{"id": "1/27", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 27", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "261C–264D", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XXVII. Quod omnia a prouidentia diuina eueniunt.\n\nCOnsequens autem dictis videtur de prouidentia indagare. Recitante namque Lactantio primi institutio num diuinarum aduersus gentes. 1. Democritus est autor sententiae ponentis omnia fortuito fieri, et confirmator Epicurus; vnde et Philosophus 2. Physic. 44. Sunt, inquit, quidam, qui coeli huius et mundanorum omnium causantur esse casum: a casu enim fieri volutionem, et motum discernentem in hunc ordinem, omne. Hi autem, sicut apparet ex primo De generatione et corruptione; et 1. Metaph.\n\nvidentur fuisse Democritus et collega eius Leucippus, qui posuerunt omnia fieri ex corporibus indiuisibilibus, sed concurrentibus differenter, secundum risutos diatigi, et tropi, id est, secundum figuram, ordinem, et positionem; huiusmodi autem concursum dixerunt fieri fortuito seu a casu, quos et imitans Epicurus similiter aestimauit. Quare et Isidorus 8. Ethic. 19. dicit, quod Epicurus dixit; Nulla diuina prouidentia instructum esse, aut regi mundum; sed originem rerum Atomis, id est, insecabilibus ac solidis corporibus assignauit, quorum fortuitis concursionibus vniuersa nascuntur: Asseruit autem et Deum nihil agere. Iosephus quoque 10. Antiquit. Iudaicae vlt. dicit; Quod Epicurei prouidentiam vitae negant, et Deum res humanas curare non existimant, neque a beata incorruptibilique substantia pro stabilitate cunctorum, gubernari iudicant vniuersa, sed hunc mundum sine rectore, et sine cura aliqua ferri sponte confirmant. Alij vero non ita vniuersaliter, sed diuidentes dixerunt; Coelestia prouidentia\n\ngubernari, inferiora vero quaecunque fortuitis motibus agitari. Alij autem irrationabilius opinantes, opinionem contrariam protulerunt. Verum contra hos omnes, quin magis pro his omnibus ostendendum, omnia quae eueniunt a diuina prouidentia euenire, ac eius prouidentiae legibus ordinari. Quid enim est prouidentia, nisi procul videntia, seu praeuidentia intellectus, cum procul violentia, seu praeuolentia voluntatis: Deus autem habet scientiam omnium, sicut capitulum sextum docet, et illa est quaedam causa cuiuslibet •ei factae, 17o attestante: habet quoque Deus volutionem ad omnia, sicut 8.9. et 22. ostendunt, et neutra harum est noua per vicesimum tertium, et volutio Dei est efficax, nec potest frustrari per 10. Patet ergo omnia quae eueniunt a diuina prouidentia euenire. Item per cap. proximum, omnia sunt bona, quare et secundū priora a primo bono descendunt, et non perperam et improuide, sed prouide et discrete. Itē, bonus paterfamilias omnia eū concernētia curat, et prouidet quā tum\n\nscit et potest, nec quicquā relinquit inordinatū in domo, sed omnia suis locis et temporibus ordinat curiose; Vnde et Aristoteles 1. Oeconomicae suae 3. ita dicit, Quotquot conuenit per se ficri, oportet et curam scilicet per se fieri, et sequitur, Oportet prius seruis Dominos surgere, et dormire vltimos, et nunquam sine custodia domum esse, sicut et ciuitatem; et quaecunque oportet facere, nec nocte, nec dic omittere. Et infra, eodem, Domum etiam ad rerum custodiam construendū, pro nutrimentis, indumentis, alijsque rebus animatis, seruis, liberis; foeminis, masculis; extraneis, et ciuibus; ad salutem et ad sanitatem, pro aestate, frigida; pro hyeme, calida; et oportet vnumquodque in loco suo poni. Quanto magis ille magnus Paterfamilias, cuius magnitudinis non est finis, et sapientiae eius non est numerus, cuius et bonitas est immensa, totam magnam domum suam, cum omnibus eius contentis, omni tempore prouide gubernabit? Vnde Matth. 20. Simile est regnum Coelorum homini Patrifamilias, Vbi Chrysostomus, Homo Paterfamilias Christus\n\nest, cui coelum et terra quasi vna domus est; familia autem coelestium, terrestrium, et inferatum creaturarum. Item si Deus non omnia prouideret, hoc videretur imperitiae, impotentiae, malitiae, vel negligentiae, quae omnia longissime sunt a Deo: imo tam Deum quam alia magis decet, vt per ipsum omnia prouide gubernentur. Vnde Boetius 4. de Consolat. Philosophiae prosa sexta, Ita res optime geruntur, si manens in diuina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum ordinem promat; hic vero ordo res mutabiles, et alioquin temere fluituras coercet, quo fit, vt tametsi nobis hunc ordinem minime considerare valentibus, confusa omnia perturbata quaeque videantur, nihilominus tamen suus modus ad bonum di rigens cuncta disponit. Cui concordat Augustinus 1. de libero arbitrio 13. ita dicens, Aeterna lex est qua iustum est, vt omnia sint ordinatissima; et 3i. 7o. Quicquid tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit, scias fecisse Deum, tanquam bonorum omnium conditorem; et 4. super Gen. ad literam 14. Si Deus posset bona facere, nec faceret, magna esset inuidentia;\n\nEt de quantitate Animae 18. Iustitia Dei haec vniuersitas sustentatur et regitur, qua factum est vt non modo sint omnia, sed ita sint, vt omnino melius esse non possint. Algazel quoque 3. Metaph. sententia septima ita dicit, Omne quod est, scilicet numerus stellarum, et mensura earum, dispositio terrae et Animalium, et quicquid est quod habet esse, secundum modum, quo est, fuit, quia ex omnibus modis essendi hic fuit conuenientior illi, et quicquid aliud possibile est praeter hoc, imperfectum est respectu huius quod nunc est: Completa igitur est cura cum completudine bonitatis. Item similiter videtur esse in omnibus entibus vnius specici, et generaliter in omnibus entibus omnium specierum, quia secundum Philosophum 1. Oeconomicae suae primo capite; In minimis natura singulorum reperitur; sed ita est de hominibus, quod nisi haberent rectorem communem ipsos ad bonum publicum dirigentem, sed quilibet intenderet bono suo priuato, eorum respublica disponeretur pessime, vel periret; et licet in diuersis prouincijs haberent diuersos Principes et rectores, nisi adhuc ipsi\n\nhaberent vnum superiorem communem Principem, et rectorem, contingeret error, qualis prior. Quomodo prouidentia indigens ab abundante congrue iuuaretur, nisi autoritate Principis communis ambatum? Omnium igitur Prouinciarū et hominū est naturaliter vnus Princeps; hoc enim est melius vniuersis. Omnia nam que naturaliter bonum desiderant, sicut ex proximo huius patet, et maius bonū magis. Quare et Philosophus 1. Polit. 1. dicit, quod in hominibus est principans et secundum naturam propter salutem. Et infra, eodem; probat quod Ciuitas est cōmunitas naturalis, quia est finis duarum cōmunitatum naturalium, scilicet dom et viciniae, et finis cuiuslibet rei est sibi naturalis. Secundo probat idem per hoc, quod optimū et sufficientissimum cuiuslibet est sibi naturale, quia est finis eius; optimum autem et sufficientissimum dicit esse in communitate ciuili: Quare concludit sic dicens, ex his igitur manifestum, quod eorum quae natura ciuitas est, et quod homo natura ciuile Animal est, et per easdem rationes potest ostendi, quod omnium hominum deberet esse naturaliter vna cōmunitas ab vno\n\nPrincipe gubernata; quare et vniuersaliter omnium entium per similem rationem, et haec videtur determinatio Aristotelis, 12. Metaph. vlt. vbi arguit contra Pictagoricos ponentes numerum Mathematicum esse primum rerum principium, per hoc quia tunc substantia vniuersi esset inconnexa, nec entia mutuo sibi conferrent, et essent multa principia non subinuicem nec sub aliquo alio ordinata; sed hoc est contra naturalem dispositionem entium, et vniuersi. Non est ergo ita; et hoc est quod dicit his verbis, Entia non volunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum; vnus ergo Princeps; hic autem Princeps secundum totum suum processum ibi est Deus; et haec videtur ratio Damaceni 1. sentent. 3. et Lumbardi 1. sentent. dist. 3. multorum que Philosophorum et Doctorum alijs locis multis. Item partes Animalium\n\net plantatum, et totius vniuersi sunt optime et vtilissime ordinatae; huius autem causa non potest esse aliquod elementum, nec aliqua causa particularis, quare secundum Philosophum natura vniuersalis, quae est Deus. Et haec fuit ratio Antiquorum Philosophorum, a 9o et 10 capitulis 1i Metaph. capitulo proximo allegata. Vnde Auicenna 10. Metaph. 1. Cum volueris scire quod res vtiles quas intelligis, inducunt ad commoditates in natura, considera dispositionem vtilitatis membrorum in animalibus et plantis, et quomodo vnumquod que eorum est causatum, et non est ibi causa naturalis vllo modo, sed principium eius est ex cura diuina, sicut etiam illa pendēt ex cura. Scias etiam quod plus appropinquat vulgus, et tenet, et dicit, verum est; nec refugiunt hoc nisi illi qui volunt videri Philosophi, eo quod ignorant causas seu alias istorum. Aristoteles quoque in de Animalibus assignans causam dispositionis membrorum Animalium, dicit quod natura sic ordinauit propter melius et salutem Animalis, quod plane testatur eius Autoritas 11. de Animalibus superius recensita, et in hoc omnes Philosophi\n\net Medici sunt concordes. Frequenter quo que supponit Aristoteles, quod natura semper facit id quod est melius. Vnde 2. de generat. penult. In omnibus inquimus, quod melius desiderate naturam semper; et 2. de Coelo 34. Natura semper facit contingentium quod optimum; et 50. Nihil, vt contingit, facit natura, et irrationabile est ipsam de animalibus curasse, et despexisse praetiosa, scilicet coelestia, sed videtur studiose factum quod facit: Et 59. Natura nihil irrationabiliter, neque frustra facit: Et supra 56. Neque animata, neque violenta feretur latione nullum ipsorum, coelestium scilicet corporum, velut futurum prouidente natura, quoniam non hoc modo se habente motu, nihil vtique erit: Circa hunc locum, et alijs locis multis, talia multa dicit. Et quod haec natura apud Aristotelem sit Deus, patet per eius verba, quae conuenire non possunt irrationali naturae, nec rationali alicui, nisi primae; quod et dictum suum ex libello de morte Aristotelis recitatum superius plane docet. Vnde 1. Oeconomicae 1. dicit, Natura replet periodo procreationis prolis semper esse, cum per vnum nequeat,\n\nper speciem tamen, sicut praeordinata fuit a diuino vtriusque natura masculi et foeminae ad communitatem. Auerroes quoque super 2. de Anima comment. 