{"id": "1/33", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 33", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "289C–294B", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXXIII. Quod respectu cuiuscun que est Dei permissio, est et eius volutio actualis.\n\nHIs autem non impertinenter coniungendum existimo, quod respectu cuiuscunque est Dei permissio, est et eius volutio actualis: Hoc siquidem ex capitulo proximo sequitur euidenter. Item per vicesimum secundum huius; Deus habet aliquem actum voluntatis respectu cuiuscunque permissi, et non actum nolutionis, quia, per decimū, tunc non fieret, quare nec esset permissum. Hoc idem et probant autoritates capitulo\n\nproximo allegatae, ad hoc quod nihil est iniustum simpliciter, quia a Deo permissum; si tamen illa permissio nullum actum voluntatis haberet, non redderet quicquam iustum, sicut superius est argutum. Item dicit Augustinus Enchir. 75. Non fit aliquid nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo vt fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Et sequitur cap. 76. Nec dubitandum est Deum facere bene, etiam sinendo fieri quae cunque fiunt male; Non enim oisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est. Quamuis ergo ea quae mala sunt in quantum mala sunt, nō sunt bona; tamen vt non solum bona, sed etiam vt sint mala bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum vt essent mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono, cui sine dubio semper quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse, non sinere. Ex quo videtur, quod Deus habet actum positiuum voluntatis, volendi actualiter vel nolendi circa quodcunque. Probat enim quod bonum est mala\n\nesse per hoc, quod alias non permitterentur ab omnipotente bono; quod etiam probat per hoc, quod quam facile est ipsum facere quod vult, tam facile est non sinere esse quod non vult, innuendo quod quidlibet vult esse, vel non vult illud esse. Vel ergo intelligit ibi, non vult positiue, vt importat actum positiuum contrarium huius verbi, vult, vel pure negatiue. Si positiue, habetur propositum, scilicet quod ipse supponit istam disiunctiuam in Deo circa quodcunque, Deus vult hoc, vel non vult hoc positiue: si pure negatiue, tunc per hoc non probat, quia nisi bonum esset mala esse, mala non essent, nec sinerentur esse, quod tamen intendit, cum dicit; Tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere, innuendo quod si mala esse, non esset bonū, sed malum, Deus hoc nollet, et sic non sineret illa esse, quare nec ipsa essent. Si tamen intelligat, non vult, pure negatiue, sic posset esse medium in Deo inter vult et non vult actualiter positiue, sicut est in lapide, et homine dormiente; et sic non sequitur, non vult hoc, ergo\n\nhoc non fit, sicut non sequitur de homine qui potest impedire aliquod factibile, vel etiam promouere, non vult hoc, pure negatiue loquendo, ergo hoc non fit, nec sinit hoc esse; imo potest fieri ab alio, licet ipse non velit, dum tamen actualiter positiue non nolit, quia tunc non impediet alium facientem. Item sicut per hoc, quod dicit, quam facile est ipsum quod vult facere, intelligit aliquem actum; sic videtur, quod per hoc quod dicit, tam facile est ipsum quod non vult esse non sinere, intelligat aliquem actum aeque facilem, et aequaliter efficacem, nolle videlicet positiue. Constat insuper quod ille sinit atque permittit, qui posset prohibere nec facit; quare et ille non sinit, qui potest prohibere et facit. Cum ergo dicit Augustinus, Quam facile est Deo quod non vult esse non sinere, per non sinere, intelligit prohibere, quod aliquem actum inportat; sed quem actum nisi nolle positiue, quod per 10am. tam efficax est ad impediendum seu prohibendum, sicut velle ad faciendum quodcunque? Quod etiam in modo loquendi Augustini, non vult, importet aliquem actum positiuum contrarium volutioni,\n\npatet per eum infra, eodem, 80. sic dicentem; Quantum ad Angelicam et humanam creaturam peccantes attinet, quod Deus noluit, fecerunt; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei nullo modo id efficere valuerunt. Si tamen hoc verbum, Noluit, solam negationem importaret, videtur quod Angelus et homo potuit facere quod Deus noluit, nec hoc eius omnipotentiae in aliquo derogaret. Item 1. cap. 80. infra, sic dicit, Miro et ineffabili modo non fit praeter voluntatem Dei, quod etiam contra voluntatem eius fit, quia non fieret, si non sineret; nec vtique nolens sinit, sed volens; nec sineret bonis fieri male, nisi omnipotens, et de malo facere posset bene. Idem 22. de Ciuit. Dei 4. Multa fiunt a malis contra voluntatē Dei: sed tantae est ille sapientiae, tantae que virtutis, vt in eos exitus siue fines, quos bonos et iustos ipse praesciuit, tendant omnia, quae voluntati eius videntur aduersa. Item 26. contra Faustum, illud sane scimus factum quod Dei voluntas habet; quod autem Dei voluntas non habet, fieri de quoquam omnino non posse: Ergo Deus nedum permittit, sed actualiter vult fieri omne factum. Idem\n\nsuper illud Psal. 61. Semel locutus est Deus, Deus suo consilio permisit filium suum occidi ab iniustis; Et infra, eodem, Deus non permisisset, nisi iustum esset; Iudicio permittit; mensura, numero, et pondere permittit. Permissio ergo Dei habet secum consilium, iudicium, mensuram, numerum et pondus, ergo et actum aliquem voluntatis. Idem de bono perseuerantiae 56. allegat S. Gregorium sic dicentem; Vnius diuinitatis quaeso vos confitemini trinitatem; si vero aliter vultis, dicite vnius essentiae; et Deus vocem dari vobis a Sancto Spiritu deprecabitur, id est, rogabitur Deus, vt permittat vobis dari vocem, qua quod creditis, confiteri possitis. Illa tamen vox permissa vobis dari esset veraciter et proprie donum Dei: Ad hoc enim adducit ibi Gregorium, vt testetur, credere in Deum, et, quod credimus, confiteri, do nū Dei esse. Item B. Greg. 6. Moral. 11. super illud Iob 5. Qui comprehendit sapientes in astutia eorum, etc. ita dicit: Sepe enim nōnulli humana sapientia inflati, dum desiderijs suis diuina iudicia contraire conspiciunt, astutis eius reluctari machinationibus conantur, et quo ad votum suum vim supernae\n\ndispensationis intorqueant, callidis cogitationibus insistunt, subtiliora consilia exquirunt; sed inde voluntatem Dei peragunt, vnde hanc immutare contendunt, at que omnipotentis Dei consilio dum resistere nituntur, obsequuntur, quia sepe et hoc eius dispositioni apte militat, quod ei per humanum studium friuole resultat. Sapientes ergo Dominus in ipsa eorum astutia comprehendit, quando eius consilijs humana facta etiam tunc congrue seruiunt, cum resistunt. Et infra 12. Iustus nam que et misericors mortaliū acta disponens, alia concedit propitius, alia permittit iratus, at que ea quae permittit, sic tolerat, vt haec in sui consilij vsum conuertat. Vnde miro modo fit, vt et quod sine voluntate Dei agitur, voluntati Dei contrarium non sit; quia dum in bonum vsum mala facta vertuntur, eius consilio militant etiam quae eius consilio repugnant. Hinc enim per Psalmistam dicitur, Magna opera Domini exquisita in omnes voluntates eius. Sic quippe eius opera magna sunt, vt per omne, quod ab hominibus agitur, eius voluntas exquiratur. Hinc rursum dicit, Omnia quaecunque voluit, Dominus\n\nfecit, in Coelo et in terra. Hinc Salomon ait: Non est sapientia, non est prudentia, non est consilium contra Dominum. Restat ergo, vt in cunctis quae agimus, vim supernae voluntatis inquiramus, cui videlicet cognitae debet nostra actio deuote famulari, et quasi ducem sui itineris persequi, ne ei etiam nolens seruiat, si hanc superbiens declinat. Vitari enim vis superni consilij nequaquam potest, sed magna sibi virtute hanc temperat, qui se sub eius nutibus refraenat, eiusque sibi pondera leuigat, qui hanc subiecto cordis humero volens portat. Ex quibus ostenditur evidenter, quod respectu cuiuscunque est diuina permissio, est et diuina volutio actualis, quod et plene testatur eius Autoritas 2. Moral. 11. capitulo proximo recitata. Sed contra istud militare videntur multa dicta Sanctorum, distinguentium\n\npermissionem contra voluntatem diuinam, et dicentium eum multa permittere quae non vult, nec amat. Vnde et Hosae. 8. Ipsi regnauerunt, et non ex me, Principes extiterunt, et non cognoui: et Ierem. 14. Falso prophetae vaticinantur in nomine meo, et non misi eos, et non praecep• eis, neque locutus sum ad eos. Et infra 23. non mittebam Prophetas, et ipsi currebant; non loquebar ad eos, et ipsi prophetabant. Item tunc quicunque qualitercun que intraret in ouile, in Ecclesiam, intraret per ostium, quoniam per Deum et Christum, nec aliquis ascenderet aliunde, quod est contra illum bonum pastorem, Iohan. 10. Item tunc non esset nemesandum, et indigne ferendum, quod indigni in magnis dignitatibus praeferuntur, quod est contra communem consuetudinem et doctrinam Sanctorum. Vnde et Ecclesiastis 10. Est malum quod vidi suh Sole, quasi per errorem egrediens a facie Principis, positum stultum in dignitate sublimi, et diuites sedere deorsum: Vidi seruos in equis, et Principes ambulantes quasi seruos super terram. Item tunc nullus deberet de aliqua dignitate, vel aliquo statu quocun que\n\ndeponi, Deus enim posuit eum ibi: Nec aliquis deberet scribere, Talis permissione diuina, talis, vel talis, sed prouidentia, vel voluntate, seu electione diuina. Ne que esset resistendum in aliquo cuilibet quidlibet facienti, quia illud ex voluntate et ordinatione Dei facit. Vnde et Roboam cum domo Iuda et Beniamin, volentibus pugnare contra Ieroboam et suos, vt reintegraret regnum diuisum, dixit ad eos Dominus per Semeiam Prophetam: Non ascendetis, neque pugnabitis contra fratres vestros; reuertatur vnusquisque in domum suam, quia hoc mea gestum est voluntate. 2. Paral. 11. et 3. Reg. 12. Quibus consentit Apostolus ad Rom. 13. ita monens, Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo; quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt: Itaque qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit; qui autem resistunt, ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt. Item tunc esset obediendum praecepto cuilibet cuiuscunque, et cuilibet suggestioni, et appetitui cuicunque; omnia enim ista nedum ex permissione, verum et ex volutione Dei procedunt. Pro istis autem facilius dissoluendis,\n\nsciendum secundum Philos. 3. Eth. 1. quod velle dupliciter dicitur, scilicet simpliciter, et secundum quid, sicut Mercator in periculo naufragij simpliciter vult salutem, sed quia fortassis hanc habere non potest nisi merces eij ciat, vult eijcere merces suas; non autem vult hoc simpliciter, sed propter salutem. Vnde et Parab. 13. vult et non vult piger. August. quoque de spiritu et litera 26. ita dicit; Neque dici solet quispiā voluntate fecisse si quid fecit inuitus, quanquam si subtilius aduertamus, etiam quod quisque inuitus facere cogitur, si facit, voluntate facit: sed quia mallet aliud, ideo inuitus, id est, nolens facere dicitur. Malo quippe aliquo quis facere compellitur, quod volens euitare, facit quod cogitur; ac per hoc si facit, non quidem plena et libera voluntate, sed tamen non facit nisi voluntate. Dicunt etiam iura, quod coacta voluntas est voluntas: Tales autem operationes secundum Philos. vbi prius, sunt mixtae ex voluntario et inuoluntario, et ideo quandoque denominantur ab vno illorum et dicuntur voluntariae, quando que ab alio et dicuntur inuoluntariae, vel non voluntariae, ita quod secundum\n\nAugust. nunc allegatum, talis inuitus et nolens facere dicitur. Quare dicit Philos. 2. Topic. quod desiderium respectu alicuius desiderati potest esse triplex; aut vt finis, vt sanitas; aut vt eorum quae sunt ad finem, vt consuere, vel conficere; aut vt eorum quae sunt secundū accidens, velut in vino ad mixtum dulce. Non enim quoniam vinum, sed quoniam dulce; nam per se, dulce desiderat, vinum autem per accidens. Si enim austerum sit, iam non desiderat; per accidens ergo desiderat. Et 7. Ethic. 9. Si quis hoc propter hoc eligit aut persequitur, secundum seipsum quidem hoc eligit et persequitur, secundum accidens autem quod prius; simpliciter autem dicimus quod secundum scipsum. Et secundum eundum 6. Metaph. 4. Accidens videtur propinquum non enti; et ideo Plato non male posuit sophisticam circa non ens, quia circa ens per accidens; quare et nulla est speculatio circa illud; nec vlla scientia actiua, sactiua, vel Theologica studiosa est de eo. Et 1. Phys. 74. sic dicit, Quoniam maxime proprie dicimus Medicum aliquid facere, aut pati, aut fieri ex medico, si secundum quod Medicus,\n\nhoc patiatur aut faciat, manifestum quod ex eo quod non est, aliquid fieri, et hoc significat in quantum non est. Ideoque Autores, et Doctores Philosophici et Theologici, loquentes frequenter, vt decet, proprie, et in propositionibus non per accidens, sed simpliciter et per se veris, dicunt volentem aliquid tantum per accidens dicto modo, non velle illud vel nolle. Quare et Philosophus 8. Ethic. 3. dicit, quod amicitiae propter vtile et propter delectabile sunt amicitiae secundum accidens. Et infra 9.1. propter haec inquit, videlicet vtile et delectabile, amicitia existente dissolutio fit, cum non fiant, quorum gratia amabant. Non enim ipsos amabant, sed existentia: Et quid est amare, nisi velle bonum amato, dicente Philosopho 8. Ethic. 