De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 25
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 245D–250E; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/25/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

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He raises objections against the immutability of the divine will, and resolves them.

By the same reasons someone can also assail the immutability of the divine will, and by the same defences it can be defended. It can also be argued against it by other special reasons, thus: God created the whole rational nature for beatitude, and then willed that the whole of it be beatified; now he does not will it, nay, he wills the contrary, namely that a great part of it endure everlasting misery. Again, when Judas was in charity and grace, God willed him to be saved; for this alone, according to Augustine, On the Trinity 15, 18, divides between the sons of the eternal kingdom and of eternal perdition, and grace makes one pleasing to God; but now God wills him to be damned. And so universally of the just who will fall and the unjust who will rise, and who will finally remain so. Again, God, offended with sinners and turned away from them, is turned back and appeased by prayers and other merits; and conversely with regard to just men who sin. Otherwise prayers would seem vain and useless, and sins unpunished

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to be left so. And this seems to be the general faith of the Church, and the content of the Old Testament and the New. Hence in Jeremiah 18 the Lord says, "Suddenly I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to uproot and destroy and ruin it. If that nation repents of its evil, which I spoke against it, I too will repent of the evil which I thought to do to it. And [n1] suddenly I will speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build and to plant it. If it does evil in my eyes, so as not to hear my voice, I will repent of the good which I spoke of doing to it." Again, Ezekiel 33: "If I say that he shall live, and, trusting in his justice, he commits iniquity, all his justice will be consigned to oblivion, and in his iniquity which he has worked, in it he shall die. But if I say to the wicked, You shall surely die, and he repents of his sin, he shall surely live, and shall not die." Again, Jonah 3: "Who knows whether God may turn and forgive, and turn back from the fury of his anger, and we not perish? And God saw their works, that they were turned from their evil way, and he had mercy upon the evil which he had spoken of doing to them, and did not do it. Again, Zechariah 1: "Turn to me, and I will turn to you, says the Lord." Again, Jerome says in his exposition of the prophet Amos, and it is cited in the canon Si agamus [n2] on penance, dist. 1: "If we repent, God himself too will repent of his sentence"; and again: "He promises prosperity, if we repent; but if we are dissolved through negligence, he too will repent of his pledge, and will change what he promised." The same, on that text of Daniel 4, and it is cited in the canon [cited] before: "Wherefore, redeem your sins with almsgiving, and your iniquities with mercies to the poor, if perhaps God may pardon your offences." But if Daniel foretold a sentence that cannot be changed, how does he exhort Nebuchadnezzar himself to almsgiving to the poor, and to mercy, so that God's sentence may be altered? And he answers, saying that it is easily resolved by the example of King Hezekiah, whom Isaiah said would die, and of the Ninevites, to whom it had been said, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh will be overthrown"; and then, at the prayers of Hezekiah and of Nineveh, God's sentence was changed. Again, if he declares that he promises to one who does good

indulgence; otherwise also, "in reverence," [n3] God speaks of threatening evils against a nation, and, if it has done good, he again declares that he promises to change them by the clemency of mercies; and if it has done evil, he says that he changes his sentence, not against the men, but against the works that have changed. For God is not angry at men, but at vices; and when these are no longer in the man, he by no means punishes what has changed. And what else does the whole New Testament sound or teach, if not the mercy of God and friendship in the present, and glory in the future, for the penitent and converted, and the contraries of these for the impenitent and turned away, which do not come about without a change of the divine will? Moreover it is often read of God that he repented of some good and of some evil; how then is he not of changeable will? Why, too, would the truthful God so often rouse us to prayer and petitions, saying "Ask and you will receive, seek and you will find, knock and it will be opened to you," and "Whatever you ask the Father in my name he will give you," and "one must always pray, and never lose heart," with many similar sayings, unless prayers of this kind bent the divine