34. dicit quod sollicitudo diuina cum non potuit facere generabile et corruptibile permanere secundum indiuiduum, miserta est in dando ei virtutem quae potest permanere in specie. Adhuc autem quid rectius aestimandum naturam vniuersalem, quam animam mundi communem? Haec autem est Deus, sicut praemissa 2o huius ostendunt, quod et multa similiter ibi tacta probare videntur. Amplius autem et principalis sententia per multa Philosophorū testimonia comprobatur. Arist. enim praeter superius allegata in De secreto secretor. 1. part. 23. dicit, quod Deus omnes impressiones, frigora, et calores in hyeme et aestate summa prouidentia ineuitabiliter stabiliuit. Idem in De mundo 13. Deo gubernante, semper immobiliter et diligenter regitur totus decor coeli et terrae diuisus secundum omnes naturas. Hoc etiam plane tenent Auicen. 8. Met. 9. et 10. et Algazel. 5. Phys. et 5. Met. Auerroes quoque super 12. Meta. comment. 37. dicit, quod\n\nDeus habet curam et sollicitudinē circa omnia entia, tam circa indiuidua, quam circa species; et comment. 52. dicit, quod principium voluntarij et naturalis oportet vt habeat intentionem actionis ordinatam ad 1am causam; et sciendum quod haec est sententia Aristotelis in sollicitudine, et recitatis duabus opinionibus contrarijs, quarum vna posuit Deum habere sollicitudinem circa quodcunque; et alia, quod nulla est sollicitudo omnino, dicit; Et veritas est in hoc, quod sollicitudo est, et quod si aliqua sint sine sollicitudine, proueniunt ex necessitate materiae, non ex diminutione agentis; sed nulla proueniunt ex necessitate materiae nisi forsan sicut ipsemet loquitur, super 2. Phys. comm. 88. cum dicit, Illa quae inueniuntur in rebus naturalibus de necessitate non propter aliquid, vt mors Animalis, sunt propter materiā; et illa quae inuentuntur in eis propter aliquid, sunt propter formam; et tales priuationes licet aliquo modo intendantur a Deo, non tamen ita principaliter sicut habitus et forma: Hae nam que propter illos intenduntur finaliter, non e contra. Vnde Sap. 1. Deus mortem non fecit: Et Eccles. 39.\n\nFames et mors ad vindictam creata sunt. Adhuc autem Calcidius super 2am partem Timaei Platonis, sic ait, Priscorum hominum genus omnia quae ad vsum hominum vitae que facultatem agendam, diuino consilio et prouidentia demanant, auxiliantibus atque operantibus tam potentijs quam rationibus, haec ipsa quae auxiliantur deos putabat, propterea quod rudibus animis nondum insederat vera Dei sciscitatio. Erant enim Pastores, et Syluacedi, caeteri que huiusmodi sine studio humanitatis; vbi et ad prouidentiā affirmandā adducit Platonē, Pictagorā, Or•heum, Lipponem, et Musaeum; tota que secta Stoicorum diuinam prouidentiam concorditer profitetur, teste Lactantio vbi prius. Ad hoc etiā faciunt multae Autoritates Philosophicae, et Theologicae, 1o huius 2.3, 4, 6, 9, et proximo allegatae, quae de sollicitudine, prouidentia, gubernatione, et similibus faciunt mentionē. Praeterea Aug. 8. super Gen. ad lit. a cap. 11. vs que ad finē ostendit, multum que diffuse opus diuinae prouidentiae bipartitū, creationis scilicet et administrationis,\n\ncui tota subiacet creatura; et 9.24. idem et 1. de lib. arbitr. 11. Nihil rerum est quod non administret diuina prouidentia; et idem 2.28.34. et 3.2. ac alijs libris, et locis non paucis, quorum vnum nunc tangā alijs praetermissis 5. de ciuit. Dei 11. dicit ita, Deus qui fecit hominem rationale animal ex anima et corpore, qui eum peccantem nec impunitū esse permisit, nec sine misericordia dereliquit, qui bonis et malis essentiam cum lapidibus, vitam seminalem cum arboribus, sensualem cum pecoribus, et intellectualem cum solis Angelis dedit, a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, mensura, numerus, et pondus; et quicquid naturaliter est, cuiuscunque generis est, a quo sunt semina formarum, formae seminum, motus seminum atque formatum, qui dedit carni originem, pulchritudinem, valetudinem, propaginis foecunditatem, membrorum dispositionem, salutem, concordiam, qui et animae irrationali dedit memoriam sensum et appetitum, rationali autem mentem, intelligentiam, et voluntatem, qui non solum coelum et terram, nec solum Angelum et hominem, sed nec exigui\n\net contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec auis penulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium conuenientia et quadam veluti pace dereliquit, nullo modo est credendus regna hominum, eorumque dominationes, et seruitutes a suae prouidentiae legibus alienas esse voluisse. Lactantius insuper, vbi prius, ostendit multipliciter et diffuse diuinam prouidentiam generalem. Huius autem Lactantij, et libri eius praedicti, qui continet 7. libros, beatus Ieronymus de viris illustribus 80. et beatus Augustinus 18. de Ciuit. Dei 24. laudabilem faciunt mentionem Nulli igitur videatur eius Autoritas contemnenda. Isidorus etiam, vbi prius, recitat ab Epicuro nulla diuina prouidentia instructum esse mundum aut regi, tanquam haeresin seu errorem, sicut eius processus euidenter ostendit. Iosephus quoque 2. Antiquit. Iudaicae vlt. recitat Mosen sic dixisse, De Dei prouidentia desperare immensae vesaniae est. Item Psalmo 118. Ordinatione tua perseuerat dies, quoniam omniam seruiunt tibi. Et 146. Qui dat iumentis escam ipsorum, et pullis coruorum inuocantibus eum. Et 148. statuit\n\nea in aeternum, et in saeculum saeculi, praeceptum posuit et non praeteribit. Et Sapient. 12. Non est alius Deus quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus: Totaque Scriptura Canonica veteris Testamenti et noui dicit creberrime Deum prouidere de rebus, curare, ordinare, statuere, disponere, praeparare, facere, gubernare, et multa similia, quae tam secundum faciē literae, quam secundum expositionem sanctorum ad diuinam prouidentiam referuntur. Pro quibus omnibus sufficiat adducere vnum irrefragabile testimonium veritatis dicentis, Respicite volatilia coeli, quoniam non serunt, neque metunt, neque congregant in horrea, et pater vester coelestis pascitilla: Considerate lilia agri, quomodo crescunt; Non laborant, ne que nent, ne que Salomon in omni gloria sua coopertus est, sicut vnum ex istis; et faenum agri quod hodie est, et cras in clibanum mittitur, Deus sic vestit, Mat. 6. Et infra 10. Nonne duo passeres asse vaeneunt, et vnus ex illis non cadet super terram sine Patre vestro: Quod omnes expositores Catholici ad diuinam prouidentiam referunt, quorum vnius nunc pro omnibus memorabor.\n\nDicit siquidem Augustinus in sententijs Prosperi propositione 286. Cum Saluator dicit vnum pasterem non cadere in terram sine voluntate Dei, et quod foenum agri quod post paululum mittendum in clibanum est, ipse tamen formet ac vestiat, nonne confirmat, non solum totam istam mundi partem mortalibus rebus et corruptibilibus deputatam, verum etiam vilissimas eius abiectissimasque particulas diuina prouidentia regi, ne fortuitis perturbari motibus, ea quorum causas comprehendere non possumus, aestimemus.", "english": "Chapter 27. That all things come about from divine providence.\n\nThe next step, after what has been said, seems to be to inquire into providence. For Lactantius, in the first book of his Divine Institutes against the Gentiles, reports that Democritus is the author of the opinion which holds that all things happen by chance, and Epicurus its confirmer; whence also the Philosopher, Physics 2, 44, says: There are some, he says, who give chance as the cause of this heaven and of all the worlds: for from chance, they say, came the whirling [n1] and the motion that sorted everything into this order. These men, as appears from the first book On Generation and Corruption and from Metaphysics 1, seem to have been Democritus and his colleague Leucippus, who posited that all things come about from indivisible bodies, but bodies concurring in different ways, according to risutos, diatigi and tropi [n2], that is, according to shape, order and position; and this concurrence, they said, comes about by fortune or chance. Epicurus, imitating them, judged likewise. Hence Isidore too, Ethics 8, 19 [n3], says that Epicurus said: The world is not furnished with any divine providence, nor is it ruled; but he assigned the origin of things to atoms, that is, to uncuttable and solid bodies, by whose chance concurrences all things are born. He asserted also that God does nothing. Josephus also, Jewish Antiquities 10, last chapter, says that the Epicureans deny the providence of life, and do not think that God cares for human affairs, nor judge that the universe is governed by a blessed and incorruptible substance for the stability of all things, but affirm that this world is borne along of its own accord, without ruler and without any care. Others, not speaking so universally but making a division, said that the heavenly things are governed by providence, but that everything lower is tossed about by chance motions. Still others, thinking more irrationally, brought forward the contrary opinion.