3. Amantes autem ad inuicem volunt bona ad inuicem; Cui et concordanter Anselmus de Casu diaboli 13. Qui vult aliquid propter beatitudinem, non aliud vult quam beatitudinem, cum multis alijs Autoritatibus 26. huius ad hoc idem adductis. Sic\n\net Deus simpliciter vult Electos saluari, et aeterna beatitudine praemiari; sed quia decet, quod merita eorum praecedant, ordinauit eis tyrannos rebelles et multiplices inimicos, sicut Senacherib, Nabuchodonosor et alios, tanquam virgas furori sui, vt sic visitaret in virga iniquitates eorum, et in verberibus peccata eorum, sicque eos misericorditer castigaret, vel innocentas a peccatis taliter praeseruaret, vel etiam virtutes eorum vtiliter exerceret. Quid enim mereretur patientia humilium et iustorum, nisi cam tribularet et pungeret iniuria malignorum, quae omnia ex superioribus satis patent? quare et tales persecutores iustorum non vult Deus simpliciter esse vel persequi, sed tantum secundum quid et per accidens propter Electus; ideoque dicitur frequenter Deum nolle illos, nec operas eorum, sed tantum permittere, sicut infirmus, qui vt curetur, debet secari, vel vri, non dicit, volo, sed dicit, si sic oportet, permittam. Non dicit, volo, quia non vult simpliciter, vult tamen secundum quid et per accidens, scilicet gratia sanitatis, qui etiam modus loquendi habetur in sacra Scriptura expresse\n\nGen. 47. dicente Ioseph Aegyptijs, Accipite et serite agros vt fruges habere possitis, quintam partem Regi dabitis, et quatuor reliquas permitto vobis in sementem et cibos, liberis et familijs vestris. Dixit, permitto: nec dubium quin voluit eos habere quatuor reliquas partes pro se et suis, sed principaliter magis voluit habere quintam partem ad vsus Regis, cuius negorijs specialiter intendebat. Et Tobiae 2. loquens Scriptura de excaecatione Tobiae, sic dicit: Hanc autem tentationem ideo permisit Dominus euenire illi, vt posteris daretur exemplum patientiae ipsius, sicut et sancti Iob; Ecce dicit, quod Dominus permisit, et tamen voluit illam tentationem, quia suit bona, et nullo modo mala per culpam, quod patet testante Raphaele infra, eodem 12. Quia inquit, acceptus eras Deo, necesse erat vt tentatio te probaret, et hoc non fuit nisi ex voluntate diuina. Deus ergo hanc voluit non tamē simpliciter et propter se, sed secūdum quid et per accidens, in quantum scilicet fuit occasio patientiae in Tobia, et posteris boni exempli. Patet ergo quomodo respectu eiusdē diuina permissio et eius actualis\n\nvolutio non repugnant. Per hoc patet ad primum de Hosea, quod Regnauerunt et non ex me, scilicet volente simpliciter, licet secūdum quid et per accidens, vt est dictum; vel aliter, Regnarunt, et non ex me, quantum scilicet in eis fuit, quia forte contra conscientiam propriam, et contra iustitiam humanam et legalem, licet non contra iustitiam simpliciter quae est diuina, sicut capitulum proximum ostendebat probando, quod nihil est iniustum simpliciter. Ad alia vero de Ieremia et Iohanne patet per idem quod Indigni praelati non sunt indigne ferendi, sed digne quoad diuinam iustitiam, quae sic disponit; possunt tamen indigne ferri quantum ad iustitiam propriam; si ascenderint minus iuste, nobis tamen subditis tutum reputo et salubre, ne murmuremur faciliter contra qualescunque praelatos, sed ipsos supportemus humiliter propter Deum, qui praeposuit eos nobis: Si enim sint muti vel mali, hoc forsitan est in poenam peccatorum nostrorum, qui tales meremur habere. Vnde Iob 34. Regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi: Super quod dicit beatus Gregorius 25. Moral.\n\n15. Nullus, qui talem rectorem patitur, eum accuset, qui nimirum sui fuit meriti peruersi rectoris subiacere ditioni. Culpam ergo proprij magis accuset operis, quam iniustitiam gubernantis. Et infra, eodem 16. Sic ergo secundum merita subditorum tribuuntur personae regentium: Quandoque vero subditi propter peccata sua nedum malum praelatum suscipiunt, sed quod est magis mirabile, is quem bonum susceperant, permutatur in malum. Quare dicit Gregorius inferius vbi prius: sic pro qualitatibus subditorum disponuntur acta regentium, vt saepe pro merito gregis etiam vere boni derelinquat vita Pastoris. Ille, Deo attestante, laudatus Dauid Propheta, tumore repentinae elationis inflatus, populum numerando peccauit, et tamen vindictam populus, Dauido peccante, suscepit. Cur hoc? quia videlicet secundum merita plebium disponuntur corda Rectorum: Iustus vero Iudex peccantis vitium ex ipsorum animaduersione corripuit, ex quorum causa peccauit; sed quia ipse, sua scilicet voluntate superbiens a culpa alienus non fuit, vindictam culpae etiam ipse suscepit. Nam ira saeuiens\n\nquae corporaliter populum perculit, Rectorem quoque populi intimo cordis dolore prostrauit. Praelatus etiam bonus admissus et permanens bonus continue, propter subditorum peccata, quandoque a praedicationis et correptionis officio redditur obmutescens. Vnde Dominus Ezechieli sic dixit, Linguam tuam adhae rere faciam palato tuo, et eris mutus, nec quasi vir obiurgans, quia domus exasperans est. Vbi Glossa super verbum exasperans, quasi diceret, Tantae amaritudinis sunt, et contra Deum contentionis, vt non obiurgationem tantum mereantur audire. Ex quo patet, vbi multitudo fuerit peccatorum, indignos peccantes esse, qui a Domino corrigantur. Corrigant ergo prius subditi vitam suam, et contra Praelatos suos non murmurentur; sed deuote pro eis Dominum deprecentur, in cuius manibus corda sunt\n\nRegum, et omnium Praelatorum. Neque procedit quod arguitur consequenter, quia sicut Deus posuit Praelatum in alto, ita, si deponatur, eum deponit. Ipse enim est, qui deposuit potentes de sede, nec posuit eum ibi pro suo perpetuo, sed ad tempus, sicut dedit regnum Nabuchodonosor, et semini eius post eum, non pro semper, sed donec veniret tempus terrae eius, et ipsius, sicut ex Ieremiae vicesimo septimo, prius fuerat allegatum; non intelligendo per tempus terrae eius et ipsius, tempus durationis regni in aliqua magna, maiori, seu maxima coniunctione necessario praetaxatum, quae innouat sectas et regna, (sicuti mentiuntur Astrologi mentientes, qui nedum tempora magnorum regnorum praefinire conantur, sed etiam tempus fidei Christianae, Albumazar de coniunctionibus attestante) sed tempus a Domino praestitutum. Ipse enim mutat tempora et aetates, transfert regna, atque constituit, Dan. 2. et regnum a gente in gentem transfertur propter iniustitias, Ecclesiast. 10. Et sicut a gente in gentem, ita de tribu in tribum, de persona in personam, cuius testes sunt Saul et Dauid, sicut superius tangebatur. Et sicut transfert regna, ita et minores quaslibet dignitates. Quia igitur\n\naliqui minus digni, quandoque occupant dignitates, et hoc quantum ad eos attinet, scilicet secundum humanam et inferiorem iustitiam minus iuste, quamuis quantum ad diuinam et superiorem iustitiam aliquo modo iuste, bene possunt isti Iudices, secundum humanam et inferiorem iustitiam iudicantes, eo quod circa futura ignorant diuinam et superiorem iustitiam, scilicet Dei iustissimam voluntatem, velle eos deponi, licet forsan non penitus absolute, sed cum ista conditione expressa vel tacita; Si placitum fuerit coram Deo, et sic vlterius agere ad depositionem talium Praelatorum; et si contingat sic agi eosque deponi, hoc totum fit secundum diuinam et superiorem iustitiam, vt est dictum. Hoc autem totum confirmare videtur autoritas Augustini ad Simplicianum praescripta vicesimo quinto huius. Quintum argumentum potest in caput arguentis similiter retorqueri. Si enim quia aliqui scribunt; Talis permissione diuina talis vel talis, ideo pura permissione non voluntate Dei est talis vel talis: Simili ratione, quia aliquibus semper scribitur; Tali diuina prouidentia vel electione\n\ndiuina, vel Dei gratia summo Pontifici, Episcopo, siue Regi, omnes tales diuina prouidentia et gratia praeferuntur, et nullus eorum pura permissione diuina, cum tamen aliqui eorum sint, aut esse possunt mali, sicut et in minoribus dignitatibus constituti. Item si quia Aliquis scribit, Permissione diuina talis, propterea pura permissione Dei est talis, cum omnes in caeteris paruis dignitatibus constituti semper sic scribant, omnes semper pura Dei permissione sunt tales, et nullus eius volutione seu electione, aut prouidencia actuali, quod ratio non permittit, cum inter eos sint multi sancti et boni, ac Deus ita curet pusillum gregem vt magnum, sicut praecedentiadocuerunt. Quia tamen Dei permissio minor videtur quam eius gratia, prouidentia, electio, seu voluntas, ideo Minores humilitatis causa sic scribunt. Ad sextum vero de non resistendo cuilibet facienti, dicendum sicut ad quartum de depositione Praesidentium erat dictum: quoniam sicut Deus vult aliquem quodlibet facere, ita vult sibi resisti, si sibi ab aliquo resistatur etc, sicut ibi. Et si tu arguas,\n\nergo frustra ordinauit primam actionem, quam ordinauit similiter destrui per secundam; vnus enim aedificans, vnus destruens, quid prodest illis nisi labor? Ecclesiastici tricesimo quarto. Respondeo, quod sic posset probari, quod non ignis et aqua nec vlla contraria deberent esse in Mundo: Nam vnum contrariorum impedit et destruit alterius actionem; imo, quod est magis mirabile, boni Angeli quandoque mutuo sibi resistunt, et inuicem praeliantur; vnde Dan. decimo Princeps Regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et vno diebus: Et infra eodem, Et nunc reuertar vt praelier aduersus Principem Persarum, qui ambo Angeli boni fuerunt, vt patet per Gregorium, et recitat ibi Glossa. Et aliqua est bona voluntas et iusta, contraria tamen quodam modo voluntati diuinae; vt patet de bono filio, qui patrem suum vult viuere, quem Deus vult mori, vt patet per Augustinum Enchirid. 70. et recitat Lumbardus primo Sententiarum distinct. 48.1. et 22. de Ciuitat. Dei 2. dist. duplici\n\nvoluntate Dei, vna essentiali et aeterna, qua vult Deus, alia temporali qua alios facit velle, de hac secunda sic dicit; Secundum hanc voluntatem qua Deum velle dicimus, quod alios efficit velle, a quibus futura nesciuntur, multa vult, nec facit. Multa enim volunt fieri Sancti eius ab illo inspirata sancta voluntate, nec fiunt, sicut cum orant pro quibusdam sancte pieque quod orant non facit, cum ipse in eis hanc orandi voluntatem sancto Spiritu suo fecerit. Quod et Dominus testabatur expresse cum dixit Dauidi; Quod cogitasti in corde tuo aedificare domum nomini meo, bene fecisti, hoc ipsum mente tractans. 3. Reg. 8. Illa ergo voluntas seu cogitatio placuit Deo, et tamen opus in quod tendebat, finaliter non placebat. Statim enim subiunxit, veruntamen non aedificabis mihi domum. Vbi dicit et Glossa, argumentū, quod voluntas actus placet, et si non actus. Ex omnibus istis patet, quod licet Deus aliquid ordinet, non oportet quod velit nihil sibi resistere, nec illud destruere; imo ipse omnia agentia et resistentia,\n\ngenerantia et co•rūpentia, et vniuersaliter omnia contraria ordinauit, eis que tam agendo quam resistendo, generando et corrumpendo et generaliter faciendo, et non faciendo proprios constituit terminos quos nullatenus praeteribunt. Ad vltimum patet [per] idem: Praecepta nam que tyrannorum, suggestiones diaboli, et appetitus carnis vult Deus fieri, non vt eis obediatur ab omnibus, sed ad punitionem peccatorum, vel ad humiliationē et ad praecauendum peccata, vel etiā ad exercitationē virtutum, et cumulum meritorum. Nec mirum; Ipse enim Deus, aliquando praecipit aliquid, et prohibuit aliquid, nec tamen voluit hoc fieri, nec illud non fieri, vt patet Genes. 22. de Abraham, cui praecepit filium immolare, nec tamen eum voluit immolari: sed ad probandum fidem Abrahae sic praecepit. Et Matthaei nono de duobus caecis illuminatis, quibus dixit, Videte ne quis sciat; illi autem excuntes diffamauerunt eum in totam terram illam, nec tamen in hoc secundum Patrum sententiam peccauerunt. Et hoc est quod docet Lumbardus 1. sententia distinctione 45. et 47. manifeste. His tamen\n\nnequaquam obstantibus, inficiari non potest, quin ratio permissionis et volutionis propriae, scilicet actualiter positiuae in Deo et hominibus sit diuersa, non tamen contraria. Homines namque volunt aliqua fieri, quae et fieri permittunt, non tamen volunt quicquid permittunt, neque permittunt quicquid volunt: Nullus enim proprie permittere dicitur semetipsum quippiam operari, sed alium quem posset impedire si vellet. Quare et simili ratione videtur, quod Deus non quicquid vult, permittit; imo quicquid permittit fieri a quocunque, vult illud fieri ab eodem: Ipse namque voluntarie efficit illud, idem sicut 8um. huius; et 9um. perspicue manifestant.", "english": "Chapter 33. That in respect of whatever God permits, there is also an actual willing on his part.\n\nI judge it not out of place to add to these points that in respect of whatever God permits, there is also an actual willing on his part. This follows plainly from the preceding chapter. Likewise by the twenty-second of this book: God has some act of will in respect of whatever is permitted, and not an act of nilling [n1], because, by the tenth, it would then not happen, and so would not be permitted. The authorities cited in the preceding chapter prove the same, toward the point that nothing is unjust simply because it is permitted by God; yet if that permission had no act of will, it would render nothing just, as was argued above. Likewise Augustine says, Enchiridion 75 [n2]: \"Nothing happens unless the Omnipotent wills that it happen, either by allowing it to happen or by himself doing it.\" And it continues in chapter 76: \"Nor is it to be doubted that God acts well even in allowing whatever evils occur to occur; for he allows it only by a just judgment, and surely everything that is just is good. Although, therefore, those things that are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good, yet that not only good things exist but that evil things exist too is good. For unless it were good that evils exist, they would in no way be allowed to exist by the omnipotent Good, to whom, without doubt, it is always as easy not to allow to be what he does not will to be as it is to do what he wills.\" From which it seems that God has a positive act of will, of actually willing or nilling, about whatever it may be. For he proves that it is good that evils exist by this, that otherwise they would not be permitted by the omnipotent Good; and he proves it also by this, that as easy as it is for him to do what he wills, so easy is it not to allow to be what he does not will, implying that whatever it is, he either wills it to be or does not will it to be. Either, then, he understands \"does not will\" there positively, as it imports a positive act contrary to this verb \"wills,\" or purely negatively. If positively, we have what we set out to show, namely that he supposes this disjunction in God about anything whatever: \"God wills this, or positively does not will this.\" If purely negatively, then he does not prove by this that, unless it were good for evils to be, evils would not exist and would not be allowed to exist, which is nevertheless what he intends when he says, \"It is as easy not to allow to be what he does not will.\" He implies that if the being of evils were not good but bad, God would nill it, and so would not allow them to be, and therefore they would not be. If, however, he understands \"does not will\" purely negatively, then there could be in God a middle between \"wills\" and \"does not will\" as actual and positive, as there is in a stone and in a sleeping man; and so it does not follow, \"he does not will this, therefore\n\nthis does not happen,\" just as it does not follow, of a man who can hinder or even promote some thing that can be done, \"he does not will this\" (speaking purely negatively), \"therefore this does not happen, nor does he allow this to be\" [n3]; on the contrary, it can be done by another, though he himself does not will it, provided that he does not actually and positively nill it, since then he will not hinder the other who does it. Likewise, as by his saying \"how easy it is for him to do what he wills\" he understands some act, so it seems that by his saying \"so easy is it not to allow to be what he does not will,\" he understands some act equally easy and equally efficacious, namely, to nill positively. It is moreover agreed that he allows and permits who could prohibit and does not; hence he also does not allow who can prohibit and does. When, therefore, Augustine says, \"How easy it is for God not to allow to be what he does not will,\" by \"not to allow\" he understands \"to prohibit,\" which imports some act; but what act, except to nill positively, which by the tenth is as efficacious for hindering or prohibiting as willing is for doing whatever it may be? That in Augustine's manner of speaking, too, \"does not will\" imports some positive act contrary to willing is clear from him below, in the same work, 80, who says: \"As far as sinning angelic and human creatures are concerned, they did what God nilled; but as far as God's omnipotence is concerned, they were in no way able to bring that about.