will, and obtained something which he had not previously arranged for us? For if from the beginning he immutably willed all things to happen to all, since, according to the tenth chapter, his will is efficacious and in every way incapable of being frustrated, and, without prayers, no less, whatever was arranged for anyone would come about; then all prayers, and all the litanies too, in which we ask the Saints to pray for us, will seem vain and superfluous. Again, God is not of lesser power than a potter; but a potter can have diverse and contrary wills succeeding one another; therefore God can do this too. And this seems to be the Lord's argument in Jeremiah 18, saying to Jeremiah: "Arise and go down to the potter's house," and he went down, "and behold, he was making a work, and the vessel was spoiled; and turning he made that vessel into another, as it had pleased in his eyes," and the Lord said to Jeremiah: "Can I not do to you, house of Israel, as this potter does? Behold, as clay in the potter's hand, so are you in my hand; suddenly I will speak," etc., cited above. Again, God can do, and often does, many new effects immediately by himself, and from an

old will a new action cannot come about immediately, as the Philosopher says in Physics 8 and Averroes likewise in comment 8, 15 [n4] and elsewhere; therefore this happens through a new will. Therefore the divine will is changed. To the first of these the answer is clear from what was set out earlier concerning the twenty-third corollary; nevertheless, for the understanding of the Saints, it can be said that God so created rational nature that all of it was capable of beatitude, and all of it would have attained beatitude, had it not sinned gratuitously [n5] and so rendered itself unworthy of beatitude. For the second argument it must be known that charity, to our purpose, is taken in two ways in Scripture, namely for uncreated and for created charity. Uncreated charity again in two ways, namely commonly and essentially, and so it belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the persons; and properly also and personally, and so it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit alone; and it is also taken properly for the divine will;

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as is clear from Augustine, On the Trinity 15, 19 and 20, and in many other places. Created charity, however, is the effect of this uncreated charity in the hearts of the faithful, by which we love God and neighbour dearly; hence the Apostle in Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit"; and so it is one theological virtue; indeed, according to the same Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13, the greatest of the three theological virtues, which appears sufficiently from the almost unanimous opinion of all the Doctors. In another way charity is taken, less to our purpose, for natural, moral, or passional charity, by which someone, from nature, or from moral virtue, or from passion, holds something dear to himself. Hence 2 Maccabees 14: "But Alcimus, seeing the charity of Nicanor and Judas toward one another," etc. And so too according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5, almost throughout, and in many other places; and as is also clear from the 2nd chapter [n6]: whatever is said of diverse things is said first of one of them, by whose participation and varied attribution to it the rest have the same term, and it applies to the others in its own ways. So too charity is said first of uncreated, essential charity, from which, as from an original fountain, the other charities are derived, like streams, in a certain way. Grace, too, can likewise be taken, as it seems; for there is uncreated and created grace, that is, gratifying grace [n7], or grace giving freely, and grace freely given. Uncreated and gratifying grace is the divine will, not on account of any preceding merit, nor on account of any recompense or advantage of its own to follow, but freely willing eternally some good to someone, and giving it to him in time. Created grace, or grace freely given, is the effect of this uncreated grace. The second member of this distinction is well enough known to all, but the first is not so well known to all, though it can become known from that text of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1: "Blessed be God the Father, who predestined us unto the adoption of sons according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, in which he has graced us in his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins, according to the riches of his grace." Behold, the will of God is gratifying grace, because freely he wills good to someone; and so the Gloss says, "By grace he predestined us," that is, by grace alone he chose beforehand, that is, by gratuitous will. There is also

grace freely giving good, because it gives redemption and the remission of sins, where likewise the effect of grace freely giving is plain. Therefore Augustine says, On Genesis, Literally 9, 26, that in the will of God is the grace by which sinners are saved; and Peter Lombard sets out this distinction, Sentences 2, dist. 27, 5, plainly. Each of these graces can be understood generally and specially. For grace freely willing and giving can be said generally of any good whatever; or specially, of willing to someone the good of justice and everlasting glory, and giving him some special virtue by which he can attain such a good; and correspondingly in every respect it is called grace freely given. This uncreated, gratifying grace too, or grace freely giving, which is the divine will, can be taken in two ways, like charity: commonly and essentially, and so it belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the persons; and specially and personally, and so it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as is clear from Augustine, On the Trinity 15, 20; and so Scripture very frequently attributes grace to the Holy Spirit, as to its in a way special and proper