\n\nBut against all these (or rather, for the sake of all of them) it must be shown that everything that happens happens from divine providence, and is ordered by the laws of that providence. For what is providence but far-seeing, or fore-seeing, of the intellect, together with far-willing, or fore-willing, of the will [n4]? Now God has knowledge of all things, as the sixth chapter teaches, and that knowledge is a certain cause of any thing made, as 17 attests; God also has willing toward all things, as 8, 9 and 22 show, and neither of these is new, by the twenty-third; and the willing of God is effective and cannot be frustrated, by 10. It is evident, therefore, that everything that happens happens from divine providence. Again, by the preceding chapter all things are good, and so, according to what was set down earlier, they descend from the first good, and not wrongly and heedlessly, but with foresight and discernment. Again, a good head of the household takes care of everything that concerns him and provides as much as\n\nhe knows and can, and leaves nothing disordered in the house, but arranges all things carefully in their proper places and times; hence also Aristotle, in his Economics 1, 3 [n5], says: Whatever things it is fitting should be done by oneself, the care of them too must be taken by oneself; and he goes on: The masters must rise before the servants and go to sleep last, and the house must never be without a guard, just as the city must not; and whatever must be done must be omitted neither by night nor by day. And below, in the same place: The house also is to be built for the safekeeping of goods, for provisions, clothing and other things, living ones too, servants, free persons, women, men, strangers and citizens; for safety and for health, cool in summer, warm in winter; and each thing must be set in its own place. How much more will that great Father of the household, whose greatness has no end, and of whose wisdom there is no number, whose goodness also is immeasurable, govern with foresight, at all times, his whole great house with everything it contains? Hence Matthew 20: The kingdom of heaven is like a man, a father of a household; where Chrysostom [n6] says: The man, the father of the household, is Christ,\n\nto whom heaven and earth are as one house; and the household is the creatures heavenly, earthly and lower. Again, if God did not provide for all things, this would seem to point to inexperience, impotence, malice or negligence, all of which are very far from God; indeed it befits God, as it does other things, that all things be governed with foresight through him. Hence Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 4, prose 6: Things are managed best if the simplicity abiding in the divine mind puts forth the unswerving order of causes; and this order restrains mutable things, which would otherwise drift at random; so that, although to us, who are quite unable to consider this order, all things seem confused and disturbed, nonetheless its own measure, directing toward the good, disposes everything. Augustine agrees, On Free Choice 1, 13, saying: The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered; and in 3¹, 7 [n7]: Whatever occurs to you by true reason as better, know that God has made it, as the maker of all goods; and On Genesis according to the Letter 4, 14: If God could make good things and did not, great would be his envy;\n\nand in On the Greatness of the Soul 18: By God's justice this universe is sustained and ruled, by which it is brought about that not only do all things exist, but that they exist in such a way that they could not possibly be better. Algazel also, Metaphysics 3, seventh sentence, says: Everything that is, namely the number of the stars and their measure, the arrangement of the earth and of animals, and whatever has being, has it according to the manner in which it is, was, because of all the modes of being this one was more fitting for it; and whatever else is possible besides this is imperfect in comparison with what now is. Thus the care is complete along with the completeness of goodness. [n8] It seems likewise to be so in all beings of one species, and in general in all beings of all species, because according to the Philosopher, Economics 1, first chapter: In the smallest things the nature of each is found; but so it is with human beings, that unless they had a common ruler directing them to the public good, and each aimed instead at his own private good, their commonwealth would be very badly ordered, or would perish; and even if in different provinces they had different princes and rulers, unless these in turn\n\nhad one superior common prince and ruler, error would occur, of the same kind as before. How could one in need of foresight be fittingly helped by one who abounds in it, except by the authority of a prince common to both? Therefore of all provinces and of all men there is naturally one prince; for this is better for them all. For all things naturally desire the good, as is clear from the preceding chapter, and the greater good more. Hence the Philosopher too, Politics 1, 1, says that among men there is one who rules, and according to nature, for the sake of safety. And below, in the same place, he proves that the city is a natural community, because it is the end of two natural communities, namely the household [n9] and the neighborhood, and the end of any thing is natural to it. Secondly he proves the same by this: that what is best and most sufficient for anything is natural to it, because it is its end; and he says that what is best and most sufficient is in the civil community. Whence he concludes, saying: From these things, then, it is clear that the city is among those things which exist by nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal; and by the same reasons it can be shown that of all men there ought to be naturally one community, governed by one\n\nprince; and so, universally, of all beings, by a like reason; and this seems to be Aristotle's determination in Metaphysics 12, last chapter, where he argues against the Pythagoreans, who posit that the mathematical number is the first principle of things, on the ground that in that case the substance of the universe would be unconnected, nor would beings contribute to one another, and there would be many principles, not ordered to one another nor under any other; but this is against the natural disposition of beings and of the universe. It is not so, therefore; and this is what he says in these words: Beings do not wish to be badly disposed, nor is a plurality of rulerships good; therefore one prince; and this prince, in the whole course of his argument there, is God; and this seems to be the reasoning of Damascene, Sentences 1, 3, and of Lombard, Sentences 1, distinction 3, and of many Philosophers and Doctors in many other places. Again, the parts of animals\n\nand plants, and of the whole universe, are most excellently and most usefully ordered; but the cause of this cannot be any element, nor any particular cause; therefore, according to the Philosopher, it is universal nature, which is God. And this was the argument of the ancient Philosophers, cited from the ninth and tenth chapters of Metaphysics 1 in the preceding chapter. Hence Avicenna, Metaphysics 10, 1: When you wish to know that the useful things you understand lead to conveniences in nature, consider the arrangement of the usefulness of the members in animals and plants, and how each of them is caused; and there is no natural cause there in any way, but its principle is from divine care, just as those things too depend on care. Know also that the common people come nearer, and hold, and say, \"It is true\"; and none shun this except those who wish to seem philosophers, because they are ignorant of the causes, or other aspects, of these things. Aristotle also, in On Animals, assigning the cause of the arrangement of the members of animals, says that nature has so ordained it for the better and for the safety of the animal, which his authority from On Animals 11, reviewed above, plainly attests, and in this all the Philosophers\n\nand Physicians agree. Aristotle also frequently supposes that nature always does what is better. Hence On Generation 2, next to last: In all things, we say, nature always desires [n10] the better; and On the Heavens 2, 34: Nature always makes the best of what can be; and 50: Nature makes nothing as it chances, and it is irrational that it should have cared for animals and slighted precious things, namely the heavenly ones; but what it does is seen to be done with care; and 59: Nature does nothing irrationally, nor in vain; and above, 56: None of them, namely of the heavenly bodies, will be carried by animate or violent motion, as though nature were providing for what is to come, since if motion were not so disposed, nothing at all would exist [n11]. Around this passage, and in many other places, he says many such things. And that this nature is God for Aristotle is evident from his words, which cannot fit an irrational nature, nor any rational one except the first; which his saying, cited above from the little book On the Death of Aristotle, also plainly teaches. Hence Economics 1, 1, he says: Nature fills up, by the cycle of the begetting of offspring, the being always, since it cannot do so through the individual,\n\nyet through the species, just as the nature of each, male and female, was preordained by the divine for community. Averroes also, on On the Soul 2, comment 34, says that the divine solicitude, since it could not make the generable and corruptible persist according to the individual, took pity by giving it a power that can persist in the species. Moreover, what is more rightly to be judged universal nature than the common soul of the world? Now this is God, as the premises of chapter 2 of this book show, which many things touched on there likewise seem to prove. Further, the principal thesis is also confirmed by many testimonies of the Philosophers. For Aristotle, besides what has been cited above, says in the Secret of Secrets, part 1, 23 [n12], that God by supreme providence has unavoidably established all impressions, the colds and the heats in winter and summer. The same in On the World 13: With God governing, the whole beauty of heaven and earth, divided according to all natures, is always ruled unmoved and carefully. Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 9 and 10, and Algazel, Physics 5 and Metaphysics 5, also hold this plainly. Averroes too, on Metaphysics 12, comment 37, says that\n\nGod has care and solicitude about all beings, both about individuals and about species; and in comment 52 he says that the principle of the voluntary and the natural must have the intention of its action ordered to the first cause; and it is to be known that this is Aristotle's view on solicitude, and that, after reciting two contrary opinions, of which one held that God has solicitude about everything, and the other that there is no solicitude at all, Averroes says: And the truth is in this, that there is solicitude; and if some things are without solicitude, they proceed from the necessity of matter, not from a deficiency of the agent; but nothing proceeds from the necessity of matter, except perhaps as he himself says, on Physics 2, comment 88, when he says: Those things which are found in natural things from necessity and not for the sake of something, as the death of an animal, are due to matter; and those which are found in them for the sake of something are due to form; and though such privations are in some way intended by God, they are not so in the principal way, as the habit and the form are: for these are intended on account of those, as ends, not the other way round. Hence Wisdom 1: God did not make death; and Ecclesiasticus 39: [n13]\n\nFamine and death were created for vengeance. Moreover, Calcidius, on the second part of Plato's Timaeus, says: The race of the men of old thought that all things that flow from divine counsel and providence for the use of men and the means of carrying on life, with powers as well as reasons assisting and working, were themselves the gods who assist; because in their untutored minds the true inquiry into God had not yet settled. For they were shepherds and woodcutters and others of the sort, without any cultivation of humane learning; where, to affirm providence, he brings in Plato, Pythagoras, Orpheus, Lippo and Musaeus; and the whole Stoic school unanimously professes divine providence, as Lactantius testifies in the place cited before. To this also bear many philosophical and theological authorities, in the first book of this work, chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9, and in the preceding chapter cited, which make mention of solicitude, providence, governance and the like. Moreover Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 8, from chapter 11 right to the end, shows, and at great length, that the work of divine providence is twofold, namely of creation and of administration,\n\nto which the whole creature is subject; and in 9, 24, the same, and in On Free Choice 1, 11: There is nothing among things that divine providence does not administer; and the same in 2, 28 and 34, and 3, 2, and in other books and in no few places, of which I now touch one, passing over the others: City of God 5, 11, he says thus: God, who made man a rational animal of soul and body, who did not let him go unpunished when he sinned, nor abandoned him without mercy, who gave to good and bad alike being with the stones, seminal life with the trees, sensual life with the beasts, and intellectual life with the angels alone, from whom is every measure, every form, every order, measure, number and weight; and whatever is by nature, of whatever kind, from whom are the seeds of forms, the forms of seeds, the motion of seeds and of forms, who gave to flesh its origin, beauty, health, the fecundity of propagation, the arrangement of the members, safety, concord, who also gave to the irrational soul memory, sense and appetite, but to the rational soul mind, understanding and will, who has not left unprovided for, without the fitting arrangement of its parts and a kind of peace, only heaven and earth, only angel and man, but not even the entrails of a small and contemptible living thing, nor a bird's feather, nor the little flower of a plant, nor the leaf of a tree; in no way is he to be believed to have willed the kingdoms of men, and their dominations and servitudes, to be strangers to the laws of his providence.\n\nLactantius, moreover, in the place cited before, shows in many ways and at length the general divine providence. Of this Lactantius, and of his aforesaid book, which contains seven books, blessed Jerome, On Illustrious Men 80, and blessed Augustine, City of God 18, 24, make laudatory mention; let his authority therefore seem contemptible to no one. Isidore also, in the place cited before, reports that Epicurus said that the world is neither furnished with any divine providence nor ruled, as a heresy or error, as his argument evidently shows. Josephus also, Jewish Antiquities 2, last chapter, reports that Moses spoke thus: To despair of God's providence is immense madness. Likewise Psalm 118 [119]: By your ordinance the day endures, for all things serve you. And Psalm 146 [147]: Who gives to the beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call upon him. And Psalm 148: He established them forever and for ever and ever; he set a decree, and it will not pass away. And Wisdom 12: There is no other God but you, who care for all things.\n\nAnd the whole canonical Scripture of the Old Testament and of the New says very often that God provides for things, takes care of them, orders, establishes, disposes, prepares, makes and governs them, and many similar things, which are referred to divine providence both according to the face of the letter and according to the exposition of the saints. For all these let it suffice to bring forward one irrefragable testimony of the Truth, who says: Look at the birds of the air: they do not sow, nor reap, nor gather into barns, and your heavenly Father feeds them. Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they do not toil, nor do they spin, and not even Solomon in all his glory was clothed like one of these; and the grass of the field, which is here today and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, God clothes thus, Matthew 6. And below, in chapter 10: Are not two sparrows sold for a penny, and one of them will not fall to the ground without your Father? All the Catholic expositors refer this to divine providence, and I shall now recall one of them on behalf of all.\n\nAugustine, in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 286, says: When the Savior says that a single sparrow does not fall to the ground without the will of God, and that the grass of the field, which in a little while is to be thrown into the oven, he himself nonetheless forms and clothes, does he not confirm that not only this whole part of the world, assigned to mortal and corruptible things, but even its most worthless and abject little parts are ruled by divine providence, lest we suppose that those things whose causes we cannot grasp are disturbed by chance motions?", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "volutio here is \"whirling\" (Aristotle's δίνη, the vortex of Physics 2.4), not Bradwardine's own technical volutio, \"willing\". The latter sense is the one at work a few lines below (habet quoque Deus volutionem ad omnia), and the English \"whirling\" / \"willing\" keeps the two apart."}, {"n": 2, "text": "The three terms are the atomists' differences of the atoms in Aristotle, Metaph. 1.4 (985b): ῥυσμός (shape), διαθιγή (order), τροπή (position), here in transliterated, partly corrupt Latin form. Bradwardine's own gloss (\"shape, order and position\") gives the sense, so the transliterations are kept. Savile's text reads risutos; the margin offers rismos as a variant, closer to ῥυσμός. The main reading is translated."}, {"n": 3, "text": "Savile prints \"Ethic.\" where Isidore's Etymologies is meant; the passage on Epicurus is in book 8 (on the philosophers of the Gentiles). It is translated as printed."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Bradwardine plays on pro-videntia as \"far-seeing\": procul videntia / praevidentia for the intellect, matched by procul volentia / praevolentia for the will. Savile's print has violentia where the parallel requires volentia, a misprint in the 1618 text. The evident sense is translated."}, {"n": 5, "text": "The Oeconomica is the pseudo-Aristotelian work, cited by Savile's book and chapter numbers. These are translated as printed, without modernizing them to Bekker numbering."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The commentary on Matthew 20 attributed to Chrysostom in the Latin tradition (probably the Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum), not the genuine homilies."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Savile's reference is printed \"3ⁱ. 7°\", with a raised i. I cannot resolve it with confidence and give it as printed. The sentence itself is Augustine's."}, {"n": 8, "text": "At 262C·1 and 262C·2 Savile's margin merges a variant reading with a citation: vnitas (\"unity\" for \"universe\") + Algazel, and eiusdem (\"of the same\" for \"of one\") + Aristoteles. The main readings are translated; they are construable, so the variants are not adopted."}, {"n": 9, "text": "Savile prints the abbreviation dom°, i.e. domus (\"household\"). The keyed text drops the raised mark."}, {"n": 10, "text": "desiderate is printed (and keyed) as is. It is evidently a corrupt or elliptical desiderare (\"nature always desires the better\"), and so translated."}, {"n": 11, "text": "The quotation from On the Heavens 2 (with the commentary numbers 34, 50, 56, 59) is heavily compressed. The sentence beginning \"None of them … will be carried\" is construed as best it can be; the sense of the argument is that the heavenly bodies move neither by an animate nor by a violent motion, and that their motion therefore reflects nature's providence."}, {"n": 12, "text": "The Secret of Secrets (Secretum secretorum), On the World (De mundo) and the Liber de morte Aristotelis are pseudo-Aristotelian; Bradwardine treats them as Aristotle's."}, {"n": 13, "text": "In the print, Calcidius's name stands in the margin at 263E beside \"Adhuc autem Calcidius…\"; the keyed text has merged it into 263D·1 with the two citations belonging to Wisdom 1 and Ecclesiasticus 39. The marker is kept as given, with the margin contents listed as keyed."