\" If, however, this word \"nilled\" imported only a negation, it seems that an angel or a man could do what God did not will, and this would detract in nothing from his omnipotence. Likewise, in the same work, chapter 80, below, he says: \"In a marvelous and ineffable way, even what is done against his will is not done apart from God's will, because it would not be done if he did not allow it; and he does not allow it unwillingly, but willingly; nor would he, being good, allow evil to be done, unless he were omnipotent and could make good even out of evil\" [n4]. The same, City of God 22, 4: \"Many things are done by evil men against God's will; but he is of such wisdom and such power that everything that seems opposed to his will tends toward those outcomes or ends which he himself foreknew to be good and just.\" Likewise, Against Faustus 26: \"This indeed we know, that what God's will has is done; but that what God's will does not have cannot be done at all by anyone.\" Therefore God not only permits but actually wills that every deed done be done. The same, on that text of Psalm 61, \"God has spoken once\": \"God by his own counsel permitted his Son to be killed by the unjust\"; and further on, in the same place: \"God would not have permitted it unless it were just; he permits by judgment; he permits by measure, number, and weight.\" God's permission, therefore, has with it counsel, judgment, measure, number, and weight, and therefore some act of will as well. The same, in On the Gift of Perseverance 56, cites St Gregory [n5] saying: \"I beg you, confess the Trinity of one divinity; or if you prefer otherwise, say, of one essence; and God will be entreated that a voice be given you by the Holy Spirit\" (that is, God will be asked to permit a voice to be given you, by which you may be able to confess what you believe). Yet that voice, permitted to be given to you, would be truly and properly a gift of God: for Augustine brings Gregory forward there to this end, to bear witness that to believe in God, and to confess what we believe, is a gift of God. Likewise Blessed Gregory, Moralia 6, 11, on that text of Job 5, \"Who catches the wise in their own craftiness,\" and so on, says thus: \"For often some, puffed up with human wisdom, when they see divine judgments run counter to their desires, strive to struggle against its crafty contrivances, and to twist the force of the higher\n\ndispensation to their own wish they persist in cunning designs and seek out subtler counsels; but they carry out God's will by the very thing through which they strive to change it, and while they strive to resist the counsel of almighty God they are obeying it, since often this too serves his arrangement fittingly, that it is vainly thrown back against it by human effort. The Lord therefore catches the wise in their very craftiness, when human deeds serve his counsels fittingly even then, when they resist them.\" And below, 12: \"For the just and merciful One, ordering the acts of mortals, grants some graciously, permits others in anger; and the things he permits he so tolerates as to turn them to the use of his own counsel. Whence it comes about, in a marvelous way, that even what is done without God's will is not contrary to God's will; because while evil deeds are turned to a good use, even things that oppose his counsel serve his counsel.\" Hence it is said through the Psalmist, \"Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all his wills.\" For his works are great in this way, that through everything that is done by men, his will is sought out. Hence again he says, \"Whatever the Lord willed, he has done, in heaven and on earth.\" Hence Solomon says: \"There is no wisdom, there is no prudence, there is no counsel against the Lord.\" It remains, therefore, that in all that we do we should seek out the force of the higher will, to which, once known, our action ought devoutly to be subservient, and to follow it as the guide of its journey, lest it serve it even unwillingly if in pride it turns aside from it. For the force of the supreme counsel can in no way be avoided; but he moderates it for himself with great virtue who restrains himself under its nods, and he lightens its burdens for himself who bears it willingly on the submissive shoulder of the heart. From these texts it is plainly shown that in respect of whatever there is a divine permission, there is also an actual divine willing, which his Authority, from Moralia 2, 11, recited in the preceding chapter, also fully attests. But against this many sayings of the saints seem to militate, which set permission over against the divine will and say that he permits many things which he neither wills nor loves. Whence also Hosea 8: \"They have reigned, but not by me; they have become princes, and I did not know it\" ; and Jeremiah 14: \"The prophets prophesy falsely in my name, and I did not send them, and I did not command them, nor did I speak to them.\" And below, 23: \"I was not sending the prophets, and they ran; I was not speaking to them, and they prophesied.\" Likewise, then, whoever entered the sheepfold , the Church, in whatever manner, would enter by the door, since it would be by God and Christ, and no one would climb in from elsewhere, which is contrary to that good shepherd, John 10. Likewise, then, it would not be a matter for indignation and resentment [n6] and for bearing with grief that unworthy men are put ahead in great dignities, which is contrary to the common custom and teaching of the Saints. Whence also Ecclesiastes 10: \"There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were from an error proceeding from the face of the Prince: a fool set in high dignity, and the rich sitting below. I have seen servants on horses, and princes walking on the ground like servants.\" Likewise, then, no one ought to be deposed from any dignity or any station whatever,\n\nfor God has placed him there. Nor ought anyone to write, \"Such-and-such by divine permission,\" but rather, \"by divine providence,\" or \"will,\" or \"election.\" Nor would one have to resist anyone in anything, whatever he is doing, since he does that by the will and ordinance of God. Whence also, when Rehoboam, with the house of Judah and Benjamin, wished to fight against Jeroboam and his followers in order to restore the divided kingdom, the Lord said to them through Shemaiah the Prophet: \"You shall not go up, nor shall you fight against your brothers; let each return to his own house, for this thing has been done by my will.\" 2 Paralipomenon 11 and 3 Kings 12 [n7]. With which the Apostle agrees in Romans 13, admonishing thus: \"Let every soul be subject to higher powers. For there is no power except from God; and those that exist are ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the power resists God's ordinance; and those who resist bring condemnation upon themselves.\" Likewise, then, one would have to obey any command of anyone whatever, and any suggestion and any appetite whatever; for all these proceed not only from God's permission but from his willing. But to resolve these objections more easily, one must know, according to the Philosopher, Ethics 3, 1 [n8], that \"to will\" is said in two ways, namely simply and in a certain respect. So a merchant in the peril of shipwreck wills safety simply, but because perhaps he cannot have it unless he throws his cargo overboard, he wills to throw his goods overboard; yet he does not will this simply, but for the sake of safety. Whence also Proverbs 13: \"The sluggard wills and wills not.\" Augustine also says in On the Spirit and the Letter 26: \"Nor is anyone usually said to have acted by his will if what he did he did unwillingly, although if we look more carefully, even what each man is forced to do unwillingly, if he does it, he does by will; but because he would have preferred something else, he is therefore said to act unwillingly, that is, to act while unwilling. For a man is compelled by some evil to act, and wishing to avoid it, does what he is compelled to do; and so, if he does it, it is not indeed with full and free will, yet he does it only by will.\" The laws also say that a coerced will is a will. Now such operations, according to the Philosopher in the place cited before, are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary, and therefore sometimes take their name from one of these and are called voluntary, sometimes from the other and are called involuntary or not voluntary, so that according to the Augustine just cited, such a man is said to act unwillingly and while unwilling. Hence the Philosopher says in Topics 2 that desire, in respect of something desired, can be threefold: either as of an end, as health; or of the things that are toward the end, as to sew together or to compound [n9]; or of the things that are by accident, as in wine, with respect to the sweetness mixed in it. For one desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet; for he desires the sweet per se, but the wine by accident. For if it is harsh, he no longer desires it; so he desires it by accident. And Ethics 7, 9: \"If someone chooses or pursues this for the sake of that, he chooses and pursues the latter in itself, but what came first by accident; and we say 'simply' what is in itself.\" And according to the same, Metaphysics 6, 4: \"An accident seems close to non-being; and therefore Plato was not wrong to place sophistry about non-being, because it is about being by accident; hence there is no speculation about it, nor is any science concerned with it, whether practical, productive, or theological\" [n10]. And Physics 1, 74, he says thus: \"Since we say most properly that a doctor does something or undergoes something, or that something comes to be from a doctor, if he undergoes or does it insofar as he is a doctor, it is manifest that something comes to be from what is not, and this signifies insofar as it is not\" [n11].\n\nAnd so authors and doctors, philosophical and theological, speaking frequently as is fitting, in the strict sense, and in propositions true not by accident but simply and per se, say that one who wills something only by accident, in the manner said, neither wills that thing nor nills it. Hence also the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, 3, that friendships for the sake of the useful and for the sake of the pleasant are friendships by accident. And below, 9, 1: \"On account of these,\" he says, namely the useful and the pleasant, \"when the friendship is in existence, a dissolution occurs when those things come not to be for the sake of which they loved. For they did not love the persons themselves, but what was present in them.\" And what is it to love, except to will good to the beloved? So the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, 3: \"Those who love one another will good things for one another.\" In agreement with him also is Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, 13: \"He who wills something for the sake of happiness wills nothing other than happiness,\" together with the many other authorities brought for the same point in the twenty-sixth of this book [n12]. So too God simply wills the Elect to be saved and rewarded with eternal happiness; but because it is fitting that their merits go before, he ordained for them rebellious tyrants and manifold enemies, such as Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar and others, as rods for his wrath, in order that thus he might visit their iniquities with the rod and their sins with blows, and so mercifully chastise them, or in this way preserve the innocent from sins, or even exercise their virtues to their profit. For what would the patience of the humble and the just deserve, unless the injury of the malicious troubled and pricked it? All of which is clear enough from what was said above. Hence God does not will such persecutors of the just to be or to persecute simply, but only in a certain respect and by accident, on account of the Elect; and therefore it is frequently said that God nills them and does not will their works, but only permits them, just as a sick man who, in order to be cured, must be cut or burned does not say, \"I will it,\" but says, \"If it must be so, I permit it.\" He does not say, \"I will it,\" because he does not will it simply; yet he wills it in a certain respect and by accident, namely for the sake of health; and this manner of speaking is expressly found in Sacred Scripture too: Genesis 47, where Joseph says to the Egyptians, \"Take and sow the fields, that you may have crops; you shall give a fifth part to the King, and the other four I permit you for seed and for food, for your children and your households.\" He said, \"I permit\"; yet there is no doubt that he willed them to have the other four parts for themselves and theirs, but he principally willed more to have the fifth part for the King's uses, whose business he was especially attending to. And in Tobit 2, Scripture, speaking of the blinding of Tobit, says: \"The Lord permitted this trial to befall him for this reason, that an example of his patience might be given to posterity, as of holy Job too.\" See, it says that the Lord permitted, and yet he willed that trial, because it was good and in no way evil through fault; which is clear from the testimony of Raphael below, in the same book, chapter 12: \"Because you were acceptable to God, it was necessary that a trial should prove you,\" and this was only by the divine will. God therefore willed this, not however simply and for its own sake, but in a certain respect and by accident, insofar, that is, as it was an occasion of patience in Tobit and of good example to posterity. It is clear, then, how in respect of the same thing the divine permission and his actual\n\nwilling do not conflict. By this the answer to the first, about Hosea, is clear: \"They have reigned, but not by me,\" that is, with me willing simply, though in a certain respect and by accident, as has been said; or else otherwise: \"They reigned, and not by me,\" as far, that is, as it lay with them, because perhaps against their own conscience and against human and legal justice, though not against justice simply, which is divine, as the preceding chapter showed by proving that nothing is unjust simply. As to the other texts, from Jeremiah and John, it is clear by the same point that unworthy prelates are not to be borne unworthily, but worthily with respect to the divine justice, which so disposes; yet they can be borne unworthily as regards their own justice, if they have risen less justly. For us their subjects, however, I judge it safe and wholesome not to murmur readily against prelates of whatever sort, but to support them humbly for God's sake, who set them over us. For if they are dumb or evil, this perhaps is a punishment of our sins, we who deserve to have such men. Whence Job 34: \"He makes a hypocrite reign on account of the sins of the people.