Author. In another way grace is taken, less to our purpose, for that which is rendered to God for a gracious benefit, as we say, "Let us give thanks to the Lord our God." All these graces, too, are likewise taken in creatures, according to a certain imitation; for a created will, willing and freely giving good to some creature, can be called gratifying grace, and giving freely, and the good given can be called grace freely given. That also is called grace which the recipient renders to the giver for such a benefit. Among all these graces, "grace" is said primarily of the uncreated, essential grace, which most graciously distils and derives all the other graces, as was said above of most dear charity. The will of God also is taken in many ways: namely properly, for his essential will, which is called by the Apostle in Romans 12 well-pleasing and perfect; but improperly and figuratively it is taken for its effect, or for its sign, as is clear from Augustine, City of God 22, 2, and from Hugh, On the Sacraments book 1, part 4, and from Peter Lombard, Sentences 1, dist. 45; and this is a certain rhetorical colour which Tully, in the last [book] of his new Rhetoric, calls denomination [n8].

When, therefore, it is taken in the argument that when Judas was in charity and grace, God willed him to be saved, speaking of uncreated charity and grace in the special sense, in so far as God holds someone dear to himself and bestows grace upon him unto eternal life, it is not true; because Judas was never in such charity or grace, since God never held him pleasing or dear unto eternal life. But if it speaks of created charity and grace, and of the will of God properly and essentially, it is not true, because God never so willed Judas to be saved; and when this is proved by the claim that charity alone divides between the sons of the kingdom and of perdition, speaking of created charity, that is not true. For many sinners who will rise and finally remain so do not have it, and many just men who will fall and so finally remain have it. But uncreated charity alone, which holds some dear for the kingdom and does not hold others, divides between the sons of the kingdom and of perdition, as in the beginning he divided the light from the darkness; and Augustine speaks there of that charity, as is clear from the chapter cited, and at length in the following chapter. And that this charity,

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namely the dear will of God, divides these from those immutably and infallibly, will appear easily from the twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, and the tenth. For this charity is the Holy Spirit, "dividing to each one as he wills" (1 Corinthians 12); and the Apostle holds this more expressly earlier in the same letter, chapter 4, when he asks, "For who distinguishes you?" as if he would ask who distinguishes you, as elect, from the reprobate, and would intimate that God alone so distinguishes you. And so Augustine expounds this authority in many places; one of these, namely from On Rebuke and Grace, is cited in the Gloss, when he says: "For who distinguishes you from the mass of perdition? No one but God; he alone separates you from the lost. But because a puffed-up man could answer, whether in speech or in thought, and say, My faith distinguishes me, and my justice and my prayer, the Apostle meets him, saying, 'What have you that you did not receive?'" And so this question follows immediately upon the other question. As to grace, too, likewise one must speak throughout: which grace, and in what way, makes anyone pleasing to God, or does not. But if the argument speaks of the will of sign, or of the effect of the divine will, when it is premised that when Judas was in charity,