}], "errata": [{"address": "261E", "keyed": "•ei factae", "print": "rei factae"}, {"address": "262A", "keyed": "ficri", "print": "fieri"}, {"address": "262A", "keyed": "nec dic omittere", "print": "nec die omittere"}, {"address": "262B", "keyed": "inferatum", "print": "inferarum"}, {"address": "262C", "keyed": "specici", "print": "speciei"}, {"address": "262D", "keyed": "ambatum", "print": "ambarum"}, {"address": "262E", "keyed": "262E·1 margin: Daemacenus Lumbardus", "print": "Damacenus Lumbardus"}, {"address": "263A", "keyed": "plantatum", "print": "plantarum"}, {"address": "263D", "keyed": "inuentuntur", "print": "inueniuntur"}, {"address": "263D", "keyed": "263D·1 margin: Sapient. 1. Ecclesiastici, 39. Calcidius.", "print": "Sapient. 1. Ecclesiastici 39. at 263D; Calcidius at 263E"}, {"address": "263E", "keyed": "Or•heum", "print": "Orpheum"}, {"address": "264A", "keyed": "formatum", "print": "formarum"}, {"address": "264B", "keyed": "omniam", "print": "omnia"}, {"address": "264D", "keyed": "pasterem", "print": "passerem"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p261C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p261C", "locator_display": "261C–261E", "source_text": "CAP. XXVII. Quod omnia a prouidentia diuina eueniunt.\n\nCOnsequens autem dictis videtur de prouidentia indagare. Recitante namque Lactantio primi institutio num diuinarum aduersus gentes. 1. Democritus est autor sententiae ponentis omnia fortuito fieri, et confirmator Epicurus; vnde et Philosophus 2. Physic. 44. Sunt, inquit, quidam, qui coeli huius et mundanorum omnium causantur esse casum: a casu enim fieri volutionem, et motum discernentem in hunc ordinem, omne. Hi autem, sicut apparet ex primo De generatione et corruptione; et 1. Metaph.\n\nvidentur fuisse Democritus et collega eius Leucippus, qui posuerunt omnia fieri ex corporibus indiuisibilibus, sed concurrentibus differenter, secundum risutos diatigi, et tropi, id est, secundum figuram, ordinem, et positionem; huiusmodi autem concursum dixerunt fieri fortuito seu a casu, quos et imitans Epicurus similiter aestimauit. Quare et Isidorus 8. Ethic. 19. dicit, quod Epicurus dixit; Nulla diuina prouidentia instructum esse, aut regi mundum; sed originem rerum Atomis, id est, insecabilibus ac solidis corporibus assignauit, quorum fortuitis concursionibus vniuersa nascuntur: Asseruit autem et Deum nihil agere. Iosephus quoque 10. Antiquit. Iudaicae vlt. dicit; Quod Epicurei prouidentiam vitae negant, et Deum res humanas curare non existimant, neque a beata incorruptibilique substantia pro stabilitate cunctorum, gubernari iudicant vniuersa, sed hunc mundum sine rectore, et sine cura aliqua ferri sponte confirmant. Alij vero non ita vniuersaliter, sed diuidentes dixerunt; Coelestia prouidentia\n\ngubernari, inferiora vero quaecunque fortuitis motibus agitari. Alij autem irrationabilius opinantes, opinionem contrariam protulerunt. Verum contra hos omnes, quin magis pro his omnibus ostendendum, omnia quae eueniunt a diuina prouidentia euenire, ac eius prouidentiae legibus ordinari. Quid enim est prouidentia, nisi procul videntia, seu praeuidentia intellectus, cum procul violentia, seu praeuolentia voluntatis: Deus autem habet scientiam omnium, sicut capitulum sextum docet, et illa est quaedam causa cuiuslibet •ei factae, 17o attestante: habet quoque Deus volutionem ad omnia, sicut 8.9. et 22. ostendunt, et neutra harum est noua per vicesimum tertium, et volutio Dei est efficax, nec potest frustrari per 10. Patet ergo omnia quae eueniunt a diuina prouidentia euenire. Item per cap. proximum, omnia sunt bona, quare et secundū priora a primo bono descendunt, et non perperam et improuide, sed prouide et discrete. Itē, bonus paterfamilias omnia eū concernētia curat, et prouidet quā tum", "english": "Chapter 27. That all things come about from divine providence.\n\nThe next step, after what has been said, seems to be to inquire into providence. For Lactantius, in the first book of his Divine Institutes against the Gentiles, reports that Democritus is the author of the opinion which holds that all things happen by chance, and Epicurus its confirmer; whence also the Philosopher, Physics 2, 44, says: There are some, he says, who give chance as the cause of this heaven and of all the worlds: for from chance, they say, came the whirling [n1] and the motion that sorted everything into this order. These men, as appears from the first book On Generation and Corruption and from Metaphysics 1, seem to have been Democritus and his colleague Leucippus, who posited that all things come about from indivisible bodies, but bodies concurring in different ways, according to risutos, diatigi and tropi [n2], that is, according to shape, order and position; and this concurrence, they said, comes about by fortune or chance. Epicurus, imitating them, judged likewise. Hence Isidore too, Ethics 8, 19 [n3], says that Epicurus said: The world is not furnished with any divine providence, nor is it ruled; but he assigned the origin of things to atoms, that is, to uncuttable and solid bodies, by whose chance concurrences all things are born. He asserted also that God does nothing. Josephus also, Jewish Antiquities 10, last chapter, says that the Epicureans deny the providence of life, and do not think that God cares for human affairs, nor judge that the universe is governed by a blessed and incorruptible substance for the stability of all things, but affirm that this world is borne along of its own accord, without ruler and without any care. Others, not speaking so universally but making a division, said that the heavenly things are governed by providence, but that everything lower is tossed about by chance motions. Still others, thinking more irrationally, brought forward the contrary opinion.\n\nBut against all these (or rather, for the sake of all of them) it must be shown that everything that happens happens from divine providence, and is ordered by the laws of that providence. For what is providence but far-seeing, or fore-seeing, of the intellect, together with far-willing, or fore-willing, of the will [n4]? Now God has knowledge of all things, as the sixth chapter teaches, and that knowledge is a certain cause of any thing made, as 17 attests; God also has willing toward all things, as 8, 9 and 22 show, and neither of these is new, by the twenty-third; and the willing of God is effective and cannot be frustrated, by 10. It is evident, therefore, that everything that happens happens from divine providence. Again, by the preceding chapter all things are good, and so, according to what was set down earlier, they descend from the first good, and not wrongly and heedlessly, but with foresight and discernment. Again, a good head of the household takes care of everything that concerns him and provides as much as", "margins": [{"id": "261C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: the Philosopher."}, {"id": "261D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: rismos."}, {"id": "261D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Josephus."}]}, {"anchor": "p262A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p262A", "locator_display": "262A–262B", "source_text": "scit et potest, nec quicquā relinquit inordinatū in domo, sed omnia suis locis et temporibus ordinat curiose; Vnde et Aristoteles 1. Oeconomicae suae 3. ita dicit, Quotquot conuenit per se ficri, oportet et curam scilicet per se fieri, et sequitur, Oportet prius seruis Dominos surgere, et dormire vltimos, et nunquam sine custodia domum esse, sicut et ciuitatem; et quaecunque oportet facere, nec nocte, nec dic omittere. Et infra, eodem, Domum etiam ad rerum custodiam construendū, pro nutrimentis, indumentis, alijsque rebus animatis, seruis, liberis; foeminis, masculis; extraneis, et ciuibus; ad salutem et ad sanitatem, pro aestate, frigida; pro hyeme, calida; et oportet vnumquodque in loco suo poni. Quanto magis ille magnus Paterfamilias, cuius magnitudinis non est finis, et sapientiae eius non est numerus, cuius et bonitas est immensa, totam magnam domum suam, cum omnibus eius contentis, omni tempore prouide gubernabit? Vnde Matth. 20. Simile est regnum Coelorum homini Patrifamilias, Vbi Chrysostomus, Homo Paterfamilias Christus\n\nest, cui coelum et terra quasi vna domus est; familia autem coelestium, terrestrium, et inferatum creaturarum. Item si Deus non omnia prouideret, hoc videretur imperitiae, impotentiae, malitiae, vel negligentiae, quae omnia longissime sunt a Deo: imo tam Deum quam alia magis decet, vt per ipsum omnia prouide gubernentur. Vnde Boetius 4. de Consolat. Philosophiae prosa sexta, Ita res optime geruntur, si manens in diuina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum ordinem promat; hic vero ordo res mutabiles, et alioquin temere fluituras coercet, quo fit, vt tametsi nobis hunc ordinem minime considerare valentibus, confusa omnia perturbata quaeque videantur, nihilominus tamen suus modus ad bonum di rigens cuncta disponit. Cui concordat Augustinus 1. de libero arbitrio 13. ita dicens, Aeterna lex est qua iustum est, vt omnia sint ordinatissima; et 3i. 7o. Quicquid tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit, scias fecisse Deum, tanquam bonorum omnium conditorem; et 4. super Gen. ad literam 14. Si Deus posset bona facere, nec faceret, magna esset inuidentia;", "english": "he knows and can, and leaves nothing disordered in the house, but arranges all things carefully in their proper places and times; hence also Aristotle, in his Economics 1, 3 [n5], says: Whatever things it is fitting should be done by oneself, the care of them too must be taken by oneself; and he goes on: The masters must rise before the servants and go to sleep last, and the house must never be without a guard, just as the city must not; and whatever must be done must be omitted neither by night nor by day. And below, in the same place: The house also is to be built for the safekeeping of goods, for provisions, clothing and other things, living ones too, servants, free persons, women, men, strangers and citizens; for safety and for health, cool in summer, warm in winter; and each thing must be set in its own place. How much more will that great Father of the household, whose greatness has no end, and of whose wisdom there is no number, whose goodness also is immeasurable, govern with foresight, at all times, his whole great house with everything it contains? Hence Matthew 20: The kingdom of heaven is like a man, a father of a household; where Chrysostom [n6] says: The man, the father of the household, is Christ,\n\nto whom heaven and earth are as one house; and the household is the creatures heavenly, earthly and lower. Again, if God did not provide for all things, this would seem to point to inexperience, impotence, malice or negligence, all of which are very far from God; indeed it befits God, as it does other things, that all things be governed with foresight through him. Hence Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 4, prose 6: Things are managed best if the simplicity abiding in the divine mind puts forth the unswerving order of causes; and this order restrains mutable things, which would otherwise drift at random; so that, although to us, who are quite unable to consider this order, all things seem confused and disturbed, nonetheless its own measure, directing toward the good, disposes everything. Augustine agrees, On Free Choice 1, 13, saying: The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered; and in 3¹, 7 [n7]: Whatever occurs to you by true reason as better, know that God has made it, as the maker of all goods; and On Genesis according to the Letter 4, 14: If God could make good things and did not, great would be his envy;", "margins": [{"id": "262A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Aristotle."