\" On which Blessed Gregory says in Moralia 25, 15: \"Let no one who suffers such a ruler accuse him, since it was surely his own desert to be subject to the sway of a perverse ruler. Let him accuse rather the fault of his own work than the injustice of the one governing.\" And below, in the same, 16: \"So, then, according to the merits of the subjects the persons of rulers are assigned: but sometimes subjects, because of their sins, not only receive a bad prelate but, what is more marvelous, the one they had received as good is changed into a bad one.\" Hence Gregory says further on in the same place: \"So the acts of rulers are disposed according to the qualities of subjects, so that often, for the merit of the flock, the life even of a truly good Pastor fails. That David the Prophet, praised on God's own testimony, swollen with the swelling of sudden pride, sinned by numbering the people, and yet the people received the punishment while David sinned. Why this? Because the hearts of Rulers are disposed according to the merits of the peoples. The just Judge corrected the sinner's vice through the chastisement of those on whose account he sinned; but because he himself, being proud by his own will, was not free from guilt, he too received the punishment of the guilt. For the raging anger which struck the people in their bodies laid low the Ruler of the people too with deep grief of heart.\" Even a good prelate, admitted to office and continuing good, is sometimes, on account of the sins of his subjects, made mute in the office of preaching and correction. Whence the Lord said thus to Ezekiel: \"I will make your tongue cleave to your palate, and you shall be mute, and not as a man who rebukes, for it is a house that provokes.\" Where the Gloss on the word \"provokes\" says, as if to say: \"They are of such bitterness, and of such contention against God, that they do not deserve to hear rebuke alone.\" From which it is clear that where there is a multitude of sinners, the sinners are unworthy to be corrected by the Lord. Let subjects, therefore, first correct their own life, and let there be no murmuring against their prelates; but let them devoutly entreat the Lord for them, in whose hands are the hearts\n\nof Kings and of all Prelates. Nor does the next argument go through, since just as God placed the Prelate on high, so, if he is deposed, God deposes him. For it is he who has put down the mighty from their seat, nor did he place him there for his perpetuity, but for a time, as he gave the kingdom to Nebuchadnezzar and his seed after him, not forever, but until the time of his land and of his own should come, as was cited before from the twenty-seventh chapter of Jeremiah. This \"time of his land and of his own\" is not to be understood as the time of the duration of a kingdom necessarily fixed beforehand by some great, greater, or greatest conjunction, which renews sects and kingdoms (as the astrologers lie, liars that they are, who attempt to set in advance not only the times of great kingdoms but even the time of the Christian faith, with Albumasar bearing witness in his book on conjunctions), but a time set beforehand by the Lord. For he changes times and ages, he transfers kingdoms and establishes them, Daniel 2; and a kingdom is transferred from nation to nation on account of injustices, Ecclesiasticus 10 [n13]. And as from nation to nation, so from tribe to tribe, from person to person, of which Saul and David are witnesses, as was touched upon above. And as he transfers kingdoms, so too any lesser dignities. Since, therefore,\n\nsome less worthy men sometimes occupy dignities, and this, as far as they are concerned, namely according to human and lower justice, less justly, though as regards divine and higher justice in some way justly, these Judges, judging according to human and lower justice, can well will that such men be deposed (since regarding future events they do not know divine and higher justice, namely God's most just will), though perhaps not wholly absolutely, but with this condition, express or tacit: \"If it shall be pleasing before God,\" and so proceed further to the deposition of such Prelates; and if it should happen that they are so dealt with and deposed, all this is done according to divine and higher justice, as has been said. The authority of Augustine to Simplicianus, cited in the twenty-fifth of this book, seems to confirm all this. The fifth argument can be turned back similarly upon the head of the one arguing. For if, because some write, \"Such-and-such by divine permission,\" therefore such a one is such by pure permission and not by God's will, then by similar reasoning, because it is always written to some, \"By such divine providence or divine election, or by God's grace, Supreme Pontiff, Bishop, or King,\" all such are set over by divine providence and grace, and none of them by pure divine permission, although some of them are, or can be, evil, as also those set in lesser dignities. Likewise, if because someone writes, \"Such-and-such by divine permission,\" therefore he is such by God's pure permission, then since all those established in the other small dignities always write in this way, all are always such by God's pure permission, and none by his willing or election or actual providence, which reason does not allow, since among them are many holy and good men, and God cares for the little flock as for the great, as the preceding chapters taught. But because God's permission seems less than his grace, providence, election, or will, the lesser ones therefore write thus for the sake of humility. As to the sixth, about not resisting anyone who is doing anything, the answer is as was said to the fourth, about the deposition of Presidents: that just as God wills someone to do whatever he does, so he wills that he be resisted, if he is resisted by someone, etc., as there. And if you argue,\n\n\"then God ordained the first action in vain, which he ordained likewise to be destroyed by the second; for if one builds and one tears down, what do they gain but toil?\" (Ecclesiasticus 34). I answer that in this way it could be proved that fire and water, and no contraries at all, ought to exist in the world; for one of two contraries hinders and destroys the other's action; indeed, what is more marvelous, good angels sometimes resist one another and fight each other; whence Daniel 10: \"The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me twenty-one days\"; and further on in the same chapter: \"And now I shall return to fight against the prince of the Persians\"; both of whom were good angels, as is clear from Gregory and as the Gloss there recounts. And there is a will that is good and just, yet in a certain way contrary to the divine will; as is clear of the good son who wills his father to live, whom God wills to die, as Augustine shows, Enchiridion 70, and as the Lombard recounts, Sentences 1, distinction 48, 1, and City of God 22, 2, distinguishing [n14] a twofold will of God, one essential and eternal, by which God wills, the other temporal, by which he makes others will; of this second he says: \"According to this will, by which we say that God wills what he makes others will, those from whom the future is hidden, he wills many things and does not do them. For his Saints will many things to be done, by a holy will inspired by him, and they are not done, as when they pray for some people holily and piously, and he does not do what they pray, although he himself, by his Holy Spirit, has made in them this will to pray.\" Which the Lord also testified expressly when he said to David: \"That you thought in your heart to build a house for my name, you did well, pondering this very thing in your mind,\" 3 Kings 8. That will or thought, therefore, pleased God, and yet the work toward which it tended did not finally please. For he immediately added: \"Nevertheless you shall not build me a house.\" Where the Gloss also says that it is an argument that the will for an act pleases, even if the act does not. From all these it is clear that although God ordains something, it is not necessary that he will that nothing resist it, or destroy it; rather he himself has ordained all agents and resisters, generators and corrupters, and universally all contraries, and to them, both by acting and by resisting, by generating and corrupting, and generally by doing and by not doing, he has fixed their own limits, which they will in no way pass. As to the last, the answer is clear [through] the same point: for God wills the commands of tyrants, the suggestions of the devil, and the appetites of the flesh to occur, not that they be obeyed by all, but for the punishment of sinners, or for humbling, and for guarding against sins, or even for the exercise of virtues and the heaping up of merits. Nor is it a marvel; for God himself sometimes commands something, and has forbidden something, and yet did not will this to be done, nor that to be left undone, as is clear in Genesis 22 of Abraham, whom he commanded to sacrifice his son, and yet did not will him to be sacrificed; but he so commanded in order to prove Abraham's faith. And in Matthew 9, of the two blind men given light, to whom he said, \"See that no one knows\"; but they, going out, spread his fame throughout all that land, and yet in this, according to the opinion of the Fathers, they did not sin. And this is what the Lombard plainly teaches in Sentences 1, distinctions 45 and 47. Yet with none of this standing in the way, it cannot be denied that the notion of permission and that of willing in the proper sense, that is, actually positive willing, in God and in men, is different, though not contrary. For men will some things to be done, which they also permit to be done, yet they do not will whatever they permit, nor permit whatever they will: for no one is properly said to permit himself to do something, but another whom he could hinder if he wished. Hence by similar reasoning it seems that God does not permit whatever he wills; and indeed, whatever he permits to be done by anyone, he wills to be done by that same one: for he himself willingly brings it about, and likewise, as the eighth of this book and the ninth plainly make manifest [n15].", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Nolutio, nolle: not a mere absence of willing (non velle) but a positive act of willing against, which Bradwardine opposes to velle and which, by chapter 10, is as efficacious in hindering as willing is in effecting. \"Nill, nilling\" is used for it throughout this passage. Nolens and invitus (the unwilling man, 291C) are rendered \"unwilling.\""}, {"n": 2, "text": "Savile's numbers for the Enchiridion (75, 76, 80, 70) do not match the modern chapters. The passages are Ench. 95, 96, 100 (both citations at 80), and 101–102 (for the \"70\" cited at 293D, which may be misprinted in Savile; the image is not clear). Bradwardine's numbering is kept."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The margin variant reads siuit (print: ‖ siuit), apparently a perfect of sino, \"has allowed.\" It has the same sense as the main reading sinit (\"allows\"), which is kept."}, {"n": 4, "text": "The print reads bonis fieri male (\"evil to be done to the good\"). Augustine's text is bonus fieri male, \"being good, he would not allow evil to be done,\" which is the evident sense and is what the English gives."}, {"n": 5, "text": "This Gregory is Gregory of Nazianzus, whom Augustine quotes in De dono perseverantiae (in modern numbering, ch. 53). Bradwardine, like Savile's margin, gives only \"S. Gregorium.\""}, {"n": 6, "text": "Nemesandum, a rare form from nemesare, \"to resent, be indignant at\" (Greek νεμεσᾶν). It is paired with indigne ferendum in the same clause."}, {"n": 7, "text": "The Vulgate names. 2 Paralipomenon is 2 Chronicles; 3 Kings is 1 Kings (so also 3 Kings 8 at 293E). The Shemaiah episode is 2 Chr 11:2–4 // 1 Kgs 12:22–24."}, {"n": 8, "text": "The Aristotle references are kept as Savile gives them. The first figure for the Ethics is the book and the second the chapter (Ethics 3, 1 = Nic. Eth. III.1). The second figure for Physics 1, 74 and Metaphysics 6, 4 seems to be a text or comment number in the medieval commentated editions, not a chapter."}, {"n": 9, "text": "Consuere, vel conficere (\"to sew together or to compound\"), kept as printed. The Topics illustration is medical, and the verbs are taken as the doctor's procedures (stitching, preparing) toward the end of health."}, {"n": 10, "text": "Theologica is kept as printed. It stands where Aristotle (Metaph. VI.2) lists practical, productive and theoretical science, so \"theoretical\" is presumably meant."}, {"n": 11, "text": "The Physics sentence is compressed in Bradwardine's Latin and is translated as it stands. It is the passage in Phys. I on whether something comes to be from non-being."}, {"n": 12, "text": "This margin entry stands at the top of Savile's p. 292 (292A), not at 292E as the keyed text has it. The text there has cum multis alijs in italics marked ‖. It is therefore a variant reading (\"the same is clear from many others, etc.\") and not a source citation. The marker number 292E·1 follows the keyed Latin."}, {"n": 13, "text": "\"Ecclesiasticus 10\" is Sirach 10:8 (and \"Ecclesiasticus 34\" below is Sirach 34:28), not Ecclesiastes. Ecclesiastes is the book cited at 291A, \"Ecclesiastes 10.\""}, {"n": 14, "text": "dist. duplici voluntate Dei: the Latin is loose. \"dist.\" is taken as \"distinguishing\" (distinguens) and duplici voluntate as the thing distinguished, a twofold will. The quotation that follows is Augustine, Ench. 102 as reported by the Lombard."}, {"n": 15, "text": "idem sicut 8um. huius; et 9um. perspicue manifestant: \"idem\" is rendered \"likewise,\" a rough fit, with the plural verb taking \"the eighth and the ninth\" as subject. No other construction was found."