God willed him to be saved, it is true. And when it is argued further, "Now he does not will him to be saved, therefore the will of God is changed," speaking uniformly it concludes well, namely, that the effects and signs of the divine will are changed. Nor is this against the 23rd chapter, since that proves the immutability of the divine will and willing, essential and intrinsic, well-pleasing and perfect. Otherwise it can be said that Judas, when he was in charity and grace, was dear and pleasing to God, according to the justice then present, by which he was good, and so he was written in the book of life, and so God willed him to be saved, though not wholly absolutely; and this is clear from blessed Ambrose [n9] on that text of Romans 9, "that he might show the riches of his glory in the vessels of mercy which he prepared for glory," saying thus: "There are some to whom grace is given for use, like Saul, Judas, and those disciples to whom the Lord said, 'Your names are written in heaven,' and afterward they went back. But the Lord said this of them on account of the justice which they served, as if he said, You are now worthy of eternal life, because they were good; but according to foreknowledge, they were in the number

of the wicked." And this authority is cited more fully in the Gloss; and on account of this authority Peter Lombard holds it, Sentences 3, dist. 21, 1. Augustine makes a similar distinction concerning the Sons of God, On Rebuke and Grace 28 and 29, teaching that some are sons of God according to predestination and foreknowledge, some according to grace received in time; and in other words still: "Some are sons of God to God, some to us, that is, some according to the divine judgment, some according to the human." And above, 24, he makes a similar distinction concerning the Elect; and below, 73, concerning the son of peace. Gratian recites these distinctions of Augustine at length, On Penance, dist. 4, [canon] Si ex bono. For the third argument it must be known that the offence of God, and his appeasement, anger or love, the sentence of good or evil, and similar things, can be taken in two ways, namely for the divine will, or volition, so disposed, or for such effects or signs of his; as has just now been said of his will. Hence also Augustine, To Simplicianus 2, 20, teaching how human passions can be attributed to God, namely by separating the unworthy from the

worthy, says thus: "From the anger of man I remove the turbulent motion, so that the vigour of vengeance remains, and so in some way I rise to the notion of that which is called the anger of God. Likewise of mercy: if you take away the compassion, of shared misery, with the one whom you pity, and there remains the tranquil goodness of helping and of delivering from misery, some knowledge of divine mercy is suggested. Let us also not reject and scorn the zeal of God when we find it in Scripture, but let us take away from human zeal the pale wasting of grief and the morbid disturbance of the mind, and let there remain only that judgment by which the corruption of chastity is not allowed to go unpunished, and so we rise, so that we begin in some way to grasp the zeal of God. Wherefore, when we read also God saying, 'I repent,' let us consider what the work of repenting is wont to be in men: without doubt there is found a will to change, but in man it is with grief of mind. For he rebukes in himself what he did rashly. Let us therefore remove these things which come from human infirmity and ignorance,

and let there remain only the willing, that something not be as it was, and so it can be somewhat suggested to our mind by what rule it is to be understood that God repents. For when it is said that he repents, he wills that something not be as he had made it, so that it might be; yet even when it was so, it ought to be so, and when it is not permitted to be so, it ought no longer to be so, by a certain perpetual and tranquil judgment of equity, by which God disposes all mutable things by an immutable will." The same, on that text of Psalm 82 [n10], "In your anger you will trouble them," says: "Let us remember that we must understand the anger of God without any turbulent emotion. For his anger is called the just reason of vengeance, as if law were said to be angry when its ministers, moved according to it, exact vengeance." That anger of God, offence, and the like are also taken sometimes for the effects or signs of the divine will so disposed, the foregoing make clear. Speaking, then, in the first way, the offence of God, or his anger, is wholly immutable;

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in the second way, it is frequently changed, and so the divine will is said to be changed, not by a change of itself but of other things; as is clear from Augustine, On the Trinity 5, last [chapter], and City of God 22, 2, as 23 cited; and in this sense the authorities of the Prophets, and of Jerome, that were cited proceed. Many such threatening prophecies also predict many things, and they do not come to pass; for they do not predict these so that they may come to pass. Whence Jerome, in the Gloss on the text of Ezekiel 33 cited: "It does not immediately follow that, because the Prophet says it, what he predicts must come to pass; for he does not predict so that it may come, but threatens lest it come. Nor, because God speaks, is it necessary that what he threatens happen, but that he to whom he threatens may repent, and what would be going to happen, if God's words were despised, not happen." So that in such prophecies a certain condition seems always to be understood, such as, unless you repent of your sins. Whence also in the prologue of the Gloss on the Psalter a twofold prophecy is posited, namely according to predestination, which must always be fulfilled according to the tenor of the words; and according to