}, {"id": "262A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Matt 20; Chrysostom."}, {"id": "262B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Boethius."}, {"id": "262B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p262C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p262C", "locator_display": "262C–262D", "source_text": "Et de quantitate Animae 18. Iustitia Dei haec vniuersitas sustentatur et regitur, qua factum est vt non modo sint omnia, sed ita sint, vt omnino melius esse non possint. Algazel quoque 3. Metaph. sententia septima ita dicit, Omne quod est, scilicet numerus stellarum, et mensura earum, dispositio terrae et Animalium, et quicquid est quod habet esse, secundum modum, quo est, fuit, quia ex omnibus modis essendi hic fuit conuenientior illi, et quicquid aliud possibile est praeter hoc, imperfectum est respectu huius quod nunc est: Completa igitur est cura cum completudine bonitatis. Item similiter videtur esse in omnibus entibus vnius specici, et generaliter in omnibus entibus omnium specierum, quia secundum Philosophum 1. Oeconomicae suae primo capite; In minimis natura singulorum reperitur; sed ita est de hominibus, quod nisi haberent rectorem communem ipsos ad bonum publicum dirigentem, sed quilibet intenderet bono suo priuato, eorum respublica disponeretur pessime, vel periret; et licet in diuersis prouincijs haberent diuersos Principes et rectores, nisi adhuc ipsi\n\nhaberent vnum superiorem communem Principem, et rectorem, contingeret error, qualis prior. Quomodo prouidentia indigens ab abundante congrue iuuaretur, nisi autoritate Principis communis ambatum? Omnium igitur Prouinciarū et hominū est naturaliter vnus Princeps; hoc enim est melius vniuersis. Omnia nam que naturaliter bonum desiderant, sicut ex proximo huius patet, et maius bonū magis. Quare et Philosophus 1. Polit. 1. dicit, quod in hominibus est principans et secundum naturam propter salutem. Et infra, eodem; probat quod Ciuitas est cōmunitas naturalis, quia est finis duarum cōmunitatum naturalium, scilicet dom et viciniae, et finis cuiuslibet rei est sibi naturalis. Secundo probat idem per hoc, quod optimū et sufficientissimum cuiuslibet est sibi naturale, quia est finis eius; optimum autem et sufficientissimum dicit esse in communitate ciuili: Quare concludit sic dicens, ex his igitur manifestum, quod eorum quae natura ciuitas est, et quod homo natura ciuile Animal est, et per easdem rationes potest ostendi, quod omnium hominum deberet esse naturaliter vna cōmunitas ab vno", "english": "and in On the Greatness of the Soul 18: By God's justice this universe is sustained and ruled, by which it is brought about that not only do all things exist, but that they exist in such a way that they could not possibly be better. Algazel also, Metaphysics 3, seventh sentence, says: Everything that is, namely the number of the stars and their measure, the arrangement of the earth and of animals, and whatever has being, has it according to the manner in which it is, was, because of all the modes of being this one was more fitting for it; and whatever else is possible besides this is imperfect in comparison with what now is. Thus the care is complete along with the completeness of goodness. [n8] It seems likewise to be so in all beings of one species, and in general in all beings of all species, because according to the Philosopher, Economics 1, first chapter: In the smallest things the nature of each is found; but so it is with human beings, that unless they had a common ruler directing them to the public good, and each aimed instead at his own private good, their commonwealth would be very badly ordered, or would perish; and even if in different provinces they had different princes and rulers, unless these in turn\n\nhad one superior common prince and ruler, error would occur, of the same kind as before. How could one in need of foresight be fittingly helped by one who abounds in it, except by the authority of a prince common to both? Therefore of all provinces and of all men there is naturally one prince; for this is better for them all. For all things naturally desire the good, as is clear from the preceding chapter, and the greater good more. Hence the Philosopher too, Politics 1, 1, says that among men there is one who rules, and according to nature, for the sake of safety. And below, in the same place, he proves that the city is a natural community, because it is the end of two natural communities, namely the household [n9] and the neighborhood, and the end of any thing is natural to it. Secondly he proves the same by this: that what is best and most sufficient for anything is natural to it, because it is its end; and he says that what is best and most sufficient is in the civil community. Whence he concludes, saying: From these things, then, it is clear that the city is among those things which exist by nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal; and by the same reasons it can be shown that of all men there ought to be naturally one community, governed by one", "margins": [{"id": "262C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: unitas (i.e. \"unity\" for \"universe\"); source: Algazel."}, {"id": "262C·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: eiusdem; source: Aristotle."}, {"id": "262D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: the Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p262E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p262E", "locator_display": "262E–263A", "source_text": "Principe gubernata; quare et vniuersaliter omnium entium per similem rationem, et haec videtur determinatio Aristotelis, 12. Metaph. vlt. vbi arguit contra Pictagoricos ponentes numerum Mathematicum esse primum rerum principium, per hoc quia tunc substantia vniuersi esset inconnexa, nec entia mutuo sibi conferrent, et essent multa principia non subinuicem nec sub aliquo alio ordinata; sed hoc est contra naturalem dispositionem entium, et vniuersi. Non est ergo ita; et hoc est quod dicit his verbis, Entia non volunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum; vnus ergo Princeps; hic autem Princeps secundum totum suum processum ibi est Deus; et haec videtur ratio Damaceni 1. sentent. 3. et Lumbardi 1. sentent. dist. 3. multorum que Philosophorum et Doctorum alijs locis multis. Item partes Animalium\n\net plantatum, et totius vniuersi sunt optime et vtilissime ordinatae; huius autem causa non potest esse aliquod elementum, nec aliqua causa particularis, quare secundum Philosophum natura vniuersalis, quae est Deus. Et haec fuit ratio Antiquorum Philosophorum, a 9o et 10 capitulis 1i Metaph. capitulo proximo allegata. Vnde Auicenna 10. Metaph. 1. Cum volueris scire quod res vtiles quas intelligis, inducunt ad commoditates in natura, considera dispositionem vtilitatis membrorum in animalibus et plantis, et quomodo vnumquod que eorum est causatum, et non est ibi causa naturalis vllo modo, sed principium eius est ex cura diuina, sicut etiam illa pendēt ex cura. Scias etiam quod plus appropinquat vulgus, et tenet, et dicit, verum est; nec refugiunt hoc nisi illi qui volunt videri Philosophi, eo quod ignorant causas seu alias istorum. Aristoteles quoque in de Animalibus assignans causam dispositionis membrorum Animalium, dicit quod natura sic ordinauit propter melius et salutem Animalis, quod plane testatur eius Autoritas 11. de Animalibus superius recensita, et in hoc omnes Philosophi", "english": "prince; and so, universally, of all beings, by a like reason; and this seems to be Aristotle's determination in Metaphysics 12, last chapter, where he argues against the Pythagoreans, who posit that the mathematical number is the first principle of things, on the ground that in that case the substance of the universe would be unconnected, nor would beings contribute to one another, and there would be many principles, not ordered to one another nor under any other; but this is against the natural disposition of beings and of the universe. It is not so, therefore; and this is what he says in these words: Beings do not wish to be badly disposed, nor is a plurality of rulerships good; therefore one prince; and this prince, in the whole course of his argument there, is God; and this seems to be the reasoning of Damascene, Sentences 1, 3, and of Lombard, Sentences 1, distinction 3, and of many Philosophers and Doctors in many other places. Again, the parts of animals\n\nand plants, and of the whole universe, are most excellently and most usefully ordered; but the cause of this cannot be any element, nor any particular cause; therefore, according to the Philosopher, it is universal nature, which is God. And this was the argument of the ancient Philosophers, cited from the ninth and tenth chapters of Metaphysics 1 in the preceding chapter. Hence Avicenna, Metaphysics 10, 1: When you wish to know that the useful things you understand lead to conveniences in nature, consider the arrangement of the usefulness of the members in animals and plants, and how each of them is caused; and there is no natural cause there in any way, but its principle is from divine care, just as those things too depend on care. Know also that the common people come nearer, and hold, and say, \"It is true\"; and none shun this except those who wish to seem philosophers, because they are ignorant of the causes, or other aspects, of these things. Aristotle also, in On Animals, assigning the cause of the arrangement of the members of animals, says that nature has so ordained it for the better and for the safety of the animal, which his authority from On Animals 11, reviewed above, plainly attests, and in this all the Philosophers", "margins": [{"id": "262E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Damascene; Lombard."