}], "errata": [{"address": "289D", "keyed": "oisi", "print": "nisi"}, {"address": "291A", "keyed": "praecep•", "print": "praecepi"}, {"address": "291D", "keyed": "sactiua", "print": "factiua"}, {"address": "291E", "keyed": "292E·1 (source)", "print": "variant, on 292A (‖ before \"cum multis alijs\")"}, {"address": "292A", "keyed": "innocentas", "print": "innocentes"}, {"address": "292A", "keyed": "cam", "print": "eam"}, {"address": "292A", "keyed": "Electus", "print": "Electos"}, {"address": "292A", "keyed": "operas", "print": "opera"}, {"address": "292B", "keyed": "negorijs", "print": "negotijs"}, {"address": "292B", "keyed": "suit", "print": "fuit"}, {"address": "294A", "keyed": "co•rūpentia", "print": "corrumpentia"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p289C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p289C", "locator_display": "289C", "source_text": "CAP. XXXIII. Quod respectu cuiuscun que est Dei permissio, est et eius volutio actualis.", "english": "Chapter 33. That in respect of whatever God permits, there is also an actual willing on his part.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p289C-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p289C-2", "locator_display": "289C–289E", "source_text": "HIs autem non impertinenter coniungendum existimo, quod respectu cuiuscunque est Dei permissio, est et eius volutio actualis: Hoc siquidem ex capitulo proximo sequitur euidenter. Item per vicesimum secundum huius; Deus habet aliquem actum voluntatis respectu cuiuscunque permissi, et non actum nolutionis, quia, per decimū, tunc non fieret, quare nec esset permissum. Hoc idem et probant autoritates capitulo\n\nproximo allegatae, ad hoc quod nihil est iniustum simpliciter, quia a Deo permissum; si tamen illa permissio nullum actum voluntatis haberet, non redderet quicquam iustum, sicut superius est argutum. Item dicit Augustinus Enchir. 75. Non fit aliquid nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo vt fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Et sequitur cap. 76. Nec dubitandum est Deum facere bene, etiam sinendo fieri quae cunque fiunt male; Non enim oisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est. Quamuis ergo ea quae mala sunt in quantum mala sunt, nō sunt bona; tamen vt non solum bona, sed etiam vt sint mala bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum vt essent mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono, cui sine dubio semper quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse, non sinere. Ex quo videtur, quod Deus habet actum positiuum voluntatis, volendi actualiter vel nolendi circa quodcunque. Probat enim quod bonum est mala\n\nesse per hoc, quod alias non permitterentur ab omnipotente bono; quod etiam probat per hoc, quod quam facile est ipsum facere quod vult, tam facile est non sinere esse quod non vult, innuendo quod quidlibet vult esse, vel non vult illud esse. Vel ergo intelligit ibi, non vult positiue, vt importat actum positiuum contrarium huius verbi, vult, vel pure negatiue. Si positiue, habetur propositum, scilicet quod ipse supponit istam disiunctiuam in Deo circa quodcunque, Deus vult hoc, vel non vult hoc positiue: si pure negatiue, tunc per hoc non probat, quia nisi bonum esset mala esse, mala non essent, nec sinerentur esse, quod tamen intendit, cum dicit; Tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere, innuendo quod si mala esse, non esset bonū, sed malum, Deus hoc nollet, et sic non sineret illa esse, quare nec ipsa essent. Si tamen intelligat, non vult, pure negatiue, sic posset esse medium in Deo inter vult et non vult actualiter positiue, sicut est in lapide, et homine dormiente; et sic non sequitur, non vult hoc, ergo", "english": "I judge it not out of place to add to these points that in respect of whatever God permits, there is also an actual willing on his part. This follows plainly from the preceding chapter. Likewise by the twenty-second of this book: God has some act of will in respect of whatever is permitted, and not an act of nilling [n1], because, by the tenth, it would then not happen, and so would not be permitted. The authorities cited in the preceding chapter prove the same, toward the point that nothing is unjust simply because it is permitted by God; yet if that permission had no act of will, it would render nothing just, as was argued above. Likewise Augustine says, Enchiridion 75 [n2]: \"Nothing happens unless the Omnipotent wills that it happen, either by allowing it to happen or by himself doing it.\" And it continues in chapter 76: \"Nor is it to be doubted that God acts well even in allowing whatever evils occur to occur; for he allows it only by a just judgment, and surely everything that is just is good. Although, therefore, those things that are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good, yet that not only good things exist but that evil things exist too is good. For unless it were good that evils exist, they would in no way be allowed to exist by the omnipotent Good, to whom, without doubt, it is always as easy not to allow to be what he does not will to be as it is to do what he wills.\" From which it seems that God has a positive act of will, of actually willing or nilling, about whatever it may be. For he proves that it is good that evils exist by this, that otherwise they would not be permitted by the omnipotent Good; and he proves it also by this, that as easy as it is for him to do what he wills, so easy is it not to allow to be what he does not will, implying that whatever it is, he either wills it to be or does not will it to be. Either, then, he understands \"does not will\" there positively, as it imports a positive act contrary to this verb \"wills,\" or purely negatively. If positively, we have what we set out to show, namely that he supposes this disjunction in God about anything whatever: \"God wills this, or positively does not will this.\" If purely negatively, then he does not prove by this that, unless it were good for evils to be, evils would not exist and would not be allowed to exist, which is nevertheless what he intends when he says, \"It is as easy not to allow to be what he does not will.\" He implies that if the being of evils were not good but bad, God would nill it, and so would not allow them to be, and therefore they would not be. If, however, he understands \"does not will\" purely negatively, then there could be in God a middle between \"wills\" and \"does not will\" as actual and positive, as there is in a stone and in a sleeping man; and so it does not follow, \"he does not will this, therefore", "margins": [{"id": "289D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p290A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p290A", "locator_display": "290A–290C", "source_text": "hoc non fit, sicut non sequitur de homine qui potest impedire aliquod factibile, vel etiam promouere, non vult hoc, pure negatiue loquendo, ergo hoc non fit, nec sinit hoc esse; imo potest fieri ab alio, licet ipse non velit, dum tamen actualiter positiue non nolit, quia tunc non impediet alium facientem. Item sicut per hoc, quod dicit, quam facile est ipsum quod vult facere, intelligit aliquem actum; sic videtur, quod per hoc quod dicit, tam facile est ipsum quod non vult esse non sinere, intelligat aliquem actum aeque facilem, et aequaliter efficacem, nolle videlicet positiue. Constat insuper quod ille sinit atque permittit, qui posset prohibere nec facit; quare et ille non sinit, qui potest prohibere et facit. Cum ergo dicit Augustinus, Quam facile est Deo quod non vult esse non sinere, per non sinere, intelligit prohibere, quod aliquem actum inportat; sed quem actum nisi nolle positiue, quod per 10am. tam efficax est ad impediendum seu prohibendum, sicut velle ad faciendum quodcunque? Quod etiam in modo loquendi Augustini, non vult, importet aliquem actum positiuum contrarium volutioni,\n\npatet per eum infra, eodem, 80. sic dicentem; Quantum ad Angelicam et humanam creaturam peccantes attinet, quod Deus noluit, fecerunt; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei nullo modo id efficere valuerunt. Si tamen hoc verbum, Noluit, solam negationem importaret, videtur quod Angelus et homo potuit facere quod Deus noluit, nec hoc eius omnipotentiae in aliquo derogaret. Item 1. cap. 80. infra, sic dicit, Miro et ineffabili modo non fit praeter voluntatem Dei, quod etiam contra voluntatem eius fit, quia non fieret, si non sineret; nec vtique nolens sinit, sed volens; nec sineret bonis fieri male, nisi omnipotens, et de malo facere posset bene. Idem 22. de Ciuit. Dei 4. Multa fiunt a malis contra voluntatē Dei: sed tantae est ille sapientiae, tantae que virtutis, vt in eos exitus siue fines, quos bonos et iustos ipse praesciuit, tendant omnia, quae voluntati eius videntur aduersa. Item 26. contra Faustum, illud sane scimus factum quod Dei voluntas habet; quod autem Dei voluntas non habet, fieri de quoquam omnino non posse: Ergo Deus nedum permittit, sed actualiter vult fieri omne factum. Idem\n\nsuper illud Psal. 61. Semel locutus est Deus, Deus suo consilio permisit filium suum occidi ab iniustis; Et infra, eodem, Deus non permisisset, nisi iustum esset; Iudicio permittit; mensura, numero, et pondere permittit. Permissio ergo Dei habet secum consilium, iudicium, mensuram, numerum et pondus, ergo et actum aliquem voluntatis. Idem de bono perseuerantiae 56. allegat S. Gregorium sic dicentem; Vnius diuinitatis quaeso vos confitemini trinitatem; si vero aliter vultis, dicite vnius essentiae; et Deus vocem dari vobis a Sancto Spiritu deprecabitur, id est, rogabitur Deus, vt permittat vobis dari vocem, qua quod creditis, confiteri possitis. Illa tamen vox permissa vobis dari esset veraciter et proprie donum Dei: Ad hoc enim adducit ibi Gregorium, vt testetur, credere in Deum, et, quod credimus, confiteri, do nū Dei esse. Item B. Greg. 6. Moral. 11. super illud Iob 5. Qui comprehendit sapientes in astutia eorum, etc. ita dicit: Sepe enim nōnulli humana sapientia inflati, dum desiderijs suis diuina iudicia contraire conspiciunt, astutis eius reluctari machinationibus conantur, et quo ad votum suum vim supernae", "english": "this does not happen,\" just as it does not follow, of a man who can hinder or even promote some thing that can be done, \"he does not will this\" (speaking purely negatively), \"therefore this does not happen, nor does he allow this to be\" [n3]; on the contrary, it can be done by another, though he himself does not will it, provided that he does not actually and positively nill it, since then he will not hinder the other who does it. Likewise, as by his saying \"how easy it is for him to do what he wills\" he understands some act, so it seems that by his saying \"so easy is it not to allow to be what he does not will,\" he understands some act equally easy and equally efficacious, namely, to nill positively. It is moreover agreed that he allows and permits who could prohibit and does not; hence he also does not allow who can prohibit and does. When, therefore, Augustine says, \"How easy it is for God not to allow to be what he does not will,\" by \"not to allow\" he understands \"to prohibit,\" which imports some act; but what act, except to nill positively, which by the tenth is as efficacious for hindering or prohibiting as willing is for doing whatever it may be? That in Augustine's manner of speaking, too, \"does not will\" imports some positive act contrary to willing is clear from him below, in the same work, 80, who says: \"As far as sinning angelic and human creatures are concerned, they did what God nilled; but as far as God's omnipotence is concerned, they were in no way able to bring that about.\" If, however, this word \"nilled\" imported only a negation, it seems that an angel or a man could do what God did not will, and this would detract in nothing from his omnipotence. Likewise, in the same work, chapter 80, below, he says: \"In a marvelous and ineffable way, even what is done against his will is not done apart from God's will, because it would not be done if he did not allow it; and he does not allow it unwillingly, but willingly; nor would he, being good, allow evil to be done, unless he were omnipotent and could make good even out of evil\" [n4]. The same, City of God 22, 4: \"Many things are done by evil men against God's will; but he is of such wisdom and such power that everything that seems opposed to his will tends toward those outcomes or ends which he himself foreknew to be good and just.\" Likewise, Against Faustus 26: \"This indeed we know, that what God's will has is done; but that what God's will does not have cannot be done at all by anyone.\" Therefore God not only permits but actually wills that every deed done be done. The same, on that text of Psalm 61, \"God has spoken once\": \"God by his own counsel permitted his Son to be killed by the unjust\"; and further on, in the same place: \"God would not have permitted it unless it were just; he permits by judgment; he permits by measure, number, and weight.\" God's permission, therefore, has with it counsel, judgment, measure, number, and weight, and therefore some act of will as well. The same, in On the Gift of Perseverance 56, cites St Gregory [n5] saying: \"I beg you, confess the Trinity of one divinity; or if you prefer otherwise, say, of one essence; and God will be entreated that a voice be given you by the Holy Spirit\" (that is, God will be asked to permit a voice to be given you, by which you may be able to confess what you believe). Yet that voice, permitted to be given to you, would be truly and properly a gift of God: for Augustine brings Gregory forward there to this end, to bear witness that to believe in God, and to confess what we believe, is a gift of God. Likewise Blessed Gregory, Moralia 6, 11, on that text of Job 5, \"Who catches the wise in their own craftiness,\" and so on, says thus: \"For often some, puffed up with human wisdom, when they see divine judgments run counter to their desires, strive to struggle against its crafty contrivances, and to twist the force of the higher", "margins": [{"id": "290A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) siuit"}]}, {"anchor": "p290D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p290D", "locator_display": "290D–291A", "source_text": "dispensationis intorqueant, callidis cogitationibus insistunt, subtiliora consilia exquirunt; sed inde voluntatem Dei peragunt, vnde hanc immutare contendunt, at que omnipotentis Dei consilio dum resistere nituntur, obsequuntur, quia sepe et hoc eius dispositioni apte militat, quod ei per humanum studium friuole resultat. Sapientes ergo Dominus in ipsa eorum astutia comprehendit, quando eius consilijs humana facta etiam tunc congrue seruiunt, cum resistunt. Et infra 12. Iustus nam que et misericors mortaliū acta disponens, alia concedit propitius, alia permittit iratus, at que ea quae permittit, sic tolerat, vt haec in sui consilij vsum conuertat. Vnde miro modo fit, vt et quod sine voluntate Dei agitur, voluntati Dei contrarium non sit; quia dum in bonum vsum mala facta vertuntur, eius consilio militant etiam quae eius consilio repugnant. Hinc enim per Psalmistam dicitur, Magna opera Domini exquisita in omnes voluntates eius. Sic quippe eius opera magna sunt, vt per omne, quod ab hominibus agitur, eius voluntas exquiratur. Hinc rursum dicit, Omnia quaecunque voluit, Dominus\n\nfecit, in Coelo et in terra. Hinc Salomon ait: Non est sapientia, non est prudentia, non est consilium contra Dominum. Restat ergo, vt in cunctis quae agimus, vim supernae voluntatis inquiramus, cui videlicet cognitae debet nostra actio deuote famulari, et quasi ducem sui itineris persequi, ne ei etiam nolens seruiat, si hanc superbiens declinat. Vitari enim vis superni consilij nequaquam potest, sed magna sibi virtute hanc temperat, qui se sub eius nutibus refraenat, eiusque sibi pondera leuigat, qui hanc subiecto cordis humero volens portat. Ex quibus ostenditur evidenter, quod respectu cuiuscunque est diuina permissio, est et diuina volutio actualis, quod et plene testatur eius Autoritas 2. Moral. 