me, et reliqua: Caetera potest homo nolens, credere autem non nisi volens; et per illud gloslae super illud Gen. 24. Vocemus puellam, et quaeramus ipsius voluntatem, quia fides est voluntatis,\n\nnon necessitatis: Dicit igitur, Ad quod respondentes dicimus, haec omnia dicta esse, quia non est fides, nisi in eo qui vult credere, cuius bonam voluntatem fides praeuenit, non tempore, sed causa, et natura; quam responsionem confirmat per Augustinum Enchirid. 23. dicentem, quod bona voluntas in eis donis est, quae non praecedit, et ipsa iuuat quibus praeuenitur, dum eis consentit, quod et supra capitulis multis expressius continetur. Quaerit enim sic, Cum proculdubio, si homo eius aetatis est, vt ratione vtatur, non possit credere, sperare, diligere, nisi velit, nec peruenire ad palmam vocationis Dei, nisi voluntate cucurrerit: quomodo ergo non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei? nisi quia voluntas, vt scriptum est a Domino praeparatur: alioquin si propterea dictum est, Non volentis etc. sed miserentis, etc. quia ex vtroque fit, id est, ex voluntate hominis et misericordia Dei, vt sic dictum accipiamus, Non volentis etc. quasi diceretur non sufficit sola voluntas hominis, si non sit etiam misericordia Dei; nec sufficit sola misericordia Dei, si non sit etiam voluntas hominis; ac per hoc, si recte dictum sit, Non volentis hominis, sed miserentis est Dei, quia illud\n\nvoluntas hominis sola non implet; cur non e contrario recte dicitur, Non miserentis Dei, sed volentis est hominis, quia id misericordia Dei sola non implet? Porro si hoc dicere nullus Christianus audebit, ne Apostolo apertissime contradicat, restat vt propterea recte dictum intelligatur, Non volentis, sed miserentis est, vt totum detur Deo, qui hominis voluntatem bonam et praeparat adiuuandam, et adiuuat praeparatam: Praecedit enim bona voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia, quae autem non praecedit ipsa, in eis est et ipsa. Item eadem dist. 26. allegat Augustinum dicentem, Cum fides impetrat iustificationem, non gratiam Dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani, sed hoc fit voluntate comitante non ducente, pedissequa, non praeuia. Idem supra, dist. 25. vlt. dicit, quod Dei gratiam non adiuuat voluntas hominis vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praeuenit praeparando vt velit bonum, quod et diffuse ostendit distinct. 26. et 27. consequenter. Augustinus quoque de praedestinatione contra Pelagianos 3. scribit ita; Stulte, Deus est, qui iustificat impium, non praeuentus humana", "english": "Again, it could then properly be asked why God draws this man and does not draw that one; for there would be a true cause, namely some antecedent merit, contrary to the Augustine recited above. How, moreover, do these men uphold operating grace, which goes before sinners in all things? And if they object that saying of Augustine, \"He who created you without you will not justify you without you,\" and the like, and conclude that you must contribute something toward the giving of grace to you, the answer is that this is perhaps true of adults. Yet I need not act anything antecedently, but subsequently, so that when grace has been infused in me I may will and do well; for the infusion of grace is prior by nature, and my willing and doing well follows it by nature, as an efficient cause is followed by its effect, and a cause by its caused. Lombard answers in this way in Sentences 2, dist. 26 (when it is objected that grace does not precede man's will), by that saying of Augustine on John, where first he comments on \"No one can come to me,\" and the rest: \"Man can do other things unwilling, but believe only willing\"; and by the gloss on Genesis 24, \"Let us call the girl and ask her will,\" because faith is a matter of will, not of necessity. He says therefore:[n4] \"In reply to this we say that all these things were said because there is no faith except in him who wills to believe, whose good will faith precedes, not in time, but in cause and nature.\" This answer he confirms by Augustine, Enchiridion 23, who says that good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and itself helps those by which it is preceded, while it consents to them; and this is also set out more expressly above in many chapters. For he asks thus: \"Since beyond doubt, if a man is of an age to use reason, he cannot believe, hope, or love unless he wills, nor reach the prize of God's calling unless he has run with his will, how then is it 'not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy'? Only because the will is prepared by the Lord, as it is written.[n5] Otherwise, if 'Not of him that wills,' etc., 'but of him that shows mercy,' etc., was said for this reason, that it comes about from both, that is, from man's will and God's mercy, so that we should take 'Not of him that wills,' etc., as if it were said, 'Man's will alone is not enough, if God's mercy is not there also; nor is God's mercy alone enough, if man's will is not there also'; then, if it is rightly said, 'It is not of man who wills, but of God who shows mercy,' because man's will alone does not fulfil that, why is it not equally rightly said on the contrary, 'It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills,' because God's mercy alone does not fulfil that? But if no Christian will dare to say this, lest he contradict the Apostle most openly, it remains that 'Not of him that wills, but of him that shows mercy' is rightly understood as said so that the whole may be given to God, who both prepares man's good will to be helped, and helps it when prepared. For man's good will precedes many gifts of God, but not all; and among those which it does not precede, it is itself also included.