}, {"id": "263A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Avicenna."}, {"id": "263A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Aristotle."}]}, {"anchor": "p263B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p263B", "locator_display": "263B–263C", "source_text": "et Medici sunt concordes. Frequenter quo que supponit Aristoteles, quod natura semper facit id quod est melius. Vnde 2. de generat. penult. In omnibus inquimus, quod melius desiderate naturam semper; et 2. de Coelo 34. Natura semper facit contingentium quod optimum; et 50. Nihil, vt contingit, facit natura, et irrationabile est ipsam de animalibus curasse, et despexisse praetiosa, scilicet coelestia, sed videtur studiose factum quod facit: Et 59. Natura nihil irrationabiliter, neque frustra facit: Et supra 56. Neque animata, neque violenta feretur latione nullum ipsorum, coelestium scilicet corporum, velut futurum prouidente natura, quoniam non hoc modo se habente motu, nihil vtique erit: Circa hunc locum, et alijs locis multis, talia multa dicit. Et quod haec natura apud Aristotelem sit Deus, patet per eius verba, quae conuenire non possunt irrationali naturae, nec rationali alicui, nisi primae; quod et dictum suum ex libello de morte Aristotelis recitatum superius plane docet. Vnde 1. Oeconomicae 1. dicit, Natura replet periodo procreationis prolis semper esse, cum per vnum nequeat,\n\nper speciem tamen, sicut praeordinata fuit a diuino vtriusque natura masculi et foeminae ad communitatem. Auerroes quoque super 2. de Anima comment. 34. dicit quod sollicitudo diuina cum non potuit facere generabile et corruptibile permanere secundum indiuiduum, miserta est in dando ei virtutem quae potest permanere in specie. Adhuc autem quid rectius aestimandum naturam vniuersalem, quam animam mundi communem? Haec autem est Deus, sicut praemissa 2o huius ostendunt, quod et multa similiter ibi tacta probare videntur. Amplius autem et principalis sententia per multa Philosophorū testimonia comprobatur. Arist. enim praeter superius allegata in De secreto secretor. 1. part. 23. dicit, quod Deus omnes impressiones, frigora, et calores in hyeme et aestate summa prouidentia ineuitabiliter stabiliuit. Idem in De mundo 13. Deo gubernante, semper immobiliter et diligenter regitur totus decor coeli et terrae diuisus secundum omnes naturas. Hoc etiam plane tenent Auicen. 8. Met. 9. et 10. et Algazel. 5. Phys. et 5. Met. Auerroes quoque super 12. Meta. comment. 37. dicit, quod", "english": "and Physicians agree. Aristotle also frequently supposes that nature always does what is better. Hence On Generation 2, next to last: In all things, we say, nature always desires [n10] the better; and On the Heavens 2, 34: Nature always makes the best of what can be; and 50: Nature makes nothing as it chances, and it is irrational that it should have cared for animals and slighted precious things, namely the heavenly ones; but what it does is seen to be done with care; and 59: Nature does nothing irrationally, nor in vain; and above, 56: None of them, namely of the heavenly bodies, will be carried by animate or violent motion, as though nature were providing for what is to come, since if motion were not so disposed, nothing at all would exist [n11]. Around this passage, and in many other places, he says many such things. And that this nature is God for Aristotle is evident from his words, which cannot fit an irrational nature, nor any rational one except the first; which his saying, cited above from the little book On the Death of Aristotle, also plainly teaches. Hence Economics 1, 1, he says: Nature fills up, by the cycle of the begetting of offspring, the being always, since it cannot do so through the individual,\n\nyet through the species, just as the nature of each, male and female, was preordained by the divine for community. Averroes also, on On the Soul 2, comment 34, says that the divine solicitude, since it could not make the generable and corruptible persist according to the individual, took pity by giving it a power that can persist in the species. Moreover, what is more rightly to be judged universal nature than the common soul of the world? Now this is God, as the premises of chapter 2 of this book show, which many things touched on there likewise seem to prove. Further, the principal thesis is also confirmed by many testimonies of the Philosophers. For Aristotle, besides what has been cited above, says in the Secret of Secrets, part 1, 23 [n12], that God by supreme providence has unavoidably established all impressions, the colds and the heats in winter and summer. The same in On the World 13: With God governing, the whole beauty of heaven and earth, divided according to all natures, is always ruled unmoved and carefully. Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 9 and 10, and Algazel, Physics 5 and Metaphysics 5, also hold this plainly. Averroes too, on Metaphysics 12, comment 37, says that", "margins": [{"id": "263C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Aristotle."}, {"id": "263C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Avicenna; Algazel; Averroes."}]}, {"anchor": "p263D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p263D", "locator_display": "263D–263E", "source_text": "Deus habet curam et sollicitudinē circa omnia entia, tam circa indiuidua, quam circa species; et comment. 52. dicit, quod principium voluntarij et naturalis oportet vt habeat intentionem actionis ordinatam ad 1am causam; et sciendum quod haec est sententia Aristotelis in sollicitudine, et recitatis duabus opinionibus contrarijs, quarum vna posuit Deum habere sollicitudinem circa quodcunque; et alia, quod nulla est sollicitudo omnino, dicit; Et veritas est in hoc, quod sollicitudo est, et quod si aliqua sint sine sollicitudine, proueniunt ex necessitate materiae, non ex diminutione agentis; sed nulla proueniunt ex necessitate materiae nisi forsan sicut ipsemet loquitur, super 2. Phys. comm. 88. cum dicit, Illa quae inueniuntur in rebus naturalibus de necessitate non propter aliquid, vt mors Animalis, sunt propter materiā; et illa quae inuentuntur in eis propter aliquid, sunt propter formam; et tales priuationes licet aliquo modo intendantur a Deo, non tamen ita principaliter sicut habitus et forma: Hae nam que propter illos intenduntur finaliter, non e contra. Vnde Sap. 1. Deus mortem non fecit: Et Eccles. 39.\n\nFames et mors ad vindictam creata sunt. Adhuc autem Calcidius super 2am partem Timaei Platonis, sic ait, Priscorum hominum genus omnia quae ad vsum hominum vitae que facultatem agendam, diuino consilio et prouidentia demanant, auxiliantibus atque operantibus tam potentijs quam rationibus, haec ipsa quae auxiliantur deos putabat, propterea quod rudibus animis nondum insederat vera Dei sciscitatio. Erant enim Pastores, et Syluacedi, caeteri que huiusmodi sine studio humanitatis; vbi et ad prouidentiā affirmandā adducit Platonē, Pictagorā, Or•heum, Lipponem, et Musaeum; tota que secta Stoicorum diuinam prouidentiam concorditer profitetur, teste Lactantio vbi prius. Ad hoc etiā faciunt multae Autoritates Philosophicae, et Theologicae, 1o huius 2.3, 4, 6, 9, et proximo allegatae, quae de sollicitudine, prouidentia, gubernatione, et similibus faciunt mentionē. Praeterea Aug. 8. super Gen. ad lit. a cap. 11. vs que ad finē ostendit, multum que diffuse opus diuinae prouidentiae bipartitū, creationis scilicet et administrationis,", "english": "God has care and solicitude about all beings, both about individuals and about species; and in comment 52 he says that the principle of the voluntary and the natural must have the intention of its action ordered to the first cause; and it is to be known that this is Aristotle's view on solicitude, and that, after reciting two contrary opinions, of which one held that God has solicitude about everything, and the other that there is no solicitude at all, Averroes says: And the truth is in this, that there is solicitude; and if some things are without solicitude, they proceed from the necessity of matter, not from a deficiency of the agent; but nothing proceeds from the necessity of matter, except perhaps as he himself says, on Physics 2, comment 88, when he says: Those things which are found in natural things from necessity and not for the sake of something, as the death of an animal, are due to matter; and those which are found in them for the sake of something are due to form; and though such privations are in some way intended by God, they are not so in the principal way, as the habit and the form are: for these are intended on account of those, as ends, not the other way round. Hence Wisdom 1: God did not make death; and Ecclesiasticus 39: [n13]\n\nFamine and death were created for vengeance. Moreover, Calcidius, on the second part of Plato's Timaeus, says: The race of the men of old thought that all things that flow from divine counsel and providence for the use of men and the means of carrying on life, with powers as well as reasons assisting and working, were themselves the gods who assist; because in their untutored minds the true inquiry into God had not yet settled. For they were shepherds and woodcutters and others of the sort, without any cultivation of humane learning; where, to affirm providence, he brings in Plato, Pythagoras, Orpheus, Lippo and Musaeus; and the whole Stoic school unanimously professes divine providence, as Lactantius testifies in the place cited before. To this also bear many philosophical and theological authorities, in the first book of this work, chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9, and in the preceding chapter cited, which make mention of solicitude, providence, governance and the like. Moreover Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 8, from chapter 11 right to the end, shows, and at great length, that the work of divine providence is twofold, namely of creation and of administration,", "margins": [{"id": "263D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Wis 1; Sir [Ecclus] 39; Calcidius (see 13)."