11. capitulo proximo recitata. Sed contra istud militare videntur multa dicta Sanctorum, distinguentium\n\npermissionem contra voluntatem diuinam, et dicentium eum multa permittere quae non vult, nec amat. Vnde et Hosae. 8. Ipsi regnauerunt, et non ex me, Principes extiterunt, et non cognoui: et Ierem. 14. Falso prophetae vaticinantur in nomine meo, et non misi eos, et non praecep• eis, neque locutus sum ad eos. Et infra 23. non mittebam Prophetas, et ipsi currebant; non loquebar ad eos, et ipsi prophetabant. Item tunc quicunque qualitercun que intraret in ouile, in Ecclesiam, intraret per ostium, quoniam per Deum et Christum, nec aliquis ascenderet aliunde, quod est contra illum bonum pastorem, Iohan. 10. Item tunc non esset nemesandum, et indigne ferendum, quod indigni in magnis dignitatibus praeferuntur, quod est contra communem consuetudinem et doctrinam Sanctorum. Vnde et Ecclesiastis 10. Est malum quod vidi suh Sole, quasi per errorem egrediens a facie Principis, positum stultum in dignitate sublimi, et diuites sedere deorsum: Vidi seruos in equis, et Principes ambulantes quasi seruos super terram. Item tunc nullus deberet de aliqua dignitate, vel aliquo statu quocun que", "english": "dispensation to their own wish they persist in cunning designs and seek out subtler counsels; but they carry out God's will by the very thing through which they strive to change it, and while they strive to resist the counsel of almighty God they are obeying it, since often this too serves his arrangement fittingly, that it is vainly thrown back against it by human effort. The Lord therefore catches the wise in their very craftiness, when human deeds serve his counsels fittingly even then, when they resist them.\" And below, 12: \"For the just and merciful One, ordering the acts of mortals, grants some graciously, permits others in anger; and the things he permits he so tolerates as to turn them to the use of his own counsel. Whence it comes about, in a marvelous way, that even what is done without God's will is not contrary to God's will; because while evil deeds are turned to a good use, even things that oppose his counsel serve his counsel.\" Hence it is said through the Psalmist, \"Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all his wills.\" For his works are great in this way, that through everything that is done by men, his will is sought out. Hence again he says, \"Whatever the Lord willed, he has done, in heaven and on earth.\" Hence Solomon says: \"There is no wisdom, there is no prudence, there is no counsel against the Lord.\" It remains, therefore, that in all that we do we should seek out the force of the higher will, to which, once known, our action ought devoutly to be subservient, and to follow it as the guide of its journey, lest it serve it even unwillingly if in pride it turns aside from it. For the force of the supreme counsel can in no way be avoided; but he moderates it for himself with great virtue who restrains himself under its nods, and he lightens its burdens for himself who bears it willingly on the submissive shoulder of the heart. From these texts it is plainly shown that in respect of whatever there is a divine permission, there is also an actual divine willing, which his Authority, from Moralia 2, 11, recited in the preceding chapter, also fully attests. But against this many sayings of the saints seem to militate, which set permission over against the divine will and say that he permits many things which he neither wills nor loves. Whence also Hosea 8: \"They have reigned, but not by me; they have become princes, and I did not know it\" ; and Jeremiah 14: \"The prophets prophesy falsely in my name, and I did not send them, and I did not command them, nor did I speak to them.\" And below, 23: \"I was not sending the prophets, and they ran; I was not speaking to them, and they prophesied.\" Likewise, then, whoever entered the sheepfold , the Church, in whatever manner, would enter by the door, since it would be by God and Christ, and no one would climb in from elsewhere, which is contrary to that good shepherd, John 10. Likewise, then, it would not be a matter for indignation and resentment [n6] and for bearing with grief that unworthy men are put ahead in great dignities, which is contrary to the common custom and teaching of the Saints. Whence also Ecclesiastes 10: \"There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were from an error proceeding from the face of the Prince: a fool set in high dignity, and the rich sitting below. I have seen servants on horses, and princes walking on the ground like servants.\" Likewise, then, no one ought to be deposed from any dignity or any station whatever,", "margins": [{"id": "290D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) reluctat (\"struggles against it\")"}, {"id": "290D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Psalmist."}, {"id": "290E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Solomon."}, {"id": "291A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Hosea 8."}, {"id": "291A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Jer 14."}, {"id": "291A·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) id est (\"that is\")"}, {"id": "291A·4", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Eccles 10."}]}, {"anchor": "p291B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p291B", "locator_display": "291B–291D", "source_text": "deponi, Deus enim posuit eum ibi: Nec aliquis deberet scribere, Talis permissione diuina, talis, vel talis, sed prouidentia, vel voluntate, seu electione diuina. Ne que esset resistendum in aliquo cuilibet quidlibet facienti, quia illud ex voluntate et ordinatione Dei facit. Vnde et Roboam cum domo Iuda et Beniamin, volentibus pugnare contra Ieroboam et suos, vt reintegraret regnum diuisum, dixit ad eos Dominus per Semeiam Prophetam: Non ascendetis, neque pugnabitis contra fratres vestros; reuertatur vnusquisque in domum suam, quia hoc mea gestum est voluntate. 2. Paral. 11. et 3. Reg. 12. Quibus consentit Apostolus ad Rom. 13. ita monens, Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo; quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt: Itaque qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit; qui autem resistunt, ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt. Item tunc esset obediendum praecepto cuilibet cuiuscunque, et cuilibet suggestioni, et appetitui cuicunque; omnia enim ista nedum ex permissione, verum et ex volutione Dei procedunt. Pro istis autem facilius dissoluendis,\n\nsciendum secundum Philos. 3. Eth. 1. quod velle dupliciter dicitur, scilicet simpliciter, et secundum quid, sicut Mercator in periculo naufragij simpliciter vult salutem, sed quia fortassis hanc habere non potest nisi merces eij ciat, vult eijcere merces suas; non autem vult hoc simpliciter, sed propter salutem. Vnde et Parab. 13. vult et non vult piger. August. quoque de spiritu et litera 26. ita dicit; Neque dici solet quispiā voluntate fecisse si quid fecit inuitus, quanquam si subtilius aduertamus, etiam quod quisque inuitus facere cogitur, si facit, voluntate facit: sed quia mallet aliud, ideo inuitus, id est, nolens facere dicitur. Malo quippe aliquo quis facere compellitur, quod volens euitare, facit quod cogitur; ac per hoc si facit, non quidem plena et libera voluntate, sed tamen non facit nisi voluntate. Dicunt etiam iura, quod coacta voluntas est voluntas: Tales autem operationes secundum Philos. vbi prius, sunt mixtae ex voluntario et inuoluntario, et ideo quandoque denominantur ab vno illorum et dicuntur voluntariae, quando que ab alio et dicuntur inuoluntariae, vel non voluntariae, ita quod secundum\n\nAugust. nunc allegatum, talis inuitus et nolens facere dicitur. Quare dicit Philos. 2. Topic. quod desiderium respectu alicuius desiderati potest esse triplex; aut vt finis, vt sanitas; aut vt eorum quae sunt ad finem, vt consuere, vel conficere; aut vt eorum quae sunt secundū accidens, velut in vino ad mixtum dulce. Non enim quoniam vinum, sed quoniam dulce; nam per se, dulce desiderat, vinum autem per accidens. Si enim austerum sit, iam non desiderat; per accidens ergo desiderat. Et 7. Ethic. 9. Si quis hoc propter hoc eligit aut persequitur, secundum seipsum quidem hoc eligit et persequitur, secundum accidens autem quod prius; simpliciter autem dicimus quod secundum scipsum. Et secundum eundum 6. Metaph. 4. Accidens videtur propinquum non enti; et ideo Plato non male posuit sophisticam circa non ens, quia circa ens per accidens; quare et nulla est speculatio circa illud; nec vlla scientia actiua, sactiua, vel Theologica studiosa est de eo. Et 1. Phys. 74. sic dicit, Quoniam maxime proprie dicimus Medicum aliquid facere, aut pati, aut fieri ex medico, si secundum quod Medicus,", "english": "for God has placed him there. Nor ought anyone to write, \"Such-and-such by divine permission,\" but rather, \"by divine providence,\" or \"will,\" or \"election.\" Nor would one have to resist anyone in anything, whatever he is doing, since he does that by the will and ordinance of God. Whence also, when Rehoboam, with the house of Judah and Benjamin, wished to fight against Jeroboam and his followers in order to restore the divided kingdom, the Lord said to them through Shemaiah the Prophet: \"You shall not go up, nor shall you fight against your brothers; let each return to his own house, for this thing has been done by my will.\" 2 Paralipomenon 11 and 3 Kings 12 [n7]. With which the Apostle agrees in Romans 13, admonishing thus: \"Let every soul be subject to higher powers. For there is no power except from God; and those that exist are ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the power resists God's ordinance; and those who resist bring condemnation upon themselves.\" Likewise, then, one would have to obey any command of anyone whatever, and any suggestion and any appetite whatever; for all these proceed not only from God's permission but from his willing. But to resolve these objections more easily, one must know, according to the Philosopher, Ethics 3, 1 [n8], that \"to will\" is said in two ways, namely simply and in a certain respect. So a merchant in the peril of shipwreck wills safety simply, but because perhaps he cannot have it unless he throws his cargo overboard, he wills to throw his goods overboard; yet he does not will this simply, but for the sake of safety. Whence also Proverbs 13: \"The sluggard wills and wills not.\" Augustine also says in On the Spirit and the Letter 26: \"Nor is anyone usually said to have acted by his will if what he did he did unwillingly, although if we look more carefully, even what each man is forced to do unwillingly, if he does it, he does by will; but because he would have preferred something else, he is therefore said to act unwillingly, that is, to act while unwilling. For a man is compelled by some evil to act, and wishing to avoid it, does what he is compelled to do; and so, if he does it, it is not indeed with full and free will, yet he does it only by will.\" The laws also say that a coerced will is a will. Now such operations, according to the Philosopher in the place cited before, are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary, and therefore sometimes take their name from one of these and are called voluntary, sometimes from the other and are called involuntary or not voluntary, so that according to the Augustine just cited, such a man is said to act unwillingly and while unwilling. Hence the Philosopher says in Topics 2 that desire, in respect of something desired, can be threefold: either as of an end, as health; or of the things that are toward the end, as to sew together or to compound [n9]; or of the things that are by accident, as in wine, with respect to the sweetness mixed in it. For one desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet; for he desires the sweet per se, but the wine by accident. For if it is harsh, he no longer desires it; so he desires it by accident. And Ethics 7, 9: \"If someone chooses or pursues this for the sake of that, he chooses and pursues the latter in itself, but what came first by accident; and we say 'simply' what is in itself.\" And according to the same, Metaphysics 6, 4: \"An accident seems close to non-being; and therefore Plato was not wrong to place sophistry about non-being, because it is about being by accident; hence there is no speculation about it, nor is any science concerned with it, whether practical, productive, or theological\" [n10]. And Physics 1, 74, he says thus: \"Since we say most properly that a doctor does something or undergoes something, or that something comes to be from a doctor, if he undergoes or does it insofar as he is a doctor, it is manifest that something comes to be from what is not, and this signifies insofar as it is not\" [n11].", "margins": [{"id": "291B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) 2 Par 11 [2 Chr 11]"}, {"id": "291B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Apostle."}, {"id": "291C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Proverbs. Augustine."}, {"id": "291C·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) alio (\"by another\")"}, {"id": "291D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) sanitatis (\"of health\")"}, {"id": "291D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) autem (\"but\")"}]}, {"anchor": "p291E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p291E", "locator_display": "291E–292B", "source_text": "hoc patiatur aut faciat, manifestum quod ex eo quod non est, aliquid fieri, et hoc significat in quantum non est. Ideoque Autores, et Doctores Philosophici et Theologici, loquentes frequenter, vt decet, proprie, et in propositionibus non per accidens, sed simpliciter et per se veris, dicunt volentem aliquid tantum per accidens dicto modo, non velle illud vel nolle. Quare et Philosophus 8. Ethic. 