threat, as "forty days and Nineveh will be overthrown," which is not always fulfilled according to the surface of the words, but according to the signification of a tacit understanding; and the like is had in the Gloss on that text of Matthew 1, "Now all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet, saying: Behold, a virgin," etc. Augustine also maintains this, on that text of Psalm 50, "The uncertain and hidden things of your wisdom you have shown me," saying: "Under this merit the Ninevites repented, and deserved sure mercy. So Nineveh stood, and was not overthrown. But I think that what the Prophet said was fulfilled: Behold what Nineveh was, and see that it was overthrown in evil and built up in good." And so Gregory understands, Morals 16, 4, on that text of Job 22, "Who were taken away before their time," when he says that God often changes the sentence, the counsel never, that is, the sense of the words, not his eternal disposition; and so the Gloss expounds him, on Isaiah 38. Thus the change of the divine sentence often happens in that it is not always fulfilled to the letter. And the objection about the repentance of God is resolved by what has been premised, which also resolves the seventh of this [n11]. To the other point, which is argued about prayers and litanies, the answer is clear by the end of

23. For it must not be imagined that God first wills or does not will something, and, in the manner of an inconstant man, is overcome by prayers and changed; nor that the Saints in Heaven, by multiplied prayers, bend the divine will, as men on earth bend the human; as is clear enough from the foregoing. And Peter Lombard says, Sentences 4, dist. 45, last: "We ask the Saints to intercede for us, that is, that their merits may support us. For the Saints do not pray God to do this or that unless they have seen that God so wills, unless perhaps it is something of which they do not know the divine will, as we do not know it in many cases." But here someone can press thus: If God wills to do something, it seems vain to pray him to do it; and if he does not will to do something, he will not do it for any prayers; therefore all prayers are superfluous. Again, then one should not pray generally for all, nor for any neighbour, any wayfarer: for it is plain that wheat does not grow without tares, nor grains without chaff; and that the citizens of the city of God and of the city of the devil always run together mixed in the present. Hence it is plain that God does not will all to be saved. If,

then, his will cannot be changed by any prayers, whoever prays for all knows that he will not be heard by God; wherefore he prays so without hope and in vain, knowingly. To the first of these it must be said that it supposes one falsehood, horrifying to any Christian, which also contradicts the works and teaching of Christ; namely, that it is vain to pray to God that he may do his will. For Christ, as his most sorrowful Passion loomed, sorrowful and grieving, prayed thus: "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless not as I will, but as you will," Matthew 26. And later in the same: "My Father, if this cup cannot pass unless I drink it, your will be done"; who also taught us in Matthew 6 to pray thus: "Our Father, who are in heaven, hallowed be your name, your kingdom come, your will be done, on earth as in heaven." For although he wills to give us some good, he does not will us to be wholly idle, but wills that, always diligent and watchful, we obtain these things through prayers and the other merits. Hardly, then, in my judgment, can any prayer more useful or more efficacious be found, in any prosperity or adversity, concerning anything whatever to be chosen or avoided,

than that a man, with his whole heart, his whole mind, and all his strength and his very marrow, in all things and in each, always say to the Lord: "Your will be done." For thus it will come about that a man retains nothing of his own for himself, but subjects himself wholly, and all things that concern him in any way, totally to the divine will, willing most entirely, in the greatest and in the least, the glory and honour of God alone and nowhere his own, caring about nothing at all, nor fearing, but most joyfully embracing, if need be, for God's sake, loss of goods, of honour and of reputation, infamy, mockery, persecutions, and any miseries whatever, save only the displeasure of almighty God. For no one can say this, and in this way, without the lowest humility and the highest charity; and if someone cannot at once say this and in this way, let him repent of that, and will this, and say it in whatever way he can, and pray that he may be able to say it freely and perfectly; and even so such a prayer is undoubtedly most fruitful. For the second, it seems it must be said that some are simple, having zeal