\"", "margins": [{"id": "315A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Lombard."}, {"id": "315A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) volens"}, {"id": "315A·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) nolens"}, {"id": "315C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Lumbardus"}, {"id": "315C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus."}]}, {"anchor": "p315C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/36/#p315C", "locator_display": "315C–315E", "source_text": "voluntate, sed ipse praeueniens hominis voluntatem misericordia sua: Deus enim, inquit, meus, misericordia eius praeueniet me. Audi et alium Prophetam loquentem, Conuerte me, Domine, et conuertar; Sana me, et sanabor: vnde et Apostolus, Iustificati, inquit, gratis per gratiam ipsius. Audi gratis, et tace de meritis: Qui et de natura et gratia 32. loquens de iustificatione nostra, sic ait; Vbi quidem operamur et nos, sed illo operante nos cooperamur, quia misericordia eius praeueniet nos: Et de bono perseuerantiae 48. dicit, quod Deus eorum praeuenit voluntatem, quibus datur gratia, ideo vtique ne non gratis dari videatur, sed secundum praecedentis merita voluntatis, sicut contra veritatem Pelagianus error obloquitur. Idem Hypog. 52. In omni opere facto prior est voluntas Dei, posterior liberi arbitrij, id est, operarur Deus, cooperatur homo. Quod si dicas vt dicere consueuisti, quia ego prior volui, Deus voluit, iam meritum facis, vt gratia ex operibus iam non sit gratia, sed merces: hoc loco redarguit te Apostolus, dicens; Si ergo gratia, iam non ex operibus, alio quin\n\ngratia iam non est gratia, gratia mihi donatur, non redditur. Qui et de haeresibus 88. dicit, quod Pelagius non praeposuit gratiam libero arbitrio, sed infideli calliditate supposuit. Isidorus insuper 8. Eth. 5. sent. 14. tractans de diuersis haereticis et eorum haeresibus, dicit, quod Pelagiani liberum arbitrium diuinae gratiae anteponunt, et recitatur in Canone 24. quaest. vlt. Quidam autem; vbi Gratianus sequens Isidorum enumerat multos haereticos, cum haeresibus eorundem.", "english": "Again, in the same dist. 26 he cites Augustine, who says: \"When faith obtains justification, no human merit precedes the grace of God; but this happens with the will accompanying, not leading, following as an attendant, not going before as a guide.\" Earlier, in dist. 25, the last chapter, he says that man's will or work does not help the grace of God, but grace itself goes before the will, preparing it to will the good; and he shows this at length in dist. 26 and 27 following. Augustine also writes thus in On Predestination, against the Pelagians 3:[n6] \"Fool, it is God who justifies the ungodly, not preceded by human will, but himself preceding man's will by his mercy; for 'my God,' he says, 'his mercy will go before me.' Hear another Prophet also speaking, 'Convert me, Lord, and I shall be converted; heal me, and I shall be healed.' Hence also the Apostle says, 'Justified freely by his grace.' Hear 'freely,'[n7] and be silent about merits.\" The same Augustine, speaking of our justification in On Nature and Grace 32, says thus: \"Where indeed we also work, but we cooperate with him who works, because his mercy will go before us.\" And in On the Gift of Perseverance 48 he says that God goes before the will of those to whom grace is given, precisely so that it may not seem to be given not freely but according to the merits of a preceding will, as the Pelagian error speaks against the truth. The same, in the Hypognosticon 52:[n8] \"In every work done the will of God is prior, that of free choice posterior; that is, God works, man cooperates. But if you say, as you are accustomed to say, 'I willed first, then God willed,' you are already making a merit, so that grace from works is no longer grace but wages. At this place the Apostle refutes you, saying: 'If then by grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.' Grace is given to me; it is not repaid.\" The same Augustine says in On Heresies 88 that Pelagius did not put grace before free choice, but with faithless cunning put it beneath it. Isidore, moreover, in Etymologies 8, 5, sentence 14, treating of various heretics and their heresies, says that the Pelagians put free choice before divine grace; and this is recited in the canon in Cause 24, last question, Quidam autem, where Gratian, following Isidore, lists many heretics with their heresies.[n9]", "margins": [{"id": "315C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Lombard."}, {"id": "315C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "315D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Prophet. Apostle. Augustine."}, {"id": "315E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) proposuit"}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}