}, {"id": "263E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p264A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p264A", "locator_display": "264A–264B", "source_text": "cui tota subiacet creatura; et 9.24. idem et 1. de lib. arbitr. 11. Nihil rerum est quod non administret diuina prouidentia; et idem 2.28.34. et 3.2. ac alijs libris, et locis non paucis, quorum vnum nunc tangā alijs praetermissis 5. de ciuit. Dei 11. dicit ita, Deus qui fecit hominem rationale animal ex anima et corpore, qui eum peccantem nec impunitū esse permisit, nec sine misericordia dereliquit, qui bonis et malis essentiam cum lapidibus, vitam seminalem cum arboribus, sensualem cum pecoribus, et intellectualem cum solis Angelis dedit, a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, mensura, numerus, et pondus; et quicquid naturaliter est, cuiuscunque generis est, a quo sunt semina formarum, formae seminum, motus seminum atque formatum, qui dedit carni originem, pulchritudinem, valetudinem, propaginis foecunditatem, membrorum dispositionem, salutem, concordiam, qui et animae irrationali dedit memoriam sensum et appetitum, rationali autem mentem, intelligentiam, et voluntatem, qui non solum coelum et terram, nec solum Angelum et hominem, sed nec exigui\n\net contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec auis penulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium conuenientia et quadam veluti pace dereliquit, nullo modo est credendus regna hominum, eorumque dominationes, et seruitutes a suae prouidentiae legibus alienas esse voluisse. Lactantius insuper, vbi prius, ostendit multipliciter et diffuse diuinam prouidentiam generalem. Huius autem Lactantij, et libri eius praedicti, qui continet 7. libros, beatus Ieronymus de viris illustribus 80. et beatus Augustinus 18. de Ciuit. Dei 24. laudabilem faciunt mentionem Nulli igitur videatur eius Autoritas contemnenda. Isidorus etiam, vbi prius, recitat ab Epicuro nulla diuina prouidentia instructum esse mundum aut regi, tanquam haeresin seu errorem, sicut eius processus euidenter ostendit. Iosephus quoque 2. Antiquit. Iudaicae vlt. recitat Mosen sic dixisse, De Dei prouidentia desperare immensae vesaniae est. Item Psalmo 118. Ordinatione tua perseuerat dies, quoniam omniam seruiunt tibi. Et 146. Qui dat iumentis escam ipsorum, et pullis coruorum inuocantibus eum. Et 148. statuit", "english": "to which the whole creature is subject; and in 9, 24, the same, and in On Free Choice 1, 11: There is nothing among things that divine providence does not administer; and the same in 2, 28 and 34, and 3, 2, and in other books and in no few places, of which I now touch one, passing over the others: City of God 5, 11, he says thus: God, who made man a rational animal of soul and body, who did not let him go unpunished when he sinned, nor abandoned him without mercy, who gave to good and bad alike being with the stones, seminal life with the trees, sensual life with the beasts, and intellectual life with the angels alone, from whom is every measure, every form, every order, measure, number and weight; and whatever is by nature, of whatever kind, from whom are the seeds of forms, the forms of seeds, the motion of seeds and of forms, who gave to flesh its origin, beauty, health, the fecundity of propagation, the arrangement of the members, safety, concord, who also gave to the irrational soul memory, sense and appetite, but to the rational soul mind, understanding and will, who has not left unprovided for, without the fitting arrangement of its parts and a kind of peace, only heaven and earth, only angel and man, but not even the entrails of a small and contemptible living thing, nor a bird's feather, nor the little flower of a plant, nor the leaf of a tree; in no way is he to be believed to have willed the kingdoms of men, and their dominations and servitudes, to be strangers to the laws of his providence.\n\nLactantius, moreover, in the place cited before, shows in many ways and at length the general divine providence. Of this Lactantius, and of his aforesaid book, which contains seven books, blessed Jerome, On Illustrious Men 80, and blessed Augustine, City of God 18, 24, make laudatory mention; let his authority therefore seem contemptible to no one. Isidore also, in the place cited before, reports that Epicurus said that the world is neither furnished with any divine providence nor ruled, as a heresy or error, as his argument evidently shows. Josephus also, Jewish Antiquities 2, last chapter, reports that Moses spoke thus: To despair of God's providence is immense madness. Likewise Psalm 118 [119]: By your ordinance the day endures, for all things serve you. And Psalm 146 [147]: Who gives to the beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call upon him. And Psalm 148: He established them forever and for ever and ever; he set a decree, and it will not pass away. And Wisdom 12: There is no other God but you, who care for all things.", "margins": [{"id": "264B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Lactantius."}, {"id": "264B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Jerome; Augustine; Isidore."}, {"id": "264B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Josephus."}, {"id": "264B·4", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Ps 118 [119]."}]}, {"anchor": "p264C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/27/#p264C", "locator_display": "264C–264D", "source_text": "ea in aeternum, et in saeculum saeculi, praeceptum posuit et non praeteribit. Et Sapient. 12. Non est alius Deus quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus: Totaque Scriptura Canonica veteris Testamenti et noui dicit creberrime Deum prouidere de rebus, curare, ordinare, statuere, disponere, praeparare, facere, gubernare, et multa similia, quae tam secundum faciē literae, quam secundum expositionem sanctorum ad diuinam prouidentiam referuntur. Pro quibus omnibus sufficiat adducere vnum irrefragabile testimonium veritatis dicentis, Respicite volatilia coeli, quoniam non serunt, neque metunt, neque congregant in horrea, et pater vester coelestis pascitilla: Considerate lilia agri, quomodo crescunt; Non laborant, ne que nent, ne que Salomon in omni gloria sua coopertus est, sicut vnum ex istis; et faenum agri quod hodie est, et cras in clibanum mittitur, Deus sic vestit, Mat. 6. Et infra 10. Nonne duo passeres asse vaeneunt, et vnus ex illis non cadet super terram sine Patre vestro: Quod omnes expositores Catholici ad diuinam prouidentiam referunt, quorum vnius nunc pro omnibus memorabor.\n\nDicit siquidem Augustinus in sententijs Prosperi propositione 286. Cum Saluator dicit vnum pasterem non cadere in terram sine voluntate Dei, et quod foenum agri quod post paululum mittendum in clibanum est, ipse tamen formet ac vestiat, nonne confirmat, non solum totam istam mundi partem mortalibus rebus et corruptibilibus deputatam, verum etiam vilissimas eius abiectissimasque particulas diuina prouidentia regi, ne fortuitis perturbari motibus, ea quorum causas comprehendere non possumus, aestimemus.", "english": "And the whole canonical Scripture of the Old Testament and of the New says very often that God provides for things, takes care of them, orders, establishes, disposes, prepares, makes and governs them, and many similar things, which are referred to divine providence both according to the face of the letter and according to the exposition of the saints. For all these let it suffice to bring forward one irrefragable testimony of the Truth, who says: Look at the birds of the air: they do not sow, nor reap, nor gather into barns, and your heavenly Father feeds them. Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they do not toil, nor do they spin, and not even Solomon in all his glory was clothed like one of these; and the grass of the field, which is here today and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, God clothes thus, Matthew 6. And below, in chapter 10: Are not two sparrows sold for a penny, and one of them will not fall to the ground without your Father? All the Catholic expositors refer this to divine providence, and I shall now recall one of them on behalf of all.\n\nAugustine, in the Sentences of Prosper, proposition 286, says: When the Savior says that a single sparrow does not fall to the ground without the will of God, and that the grass of the field, which in a little while is to be thrown into the oven, he himself nonetheless forms and clothes, does he not confirm that not only this whole part of the world, assigned to mortal and corruptible things, but even its most worthless and abject little parts are ruled by divine providence, lest we suppose that those things whose causes we cannot grasp are disturbed by chance motions?", "margins": [{"id": "264D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Augustine."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}