3. dicit, quod amicitiae propter vtile et propter delectabile sunt amicitiae secundum accidens. Et infra 9.1. propter haec inquit, videlicet vtile et delectabile, amicitia existente dissolutio fit, cum non fiant, quorum gratia amabant. Non enim ipsos amabant, sed existentia: Et quid est amare, nisi velle bonum amato, dicente Philosopho 8. Ethic. 3. Amantes autem ad inuicem volunt bona ad inuicem; Cui et concordanter Anselmus de Casu diaboli 13. Qui vult aliquid propter beatitudinem, non aliud vult quam beatitudinem, cum multis alijs Autoritatibus 26. huius ad hoc idem adductis. Sic\n\net Deus simpliciter vult Electos saluari, et aeterna beatitudine praemiari; sed quia decet, quod merita eorum praecedant, ordinauit eis tyrannos rebelles et multiplices inimicos, sicut Senacherib, Nabuchodonosor et alios, tanquam virgas furori sui, vt sic visitaret in virga iniquitates eorum, et in verberibus peccata eorum, sicque eos misericorditer castigaret, vel innocentas a peccatis taliter praeseruaret, vel etiam virtutes eorum vtiliter exerceret. Quid enim mereretur patientia humilium et iustorum, nisi cam tribularet et pungeret iniuria malignorum, quae omnia ex superioribus satis patent? quare et tales persecutores iustorum non vult Deus simpliciter esse vel persequi, sed tantum secundum quid et per accidens propter Electus; ideoque dicitur frequenter Deum nolle illos, nec operas eorum, sed tantum permittere, sicut infirmus, qui vt curetur, debet secari, vel vri, non dicit, volo, sed dicit, si sic oportet, permittam. Non dicit, volo, quia non vult simpliciter, vult tamen secundum quid et per accidens, scilicet gratia sanitatis, qui etiam modus loquendi habetur in sacra Scriptura expresse\n\nGen. 47. dicente Ioseph Aegyptijs, Accipite et serite agros vt fruges habere possitis, quintam partem Regi dabitis, et quatuor reliquas permitto vobis in sementem et cibos, liberis et familijs vestris. Dixit, permitto: nec dubium quin voluit eos habere quatuor reliquas partes pro se et suis, sed principaliter magis voluit habere quintam partem ad vsus Regis, cuius negorijs specialiter intendebat. Et Tobiae 2. loquens Scriptura de excaecatione Tobiae, sic dicit: Hanc autem tentationem ideo permisit Dominus euenire illi, vt posteris daretur exemplum patientiae ipsius, sicut et sancti Iob; Ecce dicit, quod Dominus permisit, et tamen voluit illam tentationem, quia suit bona, et nullo modo mala per culpam, quod patet testante Raphaele infra, eodem 12. Quia inquit, acceptus eras Deo, necesse erat vt tentatio te probaret, et hoc non fuit nisi ex voluntate diuina. Deus ergo hanc voluit non tamē simpliciter et propter se, sed secūdum quid et per accidens, in quantum scilicet fuit occasio patientiae in Tobia, et posteris boni exempli. Patet ergo quomodo respectu eiusdē diuina permissio et eius actualis", "english": "And so authors and doctors, philosophical and theological, speaking frequently as is fitting, in the strict sense, and in propositions true not by accident but simply and per se, say that one who wills something only by accident, in the manner said, neither wills that thing nor nills it. Hence also the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, 3, that friendships for the sake of the useful and for the sake of the pleasant are friendships by accident. And below, 9, 1: \"On account of these,\" he says, namely the useful and the pleasant, \"when the friendship is in existence, a dissolution occurs when those things come not to be for the sake of which they loved. For they did not love the persons themselves, but what was present in them.\" And what is it to love, except to will good to the beloved? So the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, 3: \"Those who love one another will good things for one another.\" In agreement with him also is Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, 13: \"He who wills something for the sake of happiness wills nothing other than happiness,\" together with the many other authorities brought for the same point in the twenty-sixth of this book [n12]. So too God simply wills the Elect to be saved and rewarded with eternal happiness; but because it is fitting that their merits go before, he ordained for them rebellious tyrants and manifold enemies, such as Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar and others, as rods for his wrath, in order that thus he might visit their iniquities with the rod and their sins with blows, and so mercifully chastise them, or in this way preserve the innocent from sins, or even exercise their virtues to their profit. For what would the patience of the humble and the just deserve, unless the injury of the malicious troubled and pricked it? All of which is clear enough from what was said above. Hence God does not will such persecutors of the just to be or to persecute simply, but only in a certain respect and by accident, on account of the Elect; and therefore it is frequently said that God nills them and does not will their works, but only permits them, just as a sick man who, in order to be cured, must be cut or burned does not say, \"I will it,\" but says, \"If it must be so, I permit it.\" He does not say, \"I will it,\" because he does not will it simply; yet he wills it in a certain respect and by accident, namely for the sake of health; and this manner of speaking is expressly found in Sacred Scripture too: Genesis 47, where Joseph says to the Egyptians, \"Take and sow the fields, that you may have crops; you shall give a fifth part to the King, and the other four I permit you for seed and for food, for your children and your households.\" He said, \"I permit\"; yet there is no doubt that he willed them to have the other four parts for themselves and theirs, but he principally willed more to have the fifth part for the King's uses, whose business he was especially attending to. And in Tobit 2, Scripture, speaking of the blinding of Tobit, says: \"The Lord permitted this trial to befall him for this reason, that an example of his patience might be given to posterity, as of holy Job too.\" See, it says that the Lord permitted, and yet he willed that trial, because it was good and in no way evil through fault; which is clear from the testimony of Raphael below, in the same book, chapter 12: \"Because you were acceptable to God, it was necessary that a trial should prove you,\" and this was only by the divine will. God therefore willed this, not however simply and for its own sake, but in a certain respect and by accident, insofar, that is, as it was an occasion of patience in Tobit and of good example to posterity. It is clear, then, how in respect of the same thing the divine permission and his actual", "margins": [{"id": "291E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher."}, {"id": "291E·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) ratione (\"by reason\")"}, {"id": "291E·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) dicit (\"says\")"}, {"id": "292E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(variant, printed on 292A) hoc idem patet ex multis alijs etc. (\"the same is clear from many others, etc.\")"}]}, {"anchor": "p292C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p292C", "locator_display": "292C–292E", "source_text": "volutio non repugnant. Per hoc patet ad primum de Hosea, quod Regnauerunt et non ex me, scilicet volente simpliciter, licet secūdum quid et per accidens, vt est dictum; vel aliter, Regnarunt, et non ex me, quantum scilicet in eis fuit, quia forte contra conscientiam propriam, et contra iustitiam humanam et legalem, licet non contra iustitiam simpliciter quae est diuina, sicut capitulum proximum ostendebat probando, quod nihil est iniustum simpliciter. Ad alia vero de Ieremia et Iohanne patet per idem quod Indigni praelati non sunt indigne ferendi, sed digne quoad diuinam iustitiam, quae sic disponit; possunt tamen indigne ferri quantum ad iustitiam propriam; si ascenderint minus iuste, nobis tamen subditis tutum reputo et salubre, ne murmuremur faciliter contra qualescunque praelatos, sed ipsos supportemus humiliter propter Deum, qui praeposuit eos nobis: Si enim sint muti vel mali, hoc forsitan est in poenam peccatorum nostrorum, qui tales meremur habere. Vnde Iob 34. Regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi: Super quod dicit beatus Gregorius 25. Moral.\n\n15. Nullus, qui talem rectorem patitur, eum accuset, qui nimirum sui fuit meriti peruersi rectoris subiacere ditioni. Culpam ergo proprij magis accuset operis, quam iniustitiam gubernantis. Et infra, eodem 16. Sic ergo secundum merita subditorum tribuuntur personae regentium: Quandoque vero subditi propter peccata sua nedum malum praelatum suscipiunt, sed quod est magis mirabile, is quem bonum susceperant, permutatur in malum. Quare dicit Gregorius inferius vbi prius: sic pro qualitatibus subditorum disponuntur acta regentium, vt saepe pro merito gregis etiam vere boni derelinquat vita Pastoris. Ille, Deo attestante, laudatus Dauid Propheta, tumore repentinae elationis inflatus, populum numerando peccauit, et tamen vindictam populus, Dauido peccante, suscepit. Cur hoc? quia videlicet secundum merita plebium disponuntur corda Rectorum: Iustus vero Iudex peccantis vitium ex ipsorum animaduersione corripuit, ex quorum causa peccauit; sed quia ipse, sua scilicet voluntate superbiens a culpa alienus non fuit, vindictam culpae etiam ipse suscepit. Nam ira saeuiens\n\nquae corporaliter populum perculit, Rectorem quoque populi intimo cordis dolore prostrauit. Praelatus etiam bonus admissus et permanens bonus continue, propter subditorum peccata, quandoque a praedicationis et correptionis officio redditur obmutescens. Vnde Dominus Ezechieli sic dixit, Linguam tuam adhae rere faciam palato tuo, et eris mutus, nec quasi vir obiurgans, quia domus exasperans est. Vbi Glossa super verbum exasperans, quasi diceret, Tantae amaritudinis sunt, et contra Deum contentionis, vt non obiurgationem tantum mereantur audire. Ex quo patet, vbi multitudo fuerit peccatorum, indignos peccantes esse, qui a Domino corrigantur. Corrigant ergo prius subditi vitam suam, et contra Praelatos suos non murmurentur; sed deuote pro eis Dominum deprecentur, in cuius manibus corda sunt", "english": "willing do not conflict. By this the answer to the first, about Hosea, is clear: \"They have reigned, but not by me,\" that is, with me willing simply, though in a certain respect and by accident, as has been said; or else otherwise: \"They reigned, and not by me,\" as far, that is, as it lay with them, because perhaps against their own conscience and against human and legal justice, though not against justice simply, which is divine, as the preceding chapter showed by proving that nothing is unjust simply. As to the other texts, from Jeremiah and John, it is clear by the same point that unworthy prelates are not to be borne unworthily, but worthily with respect to the divine justice, which so disposes; yet they can be borne unworthily as regards their own justice, if they have risen less justly. For us their subjects, however, I judge it safe and wholesome not to murmur readily against prelates of whatever sort, but to support them humbly for God's sake, who set them over us. For if they are dumb or evil, this perhaps is a punishment of our sins, we who deserve to have such men. Whence Job 34: \"He makes a hypocrite reign on account of the sins of the people.\" On which Blessed Gregory says in Moralia 25, 15: \"Let no one who suffers such a ruler accuse him, since it was surely his own desert to be subject to the sway of a perverse ruler. Let him accuse rather the fault of his own work than the injustice of the one governing.\" And below, in the same, 16: \"So, then, according to the merits of the subjects the persons of rulers are assigned: but sometimes subjects, because of their sins, not only receive a bad prelate but, what is more marvelous, the one they had received as good is changed into a bad one.\" Hence Gregory says further on in the same place: \"So the acts of rulers are disposed according to the qualities of subjects, so that often, for the merit of the flock, the life even of a truly good Pastor fails. That David the Prophet, praised on God's own testimony, swollen with the swelling of sudden pride, sinned by numbering the people, and yet the people received the punishment while David sinned. Why this? Because the hearts of Rulers are disposed according to the merits of the peoples. The just Judge corrected the sinner's vice through the chastisement of those on whose account he sinned; but because he himself, being proud by his own will, was not free from guilt, he too received the punishment of the guilt. For the raging anger which struck the people in their bodies laid low the Ruler of the people too with deep grief of heart.\" Even a good prelate, admitted to office and continuing good, is sometimes, on account of the sins of his subjects, made mute in the office of preaching and correction. Whence the Lord said thus to Ezekiel: \"I will make your tongue cleave to your palate, and you shall be mute, and not as a man who rebukes, for it is a house that provokes.\" Where the Gloss on the word \"provokes\" says, as if to say: \"They are of such bitterness, and of such contention against God, that they do not deserve to hear rebuke alone.\" From which it is clear that where there is a multitude of sinners, the sinners are unworthy to be corrected by the Lord. Let subjects, therefore, first correct their own life, and let there be no murmuring against their prelates; but let them devoutly entreat the Lord for them, in whose hands are the hearts", "margins": [{"id": "292C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Job 34. Gregory."}]}, {"anchor": "p293A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p293A", "locator_display": "293A–293C", "source_text": "Regum, et omnium Praelatorum. Neque procedit quod arguitur consequenter, quia sicut Deus posuit Praelatum in alto, ita, si deponatur, eum deponit. Ipse enim est, qui deposuit potentes de sede, nec posuit eum ibi pro suo perpetuo, sed ad tempus, sicut dedit regnum Nabuchodonosor, et semini eius post eum, non pro semper, sed donec veniret tempus terrae eius, et ipsius, sicut ex Ieremiae vicesimo septimo, prius fuerat allegatum; non intelligendo per tempus terrae eius et ipsius, tempus durationis regni in aliqua magna, maiori, seu maxima coniunctione necessario praetaxatum, quae innouat sectas et regna, (sicuti mentiuntur Astrologi mentientes, qui nedum tempora magnorum regnorum praefinire conantur, sed etiam tempus fidei Christianae, Albumazar de coniunctionibus attestante) sed tempus a Domino praestitutum. Ipse enim mutat tempora et aetates, transfert regna, atque constituit, Dan. 2. et regnum a gente in gentem transfertur propter iniustitias, Ecclesiast. 