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of God, but not according to knowledge, who do not know that the sons of the kingdom and of perdition are always mixed in the present, or, if some were in some way sons of perdition, believe that they can by pious prayers change the divine will and obtain that they become sons of the kingdom. Such persons, praying generally and piously for all, do not sin, since ignorance and pious intention excuse them; indeed they also merit very much by praying thus. Hence blessed Augustine, City of God 22, 2, distinguishing a twofold will of God, one essential and eternal, the other that which God wills and effects in the hearts of the elect, says thus: "According, then, to this will, by which we say that God wills what he causes some to will, by whom future things are not known, he wills many things and does not do them. For his Saints, inspired by him with a holy will, will many things to be done, and they are not done, as when they pray piously and holily for some people, and what they pray for he does not do, although he himself has made in them this will to pray [n12] by his Holy Spirit. And so when the saints, according to God, will and pray that someone be saved, we can in that manner of speech say: God wills it and does not do it, that is, we say that he wills it who makes these will it." A similar thing is found in 3 Kings 8, where the

Lord says to David: "That you thought in your heart to build a house to my name, you did well, thinking this very thing in your mind; yet you shall not build me a house"; where the Gloss: "An argument that the will of some act pleases, even if the act does not." The same is clear from Augustine, Enchiridion 8, and from Anselm, who shows in many places that the rectitude of will is to will as God wills it to will, not however to will what God wills; which Peter Lombard also makes clear, Sentences 1, last distinction. But others, who know or hold the aforesaid, cannot, it seems, pray absolutely for all that they be saved; for reason clearly proves this. For who would reasonably pray unless he hoped to be heard, indeed even when he believed the contrary for certain? For who reasonably undertakes any work without hope, indeed with despair of any fruit or end? For this is against all reason of agents and of nature; for all agents, both natural and voluntary, act for the sake of some end, as is clear from the Philosopher, Physics 2, 49, and, as to voluntary agents, in his moral philosophy almost throughout. Hence also the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 9:

"He who plows ought to plow in hope, and he who threshes, in hope of receiving the fruit." And 2 Maccabees 12: "Unless he hoped that those who had fallen would rise again, it would seem superfluous and vain to pray for the dead." Those, therefore, who do not hope that all will be saved, but know the contrary, ought not to pray absolutely for all that they be saved. Indeed, if sometimes they pray generally for all that they be saved, it is necessary that they at least tacitly understand it of all those predestined to life, or wish that their prayer may avail for all in so far as and as it shall have been pleasing and acceptable before God; not that by their prayer they wish, as it were, to extort something from God against his will. The Saviour prayed in the first of these ways, saying, "I pray for them, I do not pray for the world, but for those whom you have given me, because they are yours," John 17; and with this accords the saying of Augustine, City of God 21, 24, cited above in 23. For if the Church were certain who, still living on the way, are predestined with the Devil to eternal fire, it would not pray more for them than for the Devil; otherwise it would be pious to pray by name for the Antichrist, that son of perdition, certain, because revealed. Those, then, who now

are certain, at least in general, that in the present way and life they are always such, ought not to pray for all absolutely, but in one of the said ways. But here someone can reply that then no one ought to pray for any wayfarer whatever: for he does not know whether he is predestined or finally reprobate. It must be said that whoever believes that someone is to be saved, or can be saved by his own prayers, can well pray for him even if he is to be damned, as was said above of all: for if he does not know or doubts, he can pray, at least under the tacit condition aforesaid. And this tacit condition of divine right everyone seems to have if he has charity, by which he prefers the divine will in all things to his own will; but absolutely, not at all does it seem one should pray for any wayfarer. To the other principal argument, concerning the potter, the answer is clear from what was said. For the succession of contrary wills in him is not without impotence and imperfection, because it goes with a potency preceding act, which necessarily implies imperfection, as the foregoing make clear; but God is of infinite perfection and actuality; therefore he is not in potency before act toward willings

contrary in succession. This, then, is not a matter of impotence or imperfection in him, as the preceding have taught. The authority of Jeremiah, however, is to be understood to mean that God can change the effects of his speaking or thinking, as the potter changes the effects of his art, the art always remaining the same and unmoved; and such a change is possible in the divine will, as has been shown above. Nor does this posit any intrinsic change in the essential will of God, but an extrinsic one in kingdoms and nations that are changed. As for what is objected about that process of Physics 8, not proceeding but limping, it is evidently refuted by the thirty-fourth part of the first corollary of this work.

NOTES

1. The print reads Vt subito loquar ("that suddenly I will speak"). The Vulgate of Jer 18:9 has Et subito loquar. I translate "And suddenly," which is the sense of the verse.
2. Si agamus is the incipit by which Savile identifies the canon (Gratian, Decretum, De poenitentia, dist. 1). It is not part of the quotation. The quotation itself is Jerome's, from his commentary on Amos.
3. alioquin et in reuerentia loquitur Deus: this makes poor sense, and the sentence is elliptical. The preceding Rursum bona agenti si asserit polliceri has no apodosis, and in the next clause misericordias clementia is hard to construe. I have kept the print's words, "in reverence," and translated the rest with the sense that Jer 18 supplies. In reuerentia is probably a corruption of in Ieremia ("in Jeremiah"), since the statement that God "threatens evils against a nation" is Jer 18:7–10. I have not emended.
4. "Comment 8, 15": Bradwardine cites Aristotle by book, and Averroes' great commentary by book and comment number. Savile's "2 Phys. 49" below means Physics II with Averroes' comment 49. I have not checked these numbers against an Aristotle–Averroes edition.
5. gratis peccasset: gratis here is "freely, for no reason, of its own accord." It plays against the gratis of gratuitous grace, which is the subject of the next paragraph. I keep the English image of sinning "gratuitously."
6. Savile gives no book. Since Bradwardine elsewhere in this chapter cites "the tenth" and "the 23rd chapter" of his own work, the second chapter of Book I is probably meant.
7. gratia gratificans: gratificare is "to make gratus, pleasing or accepted." The verb is that of Eph 1:6 (gratificauit nos), which I render "has graced us." The noun phrase I give as "gratifying grace," set against gratis dans ("giving freely") and gratis data ("freely given"). The jingle gratia / gratis / gratus / gratificare cannot be fully reproduced in English. Note also gratissime below, "most graciously."
8. The "new Rhetoric" of "Tully" is the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which medieval writers ascribed to Cicero and called the Rhetorica nova (or secunda). Denominatio is its term for metonymy (4.43), where a thing is named by what is close to it, here the will by its effect or sign.
9. The commentary on Romans cited under Ambrose's name is the one now attributed to Ambrosiaster. This is the medieval ascription; Bradwardine also had it through the Gloss.
10. Savile's Psalm numbers are Vulgate. Psalm 82 is Ps 83 in modern Bibles, and Psalm 50 below is Ps 51. "3 Kings 8" below is 1 Kings 8.
11. septimum huius: "the seventh of this" is unclear. It probably means the seventh objection of this chapter, but the numbering of the chapter's objections is not marked and the count is uncertain. I translate as it stands.
12. The print reads hanc ordinandi voluntatem ("this will of ordering"). The context, orant … orant, and Augustine's own sentence (which appears to read orandi) show that "this will to pray" is meant. I translate that sense and have not emended the Latin.