10. Et sicut a gente in gentem, ita de tribu in tribum, de persona in personam, cuius testes sunt Saul et Dauid, sicut superius tangebatur. Et sicut transfert regna, ita et minores quaslibet dignitates. Quia igitur\n\naliqui minus digni, quandoque occupant dignitates, et hoc quantum ad eos attinet, scilicet secundum humanam et inferiorem iustitiam minus iuste, quamuis quantum ad diuinam et superiorem iustitiam aliquo modo iuste, bene possunt isti Iudices, secundum humanam et inferiorem iustitiam iudicantes, eo quod circa futura ignorant diuinam et superiorem iustitiam, scilicet Dei iustissimam voluntatem, velle eos deponi, licet forsan non penitus absolute, sed cum ista conditione expressa vel tacita; Si placitum fuerit coram Deo, et sic vlterius agere ad depositionem talium Praelatorum; et si contingat sic agi eosque deponi, hoc totum fit secundum diuinam et superiorem iustitiam, vt est dictum. Hoc autem totum confirmare videtur autoritas Augustini ad Simplicianum praescripta vicesimo quinto huius. Quintum argumentum potest in caput arguentis similiter retorqueri. Si enim quia aliqui scribunt; Talis permissione diuina talis vel talis, ideo pura permissione non voluntate Dei est talis vel talis: Simili ratione, quia aliquibus semper scribitur; Tali diuina prouidentia vel electione\n\ndiuina, vel Dei gratia summo Pontifici, Episcopo, siue Regi, omnes tales diuina prouidentia et gratia praeferuntur, et nullus eorum pura permissione diuina, cum tamen aliqui eorum sint, aut esse possunt mali, sicut et in minoribus dignitatibus constituti. Item si quia Aliquis scribit, Permissione diuina talis, propterea pura permissione Dei est talis, cum omnes in caeteris paruis dignitatibus constituti semper sic scribant, omnes semper pura Dei permissione sunt tales, et nullus eius volutione seu electione, aut prouidencia actuali, quod ratio non permittit, cum inter eos sint multi sancti et boni, ac Deus ita curet pusillum gregem vt magnum, sicut praecedentiadocuerunt. Quia tamen Dei permissio minor videtur quam eius gratia, prouidentia, electio, seu voluntas, ideo Minores humilitatis causa sic scribunt. Ad sextum vero de non resistendo cuilibet facienti, dicendum sicut ad quartum de depositione Praesidentium erat dictum: quoniam sicut Deus vult aliquem quodlibet facere, ita vult sibi resisti, si sibi ab aliquo resistatur etc, sicut ibi. Et si tu arguas,", "english": "of Kings and of all Prelates. Nor does the next argument go through, since just as God placed the Prelate on high, so, if he is deposed, God deposes him. For it is he who has put down the mighty from their seat, nor did he place him there for his perpetuity, but for a time, as he gave the kingdom to Nebuchadnezzar and his seed after him, not forever, but until the time of his land and of his own should come, as was cited before from the twenty-seventh chapter of Jeremiah. This \"time of his land and of his own\" is not to be understood as the time of the duration of a kingdom necessarily fixed beforehand by some great, greater, or greatest conjunction, which renews sects and kingdoms (as the astrologers lie, liars that they are, who attempt to set in advance not only the times of great kingdoms but even the time of the Christian faith, with Albumasar bearing witness in his book on conjunctions), but a time set beforehand by the Lord. For he changes times and ages, he transfers kingdoms and establishes them, Daniel 2; and a kingdom is transferred from nation to nation on account of injustices, Ecclesiasticus 10 [n13]. And as from nation to nation, so from tribe to tribe, from person to person, of which Saul and David are witnesses, as was touched upon above. And as he transfers kingdoms, so too any lesser dignities. Since, therefore,\n\nsome less worthy men sometimes occupy dignities, and this, as far as they are concerned, namely according to human and lower justice, less justly, though as regards divine and higher justice in some way justly, these Judges, judging according to human and lower justice, can well will that such men be deposed (since regarding future events they do not know divine and higher justice, namely God's most just will), though perhaps not wholly absolutely, but with this condition, express or tacit: \"If it shall be pleasing before God,\" and so proceed further to the deposition of such Prelates; and if it should happen that they are so dealt with and deposed, all this is done according to divine and higher justice, as has been said. The authority of Augustine to Simplicianus, cited in the twenty-fifth of this book, seems to confirm all this. The fifth argument can be turned back similarly upon the head of the one arguing. For if, because some write, \"Such-and-such by divine permission,\" therefore such a one is such by pure permission and not by God's will, then by similar reasoning, because it is always written to some, \"By such divine providence or divine election, or by God's grace, Supreme Pontiff, Bishop, or King,\" all such are set over by divine providence and grace, and none of them by pure divine permission, although some of them are, or can be, evil, as also those set in lesser dignities. Likewise, if because someone writes, \"Such-and-such by divine permission,\" therefore he is such by God's pure permission, then since all those established in the other small dignities always write in this way, all are always such by God's pure permission, and none by his willing or election or actual providence, which reason does not allow, since among them are many holy and good men, and God cares for the little flock as for the great, as the preceding chapters taught. But because God's permission seems less than his grace, providence, election, or will, the lesser ones therefore write thus for the sake of humility. As to the sixth, about not resisting anyone who is doing anything, the answer is as was said to the fourth, about the deposition of Presidents: that just as God wills someone to do whatever he does, so he wills that he be resisted, if he is resisted by someone, etc., as there. And if you argue,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p293D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/33/#p293D", "locator_display": "293D–294B", "source_text": "ergo frustra ordinauit primam actionem, quam ordinauit similiter destrui per secundam; vnus enim aedificans, vnus destruens, quid prodest illis nisi labor? Ecclesiastici tricesimo quarto. Respondeo, quod sic posset probari, quod non ignis et aqua nec vlla contraria deberent esse in Mundo: Nam vnum contrariorum impedit et destruit alterius actionem; imo, quod est magis mirabile, boni Angeli quandoque mutuo sibi resistunt, et inuicem praeliantur; vnde Dan. decimo Princeps Regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et vno diebus: Et infra eodem, Et nunc reuertar vt praelier aduersus Principem Persarum, qui ambo Angeli boni fuerunt, vt patet per Gregorium, et recitat ibi Glossa. Et aliqua est bona voluntas et iusta, contraria tamen quodam modo voluntati diuinae; vt patet de bono filio, qui patrem suum vult viuere, quem Deus vult mori, vt patet per Augustinum Enchirid. 70. et recitat Lumbardus primo Sententiarum distinct. 48.1. et 22. de Ciuitat. Dei 2. dist. duplici\n\nvoluntate Dei, vna essentiali et aeterna, qua vult Deus, alia temporali qua alios facit velle, de hac secunda sic dicit; Secundum hanc voluntatem qua Deum velle dicimus, quod alios efficit velle, a quibus futura nesciuntur, multa vult, nec facit. Multa enim volunt fieri Sancti eius ab illo inspirata sancta voluntate, nec fiunt, sicut cum orant pro quibusdam sancte pieque quod orant non facit, cum ipse in eis hanc orandi voluntatem sancto Spiritu suo fecerit. Quod et Dominus testabatur expresse cum dixit Dauidi; Quod cogitasti in corde tuo aedificare domum nomini meo, bene fecisti, hoc ipsum mente tractans. 3. Reg. 8. Illa ergo voluntas seu cogitatio placuit Deo, et tamen opus in quod tendebat, finaliter non placebat. Statim enim subiunxit, veruntamen non aedificabis mihi domum. Vbi dicit et Glossa, argumentū, quod voluntas actus placet, et si non actus. Ex omnibus istis patet, quod licet Deus aliquid ordinet, non oportet quod velit nihil sibi resistere, nec illud destruere; imo ipse omnia agentia et resistentia,\n\ngenerantia et co•rūpentia, et vniuersaliter omnia contraria ordinauit, eis que tam agendo quam resistendo, generando et corrumpendo et generaliter faciendo, et non faciendo proprios constituit terminos quos nullatenus praeteribunt. Ad vltimum patet [per] idem: Praecepta nam que tyrannorum, suggestiones diaboli, et appetitus carnis vult Deus fieri, non vt eis obediatur ab omnibus, sed ad punitionem peccatorum, vel ad humiliationē et ad praecauendum peccata, vel etiā ad exercitationē virtutum, et cumulum meritorum. Nec mirum; Ipse enim Deus, aliquando praecipit aliquid, et prohibuit aliquid, nec tamen voluit hoc fieri, nec illud non fieri, vt patet Genes. 22. de Abraham, cui praecepit filium immolare, nec tamen eum voluit immolari: sed ad probandum fidem Abrahae sic praecepit. Et Matthaei nono de duobus caecis illuminatis, quibus dixit, Videte ne quis sciat; illi autem excuntes diffamauerunt eum in totam terram illam, nec tamen in hoc secundum Patrum sententiam peccauerunt. Et hoc est quod docet Lumbardus 1. sententia distinctione 45. et 47. manifeste. His tamen\n\nnequaquam obstantibus, inficiari non potest, quin ratio permissionis et volutionis propriae, scilicet actualiter positiuae in Deo et hominibus sit diuersa, non tamen contraria. Homines namque volunt aliqua fieri, quae et fieri permittunt, non tamen volunt quicquid permittunt, neque permittunt quicquid volunt: Nullus enim proprie permittere dicitur semetipsum quippiam operari, sed alium quem posset impedire si vellet. Quare et simili ratione videtur, quod Deus non quicquid vult, permittit; imo quicquid permittit fieri a quocunque, vult illud fieri ab eodem: Ipse namque voluntarie efficit illud, idem sicut 8um. huius; et 9um. perspicue manifestant.", "english": "\"then God ordained the first action in vain, which he ordained likewise to be destroyed by the second; for if one builds and one tears down, what do they gain but toil?\" (Ecclesiasticus 34). I answer that in this way it could be proved that fire and water, and no contraries at all, ought to exist in the world; for one of two contraries hinders and destroys the other's action; indeed, what is more marvelous, good angels sometimes resist one another and fight each other; whence Daniel 10: \"The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me twenty-one days\"; and further on in the same chapter: \"And now I shall return to fight against the prince of the Persians\"; both of whom were good angels, as is clear from Gregory and as the Gloss there recounts. And there is a will that is good and just, yet in a certain way contrary to the divine will; as is clear of the good son who wills his father to live, whom God wills to die, as Augustine shows, Enchiridion 70, and as the Lombard recounts, Sentences 1, distinction 48, 1, and City of God 22, 2, distinguishing [n14] a twofold will of God, one essential and eternal, by which God wills, the other temporal, by which he makes others will; of this second he says: \"According to this will, by which we say that God wills what he makes others will, those from whom the future is hidden, he wills many things and does not do them. For his Saints will many things to be done, by a holy will inspired by him, and they are not done, as when they pray for some people holily and piously, and he does not do what they pray, although he himself, by his Holy Spirit, has made in them this will to pray.\" Which the Lord also testified expressly when he said to David: \"That you thought in your heart to build a house for my name, you did well, pondering this very thing in your mind,\" 3 Kings 8. That will or thought, therefore, pleased God, and yet the work toward which it tended did not finally please. For he immediately added: \"Nevertheless you shall not build me a house.\" Where the Gloss also says that it is an argument that the will for an act pleases, even if the act does not. From all these it is clear that although God ordains something, it is not necessary that he will that nothing resist it, or destroy it; rather he himself has ordained all agents and resisters, generators and corrupters, and universally all contraries, and to them, both by acting and by resisting, by generating and corrupting, and generally by doing and by not doing, he has fixed their own limits, which they will in no way pass. As to the last, the answer is clear [through] the same point: for God wills the commands of tyrants, the suggestions of the devil, and the appetites of the flesh to occur, not that they be obeyed by all, but for the punishment of sinners, or for humbling, and for guarding against sins, or even for the exercise of virtues and the heaping up of merits. Nor is it a marvel; for God himself sometimes commands something, and has forbidden something, and yet did not will this to be done, nor that to be left undone, as is clear in Genesis 22 of Abraham, whom he commanded to sacrifice his son, and yet did not will him to be sacrificed; but he so commanded in order to prove Abraham's faith. And in Matthew 9, of the two blind men given light, to whom he said, \"See that no one knows\"; but they, going out, spread his fame throughout all that land, and yet in this, according to the opinion of the Fathers, they did not sin. And this is what the Lombard plainly teaches in Sentences 1, distinctions 45 and 47. Yet with none of this standing in the way, it cannot be denied that the notion of permission and that of willing in the proper sense, that is, actually positive willing, in God and in men, is different, though not contrary. For men will some things to be done, which they also permit to be done, yet they do not will whatever they permit, nor permit whatever they will: for no one is properly said to permit himself to do something, but another whom he could hinder if he wished. Hence by similar reasoning it seems that God does not permit whatever he wills; and indeed, whatever he permits to be done by anyone, he wills to be done by that same one: for he himself willingly brings it about, and likewise, as the eighth of this book and the ninth plainly make manifest [n15].", "margins": [{"id": "293D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Dan 10."}, {"id": "293D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gregory. Gloss. Augustine."}, {"id": "294A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gen 22."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}